# FW

## Ethics must be a priori:

#### [A] Naturalistic fallacy – experience only tells us what is, since we can only perceive what is, not what ought to be. it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises, so there needs to be additional a priori premise to make a moral theory.

#### [B] Empirical uncertainty –evil demon could deceive us, dreaming, simulation, and inability to know others’ experience make empiricism an unreliable basis for universal ethics.

#### [C] Ethical frameworks must be theoretically legitimate. All frameworks are functionally topicality interpretations of the word ought so they must be theoretically justified:

#### [D] Prefer on resource disparities—a focus on evidence and statistics privileges debaters with the most preround prep which excludes lone-wolfs and small schools who lack huge evidence files. A debate under my framework can easily be won without any prep since only analytical arguments are required. That controls the internal link to other voters because a pre-req to debating is access to the activity.

## Thus, the standard is respecting a system of inner and outer freedom in regards to the categorical imperative

### [1] Presume Freedom

#### since it allows each of us to pursue our individual search for ethics, so the AC co-opts every reason your framework is good, but adds an additional side constraint. This also serves as a tiebreaker

### [2] Consequences Fail:

#### [A] Every action has infinite stemming consequences, because every consequence can cause another consequence so we can’t predict or calculate.

#### [B] Induction is circular because it relies on the assumption that nature will hold uniform and we could only reach that conclusion through observation of past events.

#### [C] Aggregation fails – suffering is not additive you can’t compare between one migraine and 10 headaches

#### [D] Util justifies any atrocity, i.e., an incredibly miniscule and unlikely chance of extinction would categorically outweigh a 100% chance of genocide –causes cyclical violence and is extremely problematic

[E] **States use Kantianism – Germany proves, it gives citizens intrinsic value and prevents use as a mere means**

Eberle 08

(Distinguished Research Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. C, EDWARD J. EBERLE, OREGON REVIEW OF INT’L LAW [Vol. 10, 2008], <https://mylaw.uoregon.edu/org/oril/docs/10-1/Eberle.pdf)//ww> BJ

We can also observe the presence of another influence of Kant and the German classical philosophic tradition: erection of an **a priori system of reason** beyond and outside experience and human nature designed to guide society according to ethical rules. 28 This tendency toward reason rational, systematic, careful, comprehensive conception–is evident throughout the GG and comprises another trait of German legal theory, and our topic, the German idea of freedom. 29 A good example of the German practice of systematization is the GG’s catalogue of basic rights, which are conceived as concrete manifestations of human dignity. Each of the rights sets forth concrete realms of freedom so that each person may pursue and realize their vision, as **self-legislating ends in themselves**, to borrow another Kantianism. The follow up to GG article 1(1) makes this clear: “The German people therefore acknowledge inviolable and inalienable human rights as the basis of every community, of peace and of justice in the world.” 30 This catalogue of rights is systematically ordered, making up a central aspect of the objectively determined set of values that govern German society. In this respect, dignity and basic rights have a mutually nourishing effect on one another. 31 Basic rights vest further concrete content into the abstract conception of dignity. The article 3(3) guarantee of equality, for example, entitles each person to respect and recognition of “equal worth.” The article 2(2) respect of physical integrity entitles people to respect and **control over their selves and bodies**. For example, in the Spinal Tap Case, 32 the BVerfG invalidated a court-ordered sampling of a defendant’s spinal column to test his involvement in a crime on the ground it violated his physical integrity. 33 Article 2(2) further prohibits torture and corporal punishment and forbids punishment without fault in levying disproportionate penalties, norms the United States would have been well-advised to follow in the war on terrorism. Dignity means respect of intellectual and spiritual identity and integrity, points we will take up later in our discussion of personality rights. Dignity also means guarantee of individual and social existence, which is tangibly manifested in the right to life guarantee in article 2(2) and in the Sozialstaat principle, a matter we will take up later. In short, human dignity, alone or in conjunction with the more specific basic rights, is a rich source of constitutional jurisprudence that provides form and substance to this driving force of German constitutionalism every community, of peace and of justice in the world.” 30. Dignity means respect of intellectual and spiritual identity and integrity, points we will take up later in our discussion of personality rights. Dignity also means guarantee of individual and social existence, which is tangibly manifested in the right to life guarantee in article 2(2) and in the Sozialstaat principle, a matter we will take up later. In short, human dignity, alone or in conjunction with the more specific basic rights, is a rich source of constitutional jurisprudence that provides form and substance to this driving force of German constitutionalism.

#### [F] Only freedom can be the basis for state power – key to moral laws

Rauscher ’17

Rauscher, Frederick, "Kant's Social and Political Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/kant-social-political/>. WWPP

***“There is only one innate right,” says Kant***, “Freedom (independence from being constrained by another’s choice), insofar as it can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a universal law” (6:237). ***Kant rejects any other basis for the state, in particular*** arguing that the ***welfare*** of citizens ***cannot be the basis of state power***. He argues that ***a state cannot*** legitimately ***impose*** any particular conception of ***happiness upon its citizens*** (8:290–91). ***To do so would*** be for the ruler to ***treat citizens as children, assuming*** that ***they are unable to understand what is truly useful or harmful*** to themselves. This claim must be understood in light of Kant’s more general claim that ***moral law cannot be based upon happiness or any other given empirical good***. In the Groundwork Kant contrasts an ethics of autonomy, in which the will (Wille, or practical reason itself) is the basis of its own law, from the ethics of heteronomy, in which something independent of the will, such as happiness, is the basis of moral law (4:440–41). In the Critique of Practical Reason he argues that ***happiness*** (the agreeableness of life when things go in accordance with one’s wishes and desires), ***although universally sought by human beings, is not specific enough to entail any particular universal desires in human beings***. Further, even were there any universal desires among human beings, those desires would, as empirical, be merely contingent and thus unworthy of being the basis of any pure moral law (5:25–26). No particular conception of happiness can be the basis of the pure principle of the state, and the general conception of happiness is too vague to serve as the basis of a law. ***Hence, a “universal principle of right” cannot be based upon happiness but only on something truly universal, such as freedom***. The “universal principle of right” Kant offers is thus “***Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal law***” (6:230). This explains why ***happiness is not universal***, but not why ***freedom is*** universal. ***By “freedom” in political philosophy, Kant is*** not ***referring to*** the transcendental conception of freedom usually associated with the problem of the freedom of the will amid determinism in accordance with laws of nature, a solution to which is provided in the Third Antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason. Rather, freedom in political philosophy is defined, as in the claim above about ***the only innate right, as “independence from being constrained by another’s choice”. His concern*** in political philosophy ***is*** not with laws of nature determining a human being’s choice but by ***other human beings determining a human being’s choice, hence the kind of freedom Kant is concerned with in political philosophy is individual freedom of action.*** Still, the universality of political freedom is linked to transcendental freedom. Kant assumes that a human being’s use of choice (at least when it is properly guided by reason) is free in the transcendental sense. Since every human being does enjoy transcendental freedom by virtue of being rational, freedom of choice is a universal human attribute. And this freedom of choice is to be respected and promoted, even when this choice is not exercised in rational or virtuous activity. ***Presumably respecting freedom of choice involves allowing it to be effective in determining actions; this is why Kant calls political freedom, or “independence from being constrained by another’s choice”, the only innate right.*** One might still object that this freedom of choice is incapable of being the basis of a pure principle of right for the same reason that happiness was incapable of being its basis, namely, that it is too vague in itself and that when specified by the particular decisions individuals make with their free choice, it loses its universality. Kant holds that this problem does not arise for freedom, since ***freedom of choice can be understood both in terms of its content*** (the particular decisions individuals make) ***and its form*** (the free, unconstrained nature of choice of any possible particular end) (6:230). ***Freedom is universal in the proper sense because, unlike happiness, it can be understood in such a way that it is susceptible to specification without losing its universality. Right will be based on the form of free choice.***

#### This is why I affirm: A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right to strike CPS and Pics affirm because they don’t disprove my general thesis. Ill defend neg preferences on specification as long as it doesn’t change the principle of my aff-check spec in CX

### [3] Practical identities – we find our lives worth living under practical identities such as student but that presupposes agency.

**Korsgaard 92** CHRISTINE M. Korsgaard 92 [I am a Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, where I have taught since 1991. From July 1996 through June 2002, I was Chair of the Department of Philosophy. (The current chair is Sean Kelly.) From 2004-2012, I was Director of Graduate Studies in Philosophy. (The current DGS is Mark Richard.) Before coming here, I held positions at Yale, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Chicago, as well as visiting positions at Berkeley and UCLA. I served as President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 2008-2009, and held a Mellon Distinguished Achievement Award from 2006-2009. I work on moral philosophy and its history, practical reason, the nature of agency, personal identity, normativity, and the ethical relations between human beings and the other animals], “The Sources of Normativity”, THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES Delivered at Clare Hall, Cambridge University 16-17 Nov 1992, BE

The Solution: Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different reason. The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self-consciousness” because it forces us to have a conception of ourselves. As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is like to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a metaphysical self. From a third person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself. To identify with such a principle or law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself.6 An agent might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she thinks of herself will determine whether it is the law of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. The conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theoretical one, a view about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better understood as a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. So I will call this a conception of your practical identity. Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, someone’s friend, and so on. And all of these identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.

#### That hijacks roles of the ballots since the judge is one such practical identity, and other frameworks since implies first valuing ourselves to value other normative judgements

# Offense

#### **[1] The formula of autonomy demands a workers’ right to strike. The NC’s universalizability objections WILL miss the boat – it’s a question of how workers exercise their agency and autonomy which outweighs**

**Chima 13** [Chima, S. C. (2013). Global medicine: Is it ethical or morally justifiable for doctors and other healthcare workers to go on strike? BMC Medical Ethics, 14(Suppl 1), S5. doi:10.1186/1472-6939-14-s1-s5 // LEX JB]

Some philosophers have described moral obligations or duties, which ought to guide ethical behavior, such as the duty of fidelity or the obligation to keep promises, and beneficence - the obligation to do ‘good’ [10]. However, it has been suggested that some other equally compelling moral duties or ethical obligations may conflict with the above duties, such as the right to justice. Justice is the right to fair treatment in light of what is owed a person [63]. For example, it may be argued that everybody is equally entitled to a just wage for just work. The philosopher Immanuel Kant based his moral theory on a categorical imperative which encourages moral agents to act, based on a principle, which they would deem to become a universal law [64]. One can argue that the decision by any HCW to go on strike may not be universalisable. However, looking at this decision from the principle of respect for autonomy, or freedom of choice, one can conclude that individual autonomy is a sentiment which is desirable for all human beings. Accordingly, every worker should be free to choose whether to work or not, based on a whether any specific set of conditions of their own choosing have been met. Kant argues further that moral agents or individuals should be treated, “whether in your own person or in that of any other, never solely as a means, but always as an end” [64]. This idea that individuals should be treated as ends in themselves has influenced political philosophy for centuries, and stresses the libertarian ideology that people should not have their individual freedoms curtailed either for others or for the good of society in general [10,64]. From this axiomatic considerations, one can conclude that it would be unethical for people to be used as slaves or be forced to work for inadequate wages or under slave-like conditions [4,10,12,51]. The issue of HCW strikes can also be analyzed from utilitarian principles as formulated by one of its major disciples JS Mills as follows [65]: The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility, or the greatest happiness principle, holds that Chima BMC Medical Ethics 2013, 14(Suppl 1):S5 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6939/14/S1/S5 Page 6 of 10 actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.

#### [2] Recognizing ability to strike is a unique obligation of the institution – anything else allows coercive workplaces and treating workers as a means to an end

**Howard 20** [Danielle Howard,, Mar 2020, "What Should Physicians Consider Prior to Unionizing?," Journal of Ethics | American Medical Association, [https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/what-should-physicians-consider-prior-unionizing/2020-03 //](https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/what-should-physicians-consider-prior-unionizing/2020-03%20//) LEX JB]

* Written in the context of doctors, warrant can be used for all jobs

When discussing ethics, practicalities, and outcomes of physician unions, the focus is almost always entirely on physicians. Yet to place the weight of responsibility for patient care entirely on unionized clinicians is unjust, as Kant’s reasoning applies to the employing organization as well (hereafter referred to as “the health system”). The health system benefits from physicians providing patient care; if it then creates working conditions that its employed clinicians do not find sustainable, it violates the categorical imperative by using clinicians as a means to its end. The same can be said of patients, who are used as means to an end if the health system places restrictions on patient care for financial gain. When evaluating the ethics of physician unionization, it is important to realize that the health system has its own corporate social responsibility to both patients and physicians that is independent of physicians’ commitment to patient care.26 Physicians are expected to consider the effects that their unionization will have on the patient population because they have a responsibility to patient care. The health system shares equally in this responsibility.

#### [3] Strikes are just an extension of the right to self defense and a core part of human value

Waas 12 [Professor Dr. Bernd Waas, Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany [https://islssl.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Strike-Waas.pdf September 2012](https://islssl.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/Strike-Waas.pdf%20September%202012)]

Second, entirely different attitudes exist towards strikes. In some countries, strikes are considered “a right to self-defence” which is not necessarily directed at the employer; in other countries, the area of admissible industrial action may be necessarily congruent with the relationship between employers and employees. In yet other countries, strikes are seen as acts of “self-empowerment” which have very little to do with a legal order granting certain powers or rights. Finally, in some countries, the right to strike is viewed as being firmly rooted in human dignity, granted to each individual worker and not waivable by him or her, and in others, the perspective may be more “technical” with a considerable power to dispose of the right to strike.

#### [4] The offense can’t be turned – strikes are an omission of action

**Benjamin 78** [Walter Benjamin, On Violence, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings [Walter Bendix Schönflies Benjamin was a German Jewish philosopher, cultural critic and essayist]

This is above all the case in the class struggle, in the form of the workers' guaranteed right to strike. **Organized labor is, apart from the state, probably today the only legal subject en­titled to exercise violence. Against this view there is certainly the objection that an omission of actions, a nonaction, which a strike really is, cannot be described as violence**. Such a consideration doubtless made it easier for a state power to conceive the right to strike, once this was no longer avoidable. But its truth is not unconditional, and therefore not unrestricted. It is true that the omission of an action, or service, where it amounts simply to a "severing of relations," can be an entirely nonviolent, pure means. **And as in the view of the state, or the law, the right to strike conceded to labor is certainly not a right to exercise violence but, rather, to escape from a violence indirectly exercised by the employer**, **strikes conforming to this may undoubtedly occur from time to time and involve only a "withdrawal" or "estrangement" from the employer.** The mo­ment of violence, however, is necessarily introduced, in the form of extortion, into such an omission, if it takes place in the context of a conscious readiness to resume the suspended action under certain circumstances that either have nothing whatever to do with this action or only superficially modify it. Understood in this way, the right to strike constitutes in the view of labor, which is opposed to that of the state, the right to use force in attaining certain ends. The antithesis between the two conceptions emerges in all its bitterness in face of a revolu­tionary general strike. In this, labor will always appeal to its right to strike, and the state will call this appeal an abuse, since the right to strike was not "so intended," and take emer­gency measures.

#### [5] Universality requires restriction of the employer’s power to arbitrarily impose their will on employees.

**Bogg 17** [Alan. Alan L Bogg is Professor in Law at the [University of Bristol Law School](https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/organisations/university-of-bristol-law-school). 'Republican Non-Domination and Labour Law: New Normativity or Trojan Horse?', (2017), 33, International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, Issue 3, pp. 391-417, <https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/International+Journal+of+Comparative+Labour+Law+and+Industrial+Relations/33.3/IJCL2017017>] SJ//VM

According to Pettit, this equal civic status requires the effective public resourcing and protection of ‘basic liberties’ in the relations between private citizens.46 These ‘basic liberties’ consist of those freedoms that are capable of being exercised and enjoyed equally by all citizens. This would require the republican state to entrench such freedoms as ‘the freedom to think what you like’ and ‘the freedom to travel within the society’ as ‘basic liberties’.47 The specification and content of these ‘basic liberties’ is determined through Pettit’s ‘free-person heuristic,’ or ‘eyeball test’: ‘people should securely enjoy resources and protections to the point where they … can look others in the eye without reason for the fear or deference that a power of interference might inspire; they can walk tall and assume the public status, objective and subjective, of being equal in this regard with the best.’48 It is a great strength of Pettit’s account of ‘basic liberties’ that it is rooted in a concern to ameliorate private domination between citizens. By contrast, standard liberal accounts of freedom focus on state infringement of freedom, and are sometimes sceptical of the ‘horizontal’ extension of public rights into the private sphere.49 This also marks an important difference with the structure of Lovett’s republican argument, where his discussion of basic liberties is framed as a concern to impose constitutional limits on public democratic processes.50 On Pettit’s republican account, the ‘basic liberties’ demarcate a protected zone of freedoms that must be insulated from arbitrary interference by other private parties.51 In particular, Pettit’s eyeball test leads to the need for ‘special insulation’ of the ‘basic liberties’ within ‘relationships like those of wife and husband, employee and employer, debtor and creditor, where there are often asymmetries of power’.52 Pettit is therefore concerned to elaborate a republican account of labour standards, and the employment relation lies at the centre of Pettit’s democratic theory. This ‘special insulation’ regime of republican labour law requires the state to impose legal duties on the stronger party to restrain the arbitrary exercise of private power. This would include ‘for cause’ dismissal protection, encompassing ‘constraints within workplace relations that deny an employer the right to fire without cause, imposing something like a requirement to defend an appeal against dismissal in an agreed forum.’53 It also includes ‘legalizing the unionization of employees and recourse to strike action’.54 This is because ‘the resort to collective action…may represent the only hope of winning freedom as non-domination for those who are employed.’55 Pettit defends the public provision of unemployment insurance to resource effective ‘exit’ rights for workers, as part of a public republican programme of insurance for citizens. 56 Pettit’s approach to ‘special insulation’ is also attuned to the specific vulnerabilities of precarious workers. For example, in their republican audit of Spanish governmental reforms implemented under Prime Minister Zapatero, Luis Marti and Pettit offer a favourable assessment of specific legal measures to protect illegal migrant-workers and those employed on fixed term contracts.57

# Underview

### [1] Only univeralizable reason can effectively explain the perspectives of agents – that’s the best method for combatting oppression.

Farr 02

Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

**One** of the most popular **criticism**s **of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.**13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that **although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is** a **valid** distinction, **the unity of the two is required for** an understanding of human **agency.** The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. **Kant is** often **accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty**, noumenal **subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is** an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. **The** very **fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness** or wrongness **of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check** by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check **by my intelligible character**, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that **we formulate principles that keep our** empirical **impulses in check.** The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. **The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.**16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others **as** rational **moral agents** who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. **Hence,** the **universalizability** criterion **is a principle of consistency and** a principle of **inclusion.** That is, in choosing my maxims **I** attempt to **include the perspective of other moral agents.**

### [2] Put away your generic Kant indicts – our framework is a rejection of the western foundations of Kantianism in favor of a radical reconstruction of inclusion of the racialized and marginalized struggle.

**Mills 18** Charles W. Mills. “Black Radical Kantianism.” Res Philosophica, Vol. 95, No. 1, January 2018, pp. 1–33 https:// doi.org/ 10.11612/ resphil.1622 SJCP//JG

Far from being monolithic, however, it should be regarded as a general category extending over many different variants. Depending on the respec- tive diagnoses offered of the dynamic of these regimes, and the correspond- ing prescriptions for their overturning or reform, one can derive varieties of black liberalism, black Marxism, black nationalism, black feminism, and even black conservatism (Dawson 2001). My own project in recent years has become the articulation of a “black radical liberalism” that draws on what are standardly judged to be the “radical” strains of Afro-modern thought—black Marxism, black nationalism, and black feminism—while incorporating their key insights into a modified and radicalized liberal framework (Mills 2017a, epilogue). And a “black radical Kantianism” is supposed to be a key element of this proposed synthesis, though not in the sense of documenting the actual uptake of Kant by black radical theorists (unlike their actual reading of Marx), but in the sense of demonstrating how classic themes in this literature can illuminatingly be translated into a Kantian discourse reshaped by the realities of racial subordination. So the agenda is both descriptive and prescriptive, looking at the fortunes of “personhood” as a general liberal category under illiberal circumstances, and suggesting a “Kantian” reconstruction as a de-ghettoizing approach for bringing together these segregated conversations. Why Kant, though? To begin with, there is the strategic argument from Kant’s rise to centrality in contemporary Western normative theory over the last half-century. With the demise or at least considerable diminution in significance of the utilitarian liberalism (Jeremy Bentham, James and John Stuart Mill, Henry Sidgwick) that was hegemonic from the early 1800s to the mid-twentieth century, it is deontological/contractarian liberalism that is now most influential, whether in analytic Anglo-American political theory or Continental critical theory. Immanuel Kant is now regarded not merely as the most important ethicist of modernity, but as one of its most significant normative political theorists also.1 So a racially informed engagement with this body of discourse would have the virtues of being in dialogue with what is now the central strand in Western ethico-political theory: Afro-modern political thought in conversation with Euro-modern political thought. But second, in addition to these strategic considerations (and perhaps more importantly), the key principles and ideals of Kant’s ethico-political thought are, once deracialized, very attractive: the respect for the rights of individual persons, the ideal of the Rechtsstaat (admittedly somewhat modified from Kant’s own version), and the vision of a global cosmopolitan order of equals. The problem, in my opinion, has been less Kant’s own racism (since it is simply bracketed by most contemporary Kantians)2 than the failure to rethink these principles and ideals in the light of a modernity structured by racial domination. And that brings me to the third point. In contrast with, say, a dialogue between European and Asian political traditions, which at least for long periods of time developed largely separately from one another, the Euro-modern and the Afro-modern traditions are intimately and dialectically linked. As emphasized at the start, the latter develops in specific contestation of the former, involving both resistance to and rejection of its crucial tenets insofar as they rational- ize and justify Euro-domination, while nonetheless sometimes seeking to appropriate and modify others for emancipatory ends (Bogues 2003). So de- veloping a “black radical Kantianism” as a self-conscious enterprise should be not merely instrumentally and intrinsically valuable, but illuminative of a counter-hegemonic normative system already present in Afro-modern thought, if not self-denominatedly “Kantian,” formed in opposition to a white domination predicated on the denial of equal personhood to blacks.

### [3] Presumption and Permissibility Affirm –

**[A] Affirmation theory—affirm means to put support for or defend—presumption means nothing attacks, so therefore it is defended and meets affirming**

**Declare one's support for; uphold; defend.**

**That’s Léxico**

<https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/affirm>

**[B] Statements are more often true then false— if I told you my name, you’d believe me.**

**[C] Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason.**

#### [D] Use truth testing – anything else moots 6 minutes of the AC and exacerbates the fact that they get a reactivity advantage since I should be able to compensate by choosing framing – their framing collapses since you must say it is true that a world is better than another before you adopt it.

### [4] Theory

#### [A] vote aff if I win a counter interp- a) time skew- skew means I need to be able to generate offense on the theory layer to rectify the skew, otherwise the neg will read theory every time to shorten the 1ar which kills engagement and education b) deters frivolous theory since neg is held accountable and only real abuse would be valid C) competing interps justifies voting for the best model of debate which is key to norming and OWs on duration in future rounds

**[B] Grant me an auto-I meet on interps that are not checked in CX. That’s key to education and fairness—there’s infinite different interps or things I can specify which proliferates frivolous theory and kills predictability. CX checks solves-- it gives me a chance to meet the interp**

#### [C] Reasonability on neg theory – Grant me RVI otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive and there’s no way to check against this.