## Framework

#### Freedom is a primary ethical good –

#### 1] In setting an end, every agent must recognize freedom as a necessary good, Gewirth 84 bracketed for grammar and gendered language

[Alan Gewirth, () "The Ontological Basis of Natural Law: A Critique and an Alternative" American Journal Of Jurisprudence: Vol. 29: Iss. 1 Article 5, 1984, https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ajj/vol29/iss1/5/, DOA:9-10-2018 // WWBW Recut LHP AV]

Let me briefly sketch the main line of argument that leads to this conclusion. As I have said, the argument is based on the generic features of human action. To begin with, **every agent acts for purposes [t]he[y] regards as good.** Hence, **[t]he[y] must regard as necessary goods the freedom** and well being **that [is]** are the generic features and **necessary conditions of** his **action** and successful action in general. From this, it follows that **every agent logically must hold or accept** that he has **rights to these conditions**. For if he were **to deny** that he has **these rights**, then he **would** have to **admit that it is permissible** for other persons **to remove** from him the very **conditions** of freedom and well-being **that**, as **an agent**, he **must have**. But **it is contradictory** for him **to hold both that [t]he[y] must have these conditions and also that he may not have them.** Hence, on pain of self-contradiction, every agent must accept that he has rights to freedom and well-being. Moreover, **every agent must further admit that all other agents also have those rights, since all other actual or prospective agents have the same general characteristics of agency** on which he must ground his own right-claims. What I am saying, then, is that every agent, simply by virtue of being an agent, must regard his freedom and well being as necessary goods and must hold that he and all other actual or prospective agents have rights to these necessary goods. Hence, every agent, on pain of self-contradiction, must accept the following principle: Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of yourself. The generic rights are rights to the generic features of action, freedom, and well-being. I call this the Principle of Generic Consistency (PGC), because it combines the formal consideration of consistency with the material consideration of the generic features and rights of action.

#### 2] The exercise of practical rationality requires that one regards practical rationality as intrinsically good – that justifies a right to freedom.

Wood 07 [Allen W. Wood, (Stanford University, California) "Kantian Ethics" Cambridge University Press, 2007, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/kantian-ethics/769B8CD9FCC74DB6870189AE1645FAC8, DOA:8-12-2020 // WWBW]

Kant holds that **the most basic act through which people exercise their practical rationality is that of setting an end** (G 4:437). To set an end is, analytically, to subject yourself to the hypothetical imperative that you should take the necessary means to the end you have set (G 4:417). This is the claim that you rationally ought to do something whether or not you are at the moment inclined to do it. It represents the action of applying that means as good (G 4:414) – in the sense of “good” that Kant explicates as: what is required by reason independently of inclination (G 4:413). Kant correctly infers that **any being which sets itself ends is committed to regarding its end as good in this sense, and also to regarding the goodness of its end as what also makes application of the means good – that is, rationally required independently of any inclination to apply it.** The act of setting an end, therefore, must be taken as committing you to represent some other act (the act of applying the means) as good. In doing all this, however, **the rational being must also necessarily regard its own rational capacities as authoritative for what is good in general.** For it treats these capacities as capable of determining which ends are good, and at the same time as grounding the goodness of the means taken toward those good ends. But **to regard one’s capacities in this way is also to take a certain attitude toward oneself as the being that has and exercises those capacities.** It is to esteem oneself – and also to esteem the correct exercise of one’s rational capacities in determining what is good both as an end and as a means to it. One’s other capacities, such as those needed to perform the action that is good as a means, are also regarded as good as means. But **that capacity through which we can represent the very idea of something as good both as end and as means is not represented merely as the object of a contingent inclination, nor is it represented as good only as a means. It must be esteemed as unconditionally good, as an end in itself.** To find this value in oneself is not at all the same as thinking of oneself as a good person. Even those who misuse their rational capacities are committed to esteeming themselves as possessing rational nature. It also does not imply that a more intelligent person (in that sense, more “rational”) is “better” than a less intelligent one. The self-esteem involved in setting an end applies to any being capable of setting an end at all, irrespective of the cleverness or even the morality of the end setting. Kant’s argument supports the conclusion, to which he adheres with admirable consistency throughout his writings, that all rational beings, clever or stupid, even good or evil, have equal (absolute) worth as ends in themselves. For Kantian ethics **the rational nature in every person is an end in itself whether the person is morally good or bad.**

#### There are two models of freedom—the non-interference model and the non-domination model. The non-interference model holds that a person’s freedom is violated if they are actually interfered with, while the non-domination model holds that a person’s freedom is violated if someone has the capacity to arbitrarily interfere in their life. Only the non-domination model can ground legitimate state interference and cohere with intuitions about freedom. Pettit 12:

Philip Pettit, “Legitimacy and Justice in Republican Perspective” Current Legal Problems, 2012 RE Recut LHP AV

But **while** the conception of **freedom as non-interference makes it impossible to argue** on grounds of freedom for **the legitimacy of any** likely **state**, **the republican conception** of freedom that it replaced **does not make this impossible** in the same manner. Indeed it is for that reason, I surmise, that **legitimacy was taken in the republican tradition to be something that could be institutionally secured in a state**: specifically, secured **by the fact of the state’s operating under the constraints imposed by a mixed constitution**. **On the republican conception, freedom is a matter of enjoying a suitable civic status**. Spelled out in greater detail, **it requires, first, a freedom in the exercise of** certain **choices**; **second**, a freedom **in the exercise of those choices that is secured on a certain basis**; **and third, a freedom that is understood in a distinctive manner, requiring non-domination rather than non-interference**. Taking up the first of these three conditions, the choices in which freedom is required are what John Libourne in the 17th century described as ‘the fundamental liberties’: **the choices, as I conceive of them, that all citizens can exercise and enjoy at one and the same time**.32 **These do not include choices requiring impossible abilities, as in the choice between walking on water and walking on solid ground**. Nor choices in which people are in essential competition, as in the choice between winning or not winning superiority over others. Nor choices involving victims, as in the choice between attacking another or not. **They are fundamentally compossible choices that may be simultaneously exercised by all and, at the same time, enjoyed by all.** They may be compossible by nature, as with the choice between speaking your mind and not speaking your mind. Or they may be compossible by virtue of institutional design, as with the choice between appropriating or not appropriating something under local rules of property. **Turning now to the second of our three conditions, the basis on which the fundamental or basic liberties have to be secured for civic freedom in the republican sense is a basis in public law**. As a matter of shared awareness amongst the citizenry, it has to be the case that **the free person**—the liber in early Latin usage, the ‘freeman’ in 17th-century English—**is protected**, perhaps even in some ways resourced, **in the exercise of relevant choices by a law that is promulgated in public and applied equally in defence of all**. It is this public entrenchment of freedom **that enables free persons**, in the age-old republican picture, **to be able to look one another in the eye, without fear or deference**: to escape not just servitude but also servility.33 Indeed the natural criterion for what constitutes adequate entrenchment is that **it is enough**, by local cultural standards, **to give this capacity to all citizens**, or at least to those who are not excessively timid or paranoid. In the ‘free Commonwealth’ or republic, as John Milton wrote, ‘they who are greatest ... are not elevated above their brethren; live soberly in their families, walk the streets as other men, may be spoken to freely, familiarly, friendly, without adoration’.34 We have seen that **republican freedom requires freedom in the choices associated with the basic liberties and that this must be secured on the basis of public law**. Turning finally to our third condition, it also equates freedom in a choice with the absence of domination, not interference. On this conception, **freedom requires people not to be subject to the will of others rather than requiring**, as Bentham required, **that they not be subject to the interference** **of** **others**. Freedom, as Algernon Sidney put it in the 17th century, consists in ‘independency upon the will of another’. ‘Liberty’, in an 18th-century variant, ‘is, to live upon one’s own terms; slavery is, to live at the mere mercy of another’.35 The difference between the two conceptions comes out in a difference on two fronts between the implications that they support. **It is possible to be subject to the will of another in a certain choice**—**it is possible to have to depend on the will of the other as to what you should choose there**— **without that other exercising any active interference**. **The classical example of such a possibility arises with the slaves who are lucky enough to have an indulgent master who gives them a great deal of latitude in the choices they may make for themselves**. **Even if the master allows the slaves to exercise the basic liberties of the society as they wish, still they are subject to the master’s will; they have to depend on the state of the master’s will remaining favourable if they are to be able to choose as they wish.** **The slaves may not suffer interference but still, on the conception of freedom as non-domination, they lack freedom**. They are not their own men or women. **The second difference** of implication between the rival conceptions of freedom appears in the possibility, not of domination without interference, but **of interference without domination**. **You are subject to the interference** of another in your choices, **even if there is an arrangement in place, perhaps set up by you**, perhaps set up by a third party, **under which you can control that interference; say, you can stop that interference at will or allow it to continue only on terms that you endorse.** **Suppose you hire someone** to make certain of your decisions for you— say, your financial or social or even religious decisions—or suppose that you inherit such an arrangement from your family**. The person hired may not always choose as you would choose—may even choose in a way that frustrates your current wishes**—**but so long as you have to the power to suspend and shape the interference, you are not subject to their will**. You do not depend on their will remaining a goodwill for being able to impose your wishes on the matters they currently administer for you. **This should serve to introduce the republican view of the freedom that can go with civic status. We might describe the social order established by a state as just, in a republican rendering of the idea, insofar as it enables people to enjoy such a civic status in relation to one another.** **But it remains to show why we need not despair, on this view of freedom, about identifying institutional conditions under which the coercive state would not jeopardize the freedom of its citizens in imposing such an order and would count therefore as legitimate**. Why does the legitimacy problem become feasible under the conception of freedom as non-domination, when it is so obviously infeasible under the conception of freedom as non-interference? The answer, at the abstract level, is pretty straightforward. The second implication of this way of conceptualizing freedom is that **interference in your choices need not be dominating and that when it is not dominating it does not impose another’s will and does not jeopardize your freedom.** **The coercive state, as we have seen, certainly interferes in the choices of its citizens**. But **this coercion or interference will not jeopardize the freedom of those citizens if they exercise an appropriately effective form of control over the interference.** And **so the prospect of a legitimate state is nothing more or less than that of a state in which citizens exercise a suitable type of control over the coercion that the state practices in their lives**. **The legitimate state will be**, in an etymological sense, **the democratic state**: **the state in which the demos or people exercise a suitable form of kratos or control over those in power.** **This abstract answer points us in the direction that a satisfactory theory of legitimacy has to take and identifies the ideal of a legitimate state, understood in the republican way, as a form of democratic ideal.** But these indications, reassuring as they may be, are worth little unless we can say more about the sort of control that citizens must be able to achieve over the workings of their polity. Without being able to go into much detail, I turn to a consideration of this challenge in the final section.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with freedom as non-domination, defined as establishing institutional constraints that eliminate the capacity for arbitrary interference. Proving an obligation under any index is sufficient to affirm because there isn’t a higher-up framework to weigh theories under which means that you can only disprove a framework from the perspective of another and an obligation under one framework isn’t incompatible with a possibly stronger obligation under another framework.

#### Impact calc – power can be exercised non-arbitrarily insofar as those interfered with have control over domination, Pettit 2:

Pettit P. Freedom in the market. Politics, Philosophy & Economics. 2006;5(2):131-149. doi:10.1177/1470594X06064218 //LHP AV Accessed 7/4/21

In order to understand the republican conception of social freedom, we need to do two things: first, to explain exactly what sort of interference people are shielded against under this conception and, second, to explain what is involved in their being shielded in that way. I proceed now to these two tasks. **To interfere** with a choice, as that notion is understood here, **is** always **to put an obstacle** in its way intentionally, or at least in such a manner (say, such a negligent manner) that blame may be in order.6 I do not interfere with you just through happening, like a natural obstacle, to be in your way or just through doing something that has the unforeseen effect of hindering you. Nor do I generally interfere with you just through allowing such an obstacle to get in your way, or through allowing another person to interfere: not, at any rate, unless contextual criteria give such an omission a positive interpretation. Given that social freedom is what is at issue, **I have to represent an obstacle of a distinctively human, interpersonal kind and this means, in effect, that I have to be intentionally** or quasi-intentionally **obstructive**; the point is likely to be granted on many sides.7 I may be obstructive on my own, but I may also be obstructive, of course, in the company of others. I may be part of an obstructive corporate agency or I may contribute a small amount of obstruction in a context in which others do so too (perhaps unknown to me) and in which the aggregate obstruction reaches a significant level. Interfering with a choice does not necessarily mean rendering the choice of a particular option impossible.8 Interference may certainly involve removing an option from a set of otherwise available options (say, reducing options A, B, and C to options A and B), thereby rendering the choice of that option impossible. But, plausibly, it may also involve changing the options by adding a penalty to one of the alternatives; this might reduce the set to A, B, and C-minus, where ‘Cminus’ refers to C with a penalty. Equally plausibly, it may mean misleading the agent about the options available. Misinformation can be a very effective way of rendering the choice of an option effectively impossible or difficult, transforming the subjective if not the objective options in place. An act of interference in the sense explained will not be an affront to freedom under almost any approach, so long as it is subject to the control of the person interfered with: so long as it is akin to the interference that his sailors practiced on Ulysses when they kept him tied to the mast. But there are different views on what it is for an ‘interfere’ to control the interference of another. One view would put the emphasis on **historical** **consent**, for example. This **is not very plausible**, however, **since it may have been a past, now very alien, self that consented to a form of interference under which I now bristle**; **that is** one reason **why we naturally object to the slave contract**. **Another view would moralize** **freedom** and argue that if a form of interference is morally justified, or is at least justified by moral standards to which I subscribe, then it is subject to my control. **This approach implies that a morally justified intervention can never restrict my freedom**, however, **and that is surely counterintuitive**. Pettit: Freedom in the market 135 **The republican approach** on this matter has been to **assume that I control the interference** of another **so far as that interference is forced to track the interests that I am disposed to avow**. This assumption is usually extended so that I control the interference of the state so far as that interference is forced to track the interests that I am disposed to avow in common with my fellow citizens, though there are different possible accounts of how those interests are to be identified. **The word that is used to describe interference that is subject to such a mode of individual or shared control is ‘nonarbitrary’**.9 Nonarbitrary interference, like a natural obstacle, may reduce the sphere in which people enjoy social freedom, but under the republican approach it will not take such freedom away.

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Discourse – Any genuine discourse requires non-domination and concedes its authority. Pettit 3 bracketed for glang:

PETTIT, PHILIP. “THE DOMINATION COMPLAINT.” Nomos, vol. 46, 2005, pp. 87–117. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24220143. Accessed 19 Aug. 2020.

When a number of people engage in discourse, their aim being to determine what is so in some domain or how it is best for them to act as a whole, then they give exclusive privilege to a particular form of influence that they may have on one another: that which occurs by virtue of producing reasons relevant to the outcome that is to be resolved. Thus they eschew the ways in which people influence one another when they exercise violence, or coercion, or intimidation, or anything of that kind. They authorize one another as voices that are generally capable of providing reasons relevant by discursive criteria and as ears that are generally capable of recognizing such reasons when they are once produced. From the point of view of the discourse that they essay, only properly reason mediated influence is legitimate.19 This being so, any party to discourse is certainly going to be able to complain admissibly about the existence of a form of influence that reduces their capacity to exercise or undergo discursive influence proper. It will be absolutely reasonable for anyone to complain, for example, about being pressured or coerced by others to go along with a certain line; those who attempt such pressure or coercion do not honor the constitutive requirements of discourse: they are playing another game. But the existence of a relation of domination between one party and some other or others means that that party is subject to a form of influence that reduces their capacity to interact discursively—it reduces their capacity to influence and be influenced in a purely reason-mediated way—and so it is going to be perfectly admissible for someone to complain about domination of that kind. Why is domination going to reduce a person's capacity to inter act discursively with others? Because, as a long tradition of thought insists, the fact of being exposed to the possibility of interference from another impacts in a serious way on the likelihood that a person will speak ~~his~~ [their] mind.20 It will put in place a powerful incentive to keep the dominating parties on side, however beneficent they may be: to keep them sweet both by positive measures of ingratiation and by negative measures of avoidance and self-censorship. There is an old ideal, celebrated for example in the Quaker tradition, of speaking truth to power. But speaking truth to power is an ideal, precisely because it is recognized on all sides to be difficult. The person who speaks truth to power, never flinching from the most unpalatable forms of advice or rebuke, or the most unwelcome expressions of opinion, is a saint or a hero, not someone of merely regular nerve. Not only is domination likely to lead someone to warp his or her voice, tuning it to the expectations and tastes of potentially dangerous potentates. This being a matter of common recognition—as it always has been—domination will also lead others not to take seriously the words uttered by anyone in a position of subordination and dependency. How can people trust the remarks of the vulnerable person, especially when they are tailored to fit with the opinions of someone in relation to whom they suffer vulnerability?They may seek out their opinions, particularly when it is they who are in the position of power—it is always pleasing, after all, to have some reinforcement of one's own views—but they will have no reason to take the dominated person really seriously; they will have no reason to grant that person a real voice or give him or her a genuine hearing.

#### 2] Oppression – Domination as a condition takes away a person’s status as human – categorical dehumanization is created by communal recognition of domination. Pettit 4:

PETTIT, PHILIP. “THE DOMINATION COMPLAINT.” Nomos, vol. 46, 2005, pp. 87–117. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/24220143. Accessed 19 Aug. 2020.

The primary reason why the complaint about being dominated is of the first significance is that domination almost invariably undermines a person's capacity to enjoy respect in this sense. Where one person dominates another, it is almost bound to be a matter of common awareness among the people involved, and among other relevant parties, that this domination exists. The question as to whether someone is dominated by another is one that will interest all those involved, after all, and the answer to that question will be obvious in most cases from the sorts of resources they control relative to that other. Thus we may expect most people to recognize domination when they see it, and this in turn being obvious, to recognize that others will recognize it too, thereby giving rise to the usual hierarchy of common awareness; each will believe that the person is dominated, each will believe that each believes this, and so on.21 Once it is recognized as a matter of common awareness that someone is dominated, however, then that person will no longer be able to enjoy the basic respect that we think personhood entitles him to. He will no longer have the sort of voice that can be reliably forthright, or can be expected to be forthright. He will always be under suspicion of playing to the audience of the powerful and never having anything worthwhile to say in his own right. Dominated subjects of this kind may not be ignored or dismissed outright: they may be treated magnanimously to the trap pings of respect. But they will not command respect; they will receive it only in the manner of supplicants. They may be treated as if they had the status of persons, so we might put it, but they will not really have that status. Being a person is inseparable from earning and receiving respect as of right—as of effective, not just formal right—and in their case there will be no question of earning or receiving as of right. What they receive, they will receive only as a gift—only by grace of the powerful. This line of thought is a familiar and recurrent one in republican thought. It is worth mentioning in connection with it that Kant, the great philosopher of respect and personhood, seems to have shaped many of his ideas on that subject in his reflections on Rousseau's Social Contract, itself a book that belongs at least among the apocrypha of the republican tradition. The point is emphasized by J. B. Schneewind, who quotes Kant as saying: "It is not all one under what title I get something. What properly belongs to me must not be accorded to me merely as something I ask for."22 Schneewind comments: "If nothing is properly mine except what someone graciously gives me, I am forever dependent on how the donor feels toward me. My independence as an autonomous being is threatened. Only if I can claim the others have to give me what is mine by right can this be avoided."23 Given the connection between enjoying respect as a person and not being subject to domination, there is every reason to treat the complaint of being dominated as extremely significant**.** What more serious complaint could there be than one that draws attention to a relationship in virtue of which one's very standing as a person who can command the attention and respect of others is put in jeopardy? This is no mere trifle to do with having one's nose put out of joint, or one's feathers ruffled. It is a complaint of the first moment. Let some people be dominated and to that extent they will be put out of any community that involves those who dominate. They may aspire to community with such others and their presence may even be tolerated among those others. But they will always cut somewhat sorry or comic figures, and will always invite only condescension or contempt. They will have no more standing, in a somewhat archaic image, than dogs that cower at their masters' feet or snuggle that up their mistress’s skirt.

#### 3] Sociality – Agents are constructed by recognition through the other. However, that leaves agents vulnerable to denial by the not-I. This commits agents to mutual recognition. Wood:

Allen W. Wood, "Fichte's Philosophy of Right and Ethics," forthcoming in Günter Zöller (ed). The Cambridge Companion to Fichte. New York: Cambridge University Press.

To understand another as a rational being making such a demand, and to display such understanding in action is to "recognize" (anerkennen) the other (GA I/3:353). **Since every free being necessarily wills to make use of its freedom, the basic demand I necessarily make on every other free being is that it should limit its action in such a way that I am allowed a sphere for the exercise of my freedom** (GA I/3:357-358). Fichte argues that for this reason **I must assume that others will recognize me**, but **since I cannot expect others to do so unless I treat them as rational beings, I am bound by mere logical consistency** (and prior to any moral requirement) **to recognize all others and treat them accordingly** (GA I/3:349-356). **Recognition must be presupposed as the condition of all interactions between free beings, and it must be presupposed as a reciprocal relation**, which Fichte calls the "relation of right". It grounds the "principle of right": "I must in all cases recognize the free being outside me as such, i.e. limit my freedom through the concept of the possibility of its freedom" (GA I/3:358). By the principle of right each free being is to have an external sphere for the exercise of its freedom, and others are to limit their freedom accordingly. This external sphere begins at the point of origin of one's action on the external world itself. **We have seen that the I must be limited by a not-I.** Fichte interprets as saying that **the I and an external, material world must exercise a mutual causal influence on one another**. But **since only matter can act on matter, the I too must be matter – or at least it must have a material vehicle for its relations of activity and passivity to the not-I. To be an I therefore, one must be embodied, and the starting point of the external sphere recognized by others must be its body**

## Contention

#### Thus, the plan: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. Gourevitch 3:

Gourevitch, A.. “Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike.” Perspectives on Politics 14 (2016): 307 - 323. //LHP AV Accessed 7/4/21

“Is it peace or war:”1 What is a right to strike? **The right to strike is** peculiar. It is **not a right to quit**. The right to quit is part of freedom of contract and the mirror of employment-at-will. Workers may quit when they no longer wish to work for an employer, employers may fire their employees when they no longer want to employ them. Either of those acts severs the contractual relationship and the two parties are no longer assumed to be in any relationship at all. **The right to strike**, however, **assumes the continuity of the very relationship that is suspended.** **Workers on strike refuse to work but do not claim to have left the job**. After all, the whole point of a strike is that **it is a collective work stoppage**, **not a collective quitting** of the job. This is the feature of the strike that has marked it out from other forms of social action. If a right to strike is not a right to quit what is it? **It is the right that workers claim to refuse to perform work they have agreed to do while retaining a right to the job**. Most of what is peculiar, not to mention fraught, about a strike is contained in that latter clause. Yet, surprisingly, few commentators recognize just how central and yet peculiar this claim is (Locke 1984).2 Opponents of the right to strike are sometimes more alive to its distinctive features than defenders. One critic, for instance, makes the distinction between quitting and striking the basis of his entire argument: the unqualified right to withdraw labour, which is a clear right of free men, does not describe the behaviour of strikers…Strikers…withdraw from the performance of their jobs, but in the only relevant sense they do not withdraw their labour. The jobs from which

#### Absent a right to strike, workers are dominated –

#### 1] Structural Domination – a labor market structurally requires exploitation and domination – workers need an alternative, Gourevitch 16:

Gourevitch, A.. “Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike.” Perspectives on Politics 14 (2016): 307 - 323. //LHP AV Accessed 7/4/21

The commodification of labor I: structural domination and exploitation So long as we view the labor market as a series of voluntary agreements, to which workers and employers freely consent, we cannot make adequate sense of the right to strike. There are two interconnected forms of compulsion to which workers are subject that undermine any such view. The first is a form of structural domination that renders workers vulnerable to exploitation, the second is a form of legal authority that gives employers arbitrary power in the workplace itself. If we recognize these as ineliminable features of the market for labor, then the right to strike makes sense not as a relic of feudal guild privileges nor just as an economically rational effort by some to maximize wages, but as a form of resistance to the modern labor market itself. Let us **begin with structural domination and** the problem of **exploitation**. **Though most closely associated with the Marxian tradition, the thought that desperate workers are exploited is a familiar one**. Even those not so sympathetic to the complaints of modern wage-laborers can be found saying, as David Hume famously did, that “the fear of punishment will never draw so much labour from a slave, as the dread of being turned off and not getting another service, will from a freeman” (Hume [1742] 1987, II.XI.16 fn39). Adam Smith gave this fact a turn in favor of workers: It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon all ordinary occasions, have the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into a compliance with their terms… In all such disputes the masters can hold out much longer… Many workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist a month, and scarce any a year without employment. In the long-run the workman may be as necessary to his master as his master is to him, but the necessity is not so immediate. (Smith [1776] 1982, I.8.12) On top of which, as Smith noted, “**Masters are always and every where in a sort of tacit**, but constant and uniform **combination**.” In a world in which economic necessity couples with employer collusion, **workers have little choice**: “Such combinations [by employers], however, are frequently resisted by a contrary defensive combination of the workmen; who sometimes too, without any provocation of this kind, combine of their own accord to raise the price of their labour” (Smith [1776] 1982, I.8.12). For this reason Smith thought it was wrong to treat trade unions as criminal conspiracies.9 The view of unions and strikes as defensive, aimed at lessening employers’ ability to take advantage of workers’ need, persisted throughout the industrial age. By the time Hobhouse wrote Liberalism, it was possible for a liberal to argue that strikes might even be connected to human freedom: The emancipation of trade unions, however, extending over the period from 1824 to 1906, and perhaps not yet complete, was in the main a liberating movement, because combination was necessary to place the workman on something approaching terms of equality with the employer, and because tacit combinations of employers could never, in fact, be prevented by law. (Hobhouse 1944, 18) We must note, however, that nearly all of these arguments remain within a form of social theory that attempts to make capitalist practice more like its theoretical selfimage. These thinkers tended to defend unions and their right to strike as a way of achieving ‘real freedom of contract’ in the face of economic necessity. Hobhouse was updating Smith and Mill when arguing, “In the matter of contract true freedom postulates substantial equality between the parties. In proportion as one party is in a position of vantage, he is able to dictate his terms. In proportion as the other party is in a weak position, he must accept unfavourable terms” (Hobhouse 1944, 37). On this account, **the right to strike** is defensible only insofar as it helps maintain a position of relative equality among bargaining parties. It thereby **secures contracts that are not just voluntary but truly free** - Mill’s “necessary instrumentality of that free market.” This basic idea reappears in any number of twentieth century acts of labor legislation and jurisprudence, perhaps most notably in the 1935 law granting American workers the right to strike.10 The problem with the ‘real freedom of contract’ view is that it is based on faulty social analysis. **The labor market is not just another commodity market** in which property-owners are, or can be made, free to participate or not participate. Here some Marxist social theory is inescapable. **Workers who have no other consistent source of income than a wage have no reasonable alternative to selling their labor-power**. That is because, at least in highly capitalist societies where most **goods are only legally accessible if you can buy them**, **there is no other way of reliably acquiring necessary goods**. **The only way for most workers to get enough money to buy what they need is by selling their labor-power**. Their only alternatives are to steal, hope for charity, or rely on inadequate welfare provision. These are generally speaking unreasonable alternatives to seeking income through wages. **If workers have no reasonable alternative to selling their labor-power they are therefore forced to sell that labor-power to some employer or** another (Ezorsky 2007; Cohen 1988, 239-254, 255-285). This forcing exists **even when workers earn relatively high wages**, since **they still lack reasonable** **alternatives**, though the forcing is more immediate the closer one gets to poverty wages. The key feature of this forcing is that it is consistent with voluntary exchange but **it is not some occasional or accidental feature** of this or that worker’s circumstances. It is a product of the distribution of property in society. **People are forced to sell their labor when**, on the one hand, **everyone has property rights in their own capacity to labor** **and**, on the other hand, **some group** of individuals **monopolize all or nearly all of the productive assets** in that society. These are the necessary conditions to create a labor market sufficiently robust to organize production. That is to say, **a** **society in which the primary way of organizing production is through a labor market is one in which most people are forced into that labor market**. Or, put another way, a society in which most people were truly free to enter or not enter the labor market would be one in which labor is so radically de-commodified that the mere formal possibility of a labor market could not serve, on its own, to guarantee social reproduction. Relations among workers and employers would be truly free and thus truly contingent. It is only when there is a sufficiently large population of individuals who have nothing but their labor-power to sell that the mechanism of social forcing guarantees a constant supply of labor through the labor market itself. But this means that, in a society based on the commodification of labor, the conditions that would make the buying and selling of labor-power **a truly free** **set of exchanges** would require utterly transforming that market-based production relationship itself. **It would require giving workers a reasonable alternative to selling their labo**r – say through a sizable, unconditional basic income and universal public goods, or through giving all workers the possibility of owning or cooperatively owning their own enterprise**. Such measures would amount to a radical de-commodification of labor-power, an overcoming of the very social conditions that give rise to the labor market’s self-image as a site of free exchange**. As Ira Steward, a nineteenth century American labor reformer, once said, “if laborers were sufficiently free to make contracts…they would be too free to need contracts” (quoted in Stanley 1998, 96). The foregoing social analysis is familiar enough, but its implications for the right to strike are rarely considered. The right to strike begins to make more sense if we reflect upon the fact that **workers who are forced to sell their labor are vulnerable to exploitation**. Exploitation just is the word for structural domination in the domain of economic production (Vrousalis 2013; Roberts, n.d., Chap. three). **Some** workers **will accept jobs at going wage rates** and hours, **others will be unable to bargain** for what they need**, and most can be made to work longer hours**, **at lower pay, under worse conditions than they would otherwise accept.** Many employers know this and will take advantage of it (Greenhouse 2009; Krugman, New York Times, December 23, 2013). Even if employers do not intentionally take advantage of it, they do so tacitly by making numerous economic decisions about hiring, firing, wages and hours that assume this steady supply of economically dependent labor. So it is not just the force of necessity, but the fact that this forcing leaves workers vulnerable to exploitation and the further fact that **this is a class condition** that is relevant to our thinking. It explains why **workers might seek collective solutions to their structural domination** and why they might refuse to believe that they can overcome their exploitation through purely individual efforts.

#### 2] Workplace Domination – authority within the workplace arbitrarily resides in the hands of employers, which alienates and dominates workers, Gourevitch 2:

Gourevitch, A.. “Quitting Work but Not the Job: Liberty and the Right to Strike.” Perspectives on Politics 14 (2016): 307 - 323. //LHP AV Accessed 7/4/21

The commodification of labor 2: contracts and government of the workplace Strikes are ways of resisting structural domination at its most immediate, concrete point – the job. But that is only one aspect of the unfreedom that produces strikes. **The other arises from personal domination in the workplace itself**. Most modern work is a continuous, coordinated activity of workers in a workplace. This **coordination is only possible through a system of authoritative decisions and standards that cover the complex, ongoing, ever changing set of workplace activities**. Here we meet the second way in which a contract-based social theory is not up to the task of giving an adequate account of the actual relationships in which workers find themselves. Though there are attempts to explain and justify the arbitrary authority that employers possess by reference to the labor contract, these fail, leaving an analytic and moral void. The view of the workplace as a product of private contracts makes it difficult even to grasp the political structure of the workplace itself, let alone understand the range of issues against which **workers** might **strike when resisting an employer’s arbitrary authority** (Anderson 2015; Gourevitch 2013; Hsieh 2005). **A workplace is a site of personal domination because workers are subject to the arbitrary authority of bosses**. **The bosses’ authority is arbitrary because it is not sufficiently controlled by workers.** The ruling legal and social assumption is that decisions about how to run the workplace are up to employers and their managers. **Workers are expected simply to obey**. In American law, this is enshrined as the “core of managerial prerogatives” regarding hiring and firing, work schedules, design of tasks, introduction of new technology and the like – and they extend to prerogatives of capital regarding purchase of goods, plant location, and other investment-related decisions. 11 A general set of, often poorly enforced, labor laws establish specific reservations against what an employer may order workers to do or require them to accept. But the very fact that these are **specific reservations only reinforces the fact that the assumption is one of dependence on the arbitrary will of managers and owners**. For examples, consider the fact that **in many states employers have been within their rights when firing workers for comments** they made **on Facebook** (Emerson, Huffington Post, October 17, 2011), for their sexual orientation (Velasco, San Gabriel Valley Tribune, October 7, 2011), for being too sexually appealing (Strauss, ABC News, August 2, 2013), **or for not being appealing enough** (Hess, Slate Magazine, July 29, 2013). **Workers** **face** being given **more tasks** **than** **can be performed** in the allotted time (JOMO, Dissent, Winter 2013; Greenhouse 2009, 53-55, 89, 111-112), **locked** in the workplace **overnight** (Greenhouse 2009, 49-53), forced to **work in extreme** **heat or physically hazardous** but not illegal conditions (Urbina, New York Times, March 30, 2013; Hsu, Los Angeles Times, September 19, 2011), **or arbitrarily isolated** from the rest of one’s coworkers (Greenhouse 2009, 26-27). **Some workers are forced to wear diapers** rather than go to the bathroom, **refused lunch breaks or pressured to work through them** (Jamieson, Huffington Post, May 8, 2013; Wasserman, Mashable, July 25, 2012; Vega, New York Times, July 7, 2012; Egelko, San Francisco Chronicle, February 18, 2011; Greenhouse 2009, 11-12), **forced to keep working after their shift is up, denied the right to read or turn on air conditioning** during break (Bennett-Smith, Huffington Post, August 14, 2012; Little, ABC News, August 15, 2012), or **forced to take random drug tests** and to perform other humiliating or irrelevant actions (Bertram, Robin and Gourevitch, Crooked Timber, July 1, 2012). Notably, in these cases and in many others, **the law protects the employer’s right to make these decisions without consulting workers and to fire them if they refuse**. **The bitterness of this experience of subjection is old and used to carry the complaint of “wages-slavery**.” As an American labor agitator once wrote in 1886, once **Liberty consists in being able to satisfy all one’s wants, to develop all one’s faculties, without** in any way **depending upon the caprice of one’s fellow-beings**, which is impossible if man cannot produce upon his own responsibility. **So long as the workman works for a boss**, a master, **he is not free**. ‘You must obey,’ the master will say, ‘for since I assume the responsibility of the undertaking, I alone have the right to its direction.’ (Journal of United Labor, July 10, 1886, 2109– 2111) The point of greatest interest to us here is that **the employer’s claim to exercise this authority is intimately bound up with the commodification of labor**-power and the free exercise of property rights. As the quotation above suggests, the employer’s authority is supposed to derive from the way in which he “assumes the responsibility of the undertaking.” He is the agent, putting his idea and money on the line, taking all the risk. The worker, on the other hand, already received her reward. She has sold her commodity – her labor-power – to the employer, who pays her a wage in exchange for rights to that commodity. **To have a property-right in something is to have some kind of exclusive authority over it; therefore, the boss should not have to consult with the worker about how to use the labor-power he bought**. However, as labor reformers have long observed, the special thing about the sale of labor is that “**Labor is inseparably bound up with the laborer**.” A labor contract “assumes that labor shall not be a party to the sale of itself beyond rejecting or accepting the terms offered. **This purchase of labor gives control over the laborer-his physical intellectual, social and moral existence**. The conditions of the contract determine the degree of this rulership” (Journal of United Labor, January 7, 1888, 2554). In other words, **there is no way for the boss to enjoy his property right in the purchased labor-power without also exercising that arbitrary power over the person of the laborer. But this is just the kind of power that the exchange of property is not supposed to give over the seller of property since the seller’s will is supposed to be separable from the commodity.** The employer’s arbitrary authority is derived from the view that the worker has sold his property, his labor-power, but that **same theory of property seems to deny that such arbitrary control may be claimed when the seller cannot withdraw his will from the property.** There are a few ways that a contract-based social theory might respond to this challenge, but we shall focus here on the most important:12 the incompleteness of contracts. It is a well-known fact that all **contracts are incomplete** (Hart 1995). But in the case of the workplace, **this incompleteness is intensified and magnified by the fact that the contract is to take part in a dynamic, continuous activity with other people**. No matter what a worker has agreed to at the point of the contract **it is impossible for a contract to specify all of the eventualities** that arise in the complex, ongoing process of running a workplace. Something else has to explain who exercises control over all these unanticipated matters. This means, no matter how freely made a contract is, **we cannot say that the authority to which a worker is subject is justified by that free consent.** At most, the radical incompleteness of labor contracts is what allows the many aspects of law and cultural assumption to fill the void. For instance, **in American law, employers enjoy a “core of managerial prerogatives” over issues like hiring, firing, investment, and work organization**. Strikers may not strike to contest these decisions and employers may not be forced to bargain about them. They need not give any account of why such production decisions have been made, even if they have dramatic consequences for employees – like producing plant closures or changing the organization and definition of tasks. Courts have defended this managerial control and the narrowing of the right to strike by importing older, status-based ideas about contract and property to fill the void of incompleteness. Only by (often semi-articulated) reference to quasi-feudal master-servant law have they been able to fill out the authority that the contract leaves open. Courts have argued that worker deference to managers of a “common enterprise” is implied in the contract or by arguing that employers enjoy uninfringeable property rights in the worker’s labor or wider enterprise (Atleson 1983, 84-109). In other words, courts themselves have acknowledged the incompleteness and thus indeterminacy of the contract with respect to the organization of work, but generally resolved this authority in favor of employers by appeal to something outside the contract itself. So, to put the problem another way, the point about structural domination was that workers might be forced to make a variety of explicit concessions on any number of issues – wages, hours, conditions, stultifying jobs. But the point **about personal domination in the workplace is that the contract also seems to involve the tacit concession of generic control over a further set of unknown issues**. The problem from the standpoint of contract theory is that **the contract itself cannot adequately explain why this power is assumed to devolve to the employer** nor why law should support this assumption. At most, we can only say the worker agreed to give up this control, not that she in any way agreed to the various decisions about her work. Usually, however, **we do not think a human being has a right to such blanket alienation of their liberty.** In the case of work, the only reason supporting that worker’s alienation of control as authoritative seems to be that the worker sold her property – her labor-power – and therefore has no right to control that property for the duration of the work (within the reasonable boundaries of protective labor legislation) or that she owes obligations of deference to the employer.

#### 3] Strikes challenge the notion of labor as a mere commodity – that empowers workers and resists arbitrary managerial authority, Gourevitch 4:

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As we have seen, **workers resist** these accounts **on the grounds that their capacity to labor is not a commodity at all.** Or at least, labor-power cannot operate as a commodity in this case because a crucial feature of the sale of property – separability of the seller’s will from the commodity sold – is impossible. Therefore, **whatever** the status **the labor contract** has, the **authority** relations **of the workplace** itself **cannot be derived from the contract** – at least not from the contract conceived as a sale of property. Workers nevertheless find themselves in a world in which employers do legally possess this arbitrary authority. **The strike is**, again, one way of **challenging this authority by attacking the idea that labor-power is a mere commodity to be used as the employer sees fit**. The strike is a way of pressing the claim that **workers, too, should exercise control rather than submit passively to managerial prerogatives**. **Historically we can think of ‘control strikes,’ strikes over the introduction of new technology, and even strikes over seemingly lesser issues like “abolition of the luncheon** **privilege**” (Report of the Industrial Commission on the Relations and Conditions of Capital and Labor vol 7 1901, 116). The general point being that **strikes** that target decisions usually falling under the domain of “core of entrepreneurial control” (Burns 2011, 123-126; Lambert 2005, 132) **are not just** about **instrumental considerations** regarding compensation and conditions **but about resisting the very logic of contract and property that supports the manager’s authority in the first place**. It is worth noting the way in which the two kinds of domination are intertwined. Resistance to managerial discretion is not just about objecting to arbitrary power as a matter of principle, nor just about challenging a particularly nasty manager. Rather, the point is that, **in a modern capitalist economy, the manager’s authority is tied to the problem of exploitation itself.** Structurally dominated workers are not just threatened with exploitation at the moment of contract but in the workplace. **The core interest of the employer is in extracting as much labor as possible,** which is why **employers**, **regardless of whether they are benevolent or cruel, tend to seek unchallenged authority over the work process**. Seemingly petty actions, like denying bathroom breaks or imposing dangerous work speeds, are not, on this account, isolated instances of abuse, but rather moments when the structural imperatives of maximizing profits translate into the exercise of managerial authority and organization of work. **Uncontested managerial authority is of concern to workers not just because those who have power tend to abuse it, but because this power is directed to a systematic purpose**: it is used **to exploit workers**. **These prerogatives** are, in effect, a way of **unilaterally alter**ing the terms of **employment**. Threatening to introduce new technology, speed up work, relocate plants, or reduce and redistribute tasks, is typically part of an interconnected process in which structural and personal elements of domination fold into each other to guarantee maximum effort for minimum compensation. That is why **confining strikes narrowly** to issues regarding wages, hours, and conditions **is so problematic**. Such **limitations rely on analytically groundless** **or morally dubious attempts to derive entrepreneurial authority from the contract**, and they fail to understand why managerial prerogatives with respect to hiring, firing, investment and organization are just as significant to the basic interests of the worker as ‘bread and butter’ issues like wages and hours (Burns 2011, 47-55; Atleson 1983, 67-96).

## Underview

#### A] Interpretation: Debaters must, on the page with their name and the school they attend, disclose all taglines, full citations, and the first and last three words of the pieces of evidence read in their cases on the 2020-21 NDCA LD wiki at least one hour before the round if they have read that case before.

#### B] Violation: screenshot in the doc.

#### C] Net Benefits

#### 1. Reciprocity – my ACs have been up for all last night and this morning. They’ve gotten so much time to prep it out, while I have no idea what their typical strategy looks like.

#### 2. Element of Surprise – A world without disclosure rewards debaters for running arguments not because they are good, but because their opponents won't know how to respond. Disclosure forces debaters to commit to quality; under my interpretation, debaters would have to write cases knowing that their opponents will have the opportunity for thoughtful preparation.

#### 3. Disclosing on slack doesn’t solve –

**A] I only get to see what you’ve been reading for 30 minutes**

**B] There is no way to verify it – on public domains like the wiki people can call you out if you mis disclose**

**C] Novices get scared to talking to older debaters, let alone asking them to change their disclosure practices**

#### Fairness and Education are voters –

#### CI –

#### DTD –

#### No RVI’s –

**A] Baiting**

**B] Norming**

**C] Logic**

**D] Chilling Effect**

**E] 1NC Sandbagging**

Graphical user interface, application, Word

Description automatically generated