# 1NC

## Cap K:

#### [Bachand 20] Attempting to resolve the inherent contradictions within capitalism through international organizations in order to “fix” the crisis exasperate the continuation of capitalist contradictions. The affirmative acts as a regulatory measure to ensure the regime of accumulation is constantly stabilized

Bachand 20 Rémi Bachand, What’s Behind the WTO Crisis? A Marxist Analysis, European Journal of International Law, Volume 31, Issue 3, August 2020, Pages 857–882, Remi Bachand Bookmark Professor in the Law department at Universite du Quebec a Montreal <https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chaa054> //avery

Drawing on Italian activist and intellectual Antonio Gramsci, the neo-Gramscian school of IR strives to explain the development and reproduction of a social order. Specifically, it focuses on the reason for which social classes that are disadvantaged and exploited by a social order nevertheless adhere to it without attempting to reverse it. Gramsci qualifies this situation by using the concept of ‘hegemony’ which designates, among other things, the capacity of a dominant group to convince, using ideological procedures, other groups that a social order is good for them even if this is not objectively the case. Transposing this analysis at the global level, Robert Cox explains that hegemony: … means dominance of a particular kind where the dominant state creates an order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or states and leading classes but at the same time offer some measure or prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful.43 Criticizing the focus put by mainstream approaches in IR, Cox claims that hegemony is not essentially the supremacy of the leading state(s), but of the dominant classes of these state(s).44 Moreover, coming from the Marxist’s tradition and emphasizing the economic aspect of any social organization, he argues that hegemony ‘is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production’.45 In other words, hegemony is the capacity of the dominant classes of the dominant state(s) to expand, reproduce and legitimize the mode of production that is favourable to their interests. Cox sees an important relation between international organizations (and institutions) and hegemony. In his mind: International institutions and rules are generally initiated by the state which established the hegemony. At the very least they must have that state’s support. The dominant state takes care to secure the acquiescence of other states according to a hierarchy of powers within the inter-state structure of hegemony.46 More precisely, they have many roles in the reproduction of hegemony: (1) [T]hey embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; (2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic order; (3) they ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from peripheral countries and (5) they absorb counter-hegemonic ideas.47 Stephen Gill, Cox’s colleague at York University, adds an interesting dimension to these roles. With the concept of ‘new constitutionalism’ that is supported by international organizations, he refers to … political and legal reforms to redefine the political via a series of precommitment mechanisms. These include constitutions, laws, property rights and various institutional arrangements, designed to have quasi-permanent status. A central objective of new constitutionalism is to prevent future governments from undoing commitments to a disciplinary neoliberal pattern of accumulation.48 The important aspect underlined by Gill is the capacity of international organizations to exclude from the political discussion, from what is commonly sensed as ‘possible’, some aspects that are incompatible with the social order promoted by the dominant groups and social classes. Globally, the neo-Gramscian contribution is useful to emphasize the link between an international organization and a specific social order based on the reproduction of dominant social classes’ interests. Hence, an international organization (it is at least true for the most important of them) cannot be understood if not situated inside the political and economic order to which it belongs. It is also presumably the case that when this order is not functioning well any longer, the international organization will also enter into crisis, or be radically transformed. B Théorie de la régulation and Social Structure of Accumulation Theory The second step relates to a ‘mode of regulation’ that supports and legitimizes the regime of accumulation. It is constituted by ‘institutional forms’ whose functions are notably to ‘reproduce the fundamental social relations of the mode of production’ and to ‘pilot’ the reproduction of the regime of accumulation.53 To explain their argument, the SSAT claim that capitalism is ‘an inherently conflictual system’ but that its contradictions can be attenuated through the construction of sets of institutions that mitigate and channel class conflict and stabilize capitalists’ long-run expectations. Institutions in this sense are conceived of broadly and can be economic, political, ideological, or cultural in character. […] [These institutions] are mutually compatible and generally supportive of each other as well as supportive of the accumulation process.54 Joining this assessment to our earlier analysis of the neo-Gramscians, we may now deduce that hegemony does not simply represent the expansion of a ‘mode of production’ (as Cox claims) but of the ‘regime of accumulation’ that is adopted by the dominant classes of the dominant state(s) because it is felt that it is the best one to defend their interests. In fact, international organizations on which Cox and Gill focus may be interpreted as being part of what the école de la régulation calls the ‘mode of regulation’. Their function becomes clearer with the input of the SSAT and the école de la régulation: to ensure the efficiency, the legitimacy and the permanency of the regime of accumulation. C The Importance of the Rate of Profit and the Counteracting Factors to Its Fall Our last theoretical influence comes directly from Marx, who explained that the inevitable change in the organic composition of capital (that is the relation between constant capital55 and variable capital56) implies a tendency of the rate of profit to fall,57 a phenomenon that Marx strongly associates with overproduction and over accumulation of capital.58 For Marx, this fall is only a long-term tendency because of the existence of some counteracting factors that can be put in play to countervail the fall of profit. Marx enumerates six of these counteracting factors: the intensification of labour exploitation, the reduction of wages, the cheapening of the price of elements of constant capital, the relative surplus population, foreign trade (to which we can associate foreign investment) and the increase in share capital (that will here be associated to financialization59).60 The theoretical explanation for the law of the tendential fall in the rate of profit is controversial, even though some authors continue to defend it and use it in a somewhat convincing way.61 Now, even without defending Marx’s theoretical explanation, many Marxist-oriented authors put the evolution of the rate of profit (and generally its fall) at the core of their work.62 For us, the usefulness of this type of analysis is that evolution of the rate of profit is obviously an essential part of capitalism, whose single aim is to ensure capital accumulation. Geographer David Harvey’s New Imperialism offers a particularly important contribution for any international lawyer wishing to understand the link between capitalism and international law. In this book (as well as elsewhere), Harvey develops a theory of ‘capital fix’. As he explains: The central point of this argument concerned a chronic tendency within capitalism, theoretically derived out a reformulation of Marx’s theory of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, to produce crises of overaccumulation. Such crises are typically registered as surpluses of capital (in commodity, money, or productive capacity forms) and surpluses of labour side by side, without there apparently being any means to bring them together profitably to accomplish socially useful tasks. […] Since it is the lack of profitable opportunities that lies at the hearth of the difficulty, the key economic (as opposed to social and political) problem lies with capital. If devaluation is to be avoided, then profitable ways must be found to absorb the capital surpluses.63 Capital has to find solutions to face this fall of opportunities and the fall of the rate of profit. Harvey introduces the double meaning of the concept of ‘fix’: A certain portion of the total capital is literally fixed in and on the land in some physical form for a relative long period of time (depending on its economic and physical lifetime). […] The spatio-temporal ‘fix’, on the other hand, is a metaphor for a particular kind of solution to capitalist crises through temporal deferral and geographical expansion. […] The production of space, the organization of wholly new territorial divisions of labour, the opening up of new and cheaper resources complexes, of new regions as dynamic spaces of capital accumulation, and the penetration of pre-existing social formation by capitalist social relations and institutional arrangements (such as rules of contract and private property arrangements) provide important ways to absorb capital and labour surpluses.64 Hence, with the theory of ‘capital fix’, Harvey develops Marx’s own concept of ‘counteracting factors’ (a concept we will continue to use in the following pages), underlying the necessity for capital to find strategies to face its inherent contradictions. The importance of this theoretical finding is that many counteracting factors can be put at work with the help of international law and international organizations. Put together, the ideas of this section lead us to propose the following conclusion. Capitalism is wrought with strong and inherent contradictions that have the long-term tendency to bring down the rate of profit. Even if the theorization proposed by Marx of this fall has not been explicitly accepted by all, several authors have factually shown its existence and its implications. The sustainability of the rate of profit is an important, if not the main aspect of a regime of accumulation,65 and when a fall occurs, the regime of accumulation must react. In such a situation, the function of a mode of regulation (to use the concept of the école de la régulation) is actually to find ways to operationalize enough counteracting factors to re-establish a satisfying rate of profit, at least for leading state(s)’ dominant classes. Finally, if we follow the neo-Gramscian argument and admit that the purpose of international organizations is to promote the well-functioning of a regime of accumulation (and consequently the sustainability of the rate of profit), we can conclude that an international organization’s (and especially one with economic functions like the WTO) existence is linked with its capacity to put the counteracting factors at work to ensure that the dominant classes of the leading state(s) can rake satisfying profit. Consequently, if it is not able to achieve this goal, one can predict that, one day or another, its very existence will be challenged.

#### [Fukuda 10] The corporate globalization of the 1AC is capitalism in decay – the next step in neoliberal regulation of markets and expansion of the new age of imperialism. Localization becomes turned into globalization, every decision is now monitored through the lens of market efficient and capitalist expansion. Production becomes continually outsources and expanded in the name of growth

Fukuda 10 WTO REGIME AS A NEW STAGE OF IMPERIALISM: DECAYING CAPITALISM AND ITS ALTERNATIVE Author(s): Yasuo Fukuda Source: World Review of Political Economy, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall 2010), pp. 485-499 Published by: Pluto Journals Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41931884 Yasuo Fukuda, Professor of Graduate School of Economics at Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, and author of Modern Market Economy and Inflation ( 1 992), Commodificationf Land and Urban Problems (1993), Distribution of Wealth and Income in Modern Japan (2002) and Corporate Globalization and Local Sovereignty (2010). Email: [fukuda@econ.hit-u.ac.jp](mailto:fukuda@econ.hit-u.ac.jp) <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/262097784_WTO_REGIME_AS_A_NEW_STAGE_OF_IMPERIALISM_DECAYING_CAPITALISM_AND_ITS_ALTERNATIVE> //avery

Thus, the WTO regime is nothing short of a regime of imperialism, whereby monopoly capital exercises governing power over both national markets and the world economy. Whereas the first four of the five pillars by which Lenin defined imperialism still apply under the WTO regime, in place of the fifth (colonization), monopoly capital has gained new tools of dominance, most specifically the ability to design market rules. In losing the policy space to protect and develop local firms, developing countries are obliged to become incorporated into a global network managed by monopoly capital. In this way, income is steadily transferred from the lower rungs of the global economy to monopoly capital at the top. In short, the WTO regime constitutes a new stage of imperialism, in which monopoly capital holds hegemony over market rules in place of colonization. The WTO Regime: A Decaying Stage of Capitalism The WTO regime was devised under the initiatives of monopoly capital as a means to promote corporate globalization. The next task is to explore what corporate globalization has brought to society. The true nature of corporate globalization is expressed in its outcomes. Lenin characterized imperialism as a decaying stage of capitalism, owing to its unproductive character, which he described as rentier capitalism. The aim of this section is to show that corporate globalization too is nothing more than a decaying stage of capitalism. WRPE1.3 Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals WRPE.plutojournals.org This content downloaded from 162.38.186.136 on Mon, 1 Sep 2014 16:38:13 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 490 YASUO FUKUDA Over the past three decades, multinational corporations have drastically increased their shares of foreign investment and have greatly expanded their activities in the global marketplace. UNCTAD publishes the Trans-Nationality Index (TNI), which is a composite of three ratios: (foreign assets)/(totalssets), (foreign sales)/(total sales), and (foreign employment)/(total employment). The TNI for the world's top 100 companies increased from 47.0 percent in 1993 to 55.8 percent in 2003, an increase of 8.8 percent (UNCTAD 2007). The top 200 companies increased their share of total assets by 655.9 percent between 1983 and 2002, while the world GDP increased by just 179.5 percent over the same period (Anderson et al. 2005). This gap between the growth rates of corporate assets and GDP shows a considerable income shift from wages to profits. This rise in profits against wages has advanced considerably in the course of globalization (Ellwood 2001). Turning to the issue of standards of living in local communities, here the bleak side of corporate globalization is on full display. Corporate globalization has created a divided society, distinguished by rising levels of poverty among those at the lower end of the economic spectrum. In the US, which is the most unequal society among the OECD, the Gini coefficient (which measures household income inequality) has risen almost constantly since the late 1960s. Presently, the top 20 percent of US households possess 47.3 percent of total household income (2007) and 84.7 percent of net assets (2004) (Wolff 2001; Mishel et al. 2008/2009). This level of inequality is the result of considerable income gaps between capital and labor; management and the rank-and-file; standard and non-standard forms of employment; and large companies and subcontractors. It is the activities of monopoly capital which have caused the widening of these gaps. Moreover, multinational corporations have developed so-called downsizing policies, replacing standard employees with their non-standard counterparts. Such downsizing has drastically changed the make-up of society. These changes have transformed what was once basically a cooperative society into one which is markedly divided. Furthermore, this policy of downsizing is itself the result of corporate globalization in two key ways. One is a shift in the power balance toward multinational corporations; the other is the intensificationf global competition among multinationals. Large multinational firms benefit from a wide range of selection-capacity in deciding where to locate facilities, including the ability to outsource production abroad. On the other hand, it is very difficult for workers to cross national borders in search of better employment opportunities; workers must seek jobs within their respective region. This difference in the flexibility of capital against labor gives capital the upper hand in regards to negotiated labor contracts. Deregulation of labor markets further advantages management over labor. Therefore, neo-liberal policies in the labor market affect the power balance between management and labor in just World Review of Political Economy This content downloaded from 162.38.186.136 on Mon, 1 Sep 2014 16:38:13 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WTO REGIME AS A NEW STAGE OF IMPERIALISM 491 the same way as a collapse of trade unions. For just the same logic as in the labor market, the power balance has undergone a steady shiftoward monopoly capital and away from small to medium-sized firms. Corporate globalization has also widened the per capita income gap between the north and the south, exacerbating the south 's poverty. While the number of people living on less than $1.25 per day decreased between 1981 and 2005, the number of people living on less than $2 per day rose considerably over the same period. After the collapse of the housing bubble in 2008, around 1 billion people now face chronic hunger and starvation. Poverty in developing countries often has a historical context, such as estate ownership or civil war. Still, neo-liberal policies have made it much more difficult for developing countries to address issues of poverty within their borders (Oxfam 2002; UNCTAD 2004: 189). The IMF and the World Bank have occupied a central role in bringing developing countries into the fold of corporate globalization. Since the 1980s, under the IMF's Structural Adjustment Program (SAP), more than 100 developing countries have been forced to adopt "open door" policies with respect to investment and trade (Chossudovsky 1 997, 1 998). Once the door has been pried open, large multinational firms - for instance, the major players of agribusiness and infra-business - are quick to extend their reach into the newly available markets. As a result, considerable damage results to the people of developing countries through, for example, loss of traditional industries like family farming and the privatization of hitherto public resourcesuch as community water supplies. After the 1997 East Asian financial crisis, the IMF met with severe criticism for imposing neo-liberal based readjustment regimes on the afflicted countries. Nevertheless, the IMF has continued to adhere to a neo-liberal approach with respect to the global recession which is currently underway following the collapse of the housing bubble in 2008 (Weisbrot et al. 2009). The IMF's Structural Adjustment Program was formulated as global rules by WTO agreements. Thus, neo-liberalism has become the predominant feature with respect to international rules on trade. Liberalization of trade policy amounts to nothing but the loss on the part of national governments of the policy space to govern. Developing countries need flexible tariff systems, quantitative import controls, and capital controls to protect their local industries. They also need policies such as local content controls and export subsidies to foster new economic development. WTO agreements prohibit or strictly limit the use of these industrial policies, in spite of the fact that these very same policies were employed to great effect by developed countries during their earlier stages of development. Deprived of this policy space, developing countries are easily brought under the governance of monopoly capital. Following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, global capitalism underwent a variety of considerable changes, leading to the intensification ofa casino-like character on the part of the financial sector, accompanied by increasing levels WRPE1.3 Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals WRPE.plutojournals.org This content downloaded from 162.38.186.136 on Mon, 1 Sep 2014 16:38:13 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 492 YASUO FUKUDA of instability with respect to peoples' lives. This transformation of the structure of capitalism proceeded in parallel with the financialization of the economy, the phenomenon whereby trends in financial markets have come to lead the non-financial sectors. In the US, the ratio of financial assets to GDP rose from 4.2 in the 1 970s, to 6.0 in 1980s, and to 10.0 by 2007. The share of financial-sector profits, including insurance and real property, exceeded the profits of all non-financial sectors in the US in the late 1990s. In the course of financialization, it is not just industry that is drawn into the casino economy. Private citizens are also forced to become involved in the action. After retirement, dependency on financial markets increases considerably. The predominant share of pension plans has now shifted from defined-benefit packages to defined-contribution plans for both public and private pension accounts. Pension funds are often tied to speculation in commodity futures, such as futures for cereals or fuels. Nobody knows how much retirement income he or she will eventually gain. In the end, it is the casino economy which determines the final value of pension benefits. The explosive growth of the financial sector, particularly since the 1980s, is attributable to two factors: over-accumulation on the part of manufacturing industries (especially monopoly capital sectors), and deregulation. Manufacturing sectors in the G7 were faced with over-accumulation in the 1970s, after the period of prolonged growth following the end of the Second World War. Since then, both the rate of profits and accumulation for the manufacturing sector have markedly declined (Brenner 2002). On the other hand, the ratio of operating surplus (cash flow over gross fixed capital formation) has increased (Stockhammer 2007). Overaccumulation leads to the accumulation of surplus money. Monopoly capital has sought an alternative to holding money idle by investing it in the financial sector. In order to realize this alternative, deregulation of financial markets was required. In short, monopoly capital has utilized the financial sector as a means of changing idle money into active capital, leading to the advance of financialization. In the US, deregulation of the financial sector has proceeded as follows. Firstly, all "interest and financial transaction fee" regulations were abolished by 1986. Second, in 1985, securitization of mortgages was invented by Salomon Brothers. Third, the McFadden Act, which prohibited banks from operating branches across state lines, was deregulated step-by-step from 1974, and finally abolished in 1994. Fourth, the Glass-Steagall Act, which included aprovision prohibiting bank holding companies from owning other financial firms, was finally abolished in 1999. Lastly, commodity futures were deregulated in 2000, from which followed the abolition of leveraging regulations in 2004. These acts of deregulation proceeded under the cooperation of the US government and Wall Street. Robert Rubin, a former co-chairman of Goldman-Sachs, served as Treasury Secretary for the Clinton adminWorld Review of Political Economy This content downloaded from 162.38.186.136 on Mon, 1 Sep 2014 16:38:13 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WTO REGIME AS A NEW STAGE OF IMPERIALISM 493 istration. Following his tenure at the treasury, Rubin became an executive officer for Citibank. Alan Greenspan, upon stepping down from his chairmanship at the Federal Reserve, took a consulting job at Pimco. Henry Paulson, a former Goldman-Sachs CEO, served the George W. Bush administration as Treasury Secretary. Furthermore, it is Wall Street banks which have benefited most from the policies of deregulation. They created new financial businesses, inflated them with cash sucked up from household savings, pension funds, and deposits in S&L institutions, channeling these funds into the securities markets. The resulting influx of funds pushed stock prices up. Following the "management buyout" boom, which began in the late 1970s and proceeded through the 1980s, Wall Street banks expanded into the mergers and acquisition (M&A) business, including "hostile" takeovers. Regarding non-financial firms, direct financing has become more attractive because of the rise of stock prices. Thus, since the mid-1980s, household savings and pension funds have flowed into securities markets, especially via institutional investors (such as mutual funds), thus bypassing bank deposits. In short, financialization has gone hand in hand with securitization. After the collapse of the IT (or dotcom) bubble in 2000, surplus money rushed into the real-estate market, causing a housing bubble. Here again, the activities of Wall Street banks played a key part in the inflation of the bubble. Since the 1980s, they had invented new securitized commodities, such as Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS), Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO), and Credit Default Swaps (CDS), channeling the surpluses which they had inhaled from all over the world into speculation, and blowing up the housing bubble as a result. Modern capitalism needs speculation to keep the economy afloat. Financial markets now serve not only as a place for speculation, but also as a source of funds, which in turn fuel still more speculation. What forced these changes to the financial sector was over-accumulation by monopoly capital and deregulation initiated at monopoly capital's behest. In this sense, the casino economy, and the instability which it breeds, are direct outcomes of the dominance of monopoly capital. Furthermore, corporate globalization damages the ecology, thus threatening food security. Multinational negotiations on agriculture were conducted for the first time during the GATT Uruguay Round. Agribusiness leaders, most notably the CEOs of Cargill and Monsanto, took part in negotiations as representatives of the US government. The resulting Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) was written with the primary aim of liberalizing trade in agricultural goods. Liberalization of agricultural trade causes immense damage to farmers and consumers alike. Those who benefit are overwhelmingly the large stakeholders of agribusiness. The food system is comprised of three parts: the upper stream (seeds, agrochemicals, farm machinery, and fertilizer), the lower stream (trade, processing, and retail), and farming. Agribusiness firms concentrate ownership in both upper and lower stream markets. They then vertically integrate the three stages of the food WRPE1.3 Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals WRPE.plutojournals.org This content downloaded from 162.38.186.136 on Mon, 1 Sep 2014 16:38:13 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 494 YASUO FUKUDA system, often combining the upper and lower streams (Heffernan and Hendrickson 2002, 2005; Hendrickson and Heffernan 2005; Hendrickson et al. 2001). Farming, caught in the middle, loses initiative in the food system and is put under pressure to cut costs. This impetus to cut costs itself derives from globalization. By putting local products into global competition, agribusiness forces farmers to compete in the world market. The result is a sort of "race to the bottom" in regards to farming. These cost-cutting pressures force farmers to either exit from farming or expand the scale of production so as to realize lower costs. Through this process, corporate globalization leads to the intensification of industrial farming. What emerge are highly mechanized and immensely capital-intensive farming practices. Moreover, industrial farming consumes natural resources in large quantities, such as groundwater and fossil fuels, both in the transport of products over long distances and in the use of farming chemicals. Industrial farming is also heavily reliant on monoculture, which is used to further raise productivity. However, this kind of industrialized farming is not sustainable. It is said that nearly 40 percent of the world food supply depends on wasteful irrigation from rivers, lakes, and groundwater. This leads to groundwater depletion and salinization of the land. In the US, 23 percent of farmland is already affected by salt that has accumulated through wasteful irrigation methods (Briscoe 2002). Moreover, massive chemical use poisons land and water, thus destroying vegetation and animal life. These living creatures constitute indispensable elements of ecological systems, which are circular movements responsible for the reproduction of every organism on the planet. Presently, the most devastating risk to biodiversity is biotech crops, introduced by multinational corporations such as Monsanto. Although biotech seeds, such as herbicide or pest resistant strains, may raise productivity in the short term, they also adversely affect crop diversity. Once biotech seeds are in use, it is hard to control their migration, and cross-pollination is prone to occur with other plants. This sort of accident has already been reported across many countries. For these reasons, industrial farming does not guarantee food security for the people. For one, it forces farmers into insolvency due to the pressure to cut costs in the face of competition from multinational agribusiness. It also destroys the ecology, thereby damaging the integrity of both the natural environment and species diversity, which are indispensable to sustainable farming. Finally, corporate globalization undermines local communities, which are the fundamental basis of peoples' lives. The local community stands on three legs: a viable local economy, common control of public resources such as infrastructure and public services, and self-governance of community affairs (policy space). Corporate globalization threatens each of these three legs. First, it deprives workers, small to medium-sized firms, the self-employed, and farmers of their livelihoods. World Review of Political Economy This content downloaded from 162.38.186.136 on Mon, 1 Sep 2014 16:38:13 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions WTO REGIME AS A NEW STAGE OF IMPERIALISM 495 Multinational corporations have no reason to adhere to the will of a particular community. In their quest for higher profits, they downsize, outsource, replace local workers with subcontractors overseas, and undermine small-scale farming. All of these things destroy employment prospects, and thereby diminish the effective demand of local communities. Corporate globalization also eats away at the second leg, common control of public resources. It is becoming difficult for local governments to sustain public services because of pressures from monopoly capital to cut corporate taxes and privatize the commons. WTO Agreements take priority in regards to business decisions relating to the commons. GATS opens the door for large companies to force local governments to privatize public goods and infrastructure. TRIPS ensures the right of monopoly capital to own living forms, such as seeds and genetic information, as private property. Corporate globalization also undermines the third leg, community selfgovernance. As mentioned above, corporate globalization is a stage of capitalism whereby monopoly capital both governs the market and determines the market rules. Local community interests were virtually unrepresented during GATT Uruguay Round negotiations, as big business CEOs and government officials colluded to draft agreements which deregulated trade and deprived local communities of their policy space. The effects of corporate globalization on community life allow for no other conclusion than that corporate globalization represents a decaying stage of capitalism. Corporate globalization guarantees people neither ahappy and stable life nor security of food or livelihood. This decaying character originates from the power of large firms. In regards to the power balance between capital and labor, the WTO regime occupies the opposite pole of democracy. The history of capitalism is a history of collusion between economic and political power, by which capital has been steadily concentrated into fewer and fewer hands, and especially from the early 20th century onward, into the hands of big business. Corporate globalization is the culmination of a process whereby corporations have seized control of the power of governance as a means of influencing economic and political affairs. R. Reich (2007) criticizes modern capitalism (which he terms "supercapitalism") for "its negative social consequences" such as the widening of the income-inequality gap, "reduced job security," the loss of local community, the weakening of public morality, etc. And, while he concedes that large firms now hold overwhelming economic and political power, he does not accept the notion that monopoly capital is the culprit behind these social diseases. The culprits are, he insists, the activities of consumers and investors who are merely out "to get the best deals [they] possibly can" (that is, low prices, quick responses, and high returns). WRPE 1.3 Produced and distributed by Pluto Journals WRPE.plutojournals.org This content downloaded from 162.38.186.136 on Mon, 1 Sep 2014 16:38:13 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 496 YASUO FUKUDA While it is true that progress in information ad communication technology has made global competition among large firms harsher, it is also the case that large multinational corporations control global markets through the command of high market shares, and that they tailor the market rules to fit their businesses and to facilitate expansion into new markets (Crotty 2007; Balanyá et al. 2003). Simply put, power and gain are two sides of the same coin. Reich should have stopped to think about who has gained most from globalization. It is monopoly capital which has benefited most, and it is the governing power of monopoly capital which has spawned the divided society in which we now live, undermining the ecology and hollowing out local communities all the while.

#### [Robinson 18] Mode of production determines the social relations – the capitalistic mode is an inherently unsustainable and expansionary one – causes extinction via overaccumulation, environmental degradation, and mass social crisis

Robinson 18 [William I, professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara. 2018. “Accumulation Crisis and Global Police State.”<http://revolutionary-socialism.com/en/accumulation-crisis-and-global-police-state/>] JCH-PF, recut by PW

Each major episode of crisis in the world capitalist system has presented the potential for systemic change. Each has involved the breakdown of state legitimacy, escalating class and social struggles, and military conflicts, leading to a restructuring of the system, including new institutional arrangements, class relations, and accumulation activities that eventually result in a restabilization of the system and renewed capitalist expansion. The current crisis shares aspects of earlier system-wide structural crises, such as of the 1880s, the 1930s or the 1970s. But there are six interrelated dimensions to the current crisis that I believe sets it apart from these earlier ones and suggests that a simple restructuring of the system will not lead to its restabilization – that is, our very survival now requires a revolution against global capitalism (Robinson, 2014). These six dimensions, in broad strokes, present a “big picture” context in which a global police state is emerging. First, the system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. We have already passed tipping points in climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and diversity loss. For the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system in such a way that threatens to bring about a sixth mass extinction (see, e.g., Foster et al., 2011; Moore, 2015). These ecological dimensions of global crisis have been brought to the forefront of the global agenda by the worldwide environmental justice movement. Communities around the world have come under escalating repression as they face off against transnational corporate plunder of their environment. While capitalism cannot be held solely responsible for the ecological crisis, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system given capital’s implacable impulse to accumulate and its accelerated commodification of nature. Second, the level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented. The richest one percent of humanity in 2016 controlled over half of the world’s wealth and 20 percent controlled 95 percent of that wealth, while the remaining 80 percent had to make do with just five percent (Oxfam, 2017). These escalating inequalities fuel capitalism’s chronic problem of overaccumulation: the TCC cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to chronic stagnation in the world economy (see next section). Such extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge of social control to dominant groups. As Trumpism in the United States as well as the rise of far-right and neo-fascist movements in Europe so well illustrate, cooptation also involves the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled towards scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization. Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend themselves to projects of 21st century fascism. Third, the sheer magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as well as the magnitude and concentrated control over the means of global communication and the production and circulation of symbols, images, and knowledge. Computerized wars, drone warfare, robot soldiers, bunker-buster bombs, a new generation of nuclear weapons, satellite surveillance, cyberwar, spatial control technology, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare, and more generally, of systems of social control and repression. We have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society, a point brought home by Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013, and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication and symbolic production. If global capitalist crisis leads to a new world war the destruction would simply be unprecedented. Fourth, we are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism, in the sense that there are no longer any new territories of significance to integrate into world capitalism and new spaces to commodify are drying up. The capitalist system is by its nature expansionary. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion – from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. At the same time, the privatization of education, health, utilities, basic services, and public lands is turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital’s control into “spaces of capital,” so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? New spaces have to be violently cracked open and the peoples in these spaces must be repressed by the global police state. Fifth, there is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums” (Davis, 2007) pushed out of the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction, into a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. Crises provide capital with the opportunity to accelerate the process of forcing greater productivity out of fewer workers. The processes by which surplus labor is generated have accelerated under globalization. Spatial reorganization has helped transnational capital to break the territorial-bound power of organized labor and impose new capital–labor relations based on fragmentation, flexibilization, and the cheapening of labor. These developments, combined with a massive new round of primitive accumulation and displacement of hundreds of millions, have given rise to a new global army of superfluous labor that goes well beyond the traditional reserve army of labor that Marx discussed. Global capitalism has no direct use for surplus humanity. But indirectly, it holds wages down everywhere and makes new systems of 21st century slavery possible. Dominant groups face the challenge of how to contain both the real and potential rebellion of surplus humanity. In addition, surplus humanity cannot consume and so as their ranks expand the problem of overaccumulation becomes exacerbated. Sixth, there is an acute political contradiction in global capitalism: economic globalization takes places within a nation-state system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to substitute for a leading nation-state with enough power and authority to organize and stabilize the system, much less to impose regulations on transnational capital. In the age of capitalist globalization governments must attract to the national territory transnational corporate investment, which requires providing capital with all the incentives associated with neoliberalism – downward pressure on wages, deregulation, austerity, and so on – that aggravate inequality, impoverishment, and insecurity for working classes. Nation-states face a contradiction between the need to promote transnational capital accumulation in their territories and their need to achieve political legitimacy. As a result, states around the world have been experiencing spiraling crises of legitimacy. This situation generates bewildering and seemingly contradictory politics and also helps explain the resurgence of far-right and neo-fascist forces that espouse rhetoric of nationalism and protectionism even as they promote neo-liberalism.

#### [Foster 20] Capitalism is a regime of chaos: Ecological Crisis, Unlimited War, and Economic Crisis – the alternative is to invest in a new system of social metabolic production aimed towards socialism

Foster 20 REVIEW OF THE MONTH The Renewal of the Socialist Ideal by John Bellamy Foster (Sep 01, 2020) Topics: History Marxism Movements Socialism Places: Global John Bellamy Foster is an American professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and editor of the Monthly Review. He writes about political economy of capitalism and economic crisis, ecology and ecological crisis, and Marxist theory. <https://monthlyreview.org/2020/09/01/the-renewal-of-the-socialist-ideal/> //avery

Any serious treatment of the renewal of socialism today must begin with capitalism’s creative destruction of the bases of all social existence. Since the late 1980s, the world has been engulfed in an epoch of catastrophe capitalism, defined as the accumulation of imminent catastrophe on every side due to the unintended consequences of “the juggernaut of capital.”1 Catastrophe capitalism in this sense is manifested today in the convergence of (1) the planetary ecological crisis, (2) the global epidemiological crisis, and (3) the unending world economic crisis.2 Added to this are the main features of today’s “empire of chaos,” including the extreme system of imperialist exploitation unleashed by global commodity chains; the demise of the relatively stable liberal-democratic state with the rise of neoliberalism and neofascism; and the emergence of a new age of global hegemonic instability accompanied by increased dangers of unlimited war.3 The climate crisis represents what the world scientific consensus refers to as a “no analogue” situation, such that if net carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion do not reach zero in the next few decades, it will threaten the very existence of industrial civilization and ultimately human survival.4 Nevertheless, the existential crisis is not limited to climate change, but extends to the crossing of other planetary boundaries that together define the global ecological rift in the Earth System as a safe place for humanity. These include: (1) ocean acidification; (2) species extinction (and loss of genetic diversity); (3) destruction of forest ecosystems; (4) loss of fresh water; (5) disruption of the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles; (6) the rapid spread of toxic agents (including radionuclides); and (7) the uncontrolled proliferation of genetically modified organisms.5 This rupturing of planetary boundaries is intrinsic to the system of capital accumulation that recognizes no insurmountable barriers to its unlimited, exponential quantitative advance. Hence, there is no exit from the current capitalist destruction of the overall social and natural conditions of existence that does not require exiting capitalism itself. What is essential is the creation of what István Mészáros in Beyond Capital called a new system of “social metabolic reproduction.”6 This points to socialism as the heir apparent to capitalism in the twenty-first century, but conceived in ways that critically challenge the theory and practice of socialism as it existed in the twentieth century. The Polarization of the Class System In the United States, key sectors of monopoly-finance capital have now succeeded in mobilizing elements of the primarily white lower-middle class in the form of a nationalist, racist, misogynist ideology. The result is a nascent neofascist political-class formation, capitalizing on the long history of structural racism arising out of the legacies of slavery, settler colonialism, and global militarism/imperialism. This burgeoning neofascism’s relation to the already existing neoliberal political formation is that of “enemy brothers” characterized by a fierce jockeying for power coupled with a common repression of the working class.7 It is these conditions that have formed the basis of the rise of the New York real-estate mogul and billionaire Donald Trump as the leader of the so-called radical right, leading to the imposition of right-wing policies and a new authoritarian capitalist regime.8 Even if the neoliberal faction of the ruling class wins out in the coming presidential election, ousting Trump and replacing him with Joe Biden, a neoliberal-neofascist alliance, reflecting the internal necessity of the capitalist class, will likely continue to form the basis of state power under monopoly-finance capital. Appearing simultaneously with this new reactionary political formation in the United States is a resurgent movement for socialism, based in the working-class majority and dissident intellectuals. P, accelerated by the globalization of production, has undermined the former, imperial-based labor aristocracy among certain privileged sections of the working class, leading to a resurgence of socialism.9 Confronted with what Michael D. Yates has called “the Great Inequality,” the mass of the population in the United States, particularly youth, are faced with rapidly diminishing prospects, finding themselves in a state of uncertainty and often despair, marked by a dramatic increase in “deaths of despair.”10 They are increasingly alienated from a capitalist system that offers them no hope and are attracted to socialism as the only genuine alternative.11 Although the U.S. situation is unique, similar objective forces propelling a resurgence of socialist movements are occurring elsewhere in the system, primarily in the Global South, in an era of continuing economic stagnation, financialization, and universal ecological decline.

## Case:

### Adv 1:

#### 1]AT Yadav: cross ap Fukuda, wto furthers poverty of these countries as it is used as a method of imperialism by rich countries

#### 2] AMR won’t risk extinction---squo solves, but the impact’s inevitable

Biba 17 – New York City–based freelance science journalist [Erin, 6/8/2017, “How we can stop antibiotic resistance”, BBC, <http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20170607-how-we-can-stop-antibiotic-resistance>] AMarb

First, the entire world needs to get on board. Two years ago this essentially happened when member states of the WHO agreed to accept a Global Action Plan – by then, antibiotic resistance was a problem that had already been on the radar for many decades. The plan lays out extensive solutions and best practices that all countries can take to reduce resistance. “That’s historic,” says Sprenger. Before then, he says, the only people actively discussing how to reduce resistance were people within medical circles, for the most part. "95% of the worldwide population is now living in a country where they have developed a national action plan. All these countries have increased activities in education, training, and prevention control.” In the last couple of decades we’ve seen decreases in prescription to children in the US – Dr Katherine Fleming-Dutra Then, last year, the UN addressed the issue before the General Assembly – only the fourth time in history that a health issue was discussed there. And just this May the G20 leaders signed a declaration on global health that included tackling antibiotic resistance. So it’s definitely a grand challenge that world leaders are taking seriously. Much of the WHO action plan focuses on hospital stewardship and supervision. The CDC is currently working closely with American hospitals to provide guidelines and education for the safe and reasonable prescription of antibiotics. “We have made some progress,” says Dr Katherine Fleming-Dutra, an epidemiologist at the CDC. “In the last couple of decades we’ve seen decreases in prescription to children in the US. We have seen less progress in adults. The rate in adults has been relatively stable.” Once hospitals and physicians get on board with reducing prescriptions the next step is to change regulations around agriculture. Ten years ago the European Union banned antibiotics as growth promoters. And just this January, the US Food and Drug Administration removed growth from the indicated use of antibiotics on drug labelling. According to Dr William Flynn, deputy director for science policy at FDA’s Center for Veterinary Medicine, “There was a real recognition that this was something [farmers] needed to take seriously and respond to. We’re encouraged by the fact that they were engaging and working with us to find ways to make it work.” But other countries need to follow suit – as evidenced by the recent revelations about antibiotic resistance coming out of China. One of the most important steps in tackling resistance is tracking it. The CDC have set up a system called the National Antimicrobial Monitoring System (NARMS). “Surveillance for antibiotic resistant bacteria is a big part of our mission,” says Dr Jean Patel, deputy director of the office of Antimicrobial Resistance at the CDC. “We do this to measure the burden of infection and also characterise the types of resistance we see. This helps us strategise how best to prevent resistance.” We can only really slow the development of resistance. We’re not going to stop it completely. Even appropriate use of antibiotics does contribute to resistance – Amanda Jezek, Vice President for Public Policy and Government Relations, Infectious Diseases Society of America The CDC funds state health departments around the US (and coordinates with laboratories worldwide) to maintain a network of antibiotic resistant bacteria data and samples. Says Patel: “We can use this to give us national estimates of infection rates to see how bacteria are changing, test new drugs against bacteria, and we also have used the bacteria we collect through this to help with vaccine development.” Though, it should be noted, the continued success of the programme could be in jeopardy as US President Donald Trump’s proposed budget suggests cutting funds to the CDC by 17% (or $1.2 billion). But there are also some non-traditional methods being attempted. Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia, has established a unique Antibiotic Resistance Center. One of its main goals is to build diagnostic tests using mutated bacteria collected by the national surveillance system and physicians in their own clinic that can spot resistant bacteria. “The goal is to have scientists, clinicians, and epidemiologists all working together to address this issue. That’s something that hasn’t traditionally happened. There has been division between what the scientists and clinicians are doing,” says the centre’s director David Weiss. “I’m not a doctor. I need to know from the clinicians a lot of what they’re seeing on the front lines to help guide our research to be as relevant as possible.” A comprehensive, collaborative approach could work: last year, the National Health Service of England announced that in 2015, antibiotic prescribing reduced by 5.3% compared to 2014. Public Health England says that more responsible prescribing is key: it says that it advised the NHS in 2015 on the development of better practices that aim to slash prescriptions by 10% from 2013 to 2014 levels. Lastly, there need to be incentives that encourage the development of new antibiotics. The US National Institute of Health and the Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority have set up a biopharmaceutical accelerator called CARB-X. The fund is allotting $48 million to support antibiotic drug discovery projects. “They work with companies in the very early discovery stages to give them funding and technical support to get to the point that they have a product they can do clinical trials with,” says IDSA’s Jezek. Along those same lines, the IDSA is also currently working to develop legislation that would provide funding for clinical trials so that companies can avoid those hefty costs and stand a chance of making a profit from new antibiotics. With all of these programmes working together, and similar efforts taking place around the world, there is a lot of hope that humanity will manage to get a handle on the problem. Still, “we can only really slow the development of resistance. We’re not going to stop it completely,” says Jezek. “Even appropriate use of antibiotics does contribute to resistance.” And that means the challenge will always be immense. As long as there are humans and those humans carry and transmit disease – which they will – the entire world will have to continue fighting for resistance.

### Adv 2:

#### DPT scholarship is bankrupt and entirely lacking in real world applicability – democracy is being eroded by capitalism and collapsing in on itself – their theorizing doesn’t assume this degradation

Christopher Hobson 17, Associate Professor in the School of Political Science and Economics, “Democratic Peace: Progress and Crisis”, http://sci-hub.la/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/perspectives-on-politics/article/democratic-peace-progress-and-crisis/6D5D0A222F4BE800EBED9A555F0593A5#

When work on democratic peace first emerged it contributed to the revitalization of liberal thought and represented an important contribution to the social sciences. Yet innovation has been replaced by stagnation, with Barkawi proposing that the democratic-peace research program has become “degenerative” insofar as it “no longer creates or explains novel facts.”82 An overriding concern with methodological rigor has resulted in an increasingly monochrome literature, divorced from the most significant debates surrounding democracy. This is a prime example of the larger trend towards methodological questions dominating in IR, something that senior scholars from a range of theoretical traditions have voiced misgivings about.83 Reflecting on this state of affairs, Robert Keohane observes that the relentless pressure of more and more sophisticated quanti- tative methods continues . . . . All too often . . . they [methods] are used unimaginatively to address, in somewhat more precise ways, issues that are already well-understood, while new or more significant developments, since they seem less amenable to such methods, are ignored.84 Sanford Schram echoes this conclusion, suggesting that due to an excessive concern with method, “social science has diminished its ability to conduct research in ways that people can use to better understand and do something about what is happening in their society and economy.”85 What Keohane and Schram both point to is the limited value of work that remains defensible within the restricted parameters it sets for itself, but has little to contribute to the way we formulate and respond to fundamental questions in politics. This is certainly the case with democratic-peace research, which operates with an excessively narrow conception of how IR should be studied and what qualifies as valid scholarship. The result is the odd situation where the largest body of work on democracy in IR has remarkably little to say about democracy’s contemporary fortunes and future place in the world. It appears that democratic-peace scholars can no longer see the proverbial forest from the trees. Coding and correlation are debated ad infinitum, while little attention is given to growing economic inequality, voter alienation, a decline in traditional parties, rising populism, and a wide array of related trends that raise serious doubts about the health of established democracies. Democratic-peace re- search has remained largely oblivious to these trends, yet as shown here, these developments are directly relevant for structural and normative arguments. Engaging with these issues means overturning the unexamined assumption that states at the heart of the zone of peace will remain democratic. Not only does such a linear conception of history fail to correspond to democracy’s much more uneven past, it overlooks the possibility that established democracies may disappear, weaken drastically, or undergo great change. The collective failure to seriously consider the possibility that the Soviet Union might collapse should serve as a warning against such comfortable thinking.86 Perhaps the Trump presidency might finally prompt democratic peace scholars to begin taking demo- cratic decline more seriously. The argument made here points towards a different way of studying democracy’s role in international politics, but the conclusions can be adapted to match with the dominant mode of democratic-peace research. For example, Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder have argued that the zone of peace does not extend to transitional democracies, which may actually be more war-prone.87 This logic could be extended to considering democracies in decline, asking whether they will behave more like transitional or established democracies. On this point, Leonardo Morlino has developed a sophisticated framework for measuring the quality of democracies, classifying them in relation to rule of law, accountability, participation, competition, responsibility, freedom, and equality.88 This allows him to distinguish between a range of imperfect democracies: inefficient, irresponsible, passive, stuck, illegitimate, reduced, unequal, and minimal.89 Connecting this to work on democratic peace, it could be worth considering whether some failings or weaknesses in democracy are more consequential than others for international behavior. These are just some examples of the way a more complex—and more empirically accurate—account of democracy and its role in international politics could be developed. It is not sufficient, however, to simply expand the remit of neopositivist scholarship by adding a few new research questions. There is a need for greater openness to work that commences from different ontological, epistemological, and methodological positions.

#### Democracies cause more war than autocracies.

Sebastian Rosato 11, Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame, “On the democratic peace”, http://dlx.b-ok.org/genesis/2080000/7ac79f376c806b791801221b260dbeee/\_as/[Coyne,\_Christopher\_J(editor);\_Mathers,\_Rachel\_L(E(b-ok.org).pdf

15.3 EVALUATING THE CLAIM In this section, I evaluate the empirical claims at the core of democratic peace theory. I nd scant support for both of them. Democracies do go to war with one another and attempts to prove that they do not have the unintended consequence of making the no war claim uninteresting. Moreover, there is little evidence that democracies are less likely to engage each other in militarized disputes than other pairs of states because of their shared regime type. The finding is either statistically insignificant or explained by factors other than democracy. 15.3.1 War The claim that democracies rarely if ever go to war with one another is either incorrect or unsurprising. A careful review of the evidence suggests that contrary to the assertions of democratic peace proponents, there have been a handful of wars between democracies and these can only be excluded by imposing a highly restrictive definition of democracy. This would not pose a problem were it not for the fact that by raising the requirements for a state to be judged democratic, the theory’s defenders reduce the number of democracies in the analysis to such an extent that the finding of no war between them is wholly to be expected. Democratic wars There is considerable evidence that the absence of war claim is incorrect. As Christopher Layne (2001, p. 801) notes, “The most damning indictment of democratic peace theory, is that it happens not to be true: democratic states have gone to war with one another.” For example, categorizing a state as democratic if it achieves a democracy score of six or more in the Polity dataset on regime type – as several analysts do – yields three inter-democratic wars: the American Civil War, the Spanish–American War and the Boer War.6 This is something defenders of the theory readily admit – adopting relatively inclusive de nitions of democracy, they them- selves generate anywhere between a dozen and three dozen cases of inter- democratic war. In order to exclude these anomalies and thereby preserve the absence of war claim, the theory’s defenders restrict their definitions of democracy. In the most compelling analysis to date, Ray (1993, pp. 256–9, 269) argues that no two democracies have gone to war with one another as long as a democracy is de ned as follows: the members of the executive and legislative branches are determined in fair and competitive elections, which is to say that at least two independent parties contest the election, half of the adult population is eligible to vote and the possibility that the governing party can lose has been established by historical precedent. Similarly, Doyle (1983a, pp. 216–17) rescues the claim by arguing that states’ domes- tic and foreign policies must both be subject to the control of the citizenry if they are to be considered liberal. Russett, meanwhile, argues that his no war claim rests on de ning democracy as a state with a voting franchise for a substantial fraction of the population, a government brought to power in elections involving two or more legally recognized parties, a popularly elected executive or one responsible to an elected legislature, requirements for civil liberties including free speech and demonstrated longevity of at least three years (Russett 1993, pp. 14–16). Despite imposing these de nitional restrictions, proponents of the democratic peace cannot exclude up to ve major wars, a gure which, if con rmed, would invalidate the democratic peace by their own admission (Ray 1995, p. 27). The first is the War of 1812 between Britain and the United States. Ray argues that it does not contradict the claim because Britain does not meet his su rage requirement. Yet this does not make Britain any less democratic than the United States at the time where less than half the adult population was eligible to vote. In fact, as Layne (2001, p. 801) notes, “the United States was not appreciably more democratic than unreformed Britain.” This poses a problem for the democratic peace: if the United States was a democracy, and Ray believes it was, then Britain was also a democracy and the War of 1812 was an inter-democratic war. The second case is the American Civil War. Democratic peace theorists believe the United States was a democracy in 1861, but exclude the case on the grounds that it was a civil rather than interstate war (Russett 1993, pp. 16–17). However, a plausible argument can be made that the United States was not a state but a union of states, and that this was therefore a war between states rather than within one. Note, for example, that the term “United States” was plural rather than singular at the time and the con ict was known as the “War Between the States.”7 This being the case, the Civil War also contradicts the claim.8 The Spanish–American and Boer wars constitute two further excep- tions to the rule. Ray excludes the former because half of the members of Spain’s upper house held their positions through hereditary succession or royal appointment. Yet this made Spain little di erent to Britain, which he classi es as a democracy at the time, thereby leading to the conclusion that the Spanish–American War was a war between democracies. Similarly, it is hard to accept his claim that the Orange Free State was not a democ- racy during the Boer War because black Africans were not allowed to vote when he is content to classify the United States as a democracy in the second half of the nineteenth century (Ray 1993, pp. 265, 267; Layne 2001, p. 802). In short, defenders of the democratic peace can only rescue their core claim through the selective application of highly restrictive criteria. Perhaps the most important exception is World War I, which, by virtue of the fact that Germany fought against Britain, France, Italy, Belgium and the United States, would count as ve instances of war between liberal states in most analyses of the democratic peace.9 As Ido Oren (1995, pp. 178–9) has shown, Germany was widely considered to be a liberal state prior to World War I: “Germany was a member of a select group of the most politically advanced countries, far more advanced than some of the nations that are currently coded as having been ‘liberal’ during that period.” In fact, Germany was consistently placed toward the top of that group, “either as second only to the United States . . . or as positioned below England and above France.” Moreover, Doyle’s assertion that the case ought to be excluded because Germany was liberal domesti- cally, but not in foreign a airs, does not stand up to scrutiny. As Layne (1994, p. 42) points out, foreign policy was “insulated from parliamentary control” in both France and Britain, two purportedly liberal states (see also Mearsheimer 1990, p. 51, fn. 77; Layne 2001, pp. 803–807). Thus it is di cult to classify Germany as non-liberal and World War I constitutes an important exception to the nding. Small numbers Even if restrictive definitions of democracy enable democratic peace theorists to uphold their claim, they render it unsurprising by reducing the number of democracies in any analysis. As several scholars have noted, there were only a dozen or so democracies in the world prior to World War I, and even fewer in a position to fight one another. Therefore, since war is a rare event for any pair of states, the fact that democracies did not fight one another should occasion little surprise (Mearsheimer 1990, p. 50; Cohen 1994, pp. 214, 216; Layne 1994, p. 39; Henderson 1999, p. 212).10 It should be a source of even less surprise as the number of democracies and the potential for con ict among them falls, something that is bound to happen as the democratic bar rises. Ray’s su rage criterion, for example, eliminates two great powers – Britain and the United States – from the democratic ranks before World War I, thereby making the absence of war between democracies eminently predictable.11 A simple numerical example should serve to illustrate the point. Using a Polity score of six or more to designate a state as a democracy yields 716 purely democratic dyads out of a total 23240 politically relevant dyads between 1816 and 1913. Assuming that wars are distributed according to the proportion of democratic dyads in the population and knowing that there were 86 dyads at war during this period, we should expect to observe three democratic–democratic wars between the Congress of Vienna and World War I.12 If we actually observed no wars between democracies, the democratic peace phenomenon might be worth investigating further even though the di erence between three and zero wars is barely statisti- cally signi cant.13 Increasing the score required for a state to be coded as a democracy to eight – a score that would make Britain democratic from 1901 onwards only and eliminate states like Spain and the Orange Free State from the ranks of the democracies – makes a dramatic di erence. The number of democratic dyads falls to 171, and the expected number of wars is now between zero and one. Now the absence of war nding is to be expected. In short, by adopting restrictive de nitions of democracy, proponents of the democratic peace render their central claim wholly unexceptional. In sum, proponents of the democratic peace have unsuccessfully attempted to tread a ne line in order to substantiate their claim that democracies have rarely if ever waged war against one another. On the one hand, they admit that inter-democratic war is not an unusual phenomenon if they adopt relatively inclusive de nitions of democracy. On the other hand, in their attempts to restrict the de nition of democracy and thereby save the nding they inadvertently make the absence of war between democracies trivial. 15.3.2 Militarized Disputes There are at least two reasons to doubt the claim that pairs of democra- cies are less prone to con ict than other pairs of states. First, despite their assertions, it is not clear that democratic peace theorists have established the existence of a powerful association between joint democracy and peace. Second, there is good evidence that factors other than democracy – many of them consistent with realist expectations – account for the peace among democratic states.14 Significance Democratic peace theorists have yet to provide clearcut evidence that there is a signi cant relationship between their independent and dependent vari- ables, joint democracy and peace. It is now clear, for example, that Maoz and Russett’s analysis of the Cold War period, which claims to establish the existence of a joint, separate peace, does not in fact do so. In a reas- sessment of that analysis, which follows the original as closely as possible save for the addition of a control for economic interdependence, Oneal et al. (1996) nd that a continuous measure of democracy is not signi cantly correlated with peace. Moreover, a supplementary analysis of contiguous dyads – those that experience most of the con icts – also nds no signi - cant relationship between a continuous measure of joint democracy and peace whether a control for economic interdependence is included or not. This nding is particularly damaging because democratic peace theorists argue that “most theoretical explanations of the separate peace imply a continuous e ect: the more democratic a pair of states, the less likely they are to become involved in con ict” (Oneal and Ray 1997, p. 752). Oneal and Ray (1997, pp. 756–7) conclude that the original Maoz and Russett nding does not survive reanalysis because it is based on a joint democracy variable that, although widely used, is poorly calculated and constructed, and they therefore propose a new democracy measure that they claim does achieve statistical signi cance. Their new measure of joint democracy uses the democracy score of the less democratic state in a dyad on the assumption that con ict is a function of the regime type of the less constrained of two interacting states. This “weak link” speci cation appears to provide powerful support for the democratic peace nding: “As the less democratic state becomes more democratic, the likelihood of con ict declines. This is clear evidence of the paci c bene ts of democ- racy.” The new variable provides “corroboration of the democratic peace” (Oneal and Ray 1997, pp. 764–5). Oneal and Russett concur with this conclusion in a separate analysis that also uses the weak link assumption. An increase in democracy in the state that is “freer to resort to violence, reduces the likelihood of dyadic con ict” (Oneal and Russett 1997, p. 279). Although the weak link measure is widely accepted as the gold standard in studies of the relationship between democracy and a variety of inter- national outcomes, it does not provide evidence that joint democracy is signi cantly related to peace. Even as they developed it, Oneal and Ray admitted that the weak link was not a pure measure of joint democracy. What it really revealed was that the probability of con ict was “a func- tion of the average level of democracy in a dyad . . . [and] also the political distance separating the states along the democracy–autocracy continuum” (1997, p. 768, emphasis added). The problem, of course, is that the logics advanced to explain the democratic peace refer to the e ects of democracy on state behavior; none refer to the e ects of political similarity. Thus ndings generated using the weak link speci cation – which is to say all the major assessments of the democratic peace – may not actually support the central democratic peace claim that it is something about the norms and institutions of democracies that enables them to remain at peace. This is precisely the conclusion that Errol Henderson reaches in his compelling assessment of Oneal and Russett’s work. His analysis repli- cates theirs precisely with two minor modi cations: he includes only the rst year of any dispute because democratic peace theory is about the incidence of disputes, not their duration, and he introduces a political similarity variable in order to disentangle the e ects of joint democracy and political distance on con ict. His central result is striking: democracy “is not signi cantly associated with the probability of dispute onset.” “What is apparent from the results,” he concludes, “is that in the light of quite reasonable, modest, and straightforward modi cations of Oneal and Russett’s . . . research design, there is no statistically signi cant relation- ship between joint democracy and a decreased likelihood of militarized interstate con ict” (Henderson 2002, pp. 37–9). Mark Souva (2004) reaches essentially the same conclusion in an analysis of the relationship between domestic institutions and interstate con ict using the weak link speci cation. In a model that includes variables for political and economic institutional similarity, both of which are signi cantly associated with peace, there is no signi cant relationship between joint democracy and the absence of con ict. Other factors There is considerable evidence that factors other than democracy account for the peace among democratic states. As a prelude to elaborating on this point, a few words are in order about the temporal scope of the nding. It is generally agreed that there is scant evidence of mutual democratic paci sm prior to 1945. Henry Farber and Joanne Gowa (1995, p. 143) adopt the most extreme position, claiming that democratic dyads were signi cantly more likely to ght between 1816 and 1913 than other pairs.15 However, even proponents of the theory admit that there is no clearcut evidence for a democratic peace before the Cold War. Thus Oneal and Russett (1999b, pp. 226–7) nd that if they exclude all but the rst year of the wars in their sample – a move that is wholly appropriate given that the theory refers only to the incidence of con ict – there is scant support for the democratic peace between 1870 and 1945. Elsewhere, they are more bullish about the democratic peace, arguing that double democratic “dyads . . . were the most peaceful after about 1900,” though it is worth noting that this period constitutes a small fraction of the entire multipolar era for which data are available (1816–1945) (Oneal and Russett 1999a, p. 28). This is not surprising. As Russett (1993, p. 20) observes, the nineteenth century was a period of “very imperfect democracy,” therefore we should expect to nd a number of inter-democratic rivalries, violent con icts and, as some have suggested, even wars. When coupled with the fact that there were few democracies in the world at the time, this observation suggests that we are unlikely to nd a democratic peace before 1945. There is widespread agreement that, in contrast to the pre-World War II period, there is good evidence of a democratic peace during the Cold War. Henderson (2002, p. 15), for example, describes the postwar period as “the period within which the democratic peace is most evident.” Indeed, even Farber and Gowa (1995, p. 145) admit that “after World War II, there was a marked and statistically signi cant lower probability of disputes short of war between democracies.” Proponents of the theory attribute this to two changes at mid-century: the number of democratic states increased mark- edly, and democratic norms and institutions became stronger and more entrenched, thereby exerting a greater restraining e ect on con ict (Maoz and Russett 1993, p. 627; Oneal and Russett 1997, p. 273). The problem for democratic peace theory is that there are several factors other than democracy that plausibly account for the peace among democratic states after World War II. Farber and Gowa (1995), for example, attribute the democratic peace not to joint democracy, but to alliance ties brought on by the Cold War conflict. Proponents of the democratic peace respond by claiming that in their analyses joint democracy is still related to peace even when controlling for alliance ties. But Henderson (2002, p. 134) refutes this claim, noting that in his replication of Oneal and Russett, “alli- ance membership, more than joint democracy, contributed to peace in the postwar era.” Crucially, Farber and Gowa and Henderson demonstrate that it is not shared democracy that causes democracies to ally with one another in the rst place – thus democracy does not have even an indirect e ect on peace. Another research tradition argues that the inter-democratic peace can be attributed to economic factors, specifically economic interdependence and development. Solomon Polachek, for example, nds that “introduc- ing trade explains away democracy’s impact” on con ict in his analysis of interstate disputes between 1958 and 1967. “Democracy per se does not reduce con ict. Instead a more fundamental factor than being a democ- racy in causing bilateral cooperation is trade” (1997, p. 306, emphasis in original). Similarly, Erik Gartzke (2007) nds that adding variables for nancial and monetary integration and economic development to the standard Oneal and Russett model renders the e ect of joint democracy insigni cant. Thus he concludes that “capitalism, and not democracy, leads to peace” (2007, p. 180). Mousseau (2009) makes a similar argu- ment, claiming that it is advanced capitalist states – he refers to them as contract intensive economies – rather than democracies that do not ght one another. His analysis suggests that the democratic peace is spurious – contract intensive economies caused democracy and peace between 1961 and 2001 (2009, pp. 53–4). Scholars have come up with several other purported causes of the demo- cratic peace that do not t neatly into the security or economic categories. For Gartzke (2000), the finding can be attributed to the fact that democracies tend to have similar preferences. Adding a control for “preference affinity” makes the relationship between democracy and peace insignificant. Importantly, there is only a modest correlation between preference affnity and democracy. Thus he concludes that, contrary to the views of his critics, the e ect of preferences on con ict is not largely a by-product of regime type. His results “challenge the notion that the democratic peace is due largely, or even substantially, to democracy” (2000, p. 209).16 Douglas Gibler (2007, p. 529), meanwhile, concludes that the democratic peace is “in fact a stable border peace.” After adding a control for stable borders on the assumption that the removal of territorial issues has a pacifying e ect on interstate relations, Gibler nds that democracy has little or no e ect on con ict. Most of these findings – and therefore the postwar peace among democracies – can plausibly be explained by realism. The argument goes as follows. Beginning in 1945, the United States found itself in a life and death struggle with the Soviet Union. In order to compete and ultimately prevail in that contest, Washington implemented a two-pronged strategy. First, it established a far-reaching network of military alliances to resist Soviet aggression wherever it might occur. Second, it created an open economic order designed to generate enough wealth to fund the military e ort and to combat communist subversion. In other words, it was the exigencies of the Cold War that generated the alliances, economic integra- tion, advanced economies, and perhaps even the preference a nity that scholars have found to be powerfully associated with the peace among democracies since 1945.17 In sum, there are good reasons to doubt the claim that democracies are less likely to engage each other in violent disputes short of war than other pairs of states. The evidence that there is a signi cant relationship between joint democracy and peace is not strong. Moreover, scholars have uncov- ered several other factors that plausibly account for the peace among democracies, many of which can be explained by realism. 15.4 THE CAUSAL MECHANISMS Proponents of the theory have developed two sets of causal mechanisms to explain the democratic peace. The rst focuses on the e ect of democratic norms on foreign policy behavior. The second attributes the separate peace to the e ect of democratic institutions. 15.4.1 Norms The normative argument begins with the premise that democratic leaders are socialized to act on the basis of democratic norms whenever possible. These norms stress the importance of nonviolent con ict resolution and negotiation in a spirit of live-and-let-live. Because they have been socialized to adhere to these norms, democratic elites try to adopt them in the international arena if they can. Consequently, democracies trust and respect one another when a con ict of interest arises. They respect one another because they believe that the other is committed to the same norms of behavior and is therefore worthy of accommodation. And they trust one another because they believe that the other respects them and is normatively proscribed from using violence. Together these norm exter- nalization and trust and respect mechanisms make up the normative logic (Russett 1993, pp. 31–5; Dixon 1994, pp. 16–18; Weart 1998, pp. 77–8, 87–93). The normative logic also explains why democracies are not especially peaceful toward non-democracies. Antagonists that are not democratic are not trusted because they are presumed not to respect democracies and because their leaders are not inclined toward peaceful con ict resolution. And they are not respected because their domestic systems are unjust. Thus democracies will act violently toward non-democracies in order to defend themselves from attack, to preempt aggressive action, or in order to introduce human rights and representative government (Doyle 1983b, pp. 323–37; Russett 1993, pp. 32–5). 15.4.2 Institutions Although there are several variants of the institutional argument, all of them begin with the premise that democratic leaders are accountable to a wide variety of social groups that may, under various conditions, oppose the use of force. Their accountability derives from their desire to remain in o ce, from the fact that there are opposition parties ready to capital- ize on unpopular policies, and from the fact that democratic publics can periodically remove leaders who are judged not to have acted in their best interests. In addition, the freedom of speech and open political processes that are characteristic of democracy make it possible for the public to rate the government’s performance. In short, democratic institutions make it possible for publics to monitor and sanction their leaders (Lake 1982, pp. 25–6; Russett 1993, pp. 38–40; Owen 1997, pp. 41–3). Conscious of their accountability, democratic elites will only use force abroad if there is widespread support for doing so. This support is vital if they are not to be removed from o ce for waging an unpopular war or to encounter opposition from various social groups for committing the state to a costly violent con ict. Democratic peace theorists focus on four spe- ci c groups that must be mobilized to support a war: the general public, constituencies that bene t from an open international economic order, opposition parties and liberal opinion leaders. These groups are likely to oppose war because it is costly in terms of blood, treasure, or expected pro ts, because they can gain electorally from doing so, or because they deem it morally unacceptable (Doyle 1983a, pp. 229, 231–2; Russett 1993, pp. 38–9; Owen 1997, pp. 19, 37–9, 45–7; Schultz 1998, pp. 831–2). Six causal mechanisms ow from the elite accountability claim, each of which traces a di erent path to peace between democracies. The rst two suggest that democracies are constrained from using force in the interna- tional arena. According to the public constraint mechanism, democratic elites shy away from the use of force in response to the public’s aversion to war, which is itself driven by a reluctance to incur the costs associated with large scale interstate violence. The group constraint mechanism is similar: democratic leaders carry out the wishes of various antiwar groups. Thus in a stando involving two democracies both sides are constrained, believe the other also to be constrained and seek an agreement short of war (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, pp. 155–8; Russett 1993, pp. 38–40). Two further mechanisms focus on the claim that accountability makes democratic leaders slow to resort to force. According to the slow mobi- lization mechanism, persuading the public and potential antiwar groups to support the use of force is a long, complex process and therefore democracies cannot mobilize quickly. This is also the core of the surprise attack mechanism, which also notes that the mobilization process takes place in the open, thereby precluding the possibility that a democracy can launch a surprise attack. In a crisis involving two democracies, then, the antagonists have the time to come to a mutually acceptable agreement and can negotiate without fearing attack (Russett 1993, pp. 38–40; Bueno de Mesquita, Koch and Siverson 2004, pp. 256–7). The fth mechanism zeroes in on the advantages that democracies have in revealing information about their resolve in a crisis. Because they are accountable to their citizens and can expect opposition parties to oppose unpopular policies, democratic leaders are cautious about escalating a crisis or launching a war. In fact, they will only ght if the stakes in a con ict are important to them. This provides valuable information to an opponent: if a democracy refuses to back down or escalates a crisis, then it is resolved. In purely democratic crises, then, both states will have good information about the other’s resolve, are unlikely to misrepresent their own resolve and can reach a settlement without risking war (Schultz 1998, pp. 840–1; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, pp. 802–803). The nal mechanism focuses on democratic expectations of victory. Because they are accountable to their citizens and various domestic groups, democratic leaders will only choose to ght when they believe that their chances of victory in the ensuing war are high. It follows that when two democracies face o against one another, the odds that both believe they have a good chance of prevailing in battle are exceedingly low. Therefore pairs of democracies in a crisis will negotiate rather than ght (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, p. 799; Bueno de Mesquita 2006, p. 640). These mechanisms also explain why democracies ght nondemocracies. Leaders of nondemocratic states are not as accountable as their democratic counterparts and are therefore less constrained, quicker to act, unable to signal their resolve and prepared to ght even when their chances of victory are modest. This being the case, democracies are likely to use force against nondemocracies for three reasons: they may have to ght in self- defense; they may conclude that they have to preempt aggressive action by striking rst; or because they misread their opponents’ resolve, they may mistakenly believe that peaceful bargains are not available (Lake 1982, pp. 26–30; Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1992, pp. 158–60; Russett 1993, pp. 38–40; Bueno de Mesquita 2006, p. 640). 15.5 EVALUATING THE CAUSAL MECHANISMS 15.5.1 Norms The causal mechanisms that comprise the normative logic do not appear to operate as stipulated. The available evidence suggests that democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic norms of con ict resolution, nor do they tend to treat each other with trust and respect when their interests clash. Externalization Democracies have often failed to externalize their domestic norms of conflict resolution. These norms justify the use of force under only two conditions: self-defense, and intervention to prevent gross human rights violations or impose democracy. However, there is good evidence that democracies have frequently waged war for reasons other than these.18 Between 1815 and 1975, Europe’s most liberal states fought 33 “imperial” wars against previously independent polities, and 33 “colonial” wars against their own possessions. None of the imperial wars can be justi ed in terms of self-defense. Several, such as the First Opium War (1839) and Dutch–Achinese War (1873), were driven by the desire for pro t or in order to extend a sphere of in uence. Another set of cases that includes the British–Afghan War (1838) and the Franco–Tunisian War (1881) was driven by imperial competition: a liberal great power conquered an independent people in order to prevent it falling into the hands of another state. Some commentators justify these as defensive wars, arguing that the democracy in question was attempting to protect its empire. However, most were preventive rather than defensive: there was no imminent threat to either Afghanistan or Tunisia, for example. Moreover, in launching these wars Britain and France eschewed an obvious liberal alternative to conquest such as o ering the non-European entity a defensive alliance. A nal set of cases, including the British–Zulu War (1838) and Franco- Tonkin War (1873), involves wars fought against independent peoples bordering democratic empires. Several of these have also been erroneously categorized as defensive. In most cases, the democratic imperial power acted preventively or deliberately provoked the non-European polity into attacking as a prelude to conquering it. And in the few cases where the non- European power initiated the war it, and not the democracy, was acting in self-defense. Nor were any of the wars, colonial or imperial, fought in order to prevent human rights violations or inculcate liberal values. All of the colonial wars were waged expressly to perpetuate autocratic rule. The imperial wars, meanwhile, simply had the e ect of replacing indigenous illiberal governments with European authoritarian rule. Where this rule was not direct, the Europeans supported local autocratic elites, thereby e ectively underwriting autocratic rule. In short, there is good evidence that the norm externalization mecha- nism does not operate as advertised. Britain and France, generally viewed as classic examples of liberal states, have frequently violated liberal norms in their foreign a airs, thereby casting doubt on the claim that democracies externalize their internal norms of con ict resolution. As Dan Reiter and Allan Stam (2002, p. 151) note, “The essential parts of the norms explana- tion argue that democracies engage in wars out of fear of exploitation by nondemocratic states. However, the initiation of wars of empire against weaker states to expand democracy’s interests and in uence at the expense of weaker societies is inexplicable from the liberal norms perspective.” Trust and respect Democracies do not have a powerful inclination to treat each other with trust and respect when their interests clash. Good evidence for this claim comes from a review of American interventions to destabilize fellow democracies during the Cold War. Three features of these cases warrant attention. First, all of the regimes that the United States sought to undermine – Iran (1953), Guatemala (1954), Indonesia (1957), British Guyana (1961–64), Brazil (1961, 1964), Chile (1973) and Nicaragua (1984–90) – were established or edgling democracies and all were replaced by authoritarian regimes. Second, although the interventions were often justified as attempts to combat communism, none of the targets were communist, intended to impose a communist model, or were actively courting the Soviet Union. In other words, the United States did not trust and respect other democracies even when the issues at stake were relatively minor. Third, in the cases of Iran, Guatemala, Brazil and Chile support for democracy appears to have been subordinated to naked economic interests. Democratic peace theorists deny that these examples damage the theory. First, they argue that the target governments were not su ciently demo- cratic. Second, they argue that the United States government acted cov- ertly precisely because of democratic norms: the public would have viewed overt action as illegitimate. Thus the cases do not contradict the theory. Neither argument stands up to scrutiny. In some instances, the targets may not have been fully democratic, but they were more democratic than the regimes that preceded or succeeded them. As for the claim that the covert nature of these operations actually supports democratic peace theory, it is worth noting that the theory explicitly asserts that it is the leaders of democracies who are most likely to be socialized to and abide by liberal norms. That they did not do so and misled a liberal public is a powerful indictment of the theory. But this is of little consequence: whether or not normative considerations a ected the type of violence employed, the fact is that the United States, perhaps the most liberal state in the system, did not trust or respect these states, even though they were democratic, and used military force in order to destabilize them. Further evidence against the trust and respect claim comes from several analyses of diplomatic crises involving Britain, France, Germany and the United States. Layne looks at four crises where democratic states almost went to war with each other and concludes that they o er scant support for the mechanism: “In each of these crises, at least one of the democratic states involved was prepared to go to war. . . In each of the four crises war was avoided not because of the ‘live and let live’ spirit of peaceful dispute resolution at democratic peace theory’s core, but because of realist factors” (Layne 1994, p. 38).19 Similarly, Stephen Rock (1997) nds little evidence that shared liberal norms helped to resolve any of the nineteenth century crises between Britain and the United States. In later cases, where they do appear to have contributed to resolving divisive con icts, “liberal values and democratic institutions were not the only factors inclining Britain and the United States toward peace, and perhaps not even the dominant ones” (Rock 1997, p. 146). In short, the trust and respect mechanism does not appear to work as speci ed. Faced with these anomalies, democratic peace theorists argue that democracies will only trust and respect one another if they perceive each other to be democratic. This is only a convincing amendment, however, if democracies tend to form coherent, accurate, and stable opinions of the regime types of other states. They do not. Even John Owen (1997), in his sympathetic analysis of the democratic peace, is forced to admit that, more often than not, liberal elites fail to form coherent or accurate assessments of the regime type of their adversaries. Meanwhile, Oren (1995) has shown that these assessments are far from stable: democracies frequently redefine who is or is not democratic and they do so based on strategic considera- tions rather than on the democratic attributes of those states. Thus the introduction of perceptions has done little to strengthen the democratic peace case. 15.5.2 Institutions The available evidence suggests that the institutional argument does not work as speci ed. For one thing, democratic leaders are no more accountable than their autocratic counterparts. Nor does the evidence support the institutional mechanisms that purportedly ow from democratic account- ability. Pacific publics and antiwar groups rarely constrain decisions for war, democracies are not slow to mobilize or incapable of surprise attack, democratic states are not especially good at revealing their resolve in a crisis, and they are not especially likely to win their wars. Accountability It is generally accepted that democracies do not ght each other, but autoc- racies do. Therefore, if accountability is a key mechanism in explaining the separate peace between democracies, democratic leaders must be more accountable than autocratic leaders. If they are not, then accountability – the key to all the institutional arguments – cannot be a prime cause of the democratic peace. In assessing whether leaders are accountable, proponents of the demo- cratic peace focus exclusively on their chances of losing o ce as a result of waging a losing or costly war (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 1999, p. 794). Logically, however, accountability depends on a leader’s likelihood of removal and the costs that he or she will incur when removed. It is not clear, for example, that leaders who are likely to be voted out of o ce for prosecuting a losing or costly war, but are unlikely to be exiled, impris- oned or killed in the process will feel more accountable than leaders who are unlikely to lose o ce, but can expect severe punishment in the unlikely event that they are in fact removed. Put somewhat di erently, it is not clear that their expected costs, which are a function of the likelihood that they will be removed and the costs they will incur if they are removed, are substantially di erent.20 If we focus on expected costs, democrats do not appear to be more accountable than autocrats. An analysis of the fate of all leaders in all the wars in the Correlates of War (COW) dataset, reveals that demo- cratic leaders who lose a war or embroil their state in a costly war are marginally more likely to be removed from o ce than their autocratic counterparts (37 percent to 35 percent), but considerably less likely to be exiled, imprisoned, or killed (5 percent to 28 percent).21 Thus there is little evidence that democratic leaders face greater expected costs for waging losing or costly wars and are therefore more accountable than their auto- cratic counterparts. Giacomo Chiozza and Hein Goemans reach a similar conclusion in their examination of how defeat in war a ects the tenure of democratic and nondemocratic leaders between 1919 and 1999. Defeat in war does not significantly affect the tenure of democrats, but does significantly reduce the tenure of autocrats (Chiozza and Goemans 2004, p. 613). Similarly, in her analysis of domestic audience costs, Jessica Weeks (2008, p. 59) nds that leaders in most nondemocracies are just as accountable as their democratic counterparts. Faced with this argument, democratic peace theorists provide alterna- tive evidence that democratic leaders are more accountable than their autocratic counterparts. Noting that democracies rarely lose their wars, proponents of the democratic peace assert that this must be because they are more accountable than autocrats and therefore tend to choose winnable wars. (Slantchev, Alexandrova and Gartzke 2005, p. 461). There are several problems with this new body of evidence. First, it does not contradict the nding about the fate of leaders described above. That body of evidence, which provides a more direct test of the accountability claim, suggests that there is little di erence between democrats and autocrats in terms of accountability. Second, as I argue below, there is little evidence that democracies are more likely to win their wars than autocracies, and scant support for the claim that democrats carefully select wars that they can win because they are aware of their accountability. As Michael Desch (2003, p. 188) points out, democratic peace theorists are content to “infer” careful selection “rather than directly testing these propositions.” Public constraint The claim that public opinion can be expected to restrain leaders considering war suffers from several weaknesses. First, only a tiny fraction of the public is likely to experience the costs of war directly and therefore have a reason to oppose a conflict. Excluding the World Wars, democratic fatalities in war have tended to be quite low. In 60 percent of cases, losses amounted to less than 0.01 percent of the population, or 1 in 10 000 people. Indeed, the casualty rate only exceeded 0.1 percent, or 1 in 1000 people, in 6 percent of cases. As for militarized disputes, Britain and the United States have su ered less than one hundred total battle fatalities in 97 percent of them. Thus the vast majority of citizens do not experience the costs of war. Moreover, those who are directly a ected – the families and friends of mili- tary personnel – are the least likely to oppose a war. Because most democ- racies have professional standing armies and members of the military sign up voluntarily, they and those close to them tend to be imbued with a pow- erful spirit of patriotism and self-sacri ce, and they are therefore unlikely to speak out against a government that chooses to go to war. Second, cost aversion is often trumped by nationalism. The growth of nationalism is one of the most striking features of the modern period. Its e ect is so powerful, in fact, that ordinary citizens have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to ght and die in order to defend their state and co-nationals. This being the case, it is likely that if they believe the national interest is at stake, as it is in most interstate con icts, the citizens of democracies will ignore the costs associated with a decision for war. Third, democratic leaders can often lead the public rather than follow it. Their reputation as foreign policy experts and their privileged access to relevant information give them ample opportunity to stoke nationalistic fervor, shape public opinion and suppress dissent despite the obligation to allow free and open discussion.22 There is good evidence that cost considerations are often trumped by nationalism or elite entrepreneurship. Between 1815 and 1991, the world’s ve most militarily active democracies – the United States, Britain, France, India and Israel – went to war 30 times. In half of those cases, they were the victims of aggression and therefore we should not be surprised that their publics reacted in a nationalistic fashion or were persuaded to support decisions for war. In the other fteen cases, however, there was no obvious threat to the homeland or vital national interests. Nevertheless, on 12 of these occasions (80 percent) the outbreak of war was greeted by a spontaneous and powerful nationalistic response, or in the absence of such a response, leaders persuaded the public to support the use of force. This kind of reaction has been common even in clashes between democracies. The available evidence reveals that public opinion was highly bellicose and nationalistic on at least a dozen occasions where democracies came to the brink of war with one another. Group constraint For the group constraint mechanism to be a plausible explanation of the democratic peace, there must be good evidence that antiwar groups will, more often than not, dominate the policy process. There are theoretical and empirical reasons to doubt this claim. As far as theory goes, it is gen- erally agreed that groups that are better organized and have more at stake in a given situation are more likely to in uence policy. This being the case, there is no reason to believe that pacific groups will generally prevail over bellicose ones. When it comes to issues of war and peace, international traders and the military industrial complex will both have a great deal at stake and are likely to be equally well organized. The historical record also suggests that prowar groups often win out in the foreign policy process. Owen (1997) identi es four nineteenth century examples in which the American political elite was deeply divided about going to war and finds that in each case the prowar group won out over the antiwar group. Similarly, Jack Snyder (1991) provides abundant evidence of bellicose groups capturing the foreign policy making process in Britain and the United States over the last 200 years. Imperialist groups managed to dominate British policymaking in the middle of the nineteenth century due to “their apparent monopoly on expertise and e ective organization.” The US case is even more damaging to the group constraint claim. Despite a consensus against involvement in “high cost, low bene t endeavors” the United States became embroiled in Korea and Vietnam as a result of coalitional logrolling among prowar groups (Snyder 1991, pp. 206, 209). In short, it is not clear that paci c interest groups tend to dominate the democratic policy process even in the most mature and stable democracies. There is also little evidence for the other implication of the group con- straint claim, namely that group constraints must be weaker in autocra- cies than in democracies. If the mechanism is to explain why democracies remain at peace but autocracies do not, then there must be good evidence that democratic leaders face greater group constraints. The evidence sug- gests, however, that autocratic leaders often respond to groups – themselves or their supporters – that have powerful incentives to avoid war. One reason for autocrats to shy away from con ict is that wars are expensive and the best way to pay for them is to move to a system of con- sensual taxation, which in turn requires the expansion of the franchise. In other words, autocratic leaders have a powerful incentive to avoid wars lest they trigger political changes that may destroy their hold on power. Another reason to avoid war is that it allows civilian autocrats to maintain weak military establishments, thereby reducing the chances that they will be overthrown. Di erent considerations inhibit the war proneness of mili- tary dictators. First, because they must often devote considerable effort to domestic repression, they have fewer resources available for prosecuting foreign wars. Second, because they are used for repression their militaries often have little societal support, which makes them ill equipped to ght external wars. Third, military dictators are closely identi ed with the military and will therefore be cautious about waging war for fear that they will be blamed for any subsequent defeat. Finally, time spent fighting abroad is time away from other tasks on which a dictator’s domestic tenure also depends. Thus there may be fewer groups with access to the foreign policy process in autocracies – in extreme cases only the autocrat himself has a say – but these often have a vested interest in avoiding war. This being the case, it is not clear that group constraints are weaker in autocracies than they are in democracies. Slow mobilization There is scant support for the claim that democracies are slow to use force because of the complexity of mobilizing multiple domestic groups behind the war e ort. American presidents, for example, have routinely circumvented or ignored the checks and balances that are supposed to restrain their decisions to use force. For proof we need look no further than the following fact: most of the 200 American uses of force in the last two centuries were authorized unilaterally by the president and only ve of them were wars declared by Congress. Presidents have circumvented the democratic process in several ways: by asserting that national security is more important than observing the constitution; by rede ning the action in question as anything but a war, thereby obviating the need for consulta- tion; by putting troops in harm’s way in order to spark a wider con ict; and, at times, by simply ignoring Congress. Even the passage of the War Powers Resolution (1972), which was designed to make war decisions subject to open debate, has had little e ect. When presidents have deter- mined that national security depends on swift and decisive action they have been willing to bypass the democratic imperatives of open debate and consensus decision making. That this kind of behavior is routine in perhaps the most democratic state of the last two centuries suggests that slow mobilization is not a feature of democracies as a whole. Surprise attack There is also scant support for the claim that democracies are less able to launch surprise attacks. There have been ten surprise attacks since 1939, two of which have been launched by democracies – the British–French–Israeli attack on Egypt in 1956 and the Israeli initiation of the Six Day War (1967). Because there are so few cases, it is impossible to determine whether this nding is signi cant, but it is worth noting that democracies have made up approximately one-third of the state years since 1939, which suggests that they are as likely to launch surprise attacks as nondemocracies. Moreover, there does not appear to be a great deal of evidence for the claim at the core of the surprise attack mechanism, namely that democracies cannot keep their war deliberations secret. The United States kept its decision for war from the British before the War of 1812, Lord Grey did not publicize his agreement to defend French Channel ports before World War I and Roosevelt did not reveal his agreements with Churchill prior to World War II. In short, demo- cratic leaders will eschew open debate and maintain secrecy whenever they believe that doing so will improve their chances of military success. Information Democracies do not appear to be especially good at revealing their level of resolve in a crisis. The rst reason is that although their open politi- cal systems can provide a great deal of information, this is not the same as providing good information. In a standoff against a democracy, the other state will receive signals from numerous sources, including the government, the opposition, interest groups, public opinion and the media. Discerning which signal is representative of the democracy’s true position is likely to be a di cult task. There is good evidence for this claim. In their analysis of seven interstate crises between 1812 and 1969, for example, Bernard Finel and Kristin Lord (1999) nd that democracies do indeed provide a great deal of information, but also that its sheer volume has either confused observers or served to reinforce prior misconceptions. Democratic peace theorists have responded that opponents are not con- fused by the multitude of signals that they receive from democracies. If the opposition party supports the government then the democracy is commit- ted, otherwise it is not. It is not clear, however, that the opposition’s stance in a crisis reveals a great deal about a democracy’s resolve. For one thing, the opposition almost invariably supports the government either as a result of the familiar “rally round the ag” e ect or because the administration persuades it to do so. In fact, as Kenneth Schultz (2001, p. 167) has shown, opposition parties support their governments’ deterrent threats 84 percent of the time. What this means is that democracies are rarely able to signal their level of resolve – since the opposition almost always supports the government, opponents glean little information when they see an opposi- tion party doing exactly that. Nor do they gain valuable information when the opposition party opposes the government. On the few occasions that opposition parties have opposed military action, thereby presumably sign- aling that the democracy is not resolved, the government has instead gone ahead and initiated hostilities. Presidents Madison, Truman, and George H.W. Bush and Prime Minister Anthony Eden, to name a few, all went to war despite resistance from their respective opposition parties. In short, there does not appear to be a strong correlation between declarations by opposition parties and decisions for war. Victory For the victory mechanism to explain the democratic peace there must be good evidence that democracies win most of their wars and that their victory propensity can be attributed to the fact that they carefully select wars they can win.23 All else equal, democracies are not more likely to win their wars than autocracies. As Alexander Downes (2009) has shown, the evidence that democracies are more likely to win their wars is critically a ected by two debatable choices: the decision to code all states that did not initiate a war as targets and the exclusion of all wars that ended in draws. When he divides states into initiators, targets and joiners, and adds draws to the dataset, he nds that democracies are not signi cantly more likely to win their wars. Thus the nding does not appear to be robust. Desch (2002) reaches a similar conclusion using a di erent approach. Focusing only on cases that provide fair tests of the war-winning proposition, he con- cludes that the “historical data do not strongly support the triumphalists’ claim that democracies are more likely to win wars than nondemocracies” (Desch 2002, p. 20). Nor is there strong support for the claim that democratic leaders care- fully select wars that they can win because they are aware of their domestic accountability. In his statistical analysis of war decisions, Desch (2003, pp. 187–92) nds that democracy has one of the smallest e ects of any vari- able on whether a state wins a war that it initiates. His case studies of dem- ocratic war initiations buttress this nding: in half of the cases, democratic leaders’ decisions for war were not a ected by calculations of accountabil- ity or the operation of a robust marketplace of ideas. Meanwhile, Downes (2009) nds little evidence for the corollary of the careful selection argu- ment, namely that democracies will shy away from wars that they are not con dent of winning. Finally, democracies appear to engage in as many costly wars as autocracies, thereby suggesting that they are not especially selective about the wars that they ght. In conclusion, the causal mechanisms that purport to explain the democratic peace do not appear to operate as stipulated by the theory’s proponents. Democracies do not reliably externalize their domestic norms of con ict resolution and do not trust and respect one another when they have a con ict of interest. Moreover, democratic leaders are not more accountable than their autocratic counterparts, democratic publics are not reliably peaceful, paci c groups do not have privileged access to decision- making and democracies are not especially slow to mobilize, incapable of surprise attack, adept at revealing their resolve, or good at ghting wars.

### Adv 3:

#### AT Lift Mode 17 – Card flows negative, western colonization capitalism is bad BUT THE AFF DOESN’T SOLVE, they actually stabilize and reinforce capitalism, voting aff exacerbates the problem, voting neg solves

#### AT Ahmed 20 – No the alt is to embrace socialism and reject cap, the aff’s “sequencing strategy” is nothing more than neolib reformism that stabilizes cap and prevents it from eating itself through overproduction and accumulation. Also the aff don’t do anything about setcol or solve it, not even a native American plan aff.

#### Also both of these things are links, using cap systems to be radical only to reinforce the very cap systems they are critiquing