**Politics, and society will always have tension, because perfect harmony is an impossibility.**

**Mouffe**, Chantal. *The democratic paradox*. verso, **2000**.

Once the theoretical terrain has been delineated in such a way, we can begin formulating an alternative to both the aggregative and the deliberative model, one that I propose to call 'agonistic pluralism'.30 A first distinction is needed in order to clarify the new perspective that I am putting forward, the distinction between 'politics' and 'the political'. By 'the political', I refer to the dimension of antagonism that is inherent in human relations, antagonism that can take many forms and emerge in different types of social relations. **'Politics'**, on the other side, **indicates the ensemble of practices, discourses and institutions which seek to establish a certain order** and organize human coexistence in conditions **that are always potentially conflictual** because they are affected by the dimension of 'the political'. I consider that it is only when we acknowledge the dimension of 'the political' and understand that **'politics' consists in domesticating hostility and in trying to defuse the potential antagonism that exists in human relations,** that we can pose what I take to be the central question for democratic politics. This question, pace the rationalists, is not how to arrive at a consensus without exclusion, since this would imply the eradication of the political**. Politics aims at the creation of unity in a context of conflict and diversity; it is always concerned with the creation of an 'us' by the determination of a 'them'.** The novelty of **democratic politics is not the overcoming of this us/them opposition - which is an impossibility - but the different way in which it is established.**The crucial issue is to establish this wIthem discrimination in a way that is compatible with pluralist democracy. Envisaged from the point of view of 'agonistic pluralism', **the aim of** democratic**politics is to construct the 'them' in such a way that it is no longer perceived as an enemy to be destroyed. but as an 'adversary',** that is. somebody whose ideas we combat but whose right to defend those ideas we do not put into question. This is the real meaning of liberal-democratic tolerance, which does not entail condoning ideas that we oppose or being indifferent to standpoints that we disagree with. but treating those who defend them as legitimate opponents. This category of the 'adversary' does not eliminate antagonism, though. and it should be distinguished from the liberal notion of the competitor with which it is sometimes identified. **An adversary is an enemy. but a legitimate enemy. one with whom we have some common ground because we have a shared adhesion to the ethico-political principles of liberal democracy:**liberty and equality.**But we disagree concerning the meaning and implementation of those principles**, and such a disagreement is not one that could be resolved through deliberation and rational discussion. Indeed, given the ineradicable pluralism of value. there is no rational resolution of the conflict. hence its antagonistic dimension. 3J This does not mean. of course, that adversaries can never cease to disagree, but that does not prove that antagonism has been eradicated. To accept the view of the adversary is to undergo a radical change in political identity. It is more a sort of conversion man a process of rational persuasion (in the same way as Thomas Kuhn has argued that adherence to a new scientific paradigm is a conversion). Compromises are, of course, also possible; they are part and parcel of politics; but they should be seen as temporary respites in an ongoing confrontation. **Introducing the category of** me **'adversary' requires complexifying the notion of antagonism and distinguishing two different forms in which it can emerge. antagonism properly speaking and agonism. Antagonism is struggle between enemies. while agonism is struggle between adversaries.** We can therefore reformulate our problem by saying that envisaged from the perspective of 'agonistic pluralism' the aim of democratic politics is to transform antagonism into agonism. This requires providing channels through which collective passions will be given ways to express themselves over issues which, while allowing enough possibility for identification, will not construct the opponent as an enemy but as an adversary. An important difference with the model of 'deliberative democracy' is that for 'agonistic pluralism', **the prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions from the sphere of the public, in order to render a rational consensus possible, but to mobilize those passions towards democratic designs.**

   
   
   
 

**The only way that we can reconcile this is via an agonistic model of democracy. This is a model that welcomes the inevitable clash of views, but ensures that this clash remains civil. Anything else can lead to the violent outbreak of antagonisms.**

**Mouffe 2**, Chantal. *The democratic paradox*. verso, 2000.

**A well-functioning democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions. If this is missing there is the danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a confrontation among other forms of collective identification,** as is the case with identity politics. Too much emphasis on consensus and the refusal of confrontation lead to apathy and disaffection with political participation. Worse still,**the result can be the crystallization of collective passions around issues which cannot be managed by the democratic process and an explosion of antagonisms that can tear up the very basis of civility.** It is for that reason that **the ideal of a pluralist democracy cannot be to reach a rational consensus in the public sphere. Such a consensus cannot exist. We have to accept that every consensus exists as a temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of power,** and that it always entails some form of exclusion. **The ideas that** power could be dissolved through a rational debate and that**legitimacy could be based on pure rationality are illusions which can endanger democratic institutions.** What the deliberative-democracy model is denying is the dimension of undecidability and the ineradicability of antagonism which are constitutive of the political. By postulating the availability of a non-exclusive public sphere of deliberation where a rational consensus could obtain. they negate the inherently conflictual nature of modern pluralism. They are unable to recognize that bringing a deliberation to a close always results from a decision which excludes other possibilities and for which one should never refuse to bear responsibility by invoking the commands of general rules or principles. This is why a perspective like**'agonistic pluralism', which reveals the impossibility of establishing a consensus without exclusion, is of fundamental importance for democratic politics.** By warning us against the illusion that a fully achieved democracy could ever be instantiated, it forces us to keep the democratic contestation alive. **To make room for dissent and to foster the institutions in which it can be manifested is vital for a pluralist democracy**, and one should abandon the very idea that there could ever be a time in which it would cease to be necessary because the society is now 'well-ordered'. An 'agonistic' approach acknowledges the real nature of its frontiers and the forms of exclusion that they entail. instead of trying to disguise them under the veil of rationality or morality. Coming to terms with the hegemonic nature of social relations and identities. it can contribute to subverting the everpresent temptation existing in democratic societies to naturalize its frontiers and essentialize its identities. For this reason it is much more receptive than the deliberative model to the multiplicity of voices that contemporary pluralist societies encompass and to the complexity of their power structure.

**Thus the standard is consistency with agonistic deliberation.**

**Impact Calc:**

**My framework is a question of procedures not of consequences. I.e. it's not a question of if governments are more agonistic after the aff is passed but a question of if recognizing an unconditional right to strike is consistent with the procedures of an agnostic state.**

**Prefer:**

**1. Performativity: The only way we can deliberate and have discussions is via agonism.**

**Mouffe 3**, Chantal. *The democratic paradox*. verso, 2000.

only those norms, i.e. general **rules** of action and institutional arrangements,**can be said to be valid** which would be agreed to by all those affected by their consequences, **if such agreement were reached as a consequence of a process of deliberation which has** the following features: (a) **participation in such deliberation**is governed by the norms of equality and symmetry; **all have the same chance to initiate speech acts, to question, interrogate. and to open debate**: (b)**all have the right to question the** assigned **topics of conversation**; (c) **all have the right to initiate reflexive arguments about the very rules of the discourse procedure and the way in which they are applied or carried out.** There is no prima facie rule limiting the agenda or the conversation. nor the identity of the participants, as long as each excluded person or group can justifiably show that they are relevantly affected by the proposed norm under question. Let us examine this model of deliberative democracy closely. In their attempt to ground legitimacy on rationality, these theorists have to distinguish between mere agreement and rational consensus. That is why they assert that the process of public discussion must realize the conditions of ideal discourse. This sets the values of the procedure. which are impartiality and equality, openness and lack of coercion, and unanimity. The combination of those values in the discussion guarantees that its outcome will be legitimate, since it will produce generalizable interests on which all participants can agree. Habermasians do not deny that there will, of course, be obstacles to the realization of the ideal discourse, but these obstacles are conceived of as empirical. They are due to the fact that it is unlikely. given the practical and empirical limitations of social life. that we will ever be completely able to leave all our panicular interests aside in order to coincide with our universal rational self. This is why the ideal speech situation is presented as a regulative idea. However,**if we accept Schmitt's insight about the relations of inclusion-exclusion which are necessarily inscribed in the political constitution** of 'the people' - which is required by the exercise of democracy - **we have to acknowledge that the obstacles to the realization of the ideal speech situation - and to the consensus without exclusion that it would bring about**- are inscribed in the democratic logic itself. Indeed. The free and unconstrained public deliberation of all on matters of common concern goes against the democratic requisite of drawing a frontier betWeen 'us' and 'them'. We could say - this time using Derridean terminology - that the very conditions of possibility of the exercise of democracy constitute simultaneously the conditions of impossibility of democratic legitimacy as envisaged by deliberative democracy. **Consensus** in a liberal-democratic society **is - and will always be - the expression of a hegemony and the crystallization of power relations. The frontier that it establishes between what is and what is not legitimate is a political one. and for that reason it should remain contestable.** To deny the existence of such a moment of closure, or to present the frontier as dictated by rationality or morality, is to naturalize what should be perceived as a contingent and temporary hegemonic articulation of 'the people' through a panicular regime of inclusion. The result of such an operation is to reify the identity of the people by reducing it to one of its many possible forms of identification.

**This means the only way we can debate is via a system of agonism where different views are clashed against each other, but in a civil way.**

**2. The affirmative is the best way to reconcile the existence of a state, by ensuring that . There is no third option, where we just remove everything bad and don’t worry about how we get there.**

**Mouffe 4**, Chantal. *The democratic paradox*. verso, 2000.

On the political level a similar phenomenon is to be found in the case of the 'third way' discussed in Chapter 5. I argue that it is a**'politics without adversary' which pretends that all interests can be reconciled and that everybody** - provided, of course, that they identify with 'the project' -**can be part of 'the people'.** In order to justify acceptance of the current neo-liberal hegemony while pretending to remain radical - **the 'third way' mobilizes a view of politics which has evacuated the dimension of antagonism and postulates the existence of a 'general interest of the people' whose implementation overcomes the winners/losers form of resolution of conflicts.** The sociological background of such a thesis is that the cycle of confrontational politics that has been dominant in the West since the French Revolution has come to an end. The left/right distinction is now irrelevant, since it was anchored in a social bipolarity that has ceased to exist. For theorists like Anthony Giddens, the left/right divide which he identifies with old-style social democracy versus market fundamentalism - is an inheritance of simple modernization' and has to be transcended. In a globalized world marked by the development of a new individualism, democracy must become 'dialogic'. **What we need is a 'life politics' able to reach the various areas of personal life, creating a 'democracy of the emotions'.** What is missing in such a perspective is any grasp of the power relations which structure contemporary post-industrial societies. There is no denying that capitalism has been radically transformed, but this does not mean that its effects have become more benign; far from it. **We might have given up the idea of a radical alternative to the capitalist system, but even a renewed and modernized social democracy - which the third way claims to be - will need to challenge the entrenched wealth and power of the new class of managers if it wants to bring about a fairer and more accountable society.** The kind of social unanimity which is the trademark of Blairism is only conducive to the maintenance of existing hierarchies. **No amount of dialogue or moral preaching will ever convince the ruling class to give up its power. The state cannot limit itself to dealing with the social consequences of market failures.** To be sure, there are many new issues that an emancipatory politics has to tackle. In order to envisage the making of a new hegemony the traditional understanding of left and right needs to be redefined; but whatever the content we give to those categories, one thing is sure: there comes a time when one needs to decide on which side to stand in their agonistic confrontation. **What is specific and valuable about modern liberal democracy is that, when properly understood, it creates a space in which this confrontation is kept open, power relations are always being put into question and no victory can be final. However, such an 'agonistic' democracy requires accepting that conflict and division are inherent to politics and that there is no place where reconciliation could be definitively achieved as the full actualization of the unity of 'the people'.**To imagine that pluralist democracy could ever be perfectly instantiated is to transform it into a self-refuting ideal, since the condition of possibility of a pluralist democracy is at the same time the condition of impossibility of its perfect implementation. Hence the importance of acknowledging its paradoxical nature.

**3. Every framework procedurally collapses to mine because even if we have some theory of what is good we need to be able to apply that theory. E.g. even if util or Kant is true there is no objective calculator that can tell us if something is good or bad under those frameworks. Conclusions can only be reached via agonistic deliberation.**

**4. Rule following is infinitely regressive. Only my framework can solve this, anything else leads to skepticism because morality requires us to understand rules.**

I submit that this is a crucial insight which undermines the very objective that those who advocate the 'deliberative' approach present as the aim of democracy: the establishment of a rational consensus on universal principles. They believe that through rational deliberation an impartial standpoint could be reached where decisions would be taken that are equally in the interests of alt.l :! Wittgenstein, on the contrary. suggests another view. If we follow his lead. we should acknowledge and valorize the diversity of ways in which the 'democratic game' can be played, instead of trying to reduce this diversity to a uniform model of citizenship. This would mean fostering a plurality of forms of being a democratic citizen and creating the institutions that would make it possible to follow the democratic rules in a plurality of ways. What Wittgenstein teaches us is that **there cannot be one single best**, more **'rational' way to obey** those **rules**and that it is precisely such a recognition that is constitutive of a pluralist democracy. **'Following a rule',** says Wittgenstein, **'is analogous to obeying an order. We are trained to do so; we react to an order in a particular way. But what if one person reacts in one way and another in another** to the order and the training? Which one is right?'23 This is indeed a crucial question for democratic theory. And **it cannot be resolved**, pace the rationalists, **by claiming** that**there is a correct understanding of the rule** that every rational person should accept. To be sure, we need to be able to distinguish between 'obeying the rule' and 'going against it'. But **space needs to be provided for the many different practices in which obedience to the democratic rules can be inscribed.** And this should not be envisaged as a temporary accommodation, as a stage in the process leading to the  realization of the rational consensus, but as a constitutive feature of a democratic society**. Democratic citizenship can take many diverse forms** and such a diversity, far from being a danger for democracy, is in fact its very condition of existence. This will, of course, create conflict and it would be a mistake to expect all those different understandings to coexist without dashing. But**this struggle will not be one between 'enemies' but among 'adversaries', since all participants will recognize the positions of the others in the contest as legitimate ones.**Such an understanding of democratic politics, which is precisely what I call 'agonistic pluralism', is unthinkable within a rationalistic problematic which, by necessity. tends to erase diversity. A perspective inspired by Wittgenstein. on the contrary, can contribute to its formulation, and this is why his contribution to democratic thinking is invaluable. 

**Consequences Fail**

**1. We can’t predict the future which means we can’t predict the consequences of an action since things can happen during our actions that cause a completely different consequence.**

**2. Normativity: If people are held responsible for things they didn’t intend it means they have no control over their actions being immoral. This outweighs because people will give up on morality if they’re blamed for things they didn’t do.**

**3. Calculation freezes action: We have to calculate the results of every action yet calculation is itself an action, which means once we calculate we just keeping adding actions to calculate, and just spend our entire life calculating.**

**4. Trust Paradox: Consequentialism obligates changes in actions on a case by case basis which means every action is subject to calculation and thus people act sporadically, meaning we can’t predict what others will do. But consequentialism necessitates that we can make predictions which means it’s paradoxical and impossible to use.**

**5. Backlash: Consequentialism is repugnant because it takes into considerations the reactions to your actions of others. This means it would say an atrocious action is obligatory if it causes public backlash or reform which would outweigh the consequences of your actions. E.g. if you murdered someone but that got people scared and they prevented any other murder from happening, that action is considered good under util.**

**6. Answers to calc indicts prove them true because I chose these arguments predicting you wouldn’t beat them.**

**Contention)**

**Recognizing the right to strike allows workers to engage in a form of violence, but one that can remain in the control of the state, and not escalate out of control of the law.**

**Crépon,**Marc, **and** Micol **Bez**. "The Right to Strike and Legal War in Walter Benjamin's “Toward the Critique of Violence”." *Critical Times* 2.2 (2019): 252-260.

If we wish to understand how the question of the right to strike arises for WalterBenjamin in the seventh paragraph of his essay “Zur Kritik der Gewalt,” it is impor­tant to first analyze the previous paragraph, which concerns the state’s monopoly on violence. It is here that Benjamin questions the argument that such**a monopoly derives from the impossibility of a system of legal ends to preserve itself as long as the pursuit of natural ends through violent means remains.**Benjamin responds to this dogmatic thesis with the following hypothesis, arguably one of his most impor­tant reflections: “To counter it, one would perhaps have to consider the surprising possibility that**law’s interest in monopolizing violence visàvis the individual is explained by the intention not of preserving legal ends, but rather of preserving law itself.**[This is the possibility] that **violence, when it does not lie in the hands of law, poses a danger to law,**not by virtue of the ends that it may pursue but **by virtue of its mere existence outside of law.” In other words, nothing would endanger the law more than the possibility of its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control. The function of the law would therefore be, first and foremost, to contain violence within its own boundaries.**It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis,Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war. Let us return to the place that the right to strike occupies within class strugle.To begin with, **the very idea of such a struggle implies certain forms of violence. The strike could then be understood as one of the**recognizable**forms**that **this violence can take.**However,**this analytical framework is undermined as soon as this form of violence becomes regulated by a “right to strike,” such as the one recognized by law in France in 1864. What this recognition engages is,** in fact,**the will of the state to control the possible “violence” of the strike.**Thus,**the “right” of the right to strike appears as the best, if not the only, way for the state to circumscribe within**(and via)**the law the relative violence of class struggles.**We might consider this to be the per­fect illustration of the aforementioned hypothesis. Yet, there are two lines of questioning that destabilize this hypothesis that we would do well to consider.  In other words,**nothing would endanger the law more than the possibility of its authority being contested by a violence over which it has no control.**The function of the law would therefore be, first and foremost, to contain violence within its own boundaries. It is in this context that, to demonstrate this surprising hypothesis, Benjamin invokes two examples: the right to strike guaranteed by the state and the law of war

**This impacts back to my framework because the only way for the state to turn the antagonism of the strike into agonism is by recognizing it as a right, so the state can regulate it.**

**Underview**

**1.** **Presumption affirms. A) we presume things true until proven otherwise, I.e. you believed me when I said my name was Nate. B) It’s impossible to presume things false because then we presume that presumption is false but that also leads to a falsity, and it’s infinitely regressive.**

**2.** **Permissibility affirms, none of their arguments about the aff having to prove an obligation apply because my argument is perrmisble actions are obligatory A) it’s better for us to take okay actions than bad ones, and  B) Otherwise we would need a proactive justification to do things like drink water. C)**

**3.** **I get 1ar theory because otherwise the neg can be infinitely abusive which outwieghs everything because that makes it impossible for the aff to win.**

**4.** **Paradigm Issues: Drop the debater a) to deter future abuse, b) if I prove abuse it means substance has already been skewed. No RVIs, a) debaters don’t win for just being fair or educational, b) it would encourage good theory debaters to be abusive so they can bait theory and win off an RVI. Competing interps because a) reasonability is arbitrary and requires judge intervention b) it encourages getting as close to the brightline as possible and**

**5.** **Fairness is a voter because the ballot makes debate a game and without fairness you’re voting for the better cheater not the better debater.**

**6.** **No 2N theory because that allows the neg to just go for 6 minutes of new game over issues which is impossible for a 3 minute 2ar to deal with.**

**7.** **The negative must not contest the affirmative framework if the aff framework is agonism:**

**Time Skew:**

**8.** **Interpretation: The negative must defend the status quo. Standard:**

**Predictability:**

1 [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate](http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate" \t "_blank), [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate](http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate" \t "_blank), [http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate](http://www.thefreedictionary.com/negate" \t "_blank), [http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate](http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate" \t "_blank), [http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate](http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate" \t "_blank)

*2 Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true*

[https://www.dictionary.com/browse/resolve#:~:text=to%20come%20to%20a%20definite,(usually%20followed%20by%20into)](https://www.dictionary.com/browse/resolve" \l ":~:text=to%20come%20to%20a%20definite,(usually%20followed%20by%20into)" \t "_blank).

[https://www.amazon.com/Trix-Cereal-10-7-ounce-Box-Pack/dp/B009563BY2](https://www.amazon.com/Trix-Cereal-10-7-ounce-Box-Pack/dp/B009563BY2" \t "_blank)