# 1NC vs. Olivia Liu

## Offs

### NC

#### Ethics is based in language –

#### 1] It creates out ability to think and makes us agents – life outside language is deterministic, Pettit 09,

Phillip Pettit. Made With Words, Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics. 2009. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/j.ctt7rp73.3> //LHPYA

This picture of the mental life with which nature furnishes human beings, according to Hobbes, has two striking features. The first is that every process that takes place within the mind, cognitive or appetitive, is entirely particularistic. People will see and remember, represent and desire, only concrete things and situations. They will have no capacity to hold by general claims about how things are, or by general policies or principles for the direction of action. They will be prisoners of the imagined particular. Presented with a triangle, they will register just the individual figure contemplated, not any general aspect of the triangle (DCr 6.11; L 4.9). They will see the triangle before them, but will not register it as a triangle, a closed figure, or a drawing; not having access to such classes, they will not have the capacity to register it as anything more general than this particular thing: they will not be able, however implicitly, to classify it. The second aspect of Hobbes’s picture is that all that happens in the natural mind does precisely that: it happens. The succession of conceptions in which mental life consists is a form of vital motion, not of animal or voluntary motion; “one conception followeth not another, according to our election, and the need we have of them, but as it chanceth us to hear or see such things as shall bring them to our mind” (EL 5.1). The process does not evolve under the prompting or guidance of the agent’s desire to have those conceptions assume a certain pattern—say, constitute correct and consistent representations—but only as a by-product of a desire to act in one or another concrete fashion. If the subject is well constructed, then the succession of conceptions will lead rationally to action; the action will satisfy the subject’s desires according to evidentially sensitive representations. But no matter how rational the process or result, this succession of conceptions will not be prompted or guided by the agent’s desires in the manner of an active, intentional performance. The natural agent, animal or human, may be rational, instantiating a certain model of homo rationalis. Yet no one in this natural state will exemplify homo ratiocinans. No one will display the sort of active reflection that we naturally ascribe to Auguste Rodin’s sculpture of the thinker, bent over in concentrated thought. But while the natural mind is particularistic and passive in Hobbes’s portrait, he had no doubt that is not how our minds are. We adult, articulate human beings have words and concepts, not just for particular things, but for classes and categories of things, and we use them to classify, cross-check, and pursue interconnections. More specifically, we do this actively or intentionally, asking ourselves questions about how the words and concepts go together, and seeking to determine the answers. We may do this publicly in speaking with one another, but we may also do it silently, as in reflecting and taking counsel with ourselves. In these two respects, then, we reveal a mind that is decidedly different from the natural mind that Hobbes finds in the animal kingdom. The Linguistic Way Beyond How do human beings escape the constraints of the natural mind? How do they achieve the capacity to represent and desire things under general aspects, and think about them in an active, voluntary way? Hobbes’s answer is the most startling and original claim that he makes in the whole of his philosophy. The claim is that language or speech is a historical invention, and that it is language that makes possible the general, active form of thinking that we human beings display; it enables us to classify as well as register particulars, and seek out the implications of those classifications in a voluntary or active manner. Language, in Hobbes’s story, provides the magic that enables us to jump the limitations of the natural, animal mind. The claim is most vividly expressed in Leviathan. Having reviewed the capacities of the natural mind that human beings share with animals, Hobbes directs us to other human capacities or faculties that “proceed all from the invention of words, and speech. For besides sense, and thoughts, and the train of thoughts, the mind of man has no other motion; though by the help of speech, and method, the same faculties may be improved to such a height, as to distinguish men from all other living creatures.”(L 3.11).

#### 2] It’s inescapable – even if moral theorization could occur absent language it can only be communicated within it when getting others to act on it to create goodness

#### And language causes infinite violence –

#### 1] Language gives rise to comparison which results in endless competition and violence. Pettit 2,

Phillip Pettit. Made With Words, Hobbes on Language, Mind, and Politics. 2009. <http://www.jstor.com/stable/j.ctt7rp73.3> //LHPYA

Lacking the capacity to think in a classificatory way, other animals are insensitive to the ways in which they differ from or resemble their fellows, and so they live in the private as well as the present. But human beings can transcend the boundary of private concern as they can transcend the boundary of concern for the present. And transcend it they certainly will. It will be important for their welfare that they know how they compare with others and that they achieve a high relative standing.5 According to the Hobbesian picture, people’s concern with returns to themselves—their own pleasure, or their avoidance of pain—will naturally lead them to want access to the resources or powers whereby such returns can be produced. If they are to satisfy their wants, they will need the “natural” resources represented by “the faculties of body and mind” as well as “instrumental” resources such as “riches, place of authority, friendship or favour, and good fortune” (EL 8.4). Bent on the pursuit of their own self-interest, then, they will seek the means of conducting that pursuit; moved by the love of self, they will look for a way of consummating that love. In this they will be no different from other animals, though they may be more adept at spotting the means whereby their ends can be realized. But there is one aspect of the resources sought by human beings and other animals that only becomes clear on reflection and reasoning. This is that in a competitive world where the objects of desire are scarce, what will really matter to any creature is not the absolute level of its resources but their level relative to the resources of others. Where there is competition for resources, or competition in the use of resources, the important thing for each will be not the absolute quantity of resources commanded but the extent to which those resources enable the creature to outdo its competitors; “what all have equally is nothing” (DH 11.6). Letting the word power serve for resource, Hobbes finds a nicely turned way of putting the point. “And because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of the power of another: power simply is no more, but the excess of the power of one above that of another. For equal powers opposed, destroy one another”. These observations are true in some measure of all animals, but given their longer time horizons, it is particularly true of human beings. And it is only human beings, of course, who can become aware of the observations, since only they will be able to compare themselves with others for the resources they each command, and only they will be able to see that the important thing for each will be to have more resources than others—greater power. Under the pressure of this perceived need, the human being becomes a creature “whose joy consisteth in comparing himself with other men”

#### 2] Language is structurally negative and doesn’t refer to reality – if I say a saw an oak tree you know I didn’t see a car or person but you can’t visualize what I did see – since our rationality is based in language truth is created by individuals rather than extrinsically found but that creates infinite violence over meaning creation. Parrish:

Derrida`s Economy of Violence in Hobbes` Social Contract, Richard Parrish

For Hobbes truth is a function of logic and language, not of the relation between language and some extralinguistic reality,"25 so the "connections between names and objects are not natural."26 They are artificially constructed by persons, based on individual psychologies and desires. These individual desires are for Hobbes the only measure of good and bad, because value terms "are never used with relation to the person that useth them, there being nothing simply and absolutely so, nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves."27 Since "there are no authentical doctrines concerning right and wrong, good and evil," these labels are placed upon things by humans in acts of creation rather than discovered as extrinsic facts. Elaborating on this, Hobbes writes that "the nature, disposition, and interest of the speaker, such as are the names of virtues and vices; for one man calleth wisdom, what another calleth fear; and one cruelty what another justice."29 A more simplistic understanding of the brutality of the state of nature, which David Gauthier calls the "simple rationality account,"30 has it that mere materialistic competition for goods is the cause of the war of all against all, but such rivalry is a secondary manifestation of the more fundamental competition among all persons to be the dominant creator of meaning. Certainly, Hobbes writes that persons most frequently "desire to hurt each other" because "many men at the same time have an appetite to the same thing; which yet very often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it; whence it follows that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the sword."31 But this competition for goods only arises as the result of the more primary struggle that is inherent in the nature of persons of meaning creators. In the state of nature, "where every [person] is [their] own judge," persons will "mete good and evil by diverse measures," creat[e]ing labels for things as they see fit, based on individual appetites. One of the most significant objects that receives diverse labels in the state of nature is 'threat'. Even if most people happen to construe threat similarly, there will be serious disagreement regarding whether or not a specific situation fits a commonly-held definition.

#### Thus, morality requires an authority to enforce a universal moral theory and resolve conflict. Only an absolute sovereign can do this. Parrish 2:

Derrida`s Economy of Violence in Hobbes` Social Contract, Richard Parrish

“All of the foregoing pints to the conclusion that in the commonwealth the sovereign’sfirst and most fundamental **job is to be the ultimate definer.**Several other commentators have also reached this conclusion. By way of elaborating upon the importance of the moderation of individuality in Hobbes’ theory of government, Richard Flathman claims that **peace “is possible only if** the **ambiguity and disagreement** that pervade general thinking and acting **are eliminated** by the stipulations of a sovereign.” Pursuant to debunking the perennial misinterpretation of Hobbes’ mention of people as wolves, Paul Johnson argues that“one of the primary functions of **the sovereign is to provide** the necessary **unity of meaning** and reference **for the**‘ primary **terms in which [people]** men try to **conduct their** social **lives.” “The** whole **[purpose]** raison d’entre of sovereign helmsmanship lies squarely in the chronic**[is to] defus[e]**ing of **interpretive clashes,”without which humans would**“fly off in all directions” and **fall** inevitably **into the violence of the natural condition.”**

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the will of the sovereign. Prefer it on motivation – morality lacks authority over agents. Even if the aff defines the good it gives no way to obligate agents to actually be good. That hijacks the aff since defining good and denying the ability to enforce it the sovereign creates is contradictory.

#### That negates –

#### 1] The aff obligates the state to act – this is incoherent because it implies an authority higher than the state to constrain the sovereign. Only sovereign entities can create moral obligations, so the state can’t have an obligation to act.

#### 2] The aff changes the status quo of how the government operates – obviously the government does not want to act this way so forcing it on them is a violation of sovereignty

#### 3] Public sector workers getting the right to strike would create a right against the state which is impossible because the state has infinite power

## Case

### AT A priori truth

#### 1] Even if a priori knowledge exists it can only be comprehended through language – absent language we can’t connect a triangle to having 3 sides because we can’t conceptualize grouping like that – that’s why animals don’t understand a priori knowledge

#### 2] Only thought experience can we justify and accept a priori truth. Russell 14

[Bruce Russell. “A Priori Justification and Knowledge” May 19, 2014. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/] \*\*\*Bracketed for gendered language\*\*\* //SS

As noted in the previous section, we take it **that a belief that is “independent of experience” is based solely on understanding the proposition which is its object**; all others are based on experience. But people sometimes understand “independent of experience” to mean something else. Some have taken it to mean “apart from experience”. **But how could there be any justification apart from experience? Don't people have to learn from experience what bachelors**, crows, **and knowledge are in order to be justified in believing** (1a), (3a), and (11a)? **These are not innate ideas that people are born with**, even if there are some innate ideas. And even if we are born with some innate capacities, say, to learn a language and to reason, those capacities by themselves do not provide justification for believing any of (1a)–(14a).¶ **It seems impossible for there to be any justification completely independent of experience.** We need to distinguish the experience needed to acquire the relevant concepts involved in (1a)–(14a) and any additional experience needed to determine whether the relevant propositions that contain those concepts are true or false. To say that a person could be justified in believing any of (1a)–(14a) independent of experience means that they could be justified independent of experience beyond that which is needed to acquire the relevant concepts needed to understand those propositions. **For a person to be justified in believing** any of (1b)–(14b), **it is also true that [they] she must have enough experience to acquire the relevant concepts expressed in those propositions.** Having those concepts is necessary for her to understand the relevant propositions, and **she cannot justifiedly believe a proposition that she does not understand.** However, **she [they] must also have additional experience beyond that in order to determine whether the relevant proposition is true or false**, or be aware of the testimony of someone who has had the requisite additional experience. That additional experience is not required for someone to tell whether (1a)–(14a) are true or false. For someone to be a priori justified in believing some proposition is for her to be justified absent experiences beyond those required for her to acquire the relevant concepts employed in the statement of that proposition. This is sometimes described as the view that a priori justification depends only on enabling experiences, that is, the experiences a person needs in order to understand the proposition at issue.

#### That means conflicting opinions on a priori truth still exist between people even if one person is correct which still generates violence over meaning creation