## NC:

### Framing:

#### Even if there’s an objective morality, it can’t be transcendent like a scientific law—moral judgements depend upon lower-level laws that require exceptions

Lance and Little 6 Mark Norris Lance and Margaret Olivia Little. “Defending Moral Particularism.” In *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*, James Dreier (ed.), 2006. Z. Smith Reynolds Library at Wake Forest University. Mark Norris Lance is a professor in the Philosophy Department and Justice and Peace Studies Program at Georgetown University Margaret Olivia Little Director, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Associate Professor, Philosophy Department Georgetown University https://philpapers.org/rec/LANPAA-2 //avery

But what if one does believe cruelty and the like to be univalent? The first thing to say is that, **even if there are exceptionless moral generalizations** functioning as higher-order laws in morality, this doesn’t itself obviate the (now **lower-order**) lawlikeness of the generalizations concerning our old friends lying, promise-keeping, and the infliction of pain. Higher-order laws, it turns out, can’t do all the heavy lifting. To give an example of Lange’s, it might be the case that all the phenomena of island biodiversity can be unified as instances of Darwinian survival strategy; pointing to laws at that higher level, that is, may unify and constrain patterns of behavior at the level of islands. Nonetheless, there are inferences – the raison d’être of theoretical principles – we can **make only by invoking the lower-level laws.** Laws of island biodiversity allow us to predict with fair accuracy, for instance, the population of a species given only the size of the island, something that cannot be done within Darwinian theory, which makes no mention of islands. Higher-level laws, in short, even where they exist, often fail to capture the content of laws at a lower level. Lower-level laws retain autonomous value. Second, once we realize that genuine laws admit of exception, space opens for a more radical rejoinder. For once we realize this, pressure is placed on why one should believe that exception-filled laws must be backed up at some higher level by a strict one. It places pressure, that is, on any ex ante commitment to the claim that exception-laden laws depend, for their existence, on exceptionless ones. Again, one may have a particular view about morality – here, about its metaphysical backing rather than its first-order normative structure – that implies the existence of strict higher-order moral laws. A Natural Law theorist, or again a Platonist about morality, is committed to the existence of strict moral laws that determine everything’s ethical nature, in much the same way the laws of physics determine all physical nature. But for those who have an essentially **organic, practice-based notion** of morality, according to which morality is **objective but not transcendent**, **there may be no hidden “scientific moral image” lying behind the manifest one.**15 Given the practice we find ourselves engaged in – and only from the perspective of such engagement – we have a sense of the point of that practice, and an understanding of our goals and purposes that allows us to amend that practice. But apart from our skillful involvement with it, we could not formulate any conception of its point, much less produce a codified theory of it that could be used to determine appropriateness within the practice. Moral understanding, while drenched in exception, is understanding of a structure, not merely a series of instances. What one comes to understand is a complex whole, in which intuitions about cases, privileged conditions, and compensatory moves all exert leverage on one another..

#### Moral principles frequently have exceptions—it’s not that nothing’s universal, but there’s no way to compare or codify values independent of context

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Moral particularists like exceptions. At any rate, they regard exceptions as **ubiquitous to moral principles**; more importantly, they view them as friend rather than foe. This is of course simply to state their philosophical intuition. We believe, though, that it’s the right intuition; and in this paper, we try to say why. In doing so, we will argue more to the second point than the first. We’ll be concerned less with demonstrating that the right moral principles in fact irreducibly admit of exception, and more with demonstrating that, if such exceptions do (as we suspect) exist, they should be tolerated and indeed embraced. This distinction points to two quite different bases for objecting to the type of moral particularism we’ll be developing. The first, about which we’ll have less to say, stems from substantive moral commitments. One might well believe that, all things considered, the best moral theory is one that in fact ends up cleaning up all exceptions; if so, one certainly won’t be a particularist. Resistance to particularism thus sometimes reflects commitment to a view such as **Kant**’s about lying, say, or the **util**itarian’s about pain, on which it turns out that lying is always wrong-making and pain always bad-making. This is a stance we respect (though we do not agree with it). After all, even those who believe that exceptions can be important must agree that **not all realms admit of them**. Physics, for instance, may well be a system susceptible to a codifiable structure of exceptionless laws (though its exceptionless laws may ending up having statistical quantifiers embedded in them); and even those who are particularists about physics would agree that we could, at any rate, make up a game whose every move is governed by a finite set of exceptionless rules. For many people, though, resistance to moral particularism stems not from any ex ante commitment to a given normative theory. It stems, instead, from commitment to an extra-moral view about the nature of explanation. It stems from a conception of the way in which reasons and explanation must function in any realm – namely, by subsumption under strict theoretical generalizations or laws. According to this view, exceptions stand in the way of genuine explanation. Those committed to such a picture will regard the presence of moral exceptions as an embarrassment to the theoretical task of moral understanding and justification: morality had better be secured by a structure that doesn’t admit of exception, on pain of morality’s demotion to second-class epistemic status. The answer to this sort of resistance is provision of a different model of explanation. We believe that, while reasons and explanation can travel by way of subsumption under strict laws, it is a deep mistake to think they always do – a mistake which, unless resisted, will obscure some of the richest views available. For some realms, ethics included, understanding and expertise is, at its heart, **a matter of understanding, not eliminating, exception**. Exceptions and Explanation Few people believe that lying is always wrong. After all, there may be some contexts in which another moral duty or principle – relief of terrible suffering, say – proves more important. Except where we are prepared to be absolutist, then, claims about the all-things-considered rightness or wrongness of following a given duty will have exceptions. Amongst those who concur with this rather innocuous statement, some believe we can recover a tractable calculus governing the interactions of the various duties or principles that come our way. Perhaps justice is lexically ordered over utility maximization; perhaps we can find a way to render duties’ strengths that will allow us to recover a calculative procedure for balancing them; perhaps specifying the duties to specific roles will allow us to set forth a once-and-for-all ordering of them. Others have set this aside as a misguided project. There is **no algorithm** or quantitative method, they urge, for deciding when justice should trump mercy rather than the other way round, no setting out a way to order or balance the virtues, principles, or duties (take your personal favorite) **independently of context**. Instead, it takes **qualitative judgment** or phronesis to make the comparative judgments in individual cases. Whichever side of that debate one comes down on, though, the vast majority of contemporary philosophers believe that relevant moral duties or features always make the same sort of contribution to a moral situation. Like the forces of physics, but without the vector calculus, we can isolate various moral forces that always push, as it were, in the same moral direction as telling for or against an action. We could put it by inserting a ‘ceteris paribus’ or ‘prima facie’ or ‘pro tanto’ qualifier in front of the claim that ‘lying is wrong’, where those qualifiers function to abstract away possible competing moral considerations. Such a claim is in essence equivalent to asserting an exceptionless connection between lying and a milder moral property: lying may sometimes be morally justified, but it is always wrong-making (see, e.g., Pietrowski 1993). It is here that moral particularists part company. Pain is always bad-making – well, except when it’s constitutive of athletic challenge; intentionally telling a falsehood is prima facie wrong – well, not when done to Nazi guards, to whom the truth is not owed, or when playing the game Diplomacy, where it’s the point of the contest. Pleasure always counts in favor of a situation – well, except when it’s the sadist’s delight in her victim’s agony, where her pleasure is precisely part of what is wrong with the situation.1 It is always wrong-making not to take competent agents at their word; well, not in the S&M room, where ‘no’ precisely does mean ‘yes’. Considerations that in one context tell in favor of an action can in another **go neutral or flip directions entirely**, and all in a way that **cannot be codified** in any helpful concrete way.

#### Permissibility and Presumption negate:

#### 1] Justness – the resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove something as unjust or wrong, and permissibility would deny the existence of wrongness so you presume neg

#### 2] Falsity – Statements are more often false than true because proving one part of the statement false disproves the entire statement. Presuming all statements are true creates contradictions which would be ethically bankrupt.

#### 3] Negating is harder – Aff gets last speech to crystallize and shape the debate in a way the favors them with no 3NR

#### 5] Burden of truth – Aff has the burden of truth and needs to prove the res as true

#### 6] Illogical - negating becomes impossible because all defense becomes offense for the aff

#### 7] Squo Burden – The affs burden is to prove we do anything but the squo so presume neg if the aff can’t prove that

#### 8] Status Quo Bias – you should default to a world where you don’t make change because making change assumes that world will be better than the current world

#### 9] Absent morality nothing is unjust, so you negate

#### 11] Infinite prep time – aff gets infinite prep time and chooses the field of the debate so presume against them if they can’t even give a reason why you affirm

### Offense:

#### A] The Affirmative positions itself as moral principle regarding a situation – This makes morality impossible to achieve since we are now constrained by engrained generalizations that fail to account for exceptions within principles - thus negate on presumption since the 1AC can never contextually justify their moral actions

#### B] Tying morality to principles causes harmful ethical thought – means we can never adjust our thoughts or break principles even if the situation would be better for it

#### C] Affirmative’s generalizations make weighing ethicality between actions impossible – Moral principles will see actions that violate that moral principle as ethically the same – Means we can never decide between conflicting principles and causes the inability to make decisions – Means even if moral principles are good, they make it impossible to act under principles

#### D] MP necessary to formulating real world ethical thinking – not all situations are in the same context and require specific moral analysis to derive moral action, and actual governmental bodies contest bills because of specific instances, like how the bill hurts their specific town/city and specific workers

#### E] Principles are epistemologically circular – “X action is bad to do because it is bad” means we never form justifications for why we should or shouldn’t undergo actions. Principles are self-referential in their justification for that principle’s existence – means principles fall apart on inspection leaving no ground for moral thought. Need contextual situation to epistemologically from reasoning – knowledge formation can’t be generated outside of engagement with ethical contexts

## Case:

### Framing

#### MP > Util, we are literally a better version

### Adv -

#### Lack of property rights in space increases debris

Blodger 16 Ian Blodger, Reclassifying Geostationary Earth Orbit as Private Property: Why Natural Law and Utilitarian Theories of Property Demand Privatization, 17 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 409 (2016). Available at: <https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mjlst/vol17/iss1/7> JD Candidate, 2016, University of Minnesota Law School; BA Hillsdale College, 2013. //avery

GEO = Geostationary Earth orbit

Demsetz argues that property rights arise when the gains of internalization [of externalities] become larger than the cost of internalization.137 The current approach to geostationary orbit allocation creates direct, indirect, and administrative negative externalities, which obstruct valuable space in geostationary orbit.138 The effects of the current common scheme are felt directly though the presence of large amounts of debris.139 Under the current system, satellite operators have no long term incentives to keep the orbital area clear from debris since competitors will be able to take over the slot once the satellite no longer functions.140 Since the satellite operator cannot sell rights to the location after the termination of the satellites functions, they can ensure that their competition cannot easily gain access to the same space by leaving the satellite floating in space.141 As a result of this type of incentive, [t]he amount of space junk is increasing by about 5 percent per year; meaning that by the end of the century a satellite in GEO will have a 40 percent chance of being struck during its operation life-time.142 This poses problems for global communications networks, which rely heavily on GEO for their operations.143 Not only are these direct costs harmful, but the costs associated with preventing this kind of damage are also relevant.144 Satellites must now carry debris shields, debris monitoring systems, and maneuvering capabilities.145 Moreover, the lack of an external cost to profit from the area has increased demand such that the ITU has a large backlog of applications for GEO orbital slots.146 The ITUs current method of granting orbital registration on a first come first served basis does not allow for an efficient allocation of resources since those who would be willing to invest more in the space (in the hope of obtaining a larger return for their investment) are effectively precluded from doing so by the current registration system.147 Since the costs to the area are not internalized in the sale value of the area, they are passed on to others wishing to use the space.148 Under Demsetzs theory, if the costs associated with privatizing geostationary orbit slots are less than the benefitsgained from such privatization, then property interests should be allocated.149 First, allowing privatization of geostationary orbit will mitigate future space debris and potentially allow for a clean up of current debris.150 Analyzing different methods for reducing space debris, Nodir Aldinov, Peter Alexander, and Brenda Cunningham concluded that the lack of costs associated with launching a satellite (apart from the costs necessary to build and place the satellite in orbit) allows for more satellites than optimum.151 This is because corporations seeking to maximize profits have no need to take account of the negative externality its satellite launches impose on other firms.152 Aldinov, Alexander, and Cunningham conclude that by instituting a tax on each launch, actors would be incentivized to internalize externalities, which would in turn bring the number of launches to the socially optimum level.153 They further contend that the profits from the launch tax could be used to invest in programs to seek out and actively clean up space.154 The creation of a property interest in GEO locations will not only accomplish the end results of a tax, but it also provides an incentive to launch a satellite in the first place. By creating a property interest in geostationary orbit, the market will quickly establish a price for the zone.155 This price will act inthe same way as a tax, forcing actors to consider not just the cost of the satellite (which will inevitably be lost), but also a potential return on the investment in the property right itself.156 The creation of this additional cost and benefit will eliminate negative externalities associated with too many satellite launches.157 Additionally, allowing actors to resell their orbital zone or reuse it as needed provides an added incentive to actively clean up the area.158 Therefore, like the imposition of a tax, creating a private interest in a GEO slots will decrease the number of excess satellites launched into GEO, and provide incentives to clean up the area in order to maximize profits. Unlike a tax however, property rights more efficiently ensure a preservation of a clean space environment.159 Murray N. Rothbards book, For a New Liberty, discusses a libertarian approach to pollution and finds that the governments control over pollution regulations is much less efficient than a private property owner enforcing their rights through the court system.160 In part, this inefficiency results from an apatheticenforcement of the laws, which do not benefit the enforcers.161 Rothbard additionally argues the governments assessment of the potential harms of pollution often differ from those who have a stake in the matter, and thus fail to take into account the full magnitude of the situation, leading to inefficient tax regimes.162 In a private system with redress to the courts, property owners will zealously defend their property from trespass, and will do so efficiently, because they are able to take into account the relevant variables that threaten their property, where the government cannot take such an individualized approach.163 Thus, while the benefits derived from a system of taxation and a private property system are similar, the allocation of private property will ultimately lead to a more efficient protection of GEO. This, in turn, will effectively eliminate the need for indirect costs associated with preventing harm to satellites in orbit. Currently, satellites must contain equipment necessary to track, and maneuver away from orbiting debris.164 With a reduction in the number of satellites and an increased number of satellites moved to graveyard orbits, and the potential for a reduction in other forms of debris, the need for such sophisticated technology will decrease.165 The market will control this as well, since risk adverse actors will desire avoidance systems so they can ensure a return on the resale of the property after the satellites eventual failure.166

#### The risk of this advantage should be close to 0 -

**1] Probability – 0.1 percent chance of a collision.**

Alexander William **Salter**, **Economics Professor at Texas Tech**, **’16**, “SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS” 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 \*numbers replaced with English words

The probability of a collision is currently **low**. Bradley and Wein estimate that the **maximum probability** in LEO of a collision over the lifetime of a spacecraft remains **below one in one thousand**, conditional on continued compliance with NASA’s deorbiting guidelines.3 However, the possibility of a future “snowballing” effect, whereby debris collides with other objects, further congesting orbit space, remains a significant concern.4 Levin and Carroll estimate the average immediate destruction of wealth created by a collision to be approximately $30 million, with an additional $200 million in damages to all currently existing space assets from the debris created by the initial collision.5 The expected value of destroyed wealth because of collisions, currently small because of the low probability of a collision, can quickly become significant if future collisions result in runaway debris growth.

**2] Space debris is hype---there are thousands of satellites and only 15 debris collisions ever**

Mark **Albrecht 16**, Chairman of the board of USSpace LLC & fmr. head of the National Space Council, “Congested space is a serious problem solved by hard work, not hysteria, 5/9/16, https://spacenews.com/op-ed-congested-space-is-a-serious-problem-solved-by-hard-work-not-hysteria/

There are over a half million pieces of human-made material in orbit around our planet. Some are the size of school buses, some the size of BB gun pellets. They all had a function at some point, but now most are simply space debris littered from 100 to 22,000 miles above the Earth. Yet, all behave perfectly according to the laws of physics. Many in the space community have called the collision hazard caused by space debris a crisis.

Popular culture has embraced the risks of collisions in space in films like Gravity. Some participants have dramatized the issue by producing graphics of Earth and its satellites, which make our planet look like a fuzzy marble, almost obscured by a dense cloud of white pellets meant to conceptualize space congestion.

Unfortunately, for the sake of a good visual, satellites are depicted as if they were hundreds of miles wide, like the state of Pennsylvania (for the record, there are no space objects the size of Pennsylvania in orbit). Unfortunately, this is the rule, not the exception, and almost all of these articles, movies, graphics, and simulations are **exaggerated and misleading**. Space debris and collision risk is real, but it **certainly** is **not a crisis.**

So what are the facts?

On the positive side, space is **empty** and it is **vast**. At the altitude of the International Space Station, **one half a degree** of Earth longitude is almost **40 miles long**. That same one half a degree at geostationary orbit, some 22,000 miles up is over 230 miles long. Generally, we don’t intentionally put satellites closer together than one-half degree. That means at geostationary orbit, they are no closer than 11 times as far as the eye can see on flat ground or on the sea: That’s the horizon over the horizon 10 times over. In addition, other than minute forces like solar winds and sparse bits of atmosphere that still exist 500 miles up, **nothing gets in the way of orbiting objects** and **they behave quite predictably**. The location of the smallest spacecraft can be predicated within a 1,000 feet, 24 hours in advance.

Since we first started placing objects into space there have been 11 known low Earth orbit collisions, and three known collisions at geostationary orbit. Think of it: 135 space shuttle flights, all of the Apollo, Gemini and Mercury flights, **hundreds** of telecommunications satellites, **1,300 functioning satellites** on orbit today, **half a million** total objects in space larger than a marble, and **fewer than 15 known collisions**. **Why** do people **worry?**

#### 4] No debris cascades—This ev answers all aff warrants

Fange 2017 (Daniel Von Fange, Web Application Engineer, Founder and Owner of LeanCoder, Full Stack, Polyglot Web Developer, “Kessler Syndrome is Over Hyped”, 5/21/2017, http://braino.org/essays/kessler\_syndrome\_is\_over\_hyped/)

Kessler Syndrome is overhyped. A chorus of online commenters great any news of upcoming low earth orbit satellites with worry that humanity will to lose access to space. I now think they are wrong.

What is Kessler Syndrome?

Here’s the popular view on Kessler Syndrome. Every once in a while, a piece of junk in space hits a satellite. This single impact destroys the satellite, and breaks off several thousand additional pieces. These new pieces now fly around space looking for other satellites to hit, and so exponentially multiply themselves over time, like a nuclear reaction, until a sphere of man-made debris surrounds the earth, and humanity no longer has access to space nor the benefits of satellites.

It is a dark picture.

Is Kessler Syndrome likely to happen?

I had to stop everything and spend an afternoon doing back-of-the-napkin math to know how big the threat is. To estimate, we need to know where the stuff in space is, how much mass is there, and how long it would take to deorbit.

The orbital area around earth can be broken down into four regions.

Low LEO - Up to about 400km. Things that orbit here burn up in the earth’s atmosphere quickly - between a few months to two years. The space station operates at the high end of this range. It loses about a kilometer of altitude a month and if not pushed higher every few months, would soon burn up. For all practical purposes, Low LEO doesn’t matter for Kessler Syndrome. If Low LEO was ever full of space junk, we’d just wait a year and a half, and the problem would be over.

High LEO - 400km to 2000km. This where most heavy satellites and most space junk orbits. The air is thin enough here that satellites only go down slowly, and they have a much farther distance to fall. It can take 50 years for stuff here to get down. This is where Kessler Syndrome could be an issue.

Mid Orbit - GPS satellites and other navigation satellites travel here in lonely, long lives. The volume of space is so huge, and the number of satellites so few, that we don’t need to worry about Kessler here.

GEO - If you put a satellite far enough out from earth, the speed that the satellite travels around the earth will match the speed of the surface of the earth rotating under it. From the ground, the satellite will appear to hang motionless. Usually the geostationary orbit is used by big weather satellites and big TV broadcasting satellites. (This apparent motionlessness is why satellite TV dishes can be mounted pointing in a fixed direction. You can find approximate south just by looking around at the dishes in your northern hemisphere neighborhood.) For Kessler purposes, GEO orbit is roughly a ring 384,400 km around. However, all the satellites here are moving the same direction at the same speed - debris doesn’t get free velocity from the speed of the satellites. Also, it’s quite expensive to get a satellite here, and so there aren’t many, only about one satellite per 1000km of the ring. Kessler is not a problem here.

How bad could Kessler Syndrome in High LEO be?

Let’s imagine a worst case scenario.

An evil alien intelligence chops up everything in High LEO, turning it into 1cm cubes of death orbiting at 1000km, spread as evenly across the surface of this sphere as orbital mechanics would allow. Is humanity cut off from space?

I’m guessing the world has launched about 10,000 tons of satellites total. For guessing purposes, I’ll assume 2,500 tons of satellites and junk currently in High LEO. If satellites are made of aluminum, with a density of 2.70 g/cm3, then that’s 839,985,870 1cm cubes. A sphere for an orbit of 1,000km has a surface area of 682,752,000 square KM. So there would be one cube of junk per .81 square KM. If a rocket traveled through that, its odds of hitting that cube are tiny - less than 1 in 10,000.

So even in the worst case, we don’t lose access to space.

Now though you can travel through the debris, you couldn’t keep a satellite alive for long in this orbit of death. Kessler Syndrome at its worst just prevents us from putting satellites in certain orbits.

In real life, there’s a lot of factors that make Kessler syndrome even less of a problem than our worst case though experiment.

* Debris would be spread over a volume of space, not a single orbital surface, making collisions orders of magnitudes less likely.
* Most impact debris will have a slower orbital velocity than either of its original pieces - this makes it deorbit much sooner.
* Any collision will create large and small objects. Small objects are much more affected by atmospheric drag and deorbit faster, even in a few months from high LEO. Larger objects can be tracked by earth based radar and avoided.
* The planned big new constellations are not in High LEO, but in Low LEO for faster communications with the earth. They aren’t an issue for Kessler.
* Most importantly, all new satellite launches since the 1990’s are required to include a plan to get rid of the satellite at the end of its useful life (usually by deorbiting)

So the realistic worst case is that insurance premiums on satellites go up a bit. Given the current trend toward much smaller, cheaper micro satellites, this wouldn’t even have a huge effect.

I’m removing Kessler Syndrome from my list of things to worry about.

#### 5] No space war. Insurmountable barriers and common interests

Bohumil **Doboš**, scholar at the Institute of Political Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague, Czech Republic, and a coordinator of the Geopolitical Studies Research Centre, **’19**, Geopolitics of the Outer Space, Chapter 3: Outer Space as a Military-Diplomatic Field, Pgs. 48-49)

Despite the theorized potential for the achievement of the terrestrial dominance throughout the utilization of the ultimate high ground and the ease of destruction of space-based assets by the potential space weaponry, the utilization of space weapons is with current technology and no effective means to protect them far from fulfilling this potential (Steinberg 2012, p. 255). **In current global international political and technological setting, the utility of space weapons is very limited**, even if we accept that the ultimate high ground presents the potential to get a decisive tangible military advantage (which is unclear). This stands among the reasons for the lack of their utilization so far. Last but not the least, it must be pointed out that the states also develop passive defense systems designed to protect the satellites on orbit or critical capabilities they provide. These **further decrease the utility of space weapons**. These systems include larger maneuvering capacities, launching of decoys, preparation of spare satellites that are ready for launch in case of ASAT attack on its twin on orbit, or attempts to decrease the visibility of satellites using paint or materials less visible from radars (Moltz 2014, p. 31). Finally, we must look at the main obstacles of connection of the outer space and warfare. The first set of barriers is comprised of **physical obstructions**. As has been presented in the previous chapter, the outer space is very challenging domain to operate in. Environmental factors still present the largest threat to any space military capabilities if compared to any man-made threats (Rendleman 2013, p. 79). A following issue that hinders military operations in the outer space is the predictability of orbital movement. If the reconnaissance satellite's orbit is known, the terrestrial actor might attempt to hide some critical capabilities-an option that is countered by new surveillance techniques (spectrometers, etc.) (Norris 2010, p. 196)-but the hide-and-seek game is on. This same principle is, however, in place for any other space asset-any nation with basic tracking capabilities may quickly detect whether the military asset or weapon is located above its territory or on the other side of the planet and thus mitigate the possible strategic impact of space weapons not aiming at mass destruction. Another possibility is to attempt to destroy the weapon in orbit. Given the level of development for the ASAT technology, it seems that they will prevail over any possible weapon system for the time to come. Next issue, directly connected to the first one, is the utilization of weak physical protection of space objects that need to be as light as possible to reach the orbit and to be able to withstand harsh conditions of the domain. This means that their protection against ASAT weapons is very limited, and, whereas some avoidance techniques are being discussed, they are of limited use in case of ASAT attack. We can thus add to the issue of predictability also the issue of easy destructibility of space weapons and other military hardware (Dolman 2005, p. 40; Anantatmula 2013, p. 137; Steinberg 2012, p. 255). Even if the high ground was effectively achieved and other nations could not attack the space assets directly, there is still a need for communication with those assets from Earth. There are also ground facilities that support and control such weapons located on the surface. Electromagnetic communication with satellites might be jammed or hacked and the ground facilities infiltrated or destroyed thus rendering the possible space weapons useless (Klein 2006, p. 105; Rendleman 2013, p. 81). This issue might be overcome by the establishment of a base controlling these assets outside the Earth-on Moon or lunar orbit, at lunar L-points, etc.-but this perspective remains, for now, unrealistic. Furthermore, **no contemporary actor will risk full space weaponization in the face of possible competition and the possibility of rendering the outer space useless.** No actor is dominant enough to prevent others to challenge any possible attempts to dominate the domain by military means. To quote 2016 Stratfor analysis, "(a) war in space would be devastating to all, and preventing it, rather than finding ways to fight it, will likely remain the goal" (Larnrani 20 16). This stands true unless some space actor finds a utility in disrupting the arena for others.

#### 6] No war.

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more. The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.

#### They don’t uq prove why appropriation is bad, space tourism is not appropriation similar to how sailing in the seas isn’t appropriating it

#### Adv 1-

#### CSIS card bad and old, look at current relations, US and Russia do NOT want to work together, that means private companies don’t uniquely do anything, also they are more concerned about Ukraine not space X