**Presumption Negates**

**1. We presume things false, this is why people don’t believe things like conspiracy theories.**

**2. There are an infinite number of ways to prove something false and only one way to prove it true.**

**3. The neg burden is to deny the evidence of truth so if there’s no offense as to why the resolution is true the neg has fulfilled their burden.**

**Permissibility Negates**

**1. The aff must prove an obligation because ought indicates a moral obligation. If an action is permissible, definitionally, no obligation is present and you negate.**

**Morality must be internally motivating because we must internalize and care about external claims, which means external motivation collapses.**

**Joyce 1**, Richard (Professor of Philosophy at Victoria University Wellington, New Zealand). The Myth of Morality. 2001. [Bracketed for grammatical clarity] // (N8)

Back to the [Suppose] external reason[s]. **Suppose it were claimed,** instead, that **I have a reason to refrain from drinking the coffee because it is tapu** and must not be touched. This reason claim will be urged regardless of what I may say about my indifference to tapu, or my citing of nihilistic desires to tempt the hand of fate. **[r]egardless of my desires (it is claimed) I ought not drink** - l have a reason not to drink. But how could that reason ever explain any action of mine? Could the external reason even explain my [action] from drinking? Clearly, in order to explain it the external reason must have some causally efficacious role [in] among the antecedents of the action (in this case, an omission) — l must have. in some manner. "internalized" it. **The only possibility, it would seem, consistent with its being an external reason, is that I believe the external reason** claim [but] : I believe that the coffee is tapu. There's no doubting that such a belief can play a role in explaining actions - including my refraining from drinking the coffee. The question is whether the belief alone can[not] produce action, to which the correct answer is “No.” A very familiar and eminently sensible view says that **in order to explain an action** the **belief must couple with desires** (such that those same desires had in the absence of the belief would not have resulted in the action). And this seems correct: **if I believe that the coffee is** [bad] **tapu but really just don’t care about that, then I will not refrain from drinking it.** So in order for the belief to explain action it must couple with [desire] elements - but **in that case** the putative **external reason collapses into** an **internal** one.3

**Contracts solve this because people agree to certain constraints to better promote their self interest. People agree to channel their desires and in doing so, establish a set of moral agreements.**

**Gauthier 86** Gauthier, David P. *Morals by Agreement*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1986. Print. // (N8)

**Moral principles are introduced as the objects of** full **voluntary** ex ante a**greement among** rational **persons.**  Such agreement is hypothetical, in supposing a pre-moral context for the adoption of moral rules and practices.  But the **parties to agreement are real,** determinate individuals, **distinguished by their capacities, situations, and concerns.**  In so far as **[Since] they** would **agree to constraints on their choices, restraining their pursuit of their own interests, they acknowledge a distinction between what they may and may not do.**  As rational persons understanding the structure of their interaction, **they recognize** for mutual constraint, and so for **a moral dimension in their affairs.**

**Thus, the standard is consistency with the contractarian principle of mutual restraint, this is when people agree to constrain their actions for their own self interest. To clarify, obligations arise from restraints we place on ourselves by entering contracts.**

**Prefer:**

**1. Bindingness: Contracts are binding since there are legal repercussions to not following them. This outweighs because if people don’t have any reason to follow ethics they can just not follow it the second they don’t want to and it loses all meaning.**

**2. Them contesting my framework concedes it’s validity since contracts were fundamental to any of their cards. For example, your authors needed publishing licenses, and your empirical studies needed permits.**

**Contention)**

**Workers agree in contracts not to strike, these contracts grant employers the right to fire people if they strike and has been upheld by the state.**

"Employer Sanctions for Violation of No-Strike Clause: Union Busting through Mass Discharge and Rescission." ***Yale Law Journal*,** digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=8323&context=ylj. Accessed 23 June 2021.

**EMPLOYERS often secure no-strike clauses 1 in collective bargaining contracts** 2 with their employees' unions, 3 in order to ensure greater union responsibility for the maintenance of stable production schedules.4 **Under such clauses, the union promises not to authorize or sanction any strike during the term of its contract.' The employer is** usually **given power to discipline or discharge all the individual union members who strike in violation of the no-strike clause.0**

When confronted with a union-sponsored strike in violation of a no-strike clause, the employer may be forced to accede to the union's demands because of production requirements or the scarcity of replacement workers. 7 Alternatively, he may shut down his plant and wait out the strike, disciplining the strikers when they return to work, subject to an arbitrator's review.8 However, if he believes his bargaining position to be strong, he may discharge all the strikers, rescind the contract, and refuse thereafter to deal with the union.0 **The National Labor Relations Board has upheld such employer actions on the grounds that they are justified by the union's prior material breach of the contract,'** ° and that strikers in violation of contract are not protected by the National Labor Relations Act."1

**This impacts back to my framework because recognizing the right of the workers to strike goes against established contracts granting employers the ability to restrict the ability of workers to strike.**

**1. Turn: Strikes use others as a mere means to achieve the end of the strikers.**

**Fourie 17 Johan Fourie 11-30-2017 "Ethicality of Labor-Strike Demonstrates by Social Workers"** [**https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html**](https://www.otherpapers.com/essay/Ethicality-of-Labor-Strike-Demonstrates-by-Social-Workers/62694.html) **(Johan Fourie is professor of Economics and History at Stellenbosch University.) JG**

**A** further **formula of the Categorical Imperative is** "so, act as to **treat humanity,** whether in your own person or in that of any other context, **never solely as a means to an end but always as an end within itself'** (Parrott, 2006, p. 51). By this Kant meant people should be valued and respected as an individual and not used for the benefit of others. **Participating in a labor-strike** demonstration/action **is a direct violation of this** categorical perspective as it would not be ethically permissible because **the severe dependence and well-being of clients, the effective functioning of the employer organization, and society is used to** duly and unduly **influence the bargaining process for better working conditions.** In participating in the labor strike demonstration, the humanity, and well-being of **clients and society is** not seen as crucial and as an 'end', but rather **used to demonstrate the** undeniable **need for the skills and expertise of social workers.** Furthermore, through withholding services, social worker professionals demonstrate that the well-being and welfare of society have lost its inherent importance/value. Though the value of overall well-being is taught throughout the social work training process and is enshrined in the professional ethical codes.

**This impacts back to your framework because using others as a means to an end isn’t universalizable without contradiction since in order to use others as a means you must be an end in yourself, but if everyone is used as a means, no one can take the action of using others as means to ends.**

**2. Turn: the aff conflates positive and negative rights.**

#### The aff is a positive right to work, but only negative rights are coherent. Feser Summarizes Nozick 04, Edward Feser [Philosophy professor at Loyola], On Nozick by Eric Mack, 2004, p. 36-7, Volume 8, Issue 4 //Scopa This brings us to a second feature of Nozick’s conception of rights, namely that they are essentially negative. A right to X just is a right not to be hindered in using something you own, X, as you want to use it. It is not a right to have X if you don’t already own it and no one wants to give or sell it to you. Your right to your TV set is just your right not to have it damaged or taken from you against your will; it is not a right that someone should buy you a TV set. Your right to life is just the right not to be killed; it is not a right that others should provide you with what you need to live. You own your life, so no one has the right to take it from you. But by the same token, others own their lives, bodies, labor, and the things they produce with their labor, and thus no one has a right to take those things from them. In particular, you do not have the right forcibly to take, or have someone else take, other people’s resources simply because you want or need them, even if you need them to live (just as you have no right to take their body parts from them even if you needed those to live). A right to what you need in order to live would be a positive right a right to something that someone else must provide you with, as opposed to a (negative) right that someone merely refrain from doing something to you. So-called rights to welfare, health care, education, and the like would be positive rights. But there simply are and can be no such fundamental positive rights on a libertarian view. For no one has a basic right against other people that they must provide things for him; to assume otherwise is to assume, in effect, that a person at least partially owns other people’s property, including their labor, if I claim a right to education, for example, I am in effect claiming that other people must provide me with an education — it won’t just fall out of the sky, after all — which means I’m claiming a right to a part of their labor, i.e. whatever labor must go into paying the taxes that fund my state-run school. But no one has a right to anyone else’s labor — people own their own labor, and cannot morally be forced to give up some of it for others. If you want voluntarily to help me out in paying my tuition. and sign a contract saying you’ll do so, that’s one thing — in that case, I do have the right to your money, because you’ve agreed to provide it but if you don ‘t agree, I have no such right, and I and the government are stealing from you if we take your money anyway.  Now many rights that people claim to have are positive rights of this sort. The United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, is filled with claims not only to negative rights, but also to many positive rights — rights to education, health care, even “periodic holidays with pay”! But all such claims are bogus, and the alleged “rights” pure fictions conjured out of thin air. For they conflict with the fundamental rights of self-ownership, and make people slaves to the realization of others’ desires and needs.  Being essentially negative, a person’s rights function, in Nozick’s terminology, as moral side-constraints on the actions of others (1974, 28-35). Respecting others’ rights, that is, isn’t to be understood merely as one goal among others that we might seek to maximize, leaving open the possibility that violating rights in some circumstances for the sake of achieving some other good is an acceptable trade-off. Rather, one’s rights constitute a set of absolute restrictions within which all other people must behave with respect to him, and override all considerations of utility or welfare. They lay down the ground rules for our behavior towards others — telling us that, in anything we do, there are certain things we must not do. “Side constraints upon action reflect the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means,” Nozick says; “they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their consent. Individuals are inviolable” (1974, 30-31).  Being inviolable, their rights are also inviolable — those rights cannot be overridden for any reason. Nor, given that rights are negative, is there any danger that they might conflict, which would put their inviolability in doubt. If your having a right to X just means that I cannot interfere with your use of X, and my right to Y just means that you cannot interfere with my use of Y, then there is no conflict between our rights: All we’re required to do is to leave each other alone. But if I also claim a positive right to Z, and Z requires the use of X, then our rights inevitably will conflict, for the only way I can get Z is if you give me X. Positive rights will generally, and obviously, lead to such conflicts — surely another reason to be suspicious of them. Negative rights, however, will not. Such rights are perfectly compatible with one another, and thus with the notion that rights are inviolable.

**This impacts back to my framework because the aff is a positive right. A right to strike just means a government makes it so you can’t be fired for striking. This is a positive right because it means it's just government interference allowing you to do something not preventing the government from infringing on your freedom.**