#### Even if there’s an objective morality, it can’t be transcendent like a scientific law—moral judgements depend upon lower-level laws that require exceptions

Lance and Little 6 Mark Norris Lance and Margaret Olivia Little. “Defending Moral Particularism.” In *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*, James Dreier (ed.), 2006. Z. Smith Reynolds Library at Wake Forest University. Mark Norris Lance is a professor in the Philosophy Department and Justice and Peace Studies Program at Georgetown University Margaret Olivia Little Director, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Associate Professor, Philosophy Department Georgetown University https://philpapers.org/rec/LANPAA-2 //avery

But what if one does believe cruelty and the like to be univalent? The first thing to say is that, **even if there are exceptionless moral generalizations** functioning as higher-order laws in morality, this doesn’t itself obviate the (now **lower-order**) lawlikeness of the generalizations concerning our old friends lying, promise-keeping, and the infliction of pain. Higher-order laws, it turns out, can’t do all the heavy lifting. To give an example of Lange’s, it might be the case that all the phenomena of island biodiversity can be unified as instances of Darwinian survival strategy; pointing to laws at that higher level, that is, may unify and constrain patterns of behavior at the level of islands. Nonetheless, there are inferences – the raison d’être of theoretical principles – we can **make only by invoking the lower-level laws.** Laws of island biodiversity allow us to predict with fair accuracy, for instance, the population of a species given only the size of the island, something that cannot be done within Darwinian theory, which makes no mention of islands. Higher-level laws, in short, even where they exist, often fail to capture the content of laws at a lower level. Lower-level laws retain autonomous value. Second, once we realize that genuine laws admit of exception, space opens for a more radical rejoinder. For once we realize this, pressure is placed on why one should believe that exception-filled laws must be backed up at some higher level by a strict one. It places pressure, that is, on any ex ante commitment to the claim that exception-laden laws depend, for their existence, on exceptionless ones. Again, one may have a particular view about morality – here, about its metaphysical backing rather than its first-order normative structure – that implies the existence of strict higher-order moral laws. A Natural Law theorist, or again a Platonist about morality, is committed to the existence of strict moral laws that determine everything’s ethical nature, in much the same way the laws of physics determine all physical nature. But for those who have an essentially **organic, practice-based notion** of morality, according to which morality is **objective but not transcendent**, **there may be no hidden “scientific moral image” lying behind the manifest one.**15 Given the practice we find ourselves engaged in – and only from the perspective of such engagement – we have a sense of the point of that practice, and an understanding of our goals and purposes that allows us to amend that practice. But apart from our skillful involvement with it, we could not formulate any conception of its point, much less produce a codified theory of it that could be used to determine appropriateness within the practice. Moral understanding, while drenched in exception, is understanding of a structure, not merely a series of instances. What one comes to understand is a complex whole, in which intuitions about cases, privileged conditions, and compensatory moves all exert leverage on one another..

#### Moral principles frequently have exceptions—it’s not that nothing’s universal, but there’s no way to compare or codify values independent of context

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Moral particularists like exceptions. At any rate, they regard exceptions as **ubiquitous to moral principles**; more importantly, they view them as friend rather than foe. This is of course simply to state their philosophical intuition. We believe, though, that it’s the right intuition; and in this paper, we try to say why. In doing so, we will argue more to the second point than the first. We’ll be concerned less with demonstrating that the right moral principles in fact irreducibly admit of exception, and more with demonstrating that, if such exceptions do (as we suspect) exist, they should be tolerated and indeed embraced. This distinction points to two quite different bases for objecting to the type of moral particularism we’ll be developing. The first, about which we’ll have less to say, stems from substantive moral commitments. One might well believe that, all things considered, the best moral theory is one that in fact ends up cleaning up all exceptions; if so, one certainly won’t be a particularist. Resistance to particularism thus sometimes reflects commitment to a view such as **Kant**’s about lying, say, or the **util**itarian’s about pain, on which it turns out that lying is always wrong-making and pain always bad-making. This is a stance we respect (though we do not agree with it). After all, even those who believe that exceptions can be important must agree that **not all realms admit of them**. Physics, for instance, may well be a system susceptible to a codifiable structure of exceptionless laws (though its exceptionless laws may ending up having statistical quantifiers embedded in them); and even those who are particularists about physics would agree that we could, at any rate, make up a game whose every move is governed by a finite set of exceptionless rules. For many people, though, resistance to moral particularism stems not from any ex ante commitment to a given normative theory. It stems, instead, from commitment to an extra-moral view about the nature of explanation. It stems from a conception of the way in which reasons and explanation must function in any realm – namely, by subsumption under strict theoretical generalizations or laws. According to this view, exceptions stand in the way of genuine explanation. Those committed to such a picture will regard the presence of moral exceptions as an embarrassment to the theoretical task of moral understanding and justification: morality had better be secured by a structure that doesn’t admit of exception, on pain of morality’s demotion to second-class epistemic status. The answer to this sort of resistance is provision of a different model of explanation. We believe that, while reasons and explanation can travel by way of subsumption under strict laws, it is a deep mistake to think they always do – a mistake which, unless resisted, will obscure some of the richest views available. For some realms, ethics included, understanding and expertise is, at its heart, **a matter of understanding, not eliminating, exception**. Exceptions and Explanation Few people believe that lying is always wrong. After all, there may be some contexts in which another moral duty or principle – relief of terrible suffering, say – proves more important. Except where we are prepared to be absolutist, then, claims about the all-things-considered rightness or wrongness of following a given duty will have exceptions. Amongst those who concur with this rather innocuous statement, some believe we can recover a tractable calculus governing the interactions of the various duties or principles that come our way. Perhaps justice is lexically ordered over utility maximization; perhaps we can find a way to render duties’ strengths that will allow us to recover a calculative procedure for balancing them; perhaps specifying the duties to specific roles will allow us to set forth a once-and-for-all ordering of them. Others have set this aside as a misguided project. There is **no algorithm** or quantitative method, they urge, for deciding when justice should trump mercy rather than the other way round, no setting out a way to order or balance the virtues, principles, or duties (take your personal favorite) **independently of context**. Instead, it takes **qualitative judgment** or phronesis to make the comparative judgments in individual cases. Whichever side of that debate one comes down on, though, the vast majority of contemporary philosophers believe that relevant moral duties or features always make the same sort of contribution to a moral situation. Like the forces of physics, but without the vector calculus, we can isolate various moral forces that always push, as it were, in the same moral direction as telling for or against an action. We could put it by inserting a ‘ceteris paribus’ or ‘prima facie’ or ‘pro tanto’ qualifier in front of the claim that ‘lying is wrong’, where those qualifiers function to abstract away possible competing moral considerations. Such a claim is in essence equivalent to asserting an exceptionless connection between lying and a milder moral property: lying may sometimes be morally justified, but it is always wrong-making (see, e.g., Pietrowski 1993). It is here that moral particularists part company. Pain is always bad-making – well, except when it’s constitutive of athletic challenge; intentionally telling a falsehood is prima facie wrong – well, not when done to Nazi guards, to whom the truth is not owed, or when playing the game Diplomacy, where it’s the point of the contest. Pleasure always counts in favor of a situation – well, except when it’s the sadist’s delight in her victim’s agony, where her pleasure is precisely part of what is wrong with the situation.1 It is always wrong-making not to take competent agents at their word; well, not in the S&M room, where ‘no’ precisely does mean ‘yes’. Considerations that in one context tell in favor of an action can in another **go neutral or flip directions entirely**, and all in a way that **cannot be codified** in any helpful concrete way.

#### It is the burden of the affirmative to be able to prove that in every instance we have a moral obligation to do what they propose.

#### Permissibility and Presumption negate:

#### 1] Obligations – the resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove an obligation, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation – burden of proof proves

#### 2] Falsity – Statements are more often false than true because proving one part of the statement false disproves the entire statement. Presuming all statements are true creates contradictions which would be ethically bankrupt.

#### 3] Negating is harder – Aff gets last speech to crystallize and shape the debate in a way the favors them with no 3NR

#### A] a) The Affirmative positions itself as moral principle regarding a situation – This makes morality impossible to achieve since we are now constrained by engrained generalizations that fail to account for exceptions within principles - thus negate on presumption since the 1AC can never contextually justify their moral actions

#### B] Tying morality to principles causes harmful ethical thought – means we can never adjust our thoughts or break principles even if the situation would be better for it

#### C] Affirmative’s generalizations make weighing ethicality between actions impossible – Moral principles will see actions that violate that moral principle as ethically the same – Means we can never decide between conflicting principles and causes the inability to make decisions – Means even if moral principles are good, they make it impossible to act under principles

#### D] MP necessary to formulating real world ethical thinking – not all situations are in the same context and require specific moral analysis to derive moral action

#### E] Principles are epistemologically circular – “X action is bad to do because it is bad” means we never form justifications for why we should or shouldn’t undergo actions. Principles are self-referential in their justification for that principle’s existence – means principles fall apart on inspection leaving no ground for moral thought. Need contextual situation to epistemologically from reasoning – knowledge formation can’t be generated outside of engagement with ethical contexts

#### [Bachand 20] Attempting to resolve the inherent contradictions within capitalism through international organizations in order to “fix” the crisis exasperate the continuation of capitalist contradictions. The affirmative acts as a regulatory measure to ensure the regime of accumulation is constantly stabilized

Bachand 20 Rémi Bachand, What’s Behind the WTO Crisis? A Marxist Analysis, European Journal of International Law, Volume 31, Issue 3, August 2020, Pages 857–882, Remi Bachand Bookmark Professor in the Law department at Universite du Quebec a Montreal <https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chaa054> //avery

Drawing on Italian activist and intellectual Antonio Gramsci, the neo-Gramscian school of IR strives to explain the development and reproduction of a social order. Specifically, it focuses on the reason for which social classes that are disadvantaged and exploited by a social order nevertheless adhere to it without attempting to reverse it. Gramsci qualifies this situation by using the concept of ‘hegemony’ which designates, among other things, the capacity of a dominant group to convince, using ideological procedures, other groups that a social order is good for them even if this is not objectively the case. Transposing this analysis at the global level, Robert Cox explains that hegemony: … means dominance of a particular kind where the dominant state creates an order based ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according to general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or states and leading classes but at the same time offer some measure or prospect of satisfaction to the less powerful.43 Criticizing the focus put by mainstream approaches in IR, Cox claims that hegemony is not essentially the supremacy of the leading state(s), but of the dominant classes of these state(s).44 Moreover, coming from the Marxist’s tradition and emphasizing the economic aspect of any social organization, he argues that hegemony ‘is an order within a world economy with a dominant mode of production which penetrates into all countries and links into other subordinate modes of production’.45 In other words, hegemony is the capacity of the dominant classes of the dominant state(s) to expand, reproduce and legitimize the mode of production that is favourable to their interests. Cox sees an important relation between international organizations (and institutions) and hegemony. In his mind: International institutions and rules are generally initiated by the state which established the hegemony. At the very least they must have that state’s support. The dominant state takes care to secure the acquiescence of other states according to a hierarchy of powers within the inter-state structure of hegemony.46 More precisely, they have many roles in the reproduction of hegemony: (1) [T]hey embody the rules which facilitate the expansion of hegemonic world orders; (2) they are themselves the product of the hegemonic order; (3) they ideologically legitimate the norms of the world order; (4) they co-opt the elites from peripheral countries and (5) they absorb counter-hegemonic ideas.47 Stephen Gill, Cox’s colleague at York University, adds an interesting dimension to these roles. With the concept of ‘new constitutionalism’ that is supported by international organizations, he refers to … political and legal reforms to redefine the political via a series of precommitment mechanisms. These include constitutions, laws, property rights and various institutional arrangements, designed to have quasi-permanent status. A central objective of new constitutionalism is to prevent future governments from undoing commitments to a disciplinary neoliberal pattern of accumulation.48 The important aspect underlined by Gill is the capacity of international organizations to exclude from the political discussion, from what is commonly sensed as ‘possible’, some aspects that are incompatible with the social order promoted by the dominant groups and social classes. Globally, the neo-Gramscian contribution is useful to emphasize the link between an international organization and a specific social order based on the reproduction of dominant social classes’ interests. Hence, an international organization (it is at least true for the most important of them) cannot be understood if not situated inside the political and economic order to which it belongs. It is also presumably the case that when this order is not functioning well any longer, the international organization will also enter into crisis, or be radically transformed. B Théorie de la régulation and Social Structure of Accumulation Theory The second step relates to a ‘mode of regulation’ that supports and legitimizes the regime of accumulation. It is constituted by ‘institutional forms’ whose functions are notably to ‘reproduce the fundamental social relations of the mode of production’ and to ‘pilot’ the reproduction of the regime of accumulation.53 To explain their argument, the SSAT claim that capitalism is ‘an inherently conflictual system’ but that its contradictions can be attenuated through the construction of sets of institutions that mitigate and channel class conflict and stabilize capitalists’ long-run expectations. Institutions in this sense are conceived of broadly and can be economic, political, ideological, or cultural in character. […] [These institutions] are mutually compatible and generally supportive of each other as well as supportive of the accumulation process.54 Joining this assessment to our earlier analysis of the neo-Gramscians, we may now deduce that hegemony does not simply represent the expansion of a ‘mode of production’ (as Cox claims) but of the ‘regime of accumulation’ that is adopted by the dominant classes of the dominant state(s) because it is felt that it is the best one to defend their interests. In fact, international organizations on which Cox and Gill focus may be interpreted as being part of what the école de la régulation calls the ‘mode of regulation’. Their function becomes clearer with the input of the SSAT and the école de la régulation: to ensure the efficiency, the legitimacy and the permanency of the regime of accumulation. C The Importance of the Rate of Profit and the Counteracting Factors to Its Fall Our last theoretical influence comes directly from Marx, who explained that the inevitable change in the organic composition of capital (that is the relation between constant capital55 and variable capital56) implies a tendency of the rate of profit to fall,57 a phenomenon that Marx strongly associates with overproduction and over accumulation of capital.58 For Marx, this fall is only a long-term tendency because of the existence of some counteracting factors that can be put in play to countervail the fall of profit. Marx enumerates six of these counteracting factors: the intensification of labour exploitation, the reduction of wages, the cheapening of the price of elements of constant capital, the relative surplus population, foreign trade (to which we can associate foreign investment) and the increase in share capital (that will here be associated to financialization59).60 The theoretical explanation for the law of the tendential fall in the rate of profit is controversial, even though some authors continue to defend it and use it in a somewhat convincing way.61 Now, even without defending Marx’s theoretical explanation, many Marxist-oriented authors put the evolution of the rate of profit (and generally its fall) at the core of their work.62 For us, the usefulness of this type of analysis is that evolution of the rate of profit is obviously an essential part of capitalism, whose single aim is to ensure capital accumulation. Geographer David Harvey’s New Imperialism offers a particularly important contribution for any international lawyer wishing to understand the link between capitalism and international law. In this book (as well as elsewhere), Harvey develops a theory of ‘capital fix’. As he explains: The central point of this argument concerned a chronic tendency within capitalism, theoretically derived out a reformulation of Marx’s theory of the tendency for the rate of profit to fall, to produce crises of overaccumulation. Such crises are typically registered as surpluses of capital (in commodity, money, or productive capacity forms) and surpluses of labour side by side, without there apparently being any means to bring them together profitably to accomplish socially useful tasks. […] Since it is the lack of profitable opportunities that lies at the hearth of the difficulty, the key economic (as opposed to social and political) problem lies with capital. If devaluation is to be avoided, then profitable ways must be found to absorb the capital surpluses.63 Capital has to find solutions to face this fall of opportunities and the fall of the rate of profit. Harvey introduces the double meaning of the concept of ‘fix’: A certain portion of the total capital is literally fixed in and on the land in some physical form for a relative long period of time (depending on its economic and physical lifetime). […] The spatio-temporal ‘fix’, on the other hand, is a metaphor for a particular kind of solution to capitalist crises through temporal deferral and geographical expansion. […] The production of space, the organization of wholly new territorial divisions of labour, the opening up of new and cheaper resources complexes, of new regions as dynamic spaces of capital accumulation, and the penetration of pre-existing social formation by capitalist social relations and institutional arrangements (such as rules of contract and private property arrangements) provide important ways to absorb capital and labour surpluses.64 Hence, with the theory of ‘capital fix’, Harvey develops Marx’s own concept of ‘counteracting factors’ (a concept we will continue to use in the following pages), underlying the necessity for capital to find strategies to face its inherent contradictions. The importance of this theoretical finding is that many counteracting factors can be put at work with the help of international law and international organizations. Put together, the ideas of this section lead us to propose the following conclusion. Capitalism is wrought with strong and inherent contradictions that have the long-term tendency to bring down the rate of profit. Even if the theorization proposed by Marx of this fall has not been explicitly accepted by all, several authors have factually shown its existence and its implications. The sustainability of the rate of profit is an important, if not the main aspect of a regime of accumulation,65 and when a fall occurs, the regime of accumulation must react. In such a situation, the function of a mode of regulation (to use the concept of the école de la régulation) is actually to find ways to operationalize enough counteracting factors to re-establish a satisfying rate of profit, at least for leading state(s)’ dominant classes. Finally, if we follow the neo-Gramscian argument and admit that the purpose of international organizations is to promote the well-functioning of a regime of accumulation (and consequently the sustainability of the rate of profit), we can conclude that an international organization’s (and especially one with economic functions like the WTO) existence is linked with its capacity to put the counteracting factors at work to ensure that the dominant classes of the leading state(s) can rake satisfying profit. Consequently, if it is not able to achieve this goal, one can predict that, one day or another, its very existence will be challenged.

#### [Robinson 18] Mode of production determines the social relations – the capitalistic mode is an inherently unsustainable and expansionary one – causes extinction via overaccumulation, environmental degradation, and mass social crisis

Robinson 18 [William I, professor of sociology, global studies and Latin American studies at the University of California at Santa Barbara. 2018. “Accumulation Crisis and Global Police State.”<http://revolutionary-socialism.com/en/accumulation-crisis-and-global-police-state/>] JCH-PF, recut by PW

Each major episode of crisis in the world capitalist system has presented the potential for systemic change. Each has involved the breakdown of state legitimacy, escalating class and social struggles, and military conflicts, leading to a restructuring of the system, including new institutional arrangements, class relations, and accumulation activities that eventually result in a restabilization of the system and renewed capitalist expansion. The current crisis shares aspects of earlier system-wide structural crises, such as of the 1880s, the 1930s or the 1970s. But there are six interrelated dimensions to the current crisis that I believe sets it apart from these earlier ones and suggests that a simple restructuring of the system will not lead to its restabilization – that is, our very survival now requires a revolution against global capitalism (Robinson, 2014). These six dimensions, in broad strokes, present a “big picture” context in which a global police state is emerging. First, the system is fast reaching the ecological limits of its reproduction. We have already passed tipping points in climate change, the nitrogen cycle, and diversity loss. For the first time ever, human conduct is intersecting with and fundamentally altering the earth system in such a way that threatens to bring about a sixth mass extinction (see, e.g., Foster et al., 2011; Moore, 2015). These ecological dimensions of global crisis have been brought to the forefront of the global agenda by the worldwide environmental justice movement. Communities around the world have come under escalating repression as they face off against transnational corporate plunder of their environment. While capitalism cannot be held solely responsible for the ecological crisis, it is difficult to imagine that the environmental catastrophe can be resolved within the capitalist system given capital’s implacable impulse to accumulate and its accelerated commodification of nature. Second, the level of global social polarization and inequality is unprecedented. The richest one percent of humanity in 2016 controlled over half of the world’s wealth and 20 percent controlled 95 percent of that wealth, while the remaining 80 percent had to make do with just five percent (Oxfam, 2017). These escalating inequalities fuel capitalism’s chronic problem of overaccumulation: the TCC cannot find productive outlets to unload the enormous amounts of surplus it has accumulated, leading to chronic stagnation in the world economy (see next section). Such extreme levels of social polarization present a challenge of social control to dominant groups. As Trumpism in the United States as well as the rise of far-right and neo-fascist movements in Europe so well illustrate, cooptation also involves the manipulation of fear and insecurity among the downwardly mobile so that social anxiety is channeled towards scapegoated communities. This psychosocial mechanism of displacing mass anxieties is not new, but it appears to be increasing around the world in the face of the structural destabilization of capitalist globalization. Extreme inequality requires extreme violence and repression that lend themselves to projects of 21st century fascism. Third, the sheer magnitude of the means of violence and social control is unprecedented, as well as the magnitude and concentrated control over the means of global communication and the production and circulation of symbols, images, and knowledge. Computerized wars, drone warfare, robot soldiers, bunker-buster bombs, a new generation of nuclear weapons, satellite surveillance, cyberwar, spatial control technology, and so forth, have changed the face of warfare, and more generally, of systems of social control and repression. We have arrived at the panoptical surveillance society, a point brought home by Edward Snowden’s revelations in 2013, and the age of thought control by those who control global flows of communication and symbolic production. If global capitalist crisis leads to a new world war the destruction would simply be unprecedented. Fourth, we are reaching limits to the extensive expansion of capitalism, in the sense that there are no longer any new territories of significance to integrate into world capitalism and new spaces to commodify are drying up. The capitalist system is by its nature expansionary. In each earlier structural crisis, the system went through a new round of extensive expansion – from waves of colonial conquest in earlier centuries, to the integration in the late 20th and early 21st centuries of the former socialist countries, China, India and other areas that had been marginally outside the system. There are no longer any new territories to integrate into world capitalism. At the same time, the privatization of education, health, utilities, basic services, and public lands is turning those spaces in global society that were outside of capital’s control into “spaces of capital,” so that intensive expansion is reaching depths never before seen. What is there left to commodify? Where can the system now expand? New spaces have to be violently cracked open and the peoples in these spaces must be repressed by the global police state. Fifth, there is the rise of a vast surplus population inhabiting a “planet of slums” (Davis, 2007) pushed out of the productive economy, thrown into the margins, and subject to sophisticated systems of social control and to destruction, into a mortal cycle of dispossession-exploitation-exclusion. Crises provide capital with the opportunity to accelerate the process of forcing greater productivity out of fewer workers. The processes by which surplus labor is generated have accelerated under globalization. Spatial reorganization has helped transnational capital to break the territorial-bound power of organized labor and impose new capital–labor relations based on fragmentation, flexibilization, and the cheapening of labor. These developments, combined with a massive new round of primitive accumulation and displacement of hundreds of millions, have given rise to a new global army of superfluous labor that goes well beyond the traditional reserve army of labor that Marx discussed. Global capitalism has no direct use for surplus humanity. But indirectly, it holds wages down everywhere and makes new systems of 21st century slavery possible. Dominant groups face the challenge of how to contain both the real and potential rebellion of surplus humanity. In addition, surplus humanity cannot consume and so as their ranks expand the problem of overaccumulation becomes exacerbated. Sixth, there is an acute political contradiction in global capitalism: economic globalization takes places within a nation-state system of political authority. Transnational state apparatuses are incipient and have not been able to substitute for a leading nation-state with enough power and authority to organize and stabilize the system, much less to impose regulations on transnational capital. In the age of capitalist globalization governments must attract to the national territory transnational corporate investment, which requires providing capital with all the incentives associated with neoliberalism – downward pressure on wages, deregulation, austerity, and so on – that aggravate inequality, impoverishment, and insecurity for working classes. Nation-states face a contradiction between the need to promote transnational capital accumulation in their territories and their need to achieve political legitimacy. As a result, states around the world have been experiencing spiraling crises of legitimacy. This situation generates bewildering and seemingly contradictory politics and also helps explain the resurgence of far-right and neo-fascist forces that espouse rhetoric of nationalism and protectionism even as they promote neo-liberalism.

#### [Foster 20] Capitalism is a regime of chaos: Ecological Crisis, Unlimited War, and Economic Crisis – the alternative is to invest in a new system of social metabolic production aimed towards socialism

Foster 20 REVIEW OF THE MONTH The Renewal of the Socialist Ideal by John Bellamy Foster (Sep 01, 2020) Topics: History Marxism Movements Socialism Places: Global John Bellamy Foster is an American professor of sociology at the University of Oregon and editor of the Monthly Review. He writes about political economy of capitalism and economic crisis, ecology and ecological crisis, and Marxist theory. <https://monthlyreview.org/2020/09/01/the-renewal-of-the-socialist-ideal/> //avery

Any serious treatment of the renewal of socialism today must begin with capitalism’s creative destruction of the bases of all social existence. Since the late 1980s, the world has been engulfed in an epoch of catastrophe capitalism, defined as the accumulation of imminent catastrophe on every side due to the unintended consequences of “the juggernaut of capital.”1 Catastrophe capitalism in this sense is manifested today in the convergence of (1) the planetary ecological crisis, (2) the global epidemiological crisis, and (3) the unending world economic crisis.2 Added to this are the main features of today’s “empire of chaos,” including the extreme system of imperialist exploitation unleashed by global commodity chains; the demise of the relatively stable liberal-democratic state with the rise of neoliberalism and neofascism; and the emergence of a new age of global hegemonic instability accompanied by increased dangers of unlimited war.3 The climate crisis represents what the world scientific consensus refers to as a “no analogue” situation, such that if net carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion do not reach zero in the next few decades, it will threaten the very existence of industrial civilization and ultimately human survival.4 Nevertheless, the existential crisis is not limited to climate change, but extends to the crossing of other planetary boundaries that together define the global ecological rift in the Earth System as a safe place for humanity. These include: (1) ocean acidification; (2) species extinction (and loss of genetic diversity); (3) destruction of forest ecosystems; (4) loss of fresh water; (5) disruption of the nitrogen and phosphorus cycles; (6) the rapid spread of toxic agents (including radionuclides); and (7) the uncontrolled proliferation of genetically modified organisms.5 This rupturing of planetary boundaries is intrinsic to the system of capital accumulation that recognizes no insurmountable barriers to its unlimited, exponential quantitative advance. Hence, there is no exit from the current capitalist destruction of the overall social and natural conditions of existence that does not require exiting capitalism itself. What is essential is the creation of what István Mészáros in Beyond Capital called a new system of “social metabolic reproduction.”6 This points to socialism as the heir apparent to capitalism in the twenty-first century, but conceived in ways that critically challenge the theory and practice of socialism as it existed in the twentieth century. The Polarization of the Class System In the United States, key sectors of monopoly-finance capital have now succeeded in mobilizing elements of the primarily white lower-middle class in the form of a nationalist, racist, misogynist ideology. The result is a nascent neofascist political-class formation, capitalizing on the long history of structural racism arising out of the legacies of slavery, settler colonialism, and global militarism/imperialism. This burgeoning neofascism’s relation to the already existing neoliberal political formation is that of “enemy brothers” characterized by a fierce jockeying for power coupled with a common repression of the working class.7 It is these conditions that have formed the basis of the rise of the New York real-estate mogul and billionaire Donald Trump as the leader of the so-called radical right, leading to the imposition of right-wing policies and a new authoritarian capitalist regime.8 Even if the neoliberal faction of the ruling class wins out in the coming presidential election, ousting Trump and replacing him with Joe Biden, a neoliberal-neofascist alliance, reflecting the internal necessity of the capitalist class, will likely continue to form the basis of state power under monopoly-finance capital. Appearing simultaneously with this new reactionary political formation in the United States is a resurgent movement for socialism, based in the working-class majority and dissident intellectuals. P, accelerated by the globalization of production, has undermined the former, imperial-based labor aristocracy among certain privileged sections of the working class, leading to a resurgence of socialism.9 Confronted with what Michael D. Yates has called “the Great Inequality,” the mass of the population in the United States, particularly youth, are faced with rapidly diminishing prospects, finding themselves in a state of uncertainty and often despair, marked by a dramatic increase in “deaths of despair.”10 They are increasingly alienated from a capitalist system that offers them no hope and are attracted to socialism as the only genuine alternative.11 Although the U.S. situation is unique, similar objective forces propelling a resurgence of socialist movements are occurring elsewhere in the system, primarily in the Global South, in an era of continuing economic stagnation, financialization, and universal ecological decline.

## Case:

#### ROB is to weigh the hypothetical implications of the affirmative policy actions against the negative

#### Conceded in cross that ptx action good