# 1NC

## 1

#### Interpretation – The affirmative can only garner offense from “the appropriation of outer space by private entities being unjust”. To clarify, they can’t garner offense off of methods to solve private entities appropriating outer space

#### Violation – defend stopping of appropriation thru adding another protocol under aticle II and regulating it thru an int body

#### Standards:

#### 1] Limits – Only our interp accurately sets the upper limit to the topic. The CI will let the aff garner offense from any possible way to reduce property rights/private appropriation, which can range from treaties like OST, PTD, Common Heritage or state/actor action, which there are hundreds of. 0% chance the neg can prep for all possible offense relating to space possible and forces random LARP generics, turns edu by spreading us thin

#### 2] Neg-flex – Forces the negative to allows fall back onto generics that can never have the potential to engage with affirmative on a content level. Aff gets 2 months to pigeonhole and prep out everyneg arg

#### Voters -

#### 1] Education – 2-month time limit on the topic means every round is valuable. Specific education about the direct question the resolution asks is the only take away we get from this event. Precision in what they aff can read forces concise topic research in a limited area that allows us to deeply explore every area of the topic.

#### 2] Fairness – Fairness controls engagement with the 1AC and what we are actually able to do in the round. If the game stops becoming fair we have no reason to play in the first place. If every round was 80/20 skewed towards the aff then no one would ever be able to play the game. Fairness is key to clash and is an internal link into any of their offense

#### Paradigms -

#### Extra T is drop the debater – We indict your ability to read and garner offense from the affirmative in the first place.

#### Competing interps over reasonability – Reasonability is always arbitrary and innvites judge intervention

#### No RVIs on Extra T –

#### 1] Extra T is a gateway issue – Affirmative is always proactive while the neg is reactive. we always have to hyper tailor T args to the affirmative while the aff can just prep out the few

#### 2] Illogical – You don’t get to win for following the rules

#### 3] Deterrence – deters debaters from calling out untopical affs, otherwise unfair affs always win

#### outweighs 1AR theory, it’s a forced reaction to untopical affs

## 2

#### [Ranganathan 16] The aff’s appeal to an international regulatory system perpetuates capitalist inequality – UNCLOS and the current international system proves that the basic assumptions of the “Common Heritage of Mankind” justified nothing but interventionist programs at the interest of the hegemonies

Ranganathan 16 [(Surabhi Ranganathan is a University Senior Lecturer in International Law, a Deputy Director of the Lauterpacht Centre for International Law, and a Fellow and Director of Studies in Law at King's College. She is also a fellow of the Cambridge Centre for Environment, Energy and Natural Resource Governance (C-EENRG).) Ranganathan, S. (2016). Global Commons. European Journal of International Law, 27(3), 693–717. | <https://sci-hub.st/https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chw037|>] Comrade PW

TOC = Tradegy of the Commons

CHM = the Common Heritage of Mankind

Parochialism = relating to the local, limited outlook and perspective

4 Juxtaposing Hardin and Pardo: Politics and Epistemologies At the outset, the concepts of TOC and CHM seem to emerge from different worldviews for all that they address the same subject – commons. TOC outlines the threat of a dystopian future, overrun with people and under-nourished with resources; CHM grounds itself in a techno-utopian vision in which the oceans will supply fresh resources for continued human flourishing. TOC, evidenced in the politics of its author, is a parochial vision of the world that is split into so many inward-looking ‘lifeboats’; CHM is a cosmopolitan vision of spaceship Earth, in which ‘mankind’ is the ultimate subject of law-making. Decolonization, for Hardin, was the context in which TOC would come to bite, and he was supportive of coercive international relations between developed and developing states; decolonization for Pardo presented the need to think about the needs of developing states and enable their access to global resources – CHM was the encapsulation of these hopes. However, I hope that the analysis in the foregoing sections has given cause to complicate, rather than perpetuate, this summary of differences. Both interventions reveal parochial and cosmopolitan tendencies if we consider where, between home and world, their focus lay. Hardin’s parochialism needs no further elaboration, but it is well to keep in mind that, like other practitioners of the dynamic of difference, his imaginary was a global one – his fear was that a failure to adopt a lifeboat ethics would lead to the Earth’s carrying capacity being exceeded by its population. Pardo’s cosmopolitan proposal, on the other hand, emerged from a parochial ambition, namely to establish Malta’s presence in international affairs and obtain for it the benefits that would flow from hosting the headquarters of some international organization on its territory Moreover, Pardo’s intervention, like Hardin’s, had both illiberal and imperial dimensions. Pardo sought to bring the largest possible area of the seabed within a centralized licensing regime, asking states to forsake national claims to extended continental shelves. Moreover, although he dwelled on the possible appropriation and militarization of the seabed by technologically advanced states, and urged that benefits from exploitation should flow to developing states, his envisaged administrative authority vested the right of rule in the hands of the former. He argued for a special agency that would be led by technologically advanced states rather than UNGA oversight in which all states would have an equal vote. His plea, thus, was for a few – advanced – states to govern access to, and use of, a global resource in the name of all. Although this article does not examine later deployments of CHM and TOC, it is worth mentioning that such assertions have also sought to reframe resources lying within national jurisdictions as objects of global governance.135 However, the illiberal and imperial dimensions of Hardin’s intervention were of a different order; he advocated not simply constraints on economic activity in an international area but, rather, an interventionist American (more generally, Western) foreign policy that would effectively determine the reproductive choices of Third World people – and rejected educative ‘family planning’ approaches embraced by UN agencies and organizations like Planned Parenthood.136 His eugenicist assumptions, clothed in assertions of ecological concern, allowed him to simultaneously defend enclosures and heavy consumption by rich Western people and withhold resources from poor and Third World people. A third theme is the role that an integrative approach played in the production and impact of both TOC and CHM. As discussed above, it is by combining facts and theories culled from various disciplines that both Pardo and Hardin developed their imaginaries of the commons. Both emphasized technology and rationality-based theories as the framework within which to understand social and economic issues. Hardin, building on a biological account of individual selfishness and brute rationality (except where tempered by civilizational influences, as among rich Western people), joined to assertions about the deleterious impact of technological advances that lowered mortality rates of poor and Third World peoples and improved access to food and other resources, argued against both laissez-faire and welfare economics, advocating the far-reaching enclosure of resources and coercive taxes on the use of public goods.

#### [Landis 21] Capitalism causes warming and extinction – prioritization of profits, commodification of nature, and its impulse to expand – only the alt solves

Landis 8-10 [(Tina Landis is the author of a new book entitled “[Climate Solutions Beyond Capitalism](https://store.pslweb.org/Climate-Solutions-Beyond-Capitalism_p_69.html).”) (2021, August 11). “Code red” climate report and the failure of capitalism. Retrieved September 26, 2021, from Liberation News website: <https://www.liberationnews.org/code-red-climate-report-and-the-failure-of-capitalism/>] Comrade PW

The [UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/09/climate/un-climate-report-takeaways.html) report released August 9 warns of a “code red for humanity” if we fail to drastically cut greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. Compiled by 234 scientists and based on analysis of 14,000 studies, the new report states that even rapidly cutting emissions immediately means warming will continue beyond 2040 — meaning adaptation measures, as well as immediate mitigation efforts, are crucial. The [report](https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-i/) states: “Global surface temperature will continue to increase until at least the mid-century under all emissions scenarios considered. Global warming of 1.5°C and 2°C will be exceeded during the 21st century unless deep reductions in carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gas emissions occur in the coming decades.” We are currently on track to reach 3 C warming based on global emissions reduction pledges, which would be catastrophic. The report’s [Interactive Atlas](https://interactive-atlas.ipcc.ch/) forecasts various scenarios for each degree of temperature increase and its impact on precipitation and temperatures in different regions globally and shows the dire impacts if we fail to act now. Every corner of the globe is already experiencing ever worsening impacts of the climate crisis — from droughts and wildfires, to temperature extremes, floods and severe storms. Our [climate is unraveling](https://www.liberationnews.org/inaction-from-government-as-climate-unravels-coast-to-coast/) and still little is being done to turn the tide despite decades of warnings from the scientific community and the existence of actual solutions. The Earth’s systems are rapidly destabilizing faster than previous IPCC reports warned, which tend to be conservative in their predictions. If our so-called “leaders” continue to fail to act, humanity’s future is very uncertain as the life-sustaining systems of the planet falter. The endless growth model of capitalism, that treats everything on the planet as a commodity to be exploited with complete disregard for future generations, is the root cause of climate change. The capitalist “expand-or-die” model is incompatible with sustainability and is rapidly driving the majority of species toward extinction — including our own. Meanwhile, the billionaires play “astronaut” in their “space race” as the working class around the globe suffers in the real world from climate change. And the millionaires in Congress waste precious time debating the bandaid passive solutions in Biden’s infrastructure bill that may achieve some minor reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, but do nothing to steer the train off course from hurtling over the cliff. These millionaire “representatives” have proven time and again to be completely out of touch and unconcerned with the plight of those they claim to represent. From COVID relief and eviction moratoriums to an increased minimum wage, they squabble over even throwing tiny crumbs to the working class while they eagerly hand out trillions to the banks, corporations and military industrial complex. These wealthy politicians, and their billionaire corporate backers, can continue life as usual largely free of the climate impacts that the working class deals with in our “new normal.” They can just go to their second or third home if one burns down or gets washed away in a flood. They can shift their investments so that they actually make profits off these disasters. And they likely don’t even notice the increased costs for food and clean water as droughts impact availability — beyond perhaps seeing an increase in their return on investments in these sectors. Their economic status protects them from the reality that the rest of us face. It is poor communities and communities of color that are forced to live in inadequate housing that isn’t weatherized to withstand temperature extremes or to keep out wildfire smoke. It is working-class people who froze to death in their homes in the deep freeze in Texas in February and working-class people in the Pacific Northwest who died in the severe heatwave in June. It is low-income residents in the rural West whose wells are running dry, unable to afford to drill deeper wells, while Big Agriculture drains the precious aquifer for cash crops. It is the immigrant farmworkers who face lethal heatwaves and wildfire smoke working in the fields of California. It is poor communities and communities of color that are forced to live in floodplain areas where the affordable housing is, who have their homes washed away from the ever increasing severe storms. It is working-class urban communities that live in sweltering heat islands where temperatures are up to 7 F higher than in wealthy neighborhoods with trees and vegetation — which during prolonged heat waves can mean life or death. It is working-class people who are priced out of flood and fire insurance, who are left homeless when climate disasters occur. It is indigenous communities and low-income rural communities that bear the brunt of pollution and ecological destruction from extractive industries that make profits while continuing to fuel the climate crisis. The climate crisis is a class war. The rich can install state-of-the-art air filtration in their mansions so they can breathe easily while the world burns. They can move to higher elevation while the coastal areas are inundated by sea level rise. The 1% richest, the capitalist owners, have caused the climate crisis and their wealth should be used to solve it. We must stand up and demand that the government take action to protect the people from the unfolding catastrophe and do everything possible to stem the crisis. We cannot allow fear to demobilize us. There are real solutions and must join together and demand real action. And if our “leaders” continue to stall and make excuses, we must rise up and replace them with people and a system that truly does represent us. And that system is socialism, where the resources and knowledge of society are used for the benefit of all of humanity and the planet. Under socialism, our representatives would be those most qualified and knowledgeable to do the job, not those who have the millions needed to pay for campaign ads and a marketing team. Our representatives would be scientists, ecologists, engineers, medical doctors, educators, farmers and other leaders from our communities, who understand the problems and the solutions. These are the people we need in leadership — people who are workers themselves — who can mobilize all sectors of society to make the transition to an equitable and ecologically-regenerative society where humanity and all life have a positive, livable future.

#### [Beller 17] The language and system of control that capitalism is artificially set up to eradicate the communicability of a revolution, but the spectre of communism still haunts and linger over the continent – the alt is to embrace cybernetic communism that hijacks and interrupts the capitalist forms of control – through attacks on the cybernetic extension of lives, alternative practices, and different ways of living – as a pre-req for revolution to take place

[Beller, J. (2017). Preface to the revolution: digital specters of communism and the expiration of politics. Social Identities, 24(2), 238–254. doi:10.1080/13504630.2017.1321719 ] Recut Comrade PW

This becoming obsolescent of linguistic debate and the wholesale sublation of the political by the economic in the ‘Sekend’ World, is particularly remarkable, given the prior Soviet demands on linguistic acumen. If one buys, even provisionally, the underlying assumption here, that whether nominally capitalist or not, the discursive situation of citizens and their states was being reorganized by the informatics of capitalism by visual, social and linguistic means, than it becomes easier to see that whether via the first world or the second, we seem to arrive by 1989 at the liquidation of linguistic command and thus of politics as such – at least in relation to capitalism. Agreeing with Godzich’s (2014) notion that the ‘amputation of a third of the whole word affects the whole’, we observe that the tech revolution and the collapse of the Soviet Union meant precisely the subordination of linguistic command to capitalist machines and media at a higher level. The colonization of discourse by capital’s different ‘sectors’ (Debord, 1995), meant that neither the word nor the world would be organized any longer by sovereign subjects. Of course it really never was, but the historical development of modern subjectivity in capitalism via the exchange of equivalents posited the subject of exchange not only as equal with other subjects, but as at once a convenient site of command-control and the necessary pathway to freedom. However the bureaucratic organization of production, which we now understand as composed at once of financialized institutions and the importation of bureaucratic thinking into machines in the form of algorithms (characterized by the distinct dystopian possibility of a unified institution/algorithm of Capital at ‘the top’) would foreclose that path and grasp the subject as an interface among interfaces. Language belongs to the bureaucracy and to the machines – which are increasingly the same entities. Google, we note in passing, did not rename itself Alphabet for nothing – it is perhaps more aware than most of the functionalization of language by financialized digitization. The corollary here is that of Moten and Harney’s insight: all that today goes under the name ‘politics’ is in fact the politics of capital (meaning to say the practices of politics are informatic generators that can be harvested as data and metadata for capitalist valorization) and that under current conditions, the removal of the scare quotes from ‘politics’ is no longer possible in as much as the signifier itself is the/a property (in all senses) of capitalist mediation. This, of course, is what is meant by virtuosity at the linguistic level, but it took Moten and Harney, with their careful attention to the persistence of racism, to draw the full conclusion of not just the failure of the political as a category, but, of politicization as symptomatic of a new form of governance structurally subordinated to the logistics of racial capital and therefore a complicit participant in oppression. In this view, politics is a subroutine of computational capital. If we believe Baudrillard (and Franco Berardi says we should), what became mass media in ‘The West’ was always already postsocialist. Commenting on media coverage of Paris 1968 in his 1972 essay ‘Requiem for the Media’, Baudrillard writes, ‘transgression and subversion never get “on the air” without being subtly negated as they are transformed into models, neutralized into signs, they are eviscerated of their meaning’ (2003, p. 283). Baudrillard refers to the ‘imposition of models’ as an aspect of ‘the terrorism of the code’ (2003, p. 285), which he sees functioning as ‘a decentralized totalitarianism’ (2003, p. 286), ‘The code’, which we must here remember to understand was a new way of talking about language within the frameworks of semiotics, communication theory and computation, prevents reciprocity for Baudrillard – who, it should be noted, wrote one of the most important books on capital and sign function, For a critique of the political economy of the sign. For Baudrillard in ‘Requiem’ the code is de facto counter-revolutionary and its very function enacts a postsocialist ethic, since all struggle against hierarchy and the capitalist foreclosure of democratic representation is functionally liquidated immediately through the sheer fact of its reportage. The code contains socialism – in the sense of enforcing its imprisonment and cancellation. It is a medium of governance. Thus it is postsocialist before the arrival of socialism. And therefore, before the arrival of ‘Postsocialism’. Which is to suggest that Postsocialism is the logical consequence of finacialization’s colonization of discourse through code – the very practice and practical application of communication and information theory. Here we begin to get at the deeper meanings and consequences of what is called Digital Culture, 1 and 2. As experiments on Pavlov’s dogs with both acid and with electric shock amply showed, instrumental reason, but one could retrospectively say ‘programming’, applied to reflexes in order to condition or re-condition them in accord with the will of the ‘scientist’ (the word is the same with and without quotation marks, until proven otherwise), may use pain or the anticipation of pain to inhibit even what Pavlov calls ‘the freedom reflex’. Thus we push the date of postsocialism/postcommunism back even further. If by communism was meant autonomy, self-determination, community or communion, or even, as Groys suggests, the reliance on language as a system of command-control over the economy, reflexo-logical programming (pace Eisenstein, who used ideas drawn from Pavlovian conditioning to construct both his theories of montage and his films) hailed a future (premised on Reflexology and shortly thereafter Taylorism/Fordism, and later the deterriotrialized factory of the cinema) was designed to be postcommunist even before the Bolsheveik revolution – unless, perhaps, one considers the revolutionary potential of the destruction of (bourgeois) subjectivity. But in brief we have the foreclosure of inter-subjective reciprocity by the coding of sign function and the organization of ‘subjective’ sovereignty by machinic automation. Thus the Soviet critique of cybernetics under Stalinism, while more truthful about the West than most English-speaking readers will acknowledge, may also deflect or displace some self-criticism. Ben Peters tells us that ‘in 1954 the fourth edition of the Kratki˘ı filosofski˘ı slovar’ (Concise dictionary of philosophy) cast cybernetics as a slightly ridiculous, although still harmful, anti-Marxist “reactionary pseudoscience …”’. In sum, one sees from either side of the iron curtain a generalized movement towards the computational management and administration of social practice – a seemingly necessary evolution for the organization of complexity and scale that confronted the super-powers. From this perspective, Orwell’s three worlds, Oceania, Eastasia and Eurasia, were always-already postsocialist, and the variants of ‘democracy’ as either the Free Enterprise System, the Soviet Union or Communism, were all names for the advance of capitalism. From the standpoint of capitalist hegemony, the various collapses and transformations in the three worlds manifest the ‘objectivity’ of a computational capital that could no longer be dismissed and that tended everywhere to functionalize language as a computational subroutine. Here we approach the full meaning of platform sovereignty. The communism of computational capital As early as 1950 Norbert Wiener warned the world about letting the genie (of cybernetics) out of the bottle and thus of further displacing labor by converting humans into either cogs or irrelevant entities. The emergent ‘human use of human beings’ as Weiner entitled his 1950 volume on cybernetics appears to be at once a continuation of earlier forms of usury, an extraordinary innovation that allows humans to engineer automata enabling the real-time application of statistical and algorithmic methods to human practices such that human metabolic undertakings may be structured and organized through algorithmic governance in order to extract obedience and more importantly, profit and finally, a selffulfilling prophecy haunted by slavery, colonialism, patriarchy, hierarchy and white supremacy in societies that are purportedly postracial, postcolonial and postsocialist. In my own view, this process of cyberneticization is so endemic that it is arguable that all thought has become machine mediated and thus all intelligence is, strictly speaking, artificial – now even more artificial. Cybernetics understood as a development of computational capital is a matter of dialectics and indicates a thoroughgoing transformation of the life-world on a planetary scale. Allowing for some poetic exceptions (which may indeed be as vast as ‘the surround’), algorithmic governance is inexorably imbrecated with thought and practice post 1989, and was already in fact imbrecated with thought in the second world, albeit by other means. The troubling conclusion is that ‘We’ are the intelligence of computers, which is another way of saying that the species has been slated for subsumption by automata and this has taken place differently and unevenly across different sectors. Thus even as we limn the degree to which our own autonomy has been limned by automation, channeling Morpheus from The Matrix (1999) and suggesting that ‘because you are a slave, Neo … ’, does nothing to change the still haunting fact that some slaves are more equal than others. ‘Post-socialism’ in no way vitiates the need for socialism – the conversation on this topic could remember that. Indeed as Atanasoski and Vora (2017) conclude for the introduction to this special issue, The ‘post’ in [postsocialism] signals not the death of socialism, the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the U.S.S.R., or the politics of ‘transition’ in formerly state socialist nations, but rather it signifies an epistemological shift that makes evident how the Cold War imposed a false historical binary, delimiting both socialism and capitalism as singular visions and practices. A postsocialist approach to temporality insists that the end of the Cold War was not in fact the end of history, but the re-igniting of the multiplicity of socialisms and socialist legacies acting in the world today. (p. 6) As I have been suggestion all along these dialectical dreams were being captured as they emerged by the very media of their emergence. And yet there are so many dreams. With varying inflections, a kind of totalitarian imaginary has been in play since at least the mid-twentieth century, with roots that go back well into the nineteenth. The real specter of modernity, with its positing of innovation, connection and cosmopolitanism, is communism – a planetary hauntology if there ever was one. The subsumption of the species by cybernetics and computation makes sense, if we heed the shade cast on human exceptionalism by Turing (1950) in ‘Computing, Machinery and Intelligence’. Turing, recall, strongly suggested that there was no way to disprove the possibility that there is a rule set governing human behavior. The implication is that the entire domain of human existence including theology, cosmology and spirituality and more generally thought, is a technical effect – the execution of a program. Computational advancement, and history itself, is thus not rupture but emergence. Understood in this way, artificial intelligence allows for the perception that all intelligence is artificial – at least in the sense that it has no essential being or immaterial spirit. The materiality of the spirit, what Marx must have meant (going out on a limb here) by species being, is, in this framework at least, the world-historical repressed that underpins modernity’s theology of civilization. What was truly spectral in Western civilization’s unprecedented barbarity was not just communism, but its synonym – whatever was meant, however hypocritically or paradoxically, in the highest invocations of ‘the human’. As Bostrom (2014) suggests, the logical conclusion from Turing’s insights were already drawn in 1965 by I. J. Good chief statistician of Turing’s code-breaking team in World War II: Let an ultraintelligent machine be defined as a machine that can far surpass all the intellectual activities of any man [sic] however clever. Since the design of machines is one of those intellectual activities, an ultraintelligent machine could design even better machines; there would then unquestionably be an ‘intelligence explosion,’ and the intelligence of man would be left far behind. Thus the first ultraintelligent machine is the last invention man need ever make, provided that the machine is docile enough to tell us how to keep it under control. (p. 4; Good, 1965, p. 33; cited in Bostrom, 2014, p. 4) The collective loss of human control, visible in what would be historically the sublation of homo sapiens or ontologically the subsumption of homo-sapiens by computation, informed the aspirations for control and thus for Norbert Weiner with cybernetics – the root of which is kubernetes or governance. The loss of the human was to be restored by the saving power of technology. The loss of subjective agency to a total system also haunts the works of Niklas Luhman, Maturana and Varela, and the notion of autopoesis: in which systems can only know themselves and are inherently closed off to any outside. Communication becomes predicated on the non-transcendence of the communicative situation; the loss of the outside based on a self/other dipole proffers the paradigm of emergence, which is itself a variant on totalitarianism in as much as it fully closed. With emergence, whatever crosses the threshold is always already internal to the system. Thus within the framework of computational capital’s autopoesis in which all communication is always-already financialized, anti-capitalist struggle is structurally and thus by definition radically excluded from communicability and is itself in a condition of subalternity, erasure and spectrality.8 To get to this unholy place in which language and psychic function are but valueproductive sub-routines of the violent calculus of capitalist hierarchies and the profit motive (precisely, the autopoesis of capital, and precisely, again, the medium as the message, but in a far more sinister key), one needs, in my view at any rate, the rise of what I call the calculus of the image, and the simultaneous rise of attention economies, to scramble and re-organize psycho-semiotic domain – to mount the ‘liquidation of tradition’ by visuality – and now, to impose with Digital Culture 2.0 the large-scale adaptation of fully computable algorithms that will increase the granular resolution of the social metabolism by the monetizeable interface known as the screen. SOCIAL IDENTITIES 249 The wager I want to close with here (and wager we must) is that from the global sixties forward, there was a radical shift in the organization of sign function and the varied responses to the endeavors of hegemonic powers and their institutions constituted, loosely speaking, an emergent world literature, radical forms of deconstruction, ‘magical’ realisms, the blurring of documentary genres, shifts in narrative forms and forms of embodiment and the generation of discourses necessary for social revolution. Not just counter-histories but counter-codes and anti-codes, rising up in response to digital colonialism, the program of neo-imperialism and the white mythology of technological development. This formation, a dialectical scramble sometimes designated wholesale as postmodernism, contained within itself strains of a rejection of aspects of the standardization of codification and the ‘post-socialism’ of the code. Radical energies fought the computational and financial encroachments of a postsocialism that conscripted socialism by endeavoring to script and thus conscript social interaction before socialism could ever arrive. They imagined communities and communions counter to what was being officially imagined or cancelled. Culture, let’s call it, was, from the capitalist side, macropolitically harnessed as means of production through financialized visuality and digitization, yet, from let’s just say the peoples’ side, this medium of life and meaning had to address or otherwise battle the postsocialist and postcommunist totalitarian conformity hegemonically encoded by the financialized media of representation, or risk betraying the transmission of struggle. Thus radical cultural practitioners encounter such a postsocialist encoding as, to use the formulation deployed by the late Patrick Wolfe to characterize settler colonialism in his essay ‘Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native:’ ‘a structure not an event’ (Wolfe, 2006, p. 2). Following the lead of Kauanui (2016), we might hypothesize that the logic and practices of a settler colonialism that ‘destroys to replace’ and is ‘inherently but not invariably genocidal’, serves as a kind of template for organizing postsocialism as well (Wolfe, 2006, 387; cited in Kauanui, 2016). Capital settles into the bios the way white American settlers settle into native land – through continuing violence. Rather than agreeing with official history that there has been a revolution that was defeated, better I think to say that there was a revolution taking place planet-wide, a revolution that was diverse, multipronged, multi-lingual and distributed – one that is /many that are still here and ongoing. Such a notion signals a new role for poesis in the elaboration-generation-simulation of ontologies and affects, new practices of aesthesis and poesis capable of recalling, amplifying and transmitting strivings for justice and peace. At times this revolution was (these revolutions were) persistence and endurance, at other times active, armed confrontation and at others everything in between. This energy, this non-compliance, this planning behind the scenes, this running from the new law and its police, this aesthetic, pragmatic, and all too real escape from the domain of power, in short, this overt, covert, fugitive struggle, constitutes ‘the general antagonism’. So, not a defeated revolution but revolutions and modes of living that were partially defeated by cybernetic and algorithmic counter-revolution and the programmatic decimation and dispossesion of laboring populations. I say ‘partially’ because to me it makes more sense to say that there remains a distributed revolution, subterranean but nonetheless palpable, a revolution finding lines of flight, forms of fugitivity and community, alternative practices, ways of caring and living, waged everyday, including today, that is at once ongoing and undefeated, albeit its victories, wagers, wounds, requirements and struggles are distributed unequally. This revolution is at once world-wide, in our persons and indeed in the cybernetic extensions of species life, which is also to say, it too burns in the bios and the techne. This revolution is (these revolutions are) wagered and waged against/before/alongside/beyond/beneath capitalist conscription. The end of politics therefore means the ghost of politics, a ‘politics’ there and not there. The end of communism means the ghost of communism. A hauntology, as Derrida might say. Present, denied full appearing, spectral. Representation structured, institutionalized, functionalized and financialized such that under present conditions the full appearance of anything, including communism, occurs only by means of its commodification and hollowing out, for example, China. Precisely this virtualization of the political, a category strategically negated and poetically replaced by analytic feeling in The Undercommons and the affective scenes of its many becomings, haunts postcommunism. Yet even without ‘politics’ or ‘communism’, ‘we’ might feel the practices and spirits of the many forms of love unable to fully appear, by no means solitary endeavors; ‘we’ are aware of many others and of the necessity of many others and of our mutual embrace. Otherwise in the bright white carbon-based light of the digitized day we confront life, virtualized from the standpoint of computational capital’s own brand of ‘communism’. Computational capital: a virtualization of life itself that has sublated what was once thought of as living, a vast distributed automaton driven by a relentless pursuit of value that thus far has kept communism imprisoned in quotation marks.

## Case

#### 1 – no solvency – other communication or commercial satelilites easily repurposed for military uses.

#### 2 – [H&N 21] 1AC Foster 16’s framing of outer space to “Thus, it will be important that lawmakers and the international community be as proactive as possible—both in outlining property rights and protecting the final frontier from being harmed by an industry that might become overzealous if left unchecked.” establishes space as a place for hegemonic engagements and intervention that turns case – their rhetoric makes it impos to stop any exploitation

Hunter and Nelson 21 [Hunter, Hannah, and Elizabeth Nelson. “Out of Place in Outer Space?” Environment and Society, vol. 12, no. 1, 1 Sept. 2021, pp. 227–245, www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib52, 10.3167/ares.2021.120113. Accessed 19 Jan. 2022.] Comrade PW

Geographical Imaginations of Outer Space Outer space is a site of intense imagination and creative speculation ([McCurdy 2011](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib64)). At the same time, certain orbital locations are accessed so routinely that they may be considered banal rather than awe-inspiring ([MacDonald 2007](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib58)). The breadth of geographical imaginations of outer space are beyond the scope of this article. We focus here on some of the key geographical imaginations that underpin engagements in Earth's near space. Exploring hegemonic stakeholders’ framings of and engagements with outer and orbital space allows the examination of dominant geographical imaginations and the ways they define orbital debris. In particular, ideas of “empty space” and “purity” have shaped conceptions of orbital space, what it “should be” for, and how it might be inhabited, exploited, or protected. One consequential geographical imagination is the framing of outer space “as an empty vessel, or, more accurately, one with profound but specific forms of both absence and possibility … awaiting purposeful inscription by the human species” (Kearnes and Van Dooren 2017: 182). This imagination has inspired and legitimated hegemonic engagements with orbital space, particularly by state actors. Julie Klinger understands this imagination as one in which “the environments of outer space are recast as strategic assets that must be instrumentalized to increase state power and authority” as part of the “nationalist performativity” of outer space endeavors (2019: 3, 13; see also [MacDonald 2007](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib58)). The term “frontier” is embedded in scientific, state, and popular narratives of outer space exploration, with roots in the “final frontier” narrative of the Cold War ([Rand 2016](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib85); [McCurdy 2011](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib64)). Daniel [Sage (2008)](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib91) argues that US politicians and NASA continue to legitimize their extraterrestrial exploits with the idea of outer space as a frontier that must be explored and exploited to fulfil the geographical imagination of American manifest destiny. “Frontier” has origins in the violent colonization of the American West ([Benjamin 2003](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib8); [Sage 2008](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib91); [Messeri 2016](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib66); [Rand 2016](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib85)). It evokes extraterrestrial places as sites that demand intervention, with evident colonial logics that work to legitimate expansion and exploitation ([Bawaka Country et al. 2020](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib4); [Gorman 2005](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib34)). Scholars have recognized the troubling parallels between terrestrial colonialism and state expansion into outer space, in which “both interplanetary space and the lands of ‘primitive’ people are [considered] terra nullius, empty wildernesses, or moral vacuums, into which civilized sea-faring or space-faring nations can bring the right moral order” ([Gorman 2005](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib34): 99; see also [Genovese 2017](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib31); Kearnes and Van Dooren 2017; [Klinger 2019](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib52); [MacDonald 2007](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib58); [Rand 2016](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib85); [Sage 2008; and Sutch and Roberts 2019](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#bib91)).[2](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#f2) A formative article from the Bawaka Collective makes it clear that expansion into outer space is a direct act of colonization and “the extension of earth-based colonization into space disrupts and colonizes the plural lifeworlds of many Indigenous people who have ongoing connections with and beyond the sky” (Bawaka Country et. al. 2020: 1).[3](https://www.berghahnjournals.com/view/journals/environment-and-society/12/1/ares120113.xml#f3) Colonial logic is globally pervasive, and just as it informs terrestrial place-making, so too does it foundationally inform exploitation in outer space.

Aff fails – ambuisity of the international body and past examples are not analygous

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However, taking into consideration the letter and spirit of the OST, strengthened by the Moon Agreement, the argument that “national appropriation” only extends to appropriation of territory and not appropriation of resources is a far reach. That resource extraction is contemplated, albeit implicitly, in the OST, is nothing but logical. Not only have such claims of possessory rights not been recognised in the past, there is also global consensus regarding its illegality.[lvi] It therefore forms a part of customary international law, despite the Moon Agreement not having been widely ratified. In this light, the legalisation of space mining is a sheer violation of the elemental principles of international space law. Yet, there is no clarity on what activity is allowed and what is prohibited in outer space under the existing law.[lvii] There is ambiguity around most issues—from “who would license and regulate asteroid mining operations” to the legality of these activities as per the existing international space law.[lviii] When comparing it to the law of the seas, resource appropriation in the high seas and deep seabed is governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 1982, and that in Antarctica, as per the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, 1991. While the former is strictly regulated under Part XI of UNCLOS, the latter is completely forbidden but for scientific purposes. The law of the sea argument—“owning the fish, not the sea”—cannot be applied to outer space primarily because fish are living resources that can reproduce and therefore are renewable. Outer space resources, on the other hand, are depletable: once harvested, they cannot be replenished. The analogy with fish and seas, therefore, is not a fair one and its transposition to outer space and celestial bodies would be inaccurate. Perhaps a more comparable regime is the deep seabed, which contemplates property rights over mineral extraction. The utilisation and ownership of the deep seabed’s resources are exclusively structured around the International Seabed Authority (ISA), which is responsible for organising, carrying out and controlling all activities in the seabed.[lix] Not only must State parties seek sanction from the ISA before beginning resource exploitation, but the fiscal benefits from seabed mining must also be shared among all.[lx] Evidently, even the UNCLOS upholds State ownership and fair distribution over individual ownership and self-centred gains.[lxi] By allowing private ownership, the US and Luxembourg are once again in contravention of the very same law they are relying on.

### AT space war

#### Asteroid mining is impractical and no one is going to try any time soon

Fickling 20

David Fickling (columnist covering commodities and industrial and consumer companies, reporter for Bloomberg, Dow Jones, WSJ, Financial Times, Guardian.; “We’re Never Going to Mine the Asteroid Belt”; *Bloomberg News*; December 21, 2020; <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-12-21/space-mining-on-asteroids-is-never-going-to-happen>; HW-EMJ

It’s wonderful that people are shooting for the stars — but those who declined to fund the expansive plans of the nascent space mining industry were right about the fundamentals. Space mining won’t get off the ground in any foreseeable future — and you only have to look at the history of civilization to see why. One factor rules out most space mining at the outset: gravity. On one hand, it guarantees that most of the solar system’s best mineral resources are to be found under our feet. Earth is the largest rocky planet orbiting the sun. As a result, the cornucopia of minerals the globe attracted as it coalesced is as rich as will be found this side of Alpha Centauri. Gravity poses a more technical problem, too. Escaping Earth’s gravitational field makes transporting the volumes of material needed in a mining operation hugely expensive. On Falcon Heavy, the large rocket being developed by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, transporting a payload to the orbit of Mars comes to as little as $5,357 per kilogram — a drastic reduction in normal launch costs. Still, at those prices just lofting a single half-ton drilling rig to the asteroid belt would use up the annual exploration budget of a small mining company. Power is another issue. The international space station, with 35,000 square feet of solar arrays, generates up to 120 kilowatts of electricity. That drill would need a similar-sized power plant — and most mining companies operate multiple rigs at a time. Power demands rise drastically once you move from exploration drilling to mining and processing. Bringing material back to Earth would raise the costs even more. Japan’s Hayabusa2 satellite spent six years and 16.4 billion yen ($157 million) recovering a single gram of material from the asteroid Ryugu and returning it to Earth earlier this month. What might you want to mine from space? Water is an essential component of most earth-bound mining operations and a potential raw material for hydrogen-oxygen fuel that could be used in space. The discovery in October of ice molecules in craters on the Moon was taken as a major breakthrough. Still, the concentrations of 100 to 412 parts per million are extraordinarily low by terrestrial standards. Copper, which typically costs about $4,500 per metric ton to refine, has an average ore grade of about 6,000 ppm. The more promising commodities are platinum, palladium, gold and a handful of rare related metals. Because of their affinity for iron, these so-called siderophile elements mostly sunk toward the metallic core of our planet early in its formation, and are relatively scarce in the Earth’s crust. Estimates of their abundance on some asteroids, such as the enigmatic Psyche 16 beyond the orbit of Mars, suggest concentrations several times higher than can be found in terrestrial mines. Still, human ingenuity is all about cutting our coat according to our cloth. If such platinum-group metals are going to justify the literally astronomical costs of space mining, they’ll need to count on sustained high prices for the decade or so that would be needed to get such an operation up and running — and that sort of situation is all but unheard-of in the materials industry. When prices of an essential commodity get excessively high, chemists get extraordinarily good at finding ways to avoid using it, scrap merchants improve their recycling rates, and miners discover new deposits that wouldn’t have been viable at lower prices. Even criminals get in on the game. That eventually pushes supply up and demand down, so that prices rebalance — a dynamic we’ve seen play out in the markets for rare earths, lithium and cobalt in recent years. The world mines about three times more platinum than it did in the early 1970s, but prices have barely changed once adjusted for inflation. That might sound a disappointing prospect to those looking for excuses for humanity to colonize space — but really it should be seen as a tribute to our ingenuity. Humanity’s failure to exploit extraterrestrial ore reserves isn’t a sign that we lack imagination. If anything, it’s a sign of the adaptive genius that put us in orbit in the first place.

#### Won’t go nuclear – seen as a normal conventional attack because of integration with ground forces

Firth 7/1/19 [News Editor at MIT Technology Review, was Chief News Editor at New Scientist. How to fight a war in space (and get away with it). July 1, 2019. MIT Technology Review]

Space is so intrinsic to how advanced militaries fight on the ground that an attack on a satellite need no longer signal the opening shot in a nuclear apocalypse. As a result, “deterrence in space is less certain than it was during the Cold War,” says Todd Harrison, who heads the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS, a think tank in Washington, DC. Non-state actors, as well as more minor powers like North Korea and Iran, are also gaining access to weapons that can bloody the noses of much larger nations in space.

#### MAD checks space escalation – nuclear response and debris

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Fourth, the ubiquity of space infrastructure and the fragility of the space environment may create a degree of existential deterrence. As space is so useful to modern economies and military forces, a large-scale disruption of space infrastructure may be so intuitively escalatory to decision-makers that there may be a natural caution against a wholesale assault on a state’s entire space capabilities because the consequences of doing so approach the mentalities of total war, or nuclear responses if a society begins tearing itself apart because of the collapse of optimised energy grids and just-in-time supply chains. In addition, the problem of space debris and the political-legal hurdles to conducting debris clean-up operations mean that even a handful of explosive events in space can render a region of Earth orbit unusable for everyone. This could caution a country like China from excessive kinetic intercept missions because its own military and economy is increasingly reliant on outer space, but perhaps not a country like North Korea which does not rely on space. The usefulness, sensitivity, and fragility of space may have some existential deterrent effect. China’s catastrophic anti-satellite weapons test in 2007 is a valuable lesson for all on the potentially devastating effect of kinetic warfare in orbit.

### AT debris

#### No one’s going to war over a downed satellite

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more. The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.

#### Kessler is so unlikely, we don’t even need to remove debris

**Mosher** **’19** [Dave; September 3rd; Journalist with more than a decade of experience reporting and writing stories about space, science, and technology; Business Insider, “Satellite collisions may trigger a space-junk disaster that could end human access to orbit. Here’s How,” <https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/Space_and_Defense_2_3.pdf>; GR]

The Kessler syndrome plays center-stage in the movie "Gravity," in which an accidental space collision endangers a crew aboard a large space station. But Gossner said that type of a runaway space-junk catastrophe is unlikely. "Right now I don't think we're close to that," he said. "I'm not saying we couldn't get there, and I'm not saying we don't need to be smart and manage the problem. But I don't see it ever becoming, anytime soon, an unmanageable problem." There is no current system to remove old satellites or sweep up bits of debris in order to prevent a Kessler event. Instead, space debris is monitored from Earth, and new rules require satellites in low-Earth orbit be deorbited after 25 years so they don't wind up adding more space junk. "Our current plan is to manage the problem and not let it get that far," Gossner said. "I don't think that we're even close to needing to actively remove stuff. There's lots of research being done on that, and maybe some day that will happen, but I think that — at this point, and in my humble opinion — an unnecessary expense." A major part of the effort to prevent a Kessler event is the Space Surveillance Network (SSN). The project, led by the US military, uses 30 different systems around the world to identify, track, and share information about objects in space. Many objects are tracked day and night via a networkof radar observatories around the globe. Optical telescopes on the ground also keep an eye out, but they aren't always run by the government. "The commercial sector is actually putting up lots and lots of telescopes," Gossner said. The government pays for their debris-tracking services. Gossner said one major debris-tracking company is called Exoanalytic. It uses about 150 small telescopes set up around the globe to detect, track, and report space debris to the SSN. Telescopes in space track debris, too. Far less is known about them because they're likely top-secret military satellites. Objects detected by the government and companies get added to a catalog of space debris and checked against the orbits of other known bits of space junk. New orbits are calculated with supercomputers to see if there's a chance of any collisions. Diana McKissock, a flight lead with the US Air Force's 18th Space Control Squadron, helps track space debris for the SSN. She said the surveillance network issues warnings to NASA, satellite companies, and other groups with spacecraft, based on two levels of emergency: basic and advanced. The SSN issues a basic emergency report to the public three days ahead of a 1-in-10,000 chance of a collision. It then provides multiple updates per day until the risk of a collision passes. To qualify for such reporting, a rogue object must come within a certain distance of another object. In low-Earth orbit, that distance must be less than 1 kilometer (0.62 mile); farther out in deep space, where the precision of orbits is less reliable, the distance is less than 5 kilometers (3.1 miles). Advanced emergency reports help satellite providers see possible collisions much more than three days ahead. "In 2017, we provided data for 308,984 events, of which only 655 were emergency-reportable," McKissock told Business Insider in an email. Of those, 579 events were in low-Earth orbit (where it's relatively crowded with satellites).