### 1NC – T

#### Our interpretation is that the resolution should determine the division of affirmative and negative ground.

#### Resolved means a legislative policy

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964. ED

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### A worker is

Dictionary.com

https://www.google.com/search?q=workers+def&oq=workers+def&aqs=chrome..69i57j35i39j0i433j0l2j69i61j69i60j69i61.1848j0j7&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8

a person who does a specified type of work or who works in a specified way.

#### A government is

Dictionary.com

the governing body of a nation, state, or community.

#### Violation:

#### Vote neg for predictable limits—post-facto topic adjustment structurally favors the aff by manipulating the balance of prep which is anchored around the resolution as a stasis point. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months, which means their arguments are presumptively false because they haven’t been subject to well-researched scrutiny

#### 3 impacts:

#### First is fairness—debate is fundamentally a game which requires both sides to have a relatively equal shot at winning and is necessary for any benefit to the activity. That outweighs:

#### A] decision-making: every argument concedes to the validity of fairness i.e. that the judge will make a fair decision based on the arguments presented. This means if they win fairness bad vote neg on presumption because you have no obligation to fairly evaluate their arguments.

#### B] probability: voting aff can’t solve any of their impacts but it can solve ours. All the ballot does is tell tab who won which can’t stop any violence but can resolve the fairness imbalance in this particular debate.

#### Second is switch side and idea-testing --- only a limited topic that leaves a role for the negative allows contestation and second-order testing that overcomes polarization. Switching sides forces them to scrutinize their own beliefs, which is valuable for developing and defending their own convictions more robustly.

Poscher 16

Ralf Poscher, Diat the Institute for Staatswissenschaft and Philosophy of Law at the University of Freiburg “Why We Argue About the Law: An Agonistic Account of Legal Disagreement”, Metaphilosophy of Law, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki/Adam Dyrda/Pawel Banas (eds.), Hart Publishing. 2016.

Hegel’s dialectical thinking powerfully exploits the idea of negation. It is a central feature of spirit and consciousness that they have the power to negate. The spirit “is this power only by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it. This […] is the magical power that converts it into being.”102 The tarrying with the negative is part of what Hegel calls the “labour of the negative”103. In a loose reference to this Hegelian notion Gerald Postema points to yet another feature of disagreements as a necessary ingredient of the process of practical reasoning. Only if our reasoning is exposed to contrary arguments can we test its merits. We must go through the “labor of the negative” to have trust in our deliberative processes.104

This also holds where we seem to be in agreement. Agreement without exposure to disagreement can be deceptive in various ways. The first phenomenon Postema draws attention to is the group polarization effect. When a group of like‐minded people deliberates an issue, informational and reputational cascades produce more extreme views in the process of their deliberations.105 The polarization and biases that are well documented for such groups106 can be countered at least in some settings by the inclusion of dissenting voices. In these scenarios, disagreement can be a cure for dysfunctional deliberative polarization and biases.107 A second deliberative dysfunction mitigated by disagreement is superficial agreement, which can even be manipulatively used in the sense of a “presumptuous ‘We’”108. Disagreement can help to police such distortions of deliberative processes by challenging superficial agreements. Disagreements may thus signal that a deliberative process is not contaminated with dysfunctional agreements stemming from polarization or superficiality. Protecting our discourse against such contaminations is valuable even if we do not come to terms. Each of the opposing positions will profit from the catharsis it received “by looking the negative in the face and tarrying with it”.

These advantages of disagreement in collective deliberations are mirrored on the individual level. Even if the probability of reaching a consensus with our opponents is very low from the beginning, as might be the case in deeply entrenched conflicts, entering into an exchange of arguments can still serve to test and improve our position. We have to do the “labor of the negative” for ourselves. Even if we cannot come up with a line of argument that coheres well with everybody else’s beliefs, attitudes and dispositions, we can still come up with a line of argument that achieves this goal for our own personal beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. To provide ourselves with the most coherent system of our own beliefs, attitudes and dispositions is – at least in important issues – an aspect of personal integrity – to borrow one of Dworkin’s favorite expressions for a less aspirational idea.

In hard cases we must – in some way – lay out the argument for ourselves to figure out what we believe to be the right answer. We might not know what we believe ourselves in questions of abortion, the death penalty, torture, and stem cell research, until we have developed a line of argument against the background of our subjective beliefs, attitudes and dispositions. In these cases it might be rational to discuss the issue with someone unlikely to share some of our more fundamental convictions or who opposes the view towards which we lean. This might even be the most helpful way of corroborating a view, because we know that our adversary is much more motivated to find a potential flaw in our argument than someone with whom we know we are in agreement. It might be more helpful to discuss a liberal position with Scalia than with Breyer if we want to make sure that we have not overlooked some counter‐argument to our case.

It would be too narrow an understanding of our practice of legal disagreement and argumentation if we restricted its purpose to persuading an adversary in the case at hand and inferred from this narrow understanding the irrationality of argumentation in hard cases, in which we know beforehand that we will not be able to persuade. Rational argumentation is a much more complex practice in a more complex social framework. Argumentation with an adversary can have purposes beyond persuading him: to test one’s own convictions, to engage our opponent in inferential commitments and to persuade third parties are only some of these; to rally our troops or express our convictions might be others. To make our peace with Kant we could say that “there must be a hope of coming to terms” with someone though not necessarily with our opponent, but maybe only a third party or even just ourselves and not necessarily only on the issue at hand, but maybe through inferential commitments in a different arena.

f) The Advantage Over Non‐Argumentative Alternatives

It goes without saying that in real world legal disagreements, all of the reasons listed above usually play in concert and will typically hold true to different degrees relative to different participants in the debate: There will be some participants for whom our hope of coming to terms might still be justified and others for whom only some of the other reasons hold and some for whom it is a mixture of all of the reasons in shifting degrees as our disagreements evolve. It is also apparent that, with the exception of the first reason, the rationality of our disagreements is of a secondary nature. The rational does not lie in the discovery of a single right answer to the topic of debate, since in hard cases there are no single right answers. Instead, our disagreements are instrumental to rationales which lie beyond the topic at hand, like the exploration of our communalities or of our inferential commitments. Since these reasons are of this secondary nature, they must stand up to alternative ways of settling irreconcilable disagreements that have other secondary reasons in their favor – like swiftness of decision making or using fewer resources. Why does our legal practice require lengthy arguments and discursive efforts even in appellate or supreme court cases of irreconcilable legal disagreements? The closure has to come by some non‐argumentative mean and courts have always relied on them. For the medieval courts of the Germanic tradition it is bequeathed that judges had to fight it out literally if they disagreed on a question of law – though the king allowed them to pick surrogate fighters.109 It is understandable that the process of civilization has led us to non‐violent non‐ argumentative means to determine the law. But what was wrong with District Judge Currin of Umatilla County in Oregon, who – in his late days – decided inconclusive traffic violations by publicly flipping a coin?110 If we are counting heads at the end of our lengthy argumentative proceedings anyway, why not decide hard cases by gut voting at the outset and spare everybody the cost of developing elaborate arguments on questions, where there is not fact of the matter to be discovered?

#### Third—small schools disad: under-resourced are most adversely effected by a massive, unpredictable caselist which worsens structural disparities

#### Topical version—defend giving workers the unconditional right to strike – it’s neoliberal to say that corporations and the state should have entire control over their workers.

#### Disads to the TVA prove there’s negative ground and that it’s a contestable stasis point, and if their critique is incompatible with the topic reading it on the neg solves and is better because it promotes switch-side debate

#### Winning their aff doesn’t answer T because only through the process of clash can they refine their defense of it—they need an explanation of why we switch sides and why there’s a winner and loser under their model

#### Reject the team—T is question of models of debate and the damage to our strategy was already done

#### Competing interps—they have to proactively to justify their model and reasonability links to our offense

#### No rvis or impact turns—it’s their burden to prove their topical. Beating back T doesn’t prove their advocacy is good

### 1NC – DA

#### The stars are aligning -- comprehensive infrastructure will pass now through reconciliation. Speed and PC are key.

Kilgore 6-15-2021, journalist @ NY Mag (Ed, “Democrats Move Ahead With Plan to Pass the Rest of Biden’s Agenda,” New York Mag, <https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2021/06/democrats-move-ahead-with-plan-to-pass-rest-of-biden-agenda.html)//BB>

House and Senate Democratic leaders on Tuesday indicated they are preparing to move ahead with steps necessary to enact as much of President Biden’s agenda as possible by using the same tactic that got around a Republican filibuster threat and passed the $1.9 trillion COVID-relief package earlier this year. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and John Yarmuth, the chairman of the House budget committee, want to include budget-reconciliation instructions in the next budget resolution, which would make it possible to enact another big spending package by a simple majority vote in both chambers, exceeding in size and scope even Biden’s aforementioned American Rescue Plan enacted in March. Naturally, a Beltway media environment dominated by discussion of on-again off-again bipartisan infrastructure negotiations will view this highly predictable development as a potential deal-killer in talks with Republicans. But Democrats are making it clear any potential reconciliation bill can be adjusted to accommodate an infrastructure agreement that would be enacted by regular old legislation: [Yarmuth] said his committee is preparing to write reconciliation instructions for about $4 trillion in spending but could remove any bipartisan agreement from those instructions. “We’re assuming right now that everything will be done by reconciliation,” he said, including Biden’s infrastructure, child care and other proposals and perhaps some additions backed by congressional Democrats. “That doesn’t preclude a bipartisan agreement. If one happens, we just take that part out of the instructions. But right now, we’re assuming everything will be in.” Similarly, Schumer said he “plans to bring a scaled-down infrastructure package to the Senate floor in July under regular order … Both are moving forward, the bipartisan track and the track on reconciliation, and both we hope to get done in July, both the budget resolution and the bipartisan bill.” Obviously the two “tracks” are interdependent, in part because Senate progressives don’t want to back a bipartisan infrastructure bill without assurances from Democratic centrists that they’ll support a later reconciliation bill even as Republicans claim Congress cannot afford to do anything more this year. Moving ahead on the budget resolution, moreover, will keep some pressure on Republicans to negotiate with at least a bit of good faith, in the understanding that Democrats aren’t going to wait perpetually. And they really can’t: If they want to pass a reconciliation bill after the planned August congressional recess, the building blocks have to be put into place in the next few weeks. Having said that, there is enough time for Democrats to adjust their resolution and the reconciliation instructions to take into account some internal deal-making to ensure a united party (essential in both chambers), and to cover whatever gets left out of a bipartisan deal, if one is actually reached. Whatever else happens, the reconciliation bill will include most of Biden’s $2.25 trillion American Jobs Plan, and his $1.8 trillion American Families Plan. So it will be an enormous piece of legislation, and quite possibly the last big package that can be enacted prior to the 2022 midterm elections.

#### Preserving comfortable union relations maintains PC.

**Kerrissey and Schofer 13** [Kerrissey, Jasmine, and Evan Schofer. Jasmine Kerrissey Department of Sociology University of California, Irvine Evan Schofer Department of Sociology University of California, Irvine. “Union Membership and Political Participation in the United States.” *Social Forces*, vol. 91, no. 3, 2013, pp. 895–928. *JSTOR*, www.jstor.org/stable/23361125]

Discussion and Conclusion We observe consistent evidence that union members are more politically engaged than non-members. The effect of union membership is broad, spanning most types of political and civic involvement, including voting, protesting, signing petitions, association membership, and so on, and holds up with a large range of control variables. 36 The prior literature looks mainly at voting outcomes – and often finds weak results when many variables are controlled – so even these basic findings represent a step forward. The magnitude of the union membership effect varies across outcomes, but is generally substantial. For instance, union members have 20% greater odds of voting than comparable non-members. The odds of participating in a protest were 73% to 100% higher among union members, according to the Roper and Verba datasets, respectively. Many of the large and highly significant effects are in areas of social protest and electoral participation. In the case of volunteering and charitable donations, for instance, we see substantially larger effects in political forms of those activities – whereas general measures of volunteering and donations show smaller effects. We observe weaker or non-significant effects of union membership on activities that are far removed from union agendas, such as general civic membership, volunteering, or blood donation. It appears that unions build ‘political capital’ more than generalized ‘social capital’.8 These patterns are broadly consistent with our structural arguments, discussed above, that contemporary American labor unions face strong pressures to mobilize members to prepare for collective action with employers and to maintain political capital with the Democratic party.

#### Strike divide the Union.

Israelstam 17 [Ivan. Ivan Israelstam is the Chief Executive of Labour Law Management Consulting. “What is the impact of strikes for employers and employees?”. 11-22-2017. Skills Portal. https://www.skillsportal.co.za/content/what-impact-strikes-employers-and-employees.]

The loss of production and of customers is usually the first consequence of a strike. However, indirect strike costs incurred later can be just as serious. In the case of *NUM and others vs Chrober Slate (Pty) Ltd* (2008, 3 BLLR 287) the mine dismissed its quarry workers and factory staff due to an unprocedural strike by the quarry workers. The employer admitted that the factory staff were not to blame for the work stoppage as it had been the quarry workers who had refused to work. The dismissals of the factory staff were found to be unfair and the Labour Court ordered the mine to reinstate the 42 dismissed employees with back pay. In order to avoid the snowballing costs and loss of business that strikes can cause the employer needs to understand: What constitutes a strike in legal terms, The economic effects of a strike for both parties, The effects of a strike on the employment relationship, How to resolve constructively the conflict that causes industrial action, How to minimise the damage caused by a strike, and How to bring a strike to a speedy end. WHAT CONSTITUTES A STRIKE? A strike is any concerted withholding of labour by a group of employees in support of a demand made by them to the employer. Examples of this are work stoppages, go-slows, overtime bans and work-to-rule. THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF A STRIKE FOR BOTH PARTIES. The employer is likely to lose money due to delayed service to clients or to lost production time. The employees will lose their pay due to the no work, no pay principle. If the strikers are dismissed they will lose their livelihoods altogether. THE EFFECTS OF A STRIKE ON THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP. Once the strike is over, even if the business has not been closed down by it, the feelings of hostility resulting from the strike can severely damage teamwork, productivity and profitability. HOW TO RESOLVE CONSTRUCTIVELY THE CONFLICT THAT CAUSES INDUSTRIAL ACTION. Before the conflict gets to the stage of impasse that results in a strike the parties need to utilise the services of an expert in conflict resolution. The CCMA was set up with the purpose of helping the parties to resolve conflict peacefully. However, in practice, the warring parties too often go to the CCMA because the law says they must rather than in a sincere attempt to sort out their differences. In other words, by the time the parties end up at the CCMA the conflict is often beyond the point of no return. For this reason, during times of industrial peace, employers and employees should identify and agree upon the use of a trained and reputable conflict resolution expert to be called in when the parties are unable to solve the problem themselves. HOW TO MINIMISE THE DAMAGE CAUSED BY A STRIKE. Employees should allow the business to continue to run in order to avert the likelihood of a closure that could result in job losses. Employers should use the services of a reputable labour broker who can provide alternative labour during the strike. Both parties should behave in a civil and professional manner towards each other. HOW TO BRING A STRIKE TO A SPEEDY END. Where the parties are unable to find common ground they should not delay in bringing in the services of their mutually agreed strike resolution expert. An expert in this field will not only have techniques of bringing the parties together but will also be able to see solutions that the emotions of the parties have prevented them from seeing. The expert should also be able to help the parties rebuild their relationship once the strike is over.

#### Infrastructure solves international emissions through an enforceable NDC [Nationally Determined Contributions] 2021 is try-or-die.

Mazria 3-23-2021, FAIA, founder and CEO of the nonprofit Architecture 2030, is an internationally recognized architect, author, researcher, and educator. Over the past four decades, his seminal research into the sustainability, resilience, energy consumption, and greenhouse gas emissions of the built environment has redefined the role of architecture, planning, design, and building in reshaping our world. He is the 2021 recipient of AIA's Gold Medal (Edward, “CarbonPositive: This Is the Make-or-Break Year for the Planet,” *Architect Magazine*, <https://www.architectmagazine.com/technology/carbonpositive-this-is-the-make-or-break-year-for-the-planet_o>)//BB

In the Feb. 26 release of the interim United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change report, Secretary-General António Guterres boldly declared 2021 the “make or break year” for the planet. The report found the 2030 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) emissions-reduction pledges of 75 countries to be wholly inadequate. Global greenhouse gas emissions would only be cut by about 1%, far short of the 65% cut in carbon emissions from January 2020 levels needed by 2030 to have a 67% probability of limiting global warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels and to meet the goals of the 2015 Paris Agreement. The science and global carbon budget for limiting warming to 1.5°C are clear. The remaining budget at the beginning of 2020 was 340 gigatons of carbon dioxide, which means that if the world achieves a 65% reduction of CO₂ emissions by 2030 and zero emissions by 2040, we can expect warming to be kept at about 1.5°C. The time to act is now. The most significant climate event since the 2015 Paris Agreement—when all parties agreed to pursue efforts to limit the global temperature increase to 1.5°C—will take place this November. At the 2021 U.N. Climate Change Conference (COP26), countries must submit their updated 2030 NDCs. To date, only the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Denmark have committed to significant 2030 emissions reductions from 1990 levels: 55%, 68%, and 70%, respectively. Much, much more is needed to reach the critical goals. Fortunately, the U.S. is now poised to lead in this endeavor, as COP26 will be the first U.N. climate change conference the country will attend since rejoining the Paris Agreement. All eyes will be on its updated NDC pledge. This figure should be announced before April 22, when President Biden will host world leaders for a summit “aimed at raising climate ambition.” The country must persuade other nations to follow suit by setting a minimum 2030 NDC of a 65% emissions reduction from 2005 levels, in line with the 1.5°C carbon budget. Additionally, the U.S. must work with the EU, China, and India to be similarly ambitious, as these four entities are responsible for 58% of global CO₂ emissions. The U.S. can lead other nations with confidence and the knowledge that a 65% reduction is achievable. Why? U.S. carbon emissions today are already down 23% from 2005 levels. The building sector, the country’s largest energy consumer, continues to reduce its emissions and is now 30% below 2005 levels, ahead of the U.S. Paris Agreement’s NDC of a 26% to 28% reduction by 2025. The Biden pledge of a clean electricity grid by 2035 should further cut emissions from the building sector, surpassing the targeted 65% reduction, and also drive emissions down in other sectors. Prior to COP26, the world’s largest professional planning, design, and construction organizations will meet to demonstrate the significant actions our industry is taking to work within the 1.5°C carbon budget. With urban environments responsible for more than 75% of all annual global emissions—predominantly generated by day-to-day building and infrastructure operations, the manufacture of materials, and construction—we can show what is practically possible and embolden all governments to do the same.

#### Warming leads to extinction---it’s a conflict-multiplier and defense doesn’t assume non-linearity

Kareiva 18, Ph.D. in ecology and applied mathematics from Cornell University, director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al. (Peter, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back,” *Futures*, 102)

In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (climate change, global freshwater cycle, and ocean acidification) do pose existential risks. This is because of intrinsic positive feedback loops, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all directly connected to the provision of food and water, and shortages of food and water can create conflict and social unrest. Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields). Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. Ample clean water is not a luxury—it is essential for human survival. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease. Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms. A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people. 4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes Humans are remarkably ingenious, and have adapted to crises throughout their history. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). However, the many stories of human ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks such as global famine or extreme air pollution represent environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate without positive feedbacks. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm. In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios. Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002). Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This catastrophic fire embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that could catch humanity off-guard and produce a true apocalyptic event. Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming. Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967). Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009). The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that runaway climate change, and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks portends even greater existential risks. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.

#### Apocalyptic images challenge dominant power structures to create futures of social justice

Jessica Hurley 17, Assistant Professor in the Humanities at the University of Chicago, “Impossible Futures: Fictions of Risk in the Longue Durée”, Duke University Press, https://read.dukeupress.edu/american-literature/article/89/4/761/132823/Impossible-Futures-Fictions-of-Risk-in-the-Longue

If contemporary ecocriticism has a shared premise about environmental risk it is that genre is the key to both perceiving and, possibly, correcting ecological crisis. Frederick Buell’s 2003 From Apocalypse to Way of Life: Environmental Crisis in the American Century has established one of the most central oppositions of this paradigm. As his title suggests, Buell tells the story of a discourse that began in the apocalyptic mode in the 1960s and 70s, when discussions of “the immanent end of nature” most commonly took the form of “prophecy, revelation, climax, and extermination” before turning away from apocalypse when the prophesied ends failed to arrive (112, 78). Buell offers his suggestion for the appropriate literary mode for life lived within a crisis that is both unceasing and inescapable: new voices, “if wise enough….will abandon apocalypse for a sadder realism that looks closely at social and environmental changes in process and recognizes crisis as a place where people dwell” (202-3). In a world of threat, Buell demands a realism that might help us see risks more clearly and aid our survival.¶ Buell’s argument has become a broadly held view in contemporary risk theory and ecocriticism, overlapping fields in the social sciences and humanities that address the foundational question of second modernity: “how do you live when you are at such risk?” (Woodward 2009, 205).1 Such an assertion, however, assumes both that realism is a neutral descriptive practice and that apocalypse is not something that is happening now in places that we might not see, or cannot hear. This essay argues for the continuing importance of apocalyptic narrative forms in representations of environmental risk to disrupt conservative realisms that maintain the status quo. Taking the ecological disaster of nuclear waste as my case study, I examine two fictional treatments of nuclear waste dumps that create different temporal structures within which the colonial history of the United States plays out. The first, a set of Department of Energy documents that use statistical modeling and fictional description to predict a set of realistic futures for the site of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico (1991), creates a present that is fully knowable and a future that is fully predictable. Such an approach, I suggest, perpetuates the state logics of implausibility that have long undergirded settler colonialism in the United States. In contrast, Leslie Marmon Silko’s contemporaneous novel Almanac of the Dead (1991) uses its apocalyptic form to deconstruct the claims to verisimilitude that undergird state realism, transforming nuclear waste into a prophecy of the end of the United States rather than a means for imagining its continuation. In Almanac of the Dead, the presence of nuclear waste introjects a deep-time perspective into contemporary America, transforming the present into a speculative space where environmental catastrophe produces not only unevenly distributed damage but also revolutionary forms of social justice that insist on a truth that probability modeling cannot contain: that the future will be unimaginably different from the present, while the present, too, might yet be utterly different from the real that we think we know.¶ Nuclear waste is rarely treated in ecocriticism or risk theory, for several reasons: it is too manmade to be ecological; its catastrophes are ongoing, intentionally produced situations rather than sudden disasters; and it does not support the narrative that subtends ecocritical accounts of risk perception in which the nuclear threat gives rise to an awareness of other kinds of threat before reaching the end of its relevance at the end of the Cold War.2 In what follows, I argue that the failure of nuclear waste to fit into the critical frames created by ecocriticism and risk theory to date offers an opportunity to expand those frames and overcome some of their limitations, especially the impulse towards a paranoid, totalizing realism that Peter van Wyck (2005) has described as central to ecocriticism in the risk society. Nuclear waste has durational forms that dwarf the human. It therefore dwells less in the economy of risk as it is currently conceptualized and more in the blown-out realm of deep time. Inhabiting the temporal scale that has recently been christened the Anthropocene, the geological era defined by the impact of human activities on the world’s geology and climate, nuclear waste unsettles any attempt at realist description, unveiling the limits of human imagination at every turn.3 By analyzing risk society through a heuristic of nuclear waste, this essay offers a critique of nuclear colonialism and environmental racism. At the same time, it shows how the apocalyptic mode in deep time allows narratives of environmental harm and danger to move beyond the paranoid logic of risk. In the world of deep time, all that might come to pass will come to pass, sooner or later. The endless maybes of risk become certainties. The impossibilities of our own deaths and the deaths of everything else will come. But so too will other impossibilities: talking macaws and alien visitors; the end of the colonial occupation of North America, perhaps, or a sudden human determination to let the world live. The end of capitalism may yet become more thinkable than the end of the world. Just wait long enough. Stranger things will happen.¶

### 1NC – PIC

#### We endorse the entirety of the affirmative except the resolution.

### 1NC – case

#### ROB is to vote for the better debater – anything else is self-serving, arbitrary, and begs the question of the rest of the debate

Can’t resolve anything

1] systens

2] spillover

#### Vote aff/neg to vote neg/aff

Merrin 01 (William, Prof. of School of Cultural Studies, Leeds Metropolitan University, “To play with phantoms: Jean Baudrillard and the Evil Demon of the Simulacrum” Economy and Society Volume 30 Number 1)

The power of the simulacrum, therefore, may prove to be greater than Baudrillard realized. On a personal level this is certainly the case. In a candid 1984–5 interview he reveals that his courtship of its demon became an unlivable experience: ‘I stopped working on simulation. I felt I was going totally nuts’ (1993a: 105). The simulacrum, however, could not be so easily disposed of. Despite his desire to ‘cast off this yoke of simulacres and simulation’ (1993a: 184), the ‘simulacrum’ has thrived, becoming an idea popularly and irrevocably identified with Baudrillard. It has, appropriately, exerted its simulacral power to appear in the popular imagination as the real philosophy of Jean Baudrillard, eclipsing his critique, and all other aspects of his work and career. Journalistic commentary and student texts are typical here in identifying the simulacrum as Baudrillard’s sole approved project. Thus the problem of finding Baudrillard’s flat is turned into an obvious and banal hook by one interviewer, who takes the opportunity to enquire whether ‘Baudrillard himself . . . might be a simulacrum’: Does he really exist? (Leith 1998: 14). More importantly for Baudrillard, however, is the simulacral efficacy of doubling – the theoretical strategy of employing simulation which, quite naturally, has a simulacral effect. The theory of simulation Baudrillard did not believe in has now been realized: as the Japanese interviewer makes clear, the simulacrum has become reality. Volatized in, and as, the real, its victory is the concept’s defeA2: once it is ‘true’, the simulacrum becomes a commonplace, robbed of its capacity to arouse the world’s denial and thus its critical force: if there is nothing beyond the simulacrum then it is not even open to question but is simply ‘our absolute banality, our everyday obscenity’ (Zurbrugg 1997: 11). Hence Baudrillard’s emphasis upon the theoretical challenge of the simulacrum. Once realized, unless – as Baudrillard hopes – it can itself be reversed against simulation, then this critical function is lost. Opposing Baudrillard with the simulacrum – with its success – is, therefore, the most effective means of critique. For his work is not wrong, but too true: the simulacrum has become reality and this is his end; the game is over. It is, therefore, in the hyperdefence of Baudrillard that we find a means of leaving him behind. With his success, Baudrillard disappears. If we want him to survive, we must condemn him as a nihilistic proponent of the simulacrum and oppose him with an outraged, vituperic, moral appeal to reality, as Kellner and Norris do; thereby restoring his work to life. For, if it is only in its contradiction that it can live as a provocation and diabolical challenge, then once it is true this ends. Kellner and Norris, therefore, may yet prove to be Baudrillard’s greatest defenders. Baudrillard, of all people, should have anticipated his disappearance, for the simulacrum’s demonic power rests also in its attraction for, and hold over, humanity. Aristotle, for example, recognized this, writing of this instinctive pleas- ure of imitation in man, ‘the most imitative of living creatures’ (1997: 5), while Nietzsche also speaks of ‘the delight in simulation’ and of its effects in ‘explod- ing as a power that pushes aside one’s so-called “character”, 􏰝 ooding it and at times extinguishing it’ (1974: para. 361). One courts this demon, therefore, at one’s own risk, as it captivates and ovearwhelms our personality. As the author of the Psalms cautioned the makers and worshippers of idols, ‘they that make them are like unto them: so is everyone who trusteth in them’ (Barasch 1992: 20). The efficacy of simulation and the danger of disappearance are key themes in Roger Caillois’ influential essay on animal mimicry and the mimetic instinct – no less powerful in insects than in man (Caillois 1984). The instinct of mimesis parallels primitive magic, Caillois says, though it is a mimetic spell which is too strong for those who cast it. For the insects it is a spell which has ‘caught the sorcerer in his own trap’ (1984: 27) – Phylia, for example, ‘browse among them- selves, taking each other for real leaves’ (1984: 25). So, Caillois argues, simulation absorbs the simulator, leading to their mimetic ‘assimilation to the surroundings’ with a consequent ‘psychasthenic’ loss of distinction, personality, and also, in a thanatophilic movement, the loss of the signs of life itself (1984: 28, 30). Simulation, therefore, 􏰜 nally overwhelms the simulator: as Caillois warns in the epigram which opens his article, ‘Take care: when you play with phantoms, you may become one’ (1984: 17). So Baudrillard’s game has the same result. If the simulacrum has been realized; if simulation is now our everyday banality, then Baudrillard is condemned to a lifeless disappearance as a sorcerer trapped by his own magical invocation, absorbed by his own simulation. Baudrillard may not believe in the ghost of the simulacrum, but he himself becomes this very ghost. His game with phantoms ends, as Caillois knew it would, with his own phantasmatic transformation, with his apparitional disappearance. But this is only fitting, for in the pact with the devil it is always your soul that is the stake.

#### Signs are products of specific historical contexts—policies can reduce material violence.

Mattson 12 (Michelle, Rhodes College German politics and culture professor, “Rebels Without Causes: Contemporary German Authors Not in Search of Meaning”, Monatshefte, 104.2, Summer, project muse)

I shall not venture to judge whether Baudrillard’s diagnosis of postmodern society is accurate, although it appears that many of Germany’s current writers agree with him or were influenced by postmodern theories of late 20th-century consumerist societies. I can, however, say in conclusion that it is not helpfulor productive on either an individual or social level in imagining ways of living in today’s world. As Steven Best points out: Baudrillard’s radical rejection of referentiality is premised upon a one-dimensional, No-Exit world of self-referring simulacra. But, however, reified and self-referential postmodern semiotics is, signs do not simply move in their own signifying orbit. They are historically produced and circulated and while they may not translucently refer to some originating world, they none the less can be socio-historically contextualized, interpreted, and critiqued.(57) In other words, human beings generate the simulacra in specific historical contexts that are subject to interpretation and challenge. Regardless of how pervasively the media spin our reality, real people suffer and—occasionally [End Page 259] prosper—because of political decisions made at the local, national, and international level. Media images may overpower us, but they shouldn’t make us lose sight of the real ramifications of political and economic development. Many critics have suggested that Baudrillard’s chief accomplishment was to serve as an agent provocateur. In an interview with Mike Gane, Baudrillard himself saw his method of reflection as “provocative, reversible, [ . . . ] a way of raising things to the ‘N’th power [ . . . ] It’s a bit like a theory-fiction” (Poster 331). One could argue that this is precisely the function of such novels and short stories as the ones examined here: to provoke us. But to what end? Naters, Regener, and Hermann all write very readable literature, and they challenge us to understand the world of the insipid, self-centered, and myopic characters that they have created. It would indeed be a disservice to the authors to imply that they do not view their own characters with critical distance. Thus, I am not suggesting that they believe their readers should emulate the characters they have created. They have not, however, successfully demonstrated either why we should care about them or—more importantly—what we can learn from them.

#### Burden of proof is on them—risk of offense goes neg

Gilman-Opalsky ‘10

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Simulacra are, by definition, indistinguishable from real events. Nevertheless, the actual existence and constant possibility of simulacra are not sufficient causes for adopting reality agnosticism. It may be impossible to distinguish the fake holdup and fake sickness from the real holdup and real sickness, but the child has really been sick and most criminals are not playing. Those involved in staging the act of simulation itself do mostly know the difference. But Baudrillard would rightly point out that, from the outside, for those of us confronting simulacra phenomenologically (instead of making them), our general inability to tell the difference means that we can never be too confident about reality. Reality agnosticism is tantamount to treating every event as a possible simulacrum. This is the same as to treat no events as real. This is precisely what Baudrillard wants to do, yet I think this is a mistake. Baudrillard presses us to recognize that even suffering and death can be and have been simulated (i.e. the Timisoara Massacre in 1989 in Western Romania, where protestors were gunned down by the army. While the massacre was real, it was later disclosed that 27 bodies were exhumed from the Timisoara " Paupers' Cemetery" to exaggerate the massacre for TV effect. This series of events marked the end of Ceausescu’s Stalinist regime in Romania.) . .l2 However, despite such manipulation. we do live in a world where suffering and death are real. That even suffering and death could be staged, and that we cannot always tell when that is the case does not mean that we should make such suspicion into an operational logic – there is always the other side, the side of actual suffering and death. Baudrillard makes too much out of the fake, and he errs on the wrong side of the equation. What I mean by saying "too much"" and "wrong side", is precisely to raise a normative objection. Wherever we cannot tell the difference (that is, wherever there are functional simulacra), I contend that we should err on the side of a different obligation. And this is indeed a moral obligation to take human suffering seriously, an obligation that outweighs the integrity of Baudrillard's skepticism. To put it bluntly, I would rather be fooled into thinking a faked death was real than that a real death was faked.

#### Reality exists and is knowable. Saying it doesn’t is ethical relativism that licenses mass violence.

Every ’7

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Jean Baudrillard chose the occasion of the Gulf Conflict to extend his thesis that global society is so caught in the grip of media simulation that its connection with reality has, once and for all, been severed: "Just a couple of days before war broke out in the Gulf, one could find Baudrillard regaling readers of the Guardian newspaper with an article which declared that this war would never happen, existing as it did only as a figment of mass media simulation, war-games rhetoric or imaginary scenarios beyond all limits of real-world, factual possibility" (Norris: 11) In choosing to concentrate on the undeniably manifest talk of war and foregrounding the role of strategic simulation whilst, simultaneously, refusing to engage in an account of events beyond the media, Jean Baudrillard was able to construct the case that a war conducted at a distance would be, of necessity, a matter of pure speculation and simulation: "Exchanging war for the signs of war" (Baudrillard 1994: 62). Written in to this article, almost as a fail-safe device against the collapse of his contention, was an interdiction against the ability of anyone to make a claim to know the truth of the situation. For, in Baudrillard's eyes, such a claim would be "banking on a realist ontology that clung to some variant of the truth/falsehood or fact/fiction dichotomy" (Norris: 13). A claim that would be forever stuck in nostalgia for some ultimate truth telling discourse (or metalanguage) - offering a delusory refuge from the "knowledge that we are nowadays utterly without resources in the matter of distinguishing truth from falsehood" (ibid: 13). This is akin to Richard Rorty's position in "Contingency, Irony and Solidarity" in which: "To say that truth is not out there is simply to say that where there are no sentences there is no truth, that sentences are elements of human language, and that human languages are human creations. Truth cannot be out there - cannot exist independently of the human mind - because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there", (q.v. Sprinkler: 125) The ethical consequences of such linguistic relativism can be seen when one compares Baudrillard or Rorty's position to that of revisionist historian Robert Faurrison. Faurrison claimed that as there were no surviving 'eye witnesses' to Nazi gas chambers there would, ultimately, be no way of confirming those chamber's existence. These consequences became more evident as events unfolded in the Gulf. Outbreaks of the real -Virilio's 'interruptions' - such as the bombing of the El Almiriyah air raid shelter (no matter how mediated or explained away by military spokespeople) could not disguise the fact that people, civilians, actually died. There were eye-witness survivors. Baudrillard's take on the fact/fiction dichotomy began to look decidedly sickening: "There will be nobody in a position to know what they are seeing, reading or hearing is not some fictive 'simulacrum' of the real, conjured up by the ubiquitous propaganda machine or the various techniques of media disinformation" (Norris: 12) To go down the road, like Baudrillard, of a fictive conspiracy theory in which images of death at El Almiriyah were nothing more than the a highly competent, cinematically constructed, simulation is surely stretching the limits of credibility. If contemporary truth is, according to this post-modern critical line, only a matter of rhetorical or suasive force then El Almiriya was the point at which Baudrillard's "(un)truth claim" lost its own persuasive appeal - breaking the bounds of virtually ever)' consensual notion of reality. Despite this, following the conflict, Baudrillard was minded to publish an article entitled "La Guerre du Golfe n'a pas en lieu" (The Gulf War did not take place) in Liberation - An extract of which was published in The Guardian. In the article he conceded that "this 'simulated' war has not been entirely a product of mass-media illusionist techniques; that large numbers of Iraqi conscripts and civilians had been killed by the Allied aerial bombardment; that massive damage had been inflicted on the country's infrastructure" (Norris: 192). Nevertheless, none of the 'facts' had persuaded him to drop his original contention that the war had predominantly existed as a virtual construct: "If we have no practical knowledge of this war - and such knowledge is out of the question - then let us at least have the sceptical intelligence to reject the probability of all information, of all images whatever their source. To be more 'virtual' than the events themselves, not to re-establish some criterion of truth - for this we lack the means" (q.v. Norris 194). With this Baudrillard maintains a strict adherence to the notion of the impossibility of veridical knowledge. And herein lays his paradox - that in the same article he can admit the 'facts' as regards casualties whilst denying any means of ascertaining their truth. Admitting knowledge and the impossibility of knowledge, in the same breath, is a logical error - both cannot be true.