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## Chapter One is the Cult

#### [Malott 18] Capitalism is a bundle of contradictions strapped together by brutal expansion and violence – internal contradictions of labor and capital fuels the expansion and exploitation but simultaneously creates the tools of its own destruction

Malott 18[ (Curry Malott is an Associate Professor in the department of Educational Foundations and Policy Studies at West Chester University of Pennsylvania, US. His teaching and research focus on Marxist educational theory and the history of education.) “What Is Dialectical Materialism? An Introduction.” Liberation School, 4 Apr. 2018, liberationschool.org/what-is-dialectical-materialism-an-introduction/?fbclid=IwAR2ZhW5ws9\_sfJOSFxuy5YD7kUMY7PQKjWY0JUnTONE4mbIM\_0-rzuJJfPk. Accessed 9 July 2021.] Comrade PW

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What is Marx’s method? In developing his method, Marx challenged what he considered to be vulgar materialism for its tendency to ignore the totality and the relationship between consciousness and material reality. A philosophical term, the “totality” refers to the total of existence in any given moment. At the same time, Marx rejected pure idealism for substituting material reality with the idea of reality (i.e. with abstract thought). Idealism therefore leads to the false assumption that alienation or estrangement can be overcome in the realm of thought alone, as if we could change our material reality by changing our ideas and beliefs. Rather, Marx’s dialectical method is based on “the unifying truth of both” (1844/1988, 154). What this means is that “it is not enough that thought should seek to realize itself; reality must also strive toward thought.” In other words, Marx’s method entails the examination of the relationship between ideas and material reality, specifically as it pertains to class struggle and the emancipation of the proletariat. Marx’s dialectics are called “dialectical materialism” in contrast with Hegel’s dialectics. Marx wrote that he “discover[ed] the rational kernel within the mystical shell” (1867/1967, 29) of Hegel’s dialectics. To realize this revolution the working-class must not only understand the interaction of forces behind the development of society, but it must understand itself as one of those forces. The dialectic is a powerful weapon because it breaks through the capitalist illusion of individualism and atomism and disrupts the idea that isolated facts speak for themselves. Only by situating facts or ideas in the historical totality of society do they begin to make real sense. To comprehend this revolutionary movement we must conceive the interaction of forces as much more than the interaction of static and independent entities. When the parts of the totality change, their relationship to the totality changes, and they themselves change. Dialectics presents reality as an ongoing social process; nothing is ever static or fixed. Dialectics is both a method–or a way of investigating and understanding phenomena–and a fact of existence. For Engels, what is most central to dialectics is the tendency toward perpetual “motion and development” (1894/1987, 131). What follows is a summary of the dialectical theory of movement and change. The concept around which the dialectical understanding of development revolves is the negation of the negation, which will be taken up first, before turning to the concept of sublation. The unity of opposites or the interpenetration of opposites, a central driving force of the dialectic is then explored. Finally, we look at the tendency toward the transformation of quantity into quality, which in turn allows us to understand the negation of the negation more deeply. The negation of the negation The tendency toward the negation of the negation is arguably at the heart of dialectical development. Engels, for example, notes that the negation of the negation is “extremely general—and for this reason extremely far-reaching and important” (1894/1987, 131). The negation of the negation refers specifically to the way that phenomena and structures produce their opposites. For example, in the first volume of Capital, Marx (1867/1967) writes that capitalist private property is the negation of individual private property, or property held by the proprietor or individual laborer. Peasant proprietors, as small-scale industrial producers, tended to own private property and produced their own means of subsistence. This small-scale, scattered, petty industry of the peasants was limited in terms of its ability to foster economic growth. The advent of the capitalist era included the expropriation of the peasants from their means of production. The logic of the feudal system and exchange created the agencies of its own annihilation. While feudalism was overcome in capitalism, aspects of it were preserved but reconfigured in a way to facilitate economic growth. For example, the private property of peasants was abolished, but private property itself was not. Capitalism concentrates and centralizes property, tending towards monopoly. Bigger capitalists buy out or otherwise out maneuver smaller capitalists. At the same time, capitalism creates its antagonist: the working class. As capital grows so too does the working class. These contradictions provide the basis for the second negation: the expropriation of the expropriators, or the transformation of capitalism into socialism. Under socialism the means of production that existed under capitalism are preserved. Instead of being held in private they are held in common. In place of exploitation the means of production are put in the service of meeting the many needs of the producers. This process is called sublation. When something is sublated it is both overcome yet preserved. We can also see sublation at work in Marx’s theory of monopoly. Monopolies create the material basis for socialism as they aggregate and concentrate productive forces. Socialist revolution expropriates these from the capitalists, but instead of breaking them up into smaller enterprises, the working class takes control of them as they are. If this is still a bit confusing at this point, it should be clearer after we go through the other components of dialectics. Of course, capitalism is not going to automatically transform into socialism, even though its own internal logic orients its development in that general direction. Capitalist crises and contradictions are necessary for socialist revolutions but they are not sufficient. If they were sufficient, then we would already be living under socialism! The interpenetration of opposites What compels entities to be in a constant state of motion are their internal contradictions, or the forces generated by the unity of opposites. The most central or essential contradiction within capitalism is between labor and capital. Labor and capital are opposites because they have contradictory drives. For example, historically, labor has spontaneously sought to decrease the rate of exploitation by collectively bargaining for higher wages, better conditions, benefits, and so on. When successful, these decrease profit margins. Capital, on the other hand, seeks to always increase the rate of exploitation. Labor and capital are therefore compelled by opposite and antagonistic drives. This antagonism can be managed and mediated by unions and state regulation, but it can only be overcome through the negation of the negation. Labor and capital, as such, do not have an independent existence apart from each other. To be a worker is by definition to be exploited by capital, and to be a capitalist is by definition to exploit workers. The relationship between labor and capital is therefore internal and constitutes the totality. As a relation of exploitation, capital is a unity of contradictions. The dialectical development of this relationship over time is the movement of the balances of forces within capitalism. A common mistake is to conceptualize the movement generated from antagonistically-related social classes as the interaction of separate forces external to each other. This leads to the false belief that the role of the working-class revolution today is to destroy capitalism and replace it with socialism. Socialism can only be created out of what already exists. Marx and Engels believed that socialism would first emerge out of the most developed capitalist countries. This did not turn out to be true, as socialism emerged first in Russia, an underdeveloped, predominantly feudal-based country. Socialism, nevertheless, was ushered in by the producers and created out of an old society, not separate from it. Quantity into quality The tendency toward the transformation of quantity into quality offers deeper insight into the negation of the negation. So far, we have seen how the essential contradiction within capitalism is the labor/capital relationship, which is an example of the unity of opposites. We also saw the sublation of private property from one negated mode of production to the next. Investigating the interrelationship of these two issues will provide the basis for our example of the transformation of quantity into quality. The inherently unequal relationship between labor and capital was established, in part, through the violence of expropriating peasants from their means of production. Without direct access to the means of production, former peasants were forced to sell their ability to work for a wage, thereby becoming part of the working class. Although beyond the scope of this short introduction, it’s crucial to note that the violence of slavery, colonialism, and settler colonialism were equally important in establishing capitalism. The competition between capitalists drives technological development. Because the price of any given commodity tends to center around the average amount of time its production requires, devising new technologies that can reduce the number of labor hours it takes to produce whatever commodity is a tendency internal to capitalism. In the short term this gives the capitalist at the technological forefront a competitive advantage because they can sell the commodity below its social value. But as soon as the new technology gets integrated into the entire branch or branches of industry, the average amount of time that it takes to produce whatever commodity lowers, and the competition begins anew. While new labor-saving technologies can be super profitable for individual capitalists in the short term, in the long term it reduces the number of labor hours simultaneously set into motion. It also means that more capital is invested into machinery rather than workers. And since workers produce value and machines do not, this contributes to the tendency of the falling rate of profit. When the amount of labor hours it takes to transform a given quantity of raw materials into whatever commodity is reduced, the composition of capital shifts quantitatively, by degree. Historically, individual capitalists have countered the falling rate of their profit margins in many ways such as devising schemes to reduce the price they pay for labor even while its value remains the same thereby pushing the laborer into depravity and impoverishment. The capitalist, driven to counter the falling rate of profit by extracting more and more value from the laborer, thereby deepens capital’s crisis. The internal drive of capital to forever expand the accumulation of surplus value brings the unity of opposites, labor and capital, into growing conflict with each other. This movement is the developmental process at the heart of the dialectics of capitalism. While the capitalist has an interest in maintaining the contradiction and creating the illusion of capital’s permanence, the objective interest of labor is to resolve the contradiction, thereby changing the quality of production relations. This is quantity into quality and the center of struggle between labor and capital. The quantitative changes provide the basis or possibility of qualitative change. Conclusion One of the reasons why dialectical materialism is so important is because it embodies a deep revolutionary optimism. Drawing attention to the fact that the future already exists as an unrealized potential within the present demystifies the seeming permanence of capitalism. In other words, it reveals the defeat of imperialism as a real potential and not a fantasy. For example, it is a fact that the most advanced means of production, labor saving technologies, as they currently exist, are able to meet the basic needs of every person in the world. In this way, the future liberation of humanity from exploitation and material oppression already exists. The practicality of the aforementioned optimism resides in the fact that Marx’s method correctly locates the agent of revolutionary transformation within the working class, the many.

#### [Elias 19] It is the inherent nature for humans to engage in free and creative production – only within their material production and development of social relations humans are created and subjectivity emerges

Elias 19 [(Paul Elias has a PhD Social and Political Thought, York University.Academic background includes a focus on Marx’s social philosophy, German Idealism, ancient Greek thought, Phenomenology and Existentialism, Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, Psychoanalysis.). “Revolutionary Subjectivity in the Thought of Karl Marx.” Yorku.ca, 22 Nov. 2019 | <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/240107056.pdf> | Accessed 31 Aug. 2021.] comrade PW

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2. Human Self-Creation and the Role of Labour in Our Transformative Relationship with Nature In Marx’s writing revolutionary subjectivity is depicted as a form of individuality which emerges amid the activities and relations of the productive process in capitalist society. A successful revolution which marks the transition to truly “human” life is the result of a broader historical process of “human” development out of our bestial origin in nature, from which we emerge with only the potential to become free. 254 According to Marx this process is driven from the outset by fundamental features of our socio-productive activity.255 In his view the labour process is the locus of the dialectic between human activity as natural activity and the natural activity of humanity in which nature is turning into humanity as humanity is transforming nature and becoming consciously free.256 We participate in this fundamentally social life-activity initially only to satisfy immediate “natural necessity” and according to Marx the growth of our “species-powers” is an unintended result of it.257 Through labour we alter the natural world—as we find it altered by socio-historical activity—and ourselves as well. As Marx claimed in Capital, “Labour is...a process by which [humanity], through [its] own actions, mediates, regulates and controls the metabolism between [itself] and nature. [We set] in motion the natural forces which belong to [our] own body…in order to appropriate the materials of nature in a form adapted to [our] own needs. Through this movement [we act] upon external nature and [change] it, and in this way [we] simultaneously [change our] own nature. [We develop] the potentialities slumbering within nature, and [subject] the play of its forces to [our] own sovereign power.”258 A fundamental aspect of Marx’s notion of humanity is that we are self-created. 259 From his perspective, real self-determination essentially involves self-creation.260 Humanity is able to have a free relationship with nature—in which we are self-determined but not independent of nature per se—insofar as we develop our “species-powers” because nature is governed by ‘natural laws’ which are “reason.”261 In this way the human being—as “self-conscious reason”—is fully developed nature. Marx articulated this dialectic of nature and humanity in the following passage: “The human essence of nature primarily exists only for social man, because only here is nature a link with man, as his existence for others and their existence for him, as the life-element of human actuality—only here is nature the foundation of man’s own human existence. Only here has the natural existence of man become his human existence and nature become human. Thus society is the comprehended, essential unity of man with nature, the true resurrection of nature, the fulfilled naturalism of man and humanism of nature.”262 With the growth of our inherent capacity for “universally” conscious labour, the development of productive technology and organization, etc., we are able to overcome the alien and dominating character of nature overtime.263 As Marx put it, “the human being comes to relate more as watchman and regulator to the production process”; e.g., we insert “the process of nature, transformed into an industrial process, as a means between [ourselves] and inorganic nature, mastering it.”264 Marx does not suggest that we will be entirely independent from the necessity for instrumental activity associated with our organic body, although this does not necessarily entail activity determined by something other than the human ‘self’. Instead, freedom—in an “advanced phase of communist society”—can be characterized as being in tune with nature and adapting it as much as possible to our “universal” life-activity rather than being subjected to its unconquered might,265 but the “natural necessity” associated with the maintenance of our life at a desirable standard (or at all) will remain because we are always internally related to nature. This transformation and control over forces of the natural world through labour involves the modification of features of our own natural-physical being throughout the historical process. Marx imagined “the full development of human mastery over the forces of nature, those of socalled nature as well as of humanity’s own nature.”266 Hegel’s philosophy was an important influence on Marx in this regard,267 although this Hegelian view of the “self-creation” of humanity comes with a terrible catch. “At the same pace that mankind masters nature,” Marx claimed, “man seems to become enslaved to other men or to his own infamy.”268 Appropriating Hegel, Marx made “estrangement” a key feature of the social labour process (throughout the “prehistory of human society”) which provides the dynamism whereby “reason” becomes increasingly conscious and we create the objective and subjective conditions for a life in which the full development of humanity is consciously pursued as an end-in-itself.269

#### [Dai 16] Tearing away the product from the creator kills it – commodity fetishism is the very definition of alienation – the hyper specific focus on possession and ownership distorts our subjectivities and base it upon material and monetary gains

Dai 16[(Duong Dai, Vietnam National University of Agriculture, [University of Missouri Kansas City](https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_org&hl=en&org=10466414618594003349)) |”Human development and alienation in the context of economic crisis in Vietnam”|Published November 23, 2016|Accessed August 29, 2021|https://sci-hub.st/https://doi.org/10.1177/0309816816678575] Comrade PW

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Commodity fetishism as a common form of alienation in commodity production In his effort to critique other theories of value, Marx introduced the concept of ‘commodity fetishism’ to explain the false belief that ‘goods possess value just as they have weight, as an inherent property’ (Elster 1986: 57). Actually, commodity fetishism is restated from alienation in order to reveal the essence and mystification of capitalism (Cowling 2006: 329). For Marx, commodity fetishism refers to a social phenomenon whereby the commodity becomes mysterious and appears to dominate human relationships. In the eyes of human beings, the commodity seems to be endowed naturally with its value. It looks like an autonomous and independent power in the relation with human beings (Marx 2007: 83). However, the secret behind such mystification is that value is the result of socially necessary abstract labour embodied in commodity. Because value expresses relations between producers, when the source of value is concealed, relations between producers are also obscured. Harvey described in A Companion to Marx’s Capital that ‘our social relation to the labouring activities of others is disguised in the relationships between things’. So, it is impossible to know anything about the labour or the labourers through commodities (Harvey & Marx 2010: 39–40). In short, commodity fetishism is an epistemic problem, involving the mistaking of appearance for commodity production (Ripstein 1987: 736). It plays an important role in creating alienation of consciousness that contributes significantly to alienation of human nature. Therefore, commodity fetishism changes life styles, thoughts and enjoyments in human life. Commodity fetishism is summarised in five points by Cohen: (1) the labour of persons takes the form of the exchange-value of things, (2) things do have exchange-value, (3) they do not have it autonomously, (4) they appear to have it autonomously and (5) exchange-value, and the illusion accompanying it, is not permanent but peculiar to a determinate form of society (Cohen 2000: 116). Point 3 jumps to point 4 due to a very peculiar kind of false consciousness of participants in commodity production. Producers cannot understand the origin of exchange value, not because they are unintelligent but because commodity fetishism hides its own origins, making it impossible to see the origin of value and, therefore, making it difficult to understand. Related to point 5, Lukacs showed that a commodity takes a form of objectivity and also creates subjective behaviour for human beings (John & Dimitri 2004: 6). The unawareness of the origin of value leads people to wrongly evaluate their lives. They are happier with activities that gain money, and vice versa, losing money brings depression. Similarly, their attitude of valuable things is intensive and explicit. Commodity fetishism is a symptom of alienation whereby some people become obsessed by the ownership of commodities. These people lose themselves in their objects, and their existence is then proved by their ownership of them. As Marx (1964) said, ‘Thus, the objectification of the human essence, both in its theoretical and practical aspects, is required to make man’s sense human, as well as to create the human sense corresponding to the entire wealth of human and natural substance’ (p. 141). In other words, ownership of objects, or commodities, in the context of capitalism, conveys status on their owners and brings feelings of well-being. Meanwhile, the absence of commodities clearly defines their situation of poverty. Possessing luxury commodities or collecting unique ones is the common way to signify the wealth, status, power, lifestyle and social relations of their owners. Money and often precious metals become the highest of fetishised things, appearing to have innate power. Owning them often becomes the goal of many people instead of being the means to live their lives. The empirical evidence I present in the case studies (part 4) will show how people were worried when they have less. Their feelings were strongly affected by commodity fetishism when they lost their objects – that is, via reduced incomes. This suggests that some people had exposed their identities through their preoccupation with commodities. Commodity fetishism does all this, while concealing the real relations between those who produce and those who exchange. Such negative impacts of commodity fetishism are shown clearly in difficult times, such as in economic crises. It is to this that we now turn.

#### Thus, the standard is resisting against commodification. To clarify, the aff is only concerned with the *procedures* of resisting commodification and proposes exposing the flawed logic of commodity fetishism as a syllogistic pre-req and rupturing of the capitalistic ideology and structure.

#### Prefer additionally –

#### 1 – [Balaranjan 20] Current practices addressing warming are manifestations of fetishized narratives of nature and class antagonism between the Global North/South divide that inevitably fails and results in increased appropriation

Balaranjan 20 [(Sarun Balaranhan, McMaster University | McMaster Arts and Science, Bachelor of Arts and Science)“View of Marxist Commodity Fetishization Encoded in Illusory Environmental Policy.” Uwaterloo.ca, 2021, openjournals.uwaterloo.ca/index.php/jirr/article/view/1674/2091. Accessed 27 Aug. 2021.] Comrade PW

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Analysis: Commodity Fetishism and Marxist Rhetoric in Environmental Policy Through the lens of Marxist rhetoric, I aim to show that climate change policy strategies are shrouded by their unapologetic emphasis of commodity fetishism. Through this, they inhibit their ability to mitigate climate change, and will instead serve only to broaden the absolute class conflict of our time: the Global North-South divide. Limitless growth is one of the foundations capitalist structures are built on. Current international environmental policy fails to oppose the capitalist ideal of infinite growth. This is exemplified best in the most recent global climate change policy event: the 2019 UN Climate Action Summit. Political leaders and climate change advocates pat each other on the back for their progressive action when in reality, the international policy decisions reached during this conference do not bode well for the fate of humanity. The U.S., apex of consumer culture, did not speak (Beuret, 2019). China, one of the most significant contributors to climate change, did not change any goals from the Paris Accord of 2016 (Beauret, 2019). India, a nation on the verge of possession by consumerist culture (Beauret, 2019), decided on unrestrained coal use in the name of economic growth (Beauret, 2019). However, the transition from coal or oil to renewables is not of paramount concern to my argument. Instead, it is the fact that nowhere in the agreements is it considered to be of dire importance to change the behaviours and views that result in the global usage of this amount of energy and resources. Marxist theory challenges reactionary approaches to global problems, which can provide analysis of these global institutions’ decisions. In The Communist Manifesto, Marx (1847) asserts that the “lower middle class. . . fight against the bourgeoisie, to save from extinction their existence as fractions of the middle class. . . They are reactionary, for they try to roll back the wheel of history” (p.11). This “lower middle class”, shifted to a global scale, should be interpreted to mean everyone from working classes to upper-middle classes of the Global North. They are in fact still Bourgeoisie in a global context, and came out in droves for the climate protests. This subset of the Bourgeoisie, which Marx (1847) refers to as the petite or socialist Bourgeoisie, is characterized as “fluctuating between proletariat and bourgeoisie, and ever renewing itself a supplementary part of bourgeois society” (p.23). We, the denizens of the Global North, remain fearful of being demoted to the proletariat that constitutes the South, and so we become lawyers and activists and advocates against the symptoms of the financial crisis of climate change: environmental degradation. Hence, the majority of the North petite bourgeoisie look towards action that is reactionary in nature to enforce their existence as bourgeoisie and reassert existing economic structures of power. This is visible in the results of the aforementioned international summit surrounding climate change. The Global North’s petite Bourgeoisie attack the true bourgeoisie that comprise the global top 1% with climate change policy that imposes moderate restrictions on these owners of transnational organizations, all the while ensuring their own place in the North. The petite bourgeoisie generate climate action that requires minimal motion on their behalf to change the behaviours and culture that has ensued in this sordid state of affairs. Therefore, despite society’s tendencies to infer that environmental policy is progressive on the political spectrum, it is entirely reactionary in nature. The shrouded content of the 2019 UN Climate Change Summit can be further uncloaked through John Bellamy Foster’s (2019) statement in “Absolute Capitalism”, that “in absolute capitalism, absolute, abstract value dominates. In a system that focuses above all on financial wealth, exchange value is removed from any direct connection to use value. The inevitable result is a fundamental and rapidly growing rift between capitalist commodity society and the planet.” This returns us to inquire into how we conceptualize the environment, as the summit discussions unfolded with a distinct perspective. The exchange value of environmental resources is at the forefront of negotiations. As a result, nations like India are spurred towards harmful coal use in pursuit of a capitalist commodity nation reminiscent of the North (Beuret, 2019). This conceptualization of the environment can be further analyzed by rerouting Marx’s definition of the lumpenproletariat. The lumpenproletariat is the lowest strata of the proletariat; a class that does not contribute to the economy while still experiencing the bourgeoisie’s exploitation (Marx, 1847). Through this lens, we can understand the objective commodification of nature in Marxist dialectic. Nature does not contribute to an economy in the form of labour, but is exploited nonetheless as a resource, and so, the natural environment can be understood as the lumpenproletariat. This assertion can be linked with the Marxist (1967) provision in Capital on commodity fetishism: that relations connecting the labour of individuals are “material relations between persons and social relations between things” (p.2) to conclude the alienation of man from nature. The consumer of the Global North does not see either the Global South or nature as deserving of the dignity in social relations, but instead perceives them as simply the producers of material goods. Retrofitting the term lumpenproletariat to indicate “environment” elucidates that there is no social relation between the individual producer and the environment. This means that the relationship between producers of the Global South have been degraded by capitalist economic structures such that the environment wanes in social value and exists only for material use. The material relation is grounded within the physical interaction between the producer who extracts resources and the lumpenproletariat being exploited, while any intrinsic value comes from the North’s manufacturing of goods with these raw resources. Therefore, labour value can be equated to the natural resources of the environment under this new age of neoliberalism, and this conceptualization of the environment is crucial moving forwards. With regards to decreasing carbon emissions, the president of the World Resources Institute, Andrew Steer, has exclaimed that “most of the major economies fell woefully short of increasing their targets. Those who promise to achieve carbon neutrality by 2050 are unsure how to do it” (World Resources Institute, 2019). This calls for further inquisition into the social character of the strategies being used to meet these targets. There exist two prevalent strategies through which nations aim to meet these carbon targets. Namely, these are the implementation of a carbon tax or the introduction of a “cap and trade” program. The carbon tax is paid by businesses and industries that produce carbon dioxide through their operations (Van Beuren, 2014). The tax is designed to reduce the output of greenhouse gases and carbon dioxide with the goal of environmental stewardship as firms opt out of producing carbon dioxide in their transactions (Van Beuren, 2014). In juxtaposition, the “cap and trade” is an initiative wherein the government issues a limited number of annual permits that allow companies to emit a certain amount of carbon dioxide (Van Beuren, 2014). The allotted level of emissions is what is referred to as the “cap”. Companies are taxed when they exceed the limits of their emissions, but companies that reduce their emissions can “trade” these unused permits to other companies (Van Beuren, 2014). One must admit, there is an astounding absurdity in the two established solutions to capitalist-induced climate change being further commodification — this time, of pollution. John Bellamy Foster (2019) describes this peculiar direction of policy when he writes in “Absolute Capitalism” that “the principal strategic aim of which is to embed the state in capitalist market relations.” Given these strategies, it is apparent that institutions aim to maneuver the mitigation of climate change, so it operates within the neoliberal state, but this feat is ineffective in achieving the original goal. Marx (1847) substantiates the problematic nature of “cap and trade” when he asserts that free trade is a veiled political illusion for brutal exploitation. This affirms the notion that the existence of “cap and trade” is merely an attempt, veiled under the guise of progressive climate action, for further exploitation between those who can afford the emissions and those who cannot. The commodification of carbon dioxide attaches a social relation between the carbon dioxide emitted by industrial producers, because commodity fetishization turns the social relations between people into social relations between material goods. The social relations between manufacturers is no longer an interaction between people but can be boiled down to an exchange of carbon credits. Marx (1867) enforces this notion by proclaiming that “the mutual relations of the producers, within which the social character of their labour affirms itself, takes the form of a social relation between the products” (p.1). “Cap and trade” policies have undergone exactly what Marx described. Producers, in an environmental context, are unable to correctly value the labour of the Global South because “cap and trade” allows them to view this labour in the context of social relations between carbon credit exchange. Essentially, the “cap and trade” policies intend to assign material value between humanity and the exploited environment, and, in doing so, demolish the social relationship with the environment that is crucial to stewardship. Instead, the social character of the lumpenproletariat, or nature, is reduced to social value in the form of the carbon credit products that nature “labours” to create. The social relation between carbon emissions and capital becomes the defining relationship between man and nature through commodity fetishism. Ascribing monetary sums to carbon emissions in the form of taxation is, as Marx (1867) states in Capital, a “value that converts every product into a social hieroglyphic” (p.3). Members of society are now coerced into discerning carbon dioxide emissions’ value based on the labour’s peculiar social character which produces these pollutants. The social character of labour is the conditions and perspective from which that labour is valued. The economic freedom to release carbon dioxide has been commodified, which is peculiar in that the labour which produces these pollutants is generally lucrative to the Bourgeoisie. As is, the carbon tax transforms carbon dioxide into a highly valued commodity that is inversely proportional to the well-being of the planet. This is indicative of this policy’s flawed conceptualization of the environment; however, it is valuable to note that assigning negative value to carbon emissions is the most effective method of coaxing a sustainable relationship with the environment while the world is locked in neoliberal economic structures. Unfortunately, both the freedom to emit carbon dioxide and produce industrial goods are commodified in this system. Thus, it fetishizes nature and creates opportunity for exploitation. Again, we must adjust Marxist rhetoric to unmask the preconceived notions that exist within the current economic climate. Marx (1867) asserts in Capital that “exchange value is a definite social manner of expressing the amount of labour bestowed upon an object, nature has no more to do with it” (p.6). Marx means to convey that the exchange of labour in producing a material good has socially constructed value that ignores the role in which nature plays as a supplier of natural resources. This assertion is clearly flawed given that nature plays the role of the lumpenproletariat in the current ecological crisis. As such, nature partakes in labour to produce natural resources, which warrants consideration of its exchange value. Through the carbon tax or “cap and trade” implementations, the environment is able to acquire social value. However, subsequently, nature is exploited under the guise of the environment being “paid back” for industrial damage in the form of taxes or imposed value in the form of carbon credits, which firms can transfer between each other. In reality, the social value placed on nature in the form of carbon taxes or “cap and trade” policies is an example of how commodity fetishization is utilized to further alienate mankind from the environment. To truly decloak contemporary climate change policy, we must comprehend the economic role that such policy plays in stunting the Global South’s development, thereby deepening the despotic dynamic between North and South. This suppression is the systematic failure of seemingly progressive policies to promote climate change mitigation. These policies are manifestations of this very class antagonism, because they do little to address the inequalities encoded within. Perhaps one of the most apt statements Marx (1847) unwittingly made regarding the modern class conflict was that “the socialist bourgeois want all the advantages of modern social conditions without the struggles and dangers necessarily resulting therefrom” (p.27). The petite Bourgeois of the North crave endless variety in consumption — food, technology, fashion, etc. — while simultaneously dealing with the climate crisis through protests, metal straws, and poorly-adhered-to policy changes. Marx (1847) explains how the Bourgeois gets past these crises as such: “on the one hand, by enforced destruction of a mass of productive forces; on the other, by the conquest of new markets, and by the more thorough exploitation of the old ones” (p.8). The Global North is already conducting a methodical razing of nature, but to progress through the crisis of climate change unscathed requires further exploitation of the South. The commodity fetishism encoded in carbon emission policies shifts the focus of climate change resolution towards the arbitrary effort to lower these emissions, because, as previously established, carbon dioxide has been assigned tangible social value. This fetishization remains implicit in the current proposed strategies for mitigation, which do not call for fair trade of natural resources or tangible decreases of consumption, and in doing so, serve only to further pauperize the South.

#### [Torres 16] Extinction — a threat multiplier that increases the risk of every other extinction scenarios

Torres 16 [Phil Torres, conservationist, science advocate, and educator, with a BS in entomology from Cornell, working on a PhD at Rice University in tropical conservation biology, he is a biologist, science communicator, photographer, and television host based in New York City who works projects all over the globe, Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies Affiliate Scholar, 8-7-2016, IEET, "Climate Change Is the Most Urgent Existential Risk", <https://ieet.org/index.php/IEET2/more/Torres20160807>] someone//PW

Humanity faces a number of formidable challenges this century. Threats to our collective survival stem from asteroids and comets, supervolcanoes, global pandemics, climate change, biodiversity loss, nuclear weapons, biotechnology, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, and artificial superintelligence. With such threats in mind, an informal survey conducted by the Future of Humanity Institute placed the probability of human extinction this century at 19%. To put this in perspective, it means that the average American is more than a thousand times more likely to die in a human extinction event than a plane crash.\* So, given limited resources, which risks should we prioritize? Many intellectual leaders, including Elon Musk, Stephen Hawking, and Bill Gates, have suggested that artificial superintelligence constitutes one of the most significant risks to humanity. And this may be correct in the long-term. But I would argue that two other risks, namely **climate change** and biodiveristy loss, **should take priority** right now **over every other known threat**. Why? Because these **ongoing catastrophes** in slow-motion **will frame our existential predicament on Earth** not just for the rest of this century, but for literally thousands of years to come. As such, **they** have the capacity to **raise** or lower **the probability of other risks scenarios** unfolding. Multiplying Threats Ask yourself the following: are **wars more** or less **likely in a world marked by extreme weather events**, mega**droughts, food supply disruptions, and sea-level rise**? Are **terrorist attacks more** or less lik**ely in a world beset by the collapse of global ecosystems**, agricultural failures, **economic uncertainty, and political instability**? Both government officials and scientists agree that the answer is “more likely.” For example, the current Director of the CIA, John Brennan, recently identified “the impact of climate change” as one of the “deeper causes of this rising instability” in countries like Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Ukraine. Similarly, the former Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel, has described climate change as **a “threat multiplier”** with “the potential to **exacerbate** many of the **challenges we are dealing with today** — from infectious disease to terrorism.” The Department of Defense has also affirmed a connection. In a 2015 report, it states, “Global climate change will aggravate problems such as poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectual leadership and weak political institutions that threaten stability in a number of countries.” Scientific studies have further shown a connection between the environmental crisis and violent conflicts. For example, a 2015 paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences argues that climate change was a causal factor behind the record-breaking 2007-2010 **drought** in Syria. This drought led to a mass migration of farmers into urban centers, which **fueled** the 2011 **Syrian civil war**. Some observers, including myself, have suggested that this struggle could be the beginning of World War III, given the complex tangle of international involvement and overlapping interests. The study’s conclusion is also significant because the Syrian civil war was the Petri dish in which the Islamic State consolidated its forces, later emerging as the largest and most powerful terrorist organization in human history. A Perfect Storm The point is that **climate change** and biodiversity loss could very easily **push societies to the brink of collapse**. This will exacerbate existing geopolitical tensions and introduce entirely new power struggles between state and nonstate actors. At the same time, advanced technologies will very likely become increasingly powerful and accessible. As I’ve written elsewhere, the malicious agents of the future will have bulldozers rather than shovels to dig mass graves for their enemies. The result is a perfect storm of more conflicts in the world along with unprecedentedly dangerous weapons. If the conversation were to end here, we’d have ample reason for placing climate change and biodiversity loss at the top of our priority lists. But there are other reasons they ought to be considered urgent threats. I would argue that they could make humanity more vulnerable to a catastrophe involving superintelligence and even asteroids. The basic reasoning is the same for both cases. Consider superintelligence first. Programming a superintelligence whose values align with ours is a formidable task even in stable circumstances. As Nick Bostrom argues in his 2014 book, we should recognize the “default outcome” of superintelligence to be “doom.” Now imagine trying to solve these problems amidst a rising tide of interstate wars, civil unrest, terrorist attacks, and other tragedies? The societal stress caused by climate change and biodiversity loss will almost certainly compromise important conditions for creating friendly AI, such as sufficient funding, academic programs to train new scientists, conferences on AI, peer-reviewed journal publications, and communication/collaboration between experts of different fields, such as computer science and ethics. It could even make an “AI arms race” more likely, thereby raising the probability of a malevolent superintelligence being created either on purpose or by mistake. Similarly, imagine that astronomers discover a behemoth asteroid barreling toward Earth. Will designing, building, and launching a spacecraft to divert the assassin past our planet be easier or more difficult in a world preoccupied with other survival issues? In a relatively peaceful world, one could imagine an asteroid actually bringing humanity together by directing our attention toward a common threat. But if the “conflict multipliers” of climate change and biodiversity loss have already catapulted civilization into chaos and turmoil, I strongly suspect that humanity will become more, rather than less, susceptible to dangers of this sort. Context Risks We can describe the dual threats of climate change and biodiversity loss as “context risks.” Neither is likely to directly cause the extinction of our species. But both will define the context in which civilization confronts all the other threats before us. In this way, they could indirectly **contribute to the overall** danger of **annihilation** — and this worrisome effect could be significant. For example, according to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, **the effects** of climate change **will be “severe,” “pervasive,” and “irreversible**.” Or, as a 2016 study published in Nature and authored by over twenty scientists puts it, the consequences of climate change “will extend longer than the entire history of human civilization thus far.” Furthermore, a recent article in Science Advances confirms that humanity has already escorted the biosphere into the sixth mass extinction event in life’s 3.8 billion year history on Earth. Yet another study suggests that we could be approaching a sudden, irreversible, catastrophic collapse of the global ecosystem. If this were to occur, it could result in “widespread social unrest, economic instability and loss of human life.” Given the potential for **environmental degradation** to **elevate the likelihood of nuclear wars, nuclear terrorism, engineered pandemics**, a superintelligence takeover, and perhaps even an impact winter, it ought to take precedence over all other risk concerns — at least in the near-term. Let’s make sure we get our priorities straight.

#### 2 – [N&M 19] Creates societal norms immersed in immediate pleasures linked with commodities that results in the social amnesia of the exploitation within the process – freezes actions

Nichols & Martinez 19 [(Randy Nichols has a Ph.D. in Communication and Society at the University of Oregon. Martínez is a scholar who specializes in international communication and the political economy of communication. | Political Economy of Media Industries: Global Transformations and Challenges|)<http://library.lol/main/5EBD8D76ACE9DEE37C9260760B34B376> |P263 - 264|Published 2019|Accessed August 29, 2021] Comrade PW

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Epistemes of Time and Commodity Fetishism The fetishism of commodity exchange as an ideological process can be understood in psychological terms. For consumers in a capitalist society, purchasing, owning, and gaining pleasure from a commodity represses the realization that workers made such activities possible. This entails a shared sense of forgetting or social amnesia about the causal linkages between labor and the commodity (Billig, 1999). A geospatial dimension operates here; the awareness of labor exploitation within networks of production, transportation, and distribution is unrecognized. Labor commodity linkages are also chronological; goods are produced and assembled before they are purchased and consumed. It is this beforeness which is elided, psychologically and socially, by the omnipresence of commodity exchange. The twin problematic of remembering-forgetting and before-after brings us to temporality, an epistemic ground for understanding the relationalities between past, present, and future. A digressive consideration of such relationalities will extend our critique of commodity fetishism. Temporality is inherent to memory, expectation, and attention to the present. These are manifestations of lived time that have no necessary connection to any supervening conception of time deriving from religion or science. Temporality can be observed or experienced in the intersecting domains of self, intersubjectivity, social identity, bureaucratic institutions, and society at large. Various temporal orientations are also built into the operations of nation states, economies, polities, legal systems, international institutions, and transnational organizations. In these contexts, the study of memory draws together insights from psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literary studies, and mediacommunication studies. In general, one can make a central distinction between personal recall and constitutions of collective memory that may be institutionalized, oppositionally expressed, and/or fundamentally contested on the grounds of religion, culture, or political ideology (Zelizer, 1995). Of course, orientations toward the past and memories of the past could not occur if they did not coexist with the present. Without examining the intricacies of this coexistence, one can acknowledge an equally problematic relationship between present and future. Here, Barbara Adam and Chris Groves’ sub-definitions of futurity and its lack are illustrative (Adam & Groves, 2007). For example, habits of mind that are subsumed by present interests and imperatives regard the future as a void to be filled by unfolding events as chronological time passes. Such events, as they arise, will simply reflect the modus operandi which prevails in the present. By contrast, scenario planning describes possible futures, according to internally consistent assumptions about key development potentials within institutions and social totalities. Obvious examples include macroeconomic and intra-sectoral planning along with technological research and development. A related concept, futures-in-the-making, refers to future-orientated actions that are progressing within an unfolding present. There are general parameters of future-oriented change, but the content of this change cannot be fully established in advance. The full temporal context of futurity is exemplified by memories of the future. In this formulation, the past contains plans, visions, and ambitions concerning the future which were (in retrospect) either realized or unrealized (Adams & Groves, 2007). In the latter case, the recovery of potential futures from the past may facilitate or inspire contemporary orientations toward the future. Consumer culture induces myopia as well as amnesia. Commodity exchange in the purchase of commodity objects or services elides critical appreciations of futurity at two levels. Specifically, when an owned commodity is resold, given away, or discarded, its future is of no consequence for the (former) consumer. Such a commodity may be refined, repurposed, reassembled, and/or redistributed in ways that involve further labor exploitation. A discarded commodity may deplete ecological and biospheric surroundings. In the case of electronic equipment, devices, wirings, and screens, toxic dumps attract waste pickers; these are informal laborers who work to construct further nodes of commodity exchange. At a general level, myopia concerning the future life of commodities precludes any prospective understanding of how labor commodity relationships might develop over time. The possible futures of given capitalist economies are, therefore, likely to elude public depiction. Because commodity fetishism entails the repression of memory and futurity, it foregrounds an atemporal present. Mass-mediated advertising has long served to reify the immediacy of consumer desire. From the mid-1990s, MP3 players, digital cameras, internet search engines, handheld remotes, and multifunctional phones opened up new timesaving opportunities for consumers. Personal media technologies were easy to operate, ready-to-hand, and offered instant access to purchasable commodities. The culture of consumption shifted from an emphasis on the enjoyment of continued possession to that of “the immediate and repeated appropriation of new goods” (Tomlinson, 2007, p. 137). Quickening rhythms of consumption became intimately associated with technological mediations of presentness.

#### **3 – [Preciado 13] Capitalists’ prioritization of interests and its inherent nature to produce contradictions makes sterilization of “deviant” bodies justified for the purpose of economic growth**

Preciado 13 [Paul Preciado, (Paul B. Preciado, is a writer, philosopher and curator whose work focuses on applied and theoretical topics relating to identity, gender, pornography, architecture and sexuality.) Testo Junkie. p. 173-181.]//RGDM//recut PW

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During the period when the notion of gender, the H-bomb, silicone breast implants, electric prostheses, the computer, and Formica furnishings begin circulating in Western societies, a pioneering domestic, portable, and consumable nanotechnology of hormonal modification is produced. In 1951, a mistake made by Gregory Pincus at G. D. Searle and Company laboratories leads to the invention of the first contraceptive pill in the form of the molecule norethindrone, a synthetic variant of the active molecule progesterone that can be administered orally. The production of a portable and edible contraceptive pill enables the entrance of synthetic hormones (and therefore endocrinological and governmental birth control techniques) into the domestic space, which becomes a consumption/production knot within the pharmacological network. This is part of a larger biopolitical process of the medicalization and pharmacological regulation of domesticity that was already at work earlier in the twentieth century. At the farthest boundary of the same traffic, moving from the domestic to the colony, endocrinological programs for controlling natality and gender production were targeting the racialized body, circulating first within the slavery trade and later within urban segregated spaces, as well as the “disabled,” or the “sexually deviant.” As we will see, most clinical trials with sexual hormones are done in colonial settings, in psychiatric institutions (where homosexual, intersexual, and transsexual bodies, regarded as physical or mentally ill, are submitted to endocrinological and surgical procedures), and in penitentiaries and correctional institutions until hormones, produced and designed as consumption goods, end up being absorbed into the everyday American heterosexual domestic space. There is a Pill geography where bodies, fluids, molecules, and capital are produced and distributed. An examination of the economic and technical networks that resulted in the production of the Pill reveals that, while originating with Pincus’s project, the Pill was perfected by John Rock within the unexpected framework of experimental research on aiding procreation for sterile white Catholic families. Pincus’s and Rock’s research projects, although conflicting in relation to their vision of the function of white women in society, shared an understanding of nonwhite and deviant subjects as bodies whose reproductive power should be restricted by the state in order to “reduce hunger, poverty, and disease while fostering economic stability.” The antibaby molecule was intended to be made into a “simple, cheap, safe contraceptive to be used in poverty-stricken slums, jungles, and among the most ignorant people.” In the context of an emerging politicization of racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities in the United States, the contraceptive molecule was thought of as an urban eugenic device and as a method of controlling nonwhite population growth, as well as the population growth of nations that had not yet entered postwar liberal capitalist economies. Protocols of research and evaluation of the Pill’s technical effectiveness reveal its disciplinary and colonial roots. After the success of the preliminary Boston trials for the Pill in 1954 and 1955, John Rock and Gregory Pincus needed a large-scale human group to test the new molecule in order to receive approval from the US Food and Drug Administration, or FDA, to bring the drug to market. The first large clinical contraceptive pill trials were performed by Searle on several groups of female psychiatric patients at Worcester State Hospital and on male prison inmates in the state of Oregon in 1956–57. The tests were intended to measure the effectiveness of using synthetic oral hormones as a method of birth control in women, and also the effectiveness of these substances in controlling and decreasing “homosexual tendencies” in men. In fact, the relationship between hormonal research and the Worcester State Hospital was crucial for the development of the Pill. Founder and feminist activist Katherine McCormick had decided to invest in research on the Pill in order to fight the hereditary transmission of mental illness. Her husband was diagnosed with schizophrenia, and since at that time the illness was considered hereditary, she tried to locate a safe way of preventing pregnancy in people suffering from the condition who were potential parents. In 1944, the McCormicks helped Dr. Hudson Hoagland found the Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, dedicated to the study of the influence of hormones on mental conditions, and this transformed the Worcester Hospital into a major pharmacological laboratory. Constructed in 1833 following the Thomas S. Kirkbride plan, also known as the “building as cure” theory, according to which architecture itself was meant to have a therapeutic effect, the Worcester State Hospital in Massachusetts was one of the most prestigious institutions of its time, well known for having been visited by Freud in 1909 when he traveled to the United States. The Worcester State Hospital was the American version of the modern machine à guérir (cure machine), to use the expression coined by JacquesRené Tenon in his Mémoires sur les hôpitaux de Paris (1788), which Michel Foucault used as the key document in his study of the emergence of a new set of techniques of “public hygiene” that came to spatialize the sick body within the modern city. As Foucault argued, after the end of the eighteenth century, the modern hospital and the prison became the paradigmatic architectures of a pervasive medicalization of social and political space. A visual and spatial machinery to produce knowledge about madness and reason, the Worcester Hospital combined prison architecture with large collective rooms and numerous workshops for experimental treatment, such as saunas and rotating chairs intended to cure patients. Whereas the architecture and the treatment were still derived from the nineteenth-century disciplinary biopolitical model for understanding madness and therapy, the hospital also introduced within its walls new “soft” and molecular techniques invented during the Cold War period. But mental and prison institutions were not ideal settings for testing the Pill. The Worcester and Oregon trials were not enough to obtain approval from the FDA to commercialize the Pill or to test the ability of ordinary women to take the Pill regularly outside medical institutions. Since strong anti–birth control laws in Massachusetts and in many other states made it impossible for Searle to conduct the large study of humans required by the FDA, it turned to Puerto Rico, which already had a long history of governmental birth control programs. The pseudocolonial island of Puerto Rico became the most important clinical site for testing the Pill outside the national disciplinary institutions of the asylum and the prison and functioned as a parallel, life-sized biopolitical pharmacological laboratory and factory during the late 1950s and early 1960s. During the Cold War period, Puerto Rico would become the United States’ biggest pharmacological backyard. The island was the invisible factory behind the Playboy mansion and the white liberated middle-class American housewife. In 1955, American physician Edris Rice-Wray, the medical director of the Puerto Rican Family Planning Association, already working with Searle, offered Pincus the possibility of conducting the Pill trials at Rio Piedras, a suburb of San Juan where a new housing project had been set up as part of a slum clearance campaign. In the summer of 1955, Pincus visited Puerto Rico and immediately decided that the Rio Piedras housing was the perfect location for a large-population, long-term Pill trial. The general features of legally enforced pharmacological experimentation in an environment of imposed isolation spread from Europe and North America to colonial and postcolonial regions, transforming the design models of their penal and medical institutions. Puerto Rico was a paradigmatic case of transition from the colonial regime to postcolonial economic and political control. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Spanish colonial regime left the island overpopulated and in extreme poverty. After the end of the anticolonial war of 1898, the island became a US territory. Already in 1917, the Puerto Rican ruling classes and the American government, inspired by neo-Malthusianism ideas, had drawn up the first population control plan for the island. In 1925, in the overpopulated slums of Ponce, Dr. José A. Lanause Rolón founded the Birth Control League, built on an educational program. These early birth control programs understood sterilization as a safe means of reducing natality and “cleansing” the slums, where reduction of population was to be a first step followed by urban modernization and the development of employment, to transform agrarian Puerto Rico into an industrial economy. In fact, Puerto Rico was not a stranger to forced sterilizations. As early as 1907, the United States had instituted public policy that gave the state the right “to sterilize unwilling and unwitting people.” By 1936, there were more than one hundred birth control clinics operating on the island under federal law. As Katherine Krase has argued, in order to “catalyze economic growth” and respond to “depression era unemployment,” in 1937 the “Eugenics Board” passed Law 136, an event that signified the institutionalization of these population control programs and the legalization of sterilization techniques. “Both U.S. government funds and contributions from private individuals supported the initiative.” Laws similar to Law 136 were passed in thirty states. These policies identified the “insane,” the “feebleminded,” the “dependent,” and the “diseased” as incapable of regulating their own reproductive abilities, thereby justifying government-imposed sterilizations. Legitimizing sterilization for certain groups led to further exploitation, as group divisions were made along race, class, and disability lines. From the beginning of the experimental trials with hormones, the challenge was how to switch from animals to human subjects confined to institutions and finally to the general population. As McCormick infamously said, in stressing the connection between imprisonment and scientific control, the key issue was to find a “cage of ovulating females”: “Human females are not easy to investigate as are rabbits in cages. The latter can be intensively controlled all the time, whereas the human females leave town at unexpected times so cannot be examined at a certain period; and they also forget to take the medicine sometimes—in which case the whole experiment has to begin over again, —for scientific accuracy must be maintained or the resulting data are worthless.” For Pincus, the island of Puerto Rico offered the most accessible and most easily monitored population pool that McCormick could ever want: the island itself was already a hermetic cage. Puerto Rican women were considered to be not only as docile as laboratory animals, but also as poor and uneducated and therefore an exemplary group: if they could follow the regimen involved in taking the Pill, any white American woman could do the same. The island of Puerto Rico itself was treated as an extended, nonwhite, female body to which the Pill was administered in terms of what Foucault called “urban therapeutics.” As historians of medicine Jordan Goodman, Anthony McElligot, and Lara Marks have shown, Puerto Rico’s trials are not an exception but rather belong to a larger history of colonial and hygienist scientific experimentation involving humans that occurred during the twentieth century: “Doctors and biohygenists became the determinators of a bioracially constituted state; they saw themselves as its gatekeepers and guardians, programmed with the mission to secure a utopian healthy society.” However, after World War II, with the scandals of Nazi medicine and the Nuremberg Code, the role of the state in pharmacological and medical experimentation became less clearly visible, as this experimentation moved from state institutions to industrial pharmacological companies. As part of a larger mutation from a disciplinary to a pharmacopornographic regime, “research became ‘de-centered’ as it became more commercialized, and moved beyond the immediate sphere of the state or state-related agencies and transcended national borders, borne on the wings of multinational corporations.” The birth control programs tested in Puerto Rico clearly show the complicity between national eugenic programs and private pharmacological interests before the war and the transition from the colonial and state model to the postcolonial and neoliberal multinational model of drug production and population control after the 1940s.

#### 4 – [Lutz 09] We can’t claim our own subjectivity without breaking through the veil of commodity fetishism – pre-req for us to engage in debate and have real meaningful discussions

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Alienated in an imaginary other that presents the appearance of a unified self, the subject of capitalism understands his or her existence through the ‘‘empty speech’’ of the commodity, a me´connaissance that reproduces the negative effects of commodity fetishism on human lives. Always found alongside commodity fetishism, indeed, a condition that forms an irreducible aspect of its continued existence, is profound psychological and physical impoverishment. As a subjective process understood within the entire ensemble of social and economic relations constitutive of capitalism, fetishism is underwritten by a libidinal economy of the subject that functions to reproduce psychic impotence, an economy predicated upon the presence of an absence, or better, a fragmentation of subjectivity engendered by the contradictions endemic to the social relations of production and exchange. Commodities operate as objects of social desire invested with the magical ability to fulfill desires that, because they are substitutions for basic human needs derived from economic relations that simultaneously engender and negate those same needs, can only result in the deprivation of active, creative human satisfactions. In this sense, fetishism functions as a mechanism of concealment: ‘‘[t]he fetish itself\*/a photograph, a lock of hair, or whatever is chosen\*/becomes invested with presence, and so symbolically ‘stands in’ for absence or loss’’ (Gamman and Makinen 1995, 27). The material presence of the commodity as a fetish points to an absence both in the objective relations between subjects, that is to say, the absence of genuine community, and within the psychic economy of individuals. The hidden but all too real effect of this dialectical relationship between the libidinal economy of subjects and the objective economic process is powerlessness, an existential condition of lack that must be reproduced in order to sustain the consumption of substitutive satisfactions in the form of commodities and money. From the standpoint of a Marxian theory of subjectivity, the compulsion to consume or hoard exchange value derives from the substitution of money and commodities for the kinds of activities that would exist in a society of freely associated producers, a process which, through the internalization of social contradictions as much as the material reality of these contradictions, deprives subjects of the ability to develop themselves. In this way, Marx dramatically illustrates the contradiction between the social process immanent in the commodity, a process that entails the progressive domination of human subjects, and the emancipatory promise that all commodities present in their mystified form. To the extent that capitalism requires, under pain of its own extinction, the quantitative expansion of existing consumption, the creation of new needs by propagating existing ones in the widest possible circle, the production of new needs, and the discovery and creation of new use values (Marx 1973, 408), it sets in motion an irrational process that inverts the natural relationship between human beings and nature, a relationship where individuals would have the capacity to realize themselves through their self-objectification in labor, and undermines their capacity to engage in self-originating activities that might genuinely enrich them and allow for the creation of an authentic community. To the extent that the commodity continues to serve as an epistemological category, its true character as a form of domination remains invisible to the subject of capitalism; however, the double existence of the commodity as a material manifestation of relations of domination and as an idealized representation of autonomy corresponds to the double existence of subjects under capitalism. Marx’s theory of fetishism describes not simply the contradictions immanent in the objective relations of production and exchange, but contradictions played out in the consciousness of subjects, contradictions that must be viewed, in part, as constitutive of subjectivity itself. As Jack Amariglio and Antonio Callari aptly put it, Marx’s theory of ‘‘commodity fetishism depicts the social constitution of the individual as a ‘precondition’ for commodity trade as much as an effect of this trade’’ (1993, 190).

#### 5 – [S&W 15] Only an abstract theorization and a unified ideological framework can adequately challenge capitalism, anything else is reactionary

Srnicek and Williams 15 [(Nick is a Lecturer in Digital Economy in the Department of Digital Humanities. He is interested the development of Marxist economics and engaged in the long tradition of anti-work politics. Alex Williams is a lecturer in the sociology department at City, University of London. ) *Inventing the Future: Postcapitalism and a World Without Work*. P27 – P31. Published in 2015. Accessed September 1st 2021.] Comrade PW

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What is folk politics? Folk politics names a constellation of ideas and intuitions within the contemporary left that informs the common-sense ways of organising, acting and thinking politics. It is a set of strategic assumptions that threatens to debilitate the left, rendering it unable to scale up, create lasting change or expand beyond particular interests. Leftist movements under the sway of folk politics are not only unlikely to be successful – they are in fact incapable of transforming capitalism. The term itself draws upon two senses of ‘folk’. First, it evokes critiques of folk psychology which argue that our intuitive conceptions of the world are both historically constructed and often mistaken.11 Secondly, it refers to ‘folk’ as the locus of the small-scale, the authentic, the traditional and the natural. Both of these dimensions are implied in the idea of folk politics. As a first approximation, we can therefore define folk politics as a collective and historically constructed political common sense that has become out of joint with the actual mechanisms of power. As our political, economic, social and “technological world changes, tactics and strategies which were previously capable of transforming collective power into emancipatory gains have now become drained of their effectiveness. As the common sense of today’s left, folk politics often operates intuitively, uncritically and unconsciously. Yet common sense is also historical and mutable. It is worth recalling that today’s familiar forms of organisation and tactics, far from being natural or pre-given, have instead been developed over time in response to specific political problems. Petitions, occupations, strikes, vanguard parties, affinity groups, trade unions: all arose out of particular historical conditions.12 Yet the fact that certain ways of organising and acting were once useful does not guarantee their continued relevance. Many of the tactics and organisational structures that dominate the contemporary left are responses to the experience of state communism, exclusionary trade unions, and the collapse of social democratic parties. Yet the ideas that made sense in the wake of those moments no longer present effective tools for political transformation. Our world has moved on, becoming more complex, abstract, nonlinear and global than ever before. Against the abstraction and inhumanity of capitalism, folk politics aims to bring politics down to the ‘human scale’ by emphasising temporal, spatial and conceptual immediacy. At its heart, folk politics is the guiding intuition that immediacy is always better and often more authentic, with the corollary being a deep suspicion of abstraction and mediation. In terms of temporal immediacy, contemporary folk politics typically remains reactive (responding to actions initiated by corporations and governments, rather than initiating actions);13 ignores long-term strategic goals in favour of tactics (mobilising around single-issue politics or emphasising process);14 prefers practices that are often inherently fleeting (such as occupations and temporary autonomous zones);15 chooses the familiarities of the past over the unknowns of the future (for instance, the repeated dreams of a return to ‘good’ Keynesian capitalism);16 and expresses itself as a predilection for the voluntarist and spontaneous over the institutional (as in the romanticisation of rioting and insurrection).17 In terms of spatial immediacy, folk politics privileges the local as the site of authenticity (as in the 100-miles diet or local currencies);18 habitually chooses the small over the large (as in the veneration of small-scale communities or local businesses);19 favours projects that are un-scalable beyond a small community (for instance, general assemblies and direct democracy);20 and often rejects the project of hegemony, valuing withdrawal or exit rather than building a broad counter-hegemony.21 Likewise, folk politics prefers that actions be taken by participants themselves – in its emphasis on direct action, for example – and sees decision-making as something to be carried out by each individual rather than by any representative. The problems of scale and extension are either ignored or smoothed over in folk-political thinking. Finally, in terms of conceptual immediacy, there is a preference for the everyday over the structural, valorising personal experience over systematic thinking; for feeling over thinking, emphasising individual suffering, or the sensations of enthusiasm and anger experienced during political actions; for the particular over the universal, seeing the latter as intrinsically totalitarian; and for the ethical over the political – as in ethical consumerism, or moralising critiques of greedy bankers.22 Organisations and communities are to be transparent, rejecting in advance any conceptual mediation, or even modest amounts of complexity. The classic images of universal emancipation and global change have been transformed into a prioritisation of the suffering of the particular and the authenticity of the local. As a result, any process of constructing a universal politics is rejected from the outset.

#### 6 – [Klein 07] Capitalism facilitates and relies on crisis to ensure their survival – the shock created by forced military occupation or natural disasters gives capitalism the needed time to implement neoliberal policies and continue privatization

Klein 07 [Naomi Klein is the senior correspondent of The Intercept, she is a Canadian author, social activist, and filmmaker known for her political analyses, support of ecofeminism, organized labour, left-wing politics and criticism of corporate globalization, fascism and capitalism.|The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism |library.lol/main/889E346734D1349A84C07A77A379DFC7| P6 – 10 |Accessed 1 Sept. 2021.] Comrade PW

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For more than three decades, Friedman and his powerful followers had been perfecting this very strategy: waiting for a major crisis, then selling off pieces of the state to private players while citizens were still reeling from the shock, then quickly making the "reforms" permanent. In one of his most influential essays, Friedman articulated contemporary capitalism's core tactical nostrum, what I have come to understand as the shock doctrine. He observed that "only a crisis—actual or perceived—produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable." Some people stockpile canned goods and water in preparation for major disasters; Friedmanites stockpile free-market ideas. And once a crisis has struck, the University of Chicago professor was convinced that it was crucial to act swiftly, to impose rapid and irreversible change before the crisis-racked society slipped back into the "tyranny of the status quo." He estimated that "a new administration has some six to nine months in which to achieve major changes; if it does not seize the opportunity to act decisively during that period, it will not have another such opportunity." A variation on Machiavelli's advice that injuries should be inflicted "all at once," this proved to be one of Friedman's most lasting strategic legacies. Friedman first learned how to exploit a large-scale shock or crisis in the midseventies, when he acted as adviser to the Chilean dictator, General Augusto Pinochet. Not only were Chileans in a state of shock following Pinochet's violent coup, but the country was also traumatized by severe hyperinflation. Friedman advised Pinochet to impose a rapid-fire transformation of the economy—tax cuts, free trade, privatized services, cuts to social spending and deregulation. Eventually, Chileans even saw their public schools replaced with voucher-funded private ones. It was the most extreme capitalist makeover ever attempted anywhere, and it became known as a " Chicago School" revolution, since so many of Pinochet's economists had studied under Friedman at the University of Chicago. Friedman predicted that the speed, suddenness and scope of the economic shifts would provoke psychological reactions in the public that "facilitate the adjustment." He coined a phrase for this painful tactic: economic "shock treatment." In the decades since, whenever governments have imposed sweeping free-market programs, the all-at-once shock treatment, or "shock therapy," has been the method of choice. Pinochet also facilitated the adjustment with his own shock treatments; these were performed in the regime's many torture cells, inflicted on the writhing bodies of those deemed most likely to stand in the way of the capitalist transformation. Many in Latin America saw a direct connection between the economic shocks that impoverished millions and the epidemic of torture that punished hundreds of thousands of people who believed in a different kind of society. As the Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano asked, "How can this inequality be maintained if not through jolts of electric shock? " Exactly thirty years after these three distinct forms of shock descended on Chile, the formula reemerged, with far greater violence, in Iraq. First came the war, designed, according to the authors of the Shock and Awe military doctrine, to "control the adversary's will, perceptions, and understanding and literally make an adversary impotent to act or react." Next came the radical economic shock therapy, imposed, while the country was still in flames, by the U.S. chief envoy L. Paul Bremer—mass privatization, complete free trade, a 15 percent flat tax, a dramatically downsized government. Iraq's interim trade minister, Ali Abdul-Amir Allawi, said at the time that his countrymen were "sick and tired of being the subjects of experiments. There have been enough shocks to the system, so we don't need this shock therapy in the economy." ' When Iraqis resisted, they were rounded up and taken to jails where bodies and minds were met with more shocks, these ones distinctly less metaphorical. I started researching the free market's dependence on the power of shock four years ago, during the early days of the occupation of Iraq. After reporting from Baghdad on Washington's failed attempts to follow Shock and Awe with shock therapy, I traveled to Sri Lanka, several months after the devastating 2004 tsunami, and witnessed another version of the same maneuver: foreign investors and international lenders had teamed up to use the atmosphere of panic to hand the entire beautiful coastline over to entrepreneurs who quickly built large resorts, blocking hundreds of thousands of fishing people from rebuilding their villages near the water. "In a cruel twist of fate, nature has presented Sri Lanka with a unique opportunity, and out of this great tragedy will come a world class tourism destination," the Sri Lankan government announced. 1 8 By the time Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans, and the nexus of Republican politicians, think tanks and land developers started talking about " clean sheets" and exciting opportunities, it was clear that this was now the preferred method of advancing corporate goals: using moments of collective trauma to engage in radical social and economic engineering. Most people who survive a devastating disaster want the opposite of a clean slate: they want to salvage whatever they can and begin repairing what was not destroyed; they want to reaffirm their relatedness to the places that formed them. " When I rebuild the city I feel like I'm rebuilding myself," said Cassandra Andrews, a resident of New Orleans' heavily damaged Lower Ninth Ward, as she cleared away debris after the storm. 1 9 But disaster capitalists have no interest in repairing what was. In Iraq, Sri Lanka and New Orleans, the process deceptively called " reconstruction" began with finishing the job of the original disaster by erasing what was left of the public sphere and rooted communities, then quickly moving to replace them with a kind of corporate New Jerusalem —all before the victims of war or natural disaster were able to regroup and stake their claims to what was theirs. Mike Battles puts it best: "For us, the fear and disorder offered real promise." The thirty-four-year-old ex-CIA operative was talking about how the chaos in postinvasion Iraq had helped his unknown and inexperienced private security firm, Custer Battles, to shake roughly $100 million in contracts out of the federal government. 21 His words could serve just as well as the slogan for contemporary capitalism—fear and disorder are the catalysts for each new leap forward. When I began this research into the intersection between superprofits and megadisasters, I thought I was witnessing a fundamental change in the way the drive to "liberate" markets was advancing around the world. Having been part of the movement against ballooning corporate power that made its global debut in Seattle in 1999,1 was accustomed to seeing similar businessfriendly policies imposed through arm-twisting at World Trade Organization summits, or as the conditions attached to loans from the International Monetary Fund. The three trademark demands—privatization, government deregulation and deep cuts to social spending—tended to be extremely unpopular with citizens, but when the agreements were signed there was still at least the pretext of mutual consent between the governments doing the negotiating, as well as a consensus among the supposed experts. Now the same ideological program was being imposed via the most baldly coercive means possible: under foreign military occupation after an invasion, or immediately following a cataclysmic natural disaster. September 11 appeared to have provided Washington with the green light to stop asking countries if they wanted the U.S. version of "free trade and democracy" and to start imposing it with Shock and Awe military force. As I dug deeper into the history of how this market model had swept the globe, however, I discovered that the idea of exploiting crisis and disaster has been the modus operandi of Milton Friedman's movement from the very beginning—this fundamentalist form of capitalism has always needed disasters to advance. It was certainly the case that the facilitating disasters were getting bigger and more shocking, but what was happening in Iraq and New Orleans was not a new, post-September 11 invention. Rather, these bold experiments in crisis exploitation were the culmination of three decades of strict adherence to the shock doctrine. Seen through the lens of this doctrine, the past thirty-five years look very different. Some of the most infamous human rights violations of this era, which have tended to be viewed as sadistic acts carried out by antidemocratic regimes, were in fact either committed with the deliberate intent of terrorizing the public or actively harnessed to prepare the ground for the introduction of radical free-market "reforms." In Argentina in the seventies, the junta's "disappearance" of thirty thousand people, most of them leftist activists, was integral to the imposition of the country's Chicago School policies, just as terror had been a partner for the same kind of economic metamorphosis in Chile. In China in 1989, it was the shock of the Tiananmen Square massacre and the subsequent arrests of tens of thousands that freed the hand of the Communist Party to convert much of the country into a sprawling export zone, staffed with workers too terrified to demand their rights. In Russia in 1993, it was Boris Yeltsin's decision to send in tanks to set fire to the parliament building and lock up the opposition leaders that cleared the way for the fire-sale privatization that created the country's notorious oligarchs. The Falklands War in 1982 served a similar purpose for Margaret Thatcher in the U.K.: the disorder and nationalist excitement resulting from the war allowed her to use tremendous force to crush the striking coal miners and to launch the first privatization frenzy in a Western democracy. The NATO attack on Belgrade in 1999 created the conditions for rapid privatizations in the former Yugoslavia—a goal that predated the war. Economics was by no means the sole motivator for these wars, but in each case a major collective shock was exploited to prepare the ground for economic shock therapy.

## Chapter Two is the Spectre

#### Thus, I affirm the “Resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protection on medicines” as a general principle. CPs and DAs still link, I’ll clarify anything in CX

#### 1 – [Drahos 16] IPR are the very definition of commodification – provides capitalism with a new means of commodification and weaponizes science and technology to the aid of corporate elites

Drahos 16 [(Professor Peter Drahos is an Australian academic and researcher specializing in the areas of [intellectual property](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intellectual_property) and global business regulation amongst others. He is the Director of the Centre for Governance of Knowledge and Development and was formerly the Head of Program of the Regulatory Institutions Network at the [Australian National University](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australian_National_University). )“A Philosophy of Intellectual Property - ANU.” Anu.edu.au, 2021, press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/html/ch05.xhtml?referer=&page=9. Accessed 31 Aug. 2021. [|P144](https://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/pdf/book.pdf%20|P144) – P148|]Comrade PW

Now we are in a better position to see how intellectual property accomplishes the task of integrating creative labour into the capitalist mode of production. Marx more clearly than anyone sees that capitalism is a mode of production in which commodities are amassed on a historically unprecedented scale. Capitalism is not, however, the only mode of production which produces commodities. This is true of earlier forms of production. Where capitalism is distinctive is that it is a system in which the labour power of one class has become a circulating commodity available for purchase by another class, the members of both classes being formally free to buy and sell commodities.[61](http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/html/ch05.xhtml#footnote-311) It is the condition of being able to readily acquire labour power that gives capitalism its Midas touch in economic production. Our argument has been that capitalism increasingly comes to depend on creative labour. Individual, rational capitalists, subject to competitive pressures, begin to seek out creative labour, for it is creative labour that is the source of much-wanted innovation. We have deliberately steered away from trying to explain this search in terms of the theory of surplus value. Rather our position is this: the search by individual capitalists for creative labour is motivated by the desire for control and ownership of the abstract object so as to gain a competitive edge over a rival. In the next chapter we shall see that the ownership of abstract objects can function to relieve individuals from competitive pressures. This provides another incentive for individual capitalists to chase the ownership of abstract objects. Clearly, if abstract objects exist under conditions of positive inclusive community (that is, they belong to all) the incentives for individual capitalists to pursue them will be considerably reduced. So one task of intellectual property law, from the perspective of the industrialist, is to create conditions of negative community so that the ownership of abstract objects is possible. Intellectual property, in commodifying universal mental constructs, dramatically increases the commodity horizons of capitalism. Intellectual property is perhaps a sign that the commodity nature of capitalism never stops evolving. Marx thought that the commodity of labour power was the form of commodity that was distinctive to capitalism. Our analysis suggests that understanding the productive powers of capitalism does not stop with the commodification of labour power. Through the creation of abstract objects, intellectual property law provides capitalism with another distinctive commodity form and, potentially at least, another means to its further expansion. By creating abstract objects intellectual property brings creative labour directly into the relations of production. Capitalism can continue its historically spectacular commodity production run because through intellectual property law it has re-engineered the possibilities of commodity production. Not only that, creative labour, through the creation of more efficient means of production, actually diminishes the role of physical labour. The aim of the industrialist is no longer to control physical labour through contract and industrial relations law but to control creative labour through intellectual property law. One last remark before we close this section. Intellectual property, we have argued, is fundamental to the task of integrating creative labour and abstract objects into capitalism’s production processes. This argument does not mean that we abandon Marx’s view about the fundamental materiality of production. Much of the literature on post-industrial society or post-capitalist society tends to over-emphasise the role of knowledge in production in order to obtain a convenient and bright dividing line between capitalist and post-capitalist epochs.[62](http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/html/ch05.xhtml#footnote-310) Drucker offers a typical characterisation of this: ‘The basic economic resource – “the means of production”, to use the economist’s term – is no longer capital, nor natural resources (the economist’s “land”), nor “labour”. It is and will be knowledge.’[63](http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/html/ch05.xhtml#footnote-309) However, our analysis of the role of the abstract object in production, when placed in the context of Marx’s overall theory, suggests that perhaps good old-fashioned industrial capitalism has a way to run before it is given its last rites by scholars. Our reasons for thinking this are these. When he comes to discuss the role of physical forces (the laws of nature) Marx says that these cost the capitalist nothing once they are discovered.[64](http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/html/ch05.xhtml#footnote-308) But in order for these laws to enter the productive life of capital they must be consumed productively and that, for Marx, requires that they be mediated by or be embodied in some item of hardware, some industrial article: ‘A water-wheel is necessary to exploit the force of water, and a steam-engine to exploit the elasticity of steam.’[65](http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/html/ch05.xhtml#footnote-307) Abstract objects cannot just simply step into production. We now have the makings of a paradox. The greater the role of abstract objects in capitalist production, the greater the production of the hardware of technology there needs to be. Abstract objects propel capitalism into ever-higher levels of industrial production of physical objects. Furthermore it is clear that for Marx each new generation of technologies carries with it greater and greater investment costs. Manual tools are cheap. Machine tools are not – and computer-controlled machine tools, even less so. The rough shape of our paradox is that abstract objects, which once in existence cost nothing or little, when absorbed into capitalist production cost capitalists a great deal in terms of investment. Intangible objects generate ever-higher levels of tangible commodities. It is industrial commodity production that abstract objects help stimulate, with the result that fewer workers are employed in that production directly (because of automation) and more services are required to match the higher levels of production. For the individual capitalist there is no choice about the levels of investment needed to stay in what has become a technological race. Investment is forced upon him by competition.[66](http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/html/ch05.xhtml#footnote-306) In language not intended to comfort, Marx says, ‘one capitalist always kills many’.[67](http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/html/ch05.xhtml#footnote-305) The upshot of our remarks is this. We must not make intellectual property reveal more than is there. For post-industrial scholars, the intellectual property phenomenon seems to offer support for their pronouncements of radical social transformation. Our position is a more cautious one. Through intellectual property law, capitalism engineers new production possibilities for itself.[68](http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/html/ch05.xhtml#footnote-304) Creative labour is brought into the fold of productive labour, but the transformative possibilities of this remain for the time being grounded in a paradigm of commodity accumulation. So-called ‘knowledge societies’ have, through new communications and information technologies, the opportunity to reorganise the work patterns of their individual citizens in ways that liberate those citizens from conditions of alienated labour. But capitalist knowledge societies, if Marx is right about the commodity nature of capitalism, will not take that opportunity. Abstract objects are absorbed into production as part of a cycle of commodity production. Abstract objects are used to continue capitalism’s obsession with, to use modern parlance, the hardware of technology. Inequalities of an apparently new kind (for example, the information-poor versus the information-rich) appear, but in essence they are old forms of inequalities patterned around the ownership of productive forces. ‘Knowledge workers’ end up more like other workers, for like other wage-labourers they come to find themselves in conditions of alienated labour. The impact of intellectual property norms upon the activities of the scientific community provides an example of the way in which the positive expressive activity of scientific research and discovery becomes alienated labour. Natural science becomes part of the natural forces of production because individual capitalists realise they cannot survive without constantly ‘revolutionising the instruments of production’.[69](http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/html/ch05.xhtml#footnote-303) Modern industry draws on scientific knowledge to produce a ‘science of technology’.[70](http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/html/ch05.xhtml#footnote-302) This science of technology is derived from many earlier separate forms of production such as trade guilds and craft industries. Modern industry takes the knowledge and know-how which has been locked away in these secretive, almost ritualistic enterprises and applies it to improving production. The modern form of the science of technology as we know it seems to be, for Marx, born out of industry.[71](http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/html/ch05.xhtml#footnote-301) Once in existence, its utility is apparent to all capitalists who are all constantly seeking to improve their production techniques. Science now finds itself press-ganged into capital’s service. The normative practices of scientists begin to change. Traditionally, scientists organised themselves around the goal of extending knowledge. This goal is served by an ethos of science which consists of four key values: universalism, communism, disinterestedness and organised scepticism.[72](http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/html/ch05.xhtml#footnote-300) Intellectual property, we have argued, plays a critical role in integrating creative labour into production. Through this process, intellectual property norms come to change the ethos of science.[73](http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/html/ch05.xhtml#footnote-299) (For Marx the change would only be a symptom of deeper causes.) The ethos of science rewards the sharing of information, the public communication of ideas (the incentives being prizes, scientific immortality, recognition and so on). The existence of an intellectual commons is seen to be crucial to successful individual work. This public domain attitude of science begins to change as intellectual property norms come to govern scientific labour. Open communication and the exchange of ideas are no longer so strongly endorsed by scientists because they might, amongst other things, defeat a proprietary claim to the knowledge.[74](http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/n1902/html/ch05.xhtml#footnote-298) The direction of scientific research becomes increasingly determined by state-based priorities expressed through intellectual property rights. The fact that ideas can in one way or another be owned is itself symbolic of the fact that scientific labour has become alienated labour.

#### 2 – [C&W 10] Intellectual property is essential for the development of brands

Chasser & Wolf 10 [Chasser served as commissioner of trademarks for the United States Patent & Trademark Office and president of the International Trademark Association. Ms. Wolfe served as the managing partner of an intellectual property law firm she founded at 28ya, which ranked in the top 75 patent law firms in the U.S. by 2015. |Brand Rewired: Connecting Branding, Creativity, and Intellectual Property Strategy|http://library.lol/main/E33826664D9B02A0F0CB347BE68A4667] PW

How do Procter &Gamble, Google, and others like them build a billion - dollar brand? They design strong intellectual property strategy into their innovation and branding processes through the power of collaboration and interdisciplinary teams. In this book, we chronicle our discussions with the innovation, branding, and intellectual property leaders from top global brands to share their ideas and best practices in the next generation of branding and innovation. Whether a company is maintaining a brand that has endured for more than 100 years, such as Tide, or creating a new brand that will capture the attention of the world, such as Google, a rewired branding process can provide key competitive advantages. We ask the question: “ How does a company ensure that when it invests in developing new technology, products, and services, the brand it builds to sell that product will have long - term staying power and produce a greater return on investment? ” Based upon our research and discussions with brand leaders, the key to economic success in developing and maintaining brands is to design intellectual property strategy into the creative and innovation process. This must occur from the beginning through the use of collaborative, multidisciplinary teams to effectively rewire the branding process. Whether you are a brand manager inside a large corporation, working in an agency, or an entrepreneur, you will find that important trends are increasing the need to think about intersecting intellectual property strategy with the creative process. Thinking about intellectual property at the outset of the creative process means that you will have something with longer and more sustainable value. Additionally, changing accounting and finance principles mean your brand may be revalued each year. The right strategy to protect your brand can increase its value. If your brands are diminishing in value, they may have a bigger impact on the company than ever before. The goal for most innovation or brand campaigns is to increase: Margin, Market share, Revenue Market value In The Game Changer (2008) , A.G. Lafl ey, former CEO of Procter & Gamble, preached what marketers have long touted — that we must innovate and create for consumer needs and wants in order to achieve an increase in margin, market share, revenue, and market value. But in the changing demands of the current economic climate, that approach alone may not be enough. In the future, companies must add another layer of thinking to the creative process. Long - lasting intellectual property must also be the result of creativity and innovation activities. This requires an interdisciplinary approach from the start with an understanding of what it takes to create powerful and economically valuable intellectual property. If we approach the brand process in this way, we can get the job done faster, utilizing fewer resources, reducing costs, and increasing the likelihood of success. To do so, some assumptions that permeate most companies must be changed and new processes embraced. For example, most people think of patents when they hear the term intellectual property, which taints their thinking about the need to intersect it with the creative process. But intellectual property, as it relates to branding, includes protecting all aspects of the campaign. Just a few of the components that can be protected as valuable intellectual assets of the company include the following: Product name, Logo, Slogan, Design of the product, Design of the packaging, Distinctive colors of the product or packaging, Copy in the ad, Script of the commercial Look and feel of the retail location or point of sale Distinctive sounds and smells associated with the product/ campaign Music that accompanies the ad campaign Content created on the web site. Every aspect in a branding campaign, if it is considered as an intellectual asset at the time of creation These elements are protected by: Trademarks/trade dress, Trade secrets, — know-how Copyright, Design patents Thinking about intellectual property in the middle of the creative process or at the end of the process is too late. Protecting every facet of the campaign strategically means it can last longer, have a greater impact, and produce a higher return on investment for the company. It becomes an intellectual asset of the company to be used as leverage in obtaining financing and an important part of the market value, which affects stock prices. Brand Rewired offers a unique approach to an otherwise age - old topic for branding, innovation, and marketing professionals. A brand strategy intersecting with an equally powerful intellectual property strategy produces a greater economic return and more rewards for brand project leaders. The elements of a strong intellectual property branding portfolio often mirror a strong branding campaign from a sales and marketing perspective. Failing to consider these important strategies can not only reduce the effectiveness of the value of the brand, but potentially expose the company to lawsuits and increased costs. The internal black box – silo mentality culture of organizations can impede the development and capitalization of innovation, branding, and intellectual property and ignore key opportunities. A multidisciplinary Brand Rewired approach will reduce costs and increase return on investment.

#### [Tracey 04] Creates the perfect condition for the fetishization of pharmaceutical drugs

Tracey 04 [(Tracey works at the Department of Communication in Florida Atlantic University) Between Discourse and Being the Commodification of Pharmaceuticals in Late Capitalism. The Communication Review, 7(1), 15–34 | 10.1080/10714420490280170.” Sci-Hub.st, 2021, sci-hub.st/doi.org/10.1080/10714420490280170. Accessed 4 Sept. 2021.] Comrade PW

Following Marx (1906), a product becomes a commodity when its “production is principally organized through the process of exchange” (Mosco, 1996, p. 141), and exchange value becomes distinguishable via a product’s placement in the marketplace where commodities take on qualities alongside each other. They become, in other words, fetishized. As Jhally (1990) notes, “Fetishes were worshipped on account of the powers that they were believed to possess in and of themselves alone” (p. 53). Advertising imbues the given object with exchange value. Thus the fetish may be understood as the resultant psychosocial penumbra of commodification. In recent times advertising has become even more sophisticated and ubiquitous. Naomi Klein (1999) describes the corporate approach to and ethos of commodification that emerged in the early 1990s as “branding.” In this way, “the product always takes a back seat to the real product, the brand, and the selling of the brand acquired an extra component that can only be described as spiritual. Advertising is about hawking product. Branding, in its truest and most advanced incarnations, is about corporate transcendence” (p. 21). Pharmaceutical drugs are no exception in this regard. They require identities and forms that take on a “life” of their own in the marketplace perceptually akin to, but decidedly removed from, human social relations. And so the accelerated commodification of pharmaceuticals constitutes an heretofore uncharted dimension of marketing design. The manufacture and advertising of drugs for profit and the attendant monopolization of the industry is by no means a contemporary phenomenon. German pharmaceutical companies, for example, dominated the market for drugs in the United States until World War I through their superior research facilities and expertise which allowed for the uncontested control of U.S. patent rights on many highly profitable drugs (Liebenau 1987, p. 110). In recent years, however, the attendant research and development of new drugs has metamorphosed to where the brand’s marketability is given front-and-center attention. Drug companies have joined forces with ad agencies to commodify their products long before federal approval for the sale of such products has been granted. Today advertising agencies assist drug companies in recruiting patients for clinical trials and even perform medical experiments in their own labs. Such experiments are conducted with a clear focus on their potential for producing the next new “blockbuster drug,” (a term borrowed from Hollywood parlance to denote a pharmacological commodity capable of generating maximum profit) as a necessary and pronounced prerogative of the research and development process. As Thomas Harrison, chief executive officer of Diversified Agency Services, a division of Omnicom Group Inc., points out regarding his advertising company’s role in pharmaceutical research, “What we want to try to do is look at the molecule in the test tube as a brand … what is the maximum commercial potential of this molecule? What will it be when it grows up? What is the message? How should the clinical trial be developed?” Ad agencies become involved in the formative stages of a drug’s development to increase their chances of obtaining the prospective account if the drug comes to market. This lessens pharmaceutical companies’ up-front expenditures for research and development (O’Connell, 2002, p. B1) so that more resources may be put toward branding the product. Commodification also has more far reaching consequences, for the process upon which commoditized medicine is founded necessarily abrogates the existing human needs of the inhabitants of unindustrialized Third World countries. In this way science and technology are incapable of thoroughly addressing phenomena in accord with their purported or inferred mission. For example, only one percent of all medicines developed from 1975 to 1997 have been designed specifically to address diseases affecting those in underdeveloped countries. This translates to thirteen out of 1,223 remedies. Most such medications do not address or alleviate potentially lethal maladies threatening human life en masse, but are rather “lifestyle drugs,” available only to those capable of recognizing and consummating the products’ constructed marketplace value. As one pharmaceutical industry observer puts it, such drugs may “one day free the world from the scourge of toenail fungus, obesity, baldness, face wrinkles and impotence” (Silverstein, 1999). These medications also comprise the bulk of the pharmaceutical industry’s multi-billion dollar annual revenue, thus exemplifying the establishment’s nature and function as a capitalist institution rigorously beholden to profit maximization. “’The only thing the companies think about on a daily basis,’” another drug industry analyst notes, “’is the price of their stocks; and announcing that you’ve discovered a drug for tropical disease won’t do much for your share price’” (Silverstein, 1999). It is within the market’s strictures that pharmaceutical companies not only create and commodify new drugs; in order to stimulate demand they must increasingly forge alliances with the advertising and medical communities to foster perceived needs via the manufacture of disease while also anticipating threats to intellectual property (e.g., drugs going “off patent”) and prodding governmental agencies toward regulatory procedure conducive to profit maximization. An historical context that situates modern medicine’s crisis in the continuum of its contemporary development alongside commercial pharmacology is necessary for further understanding the pharmaceutical industry’s present utility.