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#### Power must be viewed through the lens of the Empire – a form of sovereignty that exists through globalization. Nation-states no longer have the capacity to regulate capital because capitalism now operates transnationally. The aff’s state centered understanding of power is too simplistic because it fails to meaningfully change control systems. 00:40

Hardt and Negri 17 Hardt M, Negri A. Assembly. New York: Oxford University Press; 2017. Michael, American literary theorist and political philosopher, best known for his book Empire, which was co-written with Antonio, Italian Marxist sociologist and political philosopher, best known for his co-authorship of Empire and secondarily for his work on Spinoza TJHSSTAD

**Faced with a globalizing world out of control, many politicians, analysts, and scholars, on the Right and the Left, claim that the nation-state is back**—or, rather, they wish it would come back. Some cite the need for sovereign national control over the economy, especially in light of the continuing crisis, to hold at bay the threat of a “secular stagnation” spreading across the globe or to protect workers and citizens against the depredations of financial markets. Others point to the need for secure national borders to defend the dominant countries against migrations of the poor and thus to preserve national identities. Finally, in the rush to respond to terrorist threats, the national security apparatuses are often posed as the primary or only defense. **Given the renewed calls for the nation-state, globalization seems to have for many reaped more disasters than advantages.**26 **In these terms, however, the problem is poorly posed: arguing about the virtues of globalization versus the control of nation-states will lead only to dead ends.** And, furthermore, the faith that national sovereignty can solve any of these contemporary problems is completely illusory. We need to 264 empire today formulate the problem better before we can see clearly the challenges we really face today. **Almost twenty years ago we proposed that there was forming an Empire that is reorganizing global political relations and shifting priority away from the sovereignty of nation-states.** One guiding hypothesis was that, at the same time as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformations of Chinese socialism, the position of the United States as superpower was also changing. US imperialism, we claimed, is being displaced such that the United States can no longer successfully dictate global relations in unilateral fashion. In Giovanni Arrighi’s terms, US global hegemony has suffered a terminal crisis.27 **In the formation of Empire, furthermore, no sovereign national power will be able to exert control in the manner of the old imperialisms.** Another hypothesis we forwarded was that the increasingly global capitalist markets require a global power to give them order and coherent rules**.** **As the circuits of capitalist production and accumulation achieve properly global reach, nation-states are no longer sufficient to guarantee and regulate the interests of capital. Consequently we foresaw the formation of a mixed imperial constitution, that is, an Empire composed of a changing cast of unequal powers,** including nation-states, supranational institutions (such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank), the dominant corporations, nonstate powers, and others. Empire, one might say, is incomplete. Indeed it is incomplete in the same way that capitalist society is incomplete, containing within itself a diverse array of previously existing social and economic forms. One should never expect either, in fact, to arrive at completion in some pure state. And yet their incompletion or mixed constitution is no obstacle to attacking them right now, in their present form. Numerous authors working along the same lines in recent years have helped us see the problem of Empire even more clearly. **Saskia Sassen**, for example, puts to rest useless arguments that pose nation-states and globalization as opposed and mutually exclusive. She **argues instead that nation-states and the interstate system maintain important roles, but they are being transformed from within by forces of the emerging global political and institutional order. Empire is an assemblage, one might say, of various state and nonstate authorities in concord and conflict.**28 Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson, to give another example, make clear that globalization is not bringing about a borderless world but instead the geographies of Empire are defined by proliferating and fluctuating borders at all levels, empire today 265 which cut across the territory of each city and across continental divides. In fact, they argue that the standpoint of the border, the point of inclusion and exclusion, is the privileged site for bringing into clear view the dynamics of global power.29 Finally, Keller Easterling, as we saw in chapter  10, demonstrates that rather than a homogeneous globe or one divided along national lines, the space of the world market should be understood as a myriad of varied “zones” subject to both state and extrastate governance: industrial zones, free trade zones, export processing zones, and so forth.30 The problem, these authors and many more make clear, is not one of deciding whether to submit to globalization or return to the nation-state, but rather understanding the mixed constitution of this emerging Empire and inventing adequate political means to intervene in and combat its rule. The proclamations of the return of the state, on the Right and the Left, have nonetheless been frequent in recent decades. The most dramatic and hubristic example of the renewed power of the nation-state on the Right was proclaimed by the United States in its “war on terror” and its occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq. **The Bush administration believed it could unilaterally remake the global environment, starting with the Middle East, acting in the style of the old imperialist powers.** In 2003, some viewed US forces rolling into Baghdad as evidence of the centrality of nationstates—the dominant nation-states, of course—in global affairs, **but only a few years later it was clear to all that the utter failure of US unilateral adventures in military, economic, and political terms proved just the opposite: neither the United States nor any other nation-state can successfully dominate in imperialist terms**.31 On the Left, arguments about the “return of the state” and of national sovereignty have been especially prominent in Latin America, where progressive governments came to power as part of political projects to counter the policies of neoliberalism and the rule of global markets.32 These experiences were extremely important and had enormously beneficial effects, in varying degrees and in various ways, for the populations of Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, and elsewhere in the continent. The temporary successes of holding neoliberalism at bay were primarily due, however, not to the individual sovereign states but rather to the continental coalitions of states and the interdependence among them. Indeed as that interdependence is now falling apart the incapacity for individual states to achieve a “postneoliberal” economic and political order or to protect against the spread of the global crisis or even to slow the worst misdeeds of capitalist globalization is becoming increasingly clear. 266 empire today The return of the state is an illusion. The dignity of the nation-state today would hinge on its provision of social welfare, the quality of services, education, health, housing, the levels of wages, and the potential for social mobility. But **the crisis of social and political reformism goes hand in hand with the economic crisis, and the nation-state has proven unable on its own to reconstruct prospects of social well-being and development.** Moreover, even **when nation-states lavish spending on military and security apparatuses, these quickly prove unable to provide anything resembling real security to their citizens.** **We are convinced, in fact, that if the rebirth of the nation-state were not an illusion, if it were to come to pass, it would bring only tragedy**, deepening crises, exacerbating poverty, and setting off wars, awakening demons that were thought to have been exorcized. “Those who sneer at history,” declares Henry Kissinger, the brilliant reactionary stalwart of Empire, “obviously do not recall that the legal doctrine of national sovereignty and the principle of noninterference—enshrined, by the way, in the U.N. Charter—emerged at the end of the devastating Thirty Years War,” referring to the two world wars from 1914 to 1945. The new discipline of international law sought, he continues, “to inhibit a repetition of the depredations of the seventeenth century, during which perhaps 40 percent of the population of Central Europe perished in the name of competing versions of universal truth. Once the doctrine of universal intervention spreads and competing truths contest, we risk entering a world in which, in G. K. Chesterton’s phrase, virtue runs amok.”33 We are not saying, of course, that since the return of national sovereignty is illusory and undesirable, we need to content ourselves with neoliberal globalization and the devastating rule of finance capital. That is not the choice. **We need,** as we said earlier, **to pose the problem properly.** **The first task is to interpret Empire from above, that is, to track its shifting internal hierarchies.** **The mixed constitution of Empire is a constantly changing composition of numerous unequal powers.** In part this still involves the old-fashioned realist analysis of international relations, gauging, for instance, the extent to which Russia has succeeded in shuffling the powers at play in the Middle East or eastern Europe, or evaluating the prospects of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China). Similarly, one would have to understand if and how significantly the United States’ “pivot to Asia” has shifted the primary axis of imperial power from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Imperial analysis, however, also has to consider many nonstate actors. The notion of a clash of civilizations, although purely empire today 267 hollow and false, animates equally those fighting to establish a new caliphate in the Middle East and the conservative ideologues in North America and Europe. Furthermore, material and digital infrastructures, mediascapes, production chains, international and global legal conventions, finance markets, and much more are structures of imperial power that must be illuminated by an analysis from above. **The second and crucial task, however, is to interpret Empire from below, that is, to grasp and nurture the existing powers of resistance and revolt.** Resistance, of course, is expressed in specific locations, but it can also extend to the national scale and beyond. In part, this perspective carries on the tradition of proletarian internationalism, which seeks to carry class struggle beyond the limits of national capital and the national state. But we must also analyze all the other struggles endowed with the powers of social production and reproduction that we have investigated at different points in this book. Ultimately, against the power of money and the social relation it institutionalizes, against the power of property, stand the struggles for the common in their many diverse forms. In the next chapter we sketch some of the elements of a platform for an effective struggle for the common within and against Empire.

#### Subverting the resistance of the empire through individualized labor struggles fails to interpret the Empire in a way that dismantles it. Reddy 21 [Diana S. Reddy, 06 January 2021, “’There Is No Such Thing as an Illegal Strike’: Reconceptualizing the Strike in Law and Political Economy”; Diana Reddy is a Doctoral Fellow at the Law, Economics, and Politics Center at UC Berkeley Law, and a PhD candidate in UCB's Jurisprudence and Social Policy Program. Her research interests lie at the intersection of work law, law and political economy, law and social movements, and social stratification and inequality. You can find her recent scholarship and commentary in Yale Law Journal Forum and Emory Law Journal, as well as in less formal outlets, like the Law and Political Economy blog.; https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-illegal-strike-reconceptualizing-the-strike-in-law-and-political-economy]

But my argument here for reconceptualizing the strike as political is not about more “political strikes,” or about electoral politics, or even necessarily about state action. Based on a vision of the “political” as normative engagement directed towards collective decision-making—it is about destabilizing jurisprudential line drawing between the economic and the political in the first place.167 It is recognizing that all strikes are political or have the potential to be—in that **all strikes are protest meant to transform collective conditions, not merely bargaining towards immediate, transactional ends.** To use political science terminology, **strikes are contentious politics**: “[E]pisodic, **public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects**.”168 They are a way through which workers engage in claims-making when business and politics as usual have proven nonresponsive.169 They do not only address the employer; they engage the polity. **The need to reconceptualize the strike as outward-facing towards the public, not just inward-facing towards the employer, is partly a function of material changes, both in economic production and union density.** As labor scholar Jane McAlevey points out, “Today’s service worker has a radically different relationship to the consuming public than last century’s manufacturing worker had . . . In large swaths of the service economy, the point of production is the community.”170 For this reason, she argues that effective strikes today must engage the public to be successful.171 Union density is also many times higher now in the public sector than in the private one, an upending of the realities of unionization mid-century.172 As illustrated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Janus v. AFSCME, it is easier to see the economic work of unions as political (qua affecting government policy, spending, and debt) in the public sector.173 Yet, **the shift is also about recognizing that it was a legal and an ideological accommodation that made the work of unions in their representative capacity appear as “economic,” and thus outside politics. The work of unions has been artificially “bifurcated” vis-à-vis the political realm.174 For years, as Reuel Schiller has argued, unions have engaged in “two sets of activities that appear barely related to one another”: private, transaction bargaining in the workplace; combined with broad, public mobilization around electoral politics.** But there were always alternate visions of the relationship between the economic and the political within union advocacy and workplace governance.175 **If “establishing terms and conditions of employment [is] a political act involving not just a worker and an employer, but also a union, an industry as a whole, and the state,” then union advocacy is a political act too.**176 **Strikes are part of the “contest of ideas.” Reconstructing a purposefully political philosophy, jurisprudence, and tactical repertoire of collective-labor advocacy is a project that is new again; and it will inevitably require deliberation, debate, and compromise.**177 For the time being, though, one thing seems apparent. Strikes must be a part of engaging a broad swath of the public in reconceptualizing political economy.

#### Strikes unite workers within themselves but kill the multitude with reinforcement of unequal power hierarchies and capitalism. Ruiz 21 [Leopoldo Múnera Ruiz, June 28 2021, “A Multitude in Precarious Conditions”; Lawyer and Master in Philosiphy of Law of the Universidad de Roma. Master in Social and Economic Development and Ph.D. in Political Science of the Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium. Associate Professor at Faculty of Law and Policial and Social Science of the Universidad Nacional de Colombia. https://spectrejournal.com/on-the-colombian-strikes/]

The collective decision to stage a strike during the Covid-19 pandemic has a unique feature that cannot go unnoticed. The call for Colombians to go out and protest in the streets came on April 28th, 2021.1 After a year of strict confinement, isolation from family, the virtualization of all communication, extreme sanitation measures, administered fear, contradictory and erratic public health policies, and the rise in unemployment and social inequality, the fact **that people went out despite the lack of any real safety measures meant that the people found the protest to be the lesser of two evils.** **The proposed tax reform**, like Llorente’s flower vase,2 **offered the opportunity for multiple social uprisings to converge, explosions that had neither a unitary nor a central orientation**. **A multitude, made up of individuals who had been forced to scrounge enough resources for their nuclear families’ subsistence, saw through the cynicism of the government, which wanted to increase its tax revenue by sacrificing workers’ salaries to benefit big capital.** Cynicism, in this context, means “the shameless practice and defense of reprehensible actions and practices.” To have named the tax reform “The Law of Sustainable Solidarity” (Ley de la solidaridad sostenible), was an obscene way of mocking people who depended either on their own efforts or on the real solidarity of their closest friends and family members, and in many cases, on public and private charity, to survive. **Thus, the decision to strike was first motivated by a rather broad and complex assemblage of affects and feelings, primarily those of anger and indignation.** Those who have actively led the strike and joined the mobilization in the streets have suffered and endured the effects of the pandemic. **Under a stratified and hierarchized health system, most people do not have proper access to health care**, nor do they have the slightest chance of flying to Florida to be vaccinated in the U.S. Most have been waiting for weeks to even be tested for Covid-19 if they were so lucky. Everyone has a mother, or an uncle, or a sister, or a comrade, who has been sent back home from the hospital, only to end up days later in overcrowded intensive care units. Everyone has friends who got infected and then died because they were forced to go to the streets to have something to eat, or grandparents who are still waiting for the first dose of the vaccine, even though they were scheduled to have been fully vaccinated already. The “demonstrators” (“manifestantes”), as they have been called by mainstream social media, clearly and rationally understand the dangers to which they are exposed under a general strike that requires their collective presence in the streets. And they continue to participate in public and collective actions that are repressed by the state, both legally and illegally. **Doing so, they expose themselves to the dangers of Covid-19 and to the bullets fired by the agents of an order they wish to endure no more.**

#### Societal violence allows the Empire to expand its biopower unchecked while introducing chaos and hierarchies into the multitude. Southall 10 Nicholas A multitude of possibilities: the strategic vision of Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt, Doctorate of Philosophy thesis, University of Wollongong. School of History and Politics and Sociology Program, University of Wollongong, 2010. <http://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/3274>

Neo-Liberalism and Permanent Exceptionalism While looking for alliances with imperial reformist aristocracies, Hardt and Negri continue to recognise the centrality of violence to capital and that capitalist state forms try to organise and to monopolise it. As they explain capitalist society is a "monster of provocation and devastation" (Hardt and Negri: 1994: 204) and constitutional bourgeois democracy is a "theory of the management of legitimate violence" (Negri: 2008a: 129). Paradoxically, the neo-liberal project has involved "a substantial increase of the State in terms both of size and powers of intervention" to deal with capitalist crisis (Hardt and Negri: 1994: 242). While advocating less state intervention, neo-liberal nation states have boosted the prison population and have introduced more repressive laws concerning protests, strikes, behaviour, movement, the use of public space, censorship and civil rights. At the same time as cutting back on the social security of welfare and social spending, expenditure on military and police forces has increased as these forces increasingly intervene wherever Empire is threatened. The military power of this neo- liberal global 'big government' is required to defend capital and to "force open unwilling markets and stabilise existing ones" (Hardt and Negri: 2004: 177). The power of the imperial war police is founded on the threat of nuclear destruction, genocide and torture (Hardt and Negri: 2004: 19), for Empire is "the absolute capacity for destruction", the "ultimate form of biopower", the power of death (Hardt and Negri: 2000a: 345-346). The constant and coordinated application of this violence helps to maintain social hierarchies, social anxiety and conflict within the multitude. Fear of violence is used to maintain capitalist social relations. Yet, as the global state of violence and fear is extended, it aggravates social crisis while helping to connect the multitude more deeply. In Empire, before the September I I attacks, Hardt and Negri (2000a: 18) analysed the "permanent state of emergency and exception" behind supranational interventions justified in the name of the universal values of justice and peace. They describe imperial power in a situation of permanent crisis and war as "a science of police". In response to the growing power of the a.g. movement, Empire launched a "low intensity war. combined with high intensity police action" (Negri: 2004a: 75). This defence of capital and the state by the world's police forces represents "institutional fascism: an implicit and organic fascism, consubstantial with the institutions being defended". This violence is aimed at halting new cycles of struggle and, as sections of the ruling class descend into fascism, "all acts of protest and resistance are potentially terrorism" (Negri: 2004a: 76). The war on terror's destructive power has fostered fear and insecurity across the globe and has stifled opposition. Since September II 2001, in many parts of the world, governments have introduced new police powers and national security measures. These have increased surveillance and the powers and practices of control, including preventative detention without charge, travel restrictions, roundups, deportations, disappearances, torture and assassinations. The function of the U.S. Department of Justice is now "prevention and disruption", not law enforcement (U.S. Department of Justice: 2001) and the army routinely polices the streets in numerous U.S. cities. Hardt and Negri (2004: 13-14) discuss the war on terrorism as developing out of previous wars on poverty and drugs, where the enemy is a concept or a set of practices. These wars are social wars, mobilising society to fight against "immaterial enemies" continually across the globe. As military and police actions increasingly intermingle, distinctions between the "enemy", generally conceived of as outside the nation state, and the "dangerous classes", traditionally viewed as inside, also blur. Enemies of social order and peace can be identified everywhere, leading to the criminalisation of all forms of social contestation and resistance. "In this perspective, whereas global terrorism is part of the 'civil war' for imperial leadership, the movements of resistance and exodus are actually the real new threat for the global capitalist order" (Negri: 2008b: 23). This threat is confirmed by U.S. military strategists who identify the second most dangerous future scenario that the U.S. military could face as the threat from a "Transnational Web" of "radical transnational 'peace and social justice' groups" (Nichiporuk: 2005).

#### The impact is permanent racialized targeting and elimination of bodies to maintain a global economy of violence. The Empire is a regime of biopower that regulates entire populations justifying endless imperial violence. 0:34

Harting 6. [Heike, prof at University of Montreal, Global Civil War and Post-colonial Studies, globalautonomy.ca/global1/servlet/Xml2pdf?fn=RA\_Harting\_GlobalCivilWar]

¶ The Necropolitics of Global Civil War¶ As with other civil wars, global civil war affects society as a whole. It "tends," as Hardt and Negri argue, "towards the absolute" (2004, 18) in that it polices civil society through elaborate security and surveillance systems, negates the rule of law, militarizes quotidian space, diminishes civil rights to the degree in which it increases torture, illegal incarceration, disappearances, and emergency regulations, and fosters a culture of fear, intolerance, and violent discrimination. Hardt and Negri, therefore, rightly argue that war itself has become "a permanent social relation" and thereby the "primary organizing principle of society, and politics merely one of its means or guises" (ibid., 12). What Hardt and Negri suggest is new about today's global civil war is its biopolitical agenda. "War," they write, "has become a regime of biopower, that is, a form of rule aimed not only at controlling the population but producing and reproducing all aspects of social life" (ibid., 13). For example, the biopolitics of war entails the production of particular economic and cultural subjectivities, "creating new hearts and minds through the construction of new circuits of communication, new forms of social collaboration, and new modes of interaction" (ibid., 81). The ambiguity of Hardt and Negri's notion of biopower subtly resides in their adaptation of the language of social and political revolution, for it seems to be the regime of biopower, rather than the multitude, that absorbs and transvalues the revolutionary, that is, anti-colonial, spirit inscribed in the rhetoric of "new hearts and minds." At the same time, they argue, that a biopolitical definition of war "changes war's entire legal framework" (ibid., 21-22), for "whereas war previously was regulated through legal structures, war has become regulating by constructing and imposing its own legal framework" (ibid. 22). If none of this, at least in my mind, is marked by a particular originality of thought, then this may have to do with Hardt and Negri's reluctance to address the historical continuities between earlier wars of decolonization and contemporary global wars, the legacies of imperialism, and the imperative of race in orchestrating imperial, neo-colonial, and today's global civil wars. ¶ In fact, while biopolitical global warfare might be a new phenomenon on the sovereign territory of the United States of America, specifically after 11 September 2001, it is hardly news to "people in the former colonies, who," as Crystal Bartolovich points out, "have long lived ???at the 'crossroads' of global forces" (2000, 136), violence, and wars. For example, in Sri Lanka global civil war has been a permanent, everyday reality since the country's Sinhala Only Movement in 1956, and become manifest in the normalization of racialized violence as a means of politics since President Jayawardene's election campaign for a referendum in 1982, which led to the state-endorsed anti-Tamil pogrom in 1983. Similarly, according to Achille Mbembe, biopolitical warfare was intrinsic to the European imperial project in "Africa," where "war machines emerged" as early as "the last quarter of the twentieth century" (2003, 33). In other words, although Hardt and Negri argue convincingly that it is the ubiquity of global war that restructures social relationships on the global and local level, their concept tends to dehistoricize different genealogies and effects of global civil war. Indeed, not only do Hardt and Negri refrain from reading wars of decolonization as central to the construction of what David Harvey sees as the uneven "spatial exchange relations" (2003, 31) necessary for the expansion of capital accumulation and of which global war is an intrinsic feature, but they also dissociate global civil wars from the nation-state's still thriving ability to implement and exercise rigorous regimes of violence and surveillance. As for the term's epistemological formation, global civil war has been sanitized and no longer evokes the conventional association of civil war with "insurrection and resistance" (Agamben 2005, 2). Instead, it has become the effect of a diffuse new sovereignty (i.e., Hardt and Negri's Empire), a sovereignty that no longer decides over but has itself become a disembodied, that is, denationalized and normalized, state of exception. Yet, to talk about the disembodiment of global war not only reinforces media-supported ideologies of high-tech precision wars without casualties, but it also represses narratives about the ways in which the modi operandi of global war come to be embodied differently in different sites of war.¶ In her short story "Man Without a Mask" (1995), the Sri Lankan writer Jean Arasanayagam describes the global dimensions of a war that is usually considered an ethnic civil war restricted to internally competing claims to territorial, cultural, and national sovereignty between the country's Sinhalese and Tamil population. Told by an elite mercenary who clandestinely works for the ruling members of the government and leads a group of highly trained assassins, the story follows the thoughts of its narrator and contemplates the politicization of violence and death. As a mercenary and possibly an ex-SAS (British Special Air Service) veteran the Sri Lankan Government hired after the failure of the Indo-Lankan Accord, the narrator signifies the "privatization of [Sri Lanka's] war" (Tambiah 1996, 6) and, thus, the reign of a global free market economy through which the state hands over its institutions and services to private corporations, including its army, and profits from the unrestricted global and illegal trade in war technologies. Like a craftsman, the mercenary finds satisfaction in the precision and methodical cleanliness of his work, in being, as he says, "a hunter. Not a predator" in his ability to leave "morality" out of "this business" (Arasanayagam 1995, 98). He is an extreme and perverted version of what Martin Shaw describes as the " 'soldier-scholar,'???the archetype of the new [global] officer" (1999, 60). As a self-proclaimed "scholar or scribe" (ibid., 100), the mercenary plots maps of death. Shortly before he reaches his victim, a politician who underestimated the political ambition of his enemy, he comments that bullet holes in a human body comprise a new kind of language: "The machine gun splutters. The body is pitted, pricked out with an indecipherable message. They are the braille marks of the new fictions. People are still so slow to comprehend their meaning" (ibid., 100). These new maps or fictions of global war, I suggest, describe what Etienne Balibar calls ultra-objective and ultra-subjective violence and characterize how global civil war both generates bare life and manages and instrumentalizes death.¶ According to Balibar, ultra-objective violence suggests the systematic "naturalization of asymmetrical relations of power" (2001, 27) brought about, for instance, by the Sri Lankan government's prolonged abuse of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which, in the past plunged the country into a permanent state of emergency, facilitated the random arrest of and almost absolute rule over citizens, and thus created a culture of fear and a reversal of moral and social values. As the story clarifies, under conditions of systematic or ultra-objective violence, "corruption" becomes "virtue" and "the most vile" man wears the mask of the sage and "innocent householder" (Arasanayagam 1995, 102). In this milieu, the mercenary has no need for a mask, because he bears a face of ordinary violence that is "perfectly safe" (ibid., 102) in a society structured by habitual and systemic violence. But the logic of the "new fictions" of political violence is also ultra-subjective because it is "intentional" and has a "determinate goal" (Balibar 2001, 25), namely the making and elimination of what Balibar calls "disposable people" in order to generate and maintain a profitable global economy of violence. The logic of ultra-subjective violence presents itself through the fictions of ethnicity and identity as they are advanced and instrumentalized in the name of national sovereignty. The mercenary perfectly symbolizes what Balibar means when he writes that "we have entered a world of the banality of objective cruelty" (ibid.). For if the fictions of global violence are scratched into the tortured bodies of war victims, the mercenary's detached behavior dramatizes a "will to 'de-corporation'," that is, to force disaffiliation from the other and from oneself ??? not just from belonging to the community and the political unity, but from the human condition" (ibid.). In other words, while global civil war becomes embodied in those whom it negates as social beings and thereby reduces to mere "flesh," it remains a disembodied enterprise for those who manage and orchestrate the politics of death of global war. It is through the dialectics of the embodiment and disembodiment of global violence that the dehumanization of the majority of the globe's population takes on a normative and naturalized state of existence.¶ Arasanayagam's short story also casts light on the limitations of Hardt and Negri's understanding of the biopolitics of global civil war, for the latter can account neither for the new fictions of violence in former colonial spaces nor for what Mbembe calls the "necropolitics" (2003, 11) of late modernity. Mbembe's term refers to his analysis of global warfare as the continuation of earlier and the development of new "forms of subjugation of life to the power of death" and its attendant reconfiguration of the "the relationship between resistance, sacrifice, and terror" (2003, 39). 4 Despite the many theoretical intersections of Hardt and Negri's and Mbembe's work, Mbembe's notion of necropolitics sees contemporary warfare as a species of such earlier "topographies of cruelty" (2003, 40) as the plantation system and the colony. Thus, in contrast to Hardt and Negri, Mbembe argues that the ways in which global violence and warfare produce subjectivities cannot be dissociated from the ways in which race serves as a means of both deciding over life and death and of legitimizing and making killing without impunity a customary practice of imperial population control. If global civil war is a continuation of imperial forms of warfare, it must rely on strategies of embodiment, that is, of politicizing and racializing the colonized or now "disposable" body for purposes of self-legitimization, specifically when taking decisions over the value of human life. After all, on a global level, race propels the ideological dynamics of ethnic and global civil war, while, on the local plane, it serves to orchestrate the brutalization and polarization of the domestic population, reinforcing and enacting patterns of racist exclusion and violence on the non-white body.

#### The alternative is the multitude, a mode of proliferated tactics that disrupts notions of sovereignty. This is a method of resistance that neither devolves into biocapitalist unity or anarchist fragmentary but rather exists as a living flesh that rules itself – only by acknowledging Empire’s new expanses can we find new solidarities. 0:33

Hardt and Negri 2 [Michael, American literary theorist and political philosopher, best known for his book Empire, which was co-written with Antonio, Italian Marxist sociologist and political philosopher, best known for his co-authorship of Empire and secondarily for his work on Spinoza, Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire, 99-102, The Penguin Press, 2004] recut TJHSSTAD

**Political action aimed at transformation and liberation today can only be conducted on the basis of the multitude**. To understand the concept of the multitude in its most general and abstract form, let us contrast it first with that of the people. 1 The people is one. **The population**, of course, **is composed of numerous different individuals and classes, but the people synthesizes or reduces these social differences into one identity. The mul­titude**, by contrast, is not unified but **remains plural and multiple**. This is why, according to the dominant tradition of political philosophy, the **peo­ple can rule as a sovereign power and the multitude cannot.** The multitude is composed of a set of singularities- and by singularity here we mean a social subject whose difference cannot be reduced to sameness, a differ­ ence that remains different. The component parts of the people are indif­ ferent in their unity; they become an identity by negating or setting aside their differences. The plural singularities of the multitude thus stand in contrast to the undifferentiated unity of the people. **The multitude,** however, **although it remains multiple, is not fragmented, anarchical, or incoherent**. **The concept of the multitude should thus also be contrasted to a series of other concepts that designate plural collectives**, such as the crowd, the masses, and the mob. Since the different individuals or groups that make up the crowd are incoherent and recog­nize no common shared elements, **their collection of differences remains inert and can easily appear as one indifferent aggregate.** The components of the masses, the mob, and the crowd are not singularities-and this is obvious from the fact that their differences so easily collapse into the in­ difference of the whole. Moreover, **these social subjects are fundamentally passive in the sense that they cannot act by themselves but rather must be led.** The crowd or the mob or the rabble can have social effects-often horribly destructive effects-but cannot act of their own accord. That is why they are so susceptible to external manipulation. The multitude, des­ignates an active social subject, which acts on the basis of what the singu­larities share in common. **The multitude is an internally different, multiple social subject whose constitution and action is based not on identity or unity (or, much less, indifference) but on what it has in common.** This initial conceptual definition of the multitude poses a clear challenge to the entire tradition of sovereignty. As we will explain in part 3, one of the recurring truths of political philosophy is that **only the one can rule, be it the monarch, the party, the people, or the individual; social sub­jects that are not unified and remain multiple cannot rule and instead must be ruled.** Every sovereign power, in other words, necessarily forms a political body of which there is a head that commands, limbs that obey, and organs that function together to support the ruler. The concept of the multitude challenges this accepted truth of sovereignty. **The multitude,** although it remains multiple and internally different, **is able to act in com­mon and thus rule itself.** Rather than a political body with one that com­ mands and others that obey, **the multitude is living flesh that rules itself.** This definition of the multitude, of course, raises numerous conceptual and practical problems, which we will discuss at length in this and the next chapter, but it should be clear from the outset that **the challenge of the multitude is the challenge of democracy.** **The multitude is the only so­cial subject capable of realizing democracy, that is, the rule of everyone by everyone.** The stakes, in other words, are extremely high. In this chapter we will articulate the concept of the multitude prima­ rily from a socioeconomic perspective. Multitude is also a concept of race, gender, and sexuality differences. Our focus on economic class here should considered in part as compensation for the relative lack of attention to class in recent years with respect to these other lines of social difference and hierarchy. As we will see the contemporary forms of production, which we will call biopolitical production, are not limited economic phenomena but rather tend to involve all aspects of social life, including communication, knowledge, and affects. It is also useful to recognize from the beginning that something like a concept of the multitude has long en part of powerful streams of feminist and antiracist politics. When we say that we do not want a world without racial or gender difference but in­stead a world in which race and gender do not matter, that is, a world in which they do not determine hierarchies of power, **a world in which dif­ferences express themselves freely, this is a desire for the multitude.** And, of course, **for the singularities that compose the multitude, in order to take away the limiting, negative, destructive character of differences and make differences our strength** (gender differences, racial differences, dif­ferences of sexuality, and so forth) we must radically transform the world.2 From the socioeconomic perspective, **the multitude is the common subject of labor, that is, the real flesh of postmodern production,** and at the same time the object from which collective capital tries to make the body of its global development. **Capital wants to make the multitude into an organic unity, just like the state wants to make it into a people.** This is where, **through the struggles of labor, the real productive biopolitical figure of the multitude begins to emerge. When the flesh of the multitude is imprisoned and transformed into the body of global capital, it finds itself both within and against the processes of capitalist globalization.**

#### ROTB is to endorse the debater who best uses communication to challenge the de-territorialized capitalistic regime 0:23

Dean and Passavant 04 Dean, Jodi and Passvant, Paul A.“Empire’s New Clothes reading Hardt and Nagiri” Routledge NY London 2004

Breaking this down, we find a variation on their claim regarding the struggle over the shape of the global information infrastructure. Rather than posing an alternative between “rhizome” and “tree,” here they treat the rhizomatic structure of contemporary communications as a given. They thereby suggest that the problem of imperial power is more than a problem of corporations; corporate oligopolies present one specific set of controls in a larger, shifting, and complex terrain. And in this terrain, the same attributes are benefits and burdens, assets and hindrances to resistance. What opens the network to resistance and opportunities to communicate closes the network to struggle and intervention. How can one intervene when one—and everyone—is already included? How does one struggle against already present communicative opportunities? And what does struggle even mean in a virtual space? As Noortje Marres observes, “when it comes to the manifestation of social movements, it all depends on the presence of irreducible social actors in the streets.”22 Alternatively, Hardt and Negri suggest that constructing something ontologically new, new modes of human being, a new place in the non-place, is one of the tasks of struggle (217). Perhaps. But making the virtual world a key location of struggle risks conceding the more mundane terrains, practices, and institutions of power to those forces of conservatism and capitalism old-fashioned enough to continue their occupation. It also seems to rely a lot more on the symbolic and immaterial labor of the technologically adept than it does on the affective, caring, and domestic labor of community-building.

## DA

#### Empirical evidence supports the fact that in the scarce labor market, higher wages driven by strikes results in increased inflation and higher consumer prices for basic goods. Horsley 21 [“Wages Are Going Up — And So Is Inflation. Consumer Prices Have Hit A 13-Year High,” August 11 2021, Scott Horsley, Scott Horsley is NPR's Chief Economics Correspondent. He reports on ups and downs in the national economy as well as fault lines between booming and busting communities. Horsley spent a decade on the White House beat, covering both the Trump and Obama administrations. Before that, he was a San Diego-based business reporter for NPR, covering fast food, gasoline prices, and the California electricity crunch of 2000. He also reported from the Pentagon during the early phases of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Before joining NPR in 2001, Horsley worked for NPR Member stations in San Diego and Tampa, as well as commercial radio stations in Boston and Concord, New Hampshire. Horsley began his professional career as a production assistant for NPR's Morning Edition. Horsley earned a bachelor's degree from Harvard University and an MBA from San Diego State University. He lives in Washington, D.C.; <https://www.npr.org/2021/08/11/1026493316/workers-are-getting-pay-raises-and-it-could-end-up-contributing-to-high-inflatio>] //TJHSSTAP

**A lot of workers are getting wage hikes this year as employers compete for scarce labor.** But it's not all good news for workers, or for the economy: Some **businesses are raising prices to offset the wage hikes, contributing to surging inflation and eroding some of the benefits from that higher pay.** **The Labor Department reported Wednesday that consumer prices were 5.4% higher in July than a year ago.** That matches the June inflation rate, which was the highest in nearly 13 years. **The increase was driven by rising costs for shelter, food, energy and new cars.** Most of the recent jump in inflation has been caused by pandemic bottlenecks, like the shortage of chips that limited new car production and caused a big spike in the price of used cars. Used car prices continued to climb in July, but at a much slower rate, and those prices are expected to decline in the months to come. **Rising worker pay could become a bigger factor in higher prices going forward even if it's not raising alarm bells yet.** Burrito chain Chipotle, for example, boosted its average pay to $15 an hour this summer. But to cover the cost of that pay increase, Chipotle raised prices 3.5% to 4%. For the moment, **restaurants are able to pass on higher costs to customers without a hit to their bottom lines because demand for eating out remains so strong.** "People are tired of cooking their own meals," says Lyle Margolis, a senior director at Fitch Ratings. "They're tired of cleaning up after themselves. They want to be waited on and they want to be social. And restaurants are a great place to do that." Chipotle, for one, has seen little drop in demand for carnitas or guacamole. "We saw very little resistance to the price increase," CEO Brian Niccol said on the company's quarterly earnings call. But it's not necessarily all good news. The price of restaurant meals jumped 0.8% between June and July — the biggest increase in more than four decades. **Other prices are also rising, partly as a result of rising wages. Tyson says it plans to raise prices for chicken and pork, in part to offset higher wages in its meat processing plants.** "It is encouraging that wages are rising," says Wells Fargo economist Shannon Seery. "Some of these lower-paying sectors are seeing higher wages, which in turn, hopefully, will bring more workers back to the labor force." "But it does suggest that **this inflationary environment is broadening out beyond the supply constraints that we were initially seeing from the re-opening**," Seery adds**. The rising cost of living erodes some of the benefits of higher pay for workers who will have to pay more for a range of goods across the board**. For **employers**, their rising labor cost is also something that bears closely watching. **Amazon – the nation's second largest private employer – has been paying more to attract workers to its giant warehouses.** "We have raised our wages and have increased the use of incentives to hire people," Amazon's chief financial officer Brian Olsavsky told reporters on a conference call. "We're watching it carefully. **But it's probably one of the bigger elements of inflation in our business right now**."

#### Strikes cost unions lots of money to gain enough supporters to attempt a difference in the workplace. Even then they are rarely successful and can render unions without money, which is ultimately worse in the long run. Garneau 19 [“WHY DON’T STRIKES ACHIEVE MORE?” May 1 2019, Marianne Garneau, <https://organizing.work/2019/05/why-dont-strikes-achieve-more/>] //TJHSSTAP

There are a number of factors that contain how effective strikes can be, and impel unions to settle them. For one thing, they are expensive. **If a union is providing even minimal strike pay, it needs a war chest of millions of dollars to be able to support even a few hundred workers.** **Strikes drain union coffers, and they take a financial, physical, and emotional toll on workers as well, who aren’t usually earning as much in strike pay as they would on the job, while getting yelled at or hit by cars or freezing on the picket line.** **Quite often, strikes don’t succeed in completely shutting down a business, not least because employers can legally hire scabs. The product may suffer, and employers may take a hit, but they can hobble along** **(while draining the union’s bank account)**. (A note on the alleged $100 million loss suffered by Stop & Shop during the recent strike, which leftists also celebrated: that figure was put out by the employer, and is more than double an estimate put forward by an industry analyst. We should always remain skeptical about boss communications. In this case, they may be crying poverty to get workers to sign the proposed collective agreement.) Sometimes strikes end because of government intervention, as when workers are legislated back to work, or fired en masse. Less dramatically, the government can intervene to bring about some kind of settlement in the form of binding arbitration. **Sometimes** **employers even goad unions into striking, knowing what a heavy toll strikes take. If an employer knows they can weather a strike much better than the union, they are perfectly incentivized to provoke one and starve the union out.** The bottom line is that **strikes, under the current labor relations system, are not the slam-dunk tactic the left takes them to be.** **Strikes can only take place when the contract has expired, and once the membership has been balloted. This means that the employer has years to prepare, knowing when the contract is set to expire. They probably even know roughly how long the strike can last. They’ve also seen strikes before, and aren’t bowled over by them. There is no element of surprise. They know the union won’t do anything too drastic like occupy the workplace or chain the doors shut.** They hire scabs, **they manage public relations** (often by crying poverty or publicly claiming the union won’t come to the table), **and they wait it out**. Of course we in left labor circles sympathize with strikers and see their cause as morally and politically righteous. But sympathy is one matter, and clear-eyed analysis is another. That we wish workers victory does not mean we suspend judgement about the effectiveness of their tactics. Nor is any of this meant to judge or condemn unions for choosing the tactics that they do. Instead, it is about zooming out and understanding what factors are constraining the situation in general. When leftists picture strikes, they are probably in part remembering black-and-white images of workers in the 1910s and 1920s streaming out of factories and mines and violently clashing with Pinkerton guards. But strikes have been tamed by the labor relations framework established by the Wagner Act (the National Labor Relations Act) of 1935 and the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947. Those **legislative measures were passed in response to massive upheaval, in which workers shut down production with strikes, or employers shut down production with lockouts.** The goal of the Wagner Act is right there in its full title: “to diminish the causes of labor disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and foreign commerce.” The NLRA forced employers to sit down and bargain with workers, not out of a desire to strengthen workers as a class, but to funnel disputes between workers and bosses into a less disruptive process – in boardrooms and away from the shopfloor — so that economic production could continue. Taft-Hartley further contained strikes in numerous ways, again in response to creative and effective forms of economic disruption, by outlawing sympathy strikes, political strikes, “wildcat” strikes taken without the authorization of union leadership, secondary picketing and boycotts, and so on. Under this legal framework, strikes are a blunted tactic, quite intentionally so. They do accomplish something – in each of the three cases described above, workers would almost certainly have got a worse deal had they not struck. There are also strikes that yield apparently better deals, such as the contract bargained by Unite Here with Marriott hotels – arguably in part because contracts at seven different bargaining units expired simultaneously, allowing almost 8,000 workers to strike at once. But **strikes don’t change the big-picture balance of power between employers and workers. Most of the time, strikes are like a fistfight in which one side gets a bloody nose, the other gets a black eye, and each walks away saying “You shoulda seen the other guy.” At best, a win looks like giving the other side two wounds while you only suffer one.**