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#### [Malott 18] Capitalism is a bundle of contradictions strapped together by brutal expansion and violence – internal contradictions of labor and capital fuels the expansion and exploitation but simultaneously creates the tools of its own destruction

Malott 18[ (Curry Malott is an Associate Professor in the department of Educational Foundations and Policy Studies at West Chester University of Pennsylvania, US. His teaching and research focus on Marxist educational theory and the history of education.) “What Is Dialectical Materialism? An Introduction.” Liberation School, 4 Apr. 2018, liberationschool.org/what-is-dialectical-materialism-an-introduction/?fbclid=IwAR2ZhW5ws9\_sfJOSFxuy5YD7kUMY7PQKjWY0JUnTONE4mbIM\_0-rzuJJfPk. Accessed 9 July 2021.] Comrade PW

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What is Marx’s method? In developing his method, Marx challenged what he considered to be vulgar materialism for its tendency to ignore the totality and the relationship between consciousness and material reality. A philosophical term, the “totality” refers to the total of existence in any given moment. At the same time, Marx rejected pure idealism for substituting material reality with the idea of reality (i.e. with abstract thought). Idealism therefore leads to the false assumption that alienation or estrangement can be overcome in the realm of thought alone, as if we could change our material reality by changing our ideas and beliefs. Rather, Marx’s dialectical method is based on “the unifying truth of both” (1844/1988, 154). What this means is that “it is not enough that thought should seek to realize itself; reality must also strive toward thought.” In other words, Marx’s method entails the examination of the relationship between ideas and material reality, specifically as it pertains to class struggle and the emancipation of the proletariat. Marx’s dialectics are called “dialectical materialism” in contrast with Hegel’s dialectics. Marx wrote that he “discover[ed] the rational kernel within the mystical shell” (1867/1967, 29) of Hegel’s dialectics. To realize this revolution the working-class must not only understand the interaction of forces behind the development of society, but it must understand itself as one of those forces. The dialectic is a powerful weapon because it breaks through the capitalist illusion of individualism and atomism and disrupts the idea that isolated facts speak for themselves. Only by situating facts or ideas in the historical totality of society do they begin to make real sense. To comprehend this revolutionary movement we must conceive the interaction of forces as much more than the interaction of static and independent entities. When the parts of the totality change, their relationship to the totality changes, and they themselves change. Dialectics presents reality as an ongoing social process; nothing is ever static or fixed. Dialectics is both a method–or a way of investigating and understanding phenomena–and a fact of existence. For Engels, what is most central to dialectics is the tendency toward perpetual “motion and development” (1894/1987, 131). What follows is a summary of the dialectical theory of movement and change. The concept around which the dialectical understanding of development revolves is the negation of the negation, which will be taken up first, before turning to the concept of sublation. The unity of opposites or the interpenetration of opposites, a central driving force of the dialectic is then explored. Finally, we look at the tendency toward the transformation of quantity into quality, which in turn allows us to understand the negation of the negation more deeply. The negation of the negation The tendency toward the negation of the negation is arguably at the heart of dialectical development. Engels, for example, notes that the negation of the negation is “extremely general—and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important” (1894/1987, 131). The negation of the negation refers specifically to the way that phenomena and structures produce their opposites. For example, in the first volume of Capital, Marx (1867/1967) writes that capitalist private property is the negation of individual private property, or property held by the proprietor or individual laborer. Peasant proprietors, as small-scale industrial producers, tended to own private property and produced their own means of subsistence. This small-scale, scattered, petty industry of the peasants was limited in terms of its ability to foster economic growth. The advent of the capitalist era included the expropriation of the peasants from their means of production. The logic of the feudal system and exchange created the agencies of its own annihilation. While feudalism was overcome in capitalism, aspects of it were preserved but reconfigured in a way to facilitate economic growth. For example, the private property of peasants was abolished, but private property itself was not. Capitalism concentrates and centralizes property, tending towards monopoly. Bigger capitalists buy out or otherwise out maneuver smaller capitalists. At the same time, capitalism creates its antagonist: the working class. As capital grows so too does the working class. These contradictions provide the basis for the second negation: the expropriation of the expropriators, or the transformation of capitalism into socialism. Under socialism the means of production that existed under capitalism are preserved. Instead of being held in private they are held in common. In place of exploitation the means of production are put in the service of meeting the many needs of the producers. This process is called sublation. When something is sublated it is both overcome yet preserved. We can also see sublation at work in Marx’s theory of monopoly. Monopolies create the material basis for socialism as they aggregate and concentrate productive forces. Socialist revolution expropriates these from the capitalists, but instead of breaking them up into smaller enterprises, the working class takes control of them as they are. If this is still a bit confusing at this point, it should be clearer after we go through the other components of dialectics. Of course, capitalism is not going to automatically transform into socialism, even though its own internal logic orients its development in that general direction. Capitalist crises and contradictions are necessary for socialist revolutions but they are not sufficient. If they were sufficient, then we would already be living under socialism! The interpenetration of opposites What compels entities to be in a constant state of motion are their internal contradictions, or the forces generated by the unity of opposites. The most central or essential contradiction within capitalism is between labor and capital. Labor and capital are opposites because they have contradictory drives. For example, historically, labor has spontaneously sought to decrease the rate of exploitation by collectively bargaining for higher wages, better conditions, benefits, and so on. When successful, these decrease profit margins. Capital, on the other hand, seeks to always increase the rate of exploitation. Labor and capital are therefore compelled by opposite and antagonistic drives. This antagonism can be managed and mediated by unions and state regulation, but it can only be overcome through the negation of the negation. Labor and capital, as such, do not have an independent existence apart from each other. To be a worker is by definition to be exploited by capital, and to be a capitalist is by definition to exploit workers. The relationship between labor and capital is therefore internal and constitutes the totality. As a relation of exploitation, capital is a unity of contradictions. The dialectical development of this relationship over time is the movement of the balances of forces within capitalism. A common mistake is to conceptualize the movement generated from antagonistically-related social classes as the interaction of separate forces external to each other. This leads to the false belief that the role of the working-class revolution today is to destroy capitalism and replace it with socialism. Socialism can only be created out of what already exists. Marx and Engels believed that socialism would first emerge out of the most developed capitalist countries. This did not turn out to be true, as socialism emerged first in Russia, an underdeveloped, predominantly feudal-based country. Socialism, nevertheless, was ushered in by the producers and created out of an old society, not separate from it. Quantity into quality The tendency toward the transformation of quantity into quality offers deeper insight into the negation of the negation. So far, we have seen how the essential contradiction within capitalism is the labor/capital relationship, which is an example of the unity of opposites. We also saw the sublation of private property from one negated mode of production to the next. Investigating the interrelationship of these two issues will provide the basis for our example of the transformation of quantity into quality. The inherently unequal relationship between labor and capital was established, in part, through the violence of expropriating peasants from their means of production. Without direct access to the means of production, former peasants were forced to sell their ability to work for a wage, thereby becoming part of the working class. Although beyond the scope of this short introduction, it’s crucial to note that the violence of slavery, colonialism, and settler colonialism were equally important in establishing capitalism. The competition between capitalists drives technological development. Because the price of any given commodity tends to center around the average amount of time its production requires, devising new technologies that can reduce the number of labor hours it takes to produce whatever commodity is a tendency internal to capitalism. In the short term this gives the capitalist at the technological forefront a competitive advantage because they can sell the commodity below its social value. But as soon as the new technology gets integrated into the entire branch or branches of industry, the average amount of time that it takes to produce whatever commodity lowers, and the competition begins anew. While new labor-saving technologies can be super profitable for individual capitalists in the short term, in the long term it reduces the number of labor hours simultaneously set into motion. It also means that more capital is invested into machinery rather than workers. And since workers produce value and machines do not, this contributes to the tendency of the falling rate of profit. When the amount of labor hours it takes to transform a given quantity of raw materials into whatever commodity is reduced, the composition of capital shifts quantitatively, by degree. Historically, individual capitalists have countered the falling rate of their profit margins in many ways such as devising schemes to reduce the price they pay for labor even while its value remains the same thereby pushing the laborer into depravity and impoverishment. The capitalist, driven to counter the falling rate of profit by extracting more and more value from the laborer, thereby deepens capital’s crisis. The internal drive of capital to forever expand the accumulation of surplus value brings the unity of opposites, labor and capital, into growing conflict with each other. This movement is the developmental process at the heart of the dialectics of capitalism. While the capitalist has an interest in maintaining the contradiction and creating the illusion of capital’s permanence, the objective interest of labor is to resolve the contradiction, thereby changing the quality of production relations. This is quantity into quality and the center of struggle between labor and capital. The quantitative changes provide the basis or possibility of qualitative change. Conclusion One of the reasons why dialectical materialism is so important is because it embodies a deep revolutionary optimism. Drawing attention to the fact that the future already exists as an unrealized potential within the present demystifies the seeming permanence of capitalism. In other words, it reveals the defeat of imperialism as a real potential and not a fantasy. For example, it is a fact that the most advanced means of production, labor saving technologies, as they currently exist, are able to meet the basic needs of every person in the world. In this way, the future liberation of humanity from exploitation and material oppression already exists. The practicality of the aforementioned optimism resides in the fact that Marx’s method correctly locates the agent of revolutionary transformation within the working class, the many.

#### [Bachand 20] Attempting to resolve the inherent contradictions within capitalism through international organizations in order to “fix” the crisis exasperate the continuation of capitalist contradictions. The affirmative acts as a regulatory measure to ensure the regime of accumulation is constantly stabilized

Bachand 20 Rémi Bachand, What’s Behind the WTO Crisis? A Marxist Analysis, European Journal of International Law, Volume 31, Issue 3, August 2020, Pages 857–882, Remi Bachand Bookmark Professor in the Law department at Universite du Quebec a Montreal <https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chaa054> //avery

Drawing on Italian activist and intellectual Antonio Gramsci, the neo-Gramscian school of IR strives to explain the development and reproduction of a social order. Specifically, it focuses on the reason for which social classes that are disadvantaged and exploited by a social order nevertheless adhere to it without attempting to reverse it. Gramsci qualifies this situation by using the concept of ‘hegemony’ which designates, among other things, the capacity of a dominant group to convince, using ideological procedures, other groups that a social order is good for them even if this is not objectively the case. Transposing this analysis at the global level, Robert Cox explains that hegemony: … means dominance of a particular kind where the dominant state creates an order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or states and leading classes but at the same time offer some measure or prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful.43 Criticizing the focus put by mainstream approaches in IR, Cox claims that hegemony is not essentially the supremacy of the leading state(s), but of the dominant classes of these state(s).44 Moreover, coming from the Marxist’s tradition and emphasizing the economic aspect of any social organization, he argues that hegemony ‘is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production’.45 In other words, hegemony is the capacity of the dominant classes of the dominant state(s) to expand, reproduce and legitimize the mode of production that is favourable to their interests. Cox sees an important relation between international organizations (and institutions) and hegemony. In his mind: International institutions and rules are generally initiated by the state which established the hegemony. At the very least they must have that state’s support. The dominant state takes care to secure the acquiescence of other states according to a hierarchy of powers within the inter-state structure of hegemony.46 More precisely, they have many roles in the reproduction of hegemony: (1) [T]hey embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; (2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic order; (3) they ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from peripheral countries and (5) they absorb counter-hegemonic ideas.47 Stephen Gill, Cox’s colleague at York University, adds an interesting dimension to these roles. With the concept of ‘new constitutionalism’ that is supported by international organizations, he refers to … political and legal reforms to redefine the political via a series of precommitment mechanisms. These include constitutions, laws, property rights and various institutional arrangements, designed to have quasi-permanent status. A central objective of new constitutionalism is to prevent future governments from undoing commitments to a disciplinary neoliberal pattern of accumulation.48 The important aspect underlined by Gill is the capacity of international organizations to exclude from the political discussion, from what is commonly sensed as ‘possible’, some aspects that are incompatible with the social order promoted by the dominant groups and social classes. Globally, the neo-Gramscian contribution is useful to emphasize the link between an international organization and a specific social order based on the reproduction of dominant social classes’ interests. Hence, an international organization (it is at least true for the most important of them) cannot be understood if not situated inside the political and economic order to which it belongs. It is also presumably the case that when this order is not functioning well any longer, the international organization will also enter into crisis, or be radically transformed. B Théorie de la régulation and Social Structure of Accumulation Theory The second step relates to a ‘mode of regulation’ that supports and legitimizes the regime of accumulation. It is constituted by ‘institutional forms’ whose functions are notably to ‘reproduce the fundamental social relations of the mode of production’ and to ‘pilot’ the reproduction of the regime of accumulation.53 To explain their argument, the SSAT claim that capitalism is ‘an inherently conflictual system’ but that its contradictions can be attenuated through the construction of sets of institutions that mitigate and channel class conflict and stabilize capitalists’ long-run expectations. Institutions in this sense are conceived of broadly and can be economic, political, ideological, or cultural in character. […] [These institutions] are mutually compatible and generally supportive of each other as well as supportive of the accumulation process.54 Joining this assessment to our earlier analysis of the neo-Gramscians, we may now deduce that hegemony does not simply represent the expansion of a ‘mode of production’ (as Cox claims) but of the ‘regime of accumulation’ that is adopted by the dominant classes of the dominant state(s) because it is felt that it is the best one to defend their interests. In fact, international organizations on which Cox and Gill focus may be interpreted as being part of what the école de la régulation calls the ‘mode of regulation’. Their function becomes clearer with the input of the SSAT and the école de la régulation: to ensure the efficiency, the legitimacy and the permanency of the regime of accumulation. C The Importance of the Rate of Profit and the Counteracting Factors to Its Fall Our last theoretical influence comes directly from Marx, who explained that the inevitable change in the organic composition of capital (that is the relation between constant capital55 and variable capital56) implies a tendency of the rate of profit to fall,57 a phenomenon that Marx strongly associates with overproduction and over accumulation of capital.58 For Marx, this fall is only a long-term tendency because of the existence of some counteracting factors that can be put in play to countervail the fall of profit. Marx enumerates six of these counteracting factors: the intensification of labour exploitation, the reduction of wages, the cheapening of the price of elements of constant capital, the relative surplus population, foreign trade (to which we can associate foreign investment) and the increase in share capital (that will here be associated to financialization59).60 The theoretical explanation for the law of the tendential fall in the rate of profit is controversial, even though some authors continue to defend it and use it in a somewhat convincing way.61 Now, even without defending Marx’s theoretical explanation, many Marxist-oriented authors put the evolution of the rate of profit (and generally its fall) at the core of their work.62 For us, the usefulness of this type of analysis is that evolution of the rate of profit is obviously an essential part of capitalism, whose single aim is to ensure capital accumulation. Geographer David Harvey’s New Imperialism offers a particularly important contribution for any international lawyer wishing to understand the link between capitalism and international law. In this book (as well as elsewhere), Harvey develops a theory of ‘capital fix’. As he explains: The central point of this argument concerned a chronic tendency within capitalism, theoretically derived out a reformulation of Marx’s theory of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, to produce crises of overaccumulation. Such crises are typically registered as surpluses of capital (in commodity, money, or productive capacity forms) and surpluses of labour side by side, without there apparently being any means to bring them together profitably to accomplish socially useful tasks. […] Since it is the lack of profitable opportunities that lies at the hearth of the difficulty, the key economic (as opposed to social and political) problem lies with capital. If devaluation is to be avoided, then profitable ways must be found to absorb the capital surpluses.63 Capital has to find solutions to face this fall of opportunities and the fall of the rate of profit. Harvey introduces the double meaning of the concept of ‘fix’: A certain portion of the total capital is literally fixed in and on the land in some physical form for a relative long period of time (depending on its economic and physical lifetime). […] The spatio-temporal ‘fix’, on the other hand, is a metaphor for a particular kind of solution to capitalist crises through temporal deferral and geographical expansion. […] The production of space, the organization of wholly new territorial divisions of labour, the opening up of new and cheaper resources complexes, of new regions as dynamic spaces of capital accumulation, and the penetration of pre-existing social formation by capitalist social relations and institutional arrangements (such as rules of contract and private property arrangements) provide important ways to absorb capital and labour surpluses.64 Hence, with the theory of ‘capital fix’, Harvey develops Marx’s own concept of ‘counteracting factors’ (a concept we will continue to use in the following pages), underlying the necessity for capital to find strategies to face its inherent contradictions. The importance of this theoretical finding is that many counteracting factors can be put at work with the help of international law and international organizations. Put together, the ideas of this section lead us to propose the following conclusion. Capitalism is wrought with strong and inherent contradictions that have the long-term tendency to bring down the rate of profit. Even if the theorization proposed by Marx of this fall has not been explicitly accepted by all, several authors have factually shown its existence and its implications. The sustainability of the rate of profit is an important, if not the main aspect of a regime of accumulation,65 and when a fall occurs, the regime of accumulation must react. In such a situation, the function of a mode of regulation (to use the concept of the école de la régulation) is actually to find ways to operationalize enough counteracting factors to re-establish a satisfying rate of profit, at least for leading state(s)’ dominant classes. Finally, if we follow the neo-Gramscian argument and admit that the purpose of international organizations is to promote the well-functioning of a regime of accumulation (and consequently the sustainability of the rate of profit), we can conclude that an international organization’s (and especially one with economic functions like the WTO) existence is linked with its capacity to put the counteracting factors at work to ensure that the dominant classes of the leading state(s) can rake satisfying profit. Consequently, if it is not able to achieve this goal, one can predict that, one day or another, its very existence will be challenged.

#### [Klein 07] The Aff is an investment into disaster capitalism – their emphasis on threats are the necessary fabric for the survival of capitalism, the shock created by the aff gives capitalism the needed time to implement neoliberal policies and continue privatization

Klein 07 [Naomi Klein is the senior correspondent of The Intercept, she is a Canadian author, social activist, and filmmaker known for her political analyses, support of ecofeminism, organized labour, left-wing politics and criticism of corporate globalization, fascism and capitalism.|The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism |library.lol/main/889E346734D1349A84C07A77A379DFC7| P6 – 10 |Accessed 1 Sept. 2021.] Comrade PW

For more than three decades, Friedman and his powerful followers had been perfecting this very strategy: waiting for a major crisis, then selling off pieces of the state to private players while citizens were still reeling from the shock, then quickly making the "reforms" permanent. In one of his most influential essays, Friedman articulated contemporary capitalism's core tactical nostrum, what I have come to understand as the shock doctrine. He observed that "only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable." Some people stockpile canned goods and water in preparation for major disasters; Friedmanites stockpile free-market ideas. And once a crisis has struck, the University of Chicago professor was convinced that it was crucial to act swiftly, to impose rapid and irreversible change before the crisis-racked society slipped back into the "tyranny of the status quo." He estimated that "a new administration has some six to nine months in which to achieve major changes; if it does not seize the opportunity to act decisively during that period, it will not have another such opportunity." A variation on Machiavelli's advice that injuries should be inflicted "all at once," this proved to be one of Friedman's most lasting strategic legacies. Friedman first learned how to exploit a large-scale shock or crisis in the midseventies, when he acted as adviser to the Chilean dictator, General Augusto Pinochet. Not only were Chileans in a state of shock following Pinochet's violent coup, but the country was also traumatized by severe hyperinflation. Friedman advised Pinochet to impose a rapid-fire transformation of the economy—tax cuts, free trade, privatized services, cuts to social spending and deregulation. Eventually, Chileans even saw their public schools replaced with voucher-funded private ones. It was the most extreme capitalist makeover ever attempted anywhere, and it became known as a " Chicago School" revolution, since so many of Pinochet's economists had studied under Friedman at the University of Chicago. Friedman predicted that the speed, suddenness and scope of the economic shifts would provoke psychological reactions in the public that "facilitate the adjustment." He coined a phrase for this painful tactic: economic "shock treatment." In the decades since, whenever governments have imposed sweeping free-market programs, the all-at-once shock treatment, or "shock therapy," has been the method of choice. Pinochet also facilitated the adjustment with his own shock treatments; these were performed in the regime's many torture cells, inflicted on the writhing bodies of those deemed most likely to stand in the way of the capitalist transformation. Many in Latin America saw a direct connection between the economic shocks that impoverished millions and the epidemic of torture that punished hundreds of thousands of people who believed in a different kind of society. As the Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano asked, "How can this inequality be maintained if not through jolts of electric shock? " Exactly thirty years after these three distinct forms of shock descended on Chile, the formula reemerged, with far greater violence, in Iraq. First came the war, designed, according to the authors of the Shock and Awe military doctrine, to "control the adversary's will, perceptions, and understanding and literally make an adversary impotent to act or react." Next came the radical economic shock therapy, imposed, while the country was still in flames, by the U.S. chief envoy L. Paul Bremer—mass privatization, complete free trade, a 15 percent flat tax, a dramatically downsized government. Iraq's interim trade minister, Ali Abdul-Amir Allawi, said at the time that his countrymen were "sick and tired of being the subjects of experiments. There have been enough shocks to the system, so we don't need this shock therapy in the economy." ' When Iraqis resisted, they were rounded up and taken to jails where bodies and minds were met with more shocks, these ones distinctly less metaphorical. I started researching the free market's dependence on the power of shock four years ago, during the early days of the occupation of Iraq. After reporting from Baghdad on Washington's failed attempts to follow Shock and Awe with shock therapy, I traveled to Sri Lanka, several months after the devastating 2004 tsunami, and witnessed another version of the same maneuver: foreign investors and international lenders had teamed up to use the atmosphere of panic to hand the entire beautiful coastline over to entrepreneurs who quickly built large resorts, blocking hundreds of thousands of fishing people from rebuilding their villages near the water. "In a cruel twist of fate, nature has presented Sri Lanka with a unique opportunity, and out of this great tragedy will come a world class tourism destination," the Sri Lankan government announced. 1 8 By the time Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, and the nexus of Republican politicians, think tanks and land developers started talking about " clean sheets" and exciting opportunities, it was clear that this was now the preferred method of advancing corporate goals: using moments of collective trauma to engage in radical social and economic engineering. Most people who survive a devastating disaster want the opposite of a clean slate: they want to salvage whatever they can and begin repairing what was not destroyed; they want to reaffirm their relatedness to the places that formed them. " When I rebuild the city I feel like I'm rebuilding myself," said Cassandra Andrews, a resident of New Orleans' heavily damaged Lower Ninth Ward, as she cleared away debris after the storm. 1 9 But disaster capitalists have no interest in repairing what was. In Iraq, Sri Lanka and New Orleans, the process deceptively called " reconstruction" began with finishing the job of the original disaster by erasing what was left of the public sphere and rooted communities, then quickly moving to replace them with a kind of corporate New Jerusalem —all before the victims of war or natural disaster were able to regroup and stake their claims to what was theirs. Mike Battles puts it best: "For us, the fear and disorder offered real promise." The thirty-four-year-old ex-CIA operative was talking about how the chaos in postinvasion Iraq had helped his unknown and inexperienced private security firm, Custer Battles, to shake roughly $100 million in contracts out of the federal government. 21 His words could serve just as well as the slogan for contemporary capitalism—fear and disorder are the catalysts for each new leap forward. When I began this research into the intersection between superprofits and megadisasters, I thought I was witnessing a fundamental change in the way the drive to "liberate" markets was advancing around the world. Having been part of the movement against ballooning corporate power that made its global debut in Seattle in 1999,1 was accustomed to seeing similar businessfriendly policies imposed through arm-twisting at World Trade Organization summits, or as the conditions attached to loans from the International Monetary Fund. The three trademark demands—privatization, government deregulation and deep cuts to social spending—tended to be extremely unpopular with citizens, but when the agreements were signed there was still at least the pretext of mutual consent between the governments doing the negotiating, as well as a consensus among the supposed experts. Now the same ideological program was being imposed via the most baldly coercive means possible: under foreign military occupation after an invasion, or immediately following a cataclysmic natural disaster. September 11 appeared to have provided Washington with the green light to stop asking countries if they wanted the U.S. version of "free trade and democracy" and to start imposing it with Shock and Awe military force. As I dug deeper into the history of how this market model had swept the globe, however, I discovered that the idea of exploiting crisis and disaster has been the modus operandi of Milton Friedman's movement from the very beginning—this fundamentalist form of capitalism has always needed disasters to advance. It was certainly the case that the facilitating disasters were getting bigger and more shocking, but what was happening in Iraq and New Orleans was not a new, post-September 11 invention. Rather, these bold experiments in crisis exploitation were the culmination of three decades of strict adherence to the shock doctrine. Seen through the lens of this doctrine, the past thirty-five years look very different. Some of the most infamous human rights violations of this era, which have tended to be viewed as sadistic acts carried out by antidemocratic regimes, were in fact either committed with the deliberate intent of terrorizing the public or actively harnessed to prepare the ground for the introduction of radical free-market "reforms." In Argentina in the seventies, the junta's "disappearance" of thirty thousand people, most of them leftist activists, was integral to the imposition of the country's Chicago School policies, just as terror had been a partner for the same kind of economic metamorphosis in Chile. In China in 1989, it was the shock of the Tiananmen Square massacre and the subsequent arrests of tens of thousands that freed the hand of the Communist Party to convert much of the country into a sprawling export zone, staffed with workers too terrified to demand their rights. In Russia in 1993, it was Boris Yeltsin's decision to send in tanks to set fire to the parliament building and lock up the opposition leaders that cleared the way for the fire-sale privatization that created the country's notorious oligarchs. The Falklands War in 1982 served a similar purpose for Margaret Thatcher in the U.K.: the disorder and nationalist excitement resulting from the war allowed her to use tremendous force to crush the striking coal miners and to launch the first privatization frenzy in a Western democracy. The NATO attack on Belgrade in 1999 created the conditions for rapid privatizations in the former Yugoslavia—a goal that predated the war. Economics was by no means the sole motivator for these wars, but in each case a major collective shock was exploited to prepare the ground for economic shock therapy.

#### [Kleiner 10] The Alt is to embrace copyleft activism and the building of venture communist societies – creates incremental steps and conditions necessary for the overthrow of capitalism and a new society free from oppression

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VENTURE COMMUNISM Venture communism provides a structure for independent producers to share a common stock of productive assets, allowing forms of production formerly associated exclusively with the creation of immaterial value, such as free software, to be extended to the material sphere. Part of the apparatus that allowed the free software community to grow and spread was the creation of copyleft, a type of license that allows for the re-use of the software it covers, so long as the derived works are also licensed under compatible terms. By releasing software under such licenses, the work becomes a collective stock for all free software developers. The core innovation of copyleft was to turn the copyright system against itself. The chief vehicle of asserting control under copyright is the license a work is released under, which establishes the terms under which others are permitted to use the copyrighted material. Copyleft effectively hijacks the existing apparatus that enforces privilege over intellectual assets, using the authority granted by the copyright license to guarantee access for all, and require that this freedom is passed on. This is consistent with copyright laws, and dependent on them, because without copyright and the institutions that protect it, there could be no copyleft. Venture communism requires that this same freedom be extended to material productive assets. The chief vehicle for asserting control over productive assets is the ﬁrm. Venture communism is therefore based on a corporate form: the venture commune. Employing a venture commune to share material property hijacks the existing apparatus that enforces privilege, to instead protect a common stock of productive assets that is available for use by independent producers. Legally, a venture commune is a ﬁrm, much like the venture capital funds of the capitalist class. However, the venture commune has distinct properties that transform it into an effective vehicle for revolutionary workers’ struggle. The venture commune holds ownership of all productive assets that make up the common stock employed by a diverse and geographically distributed network of collective and independent peer producers. The venture commune does not coordinate production; a community of peer producers produce according to their own needs and desires. The role of the commune is only to manage the common stock, making property, such as the housing and tools they require, available to the peer producers. The venture commune is the federation of workers’ collectives and individual workers, and is itself owned by each of them, with each member having only one share. In the case that workers are working in a collective or co-operative, ownership is held individually, by the separate people that make up the collective or co-operative. Ownership in a venture commune can only be acquired by contributions of labor, not property. Only by working is a share in the commune earned, not by contributing land, capital or even money; only labor. Property is always held in common by all the members of the commune, with the venture commune equally owned by all its members. Thus, each member may never accumulate a disproportionate share of the proceeds of property. Property can never be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands. The function of the venture commune is to acquire material assets that members need for living and working, such as equipment and tools, and allocate them to its members. The commune acquires this property when requested to do so by a member of the commune. The members interested in having this property offer a rental agreement to the commune, giving the terms they wish to have for possession of this property. The commune issues a series of bonds to raise the funds required to acquire the property, which then becomes collateral for the bondholders. The rental agreement is offered as a guarantee that the funds will be available to redeem the bonds. Should this guarantee not be met, the property can be liquidated with the proceeds going to the bondholders. This series of bonds are sold in a public auction setting. If the bond sale clears, the commune acquires the property, and the rental agreement is executed transferring possession to the renter. The property returns to the commune whenever those renting it no longer require it, or are unable to meet the agreed terms, at which point the commune offers it once again at auction to its members, who bid on new rental terms. If there is no more demand for the asset it is liquidated. After the bonds that were issued to acquire an asset are fully redeemed, it becomes fully owned by the commune. The remaining rental income the property earns is from then on divided up equally among all members of the commune and paid out to them. Proceeds from liquidated property are likewise divided. Because all the rent collected from property rental is divided up evenly among the members of the commune, those members who pay rent for property that is equal to the amount they would receive in return essentially get to use an equal share of the collectively owned property for free. What they pay in rent for the property is equal to the rent they receive back as a member of the commune. Members renting more than their per-capita share of the collective property will pay more, and presumably be choosing to pay because they are employing the property as a productive asset, and thus earning enough to pay. Conversely, members using less than their per-capita share receive more in payment than they pay in rent, thus being rewarded for not hoarding property. The main activities of the venture commune, managing bonds and rental agreements, do not impose a high level of coordination and, just like the computer networks that manage the allocation of immaterial goods, are activities that are well suited for computerized automation. Many venture communes could exist, and as they become interrelated, merge together forming larger, and more stable and sustainable communities of commons-based producers. Any change that can produce a more equitable society is dependent on a prior change in the mode of production that increases the share of wealth retained by the worker. The change in the mode of production must come ﬁrst. This change cannot be achieved politically, not by vote, or by lobby, or by advocacy, or by revolutionary violence, not as long as the owners of property have more wealth to apply to prevent any change by funding their own candidates, their own lobbyists, their own advocates, and ultimately, developing a greater capacity for counter-revolutionary violence. Society cannot be changed by a strike, not as long as owners of property have more accumulated wealth to sustain themselves during production interruptions. Not even collective bargaining can work, for so long as the owners of property own the product, they set the price of the product and thus any gains in wages are lost to rising prices. Venture communism should not be understood as a proposal for a new kind of society. It is an organizational form with which to engage in social struggle. Venture communes are not intended to replace labor unions, political parties, NGOs and other potential vehicles of class conﬂict, but to compliment them, to tilt the economic balance of power in favor of the representatives of workers’ class interest. Without venture communism, these other organized forms are always forced to work against opposition with much deeper pockets, and are thus doomed to endless co-option, failure and retreat. The only way is to stop applying our labor to property owned by non-producers and instead form a common stock of productive assets. Venture communism is taking control of our own productive process, retaining the entire product of our labor, forming our own capital, and expanding until we have collectively accumulated enough wealth to achieve a greater social inﬂuence than those that defend exploitation. This new economic balance allows for change that is far greater than the modest goals of venture communism. A truly free society would have no need for copyleft, or venture communism; these are only practices around which workers can unite towards the realization of their historic role of building a classless society, a society of equals. WORKERS OF THE WORLD UNITE! YOU HAVE NOTHING TO LOSE BUT YOUR CHAINS. YOU HAVE A WORLD TO WIN.

#### [Robinson 18] mode of production determines the social relations – the capitalistic mode is an inherently unsustainable and expansionary one – causes extinction via overaccumulation, environmental degradation, and mass social crisis

Robinson 18 [William I, professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara. 2018. “Accumulation Crisis and Global Police State.”<http://revolutionary-socialism.com/en/accumulation-crisis-and-global-police-state/>] JCH-PF, recut by PW

Each major episode of crisis in the world capitalist system has presented the potential for systemic change. Each has involved the breakdown of state legitimacy, escalating class and social struggles, and military conflicts, leading to a restructuring of the system, including new institutional arrangements, class relations, and accumulation activities that eventually result in a restabilization of the system and renewed capitalist expansion. The current crisis shares aspects of earlier system-wide structural crises, such as of the 1880s, the 1930s or the 1970s. But there are six interrelated dimensions to the current crisis that I believe sets it apart from these earlier ones and suggests that a simple restructuring of the system will not lead to its restabilization – that is, our very survival now requires a revolution against global capitalism (Robinson, 2014). These six dimensions, in broad strokes, present a “big picture” context in which a global police state is emerging. First, the system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. We have already passed tipping points in climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and diversity loss. For the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system in such a way that threatens to bring about a sixth mass extinction (see, e.g., Foster et al., 2011; Moore, 2015). These ecological dimensions of global crisis have been brought to the forefront of the global agenda by the worldwide environmental justice movement. Communities around the world have come under escalating repression as they face off against transnational corporate plunder of their environment. While capitalism cannot be held solely responsible for the ecological crisis, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system given capital’s implacable impulse to accumulate and its accelerated commodification of nature. Second, the level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented. The richest one percent of humanity in 2016 controlled over half of the world’s wealth and 20 percent controlled 95 percent of that wealth, while the remaining 80 percent had to make do with just five percent (Oxfam, 2017). These escalating inequalities fuel capitalism’s chronic problem of overaccumulation: the TCC cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to chronic stagnation in the world economy (see next section). Such extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge of social control to dominant groups. As Trumpism in the United States as well as the rise of far-right and neo-fascist movements in Europe so well illustrate, cooptation also involves the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled towards scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization. Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend themselves to projects of 21st century fascism. Third, the sheer magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as well as the magnitude and concentrated control over the means of global communication and the production and circulation of symbols, images, and knowledge. Computerized wars, drone warfare, robot soldiers, bunker-buster bombs, a new generation of nuclear weapons, satellite surveillance, cyberwar, spatial control technology, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare, and more generally, of systems of social control and repression. We have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society, a point brought home by Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013, and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication and symbolic production. If global capitalist crisis leads to a new world war the destruction would simply be unprecedented. Fourth, we are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism, in the sense that there are no longer any new territories of significance to integrate into world capitalism and new spaces to commodify are drying up. The capitalist system is by its nature expansionary. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion – from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. At the same time, the privatization of education, health, utilities, basic services, and public lands is turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital’s control into “spaces of capital,” so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? New spaces have to be violently cracked open and the peoples in these spaces must be repressed by the global police state. Fifth, there is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums” (Davis, 2007) pushed out of the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction, into a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. Crises provide capital with the opportunity to accelerate the process of forcing greater productivity out of fewer workers. The processes by which surplus labor is generated have accelerated under globalization. Spatial reorganization has helped transnational capital to break the territorial-bound power of organized labor and impose new capital–labor relations based on fragmentation, flexibilization, and the cheapening of labor. These developments, combined with a massive new round of primitive accumulation and displacement of hundreds of millions, have given rise to a new global army of superfluous labor that goes well beyond the traditional reserve army of labor that Marx discussed. Global capitalism has no direct use for surplus humanity. But indirectly, it holds wages down everywhere and makes new systems of 21st century slavery possible. Dominant groups face the challenge of how to contain both the real and potential rebellion of surplus humanity. In addition, surplus humanity cannot consume and so as their ranks expand the problem of overaccumulation becomes exacerbated. Sixth, there is an acute political contradiction in global capitalism: economic globalization takes places within a nation-state system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to substitute for a leading nation-state with enough power and authority to organize and stabilize the system, much less to impose regulations on transnational capital. In the age of capitalist globalization governments must attract to the national territory transnational corporate investment, which requires providing capital with all the incentives associated with neoliberalism – downward pressure on wages, deregulation, austerity, and so on – that aggravate inequality, impoverishment, and insecurity for working classes. Nation-states face a contradiction between the need to promote transnational capital accumulation in their territories and their need to achieve political legitimacy. As a result, states around the world have been experiencing spiraling crises of legitimacy. This situation generates bewildering and seemingly contradictory politics and also helps explain the resurgence of far-right and neo-fascist forces that espouse rhetoric of nationalism and protectionism even as they promote neo-liberalism.

## Case

### AT Innovation adv

#### Innovation high now – prefer, their ev doesn’t take into account of COVID-19

Furstenthal et al 20 [(Laura Furstenthal serves healthcare clients globally as well as not-for-profit organizations, governments, and Nobel laureates, guiding innovation in strategy, organization, research and development, commercialization, and operations), et al. “Healthcare Innovation: Building on Gains Made through the Crisis.” McKinsey & Company, McKinsey & Company, 12 Nov. 2020, www.mckinsey.com/industries/pharmaceuticals-and-medical-products/our-insights/healthcare-innovation-building-on-gains-made-through-the-crisis. Accessed 6 Aug. 2021.] PW

Leaders should consider the lessons and achievements of the COVID-19 crisis in forging new innovation aspirations—and the mechanisms needed to execute them. Medicine is a living science that prides itself on continual discovery. In recent years, healthcare innovators have brought us artificial-intelligence algorithms that arguably read chest X-rays as well as or better than radiologists, inexpensive genomic sequencing that can guide personalized cancer treatments, and vast improvements in population health management through big data and analytics, to name just a few examples. While the COVID-19 pandemic has placed unparalleled demands on modern healthcare systems, the industry’s response has vividly demonstrated its resilience and ability to bring innovations to market quickly. But the crisis is likely far from over and the sector’s innovation capabilities must continue to rise to the challenges presented both by COVID-19 and the economic fallout from its spread. While many industries are facing unprecedented disruption, medicine and healthcare are uniquely affected given the nature of this crisis. For example, pharmaceutical companies racing to develop vaccines must also manage complex supply chains, new models for engagement with healthcare professionals, a largely remote workforce, and disruption to many clinical trials. Similarly, hospitals are caring for COVID-19 patients with evolving protocols while maintaining continuity of care for others, often against the backdrop of vulnerable staff, supply and equipment shortages, and, for some, accelerating financial headwinds. While the COVID-19 pandemic has placed unparalleled demands on modern healthcare systems, the industry’s response has vividly demonstrated its resilience and ability to bring innovations to market quickly. The effects of the pandemic on the industry continue to be profound. The shifts in consumer behavior, an [acceleration of established trends](https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-great-acceleration), and the likely deep and lasting economic impact will potentially affect healthcare companies no less—and quite possibly more—than those in other sectors. Around the world, more than [90 percent of executives](https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/innovation-in-a-crisis-why-it-is-more-critical-than-ever) we polled believe COVID-19 will fundamentally change their businesses, and 85 percent predict lasting changes in customers’ preferences. Among healthcare leaders, two-thirds expect this period to be the most challenging in their careers.1 To meet both the humanitarian challenge and the obligation to their stakeholders, leaders of healthcare organizations need to meet the innovation imperative. History tells us that organizations that invest in innovation during a crisis [outperform their peers in the recovery](https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-great-acceleration) (exhibit). What’s more, a crisis can create an urgency that rallies collaborative effort, breaks through organizational silos, and overcomes institutional inertia. Exhibit During the course of this year, the healthcare industry has produced inspiring examples of innovation in products, services, processes, and business and delivery models, often in partnership with other sectors. For example, Sheba Medical Center in Israel is working with TytoCare to keep COVID-19 patients in their homes by supplying them with special stethoscopes that both listen to their hearts and transmit images of their lungs to a care team that can intervene as appropriate.2 In the United States, Zipline, which specializes in delivering medical supplies to remote areas, quickly formed a partnership with Novant Health in North Carolina to distribute supplies to hospitals via drones.3 The adoption of telehealth has exploded, from 11 percent of consumers using it in 2019 to [46 percent in April 2020](https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/telehealth-a-quarter-trillion-dollar-post-covid-19-reality), and well more than half of healthcare providers polled indicate higher comfort with this care-delivery method than before. Given the speed of recent changes, it is likely that parts of the healthcare ecosystem will operate in different ways in the coming years. To keep pace with the industry’s evolution, healthcare leaders should consider assessing their organizations’ readiness to innovate at scale and whether the needed capabilities are in place. Our past research shows that successful innovation in large organizations stems from a commitment to eight principles and practices: aspire, choose, discover, evolve, accelerate, scale, extend, and mobilize. These [eight essentials of innovation](https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-eight-essentials-of-innovation), when applied as a group, enable businesses to innovate more successfully and [outperform their peers](https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/the-innovation-commitment). Here is how healthcare players can consider applying them to their unique context at this extraordinary time.

#### TURN – if innovation under cap are good, secondary patents are key to making the best possible medicines – the aff destroys innovation for improvements to medicines – turns case

Holman 20 [Christopher M. Holman, Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law., 2-7-2020, “Why Pharmaceutical Follow-On Innovation Should Be Eligible For Patent Protection” Geneva Network, Accessed 8-14-2021, <https://geneva-network.com/research/why-pharmaceutical-follow-on-innovation-should-be-eligible-for-patent-protection/> ww

Despite the important role of intellectual property rights in incentivizing innovation, the patenting of pharmaceutical innovation is frequently accused of impeding access to medicine. Criticism of the prevailing patent regime has focused in particular on patents directed towards follow-on innovation, i.e., innovation that seeks to improve upon existing pharmaceuticals and their use in treating patients. Patents on follow-on innovation are often derided as “secondary” patents, with the implication that the underlying inventions are somehow lesser in nature than the subject matter claimed in “primary” patents, i.e., the drug active ingredient per se. While implicitly acknowledging the legitimacy of primary patents, critics of so-called secondary patents contend that patents on follow-on innovation allow drug innovators to “evergreen” their products, i.e., to extend the period of patent exclusivity beyond the expiration of any original patent on the drug active ingredient, and in doing so contribute to the high cost of drugs, thereby limiting the ability of patients to access the drugs upon which they have come to rely.¶ In 2015, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) issued a document entitled Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Patent Examination: Examining Pharmaceutical Patents from a Public Health Perspective (the “Guidelines”), which, in an effort to promote access to medicines, recommends that courts and patent offices implement newly heightened patentability requirements for follow-on pharmaceutical innovation that would be uniquely stringent and largely unprecedented. 1 In 2017, I challenged many of the assertions made in the Guidelines in an article entitled In Defense of Secondary Pharmaceutical Patents: A Response to the UN’s Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Patent Examination (“Defense of Secondary Patents”), which provides numerous examples of so-called secondary patents that have withstood validity challenges in the courts and patent offices throughout the world and which were directed towards follow-on pharmaceutical innovation clearly meriting patent protection. 2 More recently, I teamed up with legal scholars Timo Minssen and Eric Solovy in authoring Patentability Standards for Follow-on Pharmaceutical Innovation (“Patentability Standards”), an article that reiterates the important role of follow-on pharmaceutical innovation in addressing compelling human health concerns, and which proposes what we consider to be the appropriate standards and criteria to be applied in assessing the patentability of this sometimes underappreciated aspect of medical innovation. 3¶ Why Protect Follow-On Innovation?¶ The attack on secondary pharmaceutical patents is based in part on the flawed premise that follow-on innovation is of marginal value at best, and thus less deserving of protection than the primary inventive act of identifying and validating a new drug active ingredient. In fact, follow-on innovation can play a critical role in transforming an interesting drug candidate into a safe and effective treatment option for patients. A good example can be seen in the case of AZT (zidovudine), a drug ironically described in the Guidelines as the “first breakthrough in AIDS therapy.” AZT began its life as a failed attempt at a cancer drug, and it was only years later that its potential application in the fight against AIDS was realized. Follow-on research resulted in a method-of-use patent directed towards the use of AZT in the treatment of AIDS, and it was this patent that incentivized the investment necessary to bridge the gap between a promising drug candidate and a safe, effective, and FDA-approved pharmaceutical. Significantly, because of the long lag time between the first public disclosure of AZT and the discovery of its use in the treatment of AIDS, patent protection for the molecule per se was unavailable. In a world where follow-on innovation is unpatentable, there would have been no patent incentive to invest in the development of the drug, and without that incentive AZT might have languished on the shelf as simply one more failed drug candidate.¶ Other examples of important drugs that likely never would have been made available to patients without the availability of a “secondary” patent include Evista (raloxifene, used in the treatment of osteoporosis and to reduce the risk of invasive breast cancer), Zyprexa (olanzapine, used in the treatment of schizophrenia), and an orally-administrable formulation of the antibiotic cefuroxime.¶ Pharmaceutical development is prolonged and unpredictable, and frequently a safe and effective drug occurs only as a result of follow-on innovation occurring long after the initial synthesis and characterization of a pharmaceutically interesting chemical compound. The inventions protected by secondary patents can be just as critical to the development of drugs as a patent on the active ingredient itself.¶ The Benefits of Follow-On Innovation¶ The criticism of patents on follow-on pharmaceutical innovation rests on an assumption that follow-on innovation provides little if any benefit to patients, and merely serves as a pretense for extending patent protection on an existing drug. In fact, there are many examples of follow-on products that represent significant improvements in the safety-efficacy profile. For example, the original formulation of Lumigan (used to treat glaucoma) had an unfortunate tendency to cause severe hyperemia (i.e., redeye), and this adverse event often lead patients to stop using the drug, at times resulting in blindness. Subsequent research led to a new formulation which largely alleviated the problem of hyperemia, an example of the type of follow-on innovation that significantly benefits patients but that which would be discouraged by a patent regime that does not reward follow-on innovation.¶ Follow-on pharmaceutical innovation can come in the form of an extended-release formulation that permits the drug to be administered at less frequent intervals than the original formulation. Critics of secondary patents downplay the significance of extended-release formulations, claiming that they represent nothing more than a ploy to extend patent protection without providing any real benefit to patients. In fact, the availability of a drug that can be taken once a day has been shown to improve patient compliance, a significant issue with many drugs, particularly in the case of drugs taken by patients with dementia or other cognitive impairments. Extended-release formulations can also provide a more consistent dosing throughout the day, avoiding the peaks and valleys in blood levels experienced by patients forced to take an immediate-release drug multiple times a day.¶ Other examples of improved formulations that provide real benefits to patients are orally administrable formulations of drugs that could previously only be administered by more invasive intravenous or intramuscular injection, combination products that combine two or more active pharmaceutical agents in a single formulation (resulting in improved patient compliance), and a heat-stable formulation of a lifesaving drug used to treat HIV infection and AIDS (an important characteristic for use in developing countries with a hot climate).¶ “Evergreening” – an Incoherent Concept¶ Drug innovators are often accused of using secondary patents to “evergreen” the patent protection of existing drugs, based on an assumption that a secondary patent somehow extends the patent protection of a drug after the primary patent on the active ingredient is expired. As a general matter, this is a false assumption — a patent on an improved formulation, for example, is limited to that improvement and does not extend patent protection for the original formulation.¶ Once the patents covering the original formulation have expired, generic companies are free to market a generic version of the original product, and patients willing to forgo the benefits of the improved formulation can choose to purchase the generic product, free of any constraints imposed by the patent on the improvement. Of course, drug innovators hope that doctors and their patients will see the benefits of the improved formulation and be willing to pay a premium for it, but it is important to bear in mind that ultimately it is patients, doctors, and third-party payers who determine whether the value of the improvement justifies the costs.¶ Of course, this assumes a reasonably well-functioning pharmaceutical market. If that market breaks down in a manner that forces patients to pay higher prices for a patented new version of a drug that provides little real improvement over the original formulation, then it is the deficiency in the market which should be addressed, rather than the patent system itself.¶ For example,

### AT NDT

#### AT NTD (neglected tropical diseases) – a] why it’s even called NDT is because, even if there’s a decrease, western companies don’t give a shit about them. B] No link to global health diplomacy, too old to take into account of COVID, COVID already screwed US legitimacy over

#### [Tracey 04] innovation under capitalistic framework can never solve

Tracey 04 [(Tracey works at the Department of Communication in Florida Atlantic University) Between Discourse and Being the Commodification of Pharmaceuticals in Late Capitalism. The Communication Review, 7(1), 15–34 | 10.1080/10714420490280170.” Sci-Hub.st, 2021, sci-hub.st/doi.org/10.1080/10714420490280170. Accessed 4 Sept. 2021.] Comrade PW

Commodification also has more far reaching consequences, for the process upon which commoditized medicine is founded necessarily abrogates the existing human needs of the inhabitants of unindustrialized Third World countries. In this way science and technology are incapable of thoroughly addressing phenomena in accord with their purported or inferred mission. For example, only one percent of all medicines developed from 1975 to 1997 have been designed specifically to address diseases affecting those in underdeveloped countries. This translates to thirteen out of 1,223 remedies. Most such medications do not address or alleviate potentially lethal maladies threatening human life en masse, but are rather “lifestyle drugs,” available only to those capable of recognizing and consummating the products’ constructed marketplace value. As one pharmaceutical industry observer puts it, such drugs may “one day free the world from the scourge of toenail fungus, obesity, baldness, face wrinkles and impotence” (Silverstein, 1999). These medications also comprise the bulk of the pharmaceutical industry’s multi-billion dollar annual revenue, thus exemplifying the establishment’s nature and function as a capitalist institution rigorously beholden to profit maximization. “’The only thing the companies think about on a daily basis,’” another drug industry analyst notes, “’is the price of their stocks; and announcing that you’ve discovered a drug for tropical disease won’t do much for your share price’” (Silverstein, 1999).

#### AT Nand and Martin 17

#### 1] double bind – either a] they cause conflicts b] haven’t caused conflicts

2] They don’t take into account of **COVID reduces the risk of conflict.**

**Gul 20**. [(Ayaz Gul) “Kashmiri Leader: COVID-19 Lowers Chances of Pakistan-India War” VOA News. April 28, 2020. <https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/kashmiri-leader-covid-19-lowers-chances-pakistan-india-war>] TDI

ISLAMABAD - Pakistan and India are locked in almost daily military clashes across their Kashmir frontier, but the president of the Pakistani-ruled part of the disputed territory says the coronavirus pandemic has for now **diminished chances, if any, of the tensions escalating into a full-blown war.** Islamabad and New Delhi routinely accuse each other of firing the first shot that started the clashes in violation of a 2003 mutual truce across what is referred to as the Kashmir Line of Control (LoC). Critics say the increased violence in recent years, however, already has rendered the truce ineffective. The clashes have caused dozens of casualties on both sides, mostly civilians living in villages close to the LoC. “**I don’t foresee a war in the near future**,” said President Masood Khan of Azad (independent) Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), the official name Pakistan uses for the part of the divided region it administers. India controls the remaining two-thirds of the largely Muslim Himalayan region, claimed by both of the nuclear-armed rival nations. “Right now, the world is **preoccupied with the COVID-19 pandemic**, and nobody **seriously expects India and Pakistan to go to war**. And we do not know what the world would look like once this pandemic is over,” Khan told VOA in an interview at his camp office in the Pakistani capital.

### CT – dependency

#### [Khasru 20] If Aff really cared about the Global South they would have negated – COVID-19 provides the perfect opportunity for developing countries to end their dependence on Western assistance, but the aff kills it by increasing their dependency on vaccine technology and allows for the continuation of the debt economy – developing economies want autonomy, not prolonged assistance

Khasru 20[Syed Munir Khasru. “The Global South’s Pandemic Path to Self-Reliance | by Syed Munir Khasru - Project Syndicate.” Project Syndicate, 17 Nov. 2020, [www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/will-covid19-reduce-global-south-aid-dependency-by-syed-munir-khasru-2020-11. Accessed 10 Sept. 2021](http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/will-covid19-reduce-global-south-aid-dependency-by-syed-munir-khasru-2020-11.%20Accessed%2010%20Sept.%202021).] PW

MELBOURNE – COVID-19 continues to have a devastating impact on public health and to rattle the global economy with structural shocks. The pandemic has now killed [more than one million](https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html) people, while the International Monetary Fund estimates that global GDP will [shrink by 4.4%](https://blogs.imf.org/2020/10/13/a-long-uneven-and-uncertain-ascent/) in 2020. But, strange as it may seem, the current crisis could offer developing countries a path toward greater economic self-reliance. This is partly because developed countries have in general borne the brunt of the pandemic’s health effects so far. Many advanced Western economies have experienced [more COVID-19 cases and deaths](https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/?utm_campaign=homeAdUOA?Si%23countries) relative to their populations than have developing countries of the Global South, despite their superior health-care systems and stronger social safety nets. For example, India’s health system ranks [112th globally](https://www.who.int/healthinfo/paper30.pdf), while that of the United States ranks 37th. But whereas India has so far reported about [6,400 COVID-19 cases per million population](https://www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/?utm_campaign=homeAdUOA?Si%23countries), America’s tally is more than four times higher. Some developing countries like Vietnam [combated the coronavirus effectively](https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52628283) by introducing strict testing, tracing, and quarantine measures at a very early stage – something most developed countries failed to do. Even after allowing for possible underreporting and data inaccuracies in poorer countries, the relative performance of developed economies remains a paradox. Moreover, development financing has already started to plummet as richer countries focus on engineering domestic post-pandemic recoveries. The OECD [estimates](http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-impact-of-the-coronavirus-covid-19-crisis-on-development-finance-9de00b3b/) that external private finance inflows to developing economies could decrease by $700 billion year on year in 2020, exceeding the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis by 60%. Non-resident portfolio outflows from emerging markets totaled [$83.3 billion](https://www.iif.com/Portals/0/Files/content/1_IIF_Capital%20Flows%20Tracker_April.pdf) in March 2020 alone, according to the Institute of International Finance. And the OECD thinks global foreign direct investment (FDI) will drop by [at least 30%](https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/foreign-direct-investment-flows-in-the-time-of-covid-19-a2fa20c4/) this year, with flows to developing economies likely to fall even more. Such trends imply a grim outlook for Global South countries that historically have largely relied on development aid from the Global North. But studies have shown that development aid and humanitarian assistance do not necessarily foster economic empowerment. A recent [OECD survey](https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/3a2e52d2-en/index.html?itemId=/content/component/3a2e52d2-en) found that between 48% and 94% of respondents in developing countries do not believe that humanitarian assistance helps them to become economically self-reliant. People want financial autonomy, not prolonged assistance. The debate over the effectiveness of development aid is an old one, with critics claiming that rich countries use aid as a tool to exploit developing economies’ resources, and often [attach conditions](https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/02/as-a-system-foreign-aid-is-a-fraud-and-does-nothing-for-inequality) to ensure that donors reap the bulk of the export receipts. But many developed countries have lost much of their soft power because of their shambolic pandemic responses. Even before COVID-19 struck, many developing economies had been looking for ways to make a sustainable shift from aid dependency to self-reliance. In 2018, Rwanda banned second-hand clothes imports with the aim of encouraging its domestic textile industry to produce higher value-added garments; the US responded by ending the country’s duty-free export privileges. And last year, the United Kingdom’s government [allocated](https://www.bbc.com/news/business-49068882) part of its £14 billion ($18.5 billion) aid budget to capacity-building projects intended to help developing countries increase their international trade and attract FDI. Today, developing countries have more opportunities to become self-reliant. For starters, trade in developing East Asia has declined less sharply than in the West during the pandemic, [according](https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres20_e/pr862_e.htm) to the World Trade Organization. A key reason for this is that industries producing high value-added goods usually [suffer more during downturns](https://www.bain.com/about/media-center/press-releases/2020/spring-luxury-report/). Developing countries’ greater resilience, stemming from their reliance on low value-added manufacturing, is evident in Vietnam’s [textile and garments sector](https://ph.trends365.net/article/5f50323ede5aad0a81add8fa), which has remained operational throughout the pandemic and is expected to have a swifter recovery in 2021 compared to their regional competitors. Second, digitization will play a crucial role in the post-pandemic recovery by significantly boosting e-commerce, which implies a fairer competitive playing field for producers around the world. Bangladesh’s e-commerce sector [grew by 26%](https://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/economy/bangladesh/covid-cranks-up-bangladesh-e-commerce-1602474106) year on year by August, and other South Asian countries show a similar trend. Third, the health-care and pharmaceuticals sectors are expected to thrive in the post-pandemic economy as people become more aware of the importance of health and fitness. Least developed countries can take advantage of World Trade Organization provisions by producing more generic drugs, which face no patent-related obstacles. Top of Form Bottom of Form Finally, governments in the Global South can mobilize domestic resources to offset the decline in external development finance – in particular by transforming their tax policies to generate revenue from fast-growing digital economic activities. Currently, developing countries’ low levels of tax revenue as a share of GDP – typically [between 10-20%](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/268884638_Why_Do_Developing_Countries_Tax_So_Little), compared to 40% in high-income countries – hinder development by constraining governments’ ability to invest in public goods like health, infrastructure, and education. Developing countries face several hurdles on the path to self-reliance, not least poor governance, unfavorable business climates, and civil conflicts. But they also must break with the post-1945 paradigm of external development finance, which has been primarily driven by the Global North and shaped by its geopolitical agenda. For far too long, developing countries have had to listen to lectures from those who think they know better. Today, developing-country governments must chart a development agenda that is free from donor conditionality. Every crisis contains great opportunities, and the COVID-19 pandemic is no different. It offers developing countries nothing less than the chance to reinvent and reboot their economies – and to shake off the disabling legacy of external aid dependency.

#### [Murshed 11] Prevents diversification of resources that increases risk of conflict

### Impact D – ABR

#### Alt cause – overuse, means the aff mindset about relying on innovation is exactly what’s gonna cause resistance which turns case

Ventola 15 [C. Lee Ventola, Administrative coordinator at AstraZeneca] “The Antibiotic Resistance Crisis” Pharmacy and Therapeutics 2015 Apr; 40(4): 277–283. (https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4378521/) - MZhu

Overuse¶ As early as 1945, Sir Alexander Fleming raised the alarm regarding antibiotic overuse when he warned that the “public will demand [the drug and] … then will begin an era … of abuses.” 7,14 The overuse of antibiotics clearly drives the evolution of resistance.5,9 Epidemiological studies have demonstrated a direct relationship between antibiotic consumption and the emergence and dissemination of resistant bacteria strains.10 In bacteria, genes can be inherited from relatives or can be acquired from nonrelatives on mobile genetic elements such as plasmids.9 This horizontal gene transfer (HGT) can allow antibiotic resistance to be transferred among different species of bacteria.9 Resistance can also occur spontaneously through mutation.9 Antibiotics remove drug-sensitive competitors, leaving resistant bacteria behind to reproduce as a result of natural selection.9 Despite warnings regarding overuse, antibiotics are overprescribed worldwide.10¶ In the U.S., the sheer number of antibiotics prescribed indicates that a lot of work must be done to reduce the use of these medications.12 An analysis of the IMS Health Midas database, which estimates antibiotic consumption based on the volume of antibiotics sold in retail and hospital pharmacies, indicated that in 2010, 22.0 standard units (a unit equaling one dose, i.e., one pill, capsule, or ampoule) of antibiotics were prescribed per person in the U.S.17 The number of antibiotic prescriptions varies by state, with the most written in states running from the Great Lakes down to the Gulf Coast, whereas the West Coast has the lowest use (Figure 2).5,12 In some states, the number of prescribed courses of treatment with antibiotics per year exceed the population, amounting to more than one treatment per person per year.12¶ In many other countries, antibiotics are unregulated and available over the counter without a prescription.10,15 This lack of regulation results in antibiotics that are easily accessible, plentiful, and cheap, which promotes overuse.15 The ability to purchase such products online has also made them accessible in countries where antibiotics are regulated.15

### Impact D – disease

#### 2 – No extinction – doctors will always outrun them

Hirari 15 [(Yuval Noah Harari is an Israeli public intellectual, historian and a professor in the Department of History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem) Homo Deus: A Brief History of Tomorrow] PW

Many fear that this is only a temporary victory, and that some unknown cousin of the Black Death is waiting just around the corner. No one can guarantee that plagues won’t make a comeback, but there are good reasons to think **that in the arms race between doctors and germs, doctors run faster**. New **infectious diseases appear** mainly **as a result of chance mutation** in pathogens genomes. These mutations allow the pathogens to jump from animals to humans, to overcome the human immune system, or to resist medicines such as antibiotics. Today such mutation probably occur and disseminate faster than in the past, due to human impact on the environment. Yet in the race against medicine**, pathogens ultimately depend on the blind hand of fortune**. **Doctors**, in contrast, count on more than mere luck. Though science owes a huge debt to serendipity, doctors **don’t just throw different chemicals into test tubes, hoping to chance upon some new medicine.** With each passing year **doctors accumulate more and better knowledge**, which they use in order **to design more effective medicines** and treatments. Consequently, though in 2050 we will undoubtly face much more resilient germs, medicine in 2050 will likely be able to deal with them more efficiently than today.