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#### Interpretation: Debaters must defend that the member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines and ought not generate offense external to the policy implementation.

#### “Resolved” means to enact by law.

Words & Phrases ’64

(Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Nations are defined territories with governments

**Merriam Webster** [Merriam Webster, 8-22-2021, accessed on 9-6-2021, Merriam-webster, "Definition of NATION", <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nation>] Adam

Definition of nation (Entry 1 of 2) 1a(1): [NATIONALITY sense 5a](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationality)three Slav peoples … forged into a Yugoslavia without really fusing into a Yugoslav nation— Hans Kohn (2): a politically organized [nationality](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationality) (3)in the Bible : a non-Jewish nationalitywhy do the nations conspire— Psalms 2:1 (Revised Standard Version) b: a community of people composed of one or more [nationalities](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalities) and possessing a more or less defined territory and government Canada is a nation with a written constitution— B. K. Sandwell c: a territorial division containing a body of people of one or more nationalities and usually characterized by relatively large size and independent statusa nation of vast size with a small population— Mary K. Hammond 2archaic : [GROUP](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/group), [AGGREGATION](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggregation) 3: a tribe or federation of tribes (as of American Indians)the Seminole Nation in Oklahoma

#### Medicines refer to physical substances.

American Heritage Dictionary of Medicine 18 The American Heritage Dictionary of Medicine 2018 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company <https://www.yourdictionary.com/medicine> //Elmer

"A **substance**, **especially a drug**, **used to treat** the signs and symptoms of a **disease**, condition, or injury."

#### There are 4 types of IP the aff could reduce.

**Brewer 19** [Trevor Brewer, 5-16-2019, accessed on 8-11-2021, BrewerLong, "What Are The 4 Types of Intellectual Property Rights? BrewerLong", <https://brewerlong.com/information/business-law/four-types-of-intellectual-property/>] Adam

There are four types of intellectual property rights and protections (although multiple types of intellectual property itself). Securing the correct protection for your property is important, which is why consulting with a lawyer is a must. The four categories of intellectual property protections include: TRADE SECRETS Trade secrets refer to specific, private information that is important to a business because it gives the business a competitive advantage in its marketplace. If a trade secret is acquired by another company, it could harm the original holder. Examples of trade secrets include recipes for certain foods and beverages (like Mrs. Fields’ cookies or Sprite), new inventions, software, processes, and even different marketing strategies. When a person or business holds a trade secret protection, others cannot copy or steal the idea. In order to establish information as a “trade secret,” and to incur the legal protections associated with trade secrets, businesses must actively behave in a manner that demonstrates their desire to protect the information. [Trade secrets are protected without official registration](https://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/protection.htm); however, an owner of a trade secret whose rights are breached–i.e. someone steals their trade secret–may ask a court to ask against that individual and prevent them from using the trade secret. PATENTS As defined by the [U.S. Patent and Trademark Office](https://www.uspto.gov/help/patent-help#patents) (USPTO), a patent is a type of limited-duration protection that can be used to protect inventions (or discoveries) that are new, non-obvious, and useful, such a new process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter. When a property owner holds a patent, others are prevented, under law, from offering for sale, making, or using the product. COPYRIGHTS Copyrights and patents are not the same things, although they are often confused. A copyright is a type of intellectual property protection that protects original works of authorship, which might include literary works, music, art, and more. Today, copyrights also protect computer software and architecture. Copyright protections are automatic; once you create something, it is yours. However, if your rights under copyright protections are infringed and you wish to file a lawsuit, then registration of your copyright will be necessary. TRADEMARKS Finally, the fourth type of intellectual property protection is a trademark protection. Remember, patents are used to protect inventions and discoveries and copyrights are used to protect expressions of ideas and creations, like art and writing. Trademarks, then, refer to phrases, words, or symbols that distinguish the source of a product or services of one party from another. For example, the Nike symbol–which nearly all could easily recognize and identify–is a type of trademark. While patents and copyrights can expire, trademark rights come from the use of the trademark, and therefore can be held indefinitely. Like a copyright, registration of a trademark is not required, but registering can offer additional advantages.

#### Violation –

#### At best they’re Extra-T, which is a voter for Limits since they can add any amount of infinite planks to the aff to solve for all neg arguments, or Effects-T which is worse, since any small aff can spill up to the res.

#### First, competitive equity –

#### A] Ground: they get to pick the topic ex post facto which incentivizes vague argumentation that’s not grounded in a consistent, stable mechanism – they’re playing dodgeball with hand grenades – caselists are concessionary, unpredictable, beaten by perms, and don’t justify their model.

#### B] Limits: their model has no resolutional bound and creates the possibility for literally an infinite number of 1ACs. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months. Cutting negs to every possible aff is a commitment even large squads can’t handle, let alone small schools like us. Counter-interpretations are arbitrary, unpredictable, and don’t solve the world of neg prep because there’s no grounding in the resolution

#### C] Causality- debating the resolution forces the affirmative to defend a cause and effect relationship, the state doing x results in y. Non topical affs establish their own barometer “I think x is good for me” that aren’t negatable.

#### D] Fairness is an impact –

#### [1] it’s an intrinsic good – some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity – if it didn’t exist, then there wouldn’t be value to the game since judges could literally vote whatever way they wanted regardless of the competing arguments made

#### [2] probability – your ballot can’t solve their impacts but it can solve mine – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but can rectify skews

#### [3] internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education

#### [4] comes before substance – deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it – any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, since it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it. This means they don’t get to weigh the aff.

#### Second, switch-side debate –

#### A] It forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives. Non-T affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to ideological dogmatism. Even if they prove the topic is bad, our argument is that the process of preparing and defending proposals is an educational benefit of engaging it. That’s good – cross was clear that having engagement is key to recognition and spreading literature

#### B] topical version of the aff solves – they can still have all their advantages under TVA – defend reducing IP as breaking down the ability of capitalism. There’s also success in people from the NCs theorization like Michael Wimsatt, a UC Berkeley debater who quarter-finalled reading policy positions while in a wheelchair. It’s unethical to destroy it for everyone when we can make reform.

#### Our model of dialogic communication and deliberation is crucial to overcoming entrenched ableist ideology---“good enough” deliberation leads to incremental improvements that pave the way to true equality.

Amber Knight, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Saint Louis University, “Democratizing Disability: Achieving Inclusion (without Assimilation) through “Participatory Parity”,” Hypatia vol. 30, no. 1 (Winter ‘15)

There is ample evidence to suggest that able-bodied people simply miss the mark when they are asked to think about life from the point of view of a person with a disability. A recent poll found that fifty-two percent of Americans would rather be dead than disabled (Disaboom 2008). Yet when you talk with people with disabilities they usually think that their lives are very much worth living. To explain these divergent perspectives, sociologists Gary Albrecht and Patrick Devlieger coined this phenomenon “the disability paradox.” They write, The disability paradox exists in two forms: first, people with disabilities report that they have serious limitations in activities of daily living, problems in performing their social roles and experience persistent discrimination, yet they say that they have an excellent or good quality of life; and, second, the general public, physicians and other health care workers perceive that persons with disabilities have an unsatisfying quality of life despite that fact that over 50% of these people report an excellent or good quality of life. (Albrecht and Devlieger 1999, 982) This paradox serves as a reminder that people are unable to transcend social privilege to think about issues objectively. Instead, it seems that many nondisabled people project their own fears and misconceptions about living with an impairment onto the lives of people with disabilities. As this analysis has shown, it seems that the **best way** to achieve **mutual understanding** **is not through** transcendence, **but by communicating** with others **across differences.** By engaging with those with disabilities, nondisabled citizens may **confront** **their** own **stigmatized ideas about impairment**, **learn to understand important aspects of disabled peoples’ lives, and** hopefully **make** better political decisions in the long run. They may also learn to think of themselves as temporarily able-bodied and come to grips with the reality that they too will likely experience disability at some point in their lives since human beings are unavoidably vulnerable to aging, illness, and impairment. Such a realization may **motivate all citizens** **to consider their own stake in creating just arrangements that enhance everybody’s opportunities to occupy public space.** Therefore, even though Fraser specifically acknowledges that gaps between procedural fairness and substantive justice **may occur**, she cautiously implies that fair deliberation in the absence of structural power asymmetries will foster **mutual understanding** and likely generate outcomes that further **reduce social disparities** (Fraser 2007, 331). This line of thought is certainly circular since substantive policies **that reduce disparities are** necessary **to ensure procedural parity**, **and just procedures are required in order to bring about just outcomes**. To escape this cycle and realistically apply her framework, Fraser proposes the idea of “good enough deliberation.” She explains: This expression refers to deliberation that, while tainted by power asymmetries and thus falling short of procedural parity, is “good enough” to generate outcomes that **reduce disparities**, **so** that the next round **of political argument proceeds on terms that are** somewhat **more fair and can be expected to lead to still better outcomes,** and so on. (Fraser 2007, 332) Fraser therefore remains optimistic that incremental changes **in the relations of deliberation will yield more** egalitarian decisions. From a disability perspective, this concept serves as a reminder that actively working to include people with a range of impairments in formal and informal democratic spaces is paramount to achieving substantive policies that procure social justice. In sum, preserving difference is in democracy’s best interest, since it not only follows through on the promise of preserving human dignity, but also leads to better deliberative outcomes that have the potential to benefit the public at large. The outcomes of deliberations cannot be determined in advance, but it is possible that interactions between able-bodied and disabled individuals may be **progressively transformative**. In any case, if people with disabilities are persistently isolated, marginalized, and excluded, individuals with disabilities are surely denied their human dignity, and the political community will never know what it is denying itself.

#### Vote negative –

#### A] this procedurally evaluates whether their model is good, which is a prior question

#### B] they can’t get offense: we don’t exclude them, only persuade you that our methodology is best. Every debate requires a winner and loser, so voting negative doesn’t reject them from debate, it just says they should make a better argument next time

#### C] Exclusions are inevitable like the Cap K – we should draw them around reciprocal grounds

## 2

#### **The aff is a melancholic attachment to leftist failure that produce empty liberation strategies. Their unflinching focus on the margins is incapable of envisioning an egalitarian future and assimilates revolutionary content into an apparatus of production that sustains capitalism.**

Dean 13 Jodi Dean, 2013, “Communist Desire” Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges TJHSSTAD

In a widely cited essay published in 1999, Wendy Brown uses Walter Benjamin's term, 'left melancholy', to diagnose a melancholia of the contemporary left.1 Her concern in the essay, which closely tracks Stuart Hall's discussion of the rise of Thatcherism, is to analyze the fears and anxieties of a left in decline, a left that is backwards-looking, self-punishing, attached to its own failure, and seemingly incapable of envisioning an emancipatory, egalitarian future. Timely and evocative, Brown's essay, for many, seemed to capture a truth about the end of a certain sequence of the North American, British and European left. Attuned to the ends and loss occasioned by the disintegration ofthe 'we' previously held in common by the discourse of communism - in her words, to the 'unaccountable loss' and 'unavowedly crushed ideal, contemporarily signified by the terms Left, dociaLi.:Jm, l11arx, or mOJJement' - Brown provided an opportunity to reflect on the failures and continui­ ties in left projects in terms of the desires that sustain them.2 Her treatment of a 'lost historical movement' thus suggested a kind of left 'coming to grips' with or facing of reality: the reality of neoliberal capi­ talism and the defeat of the welfare state. Read from the vantage point afforded by more than a decade, however, Brown's essay is less convincing, for now it appe�rs to err in its basic account of what was lost and why. Her discussion of Benjamin is mislead­ ing. Her treatment of Freud is one-sided. Nonetheless, by analyzing the left in terms of a general structure of desire establishing the contours of a key mode of left theorizing, Brown opens up possibilities for re-conceiv­ ing communist desire, possibilities I try to extend in this essay. 'Left-Wing Melancholy' is the title of Benjamin's 1931 review of the poetry of Erich Kastner.3 Kastner was a well-regarded poet, novelist and journalist during the Weimar period. Kastner's sobering satire appealed to middle-brow readers attracted by its seemingly unadorned and honest portrayal of a stark reality. Benjamin himself disparages Kastner's poetry. He describes it as giving way to the complacency and fatalism of 'those who are most remote from the processes of production and whose obscure courting of the state of the market is comparable to the attitude of a man who yields himself up entirely to the inscrutable accidents of his digestion'.4 In a further essay, 'The Author as Producer', Benjamin uses Kastner as the exemplar of the 'new objectivity' - a literary movement that Benjamin argues 'has made the dtrugg/e againJt poveriJ:I an object of consumption'.5 Citing 'a perceptive critic' - in fact himself, writing in 'Left-Wing Melancholy' - Benjamin quotes his earlier piece: With the workers movement, this left-wing radical intelligentsia has nothing in common. It is, rather, a phenomenon ofbourgeois decompo­ sition . . . The radical-left publicists of the stamp of Kastner, Mehring, or Tucholsky are the proletarian mimicry of decayed bourgeois strata. Their function is to produce, from the political standpoint, not parties but cliques; from the economic standpoint, not producers but agents agents or hacks who make a great display of their poverty, and a banquet out ofyawning emptiness.6 As far as Benjamin is concerned, left-wing writers such as Kastner have no social function other than rendering the political situation into amus­ing content for public consumption. They transmit the apparatus of production rather than transform it, assimilating revolutionary themes into the bourgeois apparatus of production and publication while in no way placing in question the existence of the bourgeois class. Benjamin writes, 'I define a hack as a writer who abstains in principle from alienat­ ing the productive apparatus from the ruling class by improving it in ways serving the interests of socialism? Most generally put, Benjamin's critique in both 'Left-Wing Melancholy' and 'The Author as Producer' targets intellectual compromise, adaptation to the market, and the betrayal of the workers' movement, particularly insofar as this compromise, adaptation, and betrayal banks on and cans authentic revolutionary impulses already part of everyday proletarian life. Brown claims that 'left melancholy is Benjamin's unambivalent epithet for the revolutionary hack who is, finally, attached more to a particular political analysis or ideal - even to the failure of that ideal - than to seiz­ing possibilities for radical change in the present'.8 I disagree. Nowhere in his review of Kastner does Benjamin fault him for a lingering attach­ ment to political ideals. Benjamin in fact makes the opposite point, condemning Kastner for writing poems that are blind to action because 'their beat very precisely follows the notes according to which poor rich folks play the blues'. Benjamin describes Kastner's lyricism as protecting 'above all the status interests of the middle stratum - agents, journalists, heads of departments . . . it noticeably abandons any strilcing power against the big bourgeoisie, and betrays its yearning for patronage with a heartfelt sigh: "If only there were a dozen wise men with a great deal of money'".9 Kastner's melancholy is a pose, a fashion trend, a commodity. He is not attached to an ideal; he has compromised revolutionary ideals by reducing them to consumer products. Perhaps because her preoccupation is more with the inadequacies of the contemporary left than with Benjamin's discussion ofwhat the service intellectuals do to the bourgeoisie when they turn revolutionary themes into consumer contents, Brown does not emphasize the compromise of the left melancholic. Instead she reads Benjamin's critique of Kastner as suggesting that 'sentiments themselves become things for the left melan­ cholic who "takes as much pride in the traces of former spiritual goods as the bourgeois do in their material goods'". Brown locates in this reified loss a point of contact with the contemporary left: 'We come to love our left passions and reasons, our left analyses and convictions, more than we love the existing world that we presumably seek to alter with these terms or the future that would be aligned with them.'10 It is important to note that Brown's continuation differs from Benjamin's. Benjamin is not criticizing a left for its attachment to left passions, reasons, analyses and convictions. Rather, he is calling out Kastner and the 'new objectivity' trend for their compromise and the resulting 'metamorphosis of political struggle from a compulsory deci­ sion into an object of pleasure, from a means of production into an article of consumption'.11 He derides Kastner and other 'left-radical publicists' as compromised intellectuals who turn revolutionary reflexes into 'objects of distraction, of amusement, which can be supplied for consumption' and readily purchased at the 'intelligentsia's department store'.12 Unlike Brown's, Benjamin's left melancholic sublimates left commitment to revolution and the proletariat. A new objectivist, he fatalistically gives way to the bourgeois vision of the existing world instead of holding fast to the revolutionary struggle of the proletariat to reorganize and transform production. Brown argues: If the contemporary Left often clings to the formations and formula­ tions of another epoch, one in which the notion of unified movements, social totalities, and class-based politics appeared to be viable catego­ ries of political and theoretical analysis, this means that it literally renders itselfa conservative force in history - one that not only misreads the present but installs traditionalism in the very heart of its praxis, in the place where commitment to risk and upheaval belongs.13 In our present of undeniable inequality, class war and ongoing capitalist crisis, the relevance, indeed the necessity, of unified movements and class­ based analysis is undeniable in a way that it perhaps was not when Br��n was writing at the end of the nineties. This clarity helps illuminate Benjamin's own position as opposite to the one Brown takes. That is, his concern is not with a traditionalism at the heart of praxis but rather with the sublimation of left ideals in market-oriented writing and publishing. In 'Left-Wing Melancholy', the author Benjamin admires is Brecht the Brecht fully committed to communist revolution, the Brecht Badiou describes as making 'Marxism or communism into a condition for the question of the being of art'.14 In contrast to Brecht's poems, Kastner's, Benjamin writes, are removed from the process o f production, detached from the labour movement, and at a distance from unemployment. They are for 'people in the higher income bracket, those mournful, melancholic dummies who trample anything and anyone in their path'.15 Kastner's poems, and similar such writings, participate in the transmission and production of the class power of the bourgeoisie. They are ultimately a conservative social force. Commitment to Marxist ideals, to unified move­ ments and class-based politics, is not. Benjamin sees Kastner as complicit with the sublimation of revolutionary desire in intellectual booms; his poems have 'more to do with flatulence than with subversion'. Unlike Brown's, Benjamin's left melancholic is the one who gives way to 'compla­cency and fatalism', ceding desire like the 'satiated man who can no longer devote all his money to his stomach'. 1 6

#### Anti-Asian violence and oppression is rooted in the depths of capitalism. Man 20 [Simeon Man, “Anti-Asian violence and US imperialism” (2020), Simeon Man is Associate Professor of History at the University of California, San Diego, and the author of Soldiering through Empire: race and the making of the decolonizing Pacific (University of California Press, 2018), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0306396820949779]

**Anti-Asian violence is a feature of settler societies like the United States that are founded on** Native dispossession and **the freedoms of property ownership**. **The violence** takes a pattern. It **emerges in moments of crisis**, when the **capitalist mode of production predicated on the seizure of Native lands, the extraction of resources and the exploitation of labour fails to generate profit, threatening the individual worker-consumer and his imagined sense of safety, that is itself derived from the security of his property claims**. This insecurity is expressed through a violence directed at those deemed ‘alien’, a figure who occupies a space of illegality and threatens ‘order’, or the governance of property relations, and thus exists to be contained, expelled or eliminated.2 ‘The Chinese Must Go!’ was the rallying cry of the ‘working man’ in the nineteenth century, **a racialising and gendered figure aspiring for inclusion into US market society. More than a negative reaction, antiAsian violence has served as a stabilising force amidst structural inequality, producing a sense of belonging and shoring up the belief in capitalism and white supremacy from unlikely adherents**, while foreclosing other modes of relationship not premised on the theft of labour and Indigenous lands.3 In this view, **antiAsian violence recurring throughout US history should not be seen merely as episodic, arising in periods of xenophobia, but rather as a structure sustaining the racial divides inherent in capitalism**, or racial capitalism, and its twin condition, settler colonialism, a system of conquest dependent upon laws, ideologies and other state institutions to buttress property claims on stolen land.

#### Melancholia results in self-destruction and forecloses the process of mourning, locking subjects into a vicious cycle of hatred.

Dean 13 Jodi Dean, 2013, “Communist Desire” Professor of Political Science at Hobart and William Smith Colleges TJHSSTAD

What, then, of melancholia? The most valuable aspect of Brown's analysis comes from her turn to Freud's 1917 paper on melancholia to provide an account of a particularly left structure of desire. As is well known, Freud distinguishes melancholia from mourning. Mourning responds to the loss of an object of love, whether that object is a person, a country, freedom or an ideal. 17 Over the time of mourning, the subject painfully and piecemeal confronts the reality of her loss. Slowly she withdraws her attachment from the lost object. The work of mourning is complete when the subject is again free, uninhibited and capable of love. As in mourning, the melancholic subject presents an absence of interest in the outside world and a general inhibition of activity. The crucial difference is that the melancholic's lowering of self-regard is manifest in a self-reproach and self-reviling that exceeds self-punish­ ment and extends to the very 'overcoming of the instinct which compels every living thing to cling to life'. The death drive, the force of loss, reformats the structure of drive itself: The melancholic displays something else besid(js which is lacking in mourning - an extraordinary diminution in his self-regard, an impov­ erishmen� ofhis ego on a grand scale. In mourning it is the world which has become poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself. The patient represents his ego to us as worthless, incapable of any achieve­ ment and morally despicable; he reproaches himself, vilifies himself and expects to be cast out and punished. He abases himself before everyone and commiserates with his own relatives for being connected with anyone so unworthy. 18 To account for this difference in self-regard, Freud distinguishes between mourning's consciousness of loss and the unknown and unconscious dimension of object loss in melancholia. Something about the melanchol­ic's loss remains unconscious. Even when the melancholic knows that he lost, he does not know what he has lost, in what his loss consists for him. Psychoanalysis addresses this unconscious element of melancholic loss. Freud accepts the melancholic subject's self-accusation - the subject really is weak, dishonest, petty, egoistic. Yet he notes that most of us, with our reasonably healthy neuroses, don't acknowledge these limita­ tions. We actually are at pains to hide these weaknesses from ourselves and others. The accuracy of the melancholic's self-description, then, isn't at issue. It's basically correct, and Freud accepts it: 'He [the subject] has lost his self-respect and he must have good reason for this.'19 The real question is why the subject has lost his self-respect, what the 'good reason' for this loss is. Answering, Freud notes how, in melancholia, a critical agency splits off from the ego, a voice of conscience that criticizes the poor ego for all its moral failings. He explains that clinical experience reveals th\_at the specific criticisms the melancholic levels against himself correspond most fully not to the melancholic subject, but to one whom the subject loves or should love: 'the self-reproaches are reproaches against a loved object which have been shifted away from it on to the patient's own ego.'20 What the patient seems to be saying about himself is really about someone else. The melancholic subject thus is one who has narcissistically identified himself with and attached himself to someone else, his loved object, now lost. Rather than acknowledging the loss, narcissistic identification protects the subject from it, bringing the object into the subject and enabling him to keep it as part of himself. This identification is fraught insofar as there is much about the loved object that the subject does not love, that the subject hates. To deal with this unavowable hatred, a 'special agency' of the ego splits off to judge and condemn the loved object, now part of the subject himself. Freud explains: 'In this way an object loss was transformed into an ego-loss and the conflict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification.'21 The answer to the question of the subject's loss ofself-respect turns on the object: it is the internalized object who is judged, criticized and condemned, not the subject at all. I return to this point below. Brown uses Freud's account of melancholia to understand the fears and anxieties preventing the left from revising its anachronistic habits of thought. She highlights the persistence of melancholic attachment to a lost object, a persistence that, in superseding conscious desires to recover, to move on, renders 'melancholia a structure of desire, rather than a tran­ sient response'. She also emphasizes the unconscious, 'unavowed and unavowable' nature of melancholic loss. And she notes the shift of the 'reproach of the loved object' onto the left subject, a shift that preserves 'the love or idealization of the object even as the loss of this love is expe­ rienced in the suffering ofthe melancholic'. Recounting some ofthe many losses on the left - of local and international community, of a moral and political vision capable of sustaining political work, of a historical moment - Brown asks whether there might also be a still unconscious, unavowed loss, namely, of 'the promise that left analysis and left commitment would supply its adherents a clear and certain path toward the good, the right, and the true'.22 She suggests that this promise formed the basis for left self-love and fellow feeling. So long as it remains foundational, unavowed and untransformed, it will doom the left to self-destruction.

#### Capitalism is the greatest threat to human survival.

MacUaid, 07 (Liam, “Savage Capitalism—The Ecosocialist Alternative,” August, http://liammacuaid.files.wordpress.com/2007/08/savage-capitalism.pdf)

All this has happened not only because of the general priorities of any form of capitalism, but because of the present phase of ‘savage capitalism’, stalking the earth with all sense of social responsibility abandoned, increasing amounts of surveillance, violence, war and torture, and aimed at short term profits squeezed from the labour of the poor, rather than the development of social solidarity, peace and the possibility for most people to live a happy life. It is now obvious that this morbid phase of capitalism has brought upon humanity the biggest ever threat to its existence – the threat of environmental catastrophe. The overall threat to humanity and the planet we sum up here under four headings – environmental catastrophe, imperialist war and the crushing of the third world, savage capitalism in everyday life and the surveillance- security lockdown state. They are all linked; they all are part of a single system of power and exploitation. ‘Neoliberalism’, with the added ingredient of US-style neoconservatism, has degenerated into a new and more barbarous phase – ‘savage capitalism’. This new phase of capitalism forces an inevitable conclusion – only by a total transformation in politics and production, in other words a transformation of our social relations, can a sustainable future for humanity be established. We are facing the biggest crisis of human civilisation ever. No previous crisis has ever posed the existence human civilisation so directly.

#### It is try or die for the alternative—capitalism will annihilate the planet.

Sullivan, 06 (Charles free lance writer for Information Clearing House. “Scared Ecology and Capitalism” http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article13515.htm 6/6/2006).

Wherever the extractive industries have gone they have left polluted waters and depauperate landscapes, and exhausted and impoverished workers in their wake. The company owners get rich while the workers continue to live in abject poverty and are still dying in the mines. This is the legacy of capitalism, as witnessed by a historical record that is beyond dispute. It is there for the entire world to see, as if etched in granite. You can see it in the face of the miners and the impoverished remnant forest, in the toxic waste left behind in Butte, Montana, where the water in the aftermath of copper mining has the acidity of battery acid. It makes no moral, ecological or economic sense whatsoever for us to continue down this path of self-deception and self-annihilation. As we have seen, capitalism produces only a few winners, and leaves death and devastation in its wake. Either we rebel or die .

#### The aff’s intoxication with the politics of the moment and identity ensures a collective failure, cedes the state to capitalism, and is absorbed by communicative capitalism – endorse Communist Party politics which can take the multitude of dispersed movements and concentrate them into a political force capable of realizing an egalitarian future.

Dean 16 Jodi Dean, political theorist and professor in the Political Science department at Hobart and William Smith Colleges, held the position of Erasmus Professor of the Humanities in the Faculty of Philosophy at Erasmus University Rotterdam, received her B.A. in History from Princeton University and her MA, MPhil, and PhD from Columbia University, 2016, “Crowds and Party”, Verso , EO

The saturation of the generic political identity of the working class became manifest in the multiplication of political identities. From 1968’s intoxication with the politics of the beautiful moment**,** through the eighties’ embrace of civil society and the politics of society’s own self-targeting, into the “activistism” and “movementism” of the alter-globalization movement, the Left has claimed as a victory the symptom of its defeat: the erosion of working-class political power and the accompanying decay of its political parties. Defeated on the political plane—the name of this defeat is “neoliberalism”—the Left shifted to the social and cultural terrain. It fragmented into issues and identities. On some issues and with respect to some identities, there were political advances. At the same time, in jettisoning the struggle for political power, the Left lost the capacity to defend and advance the interests of the people. Economic inequality increased. Commitment to social provisioning—education, public housing, welfare, social services—collapsed. Identity as an operator for a politics is now itself fully saturated. Symptoms of this saturation include the reduction of the space of change to the individual, the circulation of the momentary outrage in the affective networks of communicative capitalism, the practices of calling out and shaming that undermine solidarity, and the contradictory and destructive attachment to national and ethnic specificity. They include as well the complex mutual policing of who can claim what identity under what conditions and what authorizes such a claim. When identity is all that is left, hanging on to it makes a kind of sense. The reality of the struggle to survive becomes the basis of an identity imagined as dignified because it has to produce itself from itself. Attachment to identity is pathological, nevertheless. It enchains us to collective failure, turning us ever inward as it holds back the advance of a politics capable of abolishing the current system and producing another one. Unfettered capitalism and the repressive state constitute real limits to cultural critique and social experimentation: exploitation, dispossession, incapacitation, incarceration, proletarianization, extermination. Perhaps the most striking symptom of the saturation of identity is thus the economic rupturing of identity categories, that is to say, the emergence of identities as themselves sites of class struggle. In 2014 and 2015, riots in Ferguson, Missouri and Baltimore, Maryland pushed this struggle into mainstream discussions in the US. Since Badiou’s 2006 interview, there has been renewed left interest in the party form. This interest results from the impasses encountered by the crowds and riots in the latter half of the decade. In cities all over the world, hundreds and thousands of people took to the streets and parks in a resounding “no” to the array of policies installed by the capitalist class to protect its interests. These protests signaled a new militancy and determination on behalf of opponents of austerity, precarity, state violence, and the neoliberal mantra of cuts, cuts, cuts. Then the protests ended. The crowds went home. Sometimes they made no demands. Other times they made impossible demands. And still other times they asserted truths both obvious and painful in the urgency of their assertion: Black Lives Matter. The press of these crowds presents an alternative to Badiou’s “identity that is beyond identity.” The alternative is movement itself, the force of many where they don’t belong, the intensity of the egalitarian discharge. Marx and Engels link socialism not simply to the identity of the working class. They link it to working-class movement. In the nineteenth century, worker uprisings were pushing forward, coming together, and breaking out, disrupting capital processes of value extraction. This active movement incited Marx and Engels (and other nineteenth-century socialists and anarchists) to see in proletarian struggle more than demands for shorter working days, safer working conditions, and higher wages. They saw these struggles as the political process of the subject of communism. We can repeat their innovation not by looking for a generic identity (a search that already preoccupied Marcuse and returns in another form in Hardt’s and Negri’s multitude) but by emphasizing movement. In place of the saturation of identity, we should turn to the process of movement, recognizing the people as the subject of that process. The very fact of the active aggregation of crowds, the rise of political opposition and militancy, directs us to a collective desire for collectivity. The crowds and riots of the last decade have shown us the many coming to sense their collective power, the capacity of number to inscribe a gap in the expected. Debt, immiseration, policing, and dispossession have incited those proletarianized under communicative capitalism to revolt. Global demonstrations have also brought to the fore the crowd’s limitation. Its powers are destructive, creative, unpredictable, contagious, and temporary. The strength that comes with the indeterminacy of the crowd’s message is a weakness when the crowd disperses. The crowd lacks capacities of endurance, implementation, and execution. Without mediation, that is to say, absent a transferential relation to another space, it doesn’t know what it desires. The crowd doesn’t have a politics. It is the opportunity for a politics. Some on the Left like to repeat Trotsky’s warning about substitutionism: the party substitutes itself for the class, the party organization substitutes itself for the party, the central committee substitutes itself for the party organization, and the leader substitutes him or herself for the central committee. They present horizontalism as an alternative that can avoid these problems. Over the past few decades, we’ve encountered the limits of horizontalism as it fails to scale, endure, or replace capitalist state power. Far from solving a problem of left political organization, horizontalism is the name of a problem. Substitutionism, though, is not. The gaps substitutionism flags are the space of the subject. Neither the crowd nor the party is the people. The people is the gap between them. Political capacity always involves delegation, transfer, and division of labor. Not everyone can do everything. The very idea of a politics of everyone is a debilitating fantasy that denies the constitutive feature of the political: division goes all the way down. The crowd enables us to build a theory of the communist party as a synthesis or movement party. Such a party is neither the movements’ vanguard nor instrument. It is a form of organized political association that holds open the space from which the crowd can see itself (and be seen) as the people. The communist party is the party faithful to the crowd’s egalitarian discharge. It doesn’t represent the movements. It transfers their egalitarian intensity from the particular to the universal. The communist party finds the people in the crowd. Badiou treats the subject-effect as a knot of four concepts: anxiety, courage, justice, and superego. 6 Canetti renders the crowd as a knot of four elements: growth, direction, equality, and density. In the party, the two knots intertwine as concentration, endurance, fidelity, and transference. The party does not represent the people as a collective subject. The party responds to this subject. Hence, it concentrates the subject-effects of anxiety, courage, justice, and superego into a transferential site from which they can work back on the collectivity. The party thus responds to the subject by recognizing it in the crowd and thereby making the crowd into something more than it is. It gives the crowd a history, letting its egalitarian moment endure in the subjective process of people’s struggle. The party occupies the place of division opened up by the crowd. It minds the breach, maintaining it as the gap of desire of the people as a collective political subject. Without the perspective of the party, multiple resistances blur into the menu of choices offered up by capitalism, so many lifestyle opportunities available for individual diversion and satisfaction. The legacy of people’s struggle and crowd event are then carried only by university, culture, and momentary organizations, subjected to the demands of capitalism and deactivated as living resource. The gap of desire is sublimated into the circuit of drive. Without the party, there is no body capable of remembering, learning, and responding. Instead, dispersed individuals, absorbed in communicative capitalism and buffeted by competition, offer multitudes of opinions, suggestions, strategies, and critiques, the collective capable of response present only as an absent addressee. Providing the perspective from which the people can be seen and the space of its desire maintained, the party enables the people to appear in the rupture of the crowd event. The need for the party stems from the fact that the people are split between the ways we are given, positioned, within capitalism. We are situated within a field that tells us who we are and what we can be, that establishes the matrix of our desire (Žižek’s definition of ideology), but that represses the truth of this field in class struggle. Capitalism strives to separate and individuate us, to instill in us the conviction that self-interest matters above all else, that freedom results from individual choices made for individual goals. It blocks from view the systemic determination of choices and outcomes, not to mention the power of collectives in rupturing these systems. When leftists assume the individualism of the dominant ideology, reiterating its emphases on uniqueness and trying to cultivate a politics out of individuated decisions, we undermine our own best impulses to collectivity and egalitarianism. The party asserts the truth of our division. It speaks from the position of this truth and offers another field of possibilities. 7 In opposition to capitalist desire, it opens up a terrain for the desire of a collective political subject. The party doesn’t know everything. It provides a form for the knowledge we gain through experience and analyze with our eyes on the communist horizon. Such a party works to extend the collective desire for collectivity after the crowds go home. When it enables the crowd to endure as a rupture with capitalism (rather than a continuation of or contribution to it) and when it directs the crowd-feeling toward its own constitutive equality, the communist party can hold open the gap for the people as the collective subject of politics. At different points over the past hundred years, the party has attempted to abolish capitalism and usher in communism in various ways—revolutionary seizure of the state, participation in parliamentary processes, training of cadres and education of masses in order to be prepared when the time comes, support and development of people’s cultures and capacities. The communist party has never been simply an organization aimed at achieving a set of economic reforms aimed at restraining capitalism’s extremes and providing workers with welfare guarantees. That this is the case is clear when we note the justified sense of betrayal voiced by communists when their parties compromise and retreat. They feel betrayed because the party gave way on communist desire, the very desire its wide array of organizations hold open, the desire underpinning solidarity and comradeship. The array of classic party organizations—newspapers, literary magazines, clubs, trade associations, sports teams, schools, theater troupes, women’s groups, industry-focused councils, to mention but a few—reminds us that communist parties have always exceeded the binary of state and factory, actively engaging on multiple social, cultural, and economic fronts as elements of one struggle. As a red thread throughout the movements of the oppressed, communists connected divergent issues and experiences, enlarging them into a common world and mobilizing the collective desire for collectivity. Unlike standard parliamentary parties claiming representative authority, the work of the communist party involves substantialization, concentration, extension, and transference. Hence communist values of comradeship, solidarity, enthusiasm, and courage support the building of a political organization capable of responding in a revolutionary situation and enduring in less propitious times. Through the party, members push each other into modes of being and acting that appeared impossible before, when they were alone against capital and its state. The problem the Left encounters today is less a matter of organizational details than it is of solidary political will. As the will emerges, people will figure out the structure in light of the challenges we face in specific contexts, challenges such as expanding militant pressure in ways that inspire and educate cadres while at the same time straining the resources of the state and breaking the confidence of the financial sector; abolishing private property and the capitalist banking system while advancing international coordination in an uneven environment; and increasing popular support of and developing a program for common management of production, health, transportation, communication, food, housing, and education all in the setting of a changing climate, to mention but a few. Responding to these variable challenges generates new knowledge that can be integrated and shared. There is no reason to assume that every component of the party must have the same structure. A global alliance of the radical Left, or, better, a new party of communists, can be knit together from the concentrated forces of already existing groups: militants skilled at direct action, artists adept with symbols and slogans, parties experienced at organizing, issue groups knowledgeable about specific areas of concern, mutual aid networks addressing basic needs. Such a concentration would let people who want to be engaged in radical politics but aren’t sure what to do have a place to go, a place to start. More importantly, such a concentration would amplify specific and local achievements as collective victories in the broader struggle for communism. At the most minimal level, if we are to have a chance of reformatting the basic conditions under which we live and work, we have to share a name in common as a fundamental marker of division. If not, our names will be given to us by capital, which will seek to fragment and distract us. In the movements of the last few years, we’ve seen growing recognition of the power and need for a name in common as a marker of division—We Are All Khaled Said, Occupy, We Are Seneca Lake. A frustrating dimension of localized political work is the way that it seems not to register (particularly if it occurs outside of major metropolitan areas). When local and issue politics are connected via a common name, however, successes in one area advance the struggle as a whole. Separate actions become themselves plus all the others. They instill enthusiasm and inspire imitation. They provide a sense of directionality and movement: which way is the struggle going? Simply multiplying fragmented, local actions isn’t enough— they have to be felt as more than what any one of them can be in isolation, indications of the enduring struggle of the people. In addition to a common name, we have to build solidarity, to extend the bonds of commitment beyond local ties and small networks. Without solidarity, a common will cannot emerge. Immiseration, precarity, defeat, and betrayal as well as ongoing patterns of sexism, racism, and homophobia have made us deeply suspicious. One way a party helps deal with this is with explicit criteria for membership and expectations for members. It supplements personal relations with relations to an organization, holding members accountable to expectations. Relations between comrades overlay and replace particularized relations anchored in individual preference. Practices of regular reporting help install these expectations. Another way a party builds solidarity is by acknowledging different skills and expertise, providing training and education, and delegating tasks. Developing and respecting one another’s skills and knowledge is essential if we are to form ourselves into a political force capable of taking on and replacing global capitalism. In practice, this suggests the utility of working groups in multiple locales and issue areas, groups with enough autonomy to be responsive and enough integration via practices of reporting to formulate and carry out a common purpose. It points as well to the active development of the organizational and political capacities crucial to multi-scalar communist selfgovernance. Left anti-party dogma mobilizes anti-authoritarian convictions. Yet this mobilization has resulted in the intensified authoritarianism of global capitalism. Today authoritarianism is less that of centralized state power than it is of power decentralized, dispersed, and extended via private contracts, interbank and interagency cooperation, and the extensive network of treaties, agreements, and provisions enabling capital flow and global trade. National states act as the police force protecting the global capitalist class. We encounter the fragmentation, dissolution, and decomposition of some elements of the state, and the concentration and intermeshing of other elements of states and markets, as in finance, security, and media. Capital as a class has worked to smash the bureaucratic state machine for us, to convince us that it is useless, even as it strengthens parts of it for its own ends. For too long, left politics in the US, UK, and EU has mirrored neoliberal economics, urging decentralization, flexibility, and innovation. Even the neoliberal push to privatize is reflected in left politics: not only do we hear ad infinitum that the personal is political, but the micro- politics of self-transformation and DIY takes the place of building and occupying institutions with duration. In this vein, some on the Left have abandoned social change entirely. Wary of “totalizing visions,” they cede society and the state to a capitalist class that acts as a global political class intent on extending its reach into and strengthening its hold over our lives and futures. The crowd has pushed this Left aside. Rising up in opposition to the decentralized authoritarianisms of interconnected states and markets, it has occupied, blockaded, and rioted. And it has come up against the limits of its capacity to give social struggles political form. The challenge we face is becoming the Left the crowd deserves, a Left that, faithful to the crowd’s egalitarian discharge, works to make it endure. A Left that speaks the language of radical change but refuses its forms is no Left at all. It’s the means by which political energy and conviction is displaced into styles and practices that make us feel good by making us feel radical. To advance, we need to organize. We need to be a party for the people in the crowd.

#### The role of the ballot is to resist capitalism – critical pedagogy should focus on organized resistance strategies that understand the holistic relation between capitalism and its constituent parts.

Wubenna et al 16 (Zane C. Wubenna, Curry Malott, Derek R. Ford. “Becoming Through Revolutionary Pedagogy: An Interview with Curry Malott and Derek R. Ford.”) CVHS AB

We take as a starting point that revolution is once again on the agenda, around the world and in the U.S., and as educators, educational scholars, and organizers, we are particularly interested in the role of education in revolution. We see education as having a dual role, one epistemological and another ontological, one about the ways in which we understand and see ourselves, others, and the world, and the other about the ways in which we are with ourselves, others, and the world. The book is primarily an intervention in “critical education” or “critical pedagogy,” but it is also an intervention in the left in general. Regarding ontological transformation, we have found that the educational left has been shoddy at best—and silent at worst—about how this type of change actually takes place. In general we would argue that this type of educational work has been reduced to work in curriculum, talking about what we should teach, and so on. While this is definitely important, there is more to it than content. This is why we concern ourselves with becoming. We insist on the role of negation in the process of becoming, and this allows us to make an argument for immanence. The future, we hold, is always only immanent in the present. This is not to say that nothing truly new can take place, for we insist that revolution is precisely a radical rupture in the current order of things, a rupture such that a return to the previous era can never take place. It is rather to insist that no new developments arise out of thin air. Actually, that’s an incorrect statement, but one that confirms our argument: thin air exists, and so when something comes out of thin air was already immanent in that very air! This is all a matter of understanding and comprehension, of course, and so we work in the book to present an understanding of contemporary operations of exploitation and oppression. This is necessary because we currently have a limited and limiting understanding of these operations, and nowhere is this more evident than in our current obsession with “neoliberalism.” Aside from the fact that neoliberalism is rarely defined in any satisfactory way, neoliberalism is just one part of a broader global class strategy, which Curry hinted to above. Neoliberalism was an attack on workers in imperialist states—like the U.S. and Britain—but it was part of a general wave of counterrevolution against all workers and oppressed people worldwide. On the flipside, the gains that workers made in imperialist states to which neoliberalism was a response were part of a wave of global revolutionary offensive. We are calling here for a real internationalism, and we believe that in the U.S. we have a lot of work to do in generating such a program of solidarity. There is a deep-seated national chauvinism in the U.S. working class, especially amongst white workers. It’s really evident on the left, and we see it most clearly in the left’s participation in imperialist war hysteria. Just take a look at how many U.S. left groups lined up behind the Pentagon’s campaign against Libya. Not just the usual suspects like the left-liberals, but many so-called “peace” and “socialist” groups, like the International Socialist Organization and United for Peace and Justice, supported this Western war against a sovereign African nation. Even that darling of the U.S. left, Noam Chomsky, supported the bombing! They bought wholesale the Pentagon’s line that Gaddafi was going to commit a genocide in Benghazi. Something had to be done! It was as if they completely forgot how, in every U.S. imperialist war, they always come up with some justification about freedom, democracy, protecting innocent civilians, and so on. The script is the same over and over again. And why should the imperialists change it? It works! Every “Free Tibet” and “Save Darfur” bumper sticker attests to this success. We see this book, and our project as a whole, as countering this type of national chauvinism, which is intimately connected with anti-communism. Only by grasping the contours of our current moment can we adequately formulate and enact resistance. One area where we make this connection between epistemology and ontology is in our chapter on Ferguson. CM: Indeed, our chapter on Ferguson deals explicitly with the ontology or the nature of reality within the social universe of capital by situating the police killings of Michael Brown, Freddie Gray, and countless others, within the terrorist energy of capital itself. That is, the state- sanctioned murder of Black lives is best understood within the tendency of capital to work labour to death unless regulated or slowed down by proletarian resistance. Marx’s detailed study of capital’s general law of accumulation allows the communist pedagogue to create the knowledge needed to enact a revolutionary practice. The critical pedagogue, especially the more privileged white critical pedagogue is an ally of the super-oppressed, the excluded, and the gentrified. The ally assumes the more privileged worker represents the height of possibility. The communist pedagogue, on the other hand, understands their place within the nature of capitalist reality as a comrade. The notion of a comrade is important to a communist pedagogy because a comrade cannot exist outside of organized resistance—resistance against capitalism and its ideological apparatuses such as white supremacy.

## 3

### OV

#### 1] We are impact turning their attempts to make debate accessible.

#### A] It forces the judge into an inappropriate role – if their argument is voting aff makes debate more accessible, voting neg requires the judge saying debate should NOT be accessible, which entails a rejection of them, identity, and accessibility – debate’s just a game and tasking the judge with determining whether someone’s identity should be accepted is incredibly violent

#### B] It leaves zero role for the neg – our only ground is to say that debate should NOT be more accessible, or to just say nothing at all, which is a hobson choice that forces us to be non-responsive or offensive

#### 2] No 1AR Impact Turns, Independent Voters, or Perfcons – a] Resolvability: Either you auto accept all responses to 2NR standards and they auto win since I can't respond, or you intervene to give 2AR credence b] No infinite abuse: 1NC is 7 minutes and 1AC spikes check a c] Hurts engagement in strategies since you would just spam blip storms d] 7-6 time 2-1 speech skew

### Presumption

#### Presumption flips neg against K affs – they have the burden of proof since they aren’t defending the rez. That’s key to ensure the neg has a shot at engagement.

#### Vote neg on presumption:

#### 1] Systems- the 1AC says institutions create social realities that replicate violence but in-round discourse does nothing to alter conditions. All you do is encourage teams to write better framework blocks.

#### 2] Spillover- they are missing an internal link as to why they need the ballot or why the reading of the aff forwards change. Empirically denied – judges vote on [x] all the time and nothing happens.

#### 3] Competition- debate is the wrong forum for change and competition moots any ethical value of the aff. Winning rounds just makes it seem like you want to win and a loss is internalized as a technical mistake.

#### 4] Voting aff doesn’t access social change, but voting neg resolves our procedural impacts. Have a high threshold for evidence not specific to debate.

Ritter ‘13 (JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1)

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually **incapable of creating any social change**, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with **nonapplicable** rhetorical **theory** that **fails to account for the unique aspects** of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: **“Can debate cause social change?”** Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen **not to prove this fundamental assumption**, which—as this article argues—is **merely a fiction** that is **harmful in** most, if not **all, respects**. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterized as a **fiction** than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is **not provable** by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be **incredibly critical** of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes.

### IdPol

#### The framing of identity as solely based on personal experience absolves the oppressor of responsibility and limits emancipatory potential.

Bhambra 10 [U Warwick and Victoria Margree (School of Humanities, U Brighton, Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, [https://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity\_Politics\_and\_the\_Need\_for\_a\_Tomorrow\_)] Re-Cut Justin](https://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity_Politics_and_the_Need_for_a_Tomorrow_)%5d%20Re-Cut%20SJWen)

We suggest that alternative models of identity and community are required from those put forward by essentialist theories, and that these are offered by the work of two theorists, Satya Mohanty and Lynn Hankinson Nelson. Mohanty’s ([1993] 2000) post-positivist, realist theorisation of identity suggests a way through the impasses of essentialism, while avoiding the excesses of the postmodernism that Bramen, among others, derides as a proposed alternative to identity politics. For Mohanty ([1993] 2000), identities must be understood as theoretical that enable subjects to read the world in particular ways; as such, substantial claims about identity are, in fact, implicit explanations of the social world and its constitutive relations of power. Experience – that from which identity is usually thought to derive– is not something that simply occurs, or announces its meaning and signiﬁcance in a self-evident fashion: rather, experience is always a work of interpretation that is collectively produced (Scott 1991). Mohanty’s work resonates with that of Nelson (1993), who similarly insists upon the communal nature of meaning of knowledge-making. Rejecting both foundationalist views of knowledge and the postmodern alternative which announces the “death of the subject” and the impossibility of epistemology, Nelson argues instead that, it is not individuals who are the agents of epistemology, but communities. Since it is not possible for an individual to know something that another individual could not also (possibly) know, it must be that the ability to make sense of the world proceeds from shared conceptual frameworks and practices. Thus, it is the community that is the generator and repository of knowledge. Bringing Mohanty’s work on identity as theoretical construction together with Nelson’s work on epistemological communities therefore suggests that, “identity” is one of the knowledges that is produced and enabled for and by individuals in the context of the communities within which they exist. The post-positivist reformulation of “experience” is necessary here as it privileges understandings that emerge through the processing of experience in the context of negotiated premises about the world, over experience itself producing self-evident knowledge (self-evident, however, only to the one who has “had” the experience). This distinction is crucial for, if it is not the experience of, for example, sexual discrimination that “makes” one a feminist, but rather, the paradigm through which one attempts to understand acts of sexual discrimination, then it is not necessary to have actually had the experience oneself in order to make the identiﬁcation “feminist”. If being a “feminist” is not a given fact of a particular social (and/or biological) location – that is, being designated “female” – but is, in Mohanty’s terms, an “achievement” – that is, something worked towards through a process of analysis and interpretation – then two implications follow. First, that not all women are feminists. Second, that feminism is something that is “achievable” by men. 3 While it is accepted that experiences are not merely theoretical or conceptual constructs which can be transferred from one person to another with transparency, we think that there is something politically self-defeating about insisting that one can only understand an experience (or then comment upon it) if one has actually had the experience oneself. As Rege (1998) argues, to privilege knowledge claims on the basis of direct experience, or then on claims of authenticity, can lead to a narrow identity politics that limits the emancipatory potential of the movements or organisations making such claims. Further, if it is not possible to understand an experience one has not had, then what point is there in listening to each other? Following Said, such a view seems to authorise privileged groups to ignore the discourses of disadvantaged ones, or, we would add, to place exclusive responsibility for addressing injustice with the oppressed themselves. Indeed, as Rege suggests, reluctance to speak about the experience of others has led to an assumption on the part of some white feminists that “confronting racism is the sole responsibility of black feminists”, just as today “issues of caste become the sole responsibility of the dalit women’s organisations” (Rege 1998). Her argument for a dalit feminist standpoint, then, is not made in terms solely of the experiences of dalit women, but rather a call for others to “educate themselves about the histories, the preferred social relations and utopias and the struggles of the marginalised” (Rege 1998). This, she argues, allows “their cause” to become “our cause”, not as a form of appropriation of “their” struggle, but through the transformation of subjectivities that enables a recognition that “their” struggle is also “our” struggle. Following Rege, we suggest that social processes can facilitate the understanding of experiences, thus making those experiences the possible object of analysis and action for all, while recognising that they are not equally available or powerful for all subjects. 4 Understandings of identity as given and essential, then, we suggest, need to give way to understandings which accept them as socially constructed and contingent on the work of particular, overlapping, epistemological communities that agree that this or that is a viable and recognised identity. Such an understanding avoids what Bramen identiﬁes as the postmodern excesses of “post-racial” theory, where in this “world without borders (“racism is real, but race is not”) one can be anything one wants to be: a black kid in Harlem can be Croatian-American, if that is what he chooses, and a white kid from Iowa can be Korean-American”(2002: 6). Unconstrained choice is not possible to the extent that, as Nelson (1993) argues, the concept of the epistemological community requires any individual knowledge claim to sustain itself in relation to standards of evaluation that already exist and that are social. Any claim to identity, then, would have to be recognised by particular communities as valid in order to be successful. This further shifts the discussion beyond the limitations of essentialist accounts of identity by recognising that the communities that confer identity are constituted through their shared epistemological frameworks and not necessarily by shared characteristics of their members conceived of as irreducible. 5 Hence, the epistemological community that enables us to identify our-selves as feminists is one that is built up out of a broadly agreed upon paradigm for interpreting the world and the relations between the sexes: it is not one that is premised upon possessing the physical attribute of being a woman or upon sharing the same experiences. Since at least the 1970s, a key aspect of black and/or postcolonial feminism has been to identify the problems associated with such assumptions (see, for discussion, Rege 1998, 2000). We believe that it is the identiﬁcation of injustice which calls forth action and thus allows for the construction of healthy solidarities. 6 While it is accepted that there may be important differences between those who recognise the injustice of disadvantage while being, in some respects, its beneﬁciary (for example, men, white people, brahmins), and those who recognise the injustice from the position of being at its effect (women, ethnic minorities, dalits), we would privilege the importance of a shared political commitment to equality as the basis for negotiating such differences. Our argument here is that thinking through identity claims from the basis of understanding them as epistemological communities militates against exclusionary politics (and its associated problems) since the emphasis comes to be on participation in a shared epistemological and political project as opposed to notions of ﬁxed characteristics – the focus is on the activities individuals participate in rather than the characteristics they are deemed to possess. Identity is thus deﬁned further as a function of activity located in particular social locations (understood as the complex of objective forces that inﬂuence the conditions in which one lives) rather than of nature or origin (Mohanty 1995:109-10). As such, the communities that enable identity should not be conceived of as “imagined” since they are produced by very real actions, practices and projects.