# FW

## Ethics must be a priori:

#### [A] Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is, since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premise to make a moral theory.

#### [B] Empirical uncertainty –evil demon could deceive us, dreaming, simulation, and inability to know others’ experience make empiricism an unreliable basis for universal ethics.

#### [C] Ethical frameworks must be theoretically legitimate. All frameworks are functionally topicality interpretations of the word ought so they must be theoretically justified:

#### [D] Prefer on resource disparities—a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs and small schools who lack huge evidence files. A debate under my framework can easily be won without any prep since only analytical arguments are required. That controls the internal link to other voters because a pre-req to debating is access to the activity.

## Thus, the standard is respecting a system of inner and outer freedom in regard to the Kantian free speech

### [1] Presume Freedom

#### since it allows each of us to pursue our individual search for ethics, so the AC co-opts every reason your framework is good, but adds an additional side constraint. This also serves as a tiebreaker

### [2] Consequences Fail:

#### [A] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence so we can’t predict or calculate.

#### [B] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through observation of past events.

#### [C] Aggregation fails – suffering is not additive you can’t compare between one migraine and 10 headaches

#### [D] Util justifies any atrocity, i.e., an incredibly miniscule and unlikely chance of extinction would categorically outweigh a 100% chance of genocide –causes cyclical violence and is extremely problematic

#### [E] Only freedom can be the basis for state power – key to moral laws

Rauscher ’17

Rauscher, Frederick, "Kant's Social and Political Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/kant-social-political/>. WWPP

***“There is only one innate right,” says Kant***, “Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law” (6:237). ***Kant rejects any other basis for the state, in particular*** arguing that the ***welfare*** of citizens ***cannot be the basis of state power***. He argues that ***a state cannot*** legitimately ***impose*** any particular conception of ***happiness upon its citizens*** (8:290–91). ***To do so would*** be for the ruler to ***treat citizens as children, assuming*** that ***they are unable to understand what is truly useful or harmful*** to themselves. This claim must be understood in light of Kant’s more general claim that ***moral law cannot be based upon happiness or any other given empirical good***. In the Groundwork Kant contrasts an ethics of autonomy, in which the will (Wille, or practical reason itself) is the basis of its own law, from the ethics of heteronomy, in which something independent of the will, such as happiness, is the basis of moral law (4:440–41). In the Critique of Practical Reason he argues that ***happiness*** (the agreeableness of life when things go in accordance with one’s wishes and desires), ***although universally sought by human beings, is not specific enough to entail any particular universal desires in human beings***. Further, even were there any universal desires among human beings, those desires would, as empirical, be merely contingent and thus unworthy of being the basis of any pure moral law (5:25–26). No particular conception of happiness can be the basis of the pure principle of the state, and the general conception of happiness is too vague to serve as the basis of a law. ***Hence, a “universal principle of right” cannot be based upon happiness but only on something truly universal, such as freedom***. The “universal principle of right” Kant offers is thus “***Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law***” (6:230). This explains why ***happiness is not universal***, but not why ***freedom is*** universal. ***By “freedom” in political philosophy, Kant is*** not ***referring to*** the transcendental conception of freedom usually associated with the problem of the freedom of the will amid determinism in accordance with laws of nature, a solution to which is provided in the Third Antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason. Rather, freedom in political philosophy is defined, as in the claim above about ***the only innate right, as “independence from being constrained by another’s choice”. His concern*** in political philosophy ***is*** not with laws of nature determining a human being’s choice but by ***other human beings determining a human being’s choice, hence the kind of freedom Kant is concerned with in political philosophy is individual freedom of action.*** Still, the universality of political freedom is linked to transcendental freedom. Kant assumes that a human being’s use of choice (at least when it is properly guided by reason) is free in the transcendental sense. Since every human being does enjoy transcendental freedom by virtue of being rational, freedom of choice is a universal human attribute. And this freedom of choice is to be respected and promoted, even when this choice is not exercised in rational or virtuous activity. ***Presumably respecting freedom of choice involves allowing it to be effective in determining actions; this is why Kant calls political freedom, or “independence from being constrained by another’s choice”, the only innate right.*** One might still object that this freedom of choice is incapable of being the basis of a pure principle of right for the same reason that happiness was incapable of being its basis, namely, that it is too vague in itself and that when specified by the particular decisions individuals make with their free choice, it loses its universality. Kant holds that this problem does not arise for freedom, since ***freedom of choice can be understood both in terms of its content*** (the particular decisions individuals make) ***and its form*** (the free, unconstrained nature of choice of any possible particular end) (6:230). ***Freedom is universal in the proper sense because, unlike happiness, it can be understood in such a way that it is susceptible to specification without losing its universality. Right will be based on the form of free choice.***

#### This is why I Negate : In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

# Offense

#### Kant is okay with advocacy that may twist the truth as the recipient of that advocacy has the judgement to determine what to believe. This means either Kant is cool with the Neg

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Niesen, Peter. “Kant and Rawls on Free Speech in Autocracies: Kantian Review.” Cambridge Core, Cambridge University Press, 21 Nov. 2018, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/kantian-review/article/abs/kant-and-rawls-on-free-speech-in-autocracies/A2277E4E67EE68F2891C764A0D14CCF7.

(1) **Kant introduces free speech as a personal liberty in his introduction to the Doctrine of Righ**t.5 **A person is entitled to ‘communicating** [his or her] **thoughts** to [others], telling or promising them something, **whether** what he says is **true and sincere or untrue and insincere’** (DR, 6: 238). We know that it is a private liberty since Kant introduces it as a natural legal position in the sense that persons can hypothetically draw on it in a ‘state of nature’, i.e. in the absence of all government, as well as under any existing legal order. **Kant** **refers to** this entitlement as part of ‘**innate right**’, i.e. the right to such freedom as can coexist with all others’ freedom under law, because innate right **contains the authorization ‘to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it**’ (DR, 6: 237). **Since others are always free to reject one’s statements or offers, one is free to make those statements and offers**. By ‘what is theirs’, Kant means other people’s innate and – as he goes on to explain in the section on Private Right – acquired rights, kant and rawls on free speech in autocracies VOLUME 23 – 4 KANTIAN REVIEW | 617 Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415418000420 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of New England, on 23 Nov 2018 at 09:13:26, subject to the including but not limited to their rightful possessions. In other words, even if a communicative act negatively affects the rights of its hearers, such communications should be free if the harm effected by them results from persuasion.6 The underlying idea is that **acts of communication** freely accepted by the hearer **shift the responsibility for any consequences onto them. Hearers** make use of their capacity to **decide what to believe and what statements** or promises **to accept**, ‘for when someone merely says what he thinks, another always remains free to take it as he pleases’ (DR, 6: 238n.).

#### Kant believes that forcing people to be objective or tell the truth takes away innate freedom and gives others an enforceable right against you

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Varden, Helga. “Kant and Lying to the Murderer at the Door . . . One More Time: Kant's Legal Philosophy and Lies to Murderers and Nazis.” Journal of Social Philosophy, vol. 41, no. 4, 2010, pp. 403–421., https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2010.01507.x.

On Kant's theory of right, to interact rightfully is to set and pursue one's own ends in space and time—to exercise “external freedom”—in ways reconcilable with other persons' right to do the same under universal law.[6](https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9833.2010.01507.x#en6) Interestingly, **on Kant's account, to lie** as such **is** therefore **not necessarily** to **wrong** another person from the point of view of justice. **Others do not have a right against you that you tell the truth,** because **if they did, they would have an enforceable right to** what is yours (**your information**), and this is **irreconcilable with** your **innate right to freedom**. Hence, in contrast to what Constant thinks, **Kant** actually **rejects** the claim **that a person has a right against another that he tells her the truth**. Indeed, against Constant Kant argues that with regard to merely the question of whether or not a person has a right against another that he tells her the truth, it is irrelevant whether or not telling the truth harms anyone. A person simply does not have a right against another person that he tells her the truth. In the “Introduction to the Doctrine of Right,” Kant expresses the above points by arguing that the innate right to freedom is to be “authorized to do to others anything that does not in itself diminish what is theirs, so long as they do not want to accept it—such things as merely communicating his thoughts to them, telling or promising them something, whether what he says is true and sincere or untrue and insincere . . . **for it is e**ntirely **up to them** whether they want **to believe** him **or not**” (6: 238). **Words** in general **do not have coercive power on Kant's view**. Although we will return to two exceptions shortly, the general point is that I cannot obtain material objects belonging to others simply by uttering words. Hence, I can say whatever I want, including telling a lie, because simply by uttering my thoughts I cannot deprive others of what is theirs; they can, after all, simply ignore what I am saying. It's a “sticks and stones” point. From the point of view of justice, therefore, you do not wrong another simply by refusing to give him some particular piece of information or simply by lying to him. Moreover, it is totally up to you what information you want to share with another and whether, in fact, what you say is insincere or untruthful. Indeed, as in the case of the murderer at the door, if someone forces you into a situation from which you cannot escape unscathed without giving up your information, this person wrongs you, not the other way around. This is why Kant says in the “Supposed Right to Lie,” as noted above, that the case of the murderer at the door involves one person (the murderer) subjecting another to “an unjust constraint” (8: 426). It is an unjust constraint because the murderer at the door does not have a right to obtain your information and hence threatening you to get it wrongs you.

#### Subjectivity leads to better reporting; consumers relate to news easier and can often spread empathy.

**Dholaki 18** , Aditi. “OPINION: Subjective Perspectives Are Vital To Effective Journalism.” Technician. May 27, 2018. Web. February 13, 2022.

<https://www.technicianonline.com/opinion/opinion-subjective-perspectives-are-vital- to-effective-journalism/article\_56944d9c-6207-11e8-bd85-7325fe7c6aee.html>.

The bigger issue I want to highlight in all of this is that, firstly, **bias is everywhere, in everything**. There is **no way to escape bias**, or partisanship, or subjectivity of any kind. **News** outlets and **organizations** **who claim** to offer the most **objective news are**, in essence, **lying to their viewers**. What’s worse, the viewers are falling for the rouse. This brings me to the second part of the bigger issue: not only is **subjectivity inherent in journalism**, but it is **in fact necessary** in order **for consumers to understand** and relate to the **news** being fed to them everywhere they go. **Subjectivity leads to empathy**, which is something that is often **lacking in the** race to be the **first** ones to get the **scoop on breaking news**. **Subjectivity leads to understanding, which is vital to being informed** about things going on. **Subjectivity leads to thoroughness**, in the way that all perspectives are accounted for, rather than just one (in the name of objectivity). At the end of the day, **it does a disservice to** the **reporter’s** veracity, **the news** organization’s credibility **and the consumer** experience **when** multiple **subjective perspectives are sidelined in the name of objective reporting**. If **journalism is a vital part of** a well-informed **democracy**, **it is important** to make sure **that** the **journalism** that is being produced **represents** the **democracy** it is helping to inform. **Embracing** the inherent **subjectivity** in journalism **is** a **part of that process** of information