### 1

### 1

#### Interpretation: The affirmative must defend topical action by current governmental bodies.

#### “Resolved” denotes a formal resolution.

**AWS ’13** [Army Writing Style; August 24th; Online resource dedicated to all major writing requirements in the Army; Army Writing Style, "Punctuation — The Colon and Semicolon," <https://armywritingstyle.com/punctuation-the-colon-and-semicolon/>]

The colon introduces the following:

a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis.

b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.)

c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it?

d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment.

e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock

g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:". Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

#### A just “government” must be a sovereign law-making body.

Merriam-Webster No Date, <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/government> brett

Full Definition of government

1: the body of persons that constitutes the governing authority of a political unit or organization: such as

a: the officials comprising the governing body of a political unit and constituting the organization as an active agency

The government was slow to react to the crisis.

bcapitalized : the executive branch of the U.S. federal government

ccapitalized

: a small group of persons holding simultaneously the principal political executive offices of a nation or other political unit and being responsible for the direction and supervision of public affairs:

(1): ADMINISTRATION sense 4b

(2): such a group in a parliamentary system constituted by the cabinet or by the ministry

#### Their “Ought” definition is mis-cut -- it says present AND future time, which indicates action by present actors that is maintained into the future, such as the US passing a law and keeping it, NOT a new actor coming into government down the line and passing a law. Added yellow.

English Grammar 10 [“Must and Ought to”; English Grammar; August 16, 2010; <https://www.englishgrammar.org/must-and-ought-to/> //BWSWJ]

Ought expresses ideas such as duty, necessity and moral obligation. It is not as forceful as must, but it is stronger than should. You ought to be punctual. We ought to help the poor. You ought to visit your friends once in a while. Ought generally points to **present** **and** future time. It can point to past time when it is followed by the perfect infinitive (have + past participle).

#### “Guarantee[ing]” the “right to strike” requires the law to be upheld or changed.

NLRB No Date, <https://www.nlrb.gov/strikes> brett

Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act states in part, “Employees shall have the right. . . to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.” Strikes are included among the concerted activities protected for employees by this section. Section 13 also concerns the right to strike. It reads as follows:

Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.

It is clear from a reading of these two provisions that: the law not only guarantees the right of employees to strike, but also places limitations and qualifications on the exercise of that right. See for example, restrictions on strikes in health care institutions (set forth below).

#### Violation: A vanguard taking power requires organizing, revolution, and overhauling the state that doesn’t even exist yet does not change current sovereign laws.

#### That’s necessary for limits and ground -- anything other than immediate governmental fiat devastates research because debaters can spike out of neg offense like Politics and counterplans that dooms predictable generics. They justify policy AFFs that occur in 40 years to protect labor unions on Mars that avoids every single piece of topic offense.

#### The impact is fairness -- an unlimited, unpredictable topic disparately raises the research burden for the negative -- treat this is a sufficient win condition because fairness is the logical structure that undergirds all impacts AND controls any benefit to debate. All responses and turns presume fairness is good in asking to be evaluated fairly which concedes competitive incentives exist behind all arguments.

#### That turns case -- rigorous research around policy questions makes us better Marxists because we can better convince people to our side BUT giving up a predictable and fair topic cedes dialogue to the fascists.

#### TVA: Defend every government that exists now unconditionally recognizes the right to strike. That solves -- causes class consciousness.

**Langford 94** Department of Sociology, University of Calgary, Calgary(Labour / Le Travail Vol. 34 (Fall, 1994), pp. 107-137 (31 pages), https://doi.org/10.2307/25143847) KD

In turn, the workplace class consciousness described by Lenin has two main aspects. First, the strike teaches workers **that their employer's interests are inimical to their own interests.** Second, workers adopt an ingroup rather than a personal point of reference when analyzing the problems in the work relationship: the worker "does not think of himself and his wages alone, he thinks of all his workmates who have downed tools together with him and who stand up for the workers' cause." In Lenin's view, participation in a strike also generates some general insights about the class character of capitalist societies and the options available to workers in fighting for their rights. First, **workers develop a class-struggle perspective on society:** "It becomes quite clear to the workers that the capitalist class as a whole is the enemy of the whole working class." Second, **since different branches of the state side with the employer in a strike, the workers' eyes are opened "to the nature, not only of the capitalists**, but of the government and the laws as well." Third, **strikes show workers "that they can struggle against the capitalists only when they are united" and that struggle is necessary for working-class advancement**. Finally, "every strike brings thoughts of socialism very forcibly to the worker's mind, thoughts of the struggle of the entire working class for emancipation from the oppression of capital."11 The need to distinguish these dimensions of consciousness change can be illustrated by the experience of Joanne, a middle-aged worker who took respon sibility for picketing one of the main pedestrian entrances to the Main Post Office in Hamilton on 1 October 1987. Most patrons attempted to walk around the pickets. Joanne's response was to move in step with the patron in a picket line dance until the patron stopped and talked to her about the strike. This sort of assertive strike activism greatly enhanced her sense of self-worth. However, Joanne's empower ment had an ironic twist. A few months after the strike's conclusion she decided to enter a Canada Post competition for a front-line supervisory job. Joanne credited her active role in the strike with providing her with the self-confidence she believed was necessary to take on the supervisory role. One further aspect of this model deserves special mention. The conception of workplace class consciousness derived from Lenin's On Strikes, like the concep tion of generalized class consciousness, involves separate beliefs about conflict with outgroups and ingroup identification. The distinction between beliefs con cerning outgroup and ingroup is also an important feature of many contemporary models of class consciousness.

### 2

#### A just government ought to recognize the right of workers to strike, except for workers who are essential to food supply. A revolutionary vanguard ought to provide workers who are essential to the food supply with a right to impartial conciliation followed by arbitration procedures without recognizing their right to strike.

#### **Workers right to strike can be conditional in the context of food supply---exceptions are limited to avoid abuses, AND enable alternatives that channel worker demands**

Brudney 21, James J., Joseph Crowley Chair in Labor and Employment Law, Fordham Law School. Yale Journal of International Law, 2021. “The Right to Strike as Customary International Law” <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=yjil> brett

The international right to strike is far from absolute. It may be restricted in exceptional circumstances, or even prohibited, pursuant to national regulation. For a start, Convention 87 provides that members of the armed forces and the police may be excluded from the scope of the Convention in general, including the right to strike.57 In addition, applications by the CFA and CEACR have concluded that three distinct forms of substantive restriction on the right to strike are compatible with Convention 87.

1. Substantive Limitations

One important restriction applies to certain categories of public servants. The CEACR and CFA have made clear that public employees generally enjoy the same right to strike as their counterparts in the private sector; at the same time, in order to ensure continuity of functions in the three branches of government, this right may be restricted for public servants exercising authority in the name of the State.58 Examples include officials performing tasks that involve the administration of necessary executive branch functions or that relate to the administration of justice.

Each country hasits own approach to classifying public servants exercising authority in the name of the State. When considering the international right under Convention 87, some public servant exceptions seem clearly applicable, such as officials auditing or collecting internal revenues, customs officers, or judges and their close judicial assistants. 59 Some public servant exceptions seem inapplicable, such as teachers, or public servants in State-owned commercial enterprises.60 Whether public servants are exercising authority in the name of the State can be a close question under particular national law, one on which the CEACR and CFA have offered encouragement and guidance,61 as has the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).62

A second equally important restriction on the right to strike involves essential services in the strict sense of the term. This is an area in which both the CEACR and CFA have developed a detailed set of applications and guidelines. 63 The two committees consider that essential services, for the purposes of restricting or prohibiting the right to strike, are only those “the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population.”64

This definition of essential services “in the strict sense of the term” stems from the idea that “essential services” as a limitation on the right to strike would lose its meaning if statutes or judicial decisions defined those services in too broad a manner. 65 The interruption of services that cause or have the potential to cause economic hardships—even serious economic hardships—is not ordinarily sufficient to qualify the interrupted service as essential. Indeed, the very purpose of a strike is to interrupt services or production and thereby cause a degree of economic hardship. That is the leverage workers can exercise; it is what allows a strike to be effective in bringing the parties to the table and securing a negotiated settlement.

The two ILO supervisory committees also have made clear that the essential services concept is not static in nature. Thus, a non-essential service may become essential if the strike exceeds a certain duration or extent, or as a function of the special characteristics of a country. 66 One example is that of an island State where at some point ferry transportation services become essential to bring food and medical supplies to the population.67

When examining concrete cases, the supervisory bodies have considered a range of services, both public and private, too broad to summarize here. As illustrative, the two bodies have determined that essential services in the strict sense of the term include air traffic control services, 68 telephone services, 69 prison services, firefighting services, and water and electricity services. 70 The CEACR and CFA also have identified a range of services that presumptively are deemed not to be essential in the strict sense of the term.71

In addition, in circumstances where a total prohibition on the right to strike is not appropriate, the magnitude of impact on the basic needs of consumers or the general public, or the need for safe operation of facilities, may justify introduction of a negotiated minimum service.72 Such a service, however, must truly be a minimum service, that is one limited to meeting the basic needs of the population or the minimum requirements of the service, while maintaining the effectiveness of the pressure brought to bear through the strike by a majority of workers.73

The third substantive restriction on the right to strike under Convention 87 relates to situations of acute national or local crisis, although only for a limited period and only to the extent necessary to meet the requirements of the situation.74

With respect to all three forms of substantive restriction, the CFA and CEACR have indicated that certain alternative options should be guaranteed for workers who are deprived of the right to strike. These options include impartial conciliation followed by arbitration procedures in which any awards are binding on both parties and are to be implemented in full and rapid terms.75

#### **The plan defends food worker strikes. Those cause food insecurity---empirics**

Lopes et al 19, Mariana Souza Lopes--Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Research Group on Nutrition Interventions, Belo Horizonte, MG, Brazil. Melissa Luciana de Araújo--Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Research Group on Urban Agriculture, Belo Horizonte, MG, Brazil. Aline Cristine Souza Lopes--Nutrition Department, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Research Group on Nutrition Interventions. PHN, (2019) <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/public-health-nutrition/article/national-general-truck-drivers-strike-and-food-security-in-a-brazilian-metropolis/90C14AC48923A17597DED720365E810B> brett

Food security exists when people have, at all times, a guaranteed and adequate food supply. Food security involves access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets individual dietary requirements and food preferences for a healthy life without restricting access to other fundamental needs( 1 ) and sovereignty( 2 ). Therefore, the risk of food insecurity is influenced by the availability, price, access and quality of the food supply to the consumer, especially in a crisis situation( 3 ). Studies that have explored the global food crisis and market instability indicate that there is an independent association between crisis situations and food security( 4 , 5 ). For example, a recent Brazilian study showed that there was a marked increase in the prevalence of food insecurity during the Brazilian economic crisis( 4 ).

In Brazil, the Centrais de Abastecimento de Minas Gerais S.A. (CEASA-MINAS) distributes produce. The aims of the CEASA-MINAS are to: (i) improve the process of marketing and distribution of products; and (ii) connect producers and consumers in urban centres. The CEASA-MINAS is supported by mixed-capital (public and private) resources and operates under governmental supervision. Consequently, the CEASA-MINAS plays an important role in guaranteeing food security and the human right to food( 6 ).

The state of Minas Gerais is the third-largest economy in Brazil and has one of the best transport networks in the country. The CEASA-MINAS has six units in this state and its headquarters is in the city of Contagem, in the metropolitan region of Belo Horizonte. The headquarters is the principal unit and is named CEASA-Minas Grande BH( 7 ). In 2018, the CEASA-Minas Grande BH traded about 2000 tonnes of food, which corresponded to 80 % of the total market in the state( 8 ). Therefore, this business unit is the subject of the present study.

The supply of unprocessed or minimally processed foods\* in the CEASA-MINAS is self-supplied by the state of Minas Gerais. In spite of this, food is transported via long routes in the state due to its large territory (586 528 km2). The distribution network is more complex for fruit. The supply of fruit at the CEASA-Minas Grande BH has multiple origins and the fruits are carried by trucks over long distances. Some leafy vegetables are produced near the food supply centre( 10 ). In general, the food supply of the CEASA-Minas Grande BH covers a radius of 200 km, but there are items that originate from distances of up to 2000 km away( 11 ). The 1081 municipality suppliers of the CEASA-Minas Grande BH move, on average, 25 700 trucks per month via Brazilian roadways( 8 ).

Consequently, a national general truck drivers’ strike may have important consequences for the economy and food supply chain of a country that is dependent on road networks. Such an event occurred on 21–30 May 2018. During this 10 d strike, Brazilians experienced an extreme event characterized by roadblocks and the unavailability of fuel, medicine, food, and the inputs for food production processes. The disruption of the supply of animal feed had a devastating impact: millions of chickens and pigs were slaughtered because producers had no food for them( 12 ). The drivers were on strike in order to make diesel oil tax-free and to obtain better working conditions( 13 ).

Despite the drivers’ important claims, in a crisis situation, 200 km can be as long as 2000 km and the repercussions may result in negative impacts for food security. Given the importance of transport conditions for the food security of the Brazilian population, the present paper aimed to analyse the impact of the national general truck drivers’ strike on the availability, variety and price of unprocessed foods sold by a food supply centre in a Brazilian metropolis.

#### Goes nuclear

Hartley et al 12 (Major General John Hartley AO (Retd), CEO and Institute, Director Future Directions International, Roundtable Chairman. Alyson Clarke, FDI Executive Officer Gary Kleyn, Manager, FDI Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme, “International Conflict Triggers and Potential Conflict Points Resulting from Food and Water Insecurity” 25 May 2012 http://futuredirections.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Workshop\_Report\_-\_Intl\_Conflict\_Triggers\_-\_May\_25.pdf) brett

There is little dispute that conflict can lead to food and water crises. This paper will consider parts of the world, however, where food and water insecurity can be the cause of conflict and, at worst, result in war. While dealing predominately with food and water issues, the paper also recognises the nexus that exists between food and water and energy security. There is a growing appreciation that the conflicts in the next century will most likely be fought over a lack of resources. Yet, in a sense, this is not new. Researchers point to the French and Russian revolutions as conflicts induced by a lack of food. More recently, Germany’s World War Two efforts are said to have been inspired, at least in part, by its perceived need to gain access to more food. Yet the general sense among those that attended FDI’s recent workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the future could be significantly greater as a result of population pressures, changing weather, urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world. In his book, Small Farmers Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDI’s March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses the problem and why countries across the globe are starting to take note. He writes (p.36), “…if people are hungry, especially in cities, the state is not stable – riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result.” “Hunger feeds anarchy.” This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if “large regions of the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale, bloody wars are liable to follow.” He continues: “An increasingly credible scenario for World War 3 is not so much a confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts.” He also says: “The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources.” As another workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources, either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves. Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because people are going hungry. A study by the International Peace Research Institute indicates that where food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon. The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine as a potential trigger for conflicts and possibly even nuclear war.

#### PIC double bind-- the revolutionary vanguard is capable of achieving global revolution in which case excluding one sector of workers is sufficient to solve OR their method is so fragile that one group being excluded dooms solvency then the AFF was doomed from the start because people crossing the picket line is inevitable -- negate on presumption.

### 3

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions on open source with the full text of all cards with highlighting on the 2020 - 2021 NDCA LD wiki after the round in which they read them.

#### Violation – Graphical user interface Description automatically generated

#### 1] Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal cards, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs.

Antonucci 05 [Michael (Debate coach for Georgetown; former coach for Lexington High School); “[eDebate] open source? resp to Morris”; December 8; http://www.ndtceda.com/pipermail/edebate/2005-December/064806.html //]

a. Open source systems are preferable to the various punishment proposals in circulation. It's better to share the wealth than limit production or participation. Various flavors of argument communism appeal to different people, but banning interesting or useful research(ers) seems like the most destructive solution possible. Indeed, open systems may be the only structural, rule-based answer to resource inequities. Every other proposal I've seen obviously fails at the level of enforcement. Revenue sharing (illegal), salary caps (unenforceable and possibly illegal) and personnel restrictions (circumvented faster than you can say 'information is fungible') don't work. This would - for better or worse. b. With the help of a middling competent archivist, an open source system would reduce entry barriers. This is especially true on the novice or JV level. Young teams could plausibly subsist entirely on a diet of scavenged arguments. A novice team might not wish to do so, but the option can't hurt. c. An open source system would fundamentally change the evidence economy without targeting anyone or putting anyone out of a job. It seems much smarter (and less bilious) to change the value of a professional card-cutter's work than send the KGB after specific counter-revolutionary teams.

#### Open source does equal the playing field

Overing 18 – Bob Overing, LD Scholar (“Holiday Disclosure Post #6 – 10 Things Edition” JANUARY 12, 2018. http://www.premierdebate.com/disclosure-post-6/)

**Open source improves on usual disclosure practices** in the obvious way – **you can read their evidence for better prep**aration – and in a number of smaller ways too. **It solves the analytics problem** I discussed above, **so round-altering uncarded arguments are available** (though this doesn’t really apply to Harvard-Westlake), **and it gives access to evidence from paywalled articles**. **Every season I coach debaters who lack access to major databases; for schools without robust online library offerings or teams without college coaches, this matters a lot**.

#### 2] Evidence ethics – open source is the only way to verify pre-round that cards aren’t miscut or highlighted or bracketed unethically. That’s a voter – maintaining ethical ev practices is key to being good academics and we should be able to verify you didn’t cheat

#### 3] Depth of clash – it allows debaters to have nuanced researched objections to their opponents evidence before the round at a much faster rate, which leads to higher quality ev comparison – outweighs cause thinking on your feet is NUQ but the best quality responses come from full access to a case.

#### D] Voter:

#### The impact is fairness—a] it’s an intrinsic good – debate is fundamentally a game and some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity, b] probability – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but it can rectify skews which means the only impact to a ballot is fairness and deciding who wins, c] it internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education

#### Education is a voter – it gives us portable skills for life like research and thinking.

#### Drop the debater – a) they have a 7-6 rebuttal advantage and the 2ar to make args I can’t respond to, b) it deters future abuse and sets a positive norm.

#### Use competing interps – a) reasonability invites arbitrary judge intervention since we don’t know your bs meter, b) collapses to competing interps – we justify 2 brightlines under an offense defense paradigm just like 2 interps.

#### No RVIs – a) illogical – you shouldn’t win for being fair – it’s a litmus test for engaging in substance, b) norming – I can’t concede the counterinterp if I realize I’m wrong which forces me to argue for bad norms, c) chilling effect – forces you to split your 2AR so you can’t collapse and misconstrue the 2NR, d) topic ed – prevents 1AR blipstorm scripts and allows us to get back to substance after resolving theory

#### Evaluate disclosure before 1AR theory – a) scope of norming – \_\_\_\_, b) magnitude – the aff advocacy and disclosure affects a larger portion of the debate since it determines every speech after it and pre round neg prep

#### No impact turns to theory—it’s a procedural that determines case’s validity and every argument says the aff is bad. Exclusions are inevitable because we only have 45 minutes so it’s best to draw those exclusions along reciprocal lines to ensure a role for the negative

#### They can’t weigh the case—lack of preround prep means their truth claims are untested which you should presume false—they’re also only winning case because we couldn’t engage with it

they’ll say they disclosed – no – 1. They disclosed like 20 minutes before this round 2. It’s hidden

## Case

### 1NC -- Framing

#### Extinction outweighs

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] brett

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

### 1NC -- Solvency

#### Their method fails:

#### The state responds with military crackdowns.

**Flaherty ’5** [Kevin; 2005; B.A. in International Relations from the University of South California; Cryptogon, “Militant Electronic Piracy:  
Non-Violent Insurgency Tactics Against the American Corporate State,” <http://cryptogon.com/docs/pirate_insurgency.html/>]

Any violent insurgency against the American Corporate State is sure to fail and will only serve to enhance the state's power. The major flaw of violent insurgencies, both cell based (Weathermen Underground, Black Panthers, Aryan Nations etc.) and leaderless (Earth Liberation Front, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, etc.) is that they are attempting to attack the system using the same tactics the American Corporate State has already mastered: terror and psychological operations. The American Corporate State attained primacy through the effective application of terror and psychological operations. Therefore, it has far more skill and experience in the use of these tactics than any upstart could ever hope to attain. This makes the American Corporate State impervious to traditional insurgency tactics.

- Political Activism and the ACS Counterinsurgency Apparatus

The American Corporate State employs a full-time counterinsurgency infrastructure with resources that are unimaginable to most would be insurgents. Quite simply, violent insurgents have no idea of just how powerful the foe actually is. Violent insurgents typically start out as peaceful, idealistic, political activists. Whether or not political activists know it, even with very mundane levels of political activity, they are engaging in low intensity conflict with the ACS.

The U.S. military classifies political activism as “low intensity conflict.” The scale of warfare (in terms of intensity) begins with individuals distributing anti-government handbills and public gatherings with anti-government/anti-corporate themes. In the middle of the conflict intensity scale are what the military refers to as Operations Other than War; an example would be the situation the U.S. is facing in Iraq. At the upper right hand side of the graph is global thermonuclear war. What is important to remember is that the military is concerned with ALL points along this scale because they represent different types of threats to the ACS.

Making distinctions between civilian law enforcement and military forces, and foreign and domestic intelligence services is no longer necessary. After September 11, 2001, all national security assets would be brought to bear against any U.S. insurgency movement. Additionally, the U.S. military established NORTHCOM which designated the U.S. as an active military operational area. Crimes involving the loss of corporate profits will increasingly be treated as acts of terrorism and could garner anything from a local law enforcement response to activation of regular military forces.

Most of what is commonly referred to as “political activism” is viewed by the corporate state's counterinsurgency apparatus as a useful and necessary component of political control.

Letters-to-the-editor...

Calls-to-elected-representatives...

Waving banners...

“Third” party political activities...

Taking beatings, rubber bullets and tear gas from riot police in free speech zones...

Political activism amounts to an utterly useless waste of time, in terms of tangible power, which is all the ACS understands. Political activism is a cruel guise that is sold to people who are dissatisfied, but who have no concept of the nature of tangible power. Counterinsurgency teams routinely monitor these activities, attend the meetings, join the groups and take on leadership roles in the organizations.

It's only a matter of time before some individuals determine that political activism is a honeypot that accomplishes nothing and wastes their time. The corporate state knows that some small percentage of the peaceful, idealistic, political activists will eventually figure out the game. At this point, the clued-in activists will probably do one of two things; drop out or move to escalate the struggle in other ways.

If the clued-in activist drops his or her political activities, the ACS wins.

But what if the clued-in activist refuses to give up the struggle? Feeling powerless, desperation could set in and these individuals might become increasingly radicalized. Because the corporate state's counterinsurgency operatives have infiltrated most political activism groups, the radicalized members will be easily identified, monitored and eventually compromised/turned, arrested or executed. The ACS wins again.

#### Those overwhelm and turn affirmative solvency.

**DeBoer ’16** [Fredrik; March 15th; Ph.D. from Purdue University; Fredrikdeboer, “c’mon, guys,” http://fredrikdeboer.com/2016/03/15/cmon-guys/]

I could be wrong about the short-term dangers, and the stakes are incredibly high. But in the end we’re left with the same old question: what tactics will actually work to secure a better world?

In a sharp, sober piece about the meaning of left-wing political violence in the 1970s, Tim Barker writes “If you can’t acknowledge radical violence, radicals are reduced to mere victims of repression, rather than political actors who made definite tactical choices under given political circumstances.” The problem, as Barker goes on to imply, is those tactical choices: in today’s America they will essentially never break on the side of armed opposition against the state. The government knows everything about you, I’m sorry to say, your movements and your associations and the books you read and the things you buy and what you’re saying to the people you communicate with. That’s simply on the level of information before we even get to the state’s incredible capacity to inflict violence.

Look, the world has changed. The relative military capacity of regular people compared to establishment governments has changed, especially in fully developed, technology-enabled countries like the United States. The Czar had his armies, yes, but the Czar’s armies depended on manpower above and beyond everything else. The fighting was still mostly different groups of people with rifles shooting at each other. If tomorrow you could rally as many people as the Bolsheviks had at their revolutionary peak, you’re still left in a world of F-15s, drones, and cluster bombs. And that’s to say nothing of the fact that establishment governments in the developed world can rely on the numbing agents of capitalist luxuries and the American dream to damper revolutionary enthusiasm even among the many millions who have been marginalized and impoverished. This just isn’t 1950s Cuba, guys. It’s just not. In a very real way, modern technology effectively lowers the odds of armed political revolution in a country like the United States to zero, and so much the worse for us.

This isn’t fatalism. It doesn’t mean there’s no hope. It means that there is little alternative to organization, to changing minds through committed political action and using the available nonviolent means to create change: a concert of grassroots organizing, labor tactics, and partisan politics. Those things aren’t exactly likely to work, either, but they’re a hell of a lot more plausible than us dweebs taking the Pentagon. Bernie Sanders isn’t really a socialist, but he’s a social democrat that moves the conversation to the left, and if people are dedicated and committed to organizing, the local, state, and national candidates he inspires will move it further to the left still. You got any better suggestions?

Listen, commie nerds. My people. I love you guys. I really do. And I want to build a better world. Not incrementally, either, but with the kind of sweeping and transformative change that is required to fix a world of such deep injustice. But seriously: none of us are ever going to take to the barricades. And it’s a good thing, too, because we’d probably find a way to shoot in the wrong direction. I can’t dribble a basketball without falling down. American socialism is largely made up of bookish dreamers. I love those people but they’re not for fighting. And even if you have a particular talent for combat, you’re looking at fighting the combined forces of Google, Goldman Sachs, and the defense industry. Violence is hard. Soldiering is hard. In an era of the NSA and military robots, it’s really, really hard. “Should we condone revolutionary violence?” is dorm room, pass-the-bong conversation fodder, of precisely the moral and intellectual weight of “should we torture a guy if we know there’s a bomb and we know he knows where it is and we know we can stop it if we do?” It’s built on absurd hypotheticals, propped up by the power of anxious machismo, and undertaken to no practical political end. It’s understandable. I get it, I really do. But it’s got nothing to do with us. The only way forward is the grubby, unsexy work of building coalitions and asking people to climb on board.

### 1NC -- Advantage

#### Cap solves war--studies prove.

Dafoe 14, Political Science and International Economics (Allan & Nina Kelsey; assistant professor in political science at Yale & research associate in international economics at Berkeley; Journal of Peace Research, “Observing the capitalist peace: Examining market-mediated signaling and other mechanisms,” http://jpr.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/51/5/619.full)

Countries with liberal political and economic systems rarely use military force against each other. This anomalous peace has been most prominently attributed to the ‘democratic peace’ – the apparent tendency for democratic countries to avoid militarized conflict with each other (Maoz & Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995; Dafoe, Oneal & Russett, 2013).More recently, however, scholars have proposed that the liberal peace could be partly (Russett & Oneal, 2001) or primarily (Gartzke, 2007; but see Dafoe, 2011) attributed to liberal economic factors, such as commercial and financial interdependence. In particular, Erik Gartzke, Quan Li & Charles Boehmer (2001), henceforth referred to as GLB, have demonstrated that measures of capital openness have a substantial and statistically significant association with peaceful dyadic relations. Gartzke (2007) confirms that this association is robust to a large variety of model specifications. To explain this correlation, GLB propose that countries with open capital markets are more able to credibly signal their resolve through the bearing of greater economic costs prior to the outbreak of militarized conflict. This explanation is novel and plausible, and resonates with the rationalist view of asymmetric information as a cause of conflict (Fearon, 1995). Moreover, it implies clear testable predictions on evidential domains different from those examined by GLB. In this article we exploit this opportunity by constructing a confirmatory test of GLB’s theory of market-mediated signaling. We first develop an innovative quantitative case selection technique to identify crucial cases where the mechanism of market-mediated signaling should be most easily observed. Specifically, we employ quantitative data and the statistical models used to support the theory we are probing to create an impartial and transparentmeans of selecting cases in which the theory – as specified by the theory’s creators –makes its most confident predictions.We implement three different case selection rules to select cases that optimize on two criteria: (1) maximizing the inferential leverage of our cases, and (2) minimizing selection bias. We examine these cases for a necessary implication of market-mediated signaling: that key participants drew a connection between conflictual events and adverse market movements. Such an inference is a necessary step in the process by which market-mediated costs can signal resolve. For evidence of this we examine news media, government documents, memoirs, historical works, and other sources. We additionally examine other sources, such as market data, for evidence that economic costs were caused by escalatory events. Based on this analysis, we assess the evidence for GLB’s theory of market mediated costly signaling. Our article then considers a more complex heterogeneous effects version of market-mediated signaling in which unspecified scope conditions are required for the mechanism to operate. Our design has the feature of selecting cases in which scope conditions are most likely to be absent. This allows us to perform an exploratory analysis of these cases, looking for possible scope conditions. We also consider alternative potential mechanisms. Our cases are reviewed in more detail in the online appendix.1 To summarize our results, our confirmatory test finds that while market-mediated signaling may be operative in the most serious disputes, it was largely absent in the less serious disputes that characterize most of the sample of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). This suggests either that other mechanisms account for the correlation between capital openness and peace, or that the scope conditions for market-mediated signaling are restrictive. Of the signals that we observed, strategic market-mediated signals were relatively more important than automatic market-mediated signals in the most serious conflicts. We identify a number of potential scope conditions, such as that (1) the conflict must be driven by bargaining failure arising from uncertainty and (2) the economic costs need to escalate gradually and need to be substantial, but less than the expected military costs of conflict. Finally, there were a number of other explanations that seemed present in the cases we examined and could account for the capitalist peace: capital openness is associated with greater anticipated economic costs of conflict; capital openness leads third parties to have a greater stake in the conflict and therefore be more willing to intervene; a dyadic acceptance of the status quo could promote both peace and capital openness; and countries seeking to institutionalize a regional peace might instrumentally harness the pacifying effects of liberal markets. The correlation: Open capital markets and peace The empirical puzzle at the core of this article is the significant and robust correlation noted by GLB between high levels of capital openness in both members of a dyad and the infrequent incidence of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and wars between the members of this dyad (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). The index of capital openness (CAPOPEN) is intended to capture the ‘difficulty states face in seeking to impose restrictions on capital flows (the degree of lost policy autonomy due to globalization)’ (Gartzke & Li, 2003: 575). CAPOPEN is constructed from data drawn from the widely used IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Controls; it is a combination of eight binary variables that measure different types of government restrictions on capital and currency flow (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 407). The measure of CAPOPEN starts in 1966 and is defined for many countries (increasingly more over time). Most of the countries that do not have a measure of CAPOPEN are communist.2 GLB implement this variable in a dyadic framework by creating a new variable, CAPOPENL, which is the smaller of the two dyadic values of CAPOPEN. This operationalization is sometimes referred to as the ‘weak-link’ specification since the functional form is consonant with a model of war in which the ‘weakest link’ in a dyad determines the probability of war. CAPOPENL has a negative monotonic association with the incidence of MIDs, fatal MIDs, and wars (see Figure 1).3 The strength of the estimated empirical association between peace and CAPOPENL, using a modified version of the dataset and model from Gartzke (2007), is comparable to that between peace and, respectively, joint democracy, log of distance, or the GDP of a contiguous dyad (Gartzke, 2007: 179; Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 412). In summary, CAPOPENL seems to be an important and robust correlate of peace. The question of why specifically this correlation exists, however, remains to be answered. The mechanism: Market-mediated signaling? Gartzke, Li & Boehmer (2001) argue that the classic liberal account for the pacific effect of economic interdependence – that interdependence increases the expected costs of war – is not consistent with the bargaining theory of war (see also Morrow, 1999). GLB argue that ‘conventional descriptions of interdependence see war as less likely because states face additional opportunity costs for fighting. The problem with such an account is that it ignores incentives to capitalize on an opponent’s reticence to fight’ (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 400.)4 Instead, GLB (see also Gartzke, 2003; Gartzke & Li, 2003) argue that financial interdependence could promote peace by facilitating the sending of costly signals. As the probability of militarized conflict increases, states incur a variety of automatic and strategically imposed economic costs as a consequence of escalation toward conflict. Those states that persist in a dispute despite these costs will reveal their willingness to tolerate them, and hence signal resolve. The greater the degree of economic interdependence, the more a resolved country could demonstrate its willingness to suffer costs ex ante to militarized conflict. Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s mechanism implies a commonly perceived costly signal before militarized conflict breaks out or escalates: if market-mediated signaling is to account for the correlation between CAPOPENL and the absence of MIDs, then visible market-mediated costs should occur prior to or during periods of real or potential conflict (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). Thus, the proposed mechanism should leave many visible footprints in the historical record. This theory predicts that these visible signals must arise in any escalating conflict, involving countries with high capital openness, in which this mechanism is operative Clarifying the signaling mechanism Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s signaling mechanism is mostly conceptualized on an abstract, game-theoretic level (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). In order to elucidate the types of observations that could inform this theory’s validity, we discuss with greater specificity the possible ways in which such signaling might occur. A conceptual classification of costly signals The term signaling connotes an intentional communicative act by one party directed towards another. Because the term signaling thus suggests a willful act, and a signal of resolve is only credible if it is costly, scholars have sometimes concluded that states involved in bargaining under incomplete information could advance their interests by imposing costs on themselves and thereby signaling their resolve (e.g. Lektzian & Sprecher, 2007). However, the game-theoretic concept of signaling refers more generally to any situation in which an actor’s behavior reveals information about her private information. In fact, states frequently adopt sanctions with low costs to themselves and high costs to their rivals because doing so is often a rational bargaining tactic on other grounds: they are trying to coerce their rival to concede the issue. Bargaining encounters of this type can be conceptualized as a type of war-of-attrition game in which each actor attempts to coerce the other through the imposition of escalating costs. Such encounters also provide the opportunity for signaling: when states resist the costs imposed by their rivals, they ‘signal’ their resolve. If at some point one party perceives the conflict to have become too costly and steps back, that party ‘signals’ a lack of resolve. Thus, this kind of signaling arises as a by-product of another’s coercive attempts. In other words, costly signals come in two forms: self-inflicted (information about a leader arising from a leader’s intentional or incidental infliction of costs on himself) or imposed (information about a leader that arises from a leader’s response to a rival’s imposition of costs). Additionally, costs may arise as an automatic byproduct of escalation towards military conflict or may be a tool of statecraft that is strategically employed during a conflict. The automatic mechanism stipulates that as the probability of conflict increases, various economic assets will lose value due to the risk of conflict and investor flight. However, the occurrence of these costs may also be intentional outcomes of specific escalatory decisions of the states, as in the case of deliberate sanctions; in this case they are strategic. Finally, at a practical level, we identify three different potential kinds of economic costs of militarized conflict that may be mediated by open capital markets: capital costs from political risk, monetary coercion, and business sanctions.

#### Overthrowing entrenched nuclear actors causes loose nukes -- extinction.

Milne and Kinsella, 17—Faculty of English, University of Cambridge AND School of Media, Culture and Creative Arts, Faculty of Humanities, Curtin University (Drew and John, “NUCLEAR THEORY DEGREE ZERO, WITH TWO CHEERS FOR DERRIDA,” Angelaki, 22:3, 1-16,) brett

Another version of the “accelerationist” argument captures some of the ideological workings of the term. In Marxist circles, an “accelerationist” is someone who thinks that the collapse of capitalism will be hastened by allowing reactionary forces to speed up capitalism’s self-destruction. There are occasions when such an argument has validity: nothing about the form of the argument makes it inherently or structurally wrong. There are revolutionary moments when allowing capitalism to collapse in order to rebuild a socialist society is a better path than propping up a failing capitalist regime. The judgement is political rather than philosophical. In most contexts, however, the accelerationist argument, especially as a political principle, is deeply dangerous. It would be better, for example, to preserve a failing US capitalist regime while building social forces to take it over, than to allow the nuclear weapons of the United States to fall into the hands of a suicidal military rearguard or some counter-revolutionary terrorist organisation. Preserving the possibility of human life might involve propping up collapsing capitalist institutions, not least the nuclear safety inspectorate, rather than allowing humanity to be swallowed up by some death spiral of presidential dictators in fear of being toppled. These are critical judgements that could arise at any moment, with real risks that poor judgements will hasten a nuclear confrontation that leads to mutually assured annihilation. The formal shape of an accelerationist argument needs to be understood strategically and politically if it is to address nuclear questions.

#### Capitalism is sustainable

Bailey ’18 [Ronald; March 12; B.A. in Economics from the University of Virginia, member of the Society of Environmental Journalists and the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities, citing a compilation of interdisciplinary research; Reason, “Climate Change Problems Will Be Solved Through Economic Growth,” <https://reason.com/2018/03/12/climate-change-problems-will-be-solved-t>; RP]

"It is, I promise, worse than you think," David Wallace-Wells wrote in an infamously apocalyptic 2017 New York Magazine article. "Indeed, absent a significant adjustment to how billions of humans conduct their lives, parts of the Earth will likely become close to uninhabitable, and other parts horrifically inhospitable, as soon as the end of this century." The "it" is man-made climate change. Temperatures will become scalding, crops will wither, and rising seas will inundate coastal cities, Wallace-Wells warns. But toward the end of his screed, he somewhat dismissively observes that "by and large, the scientists have an enormous confidence in the ingenuity of humans….Now we've found a way to engineer our own doomsday, and surely we will find a way to engineer our way out of it, one way or another." Over at Scientific American, John Horgan considers some eco-modernist views on how humanity will indeed go about engineering our way out of the problems that climate change may pose. In an essay called "Should We Chill Out About Global Warming?," Horgan reports the more dynamic and positive analyses of two eco-modernist thinkers, Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker and science journalist Will Boisvert. In an essay for The Breakthrough Journal, Pinker notes that such optimism "is commonly dismissed as the 'faith that technology will save us.' In fact, it is a skepticism that the status quo will doom us—that knowledge and behavior will remain frozen in their current state for perpetuity. Indeed, a naive faith in stasis has repeatedly led to prophecies of environmental doomsdays that never happened." In his new book, Enlightenment Now, Pinker points out that "as the world gets richer and more tech-savvy, it dematerializes, decarbonizes, and densifies, sparing land and species." Economic growth and technological progress are the solutions not only to climate change but to most of the problems that bedevil humanity. Boisvert, meanwhile, tackles and rebuts the apocalyptic prophecies made by eco-pessimists like Wallace-Wells, specifically with regard to food production and availabilty, water supplies, heat waves, and rising seas. "No, this isn't a denialist screed," Boisvert writes. "Human greenhouse emissions will warm the planet, raise the seas and derange the weather, and the resulting heat, flood and drought will be cataclysmic. Cataclysmic—but not apocalyptic. While the climate upheaval will be large, the consequences for human well-being will be small. Looked at in the broader context of economic development, climate change will barely slow our progress in the effort to raise living standards." Boisvert proceeds to show how a series of technologies—drought-resistant crops, cheap desalination, widespread adoption of air-conditioning, modern construction techniques—will ameliorate and overcome the problems caused by rising temperatures. He is entirely correct when he notes, "The most inexorable feature of climate-change modeling isn't the advance of the sea but the steady economic growth that will make life better despite global warming." Horgan, Pinker, and Boisvert are all essentially endorsing what I have called "the progress solution" to climate change. As I wrote in 2009, "It is surely not unreasonable to argue that if one wants to help future generations deal with climate change, the best policies would be those that encourage rapid economic growth. This would endow future generations with the wealth and superior technologies that could be used to handle whatever comes at them including climate change." Six years later I added that that "richer is more climate-friendly, especially for developing countries. Why? Because faster growth means higher incomes, which correlate with lower population growth. Greater wealth also means higher agricultural productivity, freeing up land for forests to grow as well as speedier progress toward developing and deploying cheaper non–fossil fuel energy technologies. These trends can act synergistically to ameliorate man-made climate change." Horgan concludes, "Greens fear that optimism will foster complacency and hence undermine activism. But I find the essays of Pinker and Boisvert inspiring, not enervating….These days, despair is a bigger problem than optimism." Counseling despair has always been wrong when human ingenuity is left free to solve problems, and that will prove to be the case with climate change as well.

#### Growth and innovation solves warming.

Ogutonye, 21—Policy Lead, Science & Innovation Unit, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change (Olamide, “Should Tech Make Us Optimistic About Climate Change?,” <https://institute.global/policy/should-tech-make-us-optimistic-about-climate-change>, dml)

In the middle of a climate emergency, it is challenging to stay upbeat. Yet the good news is that investment in climate technology has continued to grow since the early 2010s. US-listed companies involved with providing technology solutions that support global decarbonisation have consistently outperformed the average since 2019 (Figure 7). Venture capital (VC) investment in the sector grew tenfold between 2013 and 2018, representing five times the growth rate of the overall VC market. By comparison, the growth rate of VC investment in Artificial Intelligence was a third of climate tech between 2013 and 2018 although AI is renowned for its uptick within the same timeframe. Beyond VC, public investment in climate technology research has continued to grow too. In 2019, government research and development funding for energy technologies alone stood at $30 billion, with around 80 per cent of it aimed at low-carbon solutions.

In addition to the positive role of technology, political leaders are increasingly showing a willingness to make ambitious commitments on climate. The Paris Agreement is a case in point. The international treaty was adopted in 2015 and ratified internationally within a year – a much quicker pace than its predecessor, the Kyoto Protocol, which took eight years. The Paris deal grew into a political snowball, galvanising further commitment from most of the world’s leading emitters and arguably becoming the most symbolic climate event of the 21st century. The US withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2019 dealt a political blow to the global pact although the decision, since reversed by President Biden, did not resonate or last long enough to have any major impact.

The Biden-Harris administration has already indicated that it will not sit on the fence but will instead revive the country’s leadership on climate action. In the UK and elsewhere, similar efforts can be observed as more countries commit to some form of net zero target. More than 100 countries have pledged a commitment towards net zero, with estimates suggesting that over 70 per cent of global GDP and 55 per cent of CO2 emissions are now covered by a similar target. A Climate Action Tracker Report indicates that the cumulative effect of countries’ pledges to the Paris Agreement – if kept and fully achieved – could keep global temperature rise below 2.1°C by 2100, putting the stated goal of 1.5°C within striking distance.

As explored in our recent Institute paper, there are also important insights for politicians in terms of applying lessons from the Covid-19 pandemic to the climate emergency. Although the pandemic is different in scale, complexity and timeline, it offers an immediate window into how policy leaders can adapt and make decisions in order to better support climate innovation. Countries can also apply the “recovering better together” principles outlined by the UN, which calls for a commitment to climate-related actions as economies recover from the Covid-19 slowdown. More than 60 countries, including high emitters, are already making an explicit promise to link their nationally determined contributions (NDC) to Covid-19 recovery, supported by the United Nations Development Programme’s Climate Promise programme. Countries in the Global South are equally aligning their climate mission with international support for various NDC support programmes. A green recovery can cut the level of 2030 emissions to 25 per cent lower than projections based on pre-Covid commitments and put the world close to a 2°C pathway. The pandemic has also highlighted the significance of tech innovation, not least in record-breaking vaccine delivery but also in the suite of digital solutions developed for contact tracing, compliance monitoring and management of health-care records.

The global financial landscape is evolving to become more responsive to climate innovation. Since they were first issued in 2007, green bonds have grown into what is now estimated to become a $1 trillion market. Analysts expect as much as $500 billion of green bonds this year as the EU raises capital for its Covid recovery fund. From target-linked to transition bonds, innovations in this green market are being used to bring projects in energy, transport, buildings and other economic sectors to life. Investor-led initiatives such as Climate Action 100+, whose members control over $50 trillion of assets, are actively using funds to ensure the world’s largest corporate greenhouse gas emitters commit to climate action. Other investor networks are pursuing a similar agenda, including Europe’s Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC) and Australia and New Zealand’s Investor Group on Climate Change (IGCC). Humanity’s competence in technology and innovation will be central to the race in mitigating and tackling climate change.

#### Centralization dooms environmental responses -- assumes the vanguard model.

Larson-Robin, 2016 Leah, Dissertation for acquiring a Doctor of Philosophy (Political Science), “Risking Poison to Quench a Thirst: Political Engagement Choices for Citizens and the State in China’s Environmental Crisis” University of Wisconsin - Madison, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2016.

Preference falsification, principal-agent problems, and non-institutionalized regulatory systems are inextricably linked to authoritarian governance. Yet these features magnify the uncertainty problems inherent in environmental policy. While some policy mechanisms depend less these actors and institutions, there is no evidence suggesting a comprehensive and coherent environmental governance strategy can be implemented under these conditions. For example, Gilley (2012) identifies authoritarian environmentalism as a potential alternative that is more suited for political conditions. Authoritarian environmentalism is a “policy model that concentrates authority in a few executive agencies manned by capable and uncorrupt elites seeking to improve environmental outcomes, where public participation is limited to a narrow cadre of scientific and technocratic elites, while others are expected to participate only in stateled mobilization for the purposes of implementation, [often resulting in] a rapid and comprehensive response to the issue, usually with limits on individual freedoms” (Gilley 2012: 288). While this approach is applicable in some cases, the state lacks the capacity to implement such policies on a wide scale. In light of the severity and scale of China’s environmental crisis, such a strategy becomes even less probable. What does this mean for environmental policy in China? One potential course would be to improve the quality and quantity of public participation. In democracies, non-state actors such as individual citizens and NGOs can raise the alarm.33 But raising the alarm can look a lot like expressing political dissent. Authoritarian states can perceive public participation as threatening, particularly in the form of protests, and China is no different. The sweeping economic reforms of the 1980s seemed to signal that the CCP leadership was similarly inclined to consider political reform. In the spring of 1989, there was global momentum for democratization. All over China, there were calls for political liberalization, and an increasing number of people, mostly students, gathered in Tiananmen Square—directly in front of the buildings that housed the CCP’s central political organs—to protest continued political restrictions. Conflict among the leadership fragmented the party’s initial response, which served to further motivate protesters, but Deng and his allies re-established party order and brought in the army to crush the protest and political dissent. Two lessons the party derived from these events and from the successful economic development of the following years have environmental consequences: first, public participation is inherently destabilizing, and second, the promise of economic opportunity created by rapid development can be used to legitimize the denial of political rights. Over time, other channels for public participation have emerged. Legal development has created spaces for engagement, with varying success, and the CCP remains conflicted about the political costs and benefits of stronger legal institutionalization. On one hand, bringing a suit might diffuse public tensions over pollution, tensions that might otherwise spark destabilizing protests. On the other hand, stronger laws and courts could undermine the party system by restricting political discretion. The petitioning system, while not new, has been reformed and continues to serve as a channel for complaints, which the center then uses to assess public opinion (Dimitrov, 2014). At the same time, problems with the petitioning process have been rampant, and potentially made citizens more frustrated as a result (Li 2008). China clearly has an information problem. When combined with the inherent uncertainties of environmental policy and the scale and complexity of the environmental crisis, the uncertainties will continue to ~~cripple~~ [undermine] any environmental governance strategy, regardless of the CCP leadership’s commitment to address the damage. Yet that commitment can determine the extent to which the state is willing to make trade-offs, such as strengthening the legal system or increasing opportunities for public participation. Unfortunately, those magnified uncertainties that hamper environmental policy efficacy impede the leadership from determining the extent and nature of the environmental problems, what it can do about it, and what potential consequences there might be. It is also difficult to gauge the potential cost to stability of the crisis because of preference falsification. Consequently, the state is making cost-benefit analyses with limited and distorted information, which may in turn affect the state’s will to make trade-offs. As I explore in later chapters, there have been some indications that the center has sought to reduce these distortions through public participation mechanisms, but the results appear mixed. What is known for certain, though, is that villagers in rural China, often bearing a disproportionate pollution burden, have fewer opportunities to participate than those in urban areas, and are at greater political risk.

#### Only cap maintains innovation -- robust evidence.

Fitzmaurice ‘15

[Matthew, CEO of EcoAlpha Asset Management LLC, an asset management firm that invests in companies that provide solutions to global burdened resources with a specific emphasis on water, agriculture and energy efficiency. EcoAlpha focuses on public securities and seeks to generate superior risk-adjusted returns for investors. 03/23/2015. “Only Capitalism Can Save the Planet.” <https://ensia.com/voices/only-capitalism-can-save-the-planet/>] JCH-PF

To say the world has changed a lot in the last century is a huge understatement. Industrial, medical and social progress has resulted in unprecedented growth in the world’s population and economy, and that growth has placed tremendous burdens on the planet’s resources. These burdens create problems — perhaps the most substantive problems we have faced as a species: from water scarcity and pollution to climate change, reliable access to nourishing food, and affordable energy. Here’s the thing, though: where there are problems to be solved, there’s money to be made. And where there’s money to be made, we awaken one of the world’s most powerful forces for change: capitalism. Of course capitalism has played a starring role in distressing the planet’s resources. Historically, the combination of unchecked industry, a readiness to externalize costs and a relentless thirst for growth have plundered and polluted the earth. It’s not a debate, but simple fact that our population size and economies cannot continue on their present trajectories without exhausting the world’s resources. Yet, a rapidly expanding global middle class — increasingly urbanized and hungry for protein — threatens further and accelerating distress. The hopeful news is that businesses, with their almost singular focus on economic self-interest, and governments, motivated by a variety of interests, are beginning to recognize and address in earnest these inevitable problems. Today, the businesses that develop practical and affordable solutions to burdened resource problems will end up being the world’s most profitable companies. No longer can they be considered “sustainability” businesses. They are everyday businesses with a long view, targeting problems that are not going away. That’s smart business. Burdened resources have become a strong economic driver for businesses of all sizes, in all industries everywhere to spend and change — and one that will only grow in scope and intensity over time. The companies that provide effective solutions to burdened resources will provide superior risk-adjusted returns to their investors as business and governments accelerate their solutions spending out of their own economic self-interest. And because the products, technologies and services these companies provide are common solutions to global problems — and are therefore exponentially repeatable — these investments will have amplified positive impact on global resource scarcity issues. Too often people have a narrow view of these solutions, thinking only of solar panels and windmills. But solutions are enormously diverse: They include, among many others, agricultural drones that monitor soil conditions, smart irrigation technology that delivers water only where and when it’s really needed, more efficient distributed energy generation and component suppliers that make cars use less gas. As a whole, the human race has a poor track record when it comes to altruism. Although there are a great many saints among us who spend — and even sacrifice — their lives to help others, most of us are hard pressed to take care of ourselves and our families. We have a much better track record when it comes to investing money in our own self-interest, which has fueled the unprecedented innovation, economic and life-expectancy growth of the past century. In the past, many people who invested in sustainable solutions were motivated principally by conscience, willing to accept reduced returns in order to invest their money in a way that was consistent with their beliefs and convictions — be they religious, social or environmental. Now, however, we face a new reality in which our economic self-interest and the long-term well-being of the planet are coming into alignment. Because we have to face the reality of burdened resources, there’s money in it.

#### Warming isn’t existential—updated studies prove

Nordhaus 20 - (Ted Nordhaus is the founder and executive director of the Breakthrough Institute and a co-author of “An Ecomodernist Manifesto.”; 1-23-2020, WSJ, "Ignore the Fake Climate Debate," doa: 12-27-2020) url: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ignore-the-fake-climate-debate-11579795816>

Beyond the headlines and social media, where Greta Thunberg, Donald Trump and the online armies of climate “alarmists” and “deniers” do battle, there is a real climate debate bubbling along in scientific journals, conferences and, occasionally, even in the halls of Congress. It gets a lot less attention than the boisterous and fake debate that dominates our public discourse, but it is much more relevant to how the world might actually address the problem. In the real climate debate, no one denies the relationship between human emissions of greenhouse gases and a warming climate. Instead, the disagreement comes down to different views of climate risk in the face of multiple, cascading uncertainties. On one side of the debate are optimists, who believe that, with improving technology and greater affluence, our societies will prove quite adaptable to a changing climate. On the other side are pessimists, who are more concerned about the risks associated with rapid, large-scale and poorly understood transformations of the climate system. But most pessimists do not believe that runaway climate change or a hothouse earth are plausible scenarios, much less that human extinction is imminent. And most optimists recognize a need for policies to address climate change, even if they don’t support the radical measures that Ms. Thunberg and others have demanded. In the fake climate debate, both sides agree that economic growth and reduced emissions vary inversely; it’s a zero-sum game. In the real debate, the relationship is much more complicated. Long-term economic growth is associated with both rising per capita energy consumption and slower population growth. For this reason, as the world continues to get richer, higher per capita energy consumption is likely to be offset by a lower population. A richer world will also likely be more technologically advanced, which means that energy consumption should be less carbon-intensive than it would be in a poorer, less technologically advanced future. In fact, a number of the high-emissions scenarios produced by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change involve futures in which the world is relatively poor and populous and less technologically advanced. Affluent, developed societies are also much better equipped to respond to climate extremes and natural disasters. That’s why natural disasters kill and displace many more people in poor societies than in rich ones. It’s not just seawalls and flood channels that make us resilient; it’s air conditioning and refrigeration, modern transportation and communications networks, early warning systems, first responders and public health bureaucracies. New research published in the journal Global Environmental Change finds that global economic growth over the last decade has reduced climate mortality by a factor of five, with the greatest benefits documented in the poorest nations. In low-lying Bangladesh, 300,000 people died in Cyclone Bhola in 1970, when 80% of the population lived in extreme poverty. In 2019, with less than 20% of the population living in extreme poverty, Cyclone Fani killed just five people. “Poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate. The fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development.” So while it is true that poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate, it is also true that the fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development, which requires infrastructure and industrialization. Those activities, in turn, require cement, steel, process heat and chemical inputs, all of which are impossible to produce today without fossil fuels. For this and other reasons, the world is unlikely to cut emissions fast enough to stabilize global temperatures at less than 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels, the long-standing international target, much less 1.5 degrees, as many activists now demand. But recent forecasts also suggest that many of the worst-case climate scenarios produced in the last decade, which assumed unbounded economic growth and fossil-fuel development, are also very unlikely. There is still substantial uncertainty about how sensitive global temperatures will be to higher emissions over the long-term. But the best estimates now suggest that the world is on track for 3 degrees of warming by the end of this century, not 4 or 5 degrees as was once feared. That is due in part to slower economic growth in the wake of the global financial crisis, but also to decades of technology policy and energy-modernization efforts. “We have better and cleaner technologies available today because policy-makers in the U.S. and elsewhere set out to develop those technologies.” The energy intensity of the global economy continues to fall. Lower-carbon natural gas has displaced coal as the primary source of new fossil energy. The falling cost of wind and solar energy has begun to have an effect on the growth of fossil fuels. Even nuclear energy has made a modest comeback in Asia.