**I negate the resolution, resolved: A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike.**

## Framework

### Our value for today is social order because

#### Social order is intrinsic to humankind.

John Stuart Mill (Philosopher), in ON LIBERTY, James Fitzjames Stephen, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, ANDFRATERNITY, 1967, 223.

"**The social state is** at once so natural, so **necessary,** and so habitual **to man**, that except in some unusual circumstances, or by an effort of voluntary abstraction, **he never conceives himself** otherwise than as **a member of asocial body**; and **this association is riveted** more and more **as mankind are further removed from** the state of savage **independence.**"

### Our Criterion for today should be

#### Rousseau's Theory of the Social Contract and Individuals Obligations to Government

**MJSS 2018**

http://archive.sciendo.com/MJSS/mjss.2018.9.issue-5/mjss-2018-0135/mjss-2018-0135.pdf

Next comes Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778). Rousseau believes that **there is an unbridgeable gap between the natural state and** the **civil society.** The progress of our **humanity** has **moved away from the primal situation** of people. Hence, it is impossible to know with certainty the nature of the primitive natural state of the humanity. In this way, Rousseau criticized those philosophers who, when trying to examine the foundations of the society, resorted to the natural state to describe it. All they did was “finally, everyone of them, constantly dwelling on wants, avidity, oppression, desires and pride, has transferred to the state of nature ideas which were acquired in society; so that, in speaking of the savage they described the social man.” (Rousseau, 1994, p. 24) Thus, Rousseau, wanting to avoid the above trap, began to examine political life with a hypothetical story, trying to reconstruct as much as possible the true history of mankind, while recognizing the impossibility of studying the real natural state which is much different from the political life. At some point in the history of humanity, there was the movement towards culture. According to Rousseau, the progress started with the creation of inequalities among people. In the second part of the discourse on inequality he mentioned that inequalities between people began with the invention of private property. The first person who had enclosed a field, thought to say, “that's mine” and found naive people to believe it, he was the true founder of civil society. (p. 55) Rousseau has also described the transition to civil society. A man in his nature was a polite being within his wilderness. His unique aspirations were his self-preservation through the fulfillment of his basic physical needs. But he always had something that made him different from all other kinds of creatures: that is the possibility of free choice. The possibility of choice was the reason that pulled him out of his natural state and brought him to the political society. In addition, the main factor that has prompted him to set up societies is mainly the will to create a personality of himself in relation to others. This includes the tendency for competition, comparison with others, the creation of hostilities and the craving for strength. All those, according to Rousseau, is a constituent element of what is called an organized society, and de facto means the exodus of a man from the state of nature. Significant is the differentiation of Rousseau from the earlier theorist Hobbes, who considered that man formed societies because he wanted to be relieved of the stress which caused him the fear of death. That was not true, Rousseau stated, simply because the man was unaware of death, since he had been just an animal among the other animals. The knowledge of death and the resulting anxiety or fear of the end came later when he left the natural state.1 From **the moment** that **man formed societie**s, **he wanted to secure** his **happiness and prosperity**. **That was achieved through** the creation of **the Social Contract**, an act of supreme **commitment to the common good of** the whole political **society**. Ensuring social order people created law. The **law** in organized societies **is not the result of the natural state but** the product **of a contract.** While it is **a strong** commitment and supreme **contract**, it **aims to secure the freedom of every citizen**, since each citizen is not bound to someone else but to himself, in the light of the dialectical relationship he has to develop by ensuring the general good of the whole society. Rousseau attempted to avoid the subjugation to a person or to a group of people. In the theory of sovereignty considered all people to the government of the state. Sovereignty should belong to all the people, to the community. The problem of subordination to the community and not to a particular person or group of people was resolved by Rousseau through the concept of the General Will.2 General Will is a central term in the theory of Rousseau’s social contract. In its essence, General Will is neither a sum of individual wills nor an average. It is, according to Rousseau, a moral person, an abstract being, by means of which a state must be legislated. The supreme legislator, the ruler, has a teaching role in Rousseau. He must be able to transform a person to an inseparable part of a bigger community in which his security and life existence will depend. Thus, The General Will transforms the individual will and shapes the individual into an active social being. Conversely, each individual expresses his will to the whole community, disengages himself from his entrenched individuality as he decides to get out of himself and to create a single organic whole, the political body. The political body does not need to give guarantees to the persons who made it, as it does not de facto have an interest contrary to them. A body never damages its own members because it simply hurts itself. On the contrary, members of the body may present deviations from the good. 3 The perfect occasion would be the one in which everyone's will would be in line with the General Will. The analogy resembles the moral rule of Categorical Imperative as formulated by Immanuel Kant. The principle which regulates the will of each citizen should simultaneously be established as a universal law. According to Rousseau, the individual may be inclined towards discrimination and be guided by selfishness (a property which, according to Rousseau, is the source of many problems), but General Will is always right and fair and supports the notion of equality of all in the political community. (Rousseau and Cranston, 1968, pp. 72-74) The collective ethical person, the general will, has the right to manage each person and transform it into a particular unit in the community in the most appropriate way. Even when the state deems it appropriate to take the life of a single unit to preserve the integrity of the whole, the citizen must comply, be killed, because he owes not only his life to the nature but also to the sovereign, to the body of the political community. (p.78) Rousseau argues that within the framework of civil society, individual voices are not meant without their pretense to the General Will. Individual wills acquire political substance only at the time of their union with the General Will with the common interest. Therefore, **in a society**, according to Rousseau, **we should not seek** man **isolated** in the **paths** of his own will **but** diffused and **cohesive with the whole body of society**. Observing Rousseau to unfold a dialectical relationship between General and individual will we find the conceptual description of a peculiar freedom. How is it possible for a man not to lose his freedom and not to dissuade his personal will at the moment he succumbs to the moral person of General Will? The answer to this question lies in the deterministic view of issues. **Obedience to the General Will is** perceived as **an invisible natural law**, **without** which **man could not exist and evolve**. **The** natural **law of friction**, for example, **cannot be considered** as **a restriction of freedom because without** it **one could not stand** or walk. Rousseau confessed that it was not in his direct intentions to philosophize on the concept of freedom, but through the relationship of individual will and General Will illustrated us a very clear interpretation and central meaning of the notion. (pp. 64-65) Beyond that, however, the supreme law of General Will does not interfere with Individual Will. **If a citizen does not want to live in** an organized **society**, **he can return to** his **natural state at any time**. **General Will is binding only in** the **society**. Therefore, **once a man chooses** his political substance **he will be compelled to obey the General Will**, that is, he will be forced to be free.(Sabine, 1951) This compulsion, as it has already been formulated, is not explicitly expressed by anyone, but it is perceived by the man himself as an inalienable deterministic law, as a supreme natural necessity. The perception cultivated in each individual citizen as a result of the educational role of the supreme legislator. In order to understand the process, it is necessary to refer to Rousseau's Emilio, in the excerpt which explains the teacher's appropriate attitude towards the student. **General Will never orders the individual to obey but states it** clear to every single person that it **is** in **the** natural **necessity of the world to make every citizen** to **comply** not by its power but with the strength which holds the members of the political community together. The General Will is the supreme legislator and the element that entails the concept of the Social Contract. In essence, Rousseau's **Social Contract is** nothing more than **a commitment of the citizen to** his own **happiness**, **through the happiness** **of the whole** to which he belongs. **Every** individual **citizen must subdue his or her** individual **will to the** political **body**, always **for the common benefit**. **That is not a** kind of **concession of freedom** or part of it, which Hobbes claimed earlier, **but it is the precondition and safeguard of** the **true** political **freedom**. Once a person has left the state of natural freedom and has decided to live in an organized society, his freedom consists exclusively in complying with the legislative authority in which he participates. Here the momentum of appetite or instinct turns out to be slavery, while obedience to the law is the real freedom of every individual. Instinct is replaced by justice, which gives a necessary morality to persons’ actions as well as the voice of duty which citizens must follow. (pp. 496-499) Therefore, there is a difference with the Hobbes’s Social Contract. While in Hobbes, human rights are transferred to Leviathan, in the theory of Rousseau, **the Social Contract does not eliminate or degrade human rights, but enhance them** and shape them in the way they should be in an organized society. Contrary to the case of Hobbes, the idea of Social Contract in Locke's philosophy is quite closer to the Rousseau's mentality.

#### Social Contract violations control every Internal link it’s a conflict starter and escalator

#### Prioritizing upholding the social contract is the best model for debate. Making an inclusive debate space supports fairness and education. We can’t have debate about lives without first understanding what makes life important

#### Ld is distinctly a philosophical debate and constitutes moral reasoning

#### No matter the outcome unmoral actions are unmoral actions and are to be treated as such

1. **The reduction of the social contract is a violation of it entirely**

## C1: The social contract is always in the best interests of citizens.

#### Government policies reflect the general will of the people.

**Grimsley 83**

Ronald Grimsley (Emeritus Prof., French, U. of Bristol), JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, 1983, 107.

"With the establishment of a law consistent with the requirements of sovereignty and general will Rousseau lays down the essentially democratic or, as he prefers to say, 'republican' basis of his conception of political society. 'So I call "republic" **any State ruled by laws**, whatever may be the form of administration, for **then only public interest governs**, and the res publica is a reality. **All legitimate government is republican**.' **In this respect it is** true to say, as he does in the Encyclopaedia article, that, politically speaking, **'the voice of the people** is the voice of God.'

#### The general will is always just.

**Grimsley 2**

Ronald Grimsley (Emeritus Prof, French, U. Bristol), JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, 1983, 105-8.

"The **general will lifts the individual above selfish** petty **interests and enables him to identify** himself **with the common good**, **which is** also **his own higher good**. It emerges from the social setting, but **it expresses itself through** a **collective action based on** a **rational and moral principle**. In this respect, the **general will retains** an **integrity and firmness** often **lacking** in the **wayward reactions of the individual acting in response to** his own **emotions and passions**. 'The **general will is always constant, incorruptible and pure,' and is always directed up**on worth objectives: **'peace, unity, and equality**.' "It follows that the most **general will is always the most just and** that **the voice of the people** is indeed the voice of God."

#### Governments do not harm their citizens.

**Grimsley 3**

Ronald Grimsley (Emeritus Prof., French, U. Bristol), JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, 1983, 105.

"[According to Rousseau] **'it is impossible that the body should** wish to **harm** all **its members.**' By the sole fact that it is, **the sovereign is always everything it should be.**'

## C2: An unconditional right to strike violates the social contract

**A: Military**

#### Military unions wreck civilian military relations and US hegemony

Caforio 18 [Giuseppe Caforio, Brigadier General with degrees in law, political science, and strategic studies (FYI, the author died ~2015, but this was republished in 2018 in an anthology book), 5-20-2018, "Unionisation of the Military: Representation of the Interests of Military Personnel," SpringerLink, https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-71602-2\_19]/Kankee

THE OPPOSITION TO UNIONIZATION OF THE ARMED FORCES But if a convergence between the military establishment and civil society is in progress and has brought the two areas of life and work much closer together, why is there a unionization issue for the armed forces? Why is there opposition to a collective bargaining system for military personnel? The fundamental reason must be sought in the specificity of the military, which is summarized thusly by David R. Segal: Because of its unique social function—the legitimate management of violence—the military requires of its personnel a degree of commitment that differs from that required by other modern organizations. Military personnel, unlike their civilian counterparts, enter into a contract of unlimited liability with their employer. They cannot unilaterally terminate their employment any time they wish. They are subject to moving and working in any environment where the service decides they are needed. They are required to place the needs of service above the needs of their families, and must frequently endure long periods of separation. They are often called upon to work more than an eight-hour day, for which they receive no additional compensation. And in time of war, they must face prolonged danger, and may even forfeit their lives. Obviously, the man on the firing line is required to make a commitment of a different order from that made by the worker on the assembly line. (D. Segal and Kramer, 1977, p. 28). Bernhard Boene, in a study devoted to a different research topic (Boene, 1990), is both precise and efficacious in differentiating military "work" from civilian work. Military specificity, writes Boene, does not lie only in the area of the risks to which one supposes the combatant is exposed, but also in the limits of application of common rationality in combat and in the situation of habitual transgression of social norms that it entails. This implies a particular type of socialization. Notwithstanding partial analogies, according to Boene, civil emergencies belong to a different reality than military ones do. An officer, in particular, is not an ordinary civil servant: he must respond to a "call," consisting of a particular interest in military things, dedication to the common welfare, acceptance of risking his life, and submission to a series of obligations that are peculiar to the military profession. SOME THEORETICAL POSITIONS ON THE ISSUE Discussing a sample survey, David Segal observes that in the United States, in the absence of a union for military personnel, there is a considerable "misfit" between soldiers' perception of the characteristics of their role and the preferred characteristics, while in an analogous sample of civilian manpower this misfit is much smaller. In examining the attempted remedies, Segal states: "Any change to be achieved through organizational interventions, however, is likely to be incremental, and not to resolve the discrepancy between the characteristics that military personnel would like in their jobs and the characteristics that they perceived their jobs to have" (D. Segal and Kramer, 1977, p. 46). According to Segal, unionization can solve this problem, but it presents two dangers that must be carefully weighed: the first is that it tends to extend its influence also to aspects of management and direction of the military apparatus; the second is that it involves a politicisation of the personnel. Gwyn Harries Jenkins examines the consequences that unionisation would have on the operational efficiency of the armed forces and identifies three fundamental ones: 1. The creation of a dual authority structure: Since there has been a change in the basis of authority and discipline in the military establishment and a shift from authoritarian domination to greater reliance on manipulation, persuasion and group consensus, unionization extends the boundaries of these changes: it brings into armed forces the full effects of the organizational revolution which pervades contemporary society, creating a dual authority structure while modifying the traditional basis of compliance. (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 70) 2. A much greater resemblance of the style of military command to that of civilian management. The new tasks and the introduction of unionization would require commanders to possess skills and orientations more and more like those of civilian managers. 3. An abdication by the officer of his traditional image. Indeed, if the officer "wishes to retain his self-image and ideas of honor, then the introduction of trade unions into the military creates a conflict situation with substantial dysfunctional consequences" (H.Jenkins, 1977, p. 71). Harries Jenkins concludes, however, by affirming that, as a radical criticism of the existing military system, "the unionization of the armed forces can only result in an improvement to an otherwise defective situation" (H. Jenkins, 1977, p. 69). According to William Taylor and Roger Arango (Taylor et al., 1977b), many reasons offered in the United States for or against the unionization of military personnel appear to be rhetorical and not sufficiently investigated. Those who take a negative critical stance, for example, contend that unionization would lead to a breakdown in discipline; threaten the chain of command; and, especially, undermine the military's ability to carry out its assigned mission. Through a concrete field analysis, these authors believe they can shed light on the advantages and disadvantages of this process. Among the advantages are the acquisition of a greater sense of individual security, a valorization of the dignity of individuals, improved social communication, and greater competitiveness with other occupations and professions in recruiting personnel. The real drawbacks would essentially be reduced to two: a risk of divisiveness within units, due to acquired strife between personnel categories; and an increase in personnel costs. Carlo Jean (Jean, 1981) states that in itself, the creation of unions would inevitably produce increased confrontation; without it, the union representatives would have neither prestige nor credibility. He does not believe, however, that the biggest drawback that would derive from it would be that of undermining the internal cohesiveness of the armed forces and their operational capacity. According to this author military leaders would align themselves with the union's demands out of necessity to avoid internal breakup. An unacceptable corporative force would be produced that sooner or later would inevitably oppose it to the political power. The danger that a union of military personnel involves for civil society is, in his opinion, much greater than its negative implications on the efficiency of the military itself. Along the same line is the fear expressed by Sen. Thurmond (reported by David Cortright, cited essay) that unionization might reinforce the military establishment and increase its influence over society at large, decreasing the capacity for political control. This issue had already been treated by Cortright in another essay (Cortright and Thurmond, 1977b), where on the one hand he argued that unionization in the armed forces would help to prevent any form of separateness from civil society while noting on the other that little attention was given to the possibility that unionization substantially strengthens the military's ability to wield influence. Thurmond, again, judges the European experience negatively and asks himself how unionized troops would respond in battle. However, to remain faithful to his position, Thurmond conceives the armed forces as a separate body from civil society, argues that military personnel are not comparable to other labor force categories, and advances the fear that union representation of the interests of military personnel would bring the defence budget to unacceptable levels. Of the countries included in our study, unions for military personnel exist in Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Belgium, and The Netherlands. Unionization is prohibited in England, the United States, Canada, France, Portugal, Turkey, and Greece. Strikes are allowed only in Austria and Sweden. ANALYSIS OF HISTORICAL EXPERIENCES THROUGH THE THOUGHT OF VARIOUS AUTHORS

**B: Police**

#### Police Strikes are used to combat racial progress and attempts to limit police power. Making them legal and easier only make progress much harder.

Andrew Grim 2020 What is the ‘blue flu’ and how has it increased police power? https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2020/07/01/what-is-blue-flu-how-has-it-increased-police-power/

But the result of such protests matter deeply as we consider police reform today. Historically, blue flu strikes have helped expand police power, ultimately limiting the ability of city governments to reform, constrain or conduct oversight over the police. They allow the police to leverage public fear of crime to extract concessions from municipalities. This became clear in Detroit more than 50 years ago. In June 1967, tensions arose between Detroit Mayor Jerome Cavanagh and the Detroit Police Officers Association (DPOA), which represented the city’s 3,300 patrol officers. The two were at odds primarily over police demands for a pay increase. Cavanagh showed no signs of caving to the DPOA’s demands and had, in fact, proposed to cut the police department’s budget. On June 15, the DPOA escalated the dispute with a walkout: 323 officers called in sick. The number grew over the next several days as the blue flu spread, reaching a height of 800 absences on June 17. In tandem with the walkout, the DPOA launched a fearmongering media campaign to win over the public. They took out ads in local newspapers warning Detroit residents, “How does it feel to be held up? Stick around and find out!” This campaign took place at a time of rising urban crime rates and uprisings, and only a month before the 1967 Detroit riot, making it especially potent. The DPOA understood this climate and used it to its advantage. With locals already afraid of crime and displeased at Cavanagh’s failure to rein it in, they would be more likely to demand the return of the police than to demand retribution against officers for an illegal strike. The DPOA’s strategy paid off. The walkout left Detroit Police Commissioner Ray Girardin feeling “practically helpless.” “I couldn’t force them to work,” he later told The Washington Post. Rather than risk public ire by allowing the blue flu to continue, Cavanagh relented. Ultimately, the DPOA got the raises it sought, making Detroit officers the highest paid in the nation. This was far from the end of the fight between Cavanagh and the DPOA. In the ensuing months and years, they continued to tussle over wages, pensions, the budget, the integration of squad cars and the hiring of black officers. The threat of another blue flu loomed over all these disputes, helping the union to win many of them. And Detroit was not an outlier. Throughout the 1960s, ’70s and ’80s, the blue flu was a [ubiquitous and highly effective](https://www.akpress.org/our-enemies-in-blue.html) tactic in Baltimore, Memphis, New Orleans, Chicago, Newark, New York and many other cities. In most cases, as author Kristian Williams writes, “When faced with a walkout or slowdown, the authorities usually decided that the pragmatic need to get the cops back to work trumped the city government’s long term interest in diminishing the rank and file’s power.” But each time a city relented to this pressure, they ceded more and more power to police unions, which would turn to the strategy repeatedly to defend officers’ interests — particularly when it came to efforts to address systemic racism in police policies and practices. In 1970, black residents of Pittsburgh’s North Side neighborhood raised an outcry over the “hostile sadistic treatment” they experienced at the hands of white police officers. They lobbied Mayor Peter F. Flaherty to assign more black officers to their neighborhood. The mayor agreed, transferring several white officers out of the North Side and replacing them with black officers. While residents cheered this decision, white officers and the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP), which represented them, were furious. They slammed the transfer as “discrimination” against whites. About 425 of the Pittsburgh Police Department’s 1,600 police officers called out sick in protest. Notably, black police officers broke with their white colleagues and refused to join the walkout. They praised the transfer as a “long overdue action” and viewed the walkout as a betrayal of officers’ oath to protect the public. Nonetheless, the tactic paid off. After several days, Flaherty caved to the “open revolt” of white officers, agreeing to halt the transfers and instead submit the dispute to binding arbitration between the city and the police union. Black officers, though, continued to speak out against their union’s support of racist practices, and many of them later resigned from the union in protest. Similar scenarios played out in Detroit, Chicago and other cities in the 1960s and ’70s, as white officers continually staged walkouts to preserve the segregated status quo in their departments. These blue flu strikes amounted to an authoritarian power grab by police officers bent on avoiding oversight, rejecting reforms and shoring up their own authority. In the aftermath of the 1967 Detroit walkout, a police commissioner’s aide strongly criticized the police union’s strong-arm tactics, saying “it smacks of a police state.” The clash left one newspaper editor wondering, “Who’s the Boss of the Detroit Police?” But in the “law and order” climate of the late 1960s, such criticism did not resonate enough to stir a groundswell of public opinion against the blue flu. And police unions dismissed critics by arguing that officers had “no alternative” but to engage in walkouts to get city officials to make concessions. Crucially, the very effectiveness of the blue flu may be premised on a myth. While police unions use public fear of crime skyrocketing without police on duty, in many cases, the absence of police did not lead to a rise in crime. In New York City in 1971, [for example](https://untappedcities.com/2020/06/12/the-week-without-police-what-we-can-learn-from-the-1971-police-strike/), 20,000 officers called out sick for five days over a pay dispute without any apparent increase in crime. The most striking aspect of the walkout, as one observer noted, “might be just how unimportant it seemed.” Today, municipalities are under immense pressure from activists who have taken to the streets to protest the police killings of black men and women. Some have already responded by enacting new policies and cutting police budgets. As it continues, more blue flus are likely to follow as officers seek to wrest back control of the public debate on policing and reassert their independence.

**C: Health Workers**

#### Nurse strikes increase the percentage of patient mortality and destroy hospital finances – empirics.

**Masterson 17** [Les Masterson. Managing editor at HCPro. “Nursing strikes can cause harm well beyond labor relations”. 8-15-2017. Healthcare Dive. https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/nursing-strikes-can-cause-harm-well-beyond-labor-relations/447627/.] SJ//VM

When officials at Tufts Medical Center in Boston refused to allow nurses just off of a one-day strike return to their jobs, the footage spread across TV news programs and social media. Boston Mayor Martin Walsh, a former labor leader, spoke in favor of the striking nurses and the hospital found itself in an uncomfortable spotlight. About 1,200 nurses went on a one-day strike after their union, the Massachusetts Nurses Association, and Tufts couldn't come to a new contract agreement after more than a year of negotiations. Tufts, in turn, [locked out the nurses](https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/12k-striking-nurses-barred-from-returning-to-work-at-boston-hospital/447088/) when they attempted to return to work the next day. Officials said the lockout was required because they needed to give at least five-day contracts to 320 temporary nurses brought in to fill the gap. [The nurses are back on the job](https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/07/17/tufts-medical-center-nurses-expected-return-work-monday/fXGBic58UjRv8934CeVgDJ/story.html) now without a new contract, but the strike and subsequent lockout got the public’s attention. Hospital strikes aren't that common — usually, the sides agree to a new contract. Strikes or threatened strikes in recent years have typically involved conflicts over pay, benefits and staff workloads. When strikes do happen, however, they can hurt a hospital’s reputation, finances and patient care. A [study on nurses’ strikes](https://dspace.mit.edu/openaccess-disseminate/1721.1/71824) in New York found that labor actions have a temporary negative effect on a hospital’s patient safety. Study authors Jonathan Gruber and Samuel A. Kleiner found that nurses’ strikes increased in-patient mortality by 18.3% and 30-day readmission by 5.7% for patients admitted during the strike. Patients admitted during a strike got a lower quality of care, they wrote. “We show that this deterioration in outcomes occurs only for those patients admitted during a strike, and not for those admitted to the same hospitals before or after a strike. And we find that these changes in outcomes are not associated with any meaningful change in the composition of, or the treatment intensity for, patients admitted during a strike,” they said. They said a possible reason for the lower quality is fewer major procedures performed during a strike, which could lead partially to diminished outcomes. The study authors found that patients that need the most nursing care are the ones who make out worst during strikes. “We find that patients with particularly nursing-intensive conditions are more susceptible to these strike effects, and that hospitals hiring replacement workers perform no better during these strikes than those that do not hire substitute employees,” they wrote. [Allina Health’s Abbott Northwestern Hospital in Minneapolis](http://www.beckershospitalreview.com/quality/cms-puts-allina-hospital-in-immediate-jeopardy-for-drug-error-during-nurses-strike.html) faced a patient safety issue during a strike last year that resulted in the CMS placing the hospital in “immediate jeopardy” status after a medication error. A replacement nurse administered adrenaline to an asthmatic patient through an IV rather than into the patient’s muscle. The patient, who was in the emergency room (ER), wound up in intensive care for three days because of the error. Allina said the error was not the nurse’s fault, but was the result of a communication problem. The CMS accepted the hospital plan of correction, which included having a nurse observer when needed and retraining ER staff to repeat back verbal orders. Hospitals also take a financial hit during strikes. Even the threat of a one- or two-day nurse strike can cost a hospital millions. Bringing in hundreds or thousands of temporary nurses from across the country is costly for hospitals. They need to advertise the positions, pay for travel and often give bonuses to lure temporary nurses. The most expensive recent nurse strike was when [about 4,800 nurses](https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/4800-striking-nurses-cost-allina-health-104-million/430523/) went on strike at Allina Health in Minnesota two times last year. The two strikes of seven days and 41 days cost the health system $104 million. The hospital also saw a $67.74 million operating loss during the quarter of those strikes. To find temporary replacements, [Allina needed to include enticing offers](https://www.healthcaredive.com/news/allina-to-search-for-1400-nurses-in-face-of-possible-strike/421079/), such as free travel and a $400 bonus to temporary nurses. Even the threat of a strike can cost millions. Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston spent more than $8 million and lost $16 million in revenue preparing for a strike in 2016. The 3,300-nurse union threatened to walk out for a day and much like Tufts Medical Center, Brigham & Women’s said the hospital would lock out nurses for four additional days if nurses took action. At that time, Dr. Ron Walls, executive vice president and chief operating officer at Brigham and Women’s Hospital, said the hospital [spent more than $5 million](https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/blog/health-care/2016/06/brigham-nurses-strike-already-costing-hospital.html) on contracting with the U.S. Nursing Corp. to bring on 700 temporary nurses licensed in Massachusetts. The hospital also planned to cut capacity to 60% during the possible strike and moved hundreds of patients to other hospitals. They also canceled procedures and appointments in preparation of a strike.

framing doesnt matter

deontiligcial impacts

util? impact, kant bad deontology bad

what are ethics

generally from parents- racist parents loolll no objective ethics

personal actions- consequences can be from an objective point of view

categortical imperative shapes how we should feel about consquences

autonomy is being infringed bc of strikes loool ppl die u suck