## 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative debater must specify the type of strike in a delineated text in the 1AC.

#### Violation:

#### Standards –

#### 1] Topic lit – strikes are the core question of the topic and there’s no consensus on normal means so you must spec.

Law Library

[“Strike”, N.D., <https://law.jrank.org/pages/10554/Strike-Status.html>, Law Library, This law and legal reference library provides free access to thousands of legal articles, covering important court cases, historical legal documents, state laws & statutes, and general legal information. Popular articles include Landlord and Tenant Relationship, Health Insurance Law and Employment Law. The legal reference database also covers historically important court cases such as the Ulysses obscenity trial, Plessy vs. Ferguson, Roe vs. Wade and many others. All of the legal information on this website was professionally written and researched, and each law article has been carefully selected -- all to create the most comprehensive legal information site on the web. Read more: Law Library - American Law and Legal Information - JRank Articles <https://law.jrank.org/#ixzz6yOIvCHj7>] [SS]

**Strikes can be divided into** two basic types: **economic and unfair labor practice**. An economic strike seeks to obtain some type of economic benefit for the workers, such as improved wages and hours, or to force recognition of their union. An unfair labor practice strike is called to protest some act of the employer that the employees regard as unfair. A Lexicon of Labor Strikes Over the years different types of labor strikes have acquired distinctive labels. **The following are the** most common **types of strikes, some of which are illegal**: **Wildcat strike** A strike that is not authorized by the union that represents the employees. Although not illegal under law, wildcat strikes ordinarily constitute a violation of an existing collective bargaining agreement. **Walkout** An unannounced refusal to perform work. A walkout may be spontaneous or planned in advance and kept secret. If the employees' conduct is an irresponsible or indefensible method of accomplishing their goals, a walkout is illegal. In other situations courts may rule that the employees have a good reason to strike. **Slowdown** An intermittent work stoppage by employees who remain on the job. Slowdowns are illegal because they give the employees an unfair bargaining advantage by making it impossible for the employer to plan for production by the workforce. An employer may discharge an employee for a work slowdown. **Sitdown strike** A strike in which employees stop working and refuse to leave the employer's premises. Sitdown strikes helped unions organize workers in the automobile industry in the 1930s but are now rare. They are illegal under most circumstances. **Whipsaw strike** A work stoppage against a single member of a bargaining unit composed of several employers. Whipsaw strikes are legal and are used by unions to bring added pressure against the employer who experiences not only the strike but also competition from the employers who have not been struck. Employers may respond by locking out employees of all facilities that belong to members of the bargaining unit. Whipsaw strikes have commonly been used in the automobile industry. **Sympathy strike** A work stoppage designed to provide AID AND COMFORT to a related union engaged in an employment dispute. Although sympathy strikes are not illegal, unions can relinquish the right to use this tactic in a COLLECTIVE BARGAINING agreement. **Jurisdictional strike** A strike that arises from a dispute over which LABOR UNION is entitled to represent the employees. Jurisdictional strikes are unlawful under federal LABOR LAWS because the argument is between unions and not between a union and the employer.

#### **This acts as a resolvability standard. Debate has to make sense and be comparable for the judge to make a decision which means it’s an independent voter and outweighs.**

#### Implications:

#### [1] Stable advocacy – 1AR clarification delinks neg positions that prove why enforcement in a certain instance is bad by saying it isn’t their method of enforcement – wrecks neg ballot access and kills in depth clash – CX doesn’t check since it kills 1NC construction pre-round

#### [2] Prep skew – I don’t know what they will be willing to clarify until CX which means I could go 6 minutes planning to read a disad and then get screwed over in CX when they spec a different funding. This means that CX can’t check because the time in between is when I should be formulating my strat and waiting until then is the abuse. Key fairness because I won’t be able to use the strat I formulated if you skewed my prep and will have a time disadvantage

#### D. Voter

**Fairness is a voter—debate is a competitive activity that requires objective evaluation. Education is a voter – it is the terminal impact of debate. Drop the debater—the abuse has already occurred and my time allocation has shifted—also the shell indicts your whole aff—justifies severance which skews my strat. Use competing interps—leads to a race to the top since we figure out the best possible norm and avoids judge intervention since there’s a clear briteline. No RVIs—**

**a. Baiting—they’ll just bait theory and prep it out—justifies infinite abuse and results in a chilling effect**

**b. its not logical—you don’t reward them for meeting the burden of being fair, especially on T debate where definitions are objective while your interp is subjective. Logic is a meta constraint on all args because it definitionally determines whether an argument is valid.**

## 2

#### The role of the ballot is to vote for who best centers indigenous scholarship and resistance-- Any ethical commitment requires that the aff place themselves in the center of Native scholarship and demands.

Carlson 16 (Elizabeth Carlson, PhD, is an Aamitigoozhi, Wemistigosi, and Wasicu (settler Canadian and American), whose Swedish, Saami, German, Scots-Irish, and English ancestors have settled on lands of the Anishinaabe and Omaha Nations which were unethically obtained by the US government. Elizabeth lives on Treaty 1 territory, the traditional lands of the Anishinaabe, Nehiyawak, Dakota, Nakota, and Red River Metis peoples currently occupied by the city of Winnipeg, the province of Manitoba, (2016): Anti-colonial methodologies and practices for settler colonial studies, Settler Colonial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1241213) // SJ DL

Arlo Kempf says that ‘where anticolonialism is a tool used to invoke resistance for the colonized, it is a tool used to invoke accountability for the colonizer’.**42** Relational accountability should be a cornerstone of settler colonial studies**.** I believe settler colonial studies and scholars should ethically and overtly place themselves in relationship to the centuries of Indigenous oral,and later academic scholarship that conceptualizes and resists settler colonialism without necessarily using the term: SCT may be revelatory to many settler scholars, but Indigenous people have been speaking for a long time about colonial continuities based on their lived experiences. Some SCTs have sought to connect with these discussions and to foreground Indigenous resistance, survival and agency. Others, however, seem to use SCT as a pathway to explain the colonial encounter without engaging with Indigenous people and experiences – either on the grounds that this structural analysis already conceptually explains Indigenous experience, or because Indigenous resistance is rendered invisible.43 Ethical settler colonial theory (SCT) would recognize the foundational role Indigenous scholarship has in critiques of settler colonialism. It would acknowledge the limitations of settler scholars in articulating settler colonialism without dialogue with Indigenous peoplesand take as its norm making this dialogue evident. In my view, it is critical that we not view settler colonial studies as a new or unique field being established, which would enact a discovery narrative and contribute to Indigenous erasure, but rather take a longer and broade\_r view. Indigenous oral and academic scholars are indeed the originators of this work. This space is not empty. Of course, powerful forces of socialization and discipline impact scholars in the academy. There is much pressure to claim unique space, to establish a name for ourselves, and to make academic discoveries. I am suggesting that settler colonial studies and anti-colonial scholars resist these hegemonic pressures and maintain a higher anti-colonial ethic. As has been argued, ‘the theory itself places ethical demands on us as settlers, including the demand that we actively refuse its potential to re-empower our own academic voices and to marginalize Indigenous resistance’.44 As settler scholars, we can reposition our work relationally and contextually with humi- lity and accountability. We can centre Indigenous resistance, knowledges, and scholarship in our work, and contextualize our work in Indigenous sovereignty. We can view oral Indigenous scholarship as legitimate scholarly sources. We can acknowledge explicitly and often the Indigenous traditions of resistance and scholarship that have taught us and pro- vided the foundations for our work. If our work has no foundation of Indigenous scholarship and mentorship, I believe our contributions to settler colonial studies are even more deeply problematic.

#### Settler colonialism is not a one-off occurrence – based in the logic of elimination, it requires the erasure of indigenous populations for the identity-making and nation-forming of the white settler that rewrites ontological identity and relationships.

Rifkin 13 Mark Rifkin, 2013, “Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance,” University of Minnesota Press, SJKS

In Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Patrick Wolfe argues, “Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event” (2).6 He suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). In Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s work, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of Indigenous peoples by nonnatives.7 In “Writing Off Indigenous Sover- eignty,” she argues, “As a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “Writ- ing Off Treaties,” she suggests, “At an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,” such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). For Jodi Byrd, the deployment of Indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of U.S. settler colonialism. She observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of set- tler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). She argues that settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as Indianness, castin3g place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to U.S. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the Indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which U.S. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of Indians and Indianness have served as the ontological ground through which U.S. settler colonialism enacts itself ” (xix). These accounts are differently configured, but in all of them, the contours of settlement appear analytically as clear and coherent from the start, as a virtual totality. What, though, might be lost in an analytical investment in tracing settlement as a structure or ontology—a somewhat self-generating, uniform whole? The ongoing processes by which settler dominance actively is reconstituted as an embodied set of actions, occupations, deferrals, and potentials can slide from view, deferring discussion of how the regularities of settler colonialism are materialized in and through quotidian nonnative sensations, dispositions, and lived trajectories. Holland notes of discussions of antiblack racism that “when we return to [racist] practice, we can only see something produced by the machinations of large systems like the uni- versity or the state. We often only have eyes for the spectacularity of racist practice, not its everyday machinations” (27), later observing, “[W]e might come to think differently about the historical—we might find a grounding for racist practice that acknowledges both systemic practices and quotidian effects that far exceed our patterned understanding of how history has hap- pened to us” (52). When and how do projects of elimination, replacement, and possession become geographies of everyday nonnative occupancy that do not understand themselves as predicated on colonial occupation or on a history of settler–Indigenous relation (even though they are), and what are the contours and effects of such experiences of inhabitance and belong- ing? Quotidian forms of sensation—processes of routine happening—fade from view in the move away from the “everyday” and toward the “systemic.” In Reassembling the Social, Bruno Latour argues against kinds of analysis in which “the social” functions as an explanatory tool that exceeds and pre- cedes the particular sets and sites of relations under discussion: “every activ- ity—law, science, technology, religion, organization, politics, management, etc.—could be related to and explained by the same social aggregates behind all of them” (8).8 Doing so short-circuits the investigation by a priori posit- ing an integrated set of connections that is then treated as a sufficient cause for the “activity” in question, which itself functions in the analysis as merely a bearer of that self-same “social aggregate”—not doing anything on its own. The dynamics by which legislative and administrative agendas come to function as an animating part of daily life, the differences such realization and localization make in the terms and trajectories of those explicit proj- ects, and the possibilities for forms of disjuncture between the state appara- tus and everyday experience are bracketed by the positing of a clear, direct, and inevitable relation characterized as “ontological.” Raymond Williams observes, “A lived hegemony is always a process. It is not, except analytically, a system or a structure. . . . In practice, that is, hegemony can never be sin- gular,” instead needing “continually to be renewed, recreated, defended, and modified” (112), and he describes the tendency to speak and think in terms of systems as a “procedural mode” that emphasizes “formed wholes rather than forming and formative processes” (128). Following this line of thought, accounts of settlement as always-already a “formed whole” leave aside the ways the institutions of the settler-state become “actively involved” in the daily life of nonnatives, serving as “formative” but in ways that cannot be understood as always taking the same shape and thus known beforehand. Moreover, this processual approach leans away from the tendency to look to a limited set of federal laws, cases, and policy determinations as the means of defining the legal terms (the structure) of settlement, particularly given the unevenness of the application of federal norms generally, the develop- ment of divergent patterns in states and territories, and the fact that states in the Northeast sought to present themselves as not bound by the terms of federal Indian affairs.9 The notion of settler common sense seeks to address how the varied legalities, administrative structures, and concrete effects of settler governance get “renewed” and “recreated” in ordinary phenomena by nonnative, nonstate actors, in ways that do not necessarily affirm settlement as an explicit, conscious set of imperatives/initiatives or coordinate with each other as a self-identical program. As a project of reading, then, it looks for the textual traces of quotidian ways of (re)producing the givenness of settler jurisdiction, placemaking, and personhood, attending to the means by which writings that feature neither Indians nor the expropriation of Native lands register the impression of everyday modes of colonial occupation.

#### Settler workers are still settlers – the 1ac grounds their politics in a defense of indigenous dispossession and necessitates settler expansion.

Englert 20 Sai Englert (lecturer @ Universiteit Leiden), 2020, “Settlers, Workers, and the Logic of Accumulation by Dispossession,” Antipode, Vol. 0, No. 0, doi:10.1111/anti.12659

The history of settler colonialism underscores the conspicuous absence of involvement by settler working classes (as opposed to individuals or limited networks) in mass, sustained challenges against the process of settlement and indigenous dispossession.3 In fact, more often than not, settler labour movements fought for the intensification of settler expansion and racial segregation (see “An Alternative Reading: Settler Colonies and the Exploitation of the Native” above), through colour bars, boycott campaigns and demands for expulsion. In the process, bitter confrontations emerged between settler labour and capital, when the latter attempted to increase its profit margins through the exploitation of indigenous labour—for example in the context of the white labour movements in Australia and South Africa.4 Yet these conflicts can be resolved, especially while the settler colony continues to expand, by intensifying the dispossession of indigenous populations in order to improve the material conditions of settler workers (see “Case Studies” below). Here, the question of accumulation by dispossession returns to the fore. If settler workers are exploited as workers within the settler colony, they remain settlers. As such they participate in the processes of accumulation by dispossession through the occupation of lands, the elimination or exploitation of indigenous peoples, and the extraction of expropriated resources. For example, at a very basic level, their houses, workplaces, and basic infrastructure such as roads, railways, etc., are all premised on the capture and control of indigenous land. Settler workers are both exploited by settler bosses and their co-conspirators in the dispossession of indigenous peoples. As such, class struggle within a settler society has a dual character: it is waged over the distribution of wealth extracted from their labour as well as over the colonial booty. In the case of Zionism in Palestine, the current associated with the publication Matzpen (“Compass”) developed a class analysis of Israeli society. They came to the conclusion that because the Israeli economy was heavily subsidised from the outside (first primarily by Britain, then by the US) and that this subsidy was not simply going into private hands but was used by the Labour Zionist bureaucracy to organise the development of the Israeli economy and infrastructure, class antagonisms were diverted within its society. Hangebi et al. (2012:83) wrote: The Jewish worker in Israel does not receive his share in cash, but he gets it in terms of new and relatively inexpensive housing, which could not have been constructed by raising capital locally; he gets it in industrial employment, which could not have been started or kept going without external subsidies; and he gets it in terms of a general standard of living, which does not correspond to the output of that society ... In this way the struggle between the Israeli working class and its employers, both bureaucrats and capitalists, is fought not only over the surplus value produced by the worker but also over the share each group receives from this external source of subsidies. If this analysis was essentially correct, it underplayed, however, the consequences of an important aspect of Israeli wealth creation (which Matzpen otherwise recognised): the Israeli state, its infrastructure, and its economy were made possible by colonial expansion, land confiscation, the expulsion of Palestinians and the expropriation of their wealth and property. Affordable housing, for example, an issue discussed further below, was not only possible because of the subsidies the Israeli state received from abroad. It was possible because the land on which new houses were built, as well as existing Palestinian houses, had been confiscated by the Israeli army, Palestinians had been expelled in their hundreds of thousands, and the spoils were re-distributed amongst settlers. It was—and remains—the collective dispossession of the indigenous population by the Israeli population as a whole, which ties the settler community together, despite internal class, ethnic, and political divisions. The settler class struggle is fought over the distribution of wealth extracted from settler labour power as well as over the share each group receives from the process of accumulation by dispossession. This dual class and colonial relationship helps explain the relative absence of settler workers’ resistance against settler colonial expansion or alliances with Indigenous peoples.5 This tendency can be understood as “settler quietism”: even if working-class settlers are exploited by their ruling classes, overthrowing the settler state would mean overthrowing a system in which they share, however unequally, in the distribution of the colonial loot. Participating in the process of dispossession and fighting for a greater share of the pie leads to more important and immediate material gains. It also follows, as many anti-colonial thinkers and activists, not least among them Fanon (2001) in the Wretched of the Earth, have argued that indigenous people face the settler population as a whole in their struggle for de-colonisation. This is not to say that individual settlers or specific settler organisations cannot or have not supported struggles for decolonisation. It is however to point out that this is not the case for the majority of the settler working class, while it continues to depend on the continued dispossession of the natives for the quality of its living standards. Whether the settler colony is organised on the basis of an eliminatory or an exploitative model, what remains constant is that the entirety of the settler polity will participate in the process of accumulation by dispossession, and that the different settler classes will struggle both against the natives to impose and maintain this dispossession, as well as amongst themselves in order to determine the nature of its internal distribution. More than that, the specific structural forms of settler rule over the indigenous population is best understood as the outcome of struggle, both between settler classes and between settlers and indigenous populations. This paper now turns to two brief case studies demonstrating this process in the context of Zionism in Palestine.

#### Western epistemology is deeply engrained in settler colonialism. Rationalist thought centres itself as the almighty while pushing others down and is what created the conditions that were used to justify genocide. The 1AC outsources agency to a “neutral point” where they look down at Indigenous people, classify them, and eliminate them.

**Kerr 14** (Jeannie Kerr is an assistant professor of education at the University of Winnipeg, former professor at the University of British Columbia, teaches courses in Indigenous Education, Knowledge and Society, Knowledge and Curriculum, Decolonial thought. “Western epistemic dominance and colonial structures: Considerations for thought and practice in programs of teacher education,” *Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society*, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2014. Pages 88-91) // SJ DL

Coloniality scholars provide a distinct interpretation and critique of modernist thought as related to colonial violence. The rise of modernist thought leading to the 17th century Western Enlightenment has been critiqued through various lenses in post-modern scholarship. In general, the Enlightenment is seen as the project of establishing objective foundations for knowledge that was taken up by such thinkers as Descartes, Locke and, later, Kant. These Enlightenment scholars sought to establish reason as a methodology that exists abstractly and as the basis for the justification of knowledge (Bernstein, 1983, pp. 115-117). Thus, in the modern era there was a marginalization of the idea that knowledge could be understood as oral, particular, local, and timely, in favour of an understanding of knowledge as written, abstract, universal and timeless (Toulmin, 1990, p. 34). Daniel Carey and Lynn Festa (2009) argue that this sort of rationalist foundationalism at the heart of Enlightenment epistemology simultaneously centres its own perspective, while positioning any other epistemological orientation as uncivilized, irrational, or superstitious (p. 8); thus, making a strong connection between modernist epistemology and colonial dominance. Mignolo takes this post-modern critique a step further and argues that modernity has a flip side that is relatively ignored in Western based scholarship. He argues that Western European modernity created an image of itself, in the Renaissance and Enlightenment eras, as Western Civilization, and presumed itself as the arrival point of human existence and as the point of reference of global history (Mignolo, 2011, p. xiv). He argues that through these beliefs a problematic side of modernity materialized in an imperial structure of coloniality. He refers to this as the coloniality-modernity relationship which formed together in the mid 15th century, and established in space and time a perpetuating structure of racism and patriarchy, “that created the conditions to build and control a structure of knowledge, either grounded on the word of God or the word of Reason and Truth” (Mignolo, 2011, p. xv; see also, Deloria, 1973, pp. 275-281 for a more detailed discussion of European colonial imperialism intersecting with Christianity). Ramon Grosfoguel captures the idea of coloniality in an illuminating way when he states that what arrived in sovereign, non-European territories was not just a selection of representatives of a colonizing nation, nor just an economic system of labour and capital; what arrived was a complex world system embodied in the “European, capitalist, military, Christian, patriarchal, white, heterosexual, male,” who “established in time and space several entangled global hierarchies” (Grosfoguel, 2008, p. 5). Understood in this way, coloniality is a perpetuating spatio-temporal structure that imposes intersecting global hierarchies in terms of race, class, gender, sexuality, spirituality, economic system, and geography, that organizes bodies into complex hierarchal social organizations. It is a system of inequity and privilege that moves through time, claims geographic spaces, and is perpetuated through material and discursive epistemic practices in social and institutional spaces. As Grosfoguel (2008) argues: “Coloniality allows us to understand the continuity of colonial forms of domination after the end of colonial administrations, produced by colonial cultures and structures in the modern/colonial capitalist world−system” (p. 8). Western epistemic dominance Anabal Quijano further extends the concept of coloniality and the global hierarchies to theorize a colonial power matrix organized around the socially constructed notion of race. Quijano argues that race is the key element of the social classification of colonized and colonizers. Unlike previous instances of colonization, “the superiority of the dominant under European colonialism became related to biological superiority, producing new social identities using physiognomic traits as external manifestations of their 'racial nature'” (Quijano, 2007, p. 171). Quijano goes on to argue that the produced geocultural identities form the basis of distribution of work around the globe: The system of “salaried, independent peasants, independent merchants, and slave and serfs, was organized basically following the same ‘racial’ lines of global-social classification” and organized under a euro-centred world power (p. 171). Thus, colonialism produced an economic power structure that effectively classified the world's peoples into a hierarchy of superior normalized bodies and inferior racialized bodies that was used as justification for the both the benevolent and violent domination of non-white bodies by white Western European bodies. Quijano’s ideas on race are an important element in coloniality theorizing and are significantly engaged in settler colonialism scholarship. Settler colonialism scholarship similarly positions colonialism as a structural phenomenon – rather than a historical event (Wolfe, 2006, p. 388) – but also engages a more detailed consideration of the notion of race. Patrick Wolfe (2006) points out that racialization is not all of one kind, but relates to colonial desires that manifest in specific ways. Wolfe contrasts the antithetical racialization of Indigenous and African descendants in the United States, where legal frameworks supported the elimination of Indigenous peoples while simultaneously expanding African descendant groups, so as to ensure access to Indigenous peoples’ land simultaneously with access to African descendant peoples’ labour (p. 387). Lorenzo Veracini (2010) makes a related analytic distinction by considering positionalities within colonial dynamics in terms of Indigenous, Settler and Exogenous Other – noting the distinctions between those who migrate to Indigenous territory, but do or do not manifest a colonial sovereign capacity in relation to being racialized (p. 3). The focus on race in these discussions centres, instead of elides, the distinctive experiences and perspectives of peoples coming to Indigenous territories to settle. This also complicates the identity of “settler”, and views those peoples migrating to Indigenous territories not as a singular monolith, but as peoples with complex diasporic and migrational histories that position them differently within colonial encounters related to privilege, power and racialization processes. Important to the coloniality paradigm, and the central point of this article, is the notion that intersecting hierarchies and processes of racialization are supported by modernist epistemology and the centring of Western epistemic perspectives. Mignolo identifies the key to maintaining the invisibility of this structure of domination and oppression is the hubris of the zero point. Mignolo argues that the zero point is the epistemological location that places a privileged knowing body as occupying a detached and neutral point of observation, and from this neutral place “maps the world and its problems, classifies people, and projects what is good for them” (Mignolo, 2011, p. 118). Grosfoguel adds to these thoughts through noting that a particular Western modernist view of knowledge is able to dominate by masquerading as universal knowledge and present itself as the god-like view of truth – “It’s a point of view that conceals itself as being beyond a point of view” (Grosfoguel, 2007, p. 214). As Quijano argues, the European paradigm of rational knowledge not only grew in the context of colonialism, but was also a foundational part of the power structure of domination (Quijano, 2007, p. 174). Thinking again to my experience in the Garden, it becomes obvious how pervasive and sometimes subtle these epistemic dynamics become when intersecting with a privileged settler body. In the Garden, despite my decolonial aspirations, I still imposed a culturally laden view of gardens, a view that I had been raised in Western society to perceive not only as universal, but also culturally neutral or ‘natural’. Reflecting on my Eurocentric encounter with this Mayanbased garden, I realized the depth of my assumptions and commitments that came from being raised and educated in a Western modernist society, and my tacit expectation that my ideas are universally understood and will be reflected back to me in my encounters – despite my claims to the contrary. I also witnessed my incredible readiness to impose my ideas on others (the human and non-human others) from a very secure and problematic set of assumptions. My settler body has become used to engaging in knowledge that manifests European epistemic assumptions and commitments – I am immersed in this. My lifelong participation in Western social life, where my cultural assumptions are continually privileged and reflected back to me as neutral and universal, frames the challenges of engaging in these conversations and the power structure of the context. As Dei points out: “knowledge production is not an innocent or neutral project”

#### The alternative is one of decolonization-an ethic of incommensurability leads to infinite native futures

Tuck and Yang 12 Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, 2012, “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society, // SJ DL

An ethic of incommensurability, which guides moves that unsettle innocence, stands in contrast to aims of reconciliation, which motivate settler moves to innocence. Reconciliation is about rescuing settler normalcy, about rescuing a settler future. Reconciliation is concerned with questions of what will decolonization look like? What will happen after abolition? What will be the consequences of decolonization for the settler? Incommensurability acknowledges that these questions need not, and perhaps cannot, be answered in order for decolonization to exist as a framework. We want to say, first, that decolonization is not obliged to answer those questions - decolonization is not accountable to settlers, or settler futurity. Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity. Still, we acknowledge the questions of those wary participants in Occupy Oakland and other settlers who want to know what decolonization will require of them. The answers are not fully in view and can’t be as long as decolonization remains punctuated by metaphor. The answers will not emerge from friendly understanding, and indeed require a dangerous understanding of uncommonality that un-coalesces coalition politics - moves that may feel very unfriendly. But we will find out the answers as we get there, “in the exact measure that we can discern the movements which give [decolonization] historical form and content” (Fanon, 1963, p. 36). To fully enact an ethic of incommensurability means relinquishing settler futurity, abandoning the hope that settlers may one day be commensurable to Native peoples. It means removing the asterisks, periods, commas, apostrophes, the whereas’s, buts, and conditional clauses that punctuate decolonization and underwrite settler innocence. The Native futures, the lives to be lived once the settler nation is gone - these are the unwritten possibilities made possible by an ethic of incommensurability.

## 3

#### Their scholarship is bad and a reason to lose the round—their author endorsed pedophilia and actively advocated against the age of consent law.

Doezema 18 [Marie Doezema (Parisian Journalist). “France, Where Age of Consent Is Up for Debate.” The Atlantic, 10 March 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/frances-existential-crisis-over-sexual-harassment-laws/550700/ //WWDH]

After May 1968, French intellectuals would challenge the state’s authority to protect minors from sexual abuse. In one prominent example, on January 26, 1977, Le Monde, a French newspaper, published a petition signed by the era’s most prominent intellectuals—including Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Gilles Deleuze, Roland Barthes, Philippe Sollers, André Glucksmann and Louis Aragon—in defense of three men on trial for engaging in sexual acts with minors. “French law recognizes in 13- and 14-year-olds a capacity for discernment that it can judge and punish,” the petition stated, “But it rejects such a capacity when the child's emotional and sexual life is concerned.” Furthermore, the signatories argued, children and adolescents have the right to a sexual life: “If a 13-year-old girl has the right to take the pill, what is it for?” It’s unclear what impact, if any, the petition had. The defendants were sentenced to five years in prison, but did not serve their full sentences.

#### Comes first:

#### [1] Reversibility: once oppressive rhetoric is used it cannot be taken back

#### [2] Norm setting: we are part of a larger debate community with extensive norms – letting bad discourse be rampant kills the community

**[3] Competition: debate is an educational competition with no place for offensive rhetoric – that kills access to the lasting benefit debate provides**