I defend that recognizing the right to strike means that workers can’t be punished for striking not that employers automatically have to cave in to the strike.

Volition is the structure of the will, what defines us as human beings but normative theories start from a flawed starting point: either paternalistic or completely libertarian **Jaeggi**: From the perspective of liberal theory one aspect of the critique of alienation appears problematic above all others: **theories of alienation appear to appeal to objective criteria that lie beyond the “sovereignty” of individuals to interpret for themselves what the good life consists in**. Herbert Marcuse exemplifies this tendency of many theories of alienation in One Dimensional Man—a book that provided a crucial impulse for the New Left’s critique of alienation in the 1960s and 1970s— when, unconcerned with the liberal objection, he defends the validity of diagnoses of **alienation with respect to the increased integration and identification with social relations** that **characterize the members of affluent industrial societies:** “I have just suggested that the concept of alienation seems to become questionable when the individuals identify themselves with the existence which is imposed upon them and have in it their own development and satisfaction. This **identification is not illusion, but reality**. However, the reality constitutes a more progressive stage of alienation. The latter has become entirely objective; **the subject which is alienated is swallowed up by its alienated existence**.”10 The subjective satisfaction of those who are integrated into objectively alienated relations is, according to Marcuse, “a false consciousness which is immune against its falsehood.”11 Here, however, the theory of alienation appears to have made itself immune to refutation. It would seem, then, that the concept of alienation belongs to **a perfectionist ethical theory that presupposes, broadly speaking, that it is possible to determine what is objectively good for humans by identifying a set of properties or a set of functions inherent in human nature—a “purpose”—that ought to be realized. But if the foundation of modern morality** and the fundamental conviction of liberal conceptions of s**ociety is the idea “that it should be left to each individual how he lives his own life”** 12—that individuals are sovereign with respect to interpreting their own lives**—then a theory of alienation that relies on objective perfectionist ideals appears to reject this idea in favor of a paternalist perspective that claims to “know better.”** For the latter (and as seems to be the case for Marcuse), it is possible for something to count as objectively good for someone without him subjectively valuing it as such. By the same token, **it is possible to criticize a form of life as alienated or false without there being any subjective perception of suffering**. But can someone be alienated from herself in the sense outlined here if she herself fails to perceive it? Can we claim of someone that she is alienated from her own desires or driven by false (alienated) needs or that she pursues an alienated way of life if she claims to be living precisely the life she wants to lead? In diagnoses of alienation the question arises, then, whether there can be objective evidence of pathology that contradicts individuals’ subjective assessments or preferences. This is a dilemma that is difficult to resolve. On the one hand, the concept of alienation (this is what distinguishes it from weaker forms of critique) claims to be able to bring to individuals’ prima facie evaluations and preferences a deeper dimension of critique—a critical authority—that functions as a corrective to their own assertions. On the other hand, it is not easy to justify the position of such a critical corrective. What could the objective criteria that overrule the assessments and preferences of individuals be in this case? 13 The arguments from human nature frequently appealed to in this context demonstrate, even in their most methodologically sophisticated, “thin” variants, the problems that plague attempts to derive normative standards from some conception of human nature. 14 **Even if there is**—in a banal sense—**something humans share on the basis of their natural, biological constitution, and even if**—in a banal sense—**certain functional needs can be derived from these basic presuppositions of human life** (all humans need nourishment or certain climatic conditions in order to survive), **these basic conditions imply very little when it comes to evaluating how humans, in relation to issues beyond mere survival, lead their lives**. On the other hand, the more human nature is given a specific content such that it becomes relevant to (culturally specific) forms of life, the more controversial and contestable the claims become. How are we to define human nature when its extraordinary variability and malleability appear to be part of human nature itself?15 And how are we to pick out among diverse forms of human life those that really correspond to human nature, given that even forms of life criticized as alienated have been in some way developed, advanced, and lived by human beings?

[Rahel Jaeggi(August 2014). “Alienation.” Columbia University Press. Translated by Frederick Neuhouser and Alan E. Smith. Edited by Frederick Neuhouser. Rahel Jaeggi is professor of social and political philosophy at the Humboldt University in Berlin. Her research focuses on ethics, social philosophy, political philosophy, philosophical anthropology, social ontology, and critical theory. LHP JW]

 Thus, the standard is consistency with avoiding alienation, focusing on how subjects act rather than what they act on **Jaeggi 2:**

[7:40](https://nsdflagship2021.slack.com/archives/C025LGZHSCT/p1624322450011900)

In “The Ethics of Antiquity and Modernity” Tugendhat raises the problem of whether it is possible to reformulate antiquity’s inquiry into the nature of happiness (or the good life) under modern conditions. **A modern inquiry into the good life must**, on the one hand, do justice to the view that its answer can**not “deny the autonomy** and thus the interpretive sovereignty **of those concerned**,” **and** its method **must** be such that it **avoid**s **committing itself to a** “specific and **unjustifiable picture of the human being**.”3 On the other hand, if modern ethical theory is to recover the interpretive content of ancient ethics, it must be able to identify an objective criterion that allows us to say “whether it is going well or badly for a person independently of their actual perceptions of their present or future well-being.” **What is needed, then, is a criterion that, on the one hand, is not identical with the desires or preferences a person actually has and that, on the other hand, does not call into question the interpretive sovereignty of the person and with it the modern ideal of self-determination.** Tugendhat’s proposed solution is to develop a formal conception of psychological health. **Starting from** (what appears to him to be) an unproblematic definition of physical health in terms of “functional capacity,” he develops for psychological health a conception of **the “functional capacity of willing” and its possible impairment**.4 Tugendhat elaborates his criterion with the example of compulsive behavior: a volition that is compulsive in some sense would count as impaired and hence as being disturbed in its functional capacity**. This provides a standpoint that is immanent to the subject’s will and, at the same time, not subjective in the sense in which contingent** and **unevaluated preferences are**: “In this way we would attain precisely what is sought, a point of view that is independent of the respective subjective goals of our willing but that nevertheless derives its authority from the perspective of willing itself. As willing (freely choosing) beings, we always will to be unlimited in our free choosing.”5 With **the standard of the “impairment of the functional capacity of willing,”** which asks whether we have ourselves at our command in what we will, Tugendhat **has achieved a middle ground between subjectivistic and objectivistic positions** of the sort he was looking for. One could call such a positio**n a “qualified subjectivism.”**6 This provides us with a starting point for overcoming the opposition between modern antipaternalism and the paternalism of a more substantial ethical theory: whether something is good for me always depends (antipaternalistically) on my personal view, on whether I in fact want it. This view, however, must be qualified in the sense that the volition it expresses must be a “true volition” and therefore not subject to internal constraints. **I must be free in what I will; I must have my will at my command if it is to count as my own. This criterion is**, in the first place, **formal: it concerns the How, not the What, of willing. That is, I need not will anything in particular**; rather, I must be able to will what I will in a free or self-determined manner. **It is not necessary, then, to identify a “true object of willing,” but only a certain way of relating, in one’s willing, to oneself and to what one wills**. As Tugendhat puts it, “the question of what we truly will concerns not the goals of our willing but the How of willing.” Second**, this criterion is immanent: the criterion is the functional capacity of willing itself**, a claim posited by the act of willing itself. When I say, “I want to be able to do what I will,” I must also mean, “I want to be able—freely—to will.” My account of the problem of **alienation can be linked up with this conception of willing in the following way: instances of alienation can be understood as obstructions of volition and thereby**—formulated more generally—**as obstructions in the relations individuals have to themselves and the world**. With the help of Tugendhat’s conception of having oneself at one’s command, instances of alienation can be reconstructed in terms of disturbed ways of establishing relations to oneself and to the world. In this way the problem of alienation is tied to that of freedom. FREEDOM AND ALIENATION My thesis is that **alienation can be understood as a particular form of the loss of freedom**, as an obstruction of what could be called, following Isaiah Berlin, **positive freedom**. 8 Formulating the notoriously controversial distinction as briefly as possible, freedom in this sense refers not (merely negatively) to the absence of external coercion but (positively) **to the capacity to realize valuable ends**. In the sense described (and criticized) by Berlin, positive freedom has a variety of implications: The “positive” sense of the word “liberty” derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. I wish to be a subject, not an object; to be moved by reasons, by conscious purposes, which are my own, not by causes which affect me, as it were, from outside. I wish to be somebody, not nobody; a doer—deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of playing a human role, that is, of conceiving goals and policies of my own and realizing them. . . . I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by references to my own ideas and purposes. **I feel free to the degree that I believe this to be true, and enslaved to the degree that I am made to realize that it is not.** 9 As unsystematic and indeterminate the various dimensions of positive freedom might be, the important point is that conceptions of positive freedom always depict the free life as not alienated and vice versa.10 As Robert Pippin puts it, only those acts and intentions that I can “link . . . with me such that they count as due to me or count as mine” are “instances of freedom.”11 Being a human being rather than a thing means, according to this view, ascribing to oneself what one wills and does, taking responsibility for it and (therefore) being able to identify with it. Understood in this way, the concept of **alienation concerns itself with the complex conditions of “linking” one’s actions and desires** (or, more generally, one’s life) **with oneself, “counting them as due to” oneself, or making them “one’s own.”** It also concerns itself with the various obstructions and disturbances that can affect these relations. One is not always already “with oneself;” one’s actions and desires are not always one’s own from the start, and one’s relation to the surrounding natural and social world is equally constitutive and threatened. Positively formulated, clarifying the various dimensions of alienation enables us to specify the conditions for being able to understand one’s life as one’s own (and therefore to lead one’s life freely). An unalienated life, according to this view, is not one in which specific substantial values are realized but one that is lived in a specific—unalienated—manner. The belief that everyone should be able to live her own life no longer stands in opposition, then, to the project of alienation critique. Rather, **the absence of alienating impediments and the possibility of appropriating self and world without such impediments is a condition of freedom and self-determination.**

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Subjectivity is defined only through volitional relationships-there is no inner core **Jaeggi 3:** The positions of both authors can be reduced to the following common denominator: **roles are less alienating than constitutive for the development of persons and personality**. **They** are constitutive in the sense that they **are directly bound up with a person’s development** and, so, “productive.” At first glance this position might seem to come down on one side of the two alternatives—an unconditional affirmation of roles—but after giving a brief account of the position, I will make use of it to move beyond the two alternatives. Once the “productivity thesis” has been articulated, it will be possible to distinguish between alienating and non-alienating aspects of role behavior. THE HUMAN BEING AS DOPPELGÄNGER Roles are productive. In and through them we first become ourselves. This is the essence of Helmuth Plessner’s conception of the positive significance of roles (which he developed as a direct response to critiques of them as alienating). “**The human being is always** himself only in **‘doubling’ in relation to a role** figure **he can experience**. Also, all that he sees as comprising his authenticity is but the role he plays before himself and others.2**2 Roles** on this view **are not only necessary in order to make social interaction possible**, whether this be a “being together” of individuals or a benign “passing each other by;” **interaction mediated by roles is also constitutive of an individual’s relation to herself**. When Plessner speaks of a “doubling in relation to a role figure,” he means that one depends on roles not only to become a “figure” of experience for others but also in order to become such a figure for oneself. Plessner’s thesis that the human being is a Doppelgänger is grounded in a comprehensive theory of human nature that, beginning from the fundamental concept of “eccentric positionality,” is critical of every idea of immediacy or spontaneity.23 According to Plessner: **The distance that the role creates in family life, as well as in one’s profession**, work, or public offices, **is** **the human** being’s characteristic **detour to his fellow human bein**g; it is the means of his immediacy. Whoever wants to see in this an instance of selfalienation misunderstands the human essence and foists on it a possibility of existence such as animals have on the level of life or angels have on the spiritual level. . . . Only the human being appears as a Doppelgänger, on the outside in the figure of his role and on the inside, privately, as himself. 24 Although at first glance the talk of a Doppelgänger raises the suspicion that Plessner, too, is trapped in a model of doubling that relies on an opposition between authenticity and role behavior—between the inner and the outer—this suspicion turns out to be unwarranted: **the Doppelgänger character of human beings is illusory because there are not two real entities there; our character as a “double” is a construct. There is no**t an **internal division** here to be overcome; **rather, doubling is constitutive of the human self. “**The human being cannot abolish his status as a Doppelgänger without negating his humanity. He cannot complain of this doubling and play it off against the ideal of an original oneness, for I can be one only with something, with someone, even if it is only myself. **The human being gets a hold of himself in others. He encounters these others** on a detour via roles, exactly **as the others encounter him.**”25 If the other “gets a hold of himself” in the other, and if these two can encounter each other only through roles, then **a self that is prior to or outside roles is a fiction**. When Plessner says that “I can be one only with something, with someone, even if it is only myself,”26 he is referring to a constitutive internal division that precedes all possible unity—it points to the fact that **one’s relation to oneself must also be conceived of as a certain kind of relation, namely, one mediated by a relation to the outside or to others. Thus I am not “someone” already at the outset; I can become someone only in relation to others and hence only via the roles in which we reciprocally encounter one another**: “The human being gets a hold of himself in others.” Behind all roles, then, there is nothing or, in any case, there is no “authentic being” there. No matter where we look, behind roles we find nothing we can grab hold of except for more roles that one “plays before oneself and others.” **We could call this an onion conception of the self: there are various layers but no inner core**.

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**The way we form relations and interactions, through appropriation gives us active agency over our own lives Jaeggi 4:** What does it mean to appropriate something?12 If the concept of appropriation refers to a specific relation between self and world, between individuals and objects (whether spiritual or material), what precisely does this relation look like, what are its particular character and its specific structure? Various aspects come together here, and together they account for the concept’s appeal and potential. As opposed to the mere learning of certain contents, talk of appropriation emphasizes that something is not merely passively taken up but actively worked through and independently assimilated. **In contrast to merely theoretical insight into some issue, appropriation**—comparable to the psychoanalytic process of “working through”—**means that one can “deal with” what one knows, that it stands at one’s disposal as knowledge and that one really and practically has command over it**. And appropriating a role means more than being able to fill it: one is, we could say, identified with it. **Something that we appropriate does not remain external to ourselves. In making something our own, it becomes a part of ourselves** in a certain respect. This suggests a kind of introjection and a mixing of oneself with the objects of appropriation. **It also evokes the idea of productively and formatively interacting with what one makes one’s own.** Appropriation does not leave what is appropriated unchanged. **This is why the appropriation of public spaces, for example, means more than that one uses them. We make them our own by making a mark on them through what we do in and with them, by transforming them** through appropriative use such that they first acquire a specific form through this use (though not necessarily in a material sense). Although it has one of its roots in an account of property relations, the concept of appropriation, in contrast to mere possession, emphasizes the particular quality of a process that first constitutes a real act of taking possession of something. Accordingly, appropriation is a particular mode of seizing possession.13 Someone who appropriates something puts her individual mark on it, inserts her own ends and qualities into it. This means that sometimes we must still make something that we already possess our own. **Relations of appropriation,** then, are characterized by several features: appropriatio**n is a form of praxis, a way of relating practically to the world**. **It refers to a relation of penetration, assimilation, and internalization in which what is appropriated is at the same time altered, structured, and formed.** The crucial point of this model (also of great importance for Marx) is a consequence of this structure of penetration and assimilation: appropriation always means a transformation of both poles of the relation. **In a process of appropriation both what is appropriated and the appropriator are transformed**. In the process of incorporation (appropriative assimilation) the incorporator does not remain the same. This point can be given a constructivist turn: what is appropriated is itself constituted in the process of appropriation; by the same token, what is appropriated does not exist in the absence of appropriation. (In some cases this is obvious: there is no public space as such without its being publicly appropriated; but even social roles exist only insofar as they are constantly reappropriated.) One now sees the potential and the peculiar character of the concept: the possibility of appropriating something refers, on the one hand, to a subject’s power to act and form and to impose its own meaningful mark on the world it appropriates. (A successful appropriation of social roles or activities and, by extension, the appropriating relation one can take to one’s life in general constitute something like self-determination and being the author of one’s own life.) On the other hand, a process of appropriation is always bound to a given, previously existing content and thereby also to an independent meaning and dynamic over which one does not have complete command. (**Thus a role**, for example, **in order to be appropriated, must always be “found” as an already existing model and complex of rules; it can be reinterpreted but not invented from scratch**. Skills that we appropriate are constrained by success conditions; leading our own life depends on circumstances over which we do not have complete command.) There is, then, an interesting tension in the idea of appropriation between what is previously given and what is formable, between taking over and creating, between the subject’s sovereignty and its dependence. The crucial relation here is that between something’s being alien and its accessibility: objects of appropriation are neither exclusively alien nor exclusively one’s own. As Michael Theunissen puts it, “I do not need to appropriate what is exclusively my own, and what is exclusively alien I am unable to appropriate.”14 In contrast to Marx, then, for whom appropriation is conceived of according to a model of reappropriation, the account of the dynamic of appropriation and alienation that I am proposing reconceives the very concept of appropriation. This involves rehabilitating what is alien in the model of appropriation and radicalizing that model in the direction of a nonessentialist conception of appropriation. Appropriation would then be a permanent process of transformation in which what is appropriated first comes to be through its appropriation, without one needing to fall back into the myth of a creation ex nihilo. Understanding appropriation as a relation in which we are simultaneously bound to something and separated from it, and in which what is appropriated always remains both alien and our own, has important implications for the ideas of emancipation and alienation bound up with the concept of appropriation. The aspiration of a **successful appropriation of self and world would be, then, to make the world one’s own without it having been already one’s own and in wanting to give structure to the world and to one’s own life without beginning from a position of already having complete command over them**.

 Prefer additionally:

1. Performativity-debating in this round and contesting my framework proves that you’re acting on your volition which means even to debate we must avoid alienation
2. Real world education- a) only alienation can explain why material violence occurs because people are prevented from acting on their will, which means you prefer my framework
3. B) Motivation – the structure of the will is the primary source of all our desires, reasons, and beliefs since it generates what counts as motivational to the subject
4. **Self-alienation – Institutions are comprised of agents which requires that every agent play a role in establishing the conditions of non-alienation – anything else is indifference that only re-establishes alienation and violates the structure of the will. Jaeggi 5,** Jaeggi, Rahel. “Alienation.” Columbia University Press, cup.columbia.edu/book/alienation///Scopa.Second, if alienation is a form of powerlessness and impotence, then the theory of alienation concerns itself with both more and something other than straightforward relations of domination. What we are alienated from is always at once alien and our own. **In alienated relations we appear to be, in a complicated manner, both victims and perpetrators. Someone who becomes alienated in or through a role at the same time plays this role herself**; someone who is led by alien desires at the same time has those desires—and we would fail to recognize the complexity of the situation if we were to speak here simply of internalized compulsion or psychological manipulation. **Social institutions that confront us as rigid and alien are at the same time created by us. In such a case we are not**—and this is what is specific to the diagnosis of alienation—**master over what we (collectively) do**. As Erich Fromm vividly puts it: [The bourgeois human being] produces a world of the greatest and most wonderful things; but these, his own creations, confront him as alien and threatening; although they have been created, he no longer feels himself to be their master but their servant. The whole material world becomes the monstrosity of a giant machine that prescribes the direction and tempo of his life. The work of his hands, intended to serve him and make him happy, becomes a world he is alienated from, a world he humbly and impotently obeys.1 **In relations of alienation the feeling of impotence does not necessarily imply the existence of an actual power—an agent—that creates a condition of impotence**. Typically the theory of alienation— whether in the form of Heidegger’s “They” or Marx’s analysis of capitalism—concerns itself with subtle forms of structural heteronomy or with the anonymous, dominating character of objectified relationships that appear to take on a life of their own over and against individual agents. Formulated differently, the concept of alienation posits a connection between indifference and domination that calls for interpretation. **The things, situations, facts, to which we have no relation when alienated do not seem indifferent to us without consequence. They dominate us in and through this relation of indifference**.

I contend that the government recognizing an unconditional right to strike avoids alienation for workers.

First, without a form of recourse, alienation is common in the workplace**. JAEGGI 6**

[Rahel Jaeggi(August 2014). “Alienation.” Columbia University Press. Translated by Frederick Neuhouser and Alan E. Smith. Edited by Frederick Neuhouser. Rahel Jaeggi is professor of social and political philosophy at the Humboldt University in Berlin. Her research focuses on ethics, social philosophy, political philosophy, philosophical anthropology, social ontology, and critical theory.

**We can identify two dimensions of the deficit in the relation to self and world that Marx theorizes as alienation: first, the inability** meaningfully **to identify with what one does** and with those with whom one does it; **second, the inabil- ity to exert control over what one does**—that is, the inability to be, individually or collectively, the subject of one’s actions. **Alienation** from the object—**from the product of one’s own activity**—**means** atonce **loss of control** and dispos- session: **the alienated worker** (as the seller of her labor power) **no longer has at her disposal what she herself has produced**; it does not belong to her. **Her product is exchanged on a market she does not control and under conditions she does not control**. Alienation also means that the object must appear to her as fragmented: laboring under conditions of specialization and the division of labor, the worker has no relation to the product of her work as a whole. **As someone who is involved in one of the many specialized acts that make up the production** of Adam Smith’s famous pin, **she has no relation to the pin as a finished product**, as small as the pin might be. Put differently, the prod- uct of her specific labor—**her specific contribution to the production of the pin—does not fit for her into a meaningful whole, a unity with significance**. The same pairing of powerlessness and loss of meaning (or impoverish- ment) marks the worker’s alienation from her own activity. **Alienated labor is**, on the one hand, **unfree activity, labor in which and into which one is forced. In her labor the alienated worker is not the master of what she does.** Standing under foreign command, **her labor is determined by an other**, or heteronomous. “If he relates to his own activity as to an unfree activity, then he relates to it as an activity performed in the service, under the domination, the coercion, and the yoke of another human being.”5 And, being powerless, **the worker can neither comprehend nor control the process as a whole of which she is a part but that remains untransparent to her**. At the same time, **alienated labor is also characterized by**—as a counterpart to the product’s fragmenta- tion—**the fragmentation and impoverishment of laboring activity**. Thus Marx also regards as alienated **the** dullness and **limited character of the labor** itself, “**which make the human being into as abstract a being as possible,** a lathe, etc., and transforms her into a spiritual and physical monstrosity” (as he says in his “Comments on James Mill”). Alienation from others, from the world of social relations of cooperation, also reflects these two dimensions: in alienated labor the worker has no control over what she, together with others, does. And **in alienated labor others are for her, one could say, “structurally indifferent**.”6 It is interesting and of great importance for his theory that **Marx denounces not only the instrumentalization of the worker by the owner of her labor power but also the instrumental relation to herself that the worker acquires through it.** From Marx’s perspective, the instrumental relation that the worker develops (or is forced to develop) to herself and to her labor under condi- tions of alienation also appears problematic—or, more forcefully, “inhuman.” What is alienating about **alienated labor** is that it **has no intrinsic purpose, that it is not (at least also) performed for its own sake.** Activities performed in an alienated way are understood by those who carry them out not as ends but only as means. In the same way, one regards the capacities one acquires from or brings to the activity—and therefore also oneself—as means rather than ends. In other words, one does not identify with what one does. Instrumental- ization, in turn, intensifies into utter meaninglessness: When Marx says that **under conditions of alienation life itself becomes a means** (“life itself appears only as a means to life”)7—**what should be an end takes on the character of a means**—he is describing a completely meaningless event, or, as one could say, the structure of meaninglessness itself. Formulated differently, for Marx the infinite regress of ends is meaninglessness. In this respect Marx is an Aris- totelian: there must be an end that is not itself in turn a means.8 Here we see the concept’s many layers: as alienated one does not possess what one has oneself produced (and is therefore exploited and dispossessed);9 one has no control over, or power to determine, what one does and is therefore powerless and unfree; at the same time, **one is unable to realize oneself in one’s own activities and is therefore exposed to meaningless, impoverished, and instrumental relations with which one cannot identify and in which one experiences oneself as internally divided.** Conversely, the “real appropriation” that Marx contrasts with this type of alienation represents a form of wealth that goes beyond the mere distribution of property.10 **Appropriation in this sense includes taking possession of, gaining power over, and finding meaning in something.** **Thus theb content of what could one could call Marx’s conception of the good life is an idea of self-realization understood as an identificatory, appropriative relation to oneself and to the world.**11

And strikes are necessary, employers treat people as property when employers aren’t given a say, thus alienating them **Industriall global union**:

16 February, 2015**The fundamental right to strike is under attack from employers and governments at the International Labour Organization** (ILO), which sets global standards on labour rights. **Eliminating this human right would have serious repercussions** on us all. Here are five key reasons why we need the right to strike: **Striking is a** last resort but sometimes the only **tool for workers to protect themselves. To avoid being at the complete mercy of employers. To give more of a balance** between worker and employer power. **Without it, more and more governments will ban industrial action and punish people who dare to strike**. **Most strikes are over pay and better working conditions**. **Without the threat of strike** action, corporations will be able to make bigger profits, while **working conditions will get worse**. Making a stand On 18 February, ahead of a key ILO meeting on the right to strike from 23-25 February, unions and workers around the world will be protesting to safeguard this fundamental right. Employers’ groups and certain governments are challenging the long-accepted belief that ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association, which is ratified by 153 countries, up-holds the right to strike. The workers’ group and unions worldwide want the matter referred to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) but there are several government members that oppose it. They are: Algeria Iran Angola Kenya Cambodia Russia China Sudan Korea UAE Ghana USA India Zimbabwe There are also deputy government members that oppose referring the issue to the ICJ. They don’t have a vote but do exercise influence: Bahrain Lesotho Bangladesh Mali Botswana Mauritania Brunei Pakistan Ethiopia Tanzania Indonesia Chad Jordan Thailand

“[5 reasons why we need the right to strike | IndustriALL (industriall-union.org)](http://www.industriall-union.org/5-reasons-why-we-need-the-right-to-strike)” Industrial, global union, 2015

#### **These non-alienating movements proliferate around the globe. Nowak 18** (Jorg Nowak, “Workers Movements and Strikes in the Twenty-First Century, 30 May 2018, PPE Sydney, accessed 6/24/21 //ana)

Twenty-first century working class struggles have seen alliances of working people in response to issues such as climate change, immigrant rights, informalisation of work and the political-economic crisis across the globe. A glance at protests over the recent years shows the increasing relevance of strike movements within social movements in general, but research and media reports on work and working conditions rarely look at this big picture. Rather, strikes are most of the time seen as “non-movements” (Asef Bayat). They are more often conceived of as spontaneous unrest in everyday life rather than as important political events. In contrast, our new book collectively edited by [Jörg Nowak](https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/politics/people/joerg.nowak), [Madhumita Dutta](https://geography.osu.edu/people/dutta.71) and [Peter Birke](https://www.uni-goettingen.de/de/559183.html) entitled [Workers’ Movements and Strikes in the Twenty-First Century](https://www.rowmaninternational.com/book/workers_movements_and_strikes_in_the_twentyfirst_century/3-156-bd7b53fe-7ab6-420c-9d0a-e485fbc3ba2b) asks how to make sense of a seemingly decentralised, even fragmented, and massive although sometimes hidden, sometimes very visible world of labour conflicts. **A Resurgence of Strikes?** The beginning of the 21st century saw a comeback of labour strikes and working class struggles. The bulk of those struggles were located in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. It was in the context of the onset of the global financial crisis and as an integral part of the general picture of renewed social movements that the resurgence of strikes took place. A list might start with the general strikes in Guadeloupe and Martinique in spring 2009, followed by the largest strike wave, since the 1980s, in China in 2010. Such a list would include the massive garment worker strikes in Egypt in 2010, which prepared the grounds for the toppling of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, and the public sector and miners’ strikes in South Africa in 2010, 2012, and 2015. In addition, a series of strikes against austerity in Western Europe has to be noted, starting with the French strike against pension reforms in 2010, followed by general strikes in the UK, Italy, Greece, Belgium, Portugal, and a general strike in Europe in November 2012. Some of the struggles extend over a period of time, for instance the series of strikes in Indian automobile and auto parts companies unfolding since 2005 and continuing until today. Or like the biggest strike wave in the last four decades in Brazil, which started in 2011 and is still gaining momentum. Or a series of general strikes in Argentina after 2008; the enormous strikes by copper miners in Chile in 2015 and 2016; strikes and struggles of teachers, state electricity workers, and peasants in Mexico—the list could go on with various other countries and sectors, and it would still be incomplete.

#### The aff rectifies conditions of alienation – A) Objectification – individuals self-alienate when they treat themselves as passive agents incapable of affecting change. Employers view agents as objects incapable of work. B) Standardization – voting neg is standardization because the aff provides the option to participate if they will to do so whereas the neg prevents individuals without access in the squo from engaging in a job.