My value premise is morality because the word ought in the resolution is defined as moral obligation.

The ability to bring conditions upon oneself is a prerequisite to moral judgement. **Wallace[1]:**

To hold someone morally responsible is to view the person as the potential target of a special kind of moral appraisal. **People who are morally responsible** are not seen merely as acting in ways that happen to be good or bad; they **are not just causally responsible for certain** welcome or unwelcome **happenings, the way a clogged drain [is]** might be said to be **responsible for the** unfortunate **overflowing of a basin. Rather,** the **actions** of morally responsible people **are thought to reflect** specially **on them as agents**, opening them to a kind of moral appraisal that does more than record a causal connection between them and the consequences of their actions. As Susan Wolf has suggested, assessing people as morally responsible **[moral responsibility] has a quality of "depth," going beyond mere description of the moral character of what they do, or of their causal role in bringing their actions about.** An account of what it is to hold people responsible should start by characterizing this quality of depth, so as to locate more precisely the distinctive aspect of the phenomenon that is to be explained. [1] Wallace, R. Jay (Professor of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley). Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. (1994).

That implies the right to choose the course of one’s own life even if it is against one’s own self-interest. **Dworkin[2]:**

But we must try to find another, more plausible account of the point of autonomy, and ask whether the demented would have a right to autonomy according to it. The most plausible alternative emphasizes the integrity rather than the welfare of the choosing agent; the value of autonomy, on this view, derives from the capacity it protects: the capacity to express one’s own character— values, commitments, convictions, and critical as well as experiential interests— in the life one leads. **Recognizing an individual right of autonomy** makes self-creation possible. It **allows each of us to be responsible for shaping our lives according to our** own coherent or incoherent— but, in any case, distinctive— **personality**. It allows us to lead our own lives **rather than be led along them**, so that each of us can be, to the extent a scheme of rights can make this possible, what we have made of ourselves. **We allow someone to choose death over radical amputation** or a blood transfusion, if that is his informed wish, **because we acknowledge his right to a life structured by his own values.** The integrity view of autonomy does not assume that competent people have consistent values or always make consistent choices, or that they always lead structured, reflective lives. It recognizes that people often make choices that reflect weakness, indecision, caprice, or plain irrationality— that some people otherwise fanatical about their health continue to smoke, for example. Any plausible integrity-based theory of autonomy must distinguish between the general point or value of autonomy and its consequences for a particular person on a particular occasion. Autonomy encourages and protects people’s general capacity to lead their lives out of a distinctive sense of their own character, a sense of what is important to and for them. Perhaps one principal value of that capacity is realized only when a life does in fact display a general, overall integrity and authenticity. But the right to autonomy protects and encourages the capacity in any event, by allowing people who have it to choose how far and in what form they will seek to realize that aim. [2] Dworkin, Ronald (Professor of Law and Philosophy, New York University). *Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom*. New York: Knopf, 1993.

**Thus**, the standard is consistency with an individuals ability to be free from paternalism. Prefer additionally:

1.     Being free from control is a commitment of all discursive exchange. **Hoppe**:

**“Argumentation does not consist of free-floating propositions but is a form of action requiring the employment of scarce means;** and that the means which a person demonstrates as preferring by engaging in propositional exchanges are those of private property. For one thing, **[N]o one could** possibly **propose anything**, and no one could become convinced of any proposition by argumentative means, **if a person’s right to make exclusive use of [their] physical body were not** already **presupposed. [This]** It is this recognition of each other’s mutually exclusive control over one’s own body which explains the distinctive character of propositional exchanges that, while one may disagree about what has been said, it is still possible to agree at least on the fact that there is disagreement. It is also obvious that such a property right to one’s own body **must be** said to be **justified *a priori*, for** anyone who tried to justify **any norm** whatsoever would already have to **presuppose[s]** the exclusive right of control over his body as a valid norm **[it].**  simply in order o say, ‘I propose such and such.’ **Anyone disputing [this]** such a **right would [commit]** become caught up in **a practical contradiction** since arguing so would already imply acceptance of the very norm which he was disputing.**”**

Hoppe, Hans-Hermann. *The Economics and Ethics of Private Property,* p. 334.

This comes first since contradictions are logical impossibilities. Anything short of contradiction corresponds to some possible world and hence is at most implausible

2.     Enforcing compliance with a conception of the good on others is the foundation of oppression. Rawls[3]:

A continuing **shared adherence to one comprehensive doctrine can be maintained only by** the **oppressive** use of **state power**, with all its official crimes and the inevitable brutality and cruelties, **followed by the corruption of** religion, **philosophy**, **and science.** If we say a political society is a community when it is united in affirming one and the same comprehensive doctrine, then the oppressive use of state power with these attendant evils is necessary to maintain political community. Let us call this the fact of oppression. **In the** society of the **Middle Ages,** more or less **united in affirming the** Catholic **faith, the Inquisition was** not an accident; its suppression of heresy was **needed to preserve** the **shared** religious **belief. The same holds**, we suppose, **for any comprehensive** philosophical and **moral doctrine**, even secular ones. **A society united on a form of utilitarianism, or on the** moral **views of Kant or Mill, would** likewise **require** the **oppressive** sanctions of **state power to remain so.** [3] Rawls, John (Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University). *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003.

I contend that a just government recognizing the right  to strike is inherently paternalistic.

Progressive movements don’t need a state-recognized “right to strike.” State recognition of a right is a neoliberal ploy to bring the behavior described by the right under the ambit of the state’s imperialist bureaucracy. **Nash 19:**

**“**But perhaps if human **rights are** social democratic on paper, in principle, they may be **liberal in practice.** Indeed, there is a good deal of suspicion today that human rights are neoliberal in practice. There is certainly some basis to these suspicions. It is effectively **in the gap between** international **law and compliance** with that law that human **rights become part of projects of neoliberal imperialism. It is a paradox** that in international law it is **only states** that **violate** human **rights, but** it is **also only states** that **have the responsibility to guarantee** human **rights.** It is a paradox, but it is not nonsense. **Making states** the **guarantors of** human **rights against themselves** involves another presupposition: that states are all basically the same. It **presupposes that states have** all been through the same historical formation: that they have **developed administrative capacities that depersonalise and limit power** through bureaucracy and the separation of powers; **and that they have been made** relatively **responsive to an active civil society of n**on-**g**overnmental **o**rganization**s** and investigative journalists. In other words, making states the guarantors of human rights presupposes states that are both liberal and democratic. At best **this presupposition rests on a** very partial and **idealised history of state formation** in the Northwestâ€”**[of]** the **European settler states that share** broad commonalities in terms of **capitalist industrialisation and** the **development** of citizensâ€™ rights. And what they also share is a centrality to twentieth-century geopolitics. Because **what this history leaves out** most significantly **is** the history of **colonialism.** As Partha Chatterjee has argued, **in most of the world people live in postcolonial states**.undefined Postcolonial states were **formed** in the nineteenth century **to be administered from elsewhere,** so they were never as intense or as uniform in relation to citizens as colonial states: they were **built on obedience** to local powers **and subjection rather than** on winning **consent.** In this respect, human **rights can be seen as a continuation of imperialism:** they are **largely irrelevant to most** people in most **of the world,** and **they serve chiefly as justifications for international public policies, [and]** even **military interventions** that are **led by Northwestern states.** And **neo-imperialism** is connected to **[and] neoliberalism** in that at the same time they **are engaged in ‘leading’ human rights** internationally**,[while]  Northwestern states are** themselves being restructured by regulation designed to **free[ing] markets from social welfare settlements**, which were achieved through democratisation, **to the advantage of global elites.”**

Nash, Kate. “Human rights, markets, states, and movements.” *Liberalism in Neoliberal Times.* The Goldsmiths Press, 2019.

Official state recognition of a “right” undercuts the meaning of the social practice described by the right. State-codified rights become subject to the juridical reach of the state: they are negotiated, limited, and subjected to state scrutiny. States require permits to exercise rights; folks who donâ€™t get permits are beaten by the police and imprisoned.It’s paternalistic because it’s not

The progressive striker does not want or need a “right to strike.” Liberationist agitators seek to *undermine* the authority of the state; they are not asking permission to participate in it. Progressives strike for material reforms that improve the lived conditions of people.

Further, rights are “negative”. Rights as defined by states give no material benefit to the people. A “right to life” doesn’t guarantee access to nutrition, shelter, or health care; it only means that if someone murders the person, the state will incarcerate the murderer. Thus “rights” merely prop up the carceral state by flooding the prisons with impoverished bodies who can be made to work for free. If a poor person dies from lack of nutrition or health care, their “right to life” is not violated. The recognition of a right by a state is not merely useless; it is actively harmful to the projects of progressives seeking material change. A positive right is paternalistic because it denies an individual the right to strike because it falls under government control.

The neg world obtains all the advantages of the aff because liberationist protestors do not need a “right” to strike; their projects challenge the authority of states and the fact that the state fails to recognize the *right* to strike is irrelevant to truly liberationist movements. But the aff triggers the state bureaucracy disad which dooms the progressive movements they advocate.