### 1

#### Interpretation: Debaters must, on the page with their name and the school they attend, disclose their contact information on the 2021-2022 NDCA LD wiki.

#### Violation: They didn’t

#### Graphical user interface, text, application, Word Description automatically generated1] Inclusion – Novices would have a way to contact you about your positions and learn from them and debaters would tell you before round about triggering positions that you’ve read before. Independent voter because inclusion is a gateway issue for debate to occur in the first place

#### 2] Prep Skew- Pre-round disclosure can’t happen if you don’t have a preferable means of contact because I would never know the aff. Cross apply reasons prep skew outweighs.

### 2

#### The United States ought to:

#### Recognize a right of workers to strike as a manifestation of the general strike except for workers who are essential to a country’s food supply

#### Provide those workers with a right to impartial conciliation followed by arbitration procedures

#### Workers right to strike can be conditional in the context of food supply---exceptions are limited to avoid abuses, AND enable alternatives that channel worker demands

Brudney 21, James J., Joseph Crowley Chair in Labor and Employment Law, Fordham Law School. Yale Journal of International Law, 2021. “The Right to Strike as Customary International Law” <https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1710&context=yjil> brett

The international right to strike is far from absolute. It may be restricted in exceptional circumstances, or even prohibited, pursuant to national regulation. For a start, Convention 87 provides that members of the armed forces and the police may be excluded from the scope of the Convention in general, including the right to strike.57 In addition, applications by the CFA and CEACR have concluded that three distinct forms of substantive restriction on the right to strike are compatible with Convention 87.

1. Substantive Limitations

One important restriction applies to certain categories of public servants. The CEACR and CFA have made clear that public employees generally enjoy the same right to strike as their counterparts in the private sector; at the same time, in order to ensure continuity of functions in the three branches of government, this right may be restricted for public servants exercising authority in the name of the State.58 Examples include officials performing tasks that involve the administration of necessary executive branch functions or that relate to the administration of justice.

Each country hasits own approach to classifying public servants exercising authority in the name of the State. When considering the international right under Convention 87, some public servant exceptions seem clearly applicable, such as officials auditing or collecting internal revenues, customs officers, or judges and their close judicial assistants. 59 Some public servant exceptions seem inapplicable, such as teachers, or public servants in State-owned commercial enterprises.60 Whether public servants are exercising authority in the name of the State can be a close question under particular national law, one on which the CEACR and CFA have offered encouragement and guidance,61 as has the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR).62

A second equally important restriction on the right to strike involves essential services in the strict sense of the term. This is an area in which both the CEACR and CFA have developed a detailed set of applications and guidelines. 63 The two committees consider that essential services, for the purposes of restricting or prohibiting the right to strike, are only those “the interruption of which would endanger the life, personal safety or health of the whole or part of the population.”64

This definition of essential services “in the strict sense of the term” stems from the idea that “essential services” as a limitation on the right to strike would lose its meaning if statutes or judicial decisions defined those services in too broad a manner. 65 The interruption of services that cause or have the potential to cause economic hardships—even serious economic hardships—is not ordinarily sufficient to qualify the interrupted service as essential. Indeed, the very purpose of a strike is to interrupt services or production and thereby cause a degree of economic hardship. That is the leverage workers can exercise; it is what allows a strike to be effective in bringing the parties to the table and securing a negotiated settlement.

The two ILO supervisory committees also have made clear that the essential services concept is not static in nature. Thus, a non-essential service may become essential if the strike exceeds a certain duration or extent, or as a function of the special characteristics of a country. 66 One example is that of an island State where at some point ferry transportation services become essential to bring food and medical supplies to the population.67

When examining concrete cases, the supervisory bodies have considered a range of services, both public and private, too broad to summarize here. As illustrative, the two bodies have determined that essential services in the strict sense of the term include air traffic control services, 68 telephone services, 69 prison services, firefighting services, and water and electricity services. 70 The CEACR and CFA also have identified a range of services that presumptively are deemed not to be essential in the strict sense of the term.71

In addition, in circumstances where a total prohibition on the right to strike is not appropriate, the magnitude of impact on the basic needs of consumers or the general public, or the need for safe operation of facilities, may justify introduction of a negotiated minimum service.72 Such a service, however, must truly be a minimum service, that is one limited to meeting the basic needs of the population or the minimum requirements of the service, while maintaining the effectiveness of the pressure brought to bear through the strike by a majority of workers.73

The third substantive restriction on the right to strike under Convention 87 relates to situations of acute national or local crisis, although only for a limited period and only to the extent necessary to meet the requirements of the situation.74

With respect to all three forms of substantive restriction, the CFA and CEACR have indicated that certain alternative options should be guaranteed for workers who are deprived of the right to strike. These options include impartial conciliation followed by arbitration procedures in which any awards are binding on both parties and are to be implemented in full and rapid terms.75

#### Strikes are inevitable and cause food insecurity---empirics

Lopes et al 19, Mariana Souza Lopes--Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Research Group on Nutrition Interventions, Belo Horizonte, MG, Brazil. Melissa Luciana de Araújo--Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Research Group on Urban Agriculture, Belo Horizonte, MG, Brazil. Aline Cristine Souza Lopes--Nutrition Department, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Research Group on Nutrition Interventions. PHN, (2019) <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/public-health-nutrition/article/national-general-truck-drivers-strike-and-food-security-in-a-brazilian-metropolis/90C14AC48923A17597DED720365E810B> brett

Food security exists when people have, at all times, a guaranteed and adequate food supply. Food security involves access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets individual dietary requirements and food preferences for a healthy life without restricting access to other fundamental needs( 1 ) and sovereignty( 2 ). Therefore, the risk of food insecurity is influenced by the availability, price, access and quality of the food supply to the consumer, especially in a crisis situation( 3 ). Studies that have explored the global food crisis and market instability indicate that there is an independent association between crisis situations and food security( 4 , 5 ). For example, a recent Brazilian study showed that there was a marked increase in the prevalence of food insecurity during the Brazilian economic crisis( 4 ).

In Brazil, the Centrais de Abastecimento de Minas Gerais S.A. (CEASA-MINAS) distributes produce. The aims of the CEASA-MINAS are to: (i) improve the process of marketing and distribution of products; and (ii) connect producers and consumers in urban centres. The CEASA-MINAS is supported by mixed-capital (public and private) resources and operates under governmental supervision. Consequently, the CEASA-MINAS plays an important role in guaranteeing food security and the human right to food( 6 ).

The state of Minas Gerais is the third-largest economy in Brazil and has one of the best transport networks in the country. The CEASA-MINAS has six units in this state and its headquarters is in the city of Contagem, in the metropolitan region of Belo Horizonte. The headquarters is the principal unit and is named CEASA-Minas Grande BH( 7 ). In 2018, the CEASA-Minas Grande BH traded about 2000 tonnes of food, which corresponded to 80 % of the total market in the state( 8 ). Therefore, this business unit is the subject of the present study.

The supply of unprocessed or minimally processed foods\* in the CEASA-MINAS is self-supplied by the state of Minas Gerais. In spite of this, food is transported via long routes in the state due to its large territory (586 528 km2). The distribution network is more complex for fruit. The supply of fruit at the CEASA-Minas Grande BH has multiple origins and the fruits are carried by trucks over long distances. Some leafy vegetables are produced near the food supply centre( 10 ). In general, the food supply of the CEASA-Minas Grande BH covers a radius of 200 km, but there are items that originate from distances of up to 2000 km away( 11 ). The 1081 municipality suppliers of the CEASA-Minas Grande BH move, on average, 25 700 trucks per month via Brazilian roadways( 8 ).

Consequently, a national general truck drivers’ strike may have important consequences for the economy and food supply chain of a country that is dependent on road networks. Such an event occurred on 21–30 May 2018. During this 10 d strike, Brazilians experienced an extreme event characterized by roadblocks and the unavailability of fuel, medicine, food, and the inputs for food production processes. The disruption of the supply of animal feed had a devastating impact: millions of chickens and pigs were slaughtered because producers had no food for them( 12 ). The drivers were on strike in order to make diesel oil tax-free and to obtain better working conditions( 13 ).

Despite the drivers’ important claims, in a crisis situation, 200 km can be as long as 2000 km and the repercussions may result in negative impacts for food security. Given the importance of transport conditions for the food security of the Brazilian population, the present paper aimed to analyse the impact of the national general truck drivers’ strike on the availability, variety and price of unprocessed foods sold by a food supply centre in a Brazilian metropolis.

#### Food insecurity goes nuclear

Hartley et al 12 (Major General John Hartley AO (Retd), CEO and Institute, Director Future Directions International, Roundtable Chairman. Alyson Clarke, FDI Executive Officer Gary Kleyn, Manager, FDI Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme, “International Conflict Triggers and Potential Conflict Points Resulting from Food and Water Insecurity” 25 May 2012 http://futuredirections.org.au/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Workshop\_Report\_-\_Intl\_Conflict\_Triggers\_-\_May\_25.pdf) brett

There is little dispute that conflict can lead to food and water crises. This paper will consider parts of the world, however, where food and water insecurity can be the cause of conflict and, at worst, result in war. While dealing predominately with food and water issues, the paper also recognises the nexus that exists between food and water and energy security. There is a growing appreciation that the conflicts in the next century will most likely be fought over a lack of resources. Yet, in a sense, this is not new. Researchers point to the French and Russian revolutions as conflicts induced by a lack of food. More recently, Germany’s World War Two efforts are said to have been inspired, at least in part, by its perceived need to gain access to more food. Yet the general sense among those that attended FDI’s recent workshops, was that the scale of the problem in the future could be significantly greater as a result of population pressures, changing weather, urbanisation, migration, loss of arable land and other farm inputs, and increased affluence in the developing world. In his book, Small Farmers Secure Food, Lindsay Falvey, a participant in FDI’s March 2012 workshop on the issue of food and conflict, clearly expresses the problem and why countries across the globe are starting to take note. He writes (p.36), “…if people are hungry, especially in cities, the state is not stable – riots, violence, breakdown of law and order and migration result.” “Hunger feeds anarchy.” This view is also shared by Julian Cribb, who in his book, The Coming Famine, writes that if “large regions of the world run short of food, land or water in the decades that lie ahead, then wholesale, bloody wars are liable to follow.” He continues: “An increasingly credible scenario for World War 3 is not so much a confrontation of super powers and their allies, as a festering, self-perpetuating chain of resource conflicts.” He also says: “The wars of the 21st Century are less likely to be global conflicts with sharply defined sides and huge armies, than a scrappy mass of failed states, rebellions, civil strife, insurgencies, terrorism and genocides, sparked by bloody competition over dwindling resources.” As another workshop participant put it, people do not go to war to kill; they go to war over resources, either to protect or to gain the resources for themselves. Another observed that hunger results in passivity not conflict. Conflict is over resources, not because people are going hungry. A study by the International Peace Research Institute indicates that where food security is an issue, it is more likely to result in some form of conflict. Darfur, Rwanda, Eritrea and the Balkans experienced such wars. Governments, especially in developed countries, are increasingly aware of this phenomenon. The UK Ministry of Defence, the CIA, the US Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Oslo Peace Research Institute, all identify famine as a potential trigger for conflicts and possibly even nuclear war.

### 3

#### Bataille’s celebration of violence ensures co-option by militaristic elites and violent transition.

Shaviro 90 (Steven, PhD from Yale, professor at Wayne State University, former professor at University of Washington, “Passion and Excess,” The Florida State University Press, pg. 37-39, Tashma)

Yet if the intensity of Bataille’s involvement is clear, the details of its expression are not. Does the passage which I have just quoted function as description or as exhortation? On what sort of threshold are we standing, and what is the nature of the "void” which lies beyond it? At such a point, what kind of "alternative” is at stake? What further disaster could be entailed by a “retreat”? And is it even possible to retreat? Since the foundations have already crumbled, is not a fall inevitable? But what sort of courage is available in such a situation? What kind of "conquest" is it which is no longer played out according to the dialectic of master and slave, with the risk of heroic death as ultimate stake? What experience of time is realized by this leap into die void? The only way to answer such questions may be to alter the way in which they are posed. For the peculiar effect of Bataille’s work is that it offers no satisfying conclusions, no points of repose. Not even the satisfaction of absolute destruction. His obsessive meditations concern—a.nd participate in—a catastrophe all the more obscure and unsettling in that it refuses apocalyptic closure. "Ce qui seul demeure est l’agitation circulaire—qui ne s’épuise pas dans l`extase et recommence ai partir d’elle [What alone remains is circular agitation—which does not exhaust itself in ecstasy and begins again from it]" (OC, 5:130; IE, lll). The "yertiginous fall’” takes place in a “bottomless void,” and consequently never hits bottom. The privileged act of sacrifice serves no end, leads to no appeasement. And despite Bataille’s frequent sexual stereotyping and invocations of virility, his "interior experience" does not culminate in any display of phallic mastery. Pure loss, expenditure without recompense, it issues only in an **absurd compulsion** to repeat, to approach the **threshold of disaster again and again**. The “summit" of ecstasy cannot be extricated from a concomitant "decline": "De méme que le S0mKIlCt n’est a la fin que l’inacecssible, le déclin des l’abord est Pinévitable [Iust as the summit is finally only the inaccessible, so the decline, from the very first, is inevitable]” (OC, 6:57). The exuberant violence of Bataille’s texts is matched only by the pointless dissipation of the energies they invoke.

#### Extinction.

Milne and Kinsella, 17—Faculty of English, University of Cambridge AND School of Media, Culture and Creative Arts, Faculty of Humanities, Curtin University (Drew and John, “NUCLEAR THEORY DEGREE ZERO, WITH TWO CHEERS FOR DERRIDA,” Angelaki, 22:3, 1-16,) brett

Another version of the “accelerationist” argument captures some of the ideological workings of the term. In Marxist circles, an “accelerationist” is someone who thinks that the collapse of capitalism will be hastened by allowing reactionary forces to speed up capitalism’s self-destruction. There are occasions when such an argument has validity: nothing about the form of the argument makes it inherently or structurally wrong. There are revolutionary moments when allowing capitalism to collapse in order to rebuild a socialist society is a better path than propping up a failing capitalist regime. The judgement is political rather than philosophical. In most contexts, however, the accelerationist argument, especially as a political principle, is deeply dangerous. It would be better, for example, to preserve a failing US capitalist regime while building social forces to take it over, than to allow the nuclear weapons of the United States to fall into the hands of a suicidal military rearguard or some counter-revolutionary terrorist organisation. Preserving the possibility of human life might involve propping up collapsing capitalist institutions, not least the nuclear safety inspectorate, rather than allowing humanity to be swallowed up by some death spiral of presidential dictators in fear of being toppled. These are critical judgements that could arise at any moment, with real risks that poor judgements will hasten a nuclear confrontation that leads to mutually assured annihilation. The formal shape of an accelerationist argument needs to be understood strategically and politically if it is to address nuclear questions.

## Case

### 1NC -- Framing

#### Extinction outweighs

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] brett

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

#### Survival come first – “sovereignty” doesn’t have meaning outside of existence.

Nancy 91 Jean-Luc, The Unsacrificeable, Translated by Richard Livingston, Yale French Studies, No. 79, Literature and the Ethical Question, pg. 20-38

Sacrificial trans-appropriation is the appropriation of the Subject who penetrates negativity, that sustains itself there, that survives its own destruction, and that returns to itself as sovereign. (And this negativity could well play the same role, in a subtle fashion, when it is what Bataille calls "negativity without use.") Fascination for the sacrifice formulates the desire of this transfiguration. Perhaps it is also what Lacan meant by saying (a propos of the camps) that "sacrifice signifies that, in the object of our desires, we try to discover evidence of the presence of the desire of that Other whom I will here call "the obscure God."'21 Let another's desire, obscure, consecrate as his my own desire, and I am constituted in absolute Self-possession, in unlimited self-presence. What is thus required is sacrifice, the production of the object as reject, even if this object were its own subject, which here, precisely, trans-appropriates itself. But if sovereignty is nothing, if the "obscure God" is only the obscurity of desire ecstatic in the face of itself, if existence arranges itself only towards its own finitude, then we must think apart from sacrifice. On the one hand, what is at stake since the beginning of the Western sublation of sacrifice should definitively be acknowledged: strictly speaking we know nothing decisive about the old sacrifice. We need to admit that what we consider as a mercenary exchange ("Here is the butter . . . ") sustained and gave meaning to billions of individual and collective existences, and we do not know how to think about what founds this gesture. (We can only guess, confusedly, that this barter in itself goes beyond barter.) On the contrary, we know that, for us, it is absolutely impossible to declare: "here are the lives, where are the others? " (all the others: our other lives, the life of a great Other, the other of life and the other life in general). Consequently, on the other hand, it should be definitively acknowledged that the Western economy of sacrifice has come to a close, and that it is closed by the decomposition of the sacrificial apparatus itself, that bloody transgression by which the "moment of the finite" would be transcended and appropriated infinitely. But finitude is not a "moment" in a process or an economy. A finite existence does not have to let its meaning spring forth through a destructive explosion of its finitude. Not only does it not have to do so; in a sense it cannot even do so: thought rigorously, thought according to its Ereignis, "finitude" signifies that existence cannot be sacrificed. It cannot be sacrificed because, in itself, it is already, not sacrificed, but offered to the world. There is a resemblance, and the two can be mistaken for one another; and yet, there is nothing more dissimilar. One could say: existence is in essence sacrificed. To say this would be to reproduce, in one of its forms, the fundamental utterance of Western sacrifice. And we would have to add this major form, which necessarily follows: that existence is, in its essence, sacrifice. To say that existence is offered is no doubt to use a word from the sacrificial vocabulary (and if we were in the German language, it would be the same word: Opfer, Aufopferung). But it is an attempt to mark that, if we have to say that existence is sacrificed, it is not in any case sacrificed by anyone, nor is it sacrificed to anything. "Existence is offered" means the finitude of existence. Finitude is not negativity cut out of being and granting access, through this cutting, to the restored integrity of being or to sovereignty. Finitude utters what Bataille utters in saying that sovereignty is nothing. Finitude simply corresponds to the generative formula of the thought of existence, which is the thought of the finitude of being, or the thought of the meaning of being as the finitude of meaning. This formula states: "the "essence" of Dasein lies in its existence.22 If its essence (in quotation marks) is in its existence, it is that the existent has no essence. It cannot be returned to the trans-appropriation of an essence. But it is offered, that is to say, it is presented to the existence that it is. The existence exposes being in its essence disappropriated of all essence, and thus of all "being: " the being that is not. Such negativity, however, does not come dialectically to say that it shall be, that it shall finally be a trans- appropriated Self. On the contrary, this negation affirms the inappropriate as its most appropriate form of appropriation, and in truth as the unique mode of all appropriation. Also, the negative mode of this utterance: "being is not" does not imply a negation but an ontological affirmation. This is what is meant by Ereignis. The existent arrives, takes place, and this is nothing but a being-thrown into the world. In this being-thrown, it is offered. But it is offered by no one, to no one. Nor is it self-sacrificed, if nothing-no being, no subject-pre- cedes its being-thrown. In truth, it is not even offered or sacrificed to a Nothing, to a Nothingness or an Other in whose abyss it would come to enjoy its own impossibility of being impossibly. It is exactly at this point that both Bataille and Heidegger must be relentlessly corrected. Corrected, that is: withdrawn from the slightest tendency towards sacrifice. For this tendency towards sacrifice, or through sacrifice, is always linked to a fascination with an ecstasy turned towards an Other or towards an absolute Outside, into which the subject is diverted/spilled the better to be restored. Western sacrifice is haunted by an Outside of finitude, as obscure and bottomless as this "outside" may be. But there is no "outside." The event of existence, the "there is," means that there is nothing else. There is no "obscure God." There is no obscurity that would be God. In this sense, and since there is no longer any clear divine epiphany, I might say that what technique presents us with could simply be: clarity without God. The clarity, however, of an open space in which an open eye can no longer be fascinated. Fascination is already proof that something has been accorded to obscurity and its bloody heart. But there is nothing to accord, nothing but "nothing." "Nothing" is not an abyss open to the out- side. "Nothing" affirms finitude, and this "nothing" at once returns existence to itself and to nothing else. It de-subjectivizes it, removing all possibility of trans-appropriating itself through anything but its own event, advent. Existence, in this sense, its proper sense, is unsacrificeable.

#### Death is bad and outweighs.

Johnson 03 DAVID JOHNSON has a DPhil. in English and Related Literature (York University), an MA (Distinction) in Continental Philosophy (Warwick University) and a BA (Hons) in Literature and Philosophy (Middlesex Polytechnic). Time & Society copyright © 2003 available via SAGE database

Life is a serious business of highly charged temporal stakes, involving a being’s struggle to secure for itself the experience of pleasure time/free time rather than pain time/slave time. Since lived time is a living stake, death is not the profound phenomenon that Bataille thinks it is. For one who is racked by drawn-out pain, the pain of death situated at the end of time is an irrelevance. And for one who is caught up in the throes of extended pleasure, the dubious pleasure of death is likewise irrelevant. Death, far from being profound, may simply provide a pragmatic escape from a life of pain and toil, or a simple halt to a life of pleasure and freedom. We can see death as important to time in that it is the end of the great game of time, the great flow. But death is relative in importance to time for the same reason; it is simply the end of the great game of time, a game without which it would be pure abstraction. However, we are not suggesting that death has absolutely no importance for living beings. On the contrary. By countering Bataille’s view of death, which tries to domesticate death through attempting to engage it in ‘intimate’ dialogue, and which tries to make political gain out of death, we can see death as a real, non-negotiable phenomenon. Death can no longer be thought of as an ambiguous but essentially accessible deity, but must instead be seen as that which wipes out real substantial time with no hope of appeal. Death can now be viewed as a certain element in the game of time, as something to be dreaded or desired as the end of time, but which has no fixed moral or political meaning in itself. By affirming the reality of time we are in fact affirming the reality of death, and so we are proposing a more tragic philosophy than the one Bataille proposes – which is ironic, given that Bataille is considered by most postmodernist/ post-structuralist philosophers to be perhaps the cruellest thinker.

### 1NC -- Advantage

#### Productivity is fantastic: it’s key to happiness and autonomy. Institutions, if they enhance productivity or the ability of someone to be productive, are key to the improvement of life. Free market capitalism is key to individual autonomy.

Stolyarov 08, G. Stolyarov II, (“PRODUCTIVITY VERSUS COMPULSION: AYN RAND’S CASE FOR LAISSEZ-FAIRE CAPITALISM,” in *Capitalism and Morality,* August 31, 2008)//jh

\*we don’t endorse gendered language

If asked to spend but a few minutes identifying Ayn Rand’s views on capitalism, one will necessarily be able to relate only a small fraction of her thoughts on the subject. The important question – especially for those freshly introduced to Rand’s philosophy, Objectivism, is – what about Ayn Rand’s views is different from the views of other free-market thinkers? What useful, valuable insights can we gain from her justification of laissez-faire capitalism which are not found or at least not emphasized in the works of other advocates of systematic individual freedom? The beauty and power of Rand’s justification for capitalism stems from its ethical groundwork – especially insofar as she identifies the productivity of individual rational creators as the source of all human prosperity and shows why only a free-market system can enable this essential virtue to be unleashed and properly rewarded. Productiveness is one of the seven chief virtues in the Objectivist ethics. As Rand puts it, “Productive work is the central purpose of a rational man’s life, the central value that integrates and determines the hierarchy of all his other values. Reason is the source, the precondition of his productive work - pride is the result”1 . While most intellectuals and much of the public view productivity as amoral at best, Rand makes a case for why it is one of the foremost virtues accessible a human being. Recognizing that the very existence of ethics and moral values is preconditioned on the life of the valuer, Rand believes that the foremost choice each individual must make is the choice to pursue or not to pursue his survival. But survival does not come gratuitously. In order to survive, man has to discover and produce everything he needs, which means that he has to alter his background and adapt it to his needs. Nature has not equipped him for adapting himself to his background in the manner of animals. From the most primitive cultures to the most advanced civilizations, man has had to manufacture things; his well-being depends on his success at production.2 For Rand, then, productivity is a matter of life or death – quite literally – and so institutional arrangements – insofar as they encourage or restrict productivity – are encouraging life and human flourishing in the former case and death and suffering in the latter. This not a just a practical alternative; it is also a moral alternative – and indeed, Rand sees no distinction between the truly practical and the truly moral. From this ethical groundwork, Rand delves into politics, the fourth branch of philosophy – after metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics. In Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, she addresses the question: **What conditions are required in order for individuals to produce and flourish?** Her answer is – most eloquently and decisively – **freedom from compulsion**. She notes that “… intelligence does not work under coercion… man’s mind will not function at the point of a gun.” (Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, p. 141). A system based on command and control might amass a measure of brute force to tackle issues of survival and production – but it can never harness the ultimate source of all wealth – the individual rational creative mind. Why does coercion fail to utilize the resources of individual rational creators? to paraphrase Rand, when one uses compulsion, one locks a man in a deadly double bind. He has the choice of obeying authority and defying the conclusions of his reason (linked to the external reality) and facing the punishment of reality, or of obeying his own mind, and facing the punishment of authority. Man cannot exercise self-direction at the point of a gun. “A free mind and a free market are corollaries.” (Atlas Shrugged)3 But it bears emphasizing that Rand critiques central planning on an ethical basis that is inextricably tied to the results produced in such a system. Because central planning fails to enable the minds of individuals to work productively, it is an evil and immoral approach – in the most fundamental way. According to Rand, “Whoever, to whatever purpose or extent, initiates the use of force, is a killer acting on the premise of death in a manner wider than murder: the premise of destroying man’s capacity to live…Force and mind are opposites.”4 While productivity – that cardinal moral virtue – fails to be actualized in a command-and-control economy, it is unleashed to the fullest possible extent in a purely free market. A system of natural rights guarantees that individuals remain protected from the initiation of force by others. Rand believes that “rights are conditions of existence required by man’s nature for his proper survival. If man is to live on earth, it is right for him to use his mind, it is right to act on his own free judgment, it is right to work for his values and to keep the product of his work”5 . Ayn Rand identifies free-market capitalism as “a social system based on the recognition of individual rights, including property rights, in which all property is privately owned.”6 This recognition of rights is the only possible explicit protection of the virtue of productivity. Under laissez-faire capitalism, “No one has the power to decide for others or to substitute his judgment for theirs; no one has the power to appoint himself ‘the voice of the public’ and to leave the public voiceless and disenfranchised.”7 Every man in a free market speaks for himself, thinks for himself, and works for himself. When he cooperates with others, he does so to mutual benefit, not to oppress another or to be enslaved to another’s wants without regard for his own. It is because of this state of affairs primarily – and because of its beneficent byproducts only secondarily – that Rand justifies the free-market system. Only in a free market can every individual’s self-sovereignty as a rational, productive agent be respected consistently and unfailingly.

#### Productivity drives agricultural production

**Brandt ’61 -- German agricultural economist who had fled to the United states in 1933 (**“Agricultural Productivity, Economic Growth and the Farm Policy Motivation of Urban Electorates”, http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/136595/2/fris-1961-02-02-437.pdf//JC)

Whatever the stage of their economic development, all nations continue to have, as always, a vital concern in agriculture and food. In the last few decades farmers in some of the highly industrialized countries have succeeded in utilizing the results of scientiffic research, innovation, and mechanical engineering on such scale that productivity has increased more than in the nonagricultural parts of the economy. The problem in leading agricultural exporting countries, including the United States, Canada, Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, Burma, and Thailand, is a continual aggregate excess capacity of food and fiber production, while in enormous areas of the world with an overwhelming majority of the world's population, agriculture is struggling hard to produce at least a minimum supply, for the direst needs, of food, feed, and fibers. It may seem paradoxical that in the industrially advanced countries with excess agricultural capacity, either in the aggregate or for certain major commodities, the farm policy typically involves heavy subsidization of farm income and farm exports, while in the forcefully and coercively industrializing countries with their notorious shortage of farm products the opposite is true; namely, the state subsidizes industries at the expense of the farmers by a variety of measures which squeeze capital out of agriculture. However, in reality, state intervention in the form of income support as well as the "squeeze" is to a considerable degree responsible for excessive or insufficient output by overaccelerating or by retarding growth of capacity. In the United States as well as many Western European countries there has evolved through many years a political and legislative deadlock in the treatment of their peculiar type of "farm problem." It seems essential for all countries with representative government that their electorate, legislators, and administrators understand fully the nature of the impact of technological change and the powerful dynamic shifts and changes in the structure and performance of agriculture within a private enterprise and market economy. This is particularly necessary because in all these countries the farmers, like industrial groups and a part of labor, for at least two generations have been politically well organized and very effectively represented, something that does not hold for the consumers. More. over, the actual situation in agriculture in industrially advanced countries is substantially different from what the public thinks it is and what certain farm pressure groups claim it to be. Only when it is clearly seen what specifically has caused the continual rise in productivity of agriculture will it be possible to break the deadlock of farm policy without impeding the forces that give agriculture in the noncoercive society its momentum in the creation of wealth while protecting an abundant, reasonably priced supply of what remains every industrial nation's foremost raw material-food. In all countries, the hard core of the over-all farm problem is not cyclical or temporary, but almost eternal in nature and therefore not amenable to a real remedy or cure. It is part of the epic of man's struggle for survival in, and gradual conquest and partial control of, a hostile, reluctantly and scantily yielding nature. The core of the farm problem is an integral element in the eternal process of economic development and growth. What has happened in agriculture's history and what continues to go on differs considerably from what is popularly assumed in many countries, including the United States, to be a temporary disturbance in a more or less static situation in man's adaptation to geography and nature.

#### Disruption of food security causes nuclear war

**Cribb 10** (Julian, the principal of Julian Cribb & Associates, specialists in science communication, 1996-2002 he was Director, National Awareness, for Australia’s national science agency, CSIRO, has received 32 awards for journalism including the Order of Australia Association Media Prize, fellow of the Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and Engineering, The Coming Famine: The Global Food Crisis and what we can do to avoid it, University of California Press, 2010, p. 20-26)

Most of the "new" conflicts are to be found in Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia-the result of a cycle of constant famine, depri- vation, and periodic violence, leading in inevitable sequence to worse hunger, greater deprivation, and more vicious fighting. Food and economic insecurity and natural resource scarcities . . .can be major sources of conflict. When politically dominant groups seize land and food resources, deny access to other culturally or economically marginalized groups, and cause hunger and scarcities, violence often arises. In Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Sudan, food crises resulting from drought and mismanagement of agriculture and relief and development aid led to rebellion and government collapse, followed by even greater food shortfalls in ensuing years of conflict. Denial of the right to food has been linked to uprisings and civil war in Central America and Mexico. Food insecurity is also integral to civil conflicts in Asia. Competition for resources has generated cycles of hunger and hopelessness that have bred violence in Sri Lanka as well as Rwanda." These afflicted regions are generally places disconnected from the global economic mainstream, where strong-man governments arise and just as quickly crumble, having only political quicksand on which to build a foundation for stability and progress. This is vital to an understanding of what is going wrong with global food production: in nearly all these countries, food is of the first importance, and only after you have enough food can you form a government stable enough to deliver water, health care, education, opportunity for women, justice, and economic development. By neglecting or reducing support for basic food production- as many have during the past twenty-five years-in order to spread aid across these equally deserving causes, the world's aid donors may unintentionally have laid the foundation for future government failure and conflict. "The absolute number of countries with food crises caused by war and conflicts has increased since the 1985 as has the relative share of food crises caused by socio-economic factors from about 2 percent to 2.7 percent by 2.007," the UN's Food and Agriculture Organization in- formed the Committee on World Food Security in 2008. "The recent sharp increase in the price of imported food commodities is an example of a socio-economic shock that can exacerbate or cause food crises in many countries."" In describing the triggers for today's conflicts, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency states in its online World Fact Book, "Territorial disputes may evolve from historical and/or cultural claims, or they may be brought on by resource competition. . . . [S]ources of contention include access to water and mineral (especially hydrocarbon) resources, fisheries, and arable land." It adds, "Armed conflict prevails not so much between the uniformed armed forces of independent states as between stateless armed entities that detract from the sustenance and welfare of local populations, leaving the community of nations to cope with re- sultant refugees, hunger, disease, impoverishment, and environmental degradation." '4 The CIA presumably has a good grasp of what makes people fight. In its quest to predict where the world's next trouble spots are likely to erupt, it clearly recognizes-on the public record-the power of disputes over food, land, and water to fire the tinder. A scan of the scores of cur- rent disputes it lists soon reveals the frequent appearance of these three casus belli and of the border confrontations triggered by them. The question is why many of the world's governments appear unresponsive to the need to deal with these triggers for war, if these are the warnings their intelligence services are providing. The threat of conflict over food, land, and water is not, however, confined to the marginal world. Increasingly it imperils the economic powerhouses of the global economy in the early twenty-first century. In 2001 the Australian strategic analyst Alan Dupont predicted, “Food is destined to have greater strategic weight and import in an era of environmental scarcity. While optimists maintain that the world is perfectly capable of meeting the anticipated increases in demand for essential foodstuffs, there are enough imponderables to suggest that prudent governments would not want to rely on such a felicitous outcome." Anticipating the food crisis of 2007-8 by several years, he presciently added, "East Asia's rising demand for food and diminishing capacity to feed itself adds an unpredictable new element to the global food equation for several reasons. The gap between production and consumption of key foodstuffs globally is narrowing dangerously and needs to be reversed." Bearing out his words, Singapore president Lee Hsieng Loong told a 2008 international defense conference, "In the longer term, the trends towards tighter supplies and higher prices will likely reassert themselves. This has serious security implications. The impact of a chronic food shortage will be felt especially by the poor countries. The stresses from hunger and famine can easily result in social upheaval and civil strife, exacerbating conditions that lead to failed states. Between countries, competition for food supplies and displacement of people across borders could deepen tensions and provoke conflict and wars."15 Indeed, the U.S. academics Ellen Messer and Marc Cohen argue that most modern conflicts ought to be viewed as "food wars," that is, "the practice of warring parties fighting for control of food supplies to re- ward their supporters and punish their enemies." In 2003 they estimated that there were fifty-six million people living in twenty-seven countries where food wars were taking place." Aid agencies understood this better than anyone else. When the 2007-8 food price crisis struck, the International Red Cross (IRC) immediately warned of the risk of a surge in violence. Jakob Kellenberger, the president of the IRC's International Committee, told media that "there is also the potential of food-related violence." Price hikes for staple foods had sparked riots in places such as Haiti, Egypt, and Somalia, and Kellenberger predicted that the neutral Red Cross would be facing even greater responsibility "when that violence reaches the level of an armed conflict. . . . You can imagine when you have countries where you have already an armed conflict, where you have already a high level of violence and you have at the same time a lot of poor and extremely vulnerable people," he said. "The price level for them is not only a question of higher prices. It becomes a question of survival, of just having access to food."'7 Despite all the views quoted here, the majority of the world's policy analysts, defense experts, and governments persist in viewing famine as a consequence of war-not war as a consequence of famine. This monocular perspective creates dangerous international blind spots both for peace and for hunger. WATER WARS In 2007, the Egyptian-born World Bank vice president for the environment lsmail Serageldin warned, "Many of the wars of the 20th century were about oil, but wars of the 21st century will be over water." Former UN secretary general Boutros Boutros-Ghali warned bluntly that the next Middle East war might well be over water. A decade later his successor, Ban Ki-moon, was pressing home the same message at the World Economic Forum with an even greater sense of urgency: "Our experiences tell us that environmental stress, due to lack of water, may lead to conflict, and would be greater in poor nations. Ten years ago, even five years ago, few people paid much attention to the arid regions of western Sudan. Not many noticed when fighting broke out between farmers and herders, after the rains failed and water became scarce. Today, everyone knows Darfur. More than 200,000 people have died. Several million have fled their homes," he said." That disputes over water can lead to war should hardly be news. The former Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon once told interviewers that water was one of the drivers of the 1967 Six-Day War. Attempts by each side to lay claim to water that the other regarded as theirs triggered armed border clashes feeding directly into events that led to the war." Studies by water policy analysts at the Pacific Institute indicate that the regions of the world most affected by conflict over water in recent years were the Middle East, Africa, and Central Asia. However, Latin America, China, India, and many other Asian countries have also experienced outbursts of violence over water supplies. Many countries have seen disputes, sometimes violent, between farmers and industry or urban water users. More nations affected by water disputes are now nuclear-armed: India and Pakistan face one another across the contentious waters and food bowl of the Indus. And cyber-terrorists seem to have developed a predilection for computer attacks on water agencies." In East Asia, Alan Dupont thinks that as economic and political in- terdependence grows between states, the water problems of one will spill over to become the problems of the others-and foresees intensifying disputes over common resources such as the Mekong River or simply over access to freshwater for the rcgion's swelling megacities." The number of actual wars for which water was a key precipitating factor is hazy. A study by a graduate student at Oregon State University concludes that of 1,831 water-related "events" involving 124 countries, almost one-third, 507, were "conflicts"-ranging on a scale from harsh words to flying bullets-and the other two-thirds revealed a gratifying degree of cooperation in solving the problem. Although recently no war has been fought for water alone, the thirty-seven worst fights involving water tended to be sparked either by an acute regional shortage or by someone building a very large dam without seeking the downstream neighbors' approval. On the whole, the study suggests, countries still pre- fer to negotiate and collaborate rather than fight over water, and this fact deserves wider recognition. As global water scarcity increases and the cli- mate becomes more unpredictable, however, so too does the scope for trouble." A long-running study compiled by Peter Gleick at the Pacific Institute lists thirty-five significant conflicts over water, mostly involving violence or terrorism, in the 19905 and forty-nine incidents in the period 2000-2007, which suggests a ratcheting-up in global water tensions." Fish wars Alan Dupont also highlights a category of international conflict that is taking place constantly under our noses and mostly beneath the radar of the global media: gunboat battles over ocean resources involving the navies of nations Theoretically at peace with one another. These are minor flare-ups usually involving firing of live ammunition, boats being boarded and confiscated, and occasional bloodshed. Most go unremarked. "Fish is the main source of protein for an estimated 1billion Asians, and fishing supports more people in East Asia than in any other region of the world. Over half the world's fish catch is taken in Asian waters," he explains. "Unfortunately, the Pacific is showing signs of environmental degradation from coastal pollution, overfishing and unsustainable exploitation of other forms of living marine resources. Asia has already lost half its fish stocks. , , , [A]s traditional fishing grounds are exhausted, competition for remaining stocks has intensified.'1 Fish wars, in other words, are an emerging form of eco-war. Dupont notes growing friction, from the 19805 on, among the fishermen of various Asian countries, many of whom were arming themselves with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades as a way of discussing their differences. By the late 1990s the death toll resulting from clashes between fishermen from one nation and navy patrol vessels from another nation was significant. He studied fourteen clashes—firefights and vessel seizures involving the navies of Thailand, Burma, Vietnam, Malaysia, China, Indonesia, the Philippines, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, and Japan—over marine resources, both fish and oil. ''Interstate confrontation over fish and other marine living resources is emerging as a significant long-term security issue for East Asia," Dupont concludes. "The declining availability of fish is a global problem but East Asia's dependence on the oceans for food suggests that disputes over fish may trigger wider conflicts between regional states."25 His Food Security Program at Sydney University is accumulating fresh evidence of a continuing buildup in these unseen maritime confrontations, "Conflicts over the right to fish and to the fisheries resource are endemic in fishing industries all over the world, with some of these conflicts developing into open wars," warn Meryl Williams, a former director general of the scientific agency WorldFish, and her coauthor Choo Poh Sze.2' Ethnic and national differences, the global rise of "pirate" fishing, and dwindling fish stocks at a time of soaring demand are all factors in disputes that sometimes involve even developed nations such as Britain and Iceland, or France and Spain. Dupont considers major wars over fish to be unlikely, but he believes that as world fish catches dwindle due to overfishing, many states may come to regard them in the same light as oil and gas—resources worth contesting and defending by military force. Insignificant in themselves, these tiny sparks flicker at the edges of the tinder of larger regional food shortages that will emerge as a consequence of the coming famine. Far from comedic episodes, fish wars are a foretaste of what is to come as resources run low. Refugee Tsunamis "Internal wars lead to the displacement of enormous numbers of non-combatants, whose only option is to escape the violence and find refuge," the Peace Research Institute of Oslo pointed out in its seminal study on food and war. "People flee across immediate borders, some- times destabilizing entire regions, leading to more conflict and more refugees."37 After a lull in the early years of the twenty-first century, the world refugee population began to climb again, reaching 42 million in both 2007 and 2008, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). Of these refugees, the UNI--ICR found, 26 million were fleeing armed conflict. More graphically perhaps, the number of refugees roaming the Earth in search of peace, security, and sustenance represents a nation of the dispossessed as large as Spain-yet a nation with a difference: four-fifths of its citizens are women and children. The term refugee has a rather specific meaning in international law and bureaucracy. It means a person who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, member- ship of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of their nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail him/herself of the protection of that country."3" The definition was later expanded to include people fleeing war, violence, and natural disasters, but the term still is not commonly applied to people fleeing hunger. The modern approach to refugees was originally adopted to cope with the 1.5 million who fled from Russia during the 1918-26 revolution and civil war, themselves events ignited and propelled by famine. War caused by famine no longer features in the common definition, however, and this has possibly muted awareness of the impact of hunger on global refugee movements and their wider consequences. Most of today's refugees emanate from the strife-torn regions of Africa, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia, and the vast majority of them tend simply to flee to neighboring countries or other provinces of their own. Contrary to media depictions of an "invasion" of the wealthy countries, four out of five refugees remain within their own region although very often this throws an intolerable burden on neighboring countries that have few resources of their own to look after them. Indeed, in many cases, it can lead to low-level conflict and even war between the incoming people and local residents, chiefly over access to land and water. For example, low-level conflict raged for many years between contending groups in the Indian states of Assam and Tripura following the arrival of more than ten million Bangladeshi refugees flee- ing hunger in the 19705 and 19805. NATO's involvement in the 1993 war in the Balkans was motivated in part by a desire to prevent the conflict from widening and precipitating a refugee flood into the rest of Europe. Three elements have changed in recent times, however. First, a good half of all refugees, even if they originate in rural areas, now head for cities as their haven-which in turn puts great indirect pressure on the land and water resources that support the city and hence on the local farmers who feed it. Second, the number of emigrants from the mon- eyed and educated classes of countries facing scarcity of food, land, and water and potential instability has risen sharply since the start of the twenty-first century. Canada has regularly accepted close to a quarter million migrants each year since 2000 and the United States around a million."' About 200 million people around the world each year foresee trouble brewing in their homelands-including conflicts over food, land, and water-and are moving with their families to avoid it. The refugee wave, in other words, is often preceded by a far more orderly tide of far- sighted emigrants. The third thing that has changed is the media. When the great famines struck Russia and China during the middle of the twentieth cen- tury, there were not only armed guards between the refugees and escape but also, thanks to censorship, a generally low awareness of the prosper- ity and personal opportunities afforded by the outside world. Many people died where they lived rather than risking the unknown. This no longer holds true: today television, magazines, and the Internet are bursting with the charms of affluence, the prodigal lives of celebrities, and the houses, luxury cars, consumer goods, and sumptuous meals that one-third of humanity enjoys; these media are ubiquitous and have pen- etrated to even the remotest corners of the world. Potential refugees now know, at some level, that there is a far better life to be had elsewhere if they have the strength, courage, and means to reach for it. Abetted by modern transportation and people smugglers, they now flee farther and more swiftly than ever to obtain it. In 1845-51 lreland's staple potato crop was blighted, casting the country into starvation and misery. The nation was critically dependent on the potato because in Ireland a farmer could grow three times as much food from potatoes as from grain, from the same area of land. When the ensuing famine ended after ten years, 750,000 Irish had died and two million had emigrated to the United States, Canada, and Great Britain." The Great Irish Famine may belong to the nineteenth century, but it carries undeniable messages for the twenty-first. It reveals the effect of overreliance on a major food source, and even though few countries to- day are as dependent on a single crop, many crops around the world are vulnerable to the loss of critical inputs such as water, fuel, or fertilizer, to disease, or to weather disaster. Any of these can unleash a local or re- gional famine-and the famine, in turn, will release an outpouring of refugees. In a world as heavily populated as ours, it is not hard to imag- ine how refugee tsunamis could result from a general food failure in the Indian subcontinent, Central Asia, China, sub-Saharan or North Africa, or Southeast or East Asia. Events of this scale are beyond all previous human experience for the simple reason that the world has never been so populous or its resources so fragile. The possibility of regional crises involving twenty, fifty, even as many as two hundred or three hundred million refugees must now be seriously contemplated. Such floods are unlikely to be stemmed by mili- tary force. They will alter the politics, demography, and culture of entire regions. They will change history. This is the most likely means by which the coming famine will affect all citizens of Earth, both through the direct consequences of refugee floods for receiving countries and through the effect on global food prices and the cost to public revenues of redressing the problem. Coupled with this is the risk of wars breaking out over local disputes about food, land, and water and the dangers that the major military powers may be sucked into these vortices, that smaller nations newly nuclear-armed may become embroiled, and that shock waves propagated by these conflicts will jar the global economy and disrupt trade, sending food prices into a fresh spiral. Indeed, an increasingly credible scenario for World War III is not so much a confrontation of superpowers and their allies as a festering, self- perpetuating chain of resource conflicts driven by the widening gap between food and energy supplies and peoples' need to secure them.

#### Excess theory is wrong – the market needs scarcity in order to survive

Abott, 2014 (Andrew, Gustavus F. and Ann M. Swift Distinguished Service Professor in the Sociology Department at the University of Chicago, B.A. from Harvard University, M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of Chicago, “The Problem Of Excess,” Sociological Theory, Vol. 32, No. 1, 2014)

We see then that while the modern economists knew well about the empirical facts of excess, they developed a strong preference for theories attending to scarcity. The other major traditions of social thinking have more often been concerned with excess as a theoretical question, but they have mainly seen it as dangerous to individual character or morality. Their positions have rested less on a specific argument about how excess presents a challenge to moral activity itself than on a (moral) disapproval of a certain kind of character - one that lacks moral controls. In sum, the social science tradition has seldom tried to theorize society from the point of view of excess. It has rarely begun from the premise that the general This content downloaded from 141.211.4.224 on Sun, 16 Jul 2017 20:57:06 UTC All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms Abbott 1 problem of social life - whether of knowing or feeling or acting - is having too much rather than too little. Suppose then that we try to formalize that approach. Suppose we insist on thinking about society principally in terms of problematic excess, as is suggested occasionally in the line of socialist and progressive economics and by many of the practical problems we face today. This would mean a thoroughgoing reconstruction of longstanding habits of thought that we have inherited from the past. For example, we would need to see poverty as a case of too much of something rather than too little, and conversely to start seeing privilege as a case of being able to minimize some problematic form of excess rather than of being able to maxi- mize something else, whose excess is definitionally regarded as unproblematic.Outside the social sciences, there has occasionally been serious reflection about excess (in e.g., Nietzsche, Wagner, and Foucault). But most of these writers have been apostles rather than social analysts, morally committed to excess in the same way that the Federalists, Freud, and Durkheim were morally committed against excess. Perhaps the only general theory of excess - itself not very well specified - has come from Georges Bataille (1989). too was ultimately an apostle rather than a theorist. But his argument is nonetheless Bataille was more concerned to reinterpret cases than to provide a rigorous theory and he interesting. Bataille begins from an almost cosmic assumption of excess: more solar energy comes into the world than is necessary simply to maintain life in that world. This leaves an inevi- table excess, which can be used only for growth. (Growth for Bataille includes extension, in the sense of extending life processes to new spaces or zones, as well as simple multiplication of current life forms in size or endurance.) If for some reason growth is impossible, then the excess of energy - and of the things produced with it - must simply be dissipated. Bataille's argument can be scaled down to the group or individual level, although it is originally framed quite generally. At these lower - and more real - social levels, dissipation of excess in effect means destruction and waste. The real aim of war is thus to waste excess resources. The real aim of love and sexual activity is to squander energy, resources, and time. Indeed, the real aim of all animal life - the eating of plants - is simply necessary waste and luxury: the world would otherwise be overfilled with decaying plants. Bataille's examples range from Aztec human sacrifice to Islamic expansion to the Marshall Plan, all of which he treats simply as variants of potlatch (which is also analyzed). It is no surprise that Mauss's famous essay on the gift was Bataille's starting point (Bataille 1989:193). Aspects of this argument are surprisingly compelling. Bataille's ^interpretations of famil- iar cases are always interesting, and he is right to recognize that the particularism inherent in marginalist economics led to assumptions about individuals that inevitably could not deal effectively with general, system-level constraints. But he does not address the question of precisely why waste is necessary, a question that might have been resolved by pursuing more closely his analogy with the laws of thermodynamics. More important, he doesn't realize that "growth" and "extension" can take forms that undercut the need for waste (e.g., the infinite extension of consumption needs and the fractal subdivision of the spaces of desire). Thus, in the end, Bataille's general theoretical argument leaves more questions than it answers, thereby directing us to theorize the precise means by which excess creates problems. But at least Bataille sets the example of taking excess seriously as a subject for social theory.

### 1NC -- Solvency

#### No mindset shift

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Political projects do not become hegemonic just because they embody good ideas. For a project to become hegemonic, (organic) intellectuals first need to develop the project and a constellation of social forces with sufficient power and resources to implement it then needs to find it appealing and struggle for it. In this context, it is worth noting that degrowth, as a social movement, has been gaining momentum for some time, not least in Southern Europe. Countless grassroots' initiatives (e.g., D'Alisa et al., 2013) are the most visible manifestations that degrowth is on the rise. Intellectuals – including founders of ecological economics such as Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen and Herman Daly, and more recently degrowth scholars such as Serge Latouche and Giorgos Kallis – have played a major role in developing and disseminating the ideas underpinning the project. A growing interest in degrowth in academia, as well as well-attended biennial international degrowth conferences, also indicate that an increasing number of people embrace such ideas. Still, the degrowth project is nowhere near enjoying the degree and type of support it needs if its policies are to be implemented through democratic processes. The number of political parties, labour unions, business associations and international organisations that have so far embraced degrowth is modest to say the least. Economic and political elites, including social democratic parties and most of the trade union movement, are united in the belief that economic growth is necessary and desirable. This consensus finds support in the prevailing type of economic theory and underpins the main contenders in the neoliberal project, such as centre-left and nationalist projects. In spite of the world's multidimensional crisis, a pro-growth discourse in other words continues to be hegemonic: it is widely considered a matter of common sense that continued economic growth is required. It is also noteworthy that economic and political elites, to a large extent, continue to support the neoliberal project, even in the face of its evident shortcomings. Indeed, the 2008 financial crisis did not result in the weakening of transnational financial capital that could have paved the way for a paradigm shift. Instead of coming to an end, neoliberal capitalism has arguably entered a more authoritarian phase (Bruff, 2014). The main reason the power of the pre-crisis coalition remains intact is that governments stepped in and saved the dominant fraction by means of massive bailouts. It is a foregone conclusion that this fraction and the wider coalition behind the neoliberal paradigm (transnational industrial capital, the middle classes and segments of organized labour) will consider the degrowth paradigm unattractive and that such social forces will vehemently oppose the implementation of degrowth policies (see also Rees, 2014: 97). While degrowth advocates envision a future in which market forces play a less prominent role than they do today, degrowth is not an anti-market project. As such, it can attract support from certain types of market actors. In particular, it is worth noting that social enterprises, such as cooperatives (Restakis, 2010), play a major role in the degrowth vision. Such enterprises are defined by being ‘organisations involved at least to some extent in the market, with a clear social, cultural and/or environmental purpose, rooted in and serving primarily the local community and ideally having a local and/or democratic ownership structure’ (Johanisova et al., 2013: 11). Social enterprises currently exist at the margins of a system, in which the dominant type of business entity is profit-oriented, shareholder-owned corporations. The further dissemination of social enterprises, which is crucial to the transitions to degrowth societies, is – in many cases – blocked or delayed as a result of the centrifugal forces of global competition (Wigger and Buch-Hansen, 2013). Overall, social enterprises thus (still) constitute a social force with modest power. Ougaard (2016: 467) notes that one of the major dividing lines in the contemporary transnational capitalist class is between capitalists who have a material interest in the carbon-based economy and capitalists who have a material interest in decarbonisation. The latter group, for instance, includes manufacturers of equipment for the production of renewable energy (ibid.: 467). As mentioned above, degrowth advocates have singled out renewable energy as one of the sectors that needs to grow in the future. As such, it seems likely that the owners of national and transnational companies operating in this sector would be more positively inclined towards the degrowth project than would capitalists with a stake in the carbon-based economy. Still, the prospect of the “green sector” emerging as a driving force behind degrowth currently appears meagre. Being under the control of transnational capital (Harris, 2010), such companies generally embrace the “green growth” discourse, which ‘is deeply embedded in neoliberal capitalism’ and indeed serves to adjust this form of capitalism ‘to crises arising from contradictions within itself’ (Wanner, 2015: 23). In addition to support from the social forces engendered by the production process, a political project ‘also needs the political ability to mobilize majorities in parliamentary democracies, and a sufficient measure of at least passive consent’ (van Apeldoorn and Overbeek, 2012: 5–6) if it is to become hegemonic. As mentioned, degrowth enjoys little support in parliaments, and certainly the pro-growth discourse is hegemonic among parties in government.5 With capital accumulation being the most important driving force in capitalist societies, political decision-makers are generally eager to create conditions conducive to production and the accumulation of capital (Lindblom, 1977: 172). Capitalist states and international organisations are thus “programmed” to facilitate capital accumulation, and do as such constitute a strategically selective terrain that works to the disadvantage of the degrowth project. The main advocates of the degrowth project are grassroots, small fractions of left-wing parties and labour unions as well as academics and other citizens who are concerned about social injustice and the environmentally unsustainable nature of societies in the rich parts of the world. The project is thus ideationally driven in the sense that support for it is not so much rooted in the material circumstances or short-term self-interests of specific groups or classes as it is rooted in the conviction that degrowth is necessary if current and future generations across the globe are to be able to lead a good life. While there is no shortage of enthusiasts and creative ideas in the degrowth movement, it has only modest resources compared to other political projects. To put it bluntly, the advocates of degrowth do not possess instruments that enable them to force political decision-makers to listen to – let alone comply with – their views. As such, they are in a weaker position than the labour union movement was in its heyday, and they are in a far weaker position than the owners and managers of large corporations are today (on the structural power of transnational corporations, see Gill and Law, 1989). 6. Consent It is also safe to say that degrowth enjoys no “passive consent” from the majority of the population. For the time being, degrowth remains unknown to most people. Yet, if it were to become generally known, most people would probably not find the vision of a smaller economic system appealing. This is not just a matter of degrowth being ‘a missile word that backfires’ because it triggers negative feelings in people when they first hear it (Drews and Antal, 2016). It is also a matter of the actual content of the degrowth project. Two issues in particular should be mentioned in this context. First, for many, the anti-capitalist sentiments embodied in the degrowth project will inevitably be a difficult pill to swallow. Today, the vast majority of people find it almost impossible to conceive of a world without capitalism. There is a ‘widespread sense that not only is capitalism the only viable political and economic system, but also that it is now impossible to even imagine a coherent alternative to it’ (Fisher, 2009: 2). As Jameson (2003) famously observed, it is, in a sense, easier to imagine the end of the world than it is to imagine the end of capitalism. However, not only is degrowth – like other anti-capitalist projects – up against the challenge that most people consider capitalism the only system that can function; it is also up against the additional challenge that it speaks against economic growth in a world where the desirability of growth is considered common sense. Second, degrowth is incompatible with the lifestyles to which many of us who live in rich countries have become accustomed. Economic growth in the Western world is, to no small extent, premised on the existence of consumer societies and an associated consumer culture most of us find it difficult to completely escape. In this culture, social status, happiness, well-being and identity are linked to consumption (Jackson, 2009). Indeed, it is widely considered a natural right to lead an environmentally unsustainable lifestyle – a lifestyle that includes car ownership, air travel, spacious accommodations, fashionable clothing, an omnivorous diet and all sorts of electronic gadgets. This Western norm of consumption has increasingly been exported to other parts of the world, the result being that never before have so many people taken part in consumption patterns that used to be reserved for elites (Koch, 2012). If degrowth were to be institutionalised, many citizens in the rich countries would have to adapt to a materially lower standard of living. That is, while the basic needs of the global population can be met in a non-growing economy, not all wants and preferences can be fulfilled (Koch et al., 2017). Undoubtedly, many people in the rich countries would experience various limitations on their consumption opportunities as a violent encroachment on their personal freedom. Indeed, whereas many recognize that contemporary consumer societies are environmentally unsustainable, fewer are prepared to actually change their own lifestyles to reverse/address this. At present, then, the degrowth project is in its “deconstructive phase”, i.e., the phase in which its advocates are able to present a powerful critique of the prevailing neoliberal project and point to alternative solutions to crisis. At this stage, not enough support has been mobilised behind the degrowth project for it to be elevated to the phases of “construction” and “consolidation”. It is conceivable that at some point, enough people will become sufficiently discontent with the existing economic system and push for something radically different. Reasons for doing so could be the failure of the system to satisfy human needs and/or its inability to resolve the multidimensional crisis confronting humanity. Yet, various material and ideational path-dependencies currently stand in the way of such a development, particularly in countries with large middle-classes. Even if it were to happen that the majority wanted a break with the current system, it is far from given that a system based on the ideas of degrowth is what they would demand.

#### Expenditure is not transgressive- limitless consumption is useless theory

Paul **Mann**, 19**99,** “The Exquisite Corpse of Georges Bataille” in Masocriticism, p. 67-9

I would like at one and the same time to affirm this model and to dismiss it as the most desperate alibi of all. For “sacrificial consumption” can never become an explicit critical motive.13 At the moment it presents itself as a proper element of some critical method, it degenerates into another useful trope, another bit of intellectual currency, another paper-thin abyss, another proxy transgression; and the force of transgression moves elsewhere, beneath a blinder spot in the critical eye.14 Questions of motive or understanding, the fact that one might be self-critical or at least aware of recuperation, are immaterial: what is at stake here is not self-consciousness but economics, material relations of appropriation and exclusion, assimilation and positive loss. Whatever transgression occurs in writing on Bataille does so only through the stupid recuperation and hence evacuation of the whole rhetoric and dream of transgression, only insofar as the false profundity of philosophy or theory evacuates the false profundities it apes. To justify this as the sublime loss of loss is merely to indulge a paradoxical figure. Excess is not a project but a by-product of any discourse; the interest of Bataillean discourse lies chiefly in the compulsive and symptomatic way it plays with its feces. The spectacle of critics making fools of themselves does not reveal the sovereign truth of death: it is only masocritical humiliation, a pathological attempt to disavow the specter of death. As for the present essay, it makes no claims to any redeeming sacrifice. Far from presenting you with a truer Bataille, far from speaking in his voice more clearly than his other readers, this essay pleads guilty to the indictment against every appropriation. Until philosophy and theory squeal like a pig before Bataille’s work, as he claims to have done before Dali’s canvases, there will be no knowledge of Bataille. In the end, one might have to take and even stricter view: there is no discourse of transgression, either on or by Bataille. None at all. It would be necessary to write a “Postscript to Transgression” were it not for the fact that Foucault already wrote it in his “Preface,” were it not for the fact that Bataille himself wrote it the moment before he first picked up his pen. It makes no difference whether one betrays Bataille, because one lip syncs Bataille’s rhetoric or drones on in the most tedious exposition. All of these satellite texts are not heliotropic in relation to the solar anus of Bataille’s writing, of the executioners he hoped (really?) would meet him in the Bois de Boulogne, or depensives in spite of themselves. It would be sentimental to assign them such privileges. They merely fail to fail. They are symptoms of a discourse in which everyone is happily transgressing everyone else and nothing ever happens, traces of a certain narcissistic pathos that never achieves the magnificent loss Bataille’s text conveniently claims to desire, and under whose cover it can continue to account for itself, hoarding its precious debits in a masocriticism that is anything but sovereign and gloriously indifferent. What is given to us, what is ruinously and profitably exchanged, is a lie. Heterology gives the lie to meaning and discourse gives the lie to transgression, in a potlatch that reveals both in their most essential and constitutive relation. Nothing is gained by this communication except profit-taking from lies. We must indict Bataille as the alibi that allows all of this writing to go on and on, pretending it is nothing it is not, and then turn away from Bataille as from a sun long since gone nova, in order to witness the slow freezing to death of every satellite text. The sacrificial consumption of Bataille has played itself out; the rotten carcass has been consumed: no more alibis. What is at stake is no longer ecstatic sexuality or violent upheavals or bloody sacrifices under the unblinking eye of the sun; nor was it ever, from the very beginning of Bataille’s career. These are merely figures in the melodramatic theater of what is after all a “soft expenditure” (Hollier 1989, xv), a much more modest death, a death much closer to home. It has never been more than a question of the death of the theory and of theory itself as death. Of theory-death. A double fatality.

#### Fascism DA – Bataille’s alt justifies atrocities and death.

Boldt-Irons 2K(Leslie Anne, Associate Professor of French at Brock University, “Military discipline and revolutionary exaltation: the dismantling of “l’illusion lyrique” in Malraux’s L’Espoir and Bataille’s Le Bleu du Ciel,” Romantic Review, vol. 91 issue 4, p. 481)

In 1933, Bataille contributed a review of André Malraux’s novel La Condition humaine to the ultra left-wing journal La Critique sociale.1 In this article, Bataille questions the place that revolution occupies in the larger and more general context of “human agitation.” He asks, for example, whether the convulsive movements of revolt, social upheaval, and revolution should be situated outside of, or above, what is normally experienced as life in its quotidian expressions of tenderness, enthusiasm or even hate. In the name of what authority, for example, might one be justified in placing the fascination with pleasure, torture and possible death outside the limits of acceptable social practice – extreme states often linked to revolutionary upheaval outside the limits of acceptable social practice? Another way of situating the convulsion of revolutionary movements – an approach clearly endorsed by Bataille – is to place it squarely within the framework of *any* activity marked by agitation. From this perspective, the acts of torture and murder would arise from an excitability or arousal similar in nature to that intensifying the fury of the revolutionary impulse. This impulse, writes Bataille, is a means by which the proletariat – who had for a long time been deprived of the possibility of attributing any value to suffering and to life – is able to gain access to *value* itself, a value linked to states of excitation unsubordinated to any simple political means or end. This value, and the state of agitation to which it is linked, gives the proletariat both life and hope, for which even death in all its atrocity might be the payment required.