# 1

**Our thesis is this – settler colonialism is not an event, but an evolving structure of technologies – a patterning of social relations** **that renders land and life ripe for biopolitical destruction and ontological genocide. the current political system excludes natives. In the current system, civil rights are not afforded to the indigenous, silencing their voice once again.**

**Paperson 17** (La Paperson, University of Minnesota Press, "“Land. And the University Is Settler Colonial” in “A Third University Is Possible” on Manifold @uminnpress", 2017, https://manifold.umn.edu/read/a-third-university-is-possible/section/561c45d2-9442-42d5-9938-f8c9e2aafcfc#ch02) zeph

Land is the prime concern of settler colonialism, contexts in which **the colonizer comes to a “new” place not only to** seize and **exploit but to stay**, making that “new” place his permanent home. Settler colonialism thus complicates the center–periphery model that was classically used to describe colonialism, wherein an imperial center, the “metropole,” dominates distant colonies, the “periphery.” Typically, one thinks of European colonization of Africa, India, the Caribbean, the Pacific Islands, in terms of external colonialism, also called exploitation colonialism, where land and human beings are recast as natural resources for primitive accumulation: coltan, petroleum, diamonds, water, salt, seeds, genetic material, chattel. Theories named as “settler colonial studies” had a resurgence beginning around 2006.[2] However, the analysis of settler colonialism is actually not new, only often ignored within Western critiques of empire.[3] The critical literatures of the colonized have long positioned the violence of settlement as a prime feature in colonial life as well as in global arrangements of power. We can see this in Franz Fanon’s foundational critiques of colonialism. Whereas Fanon’s work is often generalized for its diagnoses of anti/colonial violence and the racialized psychoses of colonization upon colonized and colonizer, Fanon is also talking about settlement as the particular feature of French colonization in Algeria. For Fanon, the violence of French colonization in Algeria arises from settlement **as a spatial immediacy of empire: the geospatial collapse of metropole and colony into the same time and place.** On the “selfsame land” are spatialized white immunity and racialized violation, non-Native desires for freedom, Black life, and Indigenous relations.[4] Settler colonialism is too often thought of as “what happened” to Indigenous people. This kind of thinking confines the experiences of Indigenous people, their critiques of settler colonialism, their decolonial imaginations, to an unwarranted historicizing parochialism, as if settler colonialism were a past event that “happened to” Native peoples and not generalizable to non-Natives. Actually, **settler colonialism is** something that “happened for” settlers. Indeed, it is **happening** for them/us **right now.** Wa Thiong’o’s question of how instead of why directs us to think of land tenancy laws, debt, and the privatization of land as **settler colonial technologies** that **enable** the “eventful” history of **plunder and disappearance.** Property law is a settler colonial technology. The weapons that enforce it, the knowledge institutions that legitimize it, the financial institutions that operationalize it, are also technologies. Like all technologies, they evolve and spread. **Recasting land as property means severing Indigenous peoples from land. This** separation, what Hortense Spillers describes as “the loss of Indigenous name/land” for Africans-turned-chattel, **recasts Black Indigenous people as** black **bodies for biopolitical disposal:** who will be moved where, who will be murdered how, who will be machinery for what, and who will be made property for whom.[5] In the alienation of land from life**, alienable rights are produced:** the right to own (property), the right to law (protection through legitimated violence), the right to govern (supremacist sovereignty), **the right to have rights** (humanity). In a word, **what is produced is whiteness**. Moreover, it is not just human beings who are refigured in the schism. Land and nonhumans become alienable properties, a move that first alienates land from its own sovereign life. Thus we can speak of the various technologies required to create and maintain these separations, these alienations: Black from Indigenous, human from nonhuman, land from life.[6] “How?” is a question you ask if you are concerned with the mechanisms, not just the motives, of colonization. Instead of settler colonialism as an ideology, or as a history, you might consider settler colonialism as a set of technologies —a frame that could help you to forecast colonial next operations and to plot decolonial directions. This chapter proceeds with the following insights. (1) The settler–native– slave triad does not describe identities. The triad—an analytic mainstay of settler colonial studies—digs a pitfall of identity that not only chills collaborations but also implies that the racial will be the solution. (2) Technologies are trafficked. Technologies generate patterns of social relations to land. Technologies mutate, and so do these relationships. Colonial technologies travel. In tracing technologies’ past and future trajectories, we can connect how settler colonial and antiblack technologies circulate in transnational arenas. (3) **Land—not just people—is the biopolitical target.[**7] The examples are many: **fracking, biopiracy, damming of rivers and flooding of valleys, the carcasses of pigs** that die **from** the feed additive **ractopamine** and are allowable for harvest by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. **The subjugation of land** and nonhuman life **to deathlike states** in order **to support “human” life** is a “biopolitics” well beyond the Foucauldian conception of biopolitical as governmentality or the neoliberal disciplining of modern, bourgeois, “human” subject. (4) (Y)our task is to theorize in the break, that is, to refuse the master narrative that technology is loyal to the master, that (y)our theory has a Eurocentric origin. Black studies, Indigenous studies, and Othered studies have already made their breaks with Foucault (over biopolitics), with Deleuze and Guatarri (over assemblages and machines), and with Marx (over life and primitive accumulation). (5) Even when they are dangerous, understanding technologies provides us some pathways for decolonizing work. We can identify projects of collaboration on decolonial technologies. Colonizing mechanisms are evolving into new forms, and they might be subverted toward decolonizing operations. The Settler–Native–Slave Triad Does Not Describe Identities One of the main interventions of settler colonial studies has been to insist that **the patterning of social relations is shaped by colonialism’s thirst for land** and thus is **shaped to fit modes of empire.** Because colonialism is a perverted affair, our relationships are also warped into complicitous arrangements of violation, trespass, and collusion with its mechanisms. For Fanon, **the psychosis of colonialism arises from the patterning of violence into the binary relationship** between the immune humanity **of** the white **settler and** the impugned humanity of the **native.** For Fanon, the supremacist “right” to create settler space that is immune from violence, and the “right” to abuse the body of the Native to maintain white immunity, this is the spatial and fleshy immediacy of settler colonialism. Furthermore, the “humanity” of the settler is constructed upon his agency over the land and nature. As Maldonado- Torres explains, “I think, therefore I am” is actually an articulation of “I conquer, therefore I am,” a sense of identity posited upon the harnessing of nature and its “natural” people. discourse, if not common sense?

**Settler colonialism is an ontological logic of elimination that constantly manifests itself in everyday reiterations of our spatial inhabitance – the world is built on the extermination of indigenous communities which provided the ontological grounding for modern sovereignty and provided the very possibility for engaging in the realm of outer space**

**Rifkin 14** (Mark Rifkin, Ph.D. University of Pennsylvania-2003, M.A. University of Pennsylvania-1999, B.A. Rutgers University-1996 Dr. Rifkin’s research primarily focuses on Native American writing and politics from the eighteenth century onward, exploring the ways that Indigenous peoples have negotiated U.S. racial and imperial formations. His work explores the roles of gender, sexuality, affect, and eroticism in those processes, addressing legal and administrative frameworks, textual representations, and forms of everyday experience. Director of the Women's and Gender Studies Program and Professor of English at the University of North Carolina ‘Settler Common Sense: Queerness and Everyday Colonialism in the American Renaissance,’ June 2014 pages 7-10) zeph

If nineteenth-century American literary studies tends to focus on the ways Indians enter the narrative frame and the kinds of meanings and associa- tions they bear, recent attempts to theorize settler colonialism have sought to shift attention from its effects on Indigenous subjects to its implications for nonnative political attachments, forms of inhabitance, and modes of being, illuminating and tracking the pervasive operation of settlement as a system. In Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology, Patrick Wolfe argues, **“Settler colonies were (are) premised on the elimination of native societies. The split tensing reflects a determinate feature of settler colonization. The colonizers come to stay—invasion is a structure not an event”** (2).6 **He suggests that a “logic of elimination” drives settler governance and sociality**, describing “the settler-colonial will” as “a historical force that ultimately derives from the primal drive to expansion that is generally glossed as capitalism” (167), and in “Settler Colonialism and the Elimination of the Native,” he observes that “elimination is an organizing principle of settler-colonial society rather than a one-off (and superceded) occurrence” (388). Rather than being superseded after an initial moment/ period of conquest, colonization persists since “the logic of elimination marks a return whereby the native repressed continues to structure settler- colonial society” (390). In Aileen Moreton-Robinson’s work**, whiteness func- tions as the central way of understanding the domination and displacement of Indigenous peoples by nonnatives.**7 In “Writing Off Indigenous Sover- eignty,” she argues, “As a regime of power, patriarchal white sovereignty operates ideologically, materially and discursively to reproduce and main- tain its investment in the nation as a white possession” (88), and in “Writ- ing Off Treaties,” she suggests, **“At an ontological level the structure of subjective possession occurs through the imposition of one’s will-to-be on the thing which is perceived to lack will, thus it is open to being possessed,”** such that “possession . . . forms part of the ontological structure of white subjectivity” (83–84). For Jodi Byrd, the deployment of Indianness as a mobile figure works as the principal mode of U.S. settler colonialism. She observes that “colonization and racialization . . . have often been conflated,” in ways that “tend to be sited along the axis of inclusion/exclusion” and that “misdirect and cloud attention from the underlying structures of settler colonialism” (xxiii, xvii). She argues that **settlement works through the translation of indigeneity as Indianness, casting place-based political collec- tivities as (racialized) populations subject to U.S. jurisdiction and manage- ment: “the Indian is left nowhere and everywhere within the ontological premises through which U.S. empire orients, imagines, and critiques itself ”; “ideas of Indians and Indianness have served as the ontological ground through which U.S. settler colonialism enacts itself ”** (xix).

**Their “optimism” has become cruel. Their attachment with a better future simply reproduces the Natives psycho-affective attachment to reform—the impact is cruel optimism and colonial violence.**

**Grande 18** (Professor of Education and Director of the Center for the Critical Study of Race and Ethnicity at Connecticut University (Sandy, “Refusing the University”, Edited by Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, Published by Routledge Press) zeph

As policies and politics of recognition have come to increasingly condition Indigenous-state relations, there has been a corollary increase in scholarship examining their impact. Indigenous scholars, in particular, have developed trenchant critiques of recognition, accounting for the failure of liberal theories of justice to address asymmetries of power. In his groundbreaking text, Red Skins, White Masks: Rejecting the Colonial Politics of Recognition, Dene scholar Glen Coulthard (2014) builds upon the work of Fanon, arguing that while recognition draws attention to the role of misrecognition in reinforcing colonial domination, the breadth of power at play in colonial systems cannot be transcended through the mere institutionalizing of a liberal regime of mutual recognition. In short, he exposes the limits of **recognition**-based **politics** for restructuring Indigenous-state relations, as it **leaves intact the state’s role as arbiter and** therefore ultimately **reproduces the very configurations of colonial power** that Native peoples seek to transcend. Indeed, given that **the state emerged through** the criminal acts of **genocide**, land dispossession, and enslavement and the legal fictions of “discovery” and “terra nullius,” **its own legitimacy is what should be at stake, not** the sovereignty of **Indigenous nations.**12 That said, Coulthard (2014) does not dismiss the significance of the “**psycho-affective attachment” to colonialist** forms of **recognition** and the ways in which such desire **is** cultivated and **internalized.** Specifically, he points to Fanon’s “painstaking” articulation of the multiple ways in which such feelings of “attachment” are cultivated among the colonized, particularly **through the unequal exchange** of institutionalized and interpersonal patterns of recognition between the colonial society and the marginalized. Sara Ahmed (2004) similarly theorizes **the production of psychic** forms of **attachment** or desire **through** what she terms **the “affective economy,”**13 examining its function in the reconsolidation of the (neoliberal) nation-state. To clarify, **the affective economy is** one of **the central mechanisms through which subjects become “invested** emotionally, **libidinally**, and erotically” in the collective (Agathangelou et al., 2008, p. 122). In the context of Indigenous-state relations, Wolfe (2013) writes about “inducements” as a tool of the affective economy through which the desire for recognition has been cultivated. He writes, “from the treaty era onwards **Indigenous peoples** have been **subjected to** a **recurrent cycle of inducements” extended in the form of** **allotments**, **citizenship**, and tribal **enrollment** **that** have continuously **served to entice Native peoples to “consent to their own dispossession”** (p. 259). When recognition comes in the form of economic gain for individuals, Coulthard (2007) argues that it carries the potential for creating a **new (Aboriginal) elite** whose “thirst for profit” comes to “outweigh their ancestral obligations” (p. 452).14 In other words, he suggests that people who are held hostage do not make “choices”—**adaptation while under threat of annihilation is nothing more than a ransom demand.** Agathangelou (et al.) similarly theorizes the affective economy as transpiring through what she defines as an “imperial project of promise and non-promise” (p. 128)—a process through which **a series of (false) promises are granted** to certain subjects that is reliant on another series of (non)promises made to (non)subjects upon whom the entire production is staged (p. 123). Her work helps us understand the ways in which revolutionary and redistributive yearnings that would challenge the foundations of the U.S. state, capital, and racial relations have been **systematically replaced** with strategies for **individualized incorporation in the settler order**.

**The aff’s spectacularized claims of extinction are an act of settler futurity that hide the ongoing violence of settler colonialism. The world has an investment in the end of the world to create a sense of vulnerability at the expense of decolonization. Settlers fantasize their own death day and night, looking for an excuse to justify further exploitation of indigenous people. Their narrative of is an act of colonialism and the 1NC is the ACT OF RESISTANCE.**

**Dalley 16** (Hamish Dalley, Ph.D. from the Australian National University in 2013, and is now an Assistant Professor of English at Daemen College, Amherst, New York, where he is responsible for teaching in World and Postcolonial Literatures., (2016): The deaths of settler colonialism: extinction as a metaphor of decolonization in contemporary settler literature, Settler Colonial Studies, DOI: 10.1080/2201473X.2016.1238160) zeph

Such anxieties draw energy from a pattern of settler defensiveness that can be observed across numerous settler-colonial contexts. Marilyn Lake’s and Henry Reynold’s account of the emergence of transnational ‘whiteness’ highlights the paradoxical fact that while white male settlers have been arguably the most privileged class in history, they have routinely perceived themselves to be ‘under siege’, **threatened with destruction** to the extent that their very identity of ‘whiteness was born in the apprehension of imminent loss’. 11 The fear of looming annihilation serves a powerful ideological function in settler communities, working to foster racial solidarity, suppress dissent, and **legitimize violence against indigenous populations** who, by any objective measure, are far more at risk of extermination than the settlers who fear them. Ann Curthoys and Dirk Moses have traced this pattern in Australia and Israel-Palestine, respectively.12 This scholarship suggests that narratives of settler **extinction are acts of ideological mystification, obscuring the brutal inequalities of the frontier behind a mask of white vulnerability**– an argument with which I sympathize. However, this article shows how there is more to settler-colonial extinction narratives than bad faith. I argue that we need a more nuanced understanding of how they encode a specifically settler-colonial framework for imagining the future, one that has implications for how we understand contemporary literatures from settler societies, and which allows us to see extinction as a genuine, if flawed, attempt to envisage social change. In the remainder of this paper I consider extinction’s function as a metaphor of decolonization. I use this phrase to invoke, without completely endorsing, Tuck and Yang’s argument that to treat decolonization figuratively, as I argue extinction narratives do, is necessarily to preclude radical change, creating opportunities for settler ‘moves to innocence’ that re-legitimate racial inequality.13 The counterview to this pessimistic perspective is offered by Veracini, who suggests that progressive change to settler-colonial relationships will only happen if narratives can be found that make decolonization thinkable.14 This article enters the debate between these two perspectives by asking what it means for settler writers to imagine the future via the trope of extinction. Does extinction offer a meaningful way to think about ending settler colonialism, or does it re-activate settler-colonial patterns of thought that allow exclusionary social structures to persist? I explore this question with reference to examples of contemporary literary treatments of extinction from select English-speaking settler-colonial contexts: South Africa, Australia, and Canada.15 The next section of this article traces key elements of extinction narrative in a range of settler-colonial texts, while the section that follows offers a detailed reading of one of the best examples of a sustained literary exploration of human finitude, Margaret Atwood’s Maddaddam trilogy (2003–2013). I advance four specific arguments. First, extinction narratives take at least two forms depending on whether the ‘end’ of settler society is framed primarily in historical-civilizational terms or in a stronger, biological sense; the key question is whether the ‘thing’ that is going extinct is a society or a species. Second, biologically oriented extinction narratives rely on a more or less conscious slippage between ‘the settler’ and ‘the human’. Third, this slippage is ideologically ambivalent: on the one hand, it contains a radical charge that invokes environmentalist discourse and climate-change anxiety to imagine social forms that re-write settler-colonial dynamics; on the other, it replicates a core aspect of imperialist ideology by normalizing whiteness as equivalent to humanity. Fourth, these ideological effects are mediated by gender, insofar as extinction narratives invoke issues of biological reproduction, community protection, and violence that function to differentiate and reify masculine and feminine roles in the putative de-colonial future. Overall, my central claim is that extinction is a core trope through which settler futurity emerges, one with crucial narrative and ideological effects that shape much of the contemporary literature emerging from white colonial settings.

**The starting point for our revolution is an act of resistance and abolition. We refuse to sit aside while indigenous populations are subject to horrors that the settler ignores. Indigenous rights must be the foundation of our movement, or colonial violence will continue to be replicated.**

**Tuck and Yang 18** (Eve Tuck Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, and Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities at the University of Toronto, K. Wayne Yang Director of Undergraduate Studies in the Ethnic Studies Department at the University of California at San Diego, 2018, “Introduction: Born Under the Rising Sun of Social Justice,” *Toward What Justice? Describing Diverse Dreams of Justice in Education*, Edited by Eve Tuck and K. Wayne Yang, Published by Routledge Press, ISBN: 978-1-351-24093-2, pp. 1-18) zeph

**Decolonization is the rematriation of Indigenous land and life. Decolonization**, similar to abolition, **unsettles the ways** that **land has become** **alienable** into property; that animals, plants, water, air and earth have become alienable into “natural resources” to be turned into profit; that occupiers and their governments can come to have sovereignty over Indigenous people and places. **Decolonization as an imperative has made and unmade nation-states**, unmade and remade **rights to land**, unmade and remade the individual or **corporate entities** that are understood to have legal custody over peoples and places. There are, admittedly, some tensions between how scholars in Black studies and scholars in Indigenous studies have interpreted these projects, and especially how they have interpreted projects criss-crossing these disciplinary boundaries. We are exasperated with some of the practices of using Black people as a foil, or counterpoint, to arguments in Indigenous studies, and of using Indigenous people as the contrast for arguments made in Black studies (see also Latty, Scribe, Peters & Morgan, 2016; Palacios, 2016). We are interested in what Eve’s colleague Miglena Todorova teaches in her courses as the difference between a relational analysis and a comparative analysis, which is the focus of this book (see also Volume 1, Issue 2 of Critical Ethnic Studies, on Racial Comparativism Reconsidered, edited by Danika Medak-Saltzman and Antonio T. Tiongson, Jr.). Thus, we are compelled by the ways in which Indigenous and Black scholarship might be engaged together to contest the violence and legitimacy of the nation-state and its apparatuses, and to refuse routes to justice which require us to appeal for our humanity. Consider these words, from Dionne Brand, speaking at Barnard College, Colombia University, in April 2017: In our case, I believe that we live in a state of tyranny. And to ask a tyranny to dismantle itself, to claim, to ask for, to invoke justice is to present our bodies already consigned in that tyranny to the status of nonbeing, to ask the state to bring us into being. And that is impossible and it won’t. That state is anathema to us, and so I do not write toward anything called justice, but against tyranny, and toward liberation. (Brand, 2017) Leanne Simpson makes a similar observation, writing, “I am not particularly interested in holding states accountable because the structure, history and nature of states is exploitative in nature” (2016, p. 31). **Both abolition and decolonization object to the configuration of the nation-state** in its specificity (the United States, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, South Africa, Australia, and so on), and its generalizability. Such a social order, and its violences, cannot be made just; cannot be made good. Though the need for these projects cannot be disputed, the frequent response by sympathetic liberals and even people committed to radical social change is that abolition is unimaginable and that decolonization is philosophical but not **practical**. This is the observation that Dan Berger, Mariame Kaba, and David Stein make in an article in Jacobin Magazine titled “What Abolitionists Do” (2017). Linking abolition to fights against chattel slavery, private property, and the prison industrial complex, the authors note that abolition is always discarded as utopian, not practical, even by those who describe themselves as working for social change. Instead, Berger, Kaba, and Stein observe that abolition is a “lodestar and practical necessity” (2017, n.p.). Describing how abolition is both a naming of a goal and navigating the divide between current state violence and the eradication of state/violence, the authors share the variety of activities which have come to be part of abolition projects. The gains of these activities are their own proof of the need and possibility for abolition. Likewise, **there are many practical efforts to rematriate Indigenous land and life, from restoring Indigenous foodways, to turning land out of the property system, to restoring languages.** When people automatically dismiss the possibilities for abolition and decolonization, they rarely acknowledge how **this reaction is entrenched in competing projects.** Indeed, because abolition and decolonization are lodestars—stars which are used to guide our course—and practical, abolition and **decolonization** are not projects to be deferred for the next generation. They are happening next; they **are happening now.** Abolition and decolonization are rupturing into the mainstream with movements for Black life and defenders of Indigenous lands and waters, **as much as people wish to contain** #BlackLivesMatter to the plan of reducing discrimination in policing or **Idle No More or #NoDAPL to the goals of environmentalism. Abolition and decolonization have always been happening**, since the advent of a Western imperial worldview equated with modernity that took hold around 1492. Alternative societies, and the dismantling of slavery and its institutions, have been constant projects comprising serious work at the site of staunch tensions. These projects are happening now. Abolition and decolonization are **practices.** The people engaged in them are among the most **pragmatic** on earth—**they understand that these Neither abolition nor decolonization are philosophies. They are practical routes have to be happening now, because of the consequences of living beyond the capacity of the earth to heal itself** without destroying all people. As Christi Belcourt makes plain in Chapter 7, **the revolution has already begun.** In our own writing on decolonization and our reading of works on abolition, we emphasize that **neither abolition nor decolonization are endpoints. They are imperatives.** They are not a promised land or future. They are exactly **what drive** our **work** and attention. Yet, this is where it matters to consider how **there is not a one-to-one relationship between injustice and justice.** There is not a direct trajectory from the harm to the justice. Said another way, we should not think that slavery is what drives our demands for abolition. We should not think that colonization is what drives our demands for decolonization. Again, we can pursue these imperatives without being locked into a false linearity between cause and effect. Decolonization is not the effect of the cause called colonization. **Decolonization defies ongoing colonization.** The title of this volume, Toward What Justice? asks several questions. It questions the forms of justice that we think we want. What justice? It questions the compass points of our work, the directions we are taking that we sometimes mistake as endpoints. Toward what? Justice? To think of justice as an imperative, rather than as an end, might help us put our own justice projects in relation to others. Our theorizing is enhanced when we understand how projects are fulfilling an imperative, answering a calling inspired by the rising sign of social justice. To this end, we have playfully considered how we might create a notation for the “toward” of justice. This playfulness of thought is what generated our opening motif of being born under the rising sign of justice. How might we indicate what is rising in our justice projects? One idea is an arrow, a toward, which marks what the project is aiming toward. The “what toward” of justice. Might the toward become a rising? → is a notational device that conveys how we won’t be satisfied with social justice, but always a social justice → [what]. The arrow is a reminder of the demands of justice projects. The arrow is an indicator of intention, of futurity. Abolition → Black life    Decolonization → Indigenous futures In this notation, the arrows do not mean that Black life is not already happening or that Indigenous futures are not already happening. In some ways, Black life is what demands abolition. **Indigenous futures demand decolonization**, rather than abolition births Black life or decolonization births Indigenous futures.

**The role of the ballot is to vote for the team that endorses the best method of subject formation. Current debate practices normalize settler colonialism by absorbing indigenous thought into white supremacy, perpetuating the ongoing colonial project and ontological exclusion of Indigenous voices. Fiat is illusory – This means the judge should be focusing solely on how we as debaters are affecting the way in which our subjectivities are formed.**

**Tuck and Gaztambide-Fernandez 13** (Eve Tuck and Rubén A. Gaztambide-Fernandez, “Curriculum, Replacement, and Settler Futurity,” Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2013, p. 72-89) zeph

Natty Bumppo, not savage, and no longer European, is positioned to claim “native status,” symbolically taking the place of “the last of the mohicans” and of all the other vanishing tribes. The figure of the frontiers man who is one with nature saturates the U.S. cultural imaginary, from the Adirondack backwoodsman and the Order of the Arrow of the Boy Scouts of America (Alonso Recarte, 2010), to Kevin Costner’s Dances with Wolves and the most recent expression of the White settler-becoming-Indian, Johnny Depp’s characterization of Tonto. Natty Bumppo also resurfaces within the contentions over colonization and race that mar the politics of progressive fields such as curriculum studies. Here, **the future of the settler is ensured by the absorption of any and all critiques that pose a challenge to white supremacy**, **and** **the replacement of anyone who dares to speak against ongoing colonization.** This article does the simultaneously blunt and delicate work of exhuming the ways in which **curriculum and its history in the U**nited **S**tates **has invested in settler colonialism, and** **the permanence of the settler-colonial nation state**. In particular, we will describe **the settler colonial curricular project of replacement, which aims to vanish Indigenous peoples and replace them with settlers, who see themselves as the rightful claimants to land, and indeed, as indigenous**. To do this, we employ the story of Natty Bumppo, as an extended allegory to understand the ways in which **the field of curriculum has continued to absorb, silence, and replace the non-white other, perpetuating white supremacy and settlerhood.** As we discuss in this article, **even as multiple responses have evolved to counter how curriculum continues to enforce colonization and racism, these responses become refracted and adjusted to be absorbed by the whitestream**, like the knowledge gained by Natty Bumppo, **only to turn to the source and accuse them of savagery, today through a rhetorical move against identity politics**. **White curriculum scholars re-occupy the “spaces”** **opened by responses to racism and colonization in** **the curriculum**, such as multiculturalism and critical race theory, **absorbing the knowledge, but once again displacing the bodies out to the margins.** Thus, we will discuss how various **interventions have** **tried to dislodge** **the aims of replacement,** including multiculturalism, critical race theory, and browning, **but have been sidelined and reappropriated in ways that reinscribe settler colonialism and settler futurity**.

# Case

### Top Level

**1] Fiat Double Bind — either the harms of the 1AC are true and they cannot solve for their impacts before they control the levers of power which means you can vote negative on presumption OR their harms are constructed for the purpose of alarmism which means you can vote negative on principle.**

**2] Linear Progress Link – their focus on “steps in the right direction” serves settler supremacy by creating satisfaction for the settler, legitimizing expansion, and obscuring ongoing injustice. A “step in the right direction” facilitates material relationships to wrong and harmful realities – they justify genocide and oppression of the native in the name of “doing the right thing”. Time doesn’t pass for indigenous people who still live in abhorrent conditions hoping for the day the state will help them. The reservation is the time and space of no time and space – It’s the terminal place for indigenous people which outweighs any impact that they might go for in the 1AR.**

### Alt/Solvency

#### 1] they give no actual mechanism for how they achieve their alternative, so don’t buy any 1AR pre-fiat or spill-up arguments because there’s no basis for them

#### 2] they’re fiating an eco-socialist utopia, which is extremely abusive. If utopian fiat were the norm, then the aff would win every debate because they could just fiat a utopia that I couldn’t negate. Hold them to actual implementation from the in round reading of the aff or they get no offence from the AC.

#### 3] they endorse the state by saying that the alt is a policy solution (as per their underview), which is another link to the K

### Link

#### 1] neg doesn’t force people to go to space, the aff’s impacts can only be weighed as a pre-emptive block against a vague future. They never gave inherency evidence that shows that space exploration happens in the squo. Even if you buy that it happens in the status quo – they don’t give a brightline and can’t factor in governmental exploration like NASA – non-uniques their entire case impacts.

**2] Adopt an ethic that is willing to risk total extinction in order to form ethical subjectivities that are oriented towards a world of decolonization. This radical break from our ‘business as usual’ turns their impact calculus and is the prerequisite for value itself.**

**Pinkard 13** [2013, Lynice Pinkard, “Revolutionary Suicide: Risking Everything to Transform Society and Live Fully”, Tikkun 2013 Volume 28, Number 4: 31-41, http://tikkun.dukejournals.org/content/28/4/31.full]

I’d like to present an alternative to conventional identity politics, one that requires that we understand the way that capitalism itself has grown out of a very particular kind of identity politics — white supremacy — aimed at securing “special benefits” for one group of people. It is not sufficient to speak only of identities of race, class, and gender. I believe we must also speak of identities in relation to domination. To what extent does any one of us identify with the forces of domination and participate in relations that reinforce that domination and the exploitation that goes with it? In what ways and to what extent are we wedded to our own upward mobility, financial security, good reputation, and ability to “win friends and influence people” in positions of power? Or conversely, **do we identify** (not wish to identify or pretend to identify but actually identify **by putting our lives on the line) with efforts to reverse patterns of domination, empower people on the margins (even when we are not on the margins ourselves),** and seek healthy, sustainable relations? When we consider our identities in relation to domination, **we realize the manifold ways in which we have structured our lives and desires in support of the very economic and social system that is dominating us**. To shake free of this cycle, **we need to embrace a radical break from business as usual.** We need to commit revolutionary suicide. By this I mean not the killing of our bodies but the destruction of **our attachments to security,** status, wealth, **and power**. These attachments **prevent us from becoming spiritually and politically** **alive. They prevent us from changing the violent structure of the society in which we live. Revolutionary suicide means living out our commitments, even when that means risking death**. When Huey Percy Newton, the cofounder of the Black Panther Party, called us to “revolutionary suicide,” it appears that he was making the same appeal as Jesus of Nazareth, who admonished, “Those who seek to save their lives will lose them, and those who lose their lives for the sake of [the planet] will save them.” Essentially, both movement founders are saying the same thing. **Salvation is not an individual matter. It entails saving, delivering, rescuing an entire** **civilization**. This cannot be just another day at the bargain counter. The **salvation** of an entire planet **requires a total risk of everything** — of you, of me, of unyielding people everywhere, for all time. This is what revolutionary suicide is. **The cost of revolutionary change is** **people’s willingness to pay with their own lives.** This is what Rachel Corrie knew when she, determined to prevent a Palestinian home in Rafah from being demolished**, refused to move and was killed by an Israeli army bulldozer in the Gaza Strip**. This is what Daniel **Ellsberg knew when he made public the Pentagon Papers.** It’s what Oscar Schindler knew when he rescued over 1,100 Jews from Nazi concentration camps, what subversive Hutus knew when they risked their lives to rescue Tutsis in the Rwandan genocide. This call may sound extreme at first, but **an unflinching look at the structure of our society reveals why nothing less is enough**. Before returning to the question of revolutionary suicide and what it might mean in each of our lives, let’s look at what we’re up against.

### Framework

#### Don’t buy consequentialism:

#### 1] cross apply my in round framing arguments from the K – their framing is specific to governments, but we can only work within the round to have impacts

#### 2] Pleasure and pain are subjective – one person might love chocolate ice cream while another might despise it.

#### 3] You can’t aggregate consequences – ten headaches don’t equal a migraine

#### 4] It’s morally repugnant – Since util is predicated on the maxim of maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain, it naturally follows that to increase the net pleasure of society at large, it would be good to kill everyone who is suffering, which is obviously absurd.