# FW

## Ethics must be a priori:

#### [A] Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is, since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premise to make a moral theory.

#### [B] Empirical uncertainty –evil demon could deceive us, dreaming, simulation, and inability to know others’ experience make empiricism an unreliable basis for universal ethics.

#### [C] Ethical frameworks must be theoretically legitimate. All frameworks are functionally topicality interpretations of the word ought so they must be theoretically justified:

#### [D] Prefer on resource disparities—a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs and small schools who lack huge evidence files. A debate under my framework can easily be won without any prep since only analytical arguments are required. That controls the internal link to other voters because a pre-req to debating is access to the activity.

## Thus, the standard is respecting a system of inner and outer freedom in regards to the categorical imperative

### [1] Presume Freedom

#### since it allows each of us to pursue our individual search for ethics, so the AC co-opts every reason your framework is good, but adds an additional side constraint. This also serves as a tiebreaker

### [2] Consequences Fail:

#### [A] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence so we can’t predict or calculate.

#### [B] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through observation of past events.

#### [C] Aggregation fails – suffering is not additive you can’t compare between one migraine and 10 headaches

#### [D] Util justifies any atrocity, i.e., an incredibly miniscule and unlikely chance of extinction would categorically outweigh a 100% chance of genocide –causes cyclical violence and is extremely problematic

#### [E] Only freedom can be the basis for state power – key to moral laws

Rauscher ’17

Rauscher, Frederick, "Kant's Social and Political Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/kant-social-political/>. WWPP

***“There is only one innate right,” says Kant***, “Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law” (6:237). ***Kant rejects any other basis for the state, in particular*** arguing that the ***welfare*** of citizens ***cannot be the basis of state power***. He argues that ***a state cannot*** legitimately ***impose*** any particular conception of ***happiness upon its citizens*** (8:290–91). ***To do so would*** be for the ruler to ***treat citizens as children, assuming*** that ***they are unable to understand what is truly useful or harmful*** to themselves. This claim must be understood in light of Kant’s more general claim that ***moral law cannot be based upon happiness or any other given empirical good***. In the Groundwork Kant contrasts an ethics of autonomy, in which the will (Wille, or practical reason itself) is the basis of its own law, from the ethics of heteronomy, in which something independent of the will, such as happiness, is the basis of moral law (4:440–41). In the Critique of Practical Reason he argues that ***happiness*** (the agreeableness of life when things go in accordance with one’s wishes and desires), ***although universally sought by human beings, is not specific enough to entail any particular universal desires in human beings***. Further, even were there any universal desires among human beings, those desires would, as empirical, be merely contingent and thus unworthy of being the basis of any pure moral law (5:25–26). No particular conception of happiness can be the basis of the pure principle of the state, and the general conception of happiness is too vague to serve as the basis of a law. ***Hence, a “universal principle of right” cannot be based upon happiness but only on something truly universal, such as freedom***. The “universal principle of right” Kant offers is thus “***Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law***” (6:230). This explains why ***happiness is not universal***, but not why ***freedom is*** universal. ***By “freedom” in political philosophy, Kant is*** not ***referring to*** the transcendental conception of freedom usually associated with the problem of the freedom of the will amid determinism in accordance with laws of nature, a solution to which is provided in the Third Antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason. Rather, freedom in political philosophy is defined, as in the claim above about ***the only innate right, as “independence from being constrained by another’s choice”. His concern*** in political philosophy ***is*** not with laws of nature determining a human being’s choice but by ***other human beings determining a human being’s choice, hence the kind of freedom Kant is concerned with in political philosophy is individual freedom of action.*** Still, the universality of political freedom is linked to transcendental freedom. Kant assumes that a human being’s use of choice (at least when it is properly guided by reason) is free in the transcendental sense. Since every human being does enjoy transcendental freedom by virtue of being rational, freedom of choice is a universal human attribute. And this freedom of choice is to be respected and promoted, even when this choice is not exercised in rational or virtuous activity. ***Presumably respecting freedom of choice involves allowing it to be effective in determining actions; this is why Kant calls political freedom, or “independence from being constrained by another’s choice”, the only innate right.*** One might still object that this freedom of choice is incapable of being the basis of a pure principle of right for the same reason that happiness was incapable of being its basis, namely, that it is too vague in itself and that when specified by the particular decisions individuals make with their free choice, it loses its universality. Kant holds that this problem does not arise for freedom, since ***freedom of choice can be understood both in terms of its content*** (the particular decisions individuals make) ***and its form*** (the free, unconstrained nature of choice of any possible particular end) (6:230). ***Freedom is universal in the proper sense because, unlike happiness, it can be understood in such a way that it is susceptible to specification without losing its universality. Right will be based on the form of free choice.***

#### This is why I affirm: In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.

# Offense

#### [1] The Kantian idea of the universality principle means that if organizations push an agenda by twisting the truth and exploiting fears, those institutions are immoral

Penn State no date

Penn, State. Ethical Orientations: Categorical Imperative, Penn State Public Media, https://www.pagecentertraining.psu.edu/public-relations-ethics/ethical-decision-making/yet-another-test-page/ethical-orientations-categorical-imperative/.

**The Categorical Imperative**, which **comes from** sixteenth century German philosopher, Immanuel **Kant**, is an ethical orientation that **holds that one’s actions should be undertaken as** if s/he had the power to make them **universally applicable. Thus, to decide if** lying is acceptable, one should ask oneself what would happen if everyone lied? Or from a public relations position, what of **deceiving the media,** not being honest with stakeholders or publics, **using fear appeals to get people to take action, or any** number of **other dubious communication strategies**? For Kant, the answer is easy, **if everyone did it, we could not trust** individuals or **organizations.** Kant further argues that we should treat people as ends (or inherently valuable), and not as means to ends (taking advantage of people for personal gain as a situationalist might). The categorical imperative in not about doing what is easy or what people like; rather, the categorical imperative is about doing what is “right.”

#### [2] News outlets that put out hit pieces to “advocate” use defamation to make others means to the end, this violates the categorical imperative and is inherently immoral

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Varden, Helga. “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech.” Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World, 2010, pp. 39–55., https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8999-1\_4.

It is because people typically cannot deprive them of what is theirs by means of their speech alone that most immoral uses of words, including lies, do not involve private wrongdoing. Instead of tracking immorality in general and lies in particular, private wrongdoing merely tracks the few instances in which speech alone has coercive power. It should therefore not come as a surprise that these instances involve lying and that Kant argues that there are two cases in which the general rule does not protect the liar: first, lying as part of contractual negotiations, and second, defamation. In both cases the lies have coercive power and so constitute private wrongdoing. The reason contractual lies have coercive power is that if I lie when I make a contract with you and you believe me, then my intention is to deprive you non-consensually of something that is yours. For example, assuming that were I honest about what you will receive for your hard-earned money, I strongly suspect you would not contract with me, say, to buy swampland in Florida. Therefore, I lie, since otherwise you would not consent to the exchange. Thus, by lying I nonconsensually deprive you of something that is yours and lying as a part of contractual negotiations is a private wrong (6: 238, 238n). What about defamation, how does it involve coercion? Attempts at **defamation** also **constitute attempts non-consensually to deprive others** of what is theirs, namely their good reputations as determined by their actions. Corresponding to a person’s innate right to freedom, Kant argues, is that person’s duty to “Be an honourable human being… Rightful honour… consists in asserting one’s worth as a human being in relation to others” (6: 236). To defend one’s rightful honor is to defend one’s right to be recognized by others solely by the deeds one has performed. Indeed, one’s reputation, Kant explains, “is an innate external belonging” (6: 295); it can originally belong only to the person whose deeds are in question. **If others spread falsehoods** about the life she has lived, then **she has the right and duty to challenge their lies** publicly, for **her reputation belongs only to her** and to no one else. A person’s **reputation is not a means subject to other people’s choice**; it is not a means others have a right to manipulate in order to pursue their own ends. **To permit this, Kant argues, would be to permit others to use your person as their own means, or to “make yourself a mere means for others”** rather than also being “at the same time an end for them” (6: 236).

#### [3] Journalists using the categorical imperative will curb disinformation and rebuild public trust in media, This turns the Neg.

Whitson 17

WHITSON, RYAN. “Reading Your Own Front Page: How Kant Can Save Journalism in America.” Media Ethics , vol. 28, no. 2, 2017.

Recently I encouraged a friend to read *Media Ethics* magazine*,* to which she replied, “There is no such thing!” Instantly I wondered: Did she mean this publication did not exist or there is no such thing as media ethics? For this person it was the latter, and I suspect she is not alone in her view. Most Americans today, and for good reasons, have very little trust in journalism to provide truthful, unbiased reporting of facts.1 The loss of trust in news media in America has led some to announce that “journalism is dead.” But I strongly suggest that, for the sake of our republic, we reject this idea as unacceptable and not the “new normal.” Good journalism, which provides truth and accountability to leading institutions and personalities, still matters, maybe today more than ever. Simple autopsies of now-defunct national news outlets show their usual cause of death was having forsaken their role of providing checks and balances to power, politics, and harmful ideas. In exchange, journalists seem to have become the editorial arm to the powerful and often have a political agenda. The result has been the threat and loss of both *individual freedoms* and *national values*. All this is seen today in what has been labeled “Fake News”—news that is published with little or no fact-checking (or outright deceit) in order to grab the first headline or push ahead the desired narrative. The insanity of this journalistic practice of *creating* stories instead of *reporting* them has resulted in *all* reported news now being received with eyes of skepticism; nobody knows what to believe any more and people are frustrated.2 But the practice of Fake News gets even worse. It has become the go-to defense for any lack of personal accountability**. If anyone, anytime, publishes anything unfavorable to a personality or political agenda it is simply labeled “Fake News”** and, at least initially, the scandal has been avoided. **Due to this dishonest and slanted reporting people naturally assume all of what they hear and see is dishonest and slanted**—and the American people are **no longer an informed electorate.** I suggest we blow the dust off Immanuel Kant’s 1785 book Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (sounds exciting, right?) and we reconsider his ethical theory, the “Categorical Imperative,” as one way to address this problem. **Kant**’s way of thinking about morality basically **says**, “**We should not do anything unless** we can honestly say **everyone else should also be able to do the same thing**.” In other words, live your life in such a way that all you do, say, and think becomes tomorrow’s front page news. If you’re thinking this sounds a lot like the Golden Rule, you’re correct. Most people are taught to treat others as they would like to be treated.3 The bottom line is this: Every journalist wants their work and words to be taken seriously, but this is rarely the case anymore. **If a reporter, editor, or publisher embraced the Categorical Imperative, it just might curb** any tendencies toward their **dishonesty**; after all, having a voice that influences culture because there is an audience listening is more important than precisely what they use their voice (or image or reputation) to say. News organizations and journalists should, because it is the right thing to do and good for our nation, start to hold themselves accountable for their work if for no other reason than because others would not do to them what they do to others. **The Categorical Imperative can resurrect dead media and is a solution any journalist can embrace, regardless of medium, worldview, politics, race or religion**. Of course, I have little faith CNN, The New York Times, or any other source or “outlet” of news will make this adjustment, so it becomes the task of the American people to demand the journalism they deserve. The American people should stop consuming biased news sources that are more interested in furthering a political agenda than in doing their job. The American people should pay more attention to the responsibilities of corporate sponsors who support dishonest media and stop being patrons of these companies. Finally, since it is much easier to have new babies than resurrect the dead, so the American people should demand and support new media efforts that make it their goal to return to values-based journalism that is working for the good of the people.4 **When** (if?) **this happens,** I believe the results will be: **Journalism will be in the service of justice**, civility, investigation, asking questions, and inspiring those in power and vote to do the right thing and not in the service of political initiatives, polls, personalities, or audience selection. Journalism **will set aside presuppositions and anyone’s goal to manipulate their consumers and** will report truthful accounts in a fair and accurate manner what Americans have a right to hear. **Journalism will stop perpetuating lies and serve as a lie detector for the citizenry**. We need journalists who are curious and skeptical.

#### [4] Advocacy in the news is a violation of the categorical imperative as it uses people as a means to an end aswell as breaking the univeralisty principle

McGowan 10

McGowan, Sean. “Https://Dc.cod.edu/Cgi/Viewcontent.cgi?Referer=Https://Www.google.com/&amp;Httpsredir=1&amp;Article=1129&amp;Context=Essai.” ESSAI, vol. 7, no. 34, 1 Apr. 2010, pp. 109–112.

This example brings me to the next point, **Kant’s** “means to an ends” **theory** (a.k.a. practical imperative) and how it **relates to media ethics.** This theory, developed by philosopher Emmanuel **Kant, explains** that **no person can be used as a means to someone’s end** because that person is an end in himself or herself (Thiroux and Krasemann 59). In other words, no human being that can think and reason towards a happy life, can be rightfully used solely to another’s benefit. T 1 McGowan: Ethics and Its Relation to the Media Published by DigitalCommons@C.O.D., 2009 110 The issue of **the Clinton affair applies** to this theory because **journalists used** the **controversy as a means to bring out the dirt** on President Clinton. From my perspective, **this** type of reporting **is immoral** because I do not see this as fulfilling the job of a journalist. **Journalism should be a means to share the latest news** to the general public **in an unbiased manner**, thus letting the public decide whether the story deserves more attention. In other words, **journalists cannot simply drag out a story** that they believe is of interest **without truly understanding public concern**. Thus it would appear a good time to bring up the point of what it is to be tenacious, especially from a journalistic perspective. “Tenacity”, as stated by Thiroux and Krasemann, “is the principle of being persistent” (Thiroux and Krasemann 392). In the world of journalism, one must uncover facts, details, and news by means of interviewing, undercover reporting, research, etc. Sometimes the ability to obtain necessary information can be more of a difficult process than others; therefore, one’s ability to persist would be the most important aspect of news coverage. This is not to be confused with the point made earlier about overly pursuing a story, which, as explained earlier, can lead to controversy. Now I will discuss the principle of truth-telling relative to media ethics. Truth-telling can be viewed in many different ways; though I will explain how **the categorical imperative is used to justify truth telling** since **it is** most used by American media (Christians, Fackler and Rotzoll 8). First I must define that Kant’s categorical imperative is **a universal law** in **that it applies to all without exception** (Thiroux and Krasemann 58). To display how it is used by journalists to logically support truth-telling, it would be stated “**In order to tell a lie, then the truth must be known; however, if everyone lied then there would be no truth; therefore, this is illogical because it is a contradiction**.” This is one of the most influential moral principles of today and is esteemed highly by journalists.

# Underview

### [1] Presumption and Permissibility Affirm –

**[A] Affirmation theory—affirm means to put support for or defend—presumption means nothing attacks, so therefore it is defended and meets affirming**

**Declare one's support for; uphold; defend.**

**That’s Léxico**

<https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/affirm>

**[B] Statements are more often true then false— if I told you my name, you’d believe me.**

**[C] Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason.**

#### [D] Use truth testing – anything else moots 6 minutes of the AC and exacerbates the fact that they get a reactivity advantage since I should be able to compensate by choosing framing – their framing collapses since you must say it is true that a world is better than another before you adopt it.

### [2] Theory

#### [A] vote aff if I win a counter interp- a) time skew- skew means I need to be able to generate offense on the theory layer to rectify the skew, otherwise the neg will read theory every time to shorten the 1ar which kills engagement and education b) deters frivolous theory since neg is held accountable and only real abuse would be valid C) competing interps justifies voting for the best model of debate which is key to norming and OWs on duration in future rounds

**[B] Grant me an auto-I meet on interps that are not checked in CX. That’s key to education and fairness—there’s infinite different interps or things I can specify which proliferates frivolous theory and kills predictability. CX checks solves-- it gives me a chance to meet the interp**

#### [C] Reasonability on neg theory – Grant me RVI otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive and there’s no way to check against this.

### Prempts

#### [1] Journalists spreading misinformation impedes on others external freedom, clouding their judgements

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Varden, Helga. “A Kantian Conception of Free Speech.” Freedom of Expression in a Diverse World, 2010, pp. 39–55., https://doi.org/10.1007/978-90-481-8999-1\_4.

Three further clarifications are in order before we can see how this conception of virtue and right delineates the boundaries of free speech. First, even though lying is not a wrongdoing from the point of right, it is important to emphasize that **if one lies, one is** indeed **responsible for** the bad **consequences** of the lie. The reason is that by **lying** one voluntarily **sets the framework** within **which another person acts**. If the other person accepts an invitation to trust a false statement, then the bearer of the lie is responsible for the bad consequences of the lie. For example, say I ask you for directions to the library and you, due to your extraordinarily bad sense of humor, lie thereby sending me in the wrong direction. It happens that your lie directs me through the most dangerous part of town, where I become the victim of wrongdoing. Because your lie sets the framework within which I make my choices, namely the set of facts by which I make my choice, you become partly responsible for what happens to me. Your **words** have **set** the **framework** within **which I exercise my external freedom** and consequently, even if unbeknownst to you, you send me into a dangerous neighborhood, **you are** still partly **responsible for what happens to me** there. **Since** the **wrongdoing befell** me **as a result of your lie,** you are responsible for the bad consequences resulting from it. Second, it is important to distinguish threats of coercion from merely immoral speech. When you threaten me, you tell me that you do not intend to interact rightfully with me in the future. Simply saying so does not deprive me of anything that is mine, of course, but if you are serious and have the ability to make a strike against me, that is, if you really are threatening me, then you intend to back up your words with physical force. When you really threaten me, neither are you uttering ‘empty words’ nor are you taking yourself to be doing so. For example, assume that instead of yielding to your threat, I begin to walk away. You then move forward to block my retreat. This signals your intention to follow through with the threat. In fact, you might engage in other acts to signal that the threat is not empty. Perhaps you crush my hat under your foot or take a baseball bat to my car. In cases like these the words contained in the threat no longer function merely as speech but take on the role of communicating an intended future wrongdoing against me. Hence, threats are not considered mere speech on this view.

#### [2] Objective journalists can cover important stories without being an advocate.

Ryan 01

Ryan, Michael. “Journalistic Ethics, Objectivity, Existential Journalism, Standpoint Epistemology, And Public Journa.” Journal of Mass Media Ethics 16:1. 2001. Web. February 13, 2022. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1207/S15327728JMME1601\_2>.

Comment. **Objective journalists are not** moral **spectators**, unless one defines objective only as uncritically presenting two sides of a story. In fact, **it is the moral duty** of objective journalists **to collect and to disseminate the information a community needs to make sound decisions.** Objective journalists **evaluate the veracity of all information**, and they do reveal the superior sides of issues (when one side is, in fact, superior) by disseminating objective reports. It is a cliché, but the facts do speak for themselves**. If one side is more compelling**, **that is apparent from the** objective journalist’s **report. It is not necessary** or desirable for the journalist **to become an advocate** for that position. Objective journalists do not permit their employers to assume responsibility for their news reports or actions, as the Commission on Freedom of the Press (1947) asserted. They feel an ethical obligation to disseminate stories that describe reality as accurately as possible, and they are true to the highest standards of objective journalism— regardless of their employers’ views.