# FW

## Our value for today is autonomy because it is the basis of human experience

### Autonomy is necessary for purposeful human existence

Steckermeiser, 20

Steckermeier, L.C. The Value of Autonomy for the Good Life. An Empirical Investigation of Autonomy and Life Satisfaction in Europe. *Soc Indic Res* **154,**693–723 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11205-020-02565-8

**Autonomy**, understood as the ability to decide how to live one’s own life, **plays a fundamental role in shaping well-being**. Individual perceived autonomy has been shown to be related to the three general components of subjective well-being perceived **autonomy enhances life satisfaction** increases *positive affect* like **happiness and protects from** *negative affect* such as **depressiveness**. Further, **people who** feel they **have autonomy** over their lives **show** a more **positive future time perspective**, **are more trusting** toward others, **and** are **less prone to conflict thinking**. Increasing individual autonomy and its relevance for social change also constitutes a major component of modernization theory. Through the lens of different disciplinary foci, **autonomy has been** viewed as **a key** **element of cultural change and** as **necessary for** individual self-actualization, as a basic psychological need for **mental and physical development** and **functioning**, and **as the freedom to** “**do** and achieve whatever in pursuit of **whatever goals or values [a person] regards as important**”. One of the most comprehensive theoretical models revolving around individuals’ autonomy is provided by the capability approach, as developed by Amartya Sen and further developed by Martha Nussbaum and other scholars. At the heart of the CA lies the idea of focusing on peoples’ capabilities—what they are able to be and do—instead of their achieved functioning—what they in fact are and do. By distinguishing between possible capability and actual functioning, individuals are understood as active agents with different prerequisites and conceptions of what constitutes a good life. The CA considers that two people with the same set of functioning rights have completely different levels of well-being. This means that the individual relevance of an achieved functioning such as financial security or health on individual well-being varies depending on their autonomy—that is, whether they *choose* to achieve or not achieve this functioning. The CA further recognizes that individuals are embedded in socio-economic, environmental, and cultural contexts that can provide (or prohibit) opportunities as well as enable (or constrain) individual choice. These societal conditions range from public provision of health care and education to enforcements of human rights to the social norm to work or the importance of family values.

## Our Criterion for today should be individual rights because

#### Individual rights are a vital part of society

Stanford, No Date

Stanford Law School. “Introduction to the Laws of Timor-Leste Constitutional Rights.” Stanford University Press. https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Timor-Leste-Constitutional-Rights.pdf

**Rights are important for** many reasons. Some of the main reasons include the following: 1. **protection of the individual**, 2. restraint of the government’s power, **and** 3. **development of the country**. This section will explore why rights contribute to each of these purposes. It will also ask you to think about why **rights are important to** you in your **life and** your **future**. **Rights** are important for the protection of the individual, and to **empower the individual to live the kind of life** that she**[they] want**s to. A right can protect a person from the power of the government and other people in the society. Many rights give people protections that let them feel safe in their environment and choose how they want to live. **The right prevents other** actors **from interfering with** an individual’s **human dignity, individual liberty, and well-being**. **Rights** may also **guarantee** an individual **access to** the **resources necessary to live with dignity and liberty**. Rights also have other benefits for the individual. Rights give an individual predictability about what they are allowed to do in their society. **A right tells a person** that **they can** legitimately **expect** to be able **to do something**, **because they** can **rely on the right to protect their** chosen **action**. For example, Santina, a woman in Timor-Leste, can legitimately expect to be able to move from the countryside to Dili, because she has a right to freedom of movement in the Timor-Leste. Also, a right lets a person expect that others will have to treat them in a certain way. In the same example, Santina can expect that none of her neighbors, nor the government, can stop her from moving to Dili, because she has a right to do so. Rights act as a code of conduct for life in society. Rights give a person guarantees about how others will treat them. For example, if a person has a legal right to be free from torture, then he can live knowing that others are not allowed to torture him without facing legal consequences. Rights provide a set of rules that tell individuals how they can expect to behave and be treated in society. The second main purpose of individual rights is to restrain the power of the government. Restraint of government power is important to strengthen a democratic government. Rights set limits on what the government can do, and they require the government provide access and resources to individual citizens. Rights give individual citizens the power to claim that the government must stop doing something to them, or that the government must provide them with something. Writing rights down in the Constitution or in laws gives individuals legitimate expectations of the government’s power over them and what they owe to the government. It is important for rule of law in the country that citizens have an ability to restrain the power the government has over them, and have reliable expectations of what protections and duties they have. The final main reason that rights are important is that they contribute to the development of the society. As mentioned, **rights provide** individuals with **predictability** about how they can behave and how they can be treated. This **predictability is important for economic development**. For example, if the Constitution says that a person has the right to own private property, then the person can buy property and reliably know that their ownership is protected by the Constitution. Without this right, the person could not be certain that the property would not be taken away from him. With this right, the person can more easily invest in his property, develop it, and resell it, feeling secure in his ownership. **Rights provide stable rules** for behavior and expectations, **which contributes to economic development.** Rights also help build a secure environment. Because rights protect human dignity and liberties, they protect her from abuse. Rights guarantee that a person should be physically secure and free to live as she chooses. Thus, **if rights are respected and enforced, they** help **build a society in which people** can **live** **safely and freely.**

#### Prefer additionally because

#### Human rights violations control every Internal link it’s a conflict starter and escalator

#### Prioritizing human rights is the best model for debate. Making an inclusive debate space supports fairness and education. We can’t have debate about lives without first understanding what makes life important

#### Ld is distinctly a philosophical debate and constitutes moral reasoning

#### No matter the outcome unmoral actions are unmoral actions and are to be treated as such as the reduction of any right is a violation of the right entirely

# Offense

## C1: Freedom of Speech is a necessary right

#### Everyone has the right to unrestricted free speech

Niesen 18

Niesen, Peter. “Kant and Rawls on Free Speech in Autocracies: Kantian Review.” Cambridge Core, Cambridge University Press, 21 Nov. 2018, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/kantian-review/article/abs/kant-and-rawls-on-free-speech-in-autocracies/A2277E4E67EE68F2891C764A0D14CCF7.

(1) **Kant introduces free speech as a personal liberty in his introduction to the Doctrine of Righ**t.5 **A person is entitled to ‘communicating** [his or her] **thoughts** to [others], telling or promising them something, **whether** what he says is **true and sincere or untrue and insincere’** (DR, 6: 238). We know that it is a private liberty since Kant introduces it as a natural legal position in the sense that persons can hypothetically draw on it in a ‘state of nature’, i.e. in the absence of all government, as well as under any existing legal order. **Kant** **refers to** this entitlement as part of ‘**innate right**’, i.e. the right to such freedom as can coexist with all others’ freedom under law, because innate right **contains the authorization ‘to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it**’ (DR, 6: 237). **Since others are always free to reject one’s statements or offers, one is free to make those statements and offers**. By ‘what is theirs’, Kant means other people’s innate and – as he goes on to explain in the section on Private Right – acquired rights, kant and rawls on free speech in autocracies VOLUME 23 – 4 KANTIAN REVIEW | 617 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415418000420 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of New England, on 23 Nov 2018 at 09:13:26, subject to the including but not limited to their rightful possessions. In other words, even if a communicative act negatively affects the rights of its hearers, such communications should be free if the harm effected by them results from persuasion.6 The underlying idea is that **acts of communication** freely accepted by the hearer **shift the responsibility for any consequences onto them. Hearers** make use of their capacity to **decide what to believe and what statements** or promises **to accept**, ‘for when someone merely says what he thinks, another always remains free to take it as he pleases’ (DR, 6: 238n.).

#### Forcing people to be objective or tell the truth takes away innate freedom and gives others an enforceable right against you

Varden 10

Varden, Helga. “Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door . . . One More Time: Kant's Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis.” Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 41, no. 4, 2010, pp. 403–421., https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2010.01507.x.

On Kant's theory of right, to interact rightfully is to set and pursue one's own ends in space and time—to exercise “external freedom”—in ways reconcilable with other persons' right to do the same under universal law.[6](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2010.01507.x#en6) Interestingly, **on Kant's account, to lie** as such **is** therefore **not necessarily** to **wrong** another person from the point of view of justice. **Others do not have a right against you that you tell the truth,** because **if they did, they would have an enforceable right to** what is yours (**your information**), and this is **irreconcilable with** your **innate right to freedom**. Hence, in contrast to what Constant thinks, **Kant** actually **rejects** the claim **that a person has a right against another that he tells her the truth**. Indeed, against Constant Kant argues that with regard to merely the question of whether or not a person has a right against another that he tells her the truth, it is irrelevant whether or not telling the truth harms anyone. A person simply does not have a right against another person that he tells her the truth. In the “Introduction to the Doctrine of Right,” Kant expresses the above points by arguing that the innate right to freedom is to be “authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it—such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them, telling or promising them something, whether what he says is true and sincere or untrue and insincere . . . **for it is e**ntirely **up to them** whether they want **to believe** him **or not**” (6: 238). **Words** in general **do not have coercive power on Kant's view**. Although we will return to two exceptions shortly, the general point is that I cannot obtain material objects belonging to others simply by uttering words. Hence, I can say whatever I want, including telling a lie, because simply by uttering my thoughts I cannot deprive others of what is theirs; they can, after all, simply ignore what I am saying. It's a “sticks and stones” point. From the point of view of justice, therefore, you do not wrong another simply by refusing to give him some particular piece of information or simply by lying to him. Moreover, it is totally up to you what information you want to share with another and whether, in fact, what you say is insincere or untruthful. Indeed, as in the case of the murderer at the door, if someone forces you into a situation from which you cannot escape unscathed without giving up your information, this person wrongs you, not the other way around. This is why Kant says in the “Supposed Right to Lie,” as noted above, that the case of the murderer at the door involves one person (the murderer) subjecting another to “an unjust constraint” (8: 426). It is an unjust constraint because the murderer at the door does not have a right to obtain your information and hence threatening you to get it wrongs you.

## C2: Violating individual rights is inherently wrong

#### The affs framing of a ‘crisis’ caused by fake news creates justification for a violent state of exception, cracking down on individual rights- that causes dehumanization

**Agamben 14** (Giorgio – Ph.D., Baruch Spinoza Chair at the European Graduate School, Professor of Aesthetics at the University of Verona, Italy, Professor of Philosophy at Collège International de Philosophie in Paris, and at the University of Macerata in Italy, “From the State of Control to a Praxis of Destituent Power,” transcript of lecture delivered by Agamben in Athens, 11-16-13, published on Roarmag, 2-4-14, http://roarmag.org/2014/02/agamben-destituent-power-democracy/)

A reflection on the destiny of democracy today here in Athens is in some way disturbing, because it obliges us to think the end of democracy in the very place where it was born. As a matter of fact, the hypothesis I would like to suggest is that the prevailing governmental paradigm in Europe today is not only non-democratic, but that it cannot either be considered as political. I will try therefore to show that European society today is no longer a political society; it is something entirely new, for which we lack a proper terminology and we have therefore to invent a new strategy. Let me begin with a concept which seems, starting **from** September **2001, to have replaced any other political notion: security**. As you know, the formula “for **security** reasons” **functions** today in any domain, from everyday life to international conflicts, **as a codeword in order to impose measures** that **the people have no reason to accept.** I will try to show that **the real purpose of** the **security** measures **is not**, as it is currently assumed, **to prevent dangers**, troubles or even catastrophes. I will be consequently obliged to make a short genealogy of the concept of “security”. A Permanent State of Exception One possible way to sketch such a genealogy would be to inscribe its origin and history in the paradigm of the state of exception. In this perspective, we could trace it back to the Roman principle Salus publica suprema lex – public safety is the highest law — and connect it with Roman dictatorship, with the canonistic principle that necessity does not acknowledge any law, with the comités de salut publique during French revolution and finally with article 48 of the Weimar republic, which was the juridical ground for the Nazi regime. Such a genealogy is certainly correct, but I do not think that it could really explain the functioning of the security apparatuses and measures which are familiar to us. **While the state of exception was originally conceived as** a **provisional** measure, which was meant to cope with an immediate danger in order to restore the normal situation, the **security** reasons **constitute today a** permanent technology of government. When in 2003 I published a book in which I tried to show precisely how the state of exception was becoming in Western democracies a normal system of government, I could not imagine that my diagnosis would prove so accurate. The only clear precedent was the Nazi regime. When Hitler took power in February 1933, he immediately proclaimed a decree suspending the articles of the Weimar constitution concerning personal liberties. The decree was never revoked, so that the entire Third Reich can be considered as a state of exception which lasted twelve years. What is happening today is still different. **A formal state of exception is not declared and we see** instead that **vague** non-juridical **notions** — **like** the security reasons — are used **to install a stable** state of **creeping and fictitious emergency without any clearly identifiable danger. An** example of such non-juridical notions which are used as emergency producing factors is the concept of crisis. Besides the juridical meaning of judgment in a trial, two semantic traditions converge in the history of this term which, as is evident for you, comes from the Greek verb crino; a medical and a theological one. In the medical tradition, crisis means the moment in which the doctor has to judge, to decide if the patient will die or survive. The day or the days in which this decision is taken are called crisimoi, the decisive days. In theology, crisis is the Last Judgment pronounced by Christ in the end of times. As you can see, what is essential in both traditions is the connection with a certain moment in time. In the present usage of the term, it is precisely this connection which is abolished. The crisis, the judgement, is split from its temporal index and coincides now with the chronological course of time, so that — not only in economics and politics — but in every aspect of social life, the **crisis coincides with normality and becomes,** in this way, just a tool of government. Consequently, the capability to decide once for all disappears and the continuous decision-making process decides nothing. To state it in paradoxical terms, we could say that, having to face a continuous state of exception, the government tends to take the form of a perpetual coup d’état. By the way, this paradox would be an accurate description of what happens here in Greece as well as in Italy, where to govern means to make a continuous series of small coups d’état. Governing the Effects This is why I think that, in order to understand the peculiar governmentality under which we live, the paradigm of the state of exception is not entirely adequate. I will therefore follow Michel Foucault’s suggestion and investigate the origin of the concept of security in the beginning of modern economy, by François Quesnais and the Physiocrates, whose influence on modern governmentality could not be overestimated. Starting with Westphalia treaty, the great absolutist European states begin to introduce in their political discourse the idea that the sovereign has to take care of its subjects’ security. But Quesnay is the first to establish security (sureté) as the central notion in the theory of government — and this in a very peculiar way. One of the main problems governments had to cope with at the time was the problem of famines. Before Quesnay, the usual methodology was trying to prevent famines through the creation of public granaries and forbidding the exportation of cereals. Both these measures had negative effects on production. Quesnay’s idea was to reverse the process: instead of trying to prevent famines, he decided to let them happen and to be able to govern them once they occurred, liberalizing both internal and foreign exchanges. “To govern” retains here its etymological cybernetic meaning: a good kybernes, a good pilot can’t avoid tempests, but if a tempest occures he must be able to govern his boat, using the force of waves and winds for navigation. This is the meaning of the famous motto **laisser faire**, laissez passer: it is not only the catchword of economic liberalism; it is a paradigm of gove**rnment, which conceives of security (**sureté, in Quesnay’s words) **not as the prevention of troubles, but** rather **as the ability to** govern and **guide them in the right direction** once they take place. We should not neglect the philosophical implications of this reversal. It means an epochal transformation in the very idea of government, which overturns the traditional hierarchical relation between causes and effects. Since governing the causes is difficult and expensive, it is safer and more useful to try to govern the effects. I would suggest that **this theorem** by Quesnay **is the axiom of modern governmentality.** The ancien regime aimed to rule the causes; modernity pretends to control the effects. And this axiom applies to every domain, from economy to ecology, from foreign and military politics to the internal measures of police. We must realize that European governments today gave up any attempt to rule the causes, they only want to govern the effects. And Quesnay’s **theorem makes** also **understandable** a fact which seems otherwise inexplicable: I mean **the** paradoxical **convergence** today **of** an absolutely **liberal paradigm in the economy with** an **unprecedented** and equally absolute paradigm of **state and police control.** If government aims

#### Allowing unchecked human rights violations ensures future violations will occur

Hoffman 4

(Paul Hoffman is the legal director at the ACLU Foundation of Southern California and professor of Law at Oxford. "Human Rights And Terrorism," Human Rights Quarterly, Vol 26 pg. 934-935, Published 11/1/2004, Accessed 7/8/2019, <http://www.shirleymohr.com/JHU/Sample_Articles_JHUP/HRQ_2004_26_4.pdf>|Trip|

History shows that **when societies trade human rights for security**, most often **they get neither**. Instead, minorities and other marginalized groups pay the price through violation of their human rights. Sometimes this trade-off comes in the form of mass murder or genocide, other times in the form of arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, or the suppression of speech or religion. Indeed, millions of lives have been destroyed in the last sixty years when human rights norms have not been observed. **Undermining the strength of** international **human rights** law and institutions **will only facilitate** such human rights **violations in the future** and confound efforts to bring violators to justice. Also, a state’s failure to adhere to fundamental human rights norms makes it more likely that terrorist organizations will find it easier to recruit adherents among the discontented and disenfranchised and among the family and friends of those whose human rights have been violated. Human rights violations in the name of fighting terrorism undermine efforts to respond to the threats of terrorism, making us less rather than more secure in both the short and long run. **Failure to respect** universal human **rights** norms not only **undermines our shared values**, it **undermines** the **international cooperation and public support** so crucial to developing effective antiterrorism efforts. No nation, no matter how powerful, can solve the problem of terrorism on its own. All governments need the voluntary cooperation of every segment of its society to be effective in preventing acts of terrorism. Without adherence to international human rights standards, such cooperation will be more difficult, if not impossible, to obtain at the international, national, and local levels

# Covid

#### Human rights violations causes a never-ending cycle of conflict and violence

Maiese 03. Michelle Maiese is a graduate student of Philosophy at the University of Colorado, Boulder and is a part of the research staff at the Conflict Research Consortium. [“Human Rights Violations” July 2003 Beyond Intractability URL: http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/human-rights-violations]

Many have noted the strong interdependence between human rights violations and intractable conflict. Abuse of human rights often leads to conflict, and conflict typically results in human rights violations. It is not surprising, then, that human rights abuses are often at the center of wars and that protection of human rights is central to conflict resolution.[20] Violations of political and economic rights are the root causes of many crises. When rights to adequate food, housing, employment, and cultural life are denied, and large groups of people are excluded from the society's decision-making processes, there is likely to be great social unrest. Such conditions often give rise to justice conflicts, in which parties demand that their basic needs be met. Indeed, many conflicts are sparked or spread by violations of human rights. For example, massacres or torture may inflame hatred and strengthen an adversary's determination to continue fighting. Violations may also lead to further violence from the other side and can contribute to a conflict's spiraling out of control. On the flip side, armed conflict often leads to the breakdown of infrastructure and civic institutions, which in turn undermines a broad range of rights. When hospitals and schools are closed, rights to adequate health and education are threatened. The collapse of economic infrastructure often results in pollution, food shortages, and overall poverty.[21] These various forms of economic breakdown and oppression violate rights to self-determination and often contribute to further human tragedy in the form of sickness, starvation, and lack of basic shelter. The breakdown of government institutions results in denials of civil rights, including the rights to privacy, fair trial, and freedom of movement. In many cases, the government is increasingly militarized, and police and judicial systems are corrupted. Abductions, arbitrary arrests, detentions without trial, political executions, assassinations, and torture often follow. In cases where extreme violations of human rights have occurred, reconciliation and peacebuilding become much more difficult. Unresolved human rights issues can serve as obstacles to peace negotiations.[22] This is because it is difficult for parties to move toward conflict transformation and forgiveness when memories of severe violence and atrocity are still primary in their minds.

#### Objectivity in journalism is actually what enables distortions of truth under the guise of neutrality---because transparency and honest evidence are not equivalent to “objectivity,” the Aff isn't key to solve disinformation.

Ingram 20

Ingram, Matthew. “What Comes After We Get Rid Of Objectivity In Journalism?.” Columbia Journalism Review. July 02, 2020. Web. February 12, 2022. <https://www.cjr.org/the\_media\_today/what-comes-after-we-get-rid-of-objectivity-in- journalism.php>.

Brent Cunningham is the executive editor of the Food and Environment Reporting Network, and a former deputy editor of the Columbia Journalism Review, where he wrote a piece for the magazine in 2003 entitled “Rethinking Objectivity.” **He said he** **agrees** **with Wesley Lowery that “this embrace of an impossible standard** **has** **produced coverage that fails to convey the truth of a** given **situation**, **given cover** **to** **lazy reporting**, **and** **allowed those who** **would spin and distort the truth** **the ability to do so without being called on it**.” Will Meyer is a writer, editor, and musician from western Massachusetts and editor of a local publication called The Shoestring. He told CJR that **in addition** **to** **moving beyond** **a commitment** **to an old-fashioned** **concept** **like** **objectivity**, “I would argue that [we] need to move beyond an advertising/commercially driven press system. Yes, the **objectivity** **standard** **absolutely** **privileges the white male vantage** point, and I would agree with everyone who says there needs to be more work on diversifying newsrooms.” But Meyer said he also thinks that the practice of journalism has to “think about moving beyond the commercial pressures that created this shoddy standard to begin with.” Here’s more on objectivity and newsrooms: Rigor: Wallace said in his interview that just because he isn’t a fan of traditional objectivity, “this doesn’t mean that I don’t advocate for rigor and meticulousness and the use of some of these methods, such as seeking multiple sources, eye witnesses, careful data analysis, etc.” Fudging numbers and interpreting them based on your own biases are two different things, he said. “Lying, and applying a frame to facts and truth, are also two different things. Neither are objective, but the latter is what we are all doing in all of our efforts at journalism. So we also need more nuance in how we talk about work that isn’t objective. Is it evidence-based? Is it transparent about its methods? Is it transparent about its biases?”

#### Objectivity fails in science reporting---strict adherence to “balanced” reporting actually departs from scientific consensus.

Litvinenko 2000

Litvinenko, Anna. “Politicization Of Science Journalism: How Russian Journalists Covered The Covid-19 Pandemic.” Journalism Studies (2022). January 05, 2000. Web. February 12,

2022. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1461670X.2021.2017791?af=R&journa lCode=rjos20>.

Politicization of science reporting on climate change has mostly been studied with the help of content analysis, with a focus on actors featured by journalists (Chinn, Hart, and Soroka 2020; Feldman, Hart, and Milosevic 2017). Thus, in a longitudinal study of climate change articles in leading US newspapers, Chinn, Hart, and Soroka found that, in the period from 1985 to 2017, political actors were mentioned in articles increasingly often, in contrast to science actors (Chinn, Hart, and Soroka 2020). Maxwell Boykoff and Jules Boykoff have studied **global warming coverage in** **the leading US** **newspapers** **from 1988 to 2002 and found that** **the** **newspapers’ discourse on this topic has diverged from scientific discourse** **(Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). They concluded that this bias was counterintuitively** **a result of** **journalistic** **adherence to** **the value of** **balanced reporting. They also argued that the** **journalistic** **norms of objectivity and balance of reporting should be redefined** **while covering such controversial scientific issues;** **otherwise journalists start to** **play into the hands of science skeptics.** Several studies have tried to address the necessity of revising normative models for science journalism. Nisbet and Fahy (2015) have called for a knowledge-based reporting in politicized science debates. Drawing on Patterson’s concept of “knowledge-based journalism” (2013), they have suggested two major approaches within this frame: (1) journalist as knowledge broker and (2) journalist as dialogue broker. Secko et al. (2013) have developed guidelines for four normative models of science journalism: science literacy, contextual, lay-expertise, and public participation. Probably the most “revolutionary” suggestion comes from Brüggemann, Lörcher, and Walter (2020), who have developed a framework of “post-normal science communication.” They have argued that the main challenge of today’s science reporting is coping with uncertainties and associated political pressures in a constantly changing media environment in a polarizing discourse culture. They have suggested that the “classic” role of science journalist as a neutral observer cannot help in addressing these challenges. According to the authors, the emerging culture of “post-normal” science communication needs journalists who would advocate common values such as ecology, democracy, and scientific and press freedom (Brüggemann, Lörcher, and Walter 2020, 7). This major shift in the understanding of science journalism values reflects the overall reassessment of journalistic norms in the changing media environment, which remain in a constant state of flux (Mellado 2020). The contemporary role conceptions as well as perceived role enactment of science journalists beyond the Western world, so far, have remained understudied.

# Plan

#### 