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#### Even if there’s an objective morality, it can’t be transcendent like a scientific law—moral judgements depend upon lower-level laws that require exceptions

Lance and Little 6 Mark Norris Lance and Margaret Olivia Little. “Defending Moral Particularism.” In *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*, James Dreier (ed.), 2006. Z. Smith Reynolds Library at Wake Forest University. Mark Norris Lance is a professor in the Philosophy Department and Justice and Peace Studies Program at Georgetown University Margaret Olivia Little Director, Kennedy Institute of Ethics Associate Professor, Philosophy Department Georgetown University https://philpapers.org/rec/LANPAA-2 //avery

But what if one does believe cruelty and the like to be univalent? The first thing to say is that, **even if there are exceptionless moral generalizations** functioning as higher-order laws in morality, this doesn’t itself obviate the (now **lower-order**) lawlikeness of the generalizations concerning our old friends lying, promise-keeping, and the infliction of pain. Higher-order laws, it turns out, can’t do all the heavy lifting. To give an example of Lange’s, it might be the case that all the phenomena of island biodiversity can be unified as instances of Darwinian survival strategy; pointing to laws at that higher level, that is, may unify and constrain patterns of behavior at the level of islands. Nonetheless, there are inferences – the raison d’être of theoretical principles – we can **make only by invoking the lower-level laws.** Laws of island biodiversity allow us to predict with fair accuracy, for instance, the population of a species given only the size of the island, something that cannot be done within Darwinian theory, which makes no mention of islands. Higher-level laws, in short, even where they exist, often fail to capture the content of laws at a lower level. Lower-level laws retain autonomous value. Second, once we realize that genuine laws admit of exception, space opens for a more radical rejoinder. For once we realize this, pressure is placed on why one should believe that exception-filled laws must be backed up at some higher level by a strict one. It places pressure, that is, on any ex ante commitment to the claim that exception-laden laws depend, for their existence, on exceptionless ones. Again, one may have a particular view about morality – here, about its metaphysical backing rather than its first-order normative structure – that implies the existence of strict higher-order moral laws. A Natural Law theorist, or again a Platonist about morality, is committed to the existence of strict moral laws that determine everything’s ethical nature, in much the same way the laws of physics determine all physical nature. But for those who have an essentially **organic, practice-based notion** of morality, according to which morality is **objective but not transcendent**, **there may be no hidden “scientific moral image” lying behind the manifest one.**15 Given the practice we find ourselves engaged in – and only from the perspective of such engagement – we have a sense of the point of that practice, and an understanding of our goals and purposes that allows us to amend that practice. But apart from our skillful involvement with it, we could not formulate any conception of its point, much less produce a codified theory of it that could be used to determine appropriateness within the practice. Moral understanding, while drenched in exception, is understanding of a structure, not merely a series of instances. What one comes to understand is a complex whole, in which intuitions about cases, privileged conditions, and compensatory moves all exert leverage on one another..

#### Moral principles frequently have exceptions—it’s not that nothing’s universal, but there’s no way to compare or codify values independent of context

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Moral particularists like exceptions. At any rate, they regard exceptions as **ubiquitous to moral principles**; more importantly, they view them as friend rather than foe. This is of course simply to state their philosophical intuition. We believe, though, that it’s the right intuition; and in this paper, we try to say why. In doing so, we will argue more to the second point than the first. We’ll be concerned less with demonstrating that the right moral principles in fact irreducibly admit of exception, and more with demonstrating that, if such exceptions do (as we suspect) exist, they should be tolerated and indeed embraced. This distinction points to two quite different bases for objecting to the type of moral particularism we’ll be developing. The first, about which we’ll have less to say, stems from substantive moral commitments. One might well believe that, all things considered, the best moral theory is one that in fact ends up cleaning up all exceptions; if so, one certainly won’t be a particularist. Resistance to particularism thus sometimes reflects commitment to a view such as **Kant**’s about lying, say, or the **util**itarian’s about pain, on which it turns out that lying is always wrong-making and pain always bad-making. This is a stance we respect (though we do not agree with it). After all, even those who believe that exceptions can be important must agree that **not all realms admit of them**. Physics, for instance, may well be a system susceptible to a codifiable structure of exceptionless laws (though its exceptionless laws may ending up having statistical quantifiers embedded in them); and even those who are particularists about physics would agree that we could, at any rate, make up a game whose every move is governed by a finite set of exceptionless rules. For many people, though, resistance to moral particularism stems not from any ex ante commitment to a given normative theory. It stems, instead, from commitment to an extra-moral view about the nature of explanation. It stems from a conception of the way in which reasons and explanation must function in any realm – namely, by subsumption under strict theoretical generalizations or laws. According to this view, exceptions stand in the way of genuine explanation. Those committed to such a picture will regard the presence of moral exceptions as an embarrassment to the theoretical task of moral understanding and justification: morality had better be secured by a structure that doesn’t admit of exception, on pain of morality’s demotion to second-class epistemic status. The answer to this sort of resistance is provision of a different model of explanation. We believe that, while reasons and explanation can travel by way of subsumption under strict laws, it is a deep mistake to think they always do – a mistake which, unless resisted, will obscure some of the richest views available. For some realms, ethics included, understanding and expertise is, at its heart, **a matter of understanding, not eliminating, exception**. Exceptions and Explanation Few people believe that lying is always wrong. After all, there may be some contexts in which another moral duty or principle – relief of terrible suffering, say – proves more important. Except where we are prepared to be absolutist, then, claims about the all-things-considered rightness or wrongness of following a given duty will have exceptions. Amongst those who concur with this rather innocuous statement, some believe we can recover a tractable calculus governing the interactions of the various duties or principles that come our way. Perhaps justice is lexically ordered over utility maximization; perhaps we can find a way to render duties’ strengths that will allow us to recover a calculative procedure for balancing them; perhaps specifying the duties to specific roles will allow us to set forth a once-and-for-all ordering of them. Others have set this aside as a misguided project. There is **no algorithm** or quantitative method, they urge, for deciding when justice should trump mercy rather than the other way round, no setting out a way to order or balance the virtues, principles, or duties (take your personal favorite) **independently of context**. Instead, it takes **qualitative judgment** or phronesis to make the comparative judgments in individual cases. Whichever side of that debate one comes down on, though, the vast majority of contemporary philosophers believe that relevant moral duties or features always make the same sort of contribution to a moral situation. Like the forces of physics, but without the vector calculus, we can isolate various moral forces that always push, as it were, in the same moral direction as telling for or against an action. We could put it by inserting a ‘ceteris paribus’ or ‘prima facie’ or ‘pro tanto’ qualifier in front of the claim that ‘lying is wrong’, where those qualifiers function to abstract away possible competing moral considerations. Such a claim is in essence equivalent to asserting an exceptionless connection between lying and a milder moral property: lying may sometimes be morally justified, but it is always wrong-making (see, e.g., Pietrowski 1993). It is here that moral particularists part company. Pain is always bad-making – well, except when it’s constitutive of athletic challenge; intentionally telling a falsehood is prima facie wrong – well, not when done to Nazi guards, to whom the truth is not owed, or when playing the game Diplomacy, where it’s the point of the contest. Pleasure always counts in favor of a situation – well, except when it’s the sadist’s delight in her victim’s agony, where her pleasure is precisely part of what is wrong with the situation.1 It is always wrong-making not to take competent agents at their word; well, not in the S&M room, where ‘no’ precisely does mean ‘yes’. Considerations that in one context tell in favor of an action can in another **go neutral or flip directions entirely**, and all in a way that **cannot be codified** in any helpful concrete way.

#### Furthermore, the affirmative’s obligation is to prove that the resolution is true. If we the negative are able to show that the affirmative has done insufficient work to prove its truth, then you can negate.

#### The Affirmative positions itself as moral principle regarding a situation – This makes morality impossible to achieve since we are now constrained by engrained generalizations that fail to account for exceptions within principles. Not only is their framework a form of a broad moral principle, but also their defense of the resolution. It is a broad moral statement that refuses to acknowledge the nuance and exceptions within moral principles. Rather than doing a broad analysis of specific private entities appropriating outer space, the affirmative only speaks in broad terms which is problematic for reaching true morality.

### Offense:

#### As an example, SSP, or Space Solar Power is viable and requires privatization.

Oberhaus 21 [DANIEL OBERHAUS, “Space Solar Power: An Extraterrestrial Energy Resource For The U.S.,” Innovation Frontier Project, August 18, 2021. <https://innovationfrontier.org/space-solar-power-an-extraterrestrial-energy-resource-for-the-u-s/>] CT

FUTURE OF SSP

The United States’ reluctance to pursue SSP can be attributed to a number of causes. In the 1970s and 80s, the exorbitant projected costs of an SSP station guaranteed that the project would not be pursued by NASA, the DOE, or the DOD. At the same time, the agency’s emphasis on developing nuclear space technologies — a trend that continues to this day — undermined enthusiasm for other ambitious energy projects like SSP. Finally, the fact that SSP is a space project meant to provide commercial levels of electrical power on Earth meant that it wasn’t obvious whether it fell within the purview of NASA or the DOE, and so both agencies were reluctant to allocate a substantial portion of their budget for its development. Today, the low cost of natural gas and renewables like wind and solar makes it seem challenging to justify a space energy project of this scale. But SSP offers several unique benefits as an energy resource, including its resiliency, its ability to provide flexible baseload power to geographically distant locations, its capacity to accelerate decarbonization directly by providing clean energy and indirectly by expediting the transition to off-world heavy industry, and its strategic benefits as a tool for diplomacy and national security. Given SSP’s benefits and the interest in the technology from most other space agencies, it’s puzzling that policymakers in the United States have not prioritized SSP R&D. The development of key technologies such as reusable rockets and thin film solar panels has finally made SSP economically and technically viable. But there is still a lot of fundamental research on SSP that needs to be done and it is in the United States’ national interest to begin this research program as soon as possible. So far, the only glimmer of hope for an American SSP program has come from the DOD’s efforts. In 2019, the Air Force Research Lab awarded a $100 million contract to Northrop Grumman as part of the new Space Solar Power Incremental Demonstrations and Research (SSPIDR) Project, which aims to develop hardware for in-orbit SSP experiments based on the design developed at Caltech.105 This is by far the United States’ largest federal expenditure on SSP R&D, but it is only a fraction of what will be required to build a large-scale SSP station and the specific technologies included in the SSPIDR program will not result in a system that could ever provide commercial power to civilians. SSP is a key tool for ensuring the prosperity and security of the United States in the latter half of the 21st century. It is imperative that NASA and the DOE prioritize the development of SSP. We believe the federal government should earmark approximately $1 billion for SSP research over the next five years with a special emphasis on advancing emerging technologies and in-space hardware demonstrations. Congress must take the first step in establishing a civilian SSP platform by directing NASA and the DOE to collaborate on a public-private initiative similar to NASA’s commercial crew program or its more recent commercial lunar payload services program. The directive must clearly delineate responsibilities between the agencies in order to avoid leadership paralysis that has stymied domestic SSP research in the past. Furthermore, a public-private program must be structured so that there is competition among multiple private companies, which must hit key milestones in order to continue receiving contracts. These contracts should be awarded with a fixed-price structure to avoid the massive cost overruns and delays that are typical of cost-plus contracts in the aerospace and defense sector. This is also an approach likely to find support among new launch providers and spacecraft manufacturers that have demonstrated the innovation that occurs when operating within the relative constraints of fixed price contracts. In fact, the main trade group for the aerospace sector has advocated for the increased use of fixed-price contracts in the past.106 Alternatively, it may be more efficient to establish a focused research organization (FRO) dedicated to SSP technologies to avoid delays associated with collaboration between two federal agencies on multi-year—and perhaps multi-decade—projects. FROs are independent entities that exist outside of national laboratories and universities. They are effectively a startup for basic research and deep technological development that requires large-scale engineering collaboration on technologies that may not yet have a market or are not readily monetizable.107 Recently, the U.S. Congress created five FRO-like centers in the DOE’s national labs as part of the National Quantum Initiative Act, which can serve as a framework for the creation of similar FROs dedicated to space solar power.108 While there are several approaches to a large-scale SSP system, we believe the most fruitful pathway is to focus on cost reduction over energy efficiency. This would prioritize highly modular systems similar to ALPHA, which benefit from the substantially reduced costs of mass manufacturing standardized components. We believe that it is possible to conduct a civilian SSP demonstration in low-Earth orbit within three years of the program’s start with less than $250 million in funding. The first phase of this program would involve conducting a series of ground tests with prototype systems over the course of about 18 months. Based on the results of this program, a system could be selected for an in-space demonstration capable of generating up to 300kw of power in low-Earth orbit. After a successful LEO demonstration mission, the next step would be to build a larger SSP system in mid-Earth orbit capable of producing commercial amounts of power (e.g., 1-10 MW). While this orbital altitude is not sufficient for maintaining the SSP system over a fixed spot on the Earth, it would stay on a fixed path so that it always passed over the same spots on the Earth. While the power from this MEO demonstrator would not be competitive with terrestrial electricity prices — we expect a cost of about $1/kwh — it would be a critical step toward proving the system’s ability to provide commercial power. We expect that the MEO demonstrator could be built and launched for approximately $1 billion. The success of the MEO demonstrator would lay the foundation for an SSP system in geostationary orbit that would be large enough to provide meaningful amounts of baseload power. We expect the initial version of this SSP system to be capable of delivering around 2 GW of solar energy to the surface. We expect that a 2 GW SSP system in geostationary orbit could be built for about $10 billion. Here we start to see the cost savings of mass manufacturing modular SSP components. This system would be capable of delivering more than 200 times more power than the MEO demonstrator for only 10 times the cost. We believe that a public-private SSP program jointly led by NASA and the DOE could result in a commercially viable SSP platform in geostationary orbit by the end of the decade. In addition to providing a critical pathway for SSP, it also has the potential to lead to substantial advancements in solar power and wireless power transmission technologies that would be useful on Earth. If policymakers do not take action on advancing domestic SSP capabilities soon, the United States will find itself losing its leadership position in space and increasingly vulnerable to natural and human-made disasters on the ground.

#### Here we have proven an exception to the broad moral principle of the affirmative. SSPs are an example of the appropriation of outer space by private entities being just. This card on its own is a reason to vote negative since it disproves the affirmative. However, it also bolsters the claims of our framework.

## Off 2 –

#### SpaceX sats k2 US heg

Buenconsejo 20 SpaceX's 'Cleverly Engineered' Starlink Satellites Could Improve US Military Communications Against Potential Threats: Air Force Acquisition Chief is Impressed Urian B., Tech Times 24 September 2020, 08:09 pm Urian Buenconsejo <https://www.techtimes.com/articles/252827/20200924/spacexs-cleverly-engineered-starlink-improve-military-communications-against-potential-threats.htm> Urian Buenconsejo Senior Copywriter/Journalist at Tech Times //avery

SpaceX is currently deploying a constellation-like quantity of Starlink satellites all into low Earth orbit in order to deliver a global broadband internet. There are already about 708 satellites circulating in orbit, out of the whole 4,409 satellites that will be the initial Starlink network. The company is actually focused on being able to connect rural areas all around the world where the existing internet connection is both unreliable and also inaccessible. SpaceX's deal with the United States Air Force SpaceX has a deal signed by the United States Air Force with a value of about $28 million that was signed in 2018 in order to assess the whole Starlink network's military platforms performance. The Air Force is already actively experimenting with just how the space-based internet could result in an enhancement of Multi-Domain Operations otherwise known as MDO. The said operations require being able to move a huge amount of data between five different domains of warfare: sea, ground, sky, outer space, and of course, cyberspace. The military is in need for a reliable communication system at every single time in order to both protect and defend the whole country from any potential threats. The recent assessment of Starlink will be able to offer military insight on whether the US military should purchase a long-term Starlink service. The accounts of US Air Force Chief for Acquisition Dr. Will Roper, the US Air Force Chief for Acquisition who actually serves as the principal adviser in the field of technology development and research, has met with certain reporters in order to discuss a new live-fire military exercise that has taken place some time earlier this month according to [Investors](https://www.investors.com/news/spacex-starlink-impressed-air-force-in-big-live-fire-exercise/)news reports. During the known conference, Roper made SpaceX Starlink go through the live-fire exercise which is part of the military's very own Advanced Battle Management System or ABMS in order to test it. According to Roper, Starlink was both "impressive" and also "positive" during those tests even complementing that they have "cleverly engineered satellites" as well as "cleverly deployed" them. Roper even stated that there's still a lot of things to learn from how these satellites were designed. The conducted test and its meaning Roper even shared that the United States Air Force actually connected Starlink with a bunch of air as well as terrestrial assets. The Starlink terminals were being hooked to a Boeing KC-135 Stratotanker aircraft's cockpit in order to assess the whole network's main performance while the particular airplanes fly. The addition of a stable satellite-based internet system will in turn enable the US military to be able to communicate at all given times across the globe, even in certain areas where the actual internet mainly does not exist. Roper noted that the advantage of a [satellite-based internet system](https://www.tesmanian.com/blogs/tesmanian-blog/starlink-airforce) is that it can help supply the Navy, the airplanes, and other military vehicles on the go.

#### Private sector is the silver bullet – Only way to maintain hegemony

Weichert 21 The Future of Space Exploration Depends on the Private SectorBy BRANDON J. WEICHERTJuly 5, 2021 6:30 AM BRANDON J. WEICHERT is the author of “WINNING SPACE: HOW AMERICA REMAINS A SUPERPOWER” (Republic Book Publishers). He runs THE WEICHERT REPORT: WORLD NEWS DONE RIGHT and is a contributor at the Asia Times. <https://www.nationalreview.com/2021/07/the-future-of-space-exploration-depends-on-the-private-sector/#slide-1> //avery

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As Jeff Bezos, the wealthiest man on the planet, readies to launch himself into space aboard one of his own rockets, the world is watching the birth of a new dawn in space. Previously, America relied on its government agency, NASA, to propel it to the cosmos during the last space race with the Soviet Union. Today, America’s greatest hopes are with its private sector. Jeff Bezos is not engaging in such risky behavior simply because he’s an adrenaline junky. No, he’s launching himself into orbit because his Blue Origins is in a titanic struggle with Elon Musk’s SpaceX — and Bezos’s firm is losing. Whatever happens, the American people will benefit from the competition that is shaping up between America’s space entrepreneurs. This has always been how innovation occurs: through the dynamic, often cutthroat competition between actors in the private sector. While money is their ultimate prize, fame and fortune are also alluring temptations to make men like Musk and Bezos risk much of their wealth to change the world. The private space race among these entrepreneurs is part of a far more important marathon between Red China and the United States. Whichever nation wins the new space race will determine the future of the earth below. Consider this: Since winning its initial contracts to launch sensitive U.S. military satellites into orbit, SpaceX has lowered the cost of military satellite launches on taxpayers by “over a million dollars less” than what bigger defense contractors can do. Elon Musk is convinced that he can bring these costs down even more, thanks to his reusable Falcon 9 rocket. The competition between the private space start-ups is fierce — just as the competition between Edison and Westinghouse was — but the upshot is ultimately greater innovation and lower costs for you and me. In fact, Elon Musk insists that if NASA gives SpaceX the contract for building the Human Landing System for the Artemis mission, NASA would return astronauts to the lunar surface by 2024 — four years before NASA believes it will do so. (Incidentally, 2024 is also when China anticipates having a functional base on the moon’s southern pole.) Whereas China has an all-of-society approach to its space race with the United States, Washington has yet to fully galvanize the country in the way that John F. Kennedy rallied America to wage — and win — the space race in the Cold War. America’s private sector, therefore, is the silver bullet against China’s quest for total space dominance. If left unrestricted by meddlesome Washington bureaucrats, these companies will ensure that the United States retains its overall competitive advantage over China — and all other challengers, for that matter. Indeed, the next four years could prove decisive in who will be victorious. Enter the newly minted NASA director, Bill Nelson, whose station at the agency has effectively poured cold water on the private sector’s ambitious space plans. “Space is not going to be the Wild West for billionaires or anyone else looking to blast off,” Nelson admonished an inquiring reporter. Why not? America’s actions during its western expansion created a dynamic and advanced nation that was well-positioned to dominate the world for the next century. Should we not attempt to emulate this in order to remain dominant in the next century? More important, this is precisely how China treats space: as a new Wild West . . . but one in which Beijing’s forces will dominate. China takes a leap-without-looking approach to space development — everything that can be done to further its grand ambition of becoming the world’s most dominant power by 2049 will be done. Meanwhile, the Biden administration wants to prevent America’s greatest strength, the free market, from helping to beat its foremost geopolitical competitor. Nelson’s comments are fundamentally at odds with America’s spirit and animating principles. Whatever one’s opinion about Bezos or Musk, the fact is that their private space companies are inspiring greater innovation today in the space sector after years of its being left in the sclerotic hands of the U.S. government. Sensing that the federal government’s dominance of U.S. space policy is waning, the Biden administration would rather cede the strategic high ground of space to China than let wildcatting innovators do the hard work. Today, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) and NASA are contriving new ways for strangling the budding private space sector, just as it is taking flight. Risk aversion is not how one innovates. Risk is what led Americans to the moon just 66 years after the Wright brothers flew their first airplane. A willingness for risk doesn’t exist today in the federal government — which is why the feds shouldn’t be running space policy. The U.S. government should be partnering with the new space start-ups, not shunning them. The FAA should be automatically approving SpaceX launches, not stymying them. The federal government will not win space any more than it could win the West or build the locomotive. It takes strong-willed, brilliant individuals of a rare caliber to do that. All government can do is to give the resources and support to private-sector innovators and let them make history for us. The next decade will decide who wins space. Let it be America — and let America’s dynamic start-ups win that race, not China’s state capitalism.

#### Primacy solves arms races and great power war – unipolarity is sustainable, and prevents power vacuums and global escalation

Brands 18 [(Hal, Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) "American Grand Strategy in the Age of Trump," Page 129-133]

Since World War II, the United States has had a military second to none. Since the Cold War, America has committed to having overwhelming military primacy. The idea, as George W. Bush declared in 2002, that America must possess “strengths beyond challenge” has featured in every major U.S. strategy document for a quarter century; it has also been reflected in concrete terms.6

From the early 1990s, for example, the United States consistently accounted for around 35 to 45 percent of world defense spending and maintained peerless global power-projection capabilities.7 Perhaps more important, U.S. primacy was also unrivaled in key overseas strategic regions—Europe, East Asia, the Middle East. From thrashing Saddam Hussein’s million-man Iraqi military during Operation Desert Storm, to deploying—with impunity—two carrier strike groups off Taiwan during the China-Taiwan crisis of 1995– 96, Washington has been able to project military power superior to anything a regional rival could employ even on its own geopolitical doorstep.

This military dominance has constituted the hard-power backbone of an ambitious global strategy. After the Cold War, U.S. policymakers committed to averting a return to the unstable multipolarity of earlier eras, and to perpetuating the more favorable unipolar order. They committed to building on the successes of the postwar era by further advancing liberal political values and an open international economy, and to suppressing international scourges such as rogue states, nuclear proliferation, and catastrophic terrorism. And because they recognized that military force remained the ultima ratio regum, they understood the centrality of military preponderance.

Washington would need the military power necessary to underwrite worldwide alliance commitments. It would have to preserve substantial overmatch versus any potential great-power rival. It must be able to answer the sharpest challenges to the international system, such as Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 or jihadist extremism after 9/11. Finally, because prevailing global norms generally reflect hard-power realities, America would need the superiority to assure that its own values remained ascendant. It was impolitic to say that U.S. strategy and the international order required “strengths beyond challenge,” but it was not at all inaccurate.

American primacy, moreover, was eminently affordable. At the height of the Cold War, the United States spent over 12 percent of GDP on defense. Since the mid-1990s, the number has usually been between 3 and 4 percent.8 In a historically favorable international environment, Washington could enjoy primacy—and its geopolitical fruits—on the cheap.

Yet U.S. strategy also heeded, at least until recently, the fact that there was a limit to how cheaply that primacy could be had. The American military did shrink significantly during the 1990s, but U.S. officials understood that if Washington cut back too far, its primacy would erode to a point where it ceased to deliver its geopolitical benefits. Alliances would lose credibility; the stability of key regions would be eroded; rivals would be emboldened; international crises would go unaddressed. American primacy was thus like a reasonably priced insurance policy. It required nontrivial expenditures, but protected against far costlier outcomes.9 Washington paid its insurance premiums for two decades after the Cold War. But more recently American primacy and strategic solvency have been imperiled.

THE DARKENING HORIZON For most of the post–Cold War era, the international system was— by historical standards—remarkably benign. Dangers existed, and as the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, demonstrated, they could manifest with horrific effect. But for two decades after the Soviet collapse, the world was characterized by remarkably low levels of great-power competition, high levels of security in key theaters such as Europe and East Asia, and the comparative weakness of those “rogue” actors—Iran, Iraq, North Korea, al-Qaeda—who most aggressively challenged American power. During the 1990s, some observers even spoke of a “strategic pause,” the idea being that the end of the Cold War had afforded the United States a respite from normal levels of geopolitical danger and competition. Now, however, the strategic horizon is darkening, due to four factors.

First, great-power military competition is back. The world’s two leading authoritarian powers—China and Russia—are seeking regional hegemony, contesting global norms such as nonaggression and freedom of navigation, and developing the military punch to underwrite these ambitions. Notwithstanding severe economic and demographic problems, Russia has conducted a major military modernization emphasizing nuclear weapons, high-end conventional capabilities, and rapid-deployment and special operations forces— and utilized many of these capabilities in conflicts in Ukraine and Syria.10 China, meanwhile, has carried out a buildup of historic proportions, with constant-dollar defense outlays rising from US$26 billion in 1995 to US$226 billion in 2016.11 Ominously, these expenditures have funded development of power-projection and antiaccess/area denial (A2/AD) tools necessary to threaten China’s neighbors and complicate U.S. intervention on their behalf. Washington has grown accustomed to having a generational military lead; Russian and Chinese modernization efforts are now creating a far more competitive environment.

### Turns their 2nd advantage completely

## Case –

### Framing

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### Adv 3 –

Terminally nonuq, this can happen in the squo, doesn’t prove private appropriation bad, just putting stuff into space, meaning it goes outside of the topic

Private companies can easily predict this