# 1NC

## Off 1 -

### Framing:

#### Even if there’s an objective morality or conception of justice, it can’t be transcendent like a scientific law—moral judgements depend upon lower-level laws that require exceptions

Lance and Little 6 Mark Norris Lance and Margaret Olivia Little. “Defending Moral Particularism.” In *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*, James Dreier (ed.), 2006. Z. Smith Reynolds Library at Wake Forest University. Mark Norris Lance is a professor in the Philosophy Department and Justice and Peace Studies Program at Georgetown University Margaret Olivia Little Director, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Associate Professor, Philosophy Department Georgetown University https://philpapers.org/rec/LANPAA-2 //avery

But what if one does believe cruelty and the like to be univalent? The first thing to say is that, **even if there are exceptionless moral generalizations** functioning as higher-order laws in morality, this doesn’t itself obviate the (now **lower-order**) lawlikeness of the generalizations concerning our old friends lying, promise-keeping, and the infliction of pain. Higher-order laws, it turns out, can’t do all the heavy lifting. To give an example of Lange’s, it might be the case that all the phenomena of island biodiversity can be unified as instances of Darwinian survival strategy; pointing to laws at that higher level, that is, may unify and constrain patterns of behavior at the level of islands. Nonetheless, there are inferences – the raison d’être of theoretical principles – we can **make only by invoking the lower-level laws.** Laws of island biodiversity allow us to predict with fair accuracy, for instance, the population of a species given only the size of the island, something that cannot be done within Darwinian theory, which makes no mention of islands. Higher-level laws, in short, even where they exist, often fail to capture the content of laws at a lower level. Lower-level laws retain autonomous value. Second, once we realize that genuine laws admit of exception, space opens for a more radical rejoinder. For once we realize this, pressure is placed on why one should believe that exception-filled laws must be backed up at some higher level by a strict one. It places pressure, that is, on any ex ante commitment to the claim that exception-laden laws depend, for their existence, on exceptionless ones. Again, one may have a particular view about morality – here, about its metaphysical backing rather than its first-order normative structure – that implies the existence of strict higher-order moral laws. A Natural Law theorist, or again a Platonist about morality, is committed to the existence of strict moral laws that determine everything’s ethical nature, in much the same way the laws of physics determine all physical nature. But for those who have an essentially **organic, practice-based notion** of morality, according to which morality is **objective but not transcendent**, **there may be no hidden “scientific moral image” lying behind the manifest one.**15 Given the practice we find ourselves engaged in – and only from the perspective of such engagement – we have a sense of the point of that practice, and an understanding of our goals and purposes that allows us to amend that practice. But apart from our skillful involvement with it, we could not formulate any conception of its point, much less produce a codified theory of it that could be used to determine appropriateness within the practice. Moral understanding, while drenched in exception, is understanding of a structure, not merely a series of instances. What one comes to understand is a complex whole, in which intuitions about cases, privileged conditions, and compensatory moves all exert leverage on one another..

#### Moral principles frequently have exceptions—it’s not that nothing’s universal, but there’s no way to compare or codify values independent of context

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Moral particularists like exceptions. At any rate, they regard exceptions as **ubiquitous to moral principles**; more importantly, they view them as friend rather than foe. This is of course simply to state their philosophical intuition. We believe, though, that it’s the right intuition; and in this paper, we try to say why. In doing so, we will argue more to the second point than the first. We’ll be concerned less with demonstrating that the right moral principles in fact irreducibly admit of exception, and more with demonstrating that, if such exceptions do (as we suspect) exist, they should be tolerated and indeed embraced. This distinction points to two quite different bases for objecting to the type of moral particularism we’ll be developing. The first, about which we’ll have less to say, stems from substantive moral commitments. One might well believe that, all things considered, the best moral theory is one that in fact ends up cleaning up all exceptions; if so, one certainly won’t be a particularist. Resistance to particularism thus sometimes reflects commitment to a view such as **Kant**’s about lying, say, or the **util**itarian’s about pain, on which it turns out that lying is always wrong-making and pain always bad-making. This is a stance we respect (though we do not agree with it). After all, even those who believe that exceptions can be important must agree that **not all realms admit of them**. Physics, for instance, may well be a system susceptible to a codifiable structure of exceptionless laws (though its exceptionless laws may ending up having statistical quantifiers embedded in them); and even those who are particularists about physics would agree that we could, at any rate, make up a game whose every move is governed by a finite set of exceptionless rules. For many people, though, resistance to moral particularism stems not from any ex ante commitment to a given normative theory. It stems, instead, from commitment to an extra-moral view about the nature of explanation. It stems from a conception of the way in which reasons and explanation must function in any realm – namely, by subsumption under strict theoretical generalizations or laws. According to this view, exceptions stand in the way of genuine explanation. Those committed to such a picture will regard the presence of moral exceptions as an embarrassment to the theoretical task of moral understanding and justification: morality had better be secured by a structure that doesn’t admit of exception, on pain of morality’s demotion to second-class epistemic status. The answer to this sort of resistance is provision of a different model of explanation. We believe that, while reasons and explanation can travel by way of subsumption under strict laws, it is a deep mistake to think they always do – a mistake which, unless resisted, will obscure some of the richest views available. For some realms, ethics included, understanding and expertise is, at its heart, **a matter of understanding, not eliminating, exception**. Exceptions and Explanation Few people believe that lying is always wrong. After all, there may be some contexts in which another moral duty or principle – relief of terrible suffering, say – proves more important. Except where we are prepared to be absolutist, then, claims about the all-things-considered rightness or wrongness of following a given duty will have exceptions. Amongst those who concur with this rather innocuous statement, some believe we can recover a tractable calculus governing the interactions of the various duties or principles that come our way. Perhaps justice is lexically ordered over utility maximization; perhaps we can find a way to render duties’ strengths that will allow us to recover a calculative procedure for balancing them; perhaps specifying the duties to specific roles will allow us to set forth a once-and-for-all ordering of them. Others have set this aside as a misguided project. There is **no algorithm** or quantitative method, they urge, for deciding when justice should trump mercy rather than the other way round, no setting out a way to order or balance the virtues, principles, or duties (take your personal favorite) **independently of context**. Instead, it takes **qualitative judgment** or phronesis to make the comparative judgments in individual cases. Whichever side of that debate one comes down on, though, the vast majority of contemporary philosophers believe that relevant moral duties or features always make the same sort of contribution to a moral situation. Like the forces of physics, but without the vector calculus, we can isolate various moral forces that always push, as it were, in the same moral direction as telling for or against an action. We could put it by inserting a ‘ceteris paribus’ or ‘prima facie’ or ‘pro tanto’ qualifier in front of the claim that ‘lying is wrong’, where those qualifiers function to abstract away possible competing moral considerations. Such a claim is in essence equivalent to asserting an exceptionless connection between lying and a milder moral property: lying may sometimes be morally justified, but it is always wrong-making (see, e.g., Pietrowski 1993). It is here that moral particularists part company. Pain is always bad-making – well, except when it’s constitutive of athletic challenge; intentionally telling a falsehood is prima facie wrong – well, not when done to Nazi guards, to whom the truth is not owed, or when playing the game Diplomacy, where it’s the point of the contest. Pleasure always counts in favor of a situation – well, except when it’s the sadist’s delight in her victim’s agony, where her pleasure is precisely part of what is wrong with the situation.1 It is always wrong-making not to take competent agents at their word; well, not in the S&M room, where ‘no’ precisely does mean ‘yes’. Considerations that in one context tell in favor of an action can in another **go neutral or flip directions entirely**, and all in a way that **cannot be codified** in any helpful concrete way.

#### Permissibility and Presumption negate:

#### 1] Justness – the resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove something as unjust or wrong, and permissibility would deny the existence of wrongness so you presume neg

#### 2] Falsity – Statements are more often false than true because proving one part of the statement false disproves the entire statement. Presuming all statements are true creates contradictions which would be ethically bankrupt.

#### 3] Negating is harder – Aff gets last speech to crystallize and shape the debate in a way the favors them with no 3NR

#### 5] Burden of truth – Aff has the burden of truth and needs to prove the res as true

#### 6] Illogical - negating becomes impossible because all defense becomes offense for the aff

#### 7] Squo Burden – The affs burden is to prove we do anything but the squo so presume neg if the aff can’t prove that

#### 8] Status Quo Bias – you should default to a world where you don’t make change because making change assumes that world will be better than the current world

#### 9] Absent morality nothing is unjust, so you negate

#### 10] Side Burdens – Neg burden is to deny the aff, so proving no reason to do the aff means you negate

#### 11] Infinite prep time – aff gets infinite prep time and chooses the field of the debate so presume against them if they can’t even give a reason why you affirm

#### No new 1AR presumption and permissibility warrants as to why they affirm - becomes a 10-7 timeskew since I don’t get new 2nr justifications

### Offense:

#### A] The Affirmative positions itself as moral principle regarding a situation – This makes morality impossible to achieve since we are now constrained by engrained generalizations that fail to account for exceptions within principles - thus negate on presumption since the 1AC can never contextually justify their moral actions

#### B] Tying morality to principles causes harmful ethical thought – means we can never adjust our thoughts or break principles even if the situation would be better for it

#### C] Affirmative’s generalizations make weighing ethicality between actions impossible – Moral principles will see actions that violate that moral principle as ethically the same – Means we can never decide between conflicting principles and causes the inability to make decisions – Means even if moral principles are good, they make it impossible to act under principles

#### D] MP necessary to formulating real world ethical thinking – not all situations are in the same context and require specific moral analysis to derive moral action, and actual governmental bodies contest bills because of specific instances, like how the bill hurts their specific town/city and specific workers

#### E] Principles are epistemologically circular – “X action is bad to do because it is bad” means we never form justifications for why we should or shouldn’t undergo actions. Principles are self-referential in their justification for that principle’s existence – means principles fall apart on inspection leaving no ground for moral thought. Need contextual situation to epistemologically from reasoning – knowledge formation can’t be generated outside of engagement with ethical contexts

## Off 2 –

#### Russia and China are rapidly pulling ahead of the U.S. in space weapons that will be key for future conflicts

Herman, Marisa. “Russia, China Step up Orbital Attacks as Biden Fumbles Space Force Mission.” Newsmax, 3 Dec. 2021, www.newsmax.com/platinum/space-force-china-russia-biden/2021/12/03/id/1047193/. Accessed 24 Dec. 2021.

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As Russia and China ramp up space attacks targeting American assets in orbit, defense experts believe that Space Force, the newest branch of the military, is uniquely positioned to defend U.S. interests on the battlefield beyond the atmosphere — but only if the service is utilized properly. Former President Donald Trump created the Space Force on Dec. 20, 2019 as a separate branch within the Department of the Air Force that was tasked with defending national security interests from above. And as U.S. adversaries make major advancements in the space weapons arena and continue to carry out various attacks — including electronic warfare jamming, temporarily blinding optics with lasers, and cyberattacks on U.S. satellites — defense analysts argue that the Pentagon should be better equipping Space Force with the tools it needs to defend the U.S. from a possible “space Pearl Harbor.” In recent months, Russia and China have openly flexed their space capabilities. Russia recently conducted a weapons test in which it blew up one of its own defunct satellites, in the process creating more than 1,500 pieces of space junk that continues to pose a danger to astronauts aboard the International Space Station — including Russian astronauts. China carried out a hypersonic missile test that was reportedly so advanced it left Pentagon scientists “baffled” because it “defied science” after the initial vehicle fired a second missile mid-flight. “We are in an age of a great power competition and space is really an undefined arena,” said Annie Aleman, director of communications for the American Security Project. “We are seeing a lot of increasing aggression and the pace of conflict is rapidly intensifying. Space Force should absolutely continue to be a priority of the [Defense Department].” Nicolas Chaillan, who served as the first chief software officer for both the Air Force and Space Force, said China and Russia are ahead of the U.S. in the “most critical war-fighting capabilities that will make it or break it in the next wars to come.” At the same time, he said the U.S. has failed to grasp the urgency of recognizing space as a “critical domain.” “Russia is clearly seeing the importance of space, and its ability of striking down satellites could be devastating and have cascading effects for the U.S. government, American people, and allies of the U.S.,” he said. What is even more alarming to Chaillan is the fact that China has conducted over 200 hypersonic tests while the U.S. has carried out a mere nine and isn’t close to testing anything approaching a fully functioning missile. “What’s lacking is urgency and realizing that this is even bigger than we thought,” he said. “The next wave of innovation is going to touch the Air Force and Space Force.” Brandon Weichert, space expert and author of “Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower,” said these most recent space incidents should have served as a wake-up call to the threats that U.S. adversaries pose in space. He believes that Space Force is the “best way” to compete in the new “space race” playing out in the skies. But he said the branch isn’t living up to its expectations because its current leadership — and the politics of the Biden administration — are not allowing the department to act boldly enough. Weichert points out that Space Force is following the advice of consultants who are committed to the de-weaponization of space, and people who believe space “should be a sanctuary from weapons” and don’t believe that space is for anything other than “taking pretty pictures of stars.” “They don’t believe in using space as a strategic asset,” he said. “There is no strategic vision for dominating space.” Instead of going big and making the investments necessary to compete with China and Russia, Weichert said the branch has quickly become a bureaucracy that does “everything but actual space dominance.” “Space Force doesn’t want to do space,” he said. Weichert said that part of the reason Space Force has lagged behind is because it is viewed as a “Trump boondoggle, vanity project” by D.C. leadership. But as the jockeying for control of space heats up among world powers, Aleman said it was “quite frankly a mistake to not take Space Force seriously in the first place.” Earlier this year, House Democrats even went as far as to introduce a bill that aimed to abolish Space Force. Rep. Jared Huffman, D-Calif., introduced the bill and wrote that Space Force “threatened longstanding peace” and “wasted billions of taxpayer dollars” on the “militarization of space” in a statement about the proposal. Shortly after President Joe Biden took office, White House press secretary Jen Psaki mocked reporters asking questions about Space Force, after Psaki suggested she did not know who was in charge. On Wednesday, Vice President Kamala Harris held the first National Space Council meeting of the Biden administration — where she delivered a speech on the White House’s “approach to ensuring that space activities create opportunities that benefit the American people and the world.” “When you look at people promoted into leadership roles, they are people who genuinely don’t believe in space power,” Weichert said. So, instead of equipping Space Force with cutting edge technology and defense weapons, he said the Biden team is focused on crafting binding treaties that prevent the U.S. from bringing any weapons into space. And while the U.S. focus is on preserving space as some sort of haven for future explorers, Weichert said Russia is “laughing at us and going full boar” to deny Americans access to space. “It’s going to take a complete defeat of the U.S. by China or Russia for the U.S. to realize we needed it,” he said. Chaillan also fears a shocking space attack is on the horizon, and once it’s happened, it will already be too late. “This is not a game, and we keep dismissing it like it’s never going to happen,” he said of a possible space attack. “We have to be demanding more from the Pentagon and the [Biden] administration to take action.” To compete with China and Russia in space, he said the U.S. must stop being complacent, bring in leaders from the private sector who are knowledgeable about space, and create partnerships with private companies to bring more swiftly to market the type of innovative ideas that could overtake China and Russia. “The government has been so afraid of failing and making mistakes that you have seen a full stop in terms of rapid innovation,” he said. In order to convince the private sector to work with the Pentagon and Space Force, he said people need to be educated on the growing threat our adversaries pose in space. “We have to show them ‘why’ by declassifying information on the threat that China and Russia really cause on a day-to-day basis,” he said. “We need the public to freak out.”

#### Private sector is the silver bullet – Only way to maintain hegemony

Weichert 21 The Future of Space Exploration Depends on the Private SectorBy BRANDON J. WEICHERTJuly 5, 2021 6:30 AM BRANDON J. WEICHERT is the author of “WINNING SPACE: HOW AMERICA REMAINS A SUPERPOWER” (Republic Book Publishers). He runs THE WEICHERT REPORT: WORLD NEWS DONE RIGHT and is a contributor at the Asia Times. <https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/07/the-future-of-space-exploration-depends-on-the-private-sector/#slide-1> //avery

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As Jeff Bezos, the wealthiest man on the planet, readies to launch himself into space aboard one of his own rockets, the world is watching the birth of a new dawn in space. Previously, America relied on its government agency, NASA, to propel it to the cosmos during the last space race with the Soviet Union. Today, America’s greatest hopes are with its private sector. Jeff Bezos is not engaging in such risky behavior simply because he’s an adrenaline junky. No, he’s launching himself into orbit because his Blue Origins is in a titanic struggle with Elon Musk’s SpaceX — and Bezos’s firm is losing. Whatever happens, the American people will benefit from the competition that is shaping up between America’s space entrepreneurs. This has always been how innovation occurs: through the dynamic, often cutthroat competition between actors in the private sector. While money is their ultimate prize, fame and fortune are also alluring temptations to make men like Musk and Bezos risk much of their wealth to change the world. The private space race among these entrepreneurs is part of a far more important marathon between Red China and the United States. Whichever nation wins the new space race will determine the future of the earth below. Consider this: Since winning its initial contracts to launch sensitive U.S. military satellites into orbit, SpaceX has lowered the cost of military satellite launches on taxpayers by “over a million dollars less” than what bigger defense contractors can do. Elon Musk is convinced that he can bring these costs down even more, thanks to his reusable Falcon 9 rocket. The competition between the private space start-ups is fierce — just as the competition between Edison and Westinghouse was — but the upshot is ultimately greater innovation and lower costs for you and me. In fact, Elon Musk insists that if NASA gives SpaceX the contract for building the Human Landing System for the Artemis mission, NASA would return astronauts to the lunar surface by 2024 — four years before NASA believes it will do so. (Incidentally, 2024 is also when China anticipates having a functional base on the moon’s southern pole.) Whereas China has an all-of-society approach to its space race with the United States, Washington has yet to fully galvanize the country in the way that John F. Kennedy rallied America to wage — and win — the space race in the Cold War. America’s private sector, therefore, is the silver bullet against China’s quest for total space dominance. If left unrestricted by meddlesome Washington bureaucrats, these companies will ensure that the United States retains its overall competitive advantage over China — and all other challengers, for that matter. Indeed, the next four years could prove decisive in who will be victorious. Enter the newly minted NASA director, Bill Nelson, whose station at the agency has effectively poured cold water on the private sector’s ambitious space plans. “Space is not going to be the Wild West for billionaires or anyone else looking to blast off,” Nelson admonished an inquiring reporter. Why not? America’s actions during its western expansion created a dynamic and advanced nation that was well-positioned to dominate the world for the next century. Should we not attempt to emulate this in order to remain dominant in the next century? More important, this is precisely how China treats space: as a new Wild West . . . but one in which Beijing’s forces will dominate. China takes a leap-without-looking approach to space development — everything that can be done to further its grand ambition of becoming the world’s most dominant power by 2049 will be done. Meanwhile, the Biden administration wants to prevent America’s greatest strength, the free market, from helping to beat its foremost geopolitical competitor. Nelson’s comments are fundamentally at odds with America’s spirit and animating principles. Whatever one’s opinion about Bezos or Musk, the fact is that their private space companies are inspiring greater innovation today in the space sector after years of its being left in the sclerotic hands of the U.S. government. Sensing that the federal government’s dominance of U.S. space policy is waning, the Biden administration would rather cede the strategic high ground of space to China than let wildcatting innovators do the hard work. Today, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and NASA are contriving new ways for strangling the budding private space sector, just as it is taking flight. Risk aversion is not how one innovates. Risk is what led Americans to the moon just 66 years after the Wright brothers flew their first airplane. A willingness for risk doesn’t exist today in the federal government — which is why the feds shouldn’t be running space policy. The U.S. government should be partnering with the new space start-ups, not shunning them. The FAA should be automatically approving SpaceX launches, not stymying them. The federal government will not win space any more than it could win the West or build the locomotive. It takes strong-willed, brilliant individuals of a rare caliber to do that. All government can do is to give the resources and support to private-sector innovators and let them make history for us. The next decade will decide who wins space. Let it be America — and let America’s dynamic start-ups win that race, not China’s state capitalism.

#### Primacy solves arms races and great power war – unipolarity is sustainable, and prevents power vacuums and global escalation

Brands 18 [(Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump," Page 129-133]

Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6

From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep.

This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance.

Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate.

American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap.

Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled.

THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors.

First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment.

## Case –

#### Value – Its effectively justice

#### VC – there is = quite arbitrary and MP heavily critiques it