# 1NC –

## Off 1 -

#### Interpretation – The affirmative can only garner offense from the appropriation of outer space by private entities being unjust.

#### Violation – They have extra offense from -

#### Standards:

#### 1] Limits – Only our interp accurately sets the upper limit to the topic. The CI will let the aff garner offense from anything as long as they remotely mention the res at some point. 0% chance the neg can prep for all possible offense relating to space possible and forces random LARP generics, killing fairness.

#### 2] Strat-Skew – Open ended interpretations that allow public companies to appropriate literally anything in space leads to infinite 1ACs. Force the negative to allows fall back onto generics that can never have the potential to engage with affirmative on a content level. Aff gets everything while the neg is left with breadcrumbs. Kills fairness since the neg is always on the backfoot and no edu as we read backfile generics and try to outtech

#### Voters -

#### 1] Education – 2-month time limit on the topic means every round is valuable. Specific education about the direct question the resolution asks is the only take away we get from this event. Precision in what they aff can read forces concise topic research in a limited area that allows us to deeply explore every area of the topic.

#### 2] Fairness – Fairness controls engagement with the 1AC and what we are actually able to do in the round. If the game stops becoming fair we have no reason to play in the first place. If every round was 80/20 skewed towards the aff then no one would ever be able to play the game. Fairness is key to clash and is an internal link into any of their offense

#### Paradigms -

#### Extra T is drop the debater – We indict your ability to read and garner offense from the affirmative in the first place. The more the aff drops offense to meet the shell the less they solve and you can vote on presumption.

#### Competing interps over reasonability – Reasonability is always arbitrary and can never set a Brightline on what is reasonable and what isn’t. Extra T is a question of models not specific affirmatives or rounds.

#### No RVIs on Extra T –

#### 1] Extra T is a gateway issue for the negative towards the affirmative. Affirmative is always proactive towards topicality while the neg is forced to always be reactive towards the affirmative. The ground is skewed because we always have to hyper tailor T args to the affirmative while the aff can infinitely prep out the 6 T shells on the Topic

#### 2] Illogical – You don’t get to win for following the rules. That’s like me getting to win because I didn’t read 8 condo positions

#### 3] Deterrence – Winning you are topical isn’t justification for an aff ballot. Deters debaters from calling out untopical affs against techier opponents because they will always lose on the flow even if they are true. Shouldn’t actively punish for trying to meet the rules of the game.

#### Extra T outweighs 1AR theory –

#### 1] Extra T is a forced reaction to untopical affs, even if we did something wrong, you drew first blood. Any abuse from the negative is predicated by abuse from the affirmative.

## Off 2 –

#### Chinese space industrial base is set to surpass the US

Patel 21 [(Neel, space reporter for MIT Technology Review, and I also write The Airlock newsletter, your number one source for everything happening off this planet. Before joining, he worked as a freelance science and technology journalist, contributing stories to Popular Science, The Daily Beast, Slate, Wired, the Verge, and elsewhere. Prior to that, he was an associate editor for Inverse, where I grew and led the website’s space coverage.) “China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US” MIT Technology Review, 1/21/2021. https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/] BC

How did China get here—and why?

Until recently, China’s space activity has been overwhelmingly dominated by two state-owned enterprises: the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation Limited (CASIC) and the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). A few private space firms have been allowed to operate in the country for a while: for example, there’s the China Great Wall Industry Corporation Limited (in reality a subsidiary of CASC), which has provided commercial launches since it was established in 1980. But for the most part, China’s commercial space industry has been nonexistent. Satellites were expensive to build and launch, and they were too heavy and large for anything but the biggest rockets to actually deliver to orbit. The costs involved were too much for anything but national budgets to handle.

That all changed this past decade as the costs of making satellites and launching rockets plunged. In 2014, a year after Xi Jinping took over as the new leader of China, the Chinese government decided to treat civil space development as a key area of innovation, as it had already begun doing with AI and solar power. It issued a policy directive called Document 60 that year to enable large private investment in companies interested in participating in the space industry.

“Xi’s goal was that if China has to become a critical player in technology, including in civil space and aerospace, it was critical to develop a space ecosystem that includes the private sector,” says Namrata Goswami, a geopolitics expert based in Montgomery, Alabama, who’s been studying China’s space program for many years. “He was taking a cue from the American private sector to encourage innovation from a talent pool that extended beyond state-funded organizations.”

As a result, there are now 78 commercial space companies operating in China, according to a 2019 report by the Institute for Defense Analyses. More than half have been founded since 2014, and the vast majority focus on satellite manufacturing and launch services.

For example, Galactic Energy, founded in February 2018, is building its Ceres rocket to offer rapid launch service for single payloads, while its Pallas rocket is being built to deploy entire constellations. Rival company i-Space, formed in 2016, became the first commercial Chinese company to make it to space with its Hyperbola-1 in July 2019. It wants to pursue reusable first-stage boosters that can land vertically, like those from SpaceX. So does LinkSpace (founded in 2014), although it also hopes to use rockets to deliver packages from one terrestrial location to another.

Spacety, founded in 2016, wants to turn around customer orders to build and launch its small satellites in just six months. In December it launched a miniaturized version of a satellite that uses 2D radar images to build 3D reconstructions of terrestrial landscapes. Weeks later, it released the first images taken by the satellite, Hisea-1, featuring three-meter resolution. Spacety wants to launch a constellation of these satellites to offer high-quality imaging at low cost.

To a large extent, China is following the same blueprint drawn up by the US: using government contracts and subsidies to give these companies a foot up. US firms like SpaceX benefited greatly from NASA contracts that paid out millions to build and test rockets and space vehicles for delivering cargo to the International Space Station. With that experience under its belt, SpaceX was able to attract more customers with greater confidence.

Venture capital is another tried-and-true route. The IDA report estimates that VC funding for Chinese space companies was up to $516 million in 2018—far shy of the $2.2 billion American companies raised, but nothing to scoff at for an industry that really only began seven years ago. At least 42 companies had no known government funding.

And much of the government support these companies do receive doesn’t have a federal origin, but a provincial one. “[These companies] are drawing high-tech development to these local communities,” says Hines. “And in return, they’re given more autonomy by the local government.” While most have headquarters in Beijing, many keep facilities in Shenzhen, Chongqing, and other areas that might draw talent from local universities.

There’s also one advantage specific to China: manufacturing. “What is the best country to trust for manufacturing needs?” asks James Zheng, the CEO of Spacety’s Luxembourg headquarters. “It’s China. It’s the manufacturing center of the world.” Zheng believes the country is in a better position than any other to take advantage of the space industry’s new need for mass production of satellites and rockets alike.

#### A strong space industrial base makes government sponsored operations in space economically feasible

Patel 21 [(Neel, space reporter for MIT Technology Review, and I also write The Airlock newsletter, your number one source for everything happening off this planet. Before joining, he worked as a freelance science and technology journalist, contributing stories to Popular Science, The Daily Beast, Slate, Wired, the Verge, and elsewhere. Prior to that, he was an associate editor for Inverse, where I grew and led the website’s space coverage.) “China’s surging private space industry is out to challenge the US” MIT Technology Review, 1/21/2021. https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/01/21/1016513/china-private-commercial-space-industry-dominance/] BC

China’s space program might have been slowed by the pandemic in 2020, but it certainly didn’t stop. The year’s highlights included sending a rover to Mars, bringing moon rocks back to Earth, and testing out the next-generation crewed vehicle that should take taikonauts into orbit—and possibly to the moon—one day.

But there were a few achievements the rest of the world might not have noticed. One was the November 7 launch of Ceres-1, a new type of rocket that, at just 62 feet in height, is capable of taking 770 pounds of payload into low Earth orbit. The launch sent the Tianqi 11 communications satellite into space.

At first glance, the Ceres-1 launch might seem unremarkable. Ceres-1, however, wasn’t built and launched by China’s national program. It was a commercial rocket—only the second from a Chinese company ever to go into space. And the launch happened less than three years after the company was founded. The achievement is a milestone for China’s fledgling—but rapidly growing—private space industry, an increasingly critical part of the country’s quest to dethrone the US as the world’s preeminent space power.

The rivalry between the US and China, whose space program has surged over the last two decades, is what most people mean when they refer to the 21st-century's space race. China is set to build a new space station later this year and will likely attempt to send its taikonauts to the moon before the decade ends. But these big-picture projects represent just one aspect of the country’s space ambitions. Increasingly, the focus is now on the commercial space industry as well. The nation's growing private space business is less focused on bringing prestige and glory to the nation and more concerned with reducing the cost of spaceflight, increasing its international influence—and making money.

“The state is really great at large, ambitious projects like going to the moon or developing a large reconnaissance satellite,” says Lincoln Hines, a Cornell University researcher who focuses on Chinese foreign policy. “But it’s not responsive to meeting market needs”—one big way to encourage rapid technological growth and innovation. “I think the government thinks its commercial space sector can be complementary to the state,” he says.

What are the market needs that Hines is referring to? Satellites, and rockets that can launch them into orbit. The space industry is undergoing a renaissance thanks to two big trends spurred by the commercial industry: we can make satellites for less money by making them smaller and using off-the-shelf hardware; and we can also make rockets for less money, by using less costly materials or reusing boosters after they’ve already flown (which SpaceX pioneered with its Falcon 9). These trends mean it is now cheaper to send stuff into space, and the services and data that satellites can offer have come down in price accordingly.

China has seen an opportunity. A 2017 report by Bank of America Merrill Lynch estimates that the space industry could be worth up to $2.7 trillion by 2030. Setting foot on the moon and establishing a lunar colony might be a statement of national power, but securing a share of such a highly lucrative business is perhaps even more important to the country’s future.

“In the future, there will be tens of thousands of satellites waiting to launch, which is a major opportunity for Galactic Energy” says Wu Yue, a company spokesperson.

The problem is, China has to make up decades’ worth of ground lost to the West.

#### China fills in the U.S and promotes a stable world worder – solves regional security, nuclear proliferation, climate change and sustainable development

Chen and Zhang 20 Dr. Chen Zhimin is a professor of international relations at the School of International Relations and Public Affairs at Fudan University based in Shanghai, China. He is a Changjiang Scholar and a Jean Monnet Chair of European foreign policy. He is president of International Politics Committee of the Chinese High Education Association. His research interests include international relations theory, diplomacy studies, Chinese foreign policy and EU studies. Apart from his publications in China, he also published in Journal of Common Market Studies, Asia Europe Journal and Journal of Contemporary China, etc. Professor Chen received all his degrees from Fudan University. He was a visiting fellow at Harvard University (1996-1997), also visiting scholar at Queen’s University, University of Durham, Lund University, Sciences Po. and Keio University. He was made a Chevalier dans L’Ordre des Palmes Academiques by the French Government in 2006. From 2018, he served as a member of Steering Committee of the Paris Peace Forum. Zhimin Chen & Xueying Zhang (2020) Chinese conception of the world order in a turbulent Trump era, The Pacific Review, 33:3-4, 438-468, DOI: 10.1080/09512748.2020.1728574 Chinese conception of the world order in a turbulent Trump era Zhimin Chen &Xueying Zhang Pages 438-468 | Published online: 26 Feb 2020 Download citation <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2020.1728574> <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09512748.2020.1728574?journalCode=rpre20> //avery

There is a more clearly articulated official conception of the world/international order, in the notion of ‘a Community of Shared Future for Mankind’: a vision based on sovereign states and the multi-polarizing balance of power, but supportive of necessary multilateral and bilateral mechanisms to promote the level of cooperation required in a globalized world. It is not an order to replace the existing one, but an improvement of the current order. In a major speech by President Xi Jinping at the UN office in Geneva on 18 January 2017, he presented five aspects of such a future world: countries stay committed to building a world of lasting peace THE PACIFIC REVIEW 21 through dialogue and consultation; build a world of common security for all through joint efforts; build a world of common prosperity through winwin cooperation; build an open and inclusive world through exchanges and mutual learning; and make the world clean and beautiful by pursuing green and low-carbon development (Xi, 2017b). Zhang Wenmu commented that, through ‘a Community of Shared Future for Mankind’, China presents a ‘China solution’ for global governance which meets the needs of humankind by embracing ancient oriental wisdoms. (Zhang, 2017, p. 24) Gao Cheng from CASS emphasizes the idea of ‘contributing together and benefiting together’ within ‘a Community of Shared Future for Mankind’, allowing China’s development model to serve as a template and inspiration to countries encountering similar development challenges, in order to help them achieve long-term political stability and prosperity (Gao, 2016, p. 104). Overall, Chinese scholars are cautiously optimistic that this is a future world order to be promoted. First of all, Chinese in general believe that US dominance in the world is not sustainable. A recent survey conducted in China showed that a majority of Chinese citizens (57.7%) who participated in the survey believed that China will eventually surpass the US in terms of overall development (Huazhong keji daxue guojia chuanbo zhanlue yanjiuyuan (Huazhong University of Science & Technology National Communication Strategy Institute), 2019). A future China might not be a new dominating power, but the US will surely lose its dominating position (Zhang, 2019). Therefore, any hegemonic world order will not be viable in the future. Secondly, a globalized world demands cooperation among states and other global actors. Even if globalization has its many flaws, it remains one of the mega-trends in the world. Globalization is already an ‘objective reality of the contemporary world’ and could not ‘be altered by the subjective will of some people’ (Qin, 2017). The mounting number of global issues has also enlarged the wide gap between the necessity of global governance and current global governance capacity, creating a fundamental problem which requires the adjustment of the international order (Fu & Fu, 2017). Thirdly, in the wider global South, and even in most Western countries, China would still find many like-minded partners in terms of developing economic partnerships, and governance partnerships to address large-scale regional and global challenges, such as regional security, nuclear proliferation, climate change and sustainable development,. Countries in the European Union are mostly NATO allies and key supporters of the past USled liberal international order. While European states share some concerns of the Trump administration regarding policy towards China, they are also bewildered by rising US unilateralism and are willing to work with China on many key bilateral and global agendas. Chinese observers are following the 22 Z. CHEN AND X. ZHANG EU’s new foreign direct investment review mechanism, which has a fairly explicit aim to restrict Chinese direct investment in EU countries (Zhang, 2019) They are also paying close attention to the EU’s collaboration with the US and Japan in pushing WTO reforms which would restrict state subsidies and curb the role of state-owned companies in national economies (Xu & Zhang, 2019). Nevertheless, these differences do not overshadow the broader shared understanding and support between European states and China on the key aspects of a desired future world order. Both sides champion multilateralism (Michalski & Pan, 2017), while a number of key European countries have joined the China-initiated ‘AIIB’ (Pang, 2015). In a recent Joint Statement from the 21st EU-China Summit, leaders on both sides stressed that the EU and China ‘reaffirm their resolve to work together for peace, prosperity and sustainable development and their commitment to multilateralism, and respect for international law and for fundamental norms governing international relations, with the UN at its core’ (European Council, 2019). This European example showcases that the rest of the world is unlikely to follow the template of the Trump government, or embrace similar forms of narrow nationalism and isolationism in economic and foreign policy. Conclusion After becoming the world’s second largest economy in 2010, China embarked on a road of ‘major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics’, and discussions thereafter about world/international order proliferated. If Zhao Tingyang’s Tianxia view and its variations represent an idealist cosmopolitan imagination of a world order, and moral realism presents a realist China-centric conception, then sitting in the middle is the official vision of ‘a community of shared future’ and the mainstream view centred on a desired cooperative world based on sovereign states. This official and mainstream vision does not aim to overthrow the existing world order by promoting an entirely different one. It is mainly calling for an improvement of the current order. To achieve this, Chinese observers share a general consensus that the world needs to preserve the UN and many aspects of the liberal order including open trade, climate governance and sustainable development. Chinese observers have strong reservations in relation to the hegemonic side of the liberal international order, whether in the form of unilateral US leadership or collective Western leadership. They also have a problem with the heavy-handed promotion of liberal political values and norms, above respect for the principle of sovereignty. Therefore, the mainstream view in China demands some reforms of the existing arrangements, to increase the representativeness of developing countries in the current major multilateral institutions, making them compatible with an increasingly THE PACIFIC REVIEW 23 post-hegemonic new power balance reality. Chinese scholars also call for reforms to allow developing countries to better participate in multilateral rule-making processes, so that these rules and norms fall more closely in line with their interests and aspirations. They also see an additional need to further enhance capacity to conduct effective global governance, and support China as a new supplier of material and ideational resources. As Qin Yaqing observed, such a loosely-organized but multilateral order based on sovereignty may be less efficient, yet it is a relatively democratic and inclusive order, and it might be a practical order for the 21st century (Qin, 2014, p. 15). This Chinese view of a desired world order encounters a turbulent world in the era of the Trump administration. Within countries, even the developed world is starting to feel the governance challenges associated with the rise of anti-establishment populism and anti-globalization nationalism. Among the countries, an open trading system, which has been the foundation for the globalization process, is under attack from countries that helped to build it in the first place. The problem of the global leadership deficit is exacerbated by the Trump administration, while the problem of inadequate leadership and poor decision-making in the past, notably the disastrous intervention in Libya, has not been mitigated. Nevertheless, there is still a sense of a cautious optimism among Chinese observers over the future world order; although some are still deeply worried at the unprecedented level of trade and high-tech warfare between China and the US, and harbor concerns about a decoupling of the strong bilateral economic relationship which served a great deal to aid China’s rapid modernization over the past four decades. As China itself becomes a systemically important player in the global system, any instability between China and the leading Western state could also create destabilizing effects in Asia and beyond. As the US’ growing unilateralism under Trump has alienated many countries, there is a perceived wider common interest in the world working together to sustain the key elements of the existing world order, through mutual commitment and implementing necessary reforms. With or without the US, countries are striving to move forward the Paris agreement and sustain the Iranian nuclear deal. These cases demonstrate that, if others can work together, the US is not as indispensable as it was in the past. Having said that, to make this task easier, China and the US must find a way to forge a new stable relationship between them. Without that, the future world order will be plagued by an intensifying US-China rivalry.

## Case –

#### Aff was new, I have screenshots to back it up. Not a voting issue but grant me leniency in 2n responses if the 1ar extends some under contextualized/explained or hidden card warrant.

#### Presume neg – it’s the affs job to prove a desirable change from the squo. statements are false till proven true that’s why we don’t believe conspiracy theories

#### Reject framing arguments that parameterize content – debate should be an open forum to attack ideas from different directions – anything else brackets out certain modes of knowledge production which their ev would obviously disagree w/.

#### ROB is to vote for the better debater. Only evaluating the consequences of the plan allows us to determine the practical impacts of politics and preserves the predictability that fosters engagement. Rigorous contestation and third and fourth-line testing are key to generate the self-reflexivity that creates ethical subjects.0020

#### Prefer and vote neg on presumption

#### 1. Competition- The competitive nature of debate wrecks the interactive nature of debate – the judge must decide between two competing speech acts and the debaters are trying to beat each other – this is the wrong forum for interaction

#### 2. Spillover- How does educational orientations spill over beyond this space? Empirically denied – judges vote on this shit on this time and nothing ever happens.

#### 3. Prescription- certain interactions are prescripted – eg subjectivity– can’t be reformulated so easily

#### 4. No warrant for a ballot – the competitive nature of debate coopts any ethical value of advocating the aff – winning rounds only makes it look like they just want to win which proves framework and means advocating by losing is more effective.

### Underview –

#### 1] on the util shit, we say China empowering through private entities is good since it restores them to a part above mimicry

#### 2] You are extra T if u use melancholia as an independent reason to vote aff

### Part 2 –

#### This entire thing ignores history before world dominated Europe, where India and China were the dominant superpowers

#### Mimicry is only that insofar as we let it be that

#### Bekus card only decent ev but also ignores history

### Part 3 –

#### 1] Why does this go affirmative

#### 2] No we can reclaim power as Asians