# 1NC vs WestWood PM HWL R6

### 1NC -- Theory

#### The affirmative may not specify a country unless they have a solvency advocate that explicitly advocates for the plan.

#### Violation: They specify India and their solvency advocate is about all States changing their space policy, not just India, and the only times it does mention India are in reference to safety standards, not Article II commitments.

#### Vote neg on functional limits: otherwise, they could pick literally any country that could go into space either now or in the future and claim offense predicated off of their presence in space, destroying engagement -- DA’s like PTX, competition, and different national and regional scenarios change on an AFF by AFF basis so exploding functional limits means we cannot engage at all.

#### PICs is not offense -- A] If you have a solvency advocate for it, spec is OK under our interp, so the AFF is still able to have reciprocal access to spec, B] Theory checks PICs -- debaters will set norms if they proliferate.

#### CI bc reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention

#### DTD to set a norm and deter future abuse

#### No RVIs 1] Logic, you shouldn’t win for being topical, that’s a basic aff burden, 2] baiting, it lets good theory debaters read an abusive advocacy to bait out T then dump on it for 4 minutes, 3] substance will be crowded out bc we’d be forced to go for T.

### 1NC -- CP

#### The Republic of India should:

#### ---cease all military and economic cooperation with the United States and acede to a regional partnership with the People’s Republic of China.

#### ---sign, ratify and enact into all relevant domestic legislation the Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects.

#### Solvency advocate for Plank 1 is their scenario about Indo-US antagonism of China, it solves bc it has India completely draw back from the US which their internal link.

#### Plank 2 solves all of Advantage 2.

Jaramillo 09 [Cesar, In 2013 he earned a B.A. in Catholic Studies from Seton Hall University. Father Jaramillo earned the S.T.B. (Theology) and the J.C.L. (Canon Law) degrees from the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome in 2016 and 2019 respectively. He also earned a Diploma in Administrative Canonical Praxis from the Vatican’s Congregation for the Clergy in 2018. Fr. Jaramillo is a member of the Canon Law Society of America. The Ploughshares Monitor Winter 2009 Volume 30 Issue 4, “In Defence of the PPWT Treaty: Toward a Space Weapons Ban” <https://ploughshares.ca/pl_publications/in-defence-of-the-ppwt-treaty-toward-a-space-weapons-ban/>] brett

The existing legal regime that tackles the potential weaponization of outer space is outdated, inadequate, and insufficient. Moreover, the rapidity with which space-related technologies are being developed seems to be widening the gap between military applications that may affect space assets and the precarious normative architecture that should regulate them. The fact that space will inevitably become more complex and congested each year underscores the need for a comprehensive space security treaty that builds on what little international law exists in this realm and not only reflects current threats to space security, but also tackles the emerging legal questions that inevitably arise as space becomes a more convoluted domain.

The PPWT—while not perfect and subject to revisions—represents what is undoubtedly the most substantive effort thus far to embed the oft-expressed desire to maintain a weapons-free outer space in international treaty law. It is true that the 1967 Outer Space Treaty specifically bans signatory states from placing nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in orbit and calls for the peaceful exploration of outer space. However, it does not explicitly refer to the placement or use of other types of weapons in outer space or the use of earth-based weapons against space targets—activities which clearly need regulation, if not outright prohibition.

It is often said that the perils inherent to the indiscriminate weaponization of space are perhaps only comparable to those posed by nuclear weapons, although much of this assessment rests on speculation, since outer space has not yet seen a scenario of direct military confrontation. Indeed, it is assumed that there have been no weapons placed in space to date as there have been neither claims nor denunciations of such behaviour by any state, and considerable efforts are being made in diverse governmental and nongovernmental circles to ensure that this delicate threshold is preserved. To be sure, a distinction must be made between militarization and weaponization: while the former has arguably already happened, given the widespread use of satellites for military applications such as reconnaissance and intelligence, it is the latter that is the primary focus of proponents of a space security treaty.

Not surprisingly, a resolution on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) has been introduced at both the CD and the First Committee of the UN General Assembly and has garnered near-unanimous support year after year—with the notable exception of the United States and Israel.1 In this context, the PPWT draft treaty introduced at the CD in February 2008 has been touted as a practical way to “nip the problem of PAROS in the bud” (UNIDIR 2008, p. 147). If there is a ban on space weapons, the rationale goes, there will be no arms race to prevent.

The PPWT draft treaty

What, then, makes the PPWT proposal worthy of serious consideration by the international community? In other words, why is it an appealing alternative to the status quo? The PPWT is the first draft treaty on outer space ever presented at the UN Conference on Disarmament, which is the quintessential international forum for addressing multilateral disarmament agreements. In fact, the PPWT builds upon elements contained in a 2002 Working Paper presented at the CD by a group of countries that also included Russia and China. Technically speaking, though, the PPWT Treaty focuses not on disarmament but prevention, as outer space is currently considered to be weapons-free and, thus, there is nothing to disarm. Still, the CD seems to be the obvious repository for such a proposal and most member states have welcomed its introduction.

Specifically, as implied in the name of the treaty, the PPWT seeks to ban two different yet interrelated conducts:

the placement of weapons in outer space and

the threat or use of force against outer space objects.

The first initiative sensibly eliminates the fundamental prerequisite for the actual utilization of space weapons: their placement in space. The PPWT treaty defines weapon in outer space in a thorough and comprehensive manner as:

Any device placed in outer space, based on any physical principle, which has been specially produced or converted to destroy, damage, or disrupt the normal functioning of objects in outer space, on the Earth or in the Earth’s atmosphere, or to eliminate a population or components of the biosphere which are important to human existence or to inflict damage on them. (Article 1C)

Clearly, if the Treaty enters into force, such a broad definition would contribute decisively to the goals of PAROS and preventing space from becoming an arena of military confrontation. Notably, it encompasses weapons placed in space that can be used not only against other space objects, but also against Earth-based objects. Thus, it seems apparent that the framers of the PPWT strove to minimize the room for ambiguity and interpretation with regard to the conditions under which a device in space can be considered a weapon. Again, a weapon in space need not be used against an adversary for there to be a violation of the treaty, as its mere placement in space would be considered a breach of the treaty.

Similarly, the second focal point of this treaty, against the threat or use of force against outer space objects, provides a comprehensive ban on any aggressive action against objects in space, defined as:

Any hostile actions against outer space objects including, inter alia, actions aimed at destroying them, damaging them, temporarily or permanently disrupting their normal functioning or deliberately changing their orbit parameters or the threat of such actions. (Article 1E)

### 1NC -- DA

**India is going to set up commercial space mining now.**

**1AC Nanda 21** (Prakash Nanda has been commenting on politics, foreign policy on strategic affairs for nearly three decades. A former National Fellow of the Indian Council for Historical Research and recipient of the Seoul Peace Prize Scholarship, he is also a Distinguished Fellow at the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. October 13, 2021, As India Opens Up Space, How ISRO Could Help Indian Air Force Become An Aerospace Superpower, Eurasian Times, Prime Minister Narendra Modi on October 11 launched the Indian Space Association (ISpA) – the premier industry association of space and satellite companies. <https://eurasiantimes.com/as-india-opens-up-space-how-isro-could-help-indian-air-force-become-an-aerospace-superpower/)//ww> pbj

He said: “Today is the day the Indian space sector receives new wings. For 75 years since independence, Indian space has been dominated by a single umbrella of Indian government and government institutions. Scientists of India have made huge achievements in these decades, but the need of the hour is that there should be no restrictions on Indian talent, whether it is in the public sector or in the private sector. “In a way, the country has given a new gift to the talent of India’s entrepreneurs by opening up India’s space sector in its 75th year of independence. Let this collective power of India’s population take the space sector forward in an organized manner. The Indian Space Association (ISpA) will play a huge role in this.” ISpA aims at contributing to the government’s vision of making India “Atmanirbhar” (self-reliant) and a global leader in the space arena, which is fast emerging as the next growth frontier for mankind. The association is supposed to engage with stakeholders across the ecosystem for the formulation of an enabling policy framework that will also work towards building global linkages for the Indian space industry to bring in critical technology and investments. Its founding members include Bharti Airtel, Larson & Toubro, Nelco (Tata Group), OneWeb, Mapmyindia, Walchandnagar Industries, and Alpha Design Technologies. Other core members include Godrej, Hughes India, Ananth Technology Limited, Azista-BST Aerospace Private Limited, BEL, Centum Electronics, and Maxar India. India Lagging Behind According to ISRO, the current size of the global space economy stands at about $360 billion. **However, India accounts for only about 2% of the space economy with a potential to capture 9% of the global market share by 2030.** This needs to change. Despite Rafale Boost, Why Indian Air Force Remains ‘Ill-Equipped’ To Battle Chinese PLAAF Over The LAC? And here comes the **role of the IAF in safeguarding the space economy**, among other reasons. With the **increasing private sector activities in space, such as the launching of commercial satellites, the introduction of ‘space tourism’, asteroid mining of minerals, and a range of other fascinating stuff, these space assets of the country need protection from the enemy forces. This explains why many countries have been creating their respective “space forces”.** The US created one in 2019, with the space force becoming a new military branch to protect the nation’s satellites and other space assets, which are vital to everything from national security to day-to-day communications. The United Kingdom, France, Canada, and Japan are said to be following suit. Last month, Germany announced the development of a military space command. China’s “Strategic Support Force”, established in 2015, takes care of its space assets. And Russia since 2015 has had dedicated “Russian Aerospace Forces”. India’s Defence Space Agency It is against this background that Prime Minister Modi had in 2018 announced the government’s intention to create the Defence Space Agency (DSA) by integrating space assets from the army, navy, and air force. It was formally set up in 2019 with a staff of some 200 officers drawn from the three services, commanded by an air force officer. It took over the Defence Imagery Processing and Analysis Centre and the Defence Satellite Control Centre. Pioneer In Indian Aviation – Can Tatas Again ‘Rule The Roost’ After Acquiring National Carrier – Air India? In fact, the DSA conducted its first integrated space warfare exercise in July 2019, bringing together personnel from across the services. It “focused on using communications and reconnaissance satellites to integrate intelligence and fires across the range of Indian military assets, indicating a firm understanding of the necessity of access to space.” However, the DSA is still a work in progress. It is yet to become fully operational. It is to be located in Delhi and supposed to work closely with the Defence Research Development Organisation (DRDO) and ISRO to integrate military assets, surveillance platforms such as the AWACS and AEW&C, and commercial and military satellites for intelligence sharing across all three services. It may be noted that satellites are vitally important to modern warfare as they are a key communication link for ground, sea, and airborne assets, which require sufficient data for voice and data communication. The DSA, therefore, is also expected to play a greater role in enunciating the planned policies for space-based assets, allowing Indian agencies and companies to work towards meeting these requirements. A 2016 report on ‘Exploiting Indian Military Capacity in Outer Space’ by the Centre for Joint Warfare Studies (CENJOWS), states that while indigenous satellites provide an adequate capability, “but despite these, India does not get uninterrupted observation of the interested area which is possible only if India launches constellation of satellites for observation which is an emerging trend.” However, it did not mean that India never had dedicated satellites for military purposes before. India had created an “Integrated Space Cell” in June 2008 under the command of the Integrated Defence Services Headquarters with the responsibility to coordinate activities of ISRO and the Indian Armed forces. Integrating Space Assets By 2017, India had reportedly some 14 satellites that were being used for surveillance purposes. This number must have gone up by now, with the country developing ASAT (Anti-satellite) capability, though it is said to be in a nascent stage. Besides, India’s National Technical Research Organization (NTRO), which is controlled by the Research and Analysis Wing, India’s premier intelligence agency, makes extensive use of IRS (Indian Remote Satellites), RISAT (Radar Imaging Satellites), and CARTOSAT (optical earth observation satellites) data to aid in building a comprehensive intelligence picture. All this makes it clear why the Indian government has now realized the need for integrating space assets and capabilities. But, the IAF had realized this very well by publishing in 2012 “Basic Doctrine of the Indian Air Force, 2012”. In it, the IAF repeatedly mentioned “air and space power”. The doctrine was not talking of “air power” in isolation of “space power”; it talked of “aerospace power”. However, the problem has been that while the IAF has been very clear that it has an aerospace role and in this task, it needs the help of the ISRO, the latter has not been that enthusiastic to join hands, at least publicly. As India is a signatory to the international treaty that outlaws military activities (Outer Space Treaty) in space, a common property of mankind, the ISRO seems to have taken a too legalistic view of abhorring the IAF. But then the fact is that the Outer Space Treaty has been the subject of diplomatic wrangles over the precise definition of space weapons, other than nuclear weapons. Besides, there has been no transparency on the part of major world powers in keeping the outer space free from military activities, with the result that one hears concepts like “Star Wars” (Strategic Defence Initiative) by the US and anti satellites (ASAT) by Russia. In any case, it is a fact that the US and its allies have used space resources extensively in fighting recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. All told, contrary to the conventional wisdom, the **aerospace power of the IAF will protect the space tools like satellites that are used by the ISRO to augment the country’s economic and scientific power.** And this will be possible when there is the capacity to destroy the adversary’s space weapons, based in space, air, land, and water. Secondly, developing aerospace power does not necessarily mean that there will be war. In most cases, augmented power or strength will ensure that the enemy will not dare to attack you. Instead of being a frontier now, space complements airpower in numerous missions as an enabler. That is why analysts say that air and space should be complementary components of defense so that they compensate for each other’s inadequacies in maintaining surveillance of the vertical dimension and in countering threats from systems like ballistic missiles that transit and maneuver through both air and space. They must be integrated so that the diverse and yet potent elements of air and space are networked adequately. Now that the space sector is being opened up by the Modi government, it is hoped that such a network will be a reality, sooner rather than later.

#### Space mining is key to sustain India resources.

MacWhorter 16 [Kevin; J.D. Candidate, William & Mary Law School, "Sustainable Mining: Incentivizing Asteroid Mining in the Name of Environmentalism", William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review, Vol 40, Issue 2, Article 11, <https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.com/&httpsredir=1&article=1653&context=wmelpr>] brett

A. Rare Element Mining on Earth

In the next sixty years, scientists predict that certain elements crucial to modern industry such as platinum, zinc, copper, phosphorous, lead, gold, and indium could be exhausted on Earth. 12 Many of these have no synthetic alternative, unlike chemical elements such as oil or diamonds.13 Liquid-crystal display (LCD) televisions, cellphones, and laptops are among the various consumer technologies that use precious metals.14Further, green technologies including wind turbines, solar panels, and catalytic converters require these rare elements. 15 As demand rises for both types of technologies, and as reserves of rare metals fall, prices skyrocket.16 Demand for nonrenewable resources creates conflict, and consumerism in rich countries results in harsh labor treatment for poorer countries.17

In general, the mining industry is extremely destructive to Earth’s environment.18 In fact, depending on the method employed, mining can destroy entire ecosystems by polluting water sources and contributing to deforestation.19 It is by its nature an unsustainable practice, because it involves the extraction of a finite and non-renewable resource.20 Moreover, by extracting tiny amounts of metals from relatively large quantities of ore, the mining industry contributes the largest portion of solid wastes in the world.21 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) describes the industry as the source of more toxic and hazardous waste than any other industrial sector [in the United States], costing billions of dollars to address the public health and environmental threats to communities. 22 Poor regulations and oxymoronic corporate definitions of sustainability, however, make it unclear as to just how much waste the industry actually produces.23

Platinum provides an excellent case study of the issue, because it is an extremely rare and expensive metal—an ore expected to exist in vast quantities in asteroids.24 Further, production of platinum has increased sharply in the past sixty years in order to keep up with growing demand for use in new technologies.25 In fact, despite their high costs, platinum group metals are so useful that [one] of [four] industrial goods on Earth require them in production. 26 Scholars do not expect demand to slow any time soon.27 Among other technologies, industries use platinum in products such as catalytic converters, jewelry production, various catalysts for chemical processing, and hydrogen fuel cells.28 While there is no consensus on how far the Earth’s reserves of platinum will take humanity, many scientists agree that platinum ore reserves will deplete in a relatively short amount of time.29

With the rate of mining at an all-time high,30 it is increasingly clear that historical patterns of mineral resources and development cannot simply be assumed to continue unaltered into the future. 31 The platinum mining industry, however, has a strong incentive to increase its rate of extraction as profits grow with the rate of demand. Without any alternative, this destructive practice will continue into the future.32

So-called platinum-group metal (PGM) ores are mined through underground or open cut techniques.33 Due to these practices, all but a very small fraction of the mined platinum ore is disposed of as solid waste.34 The environmental consequences of platinum production are thus quite significant, but like the mining industry in general, the amount of waste is typically under-reported.35

While this is due to high production levels at the moment, those levels will only increase given the estimated future demand of platinum.36 In spite of the negative consequences, mining continues unabated because it is economically important to many areas.37 The future environmental costs provide a major challenge in creating a sustainable system. Relegating at least some mining companies to near-Earth asteroids would reduce the negative effects of future mining levels on Earth. The economic benefits of mining need not be sacrificed for the sake of the environment.38

#### Scarcity turns every war scenario---we outweigh on timeframe, just the prospect of shortages triggers escalation.

Klare 13 [Michael T., The Nation’s defense correspondent, is professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, D.C. His newest book, All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon’s Perspective on Climate Change, will be published this fall. 2013. “How Resource Scarcity and Climate Change Could Produce a Global Explosion,” <https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-resource-scarcity-and-climate-change-could-produce-global-explosion/>] brett

Brace yourself. You may not be able to tell yet, but according to global experts and the US intelligence community, the earth is already shifting under you. Whether you know it or not, you’re on a new planet, a resource-shock world of a sort humanity has never before experienced.

Two nightmare scenarios—a global scarcity of vital resources and the onset of extreme climate change—are already beginning to converge and in the coming decades are likely to produce a tidal wave of unrest, rebellion, competition and conflict. Just what this tsunami of disaster will look like may, as yet, be hard to discern, but experts warn of “water wars” over contested river systems, global food riots sparked by soaring prices for life’s basics, mass migrations of climate refugees (with resulting anti-migrant violence) and the breakdown of social order or the collapse of states. At first, such mayhem is likely to arise largely in Africa, Central Asia and other areas of the underdeveloped South, but in time, all regions of the planet will be affected.

To appreciate the power of this encroaching catastrophe, it’s necessary to examine each of the forces that are combining to produce this future cataclysm.

Resource Shortages and Resource Wars

Start with one simple given: the prospect of future scarcities of vital natural resources, including energy, water, land, food and critical minerals. This in itself would guarantee social unrest, geopolitical friction and war.

It is important to note that absolute scarcity doesn’t have to be on the horizon in any given resource category for this scenario to kick in. A lack of adequate supplies to meet the needs of a growing, ever more urbanized and industrialized global population is enough. Given the wave of extinctions that scientists are recording, some resources—particular species of fish, animals and trees, for example—will become less abundant in the decades to come, and may even disappear altogether. But key materials for modern civilization like oil, uranium and copper will simply prove harder and more costly to acquire, leading to supply bottlenecks and periodic shortages.

Oil—the single most important commodity in the international economy—provides an apt example. Although global oil supplies may actually grow in the coming decades, many experts doubt that they can be expanded sufficiently to meet the needs of a rising global middle class that is, for instance, expected to buy millions of new cars in the near future. In its 2011 World Energy Outlook, the International Energy Agency claimed that an anticipated global oil demand of 104 million barrels per day in 2035 will be satisfied. This, the report suggested, would be thanks in large part to additional supplies of “unconventional oil” (Canadian tar sands, shale oil and so on), as well as 55 million barrels of new oil from fields “yet to be found” and “yet to be developed.”

However, many analysts scoff at this optimistic assessment, arguing that rising production costs (for energy that will be ever more difficult and costly to extract), environmental opposition, warfare, corruption and other impediments will make it extremely difficult to achieve increases of this magnitude. In other words, even if production manages for a time to top the 2010 level of 87 million barrels per day, the goal of 104 million barrels will never be reached and the world’s major consumers will face virtual, if not absolute, scarcity.

Water provides another potent example. On an annual basis, the supply of drinking water provided by natural precipitation remains more or less constant: about 40,000 cubic kilometers. But much of this precipitation lands on Greenland, Antarctica, Siberia and inner Amazonia where there are very few people, so the supply available to major concentrations of humanity is often surprisingly limited. In many regions with high population levels, water supplies are already relatively sparse. This is especially true of North Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East, where the demand for water continues to grow as a result of rising populations, urbanization and the emergence of new water-intensive industries. The result, even when the supply remains constant, is an environment of increasing scarcity.

Wherever you look, the picture is roughly the same: supplies of critical resources may be rising or falling, but rarely do they appear to be outpacing demand, producing a sense of widespread and systemic scarcity. However generated, a perception of scarcity—or imminent scarcity—regularly leads to anxiety, resentment, hostility and contentiousness. This pattern is very well understood, and has been evident throughout human history.

In his book Constant Battles, for example, Steven LeBlanc, director of collections for Harvard’s Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, notes that many ancient civilizations experienced higher levels of warfare when faced with resource shortages brought about by population growth, crop failures or persistent drought. Jared Diamond, author of the bestseller Collapse, has detected a similar pattern in Mayan civilization and the Anasazi culture of New Mexico’s Chaco Canyon. More recently, concern over adequate food for the home population was a significant factor in Japan’s invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and Germany’s invasions of Poland in 1939 and the Soviet Union in 1941, according to Lizzie Collingham, author of The Taste of War.

Although the global supply of most basic commodities has grown enormously since the end of World War II, analysts see the persistence of resource-related conflict in areas where materials remain scarce or there is anxiety about the future reliability of supplies. Many experts believe, for example, that the fighting in Darfur and other war-ravaged areas of North Africa has been driven, at least in part, by competition among desert tribes for access to scarce water supplies, exacerbated in some cases by rising population levels.

“In Darfur,” says a 2009 report from the UN Environment Programme on the role of natural resources in the conflict, “recurrent drought, increasing demographic pressures, and political marginalization are among the forces that have pushed the region into a spiral of lawlessness and violence that has led to 300,000 deaths and the displacement of more than two million people since 2003.”

Anxiety over future supplies is often also a factor in conflicts that break out over access to oil or control of contested undersea reserves of oil and natural gas. In 1979, for instance, when the Islamic revolution in Iran overthrew the Shah and the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Washington began to fear that someday it might be denied access to Persian Gulf oil. At that point, President Jimmy Carter promptly announced what came to be called the Carter Doctrine. In his 1980 State of the Union Address, Carter affirmed that any move to impede the flow of oil from the Gulf would be viewed as a threat to America’s “vital interests” and would be repelled by “any means necessary, including military force.”

In 1990, this principle was invoked by President George H.W. Bush to justify intervention in the first Persian Gulf War, just as his son would use it, in part, to justify the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Today, it remains the basis for US plans to employ force to stop the Iranians from closing the Strait of Hormuz, the strategic waterway connecting the Persian Gulf to the Indian Ocean through which about 35 percent of the world’s seaborne oil commerce passes.

Recently, a set of resource conflicts have been rising toward the boiling point between China and its neighbors in Southeast Asia when it comes to control of offshore oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea. Although the resulting naval clashes have yet to result in a loss of life, a strong possibility of military escalation exists. A similar situation has also arisen in the East China Sea, where China and Japan are jousting for control over similarly valuable undersea reserves. Meanwhile, in the South Atlantic Ocean, Argentina and Britain are once again squabbling over the Falkland Islands (called Las Malvinas by the Argentinians) because oil has been discovered in surrounding waters.

By all accounts, resource-driven potential conflicts like these will only multiply in the years ahead as demand rises, supplies dwindle and more of what remains will be found in disputed areas. In a 2012 study titled Resources Futures, the respected British think-tank Chatham House expressed particular concern about possible resource wars over water, especially in areas like the Nile and Jordan River basins where several groups or countries must share the same river for the majority of their water supplies and few possess the wherewithal to develop alternatives. “Against this backdrop of tight supplies and competition, issues related to water rights, prices, and pollution are becoming contentious,” the report noted. “In areas with limited capacity to govern shared resources, balance competing demands, and mobilize new investments, tensions over water may erupt into more open confrontations.”

# Case

## Advantage 1

#### We’ll concede the private sector space industry is key to Indo-US ties -- we’ll straight turn it:

### TURN

#### India is building it’s relations with the West on the bedrock of new economic ties­­­­­---that’s key to counterbalancing China in the region

Mohan 21 C. Raja Mohan [director of the National University of Singapore’s Institute of South Asian Studies.],3-19-2021, "India Romances the West," Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/03/19/india-modi-west-quad-china-biden-non-aligned/ , accessed 8/8/2021 EH and Brett

In affirming that the “Quad has come of age” at the first-ever summit of the Quadrilateral Dialogue with the United States, Japan, and Australia last week, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has sent an unmistakable signal that India is no longer reluctant to work with the West in the global arena, including in the security domain. The country’s new readiness to participate in Western forums marks a decisive turn in independent India’s world view. That view was long defined by the idea of nonalignment and its later avatar, strategic autonomy—both of which were about standing apart from, if not against, post-World-War-II Western alliances. But today—driven by shifting balance of power in Asia, India’s clear-eyed view of its national interest, and the successful efforts of consecutive U.S. presidents—India is taking increasingly significant steps toward the West. The Quad is not the only Western institution with which India might soon be associated. New Delhi is set to engage with a wider range of Western forums in the days ahead, including the G-7 and the Five Eyes. Britain has invited India to participate in the G-7 meeting in London this summer, along with other non-members Australia and South Korea. Although India has been invited to G-7 outreach meetings—a level or two below the summits—for a number of years, the London meeting is widely expected to be a testing ground for the creation of a “Democracy Group of Ten,” or D-10. In Washington today, there are multiple ideas for U.S.-led technology coalitions to reduce the current Western dependence on China. Two initiatives unveiled at the Quad summit—the working group on critical technologies, and the vaccine initiative to supply Southeast Asia—underline the prospects for an Indian role in the trusted technology supply chains of the United States and its partners. Along with Japan, India also joined a meeting of the Five Eyes—the intelligence-sharing alliance between the United States, Canada, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand— in October 2020 to discuss ways to give law enforcement agencies access to encrypted communications on platforms such as WhatsApp and Telegram. Five Eyes is a tightly knit alliance, and it is unlikely India will be a member any time soon. But it is very much possible to imagine greater consultations between the Five Eyes and the Indian intelligence establishment.To be sure, India’s engagement with Western institutions is not entirely new. India joined the British-led Commonwealth in 1947, but only after India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, made sure the forum was stripped of any security role in the postwar world. Refusing to join military alliances was a key plank of India’s policy of non-alignment. Nehru turned to the United States when his policy of befriending China and supporting its sensitivities collapsed by the end of the 1950s. Facing reverses in a military conflict with China on the long and contested border in 1962, Nehru sought massive defense assistance from U.S. President John Kennedy. With the deaths of both Kennedy and Nehru soon after, the prospects for strategic cooperation between New Delhi and Washington receded quickly. The 1970s saw India drift away from the West on three levels. On the East-West axis, it drew closer to the Soviet Union. On the North-South axis, it became the champion of the Third World. This was reinforced by the sharply leftward turn of India’s domestic politics and a deliberate severing of commercial cooperation with the West. Many concluded in the 1970s that anti-Americanism was part of India’s genetic code. After all, India voted more often against the United States at the United Nations during the Cold War than even the Soviet Union. The idea that India is irreconcilably opposed to the United States was the dominant assessment in both country’s capitals. Most scholars of Indian foreign policy assumed that come what may—at home or abroad—India would forever be alienated from the West. But the story of India’s international relations over the last three decades has been one of a slow but definite advances in cooperation with the United States and the West. The Quad summit is not only a culmination of that long trajectory, but also a major step up. It was the reform of the Indian economy at the end of the Cold War, along with the collapse of the Soviet Union as India’s superpower partner, that created the basis for the renewal of ties between New Delhi and Washington. But even as expanding commercial ties began to stabilize and deepen the bilateral relationship in the 1990s, Washington’s activism on Kashmir and its eagerness to denuclearize India made matters difficult for New Delhi. Beset with domestic turbulence and an era of weak coalition governments, New Delhi embarked on a hedging strategy by joining the Russian initiative for a so-called strategic triangle with Moscow and Beijing that eventually evolved into the BRICS Forum after Brazil and South Africa joined. U.S. President George W. Bush, however, revolutionized U.S. policy on India in the 2000s by discarding Washington’s mediating impulse on Kashmir, decoupling engagement with New Delhi from that with Islamabad, and resolving the dispute over non-proliferation. Bush recognized that India is critical for the construction of a stable balance of power in Asia as the continent was being transformed by the rapid rise of China. But just when Washington was ready to transform relations with New Delhi, India was paralyzed by self-doubt. If then-Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee boldly called India and the United States “natural allies” in 1998—at a time when no one seemed interested in Washington—his successor, Manmohan Singh, reverted to type. His government began to reinvent non-alignment, keep distance from the United States, and double down on the principle of strategic autonomy. Even as Indian-Chinese tensions multiplied after 2008—when the global financial crisis seemed to have convinced the Chinese leadership that the United States was in terminal decline, with the consequence that Beijing adopted a more assertive posture towards its neighbors—the Singh government continued to hedge against U.S. power. Modi, who became prime minister in 2014, began to reverse New Delhi’s resistance to a deeper partnership with Washington. His affirmation in his 2016 address to the U.S. Congress that India’s “historic hesitations” to engage the United States were over was not just a rhetorical flourish. Modi resolved the remaining issues that had prevented implementation of the historic 2008 Indian-U.S. nuclear deal, renewed the 2005 agreement for defense cooperation, and signed the so-called foundational defense agreements that have facilitated interoperability between the two country’s armed forces. He widened the annual bilateral Malabar exercises to include Japan in 2015 and Australia in 2020, helped revive the dormant Quad in 2017, came up with his own version of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy in 2018, and joined the Quad summit in 2021. Beyond the relationship with the United States, Modi also revived India’s strategic interest in the Commonwealth, strengthened ties with the European Union, and joined the European Alliance for Multilateralism. He sought to make India part of the solution to mitigating climate change, supported “multi-stakeholderism” in global internet governance, initiated the International Solar Alliance and the Indo-Pacific maritime partnership with France, and is poised to lay the foundations for a substantive strategic partnership with British Prime Minister Boris Johnson when they meet in India next month. Every one of these moves was against the predominant instincts of India’s political class, bureaucratic establishment, and foreign-policy community. Two factors have facilitated this. First, Modi carried little of the anti-Western ideological baggage of the nationalists who thrive in his own party or the political left and center that prefer to keep a safe distance from Washington. Modi’s judgement that India needs a more productive relationship with the United States and the West is rooted in the simple calculus of national interest rather than any involved reasoning.

#### Their Pollard ev concedes China is revisionist in the region -- only bolstering deterrence solves

1AC Pollard 21 [Ruth Pollard is a columnist and editor with Bloomberg Opinion. Bloomberg “China and India Relations Shouldn't Be Allowed to Sink Any Lower” 10-11 – 21 <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-10-11/china-india-and-pakistan-are-raising-temperatures-along-their-disputed-borders> ] //aaditg recut brett

To be facing tension on both fronts — and with no diplomatic levers left to pull — is not a great place for India to find itself coming out of a punishing second Covid-19 wave and the accompanying economic slowdown. Despite a couple of high-profile summits, the last one in 2019 in the southern Indian state of Chennai, Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping have failed to find common ground. Instead, notes Ian Hall, deputy research director at the Griffith Asia Institute and author of a book on India’s foreign policy under Modi, China continues to apply more and more pressure, both along the border, and in regular online onslaughts critical of New Delhi’s military stance and its deepening ties with Washington. Nothing Modi has done to try to change that dynamic has worked. However, India is not alone. Hall says Japan, Taiwan, Australia and, of course, the U.S., are all dealing with the challenge of an increasingly assertive China. Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar told his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi last month that bilateral ties will only move forward once there’s troop disengagement from the border areas. But each time India pushes back, China responds with fresh incursions. Opinion. Data. More Data. Get the most important Bloomberg Opinion pieces in one email. Email Enter your email Sign Up By submitting my information, I agree to the Privacy Policy and Terms of Service and to receive offers and promotions from Bloomberg. Just last week, there was a minor face-off between the two sides in Arunachal Pradesh. Though the situation was quickly resolved, it added to the tensions in the lead up to Sunday’s unsuccessful talks. In August, more than 100 Chinese soldiers briefly entered Indian territory in the Himalayan state of Uttarakhand. Military experts say that as both sides expand their troop numbers and aggressively patrol, the chances of a miscalculation leading to another set of deadly clashes increases. Beijing’s abandonment of decades of established protocols agreed with New Delhi along its disputed border is contributing to alarm across the Indo-Pacific. Other episodes in the region include the increasing sorties into Taiwan’s air-defense-identification zone and the expanded deployment of ships into disputed areas of the South China Sea. No one has found the magic formula for dealing with China’s expansionism while maintaining restraint. India is just the latest nation to be tested, and the jury is out on whether relations have hit their lowest point since the border war of 1962 or if there’s still further to fall.

#### US-India economic ties are key to their regional endgame -- gives leverage and allows open trade.

Gupta 20, Anubhav Gupta is the associate director of the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York. WPR, March 5, 2020. “Despite the Trump-Modi ‘Love,’ Trade Is Still the Weak Link in U.S.-India Relations” <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28579/despite-the-trump-modi-love-trade-is-still-the-weak-link-in-us-india-relations> brett

Despite winning a substantial mandate in elections last year, Modi’s inclination has been to double down on a feckless approach to trade and to push a Hindu-nationalist social agenda that endangers internal stability. India’s fast-growing economy helped solidify the U.S.-India partnership after decades of bilateral aloofness during the Cold War. Without a more open, market-oriented economy, India’s growth trajectory will decline, undermining the economic foundation of the relationship as well as India’s future capabilities, and in turn, India’s utility as a partner in the region.

In the aftermath of Trump’s visit, some analysts have dismissed the trade tensions as a minor hurdle and pointed to the strength of defense ties as reassurance, arguing that the cause of paramount importance—a strategic partnership to deal with a rising China—is progressing unabated. But there is no guarantee that trade differences can continue to be compartmentalized when two economic nationalists are in charge. It also remains an open question whether growing defense sales are taking place within a truly strategic framework or simply on a transactional basis for both sides. Most importantly, it assumes that economic relations are not part of the strategic puzzle.

This is evident in the decision by Trump to leave the Trans-Pacific Partnership shortly after winning election, and by Modi to abandon the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. If the U.S.-India strategic imperative is to manage China’s rise and boost their own engagement and presence in the region, these twin actions, driven by economic nationalism, were self-inflected blunders of the highest order.

Without a vibrant commercial relationship and a constructive approach to trade that is anchored in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific strategy, the United States and India will impede their own strategic endgame for the region. For this reason, the absence of a trade deal last week makes any celebrations of a U.S.-India partnership that is “stronger than ever before” ring a little hollow.

#### It’s try-or-die -- Only working with the US can deter Chinese aggression.

Blackwill and Tellis 19 [Robert D. Blackwill is Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. He was U.S. Ambassador to India from 2001 to 2003 and Deputy National Security Adviser to U.S. President George W. Bush from 2003 to 2004. Ashley J. Tellis is Tata Chair for Strategic Affairs and a Senior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He served as Senior Adviser at the U.S. Embassy in New Delhi from 2001 to 2003. “The India Dividend: New Delhi Remains Washington’s Best Hope in Asia” September/October 2019. Foreign Affairs. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2019-08-12/india-dividend>] brett

For two decades, Washington has had high hopes for India on the global stage. Gigantic, populous, and resource rich, India is, by all appearances, a superpower in waiting. And as the world’s largest democracy, it promises—according to those hopes—to be a crucial U.S. partner at a time of rising competition from authoritarian challengers. Almost 20 years ago, acting on such expectations, Washington began resolving the disagreements that had held U.S.-Indian relations back through the Cold War and into the 1990s. During George W. Bush’s presidency, U.S. officials gave up their long-standing insistence that India relinquish its nuclear weapons, allowing Washington and New Delhi to sign a landmark nuclear accord and opening the way to heavy U.S. investments—diplomatic, economic, and military—to facilitate India’s rise. Successive U.S. administrations provided liberal access to military technologies and promoted India’s role in international institutions, culminating in President Barack Obama’s endorsement of Indian aspirations to permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Albeit imperiled by the Trump administration’s disregard for allies and partners, this basic U.S. approach continues to this day. Yet the logic of the U.S.-Indian partnership remains misunderstood by many, especially in the United States. The transformation of U.S.-Indian ties since the early years of this century has given rise to expectations that, sooner or later, the two countries would become allies in all but name, closely aligned on virtually every major foreign policy issue. That such an accord has not materialized has brought creeping disappointment and doubt about the relationship’s long-term viability. Critics carp that the United States has overinvested in India—that the favors accorded to New Delhi have not been worth the return. They point, for instance, to India’s failure to select a U.S. fighter for its air force or to its inability to conclude the nuclear reactor purchases promised under the breakthrough nuclear agreement. Even supporters of the partnership occasionally chafe at how long bilateral engagement has taken to produce the expected fruits. The Trump administration has taken such frustration further, focusing less on India’s potential as a partner than on its unbalanced trade with the United States. It recently withdrew India’s privileged trade access to the United States under the Generalized System of Preferences program, churlishly announcing the decision just hours after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was sworn into office for a second time following his spectacular victory in elections this past spring. Both critics and supporters of the U.S.-Indian relationship seem to agree that the new engagement between the two democracies has not yielded the alliance-like bond once hoped for. These complaints are off the mark. Since the turn of the century, India has become a strong supporter of the U.S.-led international order, despite showing no interest in an alliance with Washington. If the United States’ aim is to turn India into a close ally, formal or otherwise, it will come to grief. Instead, Washington and New Delhi should strive to forge a partnership oriented toward furthering common interests without expecting an alliance of any kind. Simply put, the success of U.S. efforts in India should be measured not by what India does for the United States but by what India does for itself: if New Delhi puts in the economic and political work to make itself a major power—especially at a time of growing Chinese influence—Washington’s ambition to sustain what then National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice once called “a balance of power that favors freedom” will have been satisfied in Asia. To achieve that goal, U.S. and Indian officials alike must think about the relationship differently. Ultimately, the greatest obstacle to a deeper partnership is wishful thinking about what it can achieve. STRATEGIC ALTRUISM U.S.-Indian relations underwent a dramatic change soon after Bush assumed the presidency, in 2001. After decades of alienation, Bush’s predecessor, Bill Clinton, had already made some headway with a successful visit to New Delhi in March 2000. But a major point of friction remained: the insistence that relations could not improve unless India gave up its nuclear weapons, first developed in the 1970s, in the face of opposition from Washington. Bush sought to accelerate cooperation with India in ways that would overcome existing disagreements and help both sides navigate the new century. Although the war on terrorism provided a first opportunity for cooperation (since both countries faced a threat from jihadist organzations), a larger mutual challenge lay over the horizon: China’s rise. Considering its long-standing border disputes with China, Chinese support for its archrival Pakistan, and China’s growing weight in South Asia and beyond, India had major concerns about China. In particular, leaders in New Delhi feared that a too-powerful China could abridge the freedom and security of weaker neighbors. The United States, for its part, was beginning to view China’s rise as a threat to allies such as Taiwan and Japan. Washington also worried about Beijing’s ambitions to have China gradually replace the United States as the key security provider in Asia and its increasingly vocal opposition to a global system underpinned by U.S. primacy. Where China was concerned, U.S. and Indian national interests intersected. Washington sought to maintain stability in Asia through an order based not on Chinese supremacy but on security and autonomy for all states in the region. India, driven by its own fears of Chinese domination, supported Washington’s vision over Beijing’s. For India, neutralizing the hazards posed by a growing China required revitalizing its own power—in other words, becoming a great power itself. But Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and his successors recognized that, in the short term, they could not reach this goal on their own. India’s fractious democracy, institutional weaknesses, and passive strategic culture would impede the rapid accumulation of national power. Concerted support from external powers could mitigate these weaknesses—and no foreign partner mattered as much as the United States. American assistance could make the difference between effective balancing and a losing bet. The Bush administration appreciated India’s predicament. After many hard-fought bureaucratic battles, it came to accept the central argument we had been articulating from the U.S. embassy in New Delhi: that the United States should set aside its standing nonproliferation policy in regard to India as a means of building the latter’s power to balance China. Washington thus began to convey its support for New Delhi in ways that would have seemed unimaginable a few years earlier. The United States started to work with India in four arenas in which India’s possession of nuclear weapons had previously made meaningful cooperation all but impossible: civilian nuclear safety, civilian space programs, high-tech trade, and missile defense. That step laid the foundation for the achievement of Bush’s second term, the civilian nuclear agreement, which inaugurated resumed cooperation with New Delhi on civilian nuclear energy without requiring it to give up its nuclear weapons. Skeptics in and out of government argued that the United States ought to offer its support only to the degree that India would reciprocate by consistently aligning its policies with Washington’s aims. But such a demand would have been a recipe for failure. India was too big to forgo its vital national interests when they collided with U.S. preferences, and it was too proud a nation to be seen as Washington’s minion. It was also much weaker than the United States and could not often make substantial direct contributions toward realizing U.S. objectives. Generous U.S. policies were not merely a favor to New Delhi; they were a conscious exercise of strategic altruism. When contemplating various forms of political support for India, U.S. leaders did not ask, “What can India do for us?” They hoped that India’s upward trajectory would shift the Asian balance of power in ways favorable to the United States and thus prevent Beijing from abusing its growing clout in the region. A strong India was fundamentally in Washington’s interest, even if New Delhi would often go its own way on specific policy issues. Both Bush and his successor, Barack Obama, turned a blind eye to India’s positions in international trade negotiations, its relatively closed economy, and its voting record at the United Nations, all of which ran counter to U.S. preferences. A strong India is in Washington’s interest, even if it often goes its own way on specific issues. The U.S.-Indian partnership was built on a careful calculation by each side: Washington, unsettled by the prospect of an ascendant China, sought to build up new power centers in Asia. New Delhi, meanwhile, hoped to balance China by shoring up its own national power, with the United States acting both as a source of support and, more broadly, as a guardian of the liberal international order. Under these terms, the partnership flourished. The two countries concluded a defense cooperation agreement in 2005—a first for New Delhi, with any country—and went on to sign the U.S.-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region in 2015; Indian policymakers, breaking with their past reluctance, supported the U.S. goal of “ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea,” and agreed to a road map toward, among other things, bilateral military cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. Indian defense acquisitions of U.S. military equipment substantially increased, as well—from none in 2000 to over $18 billion worth in 2018—as New Delhi began shifting away from Russia, traditionally its principal arms supplier. U.S.-Indian cooperation intensified in a number of areas, including counterterrorism, intelligence sharing, military-to-military relations, and cybersecurity, as well as such sensitive ones as climate change and nuclear security. For two countries that had been at loggerheads for much of the previous three decades, this was a remarkable achievement. A STRING OF PEARLS U.S. President Donald Trump has complicated this relationship. His administration has shifted from strategic altruism to a narrower and more self-centered conception of U.S. national interests. Its “America first” vision has upturned the post–World War II compact that the United States would accept asymmetric burdens for its friends with the knowledge that the collective success of democratic states would serve Washington’s interests in its struggle against greater authoritarian threats. India, of course, had been a beneficiary of this bargain since at least 2001. In some ways, U.S.-Indian relations have changed less in the Trump era than one might expect. There are several reasons for this continuity. For one, New Delhi saw foreign policy opportunities in Trump’s victory—such as the possibility of improved U.S. relations with Russia, a longtime Indian ally, and more restraint in the use of force abroad, giving India more sway to advance its vision of a multipolar global order. It was also believed that Trump might put less pressure on India regarding its climate policies and its relations with Pakistan. Above all, India’s fundamental security calculus hasn’t changed. Leaders in New Delhi are still convinced that China is bent on replacing the United States as the primary power in Asia, that this outcome would be exceedingly bad for India, and that only a strong partnership with the United States can prevent it. As one senior Indian policymaker told us, China’s rise “is so momentous that it should make every other government reexamine the basic principles of its foreign policy.” New Delhi particularly worries that China is encircling India with a “string of pearls”—a collection of naval bases and dual-use facilities in the Indian Ocean that will threaten its security. A Chinese-funded shipping hub in Sri Lanka and a Chinese-controlled deep-water port in Pakistan have attracted particular concern. China has also invested $46 billion in a segment of its Belt and Road Initiative that crosses through Kashmir, which is claimed by both India and Pakistan. China’s economic, political, and military support for Pakistan, India’s enemy of seven decades and adversary in three major wars, suggest that China is working to establish a local counterweight to India. India has also watched with growing alarm as China has illegally militarized its artificial islands in the South China Sea, opposed Indian membership in the UN Security Council, and blocked India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an international organization of nuclear supplier countries committed to nonproliferation. China claims a huge swath of Indian territory in the Himalayas, questions Indian sovereignty over Kashmir, and last year triggered a military standoff with Indian troops in Bhutanese territory. In Tibet, China has been constructing dams that could potentially limit the flow of water into India, which would exacerbate water scarcity and complicate flood control in India’s plains. India’s response to the growing Chinese threat has been to develop its own capabilities, including military ones. But the Indian government recognizes that only the United States has the power necessary to prevent China from becoming an Asian hegemon in the decades ahead. As a result, fostering ties with the United States remains India’s topmost foreign policy priority. This openness to U.S. influence stands in sharp contrast to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s calls for “the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia, and uphold the security of Asia”—a security vision for the region that excludes the United States. Buoyed by its hope that Washington will continue to serve as a steadfast security guarantor in Asia, India has begun to take a much tougher stance against China. It has condemned China’s claims to and militarization of islands in the South China Sea and its efforts to undermine the unity of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, emphasizing the importance of “ASEAN centrality” in its own Indo-Pacific policy. New Delhi has also begun to engage more in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, an informal group in which Australia, India, Japan, and the United States discuss how to protect the Indo-Pacific region in the face of Chinese ascendancy. And New Delhi has doubled down on its opposition to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative by collaborating with Japan on infrastructure investments in South and Southeast Asia and Africa. Most important, India began, in the last years of the Obama administration, quietly cooperating with the U.S. military through intelligence sharing, while continuing to expand its military exercises with the United States. The Trump administration, for its part, has started to resolutely confront China, much to New Delhi’s satisfaction. It has also articulated both a South Asia strategy and an Indo-Pacific strategy that stress India’s pivotal role in the region, has allowed India to buy drones and other advanced weapons systems, and has put India on a par with NATO allies in terms of trade in sensitive technologies. Other defense projects, such as India’s acquisition of advanced military technologies to counteract the expanding Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean, are still in the planning stage, but they nonetheless are noteworthy for a country that long preached the value of nonalignment.

### TURN

#### Indo-US coop staves off Middle East war, econ decline, and authoritarianism.

Rao 18 [Nirupama Rao, India's former Foreign Secretary, former Ambassador to the United States, China and Sri Lanka for India, former Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (Harvard University), written with Richard Verma who was the U.S. ambassador to India from 2015 to 2017. “America and India Must Forge a Strong Democratic Partnership,” The Hill. 1/16/18. <https://thehill.com/opinion/international/369067-america-and-india-must-forge-a-strong-democratic-partnership>] brett

The world is changing. China is ascending as a superpower looking to upend existing rules. European unity is under threat. Russia is playing a more destabilizing role abroad than it has since the Cold War. Unrest in the Middle East is tearing the region apart. At the same time, new technology and other economic dynamics are fueling income inequality and job losses, making it more and more difficult to spur widely shared and sustainable growth. While global dynamics are changing rapidly, at least one trend has remained constant in recent years: the upward trajectory of the U.S.-India relationship. Amidst geopolitical and economic uncertainty, the United States and India can be indispensable democratic partners and pillars of peace, prosperity, and democracy. The potential for the U.S.-India relationship cannot be overstated: They are the world’s two largest democracies, two of the world’s largest economies, and two of the world’s strongest militaries. The decisions the United States and India make will have far-reaching repercussions when it comes to global security, prosperity, and sustainable development. As new challenges strain the international system, it will be even more important for like-minded partners to cooperate to advanced shared interests. By working together, the United States and India can exponentially increase their ability to build a better world. Over the past year, we co-chaired a Center for American Progress task force on U.S.-India relations to unearth opportunities to further strengthen the relationship, looking ahead to the challenges and opportunities our two countries will have in this century. For too long, the relationship has underperformed, but those days appear to be over thanks to the effort over successive administrations in Delhi and Washington. This task force was a bilateral effort composed of 20 experts from the United States and India, covering diverse fields such as foreign policy, energy, business, and government accountability. Through the research and conversations conducted by the group, we were able to craft paths forward that we believe could help this critical relationship achieve its full potential. Our task force explored five areas for accelerated cooperation between the two countries: creating jobs and economic opportunities, building a clean energy future from the bottom up, creating a joint security advantage in Asia, strengthening democratic institutions at home and around the world, and fostering ties between their peoples. Despite our different histories and geographies, our shared future together encompasses so many of the same concerns, dreams and aspirations by our citizens. We are, in fact, natural allies, as so many leaders have pointed out in years past, and our recommendations seek to ensure that remains the case well into the future.

#### Economic decline causes nuclear war – loose nukes, counterbalancing, and regional instability

Mann ’14 (Eric Mann is a special agent with a United States federal agency, with significant domestic and international counterintelligence and counter-terrorism experience. Worked as a special assistant for a U.S. Senator and served as a presidential appointee for the U.S. Congress. He is currently responsible for an internal security and vulnerability assessment program. Bachelors @ University of South Carolina, Graduate degree in Homeland Security @ Georgetown. “AUSTERITY, ECONOMIC DECLINE, AND FINANCIAL WEAPONS OF WAR: A NEW PARADIGM FOR GLOBAL SECURITY,” May 2014, <https://jscholarship.library.jhu.edu/bitstream/handle/1774.2/37262/MANN-THESIS-2014.pdf>)

The conclusions reached in this thesis demonstrate how economic considerations within states can figure prominently into the calculus for future conflicts. The findings also suggest that security issues with economic or financial underpinnings will transcend classical determinants of war and conflict, and change the manner by which rival states engage in hostile acts toward one another. The research shows that security concerns emanating from economic uncertainty and the inherent vulnerabilities within global financial markets will present new challenges for national security, and provide developing states new asymmetric options for balancing against stronger states.¶ The security areas, identified in the proceeding chapters, are likely to mature into global security threats in the immediate future. As the case study on South Korea suggest, the overlapping security issues associated with economic decline and reduced military spending by the United States will affect allied confidence in America’s security guarantees. The study shows that this outcome could cause regional instability or realignments of strategic partnerships in the Asia-pacific region with ramifications for U.S. national security. Rival states and non-state groups may also become emboldened to challenge America’s status in the unipolar international system.¶ The potential risks associated with stolen or loose WMD, resulting from poor security, can also pose a threat to U.S. national security. The case study on Pakistan, Syria and North Korea show how financial constraints affect weapons security making weapons vulnerable to theft, and how financial factors can influence WMD proliferation by contributing to the motivating factors behind a trusted insider’s decision to sell weapons technology. The inherent vulnerabilities within the global financial markets will provide terrorists’ organizations and other non-state groups, who object to the current international system or distribution of power, with opportunities to disrupt global finance and perhaps weaken America’s status. A more ominous threat originates from states intent on increasing diversification of foreign currency holdings, establishing alternatives to the dollar for international trade, or engaging financial warfare against the United States.

#### Democracy eradicates war – best studies

Mazumder 17 - Department of Political Science, Harvard University [Soumyajit, 2017*,* Autocracies and the international sources of cooperation, *Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 54(3) 412–426,* Sage Pub, accessed 6/18/18]

Recently, many scholars have highlighted the ways in which domestic institutions pacify interstate relations. This literature, commonly known as the Democratic Peace literature, argues that democracies tend not to fight (Maoz & Russett, 1993; Oneal et al., 1996; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999; Russett & Oneal, 2001). As one scholar puts it, ‘the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations’ (Levy, 1989). This finding, having survived multiple operationalizations, empirical specifications, and econometric models, is now a standard control variable in the literature.

How does democratic regime type operate to pacify international relations? One of the main mechanisms that scholars point to when explaining the democratic peace focuses on the role of audience costs in constraining leaders and helping them to signal their resolve (Fearon, 1994). Importantly, this audience cost mechanism relies on the assumption that there is uncertainty over each leader’s willingness to go to war. Proponents of the audience cost theory suggest that the greater ability that a leader’s relevant domestic audience has to punish leaders who lose disputes or escalate crises, the more one learns about the leader’s resolve (Fearon, 1995). Thus, the potential for domestic audiences to punish leaders for losing disputes or escalating crises reveals information that helps states to settle their disputes without going to war. Several scholars have tested and found evidence for this audience costs explanation (Gelpi, 2001; Tomz, 2007).2

### TURN

#### Private sector development is happening now and is necessary to scale up and lock in India’s status as a powerhouse in space

EdexLive 20, 06-25-2020, "Opening space sector will enable India to play important role in global space economy: ISRO chief," New Indian Express, https://www.edexlive.com/news/2020/jun/25/opening-space-sector-will-enable-india-to-play-important-role-in-global-space-economy-isro-chief-12874.html TDI

SRO chief K Sivan on Thursday stated that opening the space sector for private enterprises will help scale up benefits from space technology and enable Indian industry to be an important player in the global space economy. "If the space sector is opened (for private enterprises), the potential of the entire country can be utilised to scale up benefits from space technology. It will not only result in the accelerated growth of the sector but also enable Indian industry to be an important player in the global space economy," the Indian Space Research Organisation chief said. Sivan said that far-reaching reforms in space technology in India will put the country in the league of the select countries. "As part of longer socio-economic reform, space reforms will improve access to space-based services for India's development. Far-reaching reforms will put India in the league of few countries with efficient promotional and authorisation mechanism for private-sector space activities," he said. Talking about reforms that the government is planning to implement in the country's space sector, he said, "Space sector, where India is among a handful of countries with advanced space technology, can play a significant role in boosting the industrial base of India." "The government's decision is to implement reform measures to leverage ISRO's achievement by opening the space sector for private enterprises," he added. He further said that "Department of Space will promote sector space activities to enable it to provide end to end space services, including building and launching of rockets and satellites as well as providing space-based services on a commercial basis." "With this, there is an opportunity for large scale employment in the technology sector and India becoming a global technology powerhouse," ISRO chief added. Sivan also talked about the government's decision to establish an autonomous nodal agency for taking independent decisions for regulating the activities of private companies. "Government has approved the establishment of an autonomous nodal agency - Indian National Space, Promotion and Authorisation Centre - for taking independent decisions with respect to permitting and regulating the activities of private companies in the space sector," said ISRO chief. "It will act as a national nodal agency for handholding and promoting the private sector in space endeavours and for this ISRO will share its technical expertise as well as facilities," he added.

#### Even if they win that the US will decline, India soft power alone is sufficient to manage global governance -- China can’t.

GPC 17 – Greater Pacific Capital, investing institution designed to identify and develop investing opportunities in and between India and other international economies, 7/17/17, “Path to Power: India’s Great Opportunity in the Changing World Order,” https://greaterpacificcapital.com/path-to-power-indias-great-opportunity-in-the-changing-world-order/

Last month’s Sign of the Times highlighted what appear to be a series of US retreats from global leadership positions. With the geopolitical cards apparently being reshuffled across a wide range of defence, political and economic areas, America’s apparent withdrawal is creating opportunities for countries seeking to fill the resulting void, with China currently taking the most proactive steps among the potential contenders. Beijing has already made clear its intent to play a more active role in matters of globalisation, international trade and climate change, global issues that also align well with China’s domestic agenda and where it can leverage significant political and financial assets. Despite China’s head start over others and its apparent desire to lead, its efforts will likely face not only resistance from the West but also competition from a number of countries, both within Asia and abroad. Further, China’s inability to lead on a broader set of issues related to matters such as human rights or regional security acts as a counter-weight to its leadership efforts and provides opportunities for other countries to fill the gaps being left by the United States. Among potential contenders for regional and international leadership, India, as the world’s fastest growing economy, the largest democracy and (potentially[1]) the most populous country, clearly has critical assets to leverage across a number of spheres. Bringing these to bear though will require India to be far more bold and strategic in handling both international affairs and in making strong domestic progress, both are matters that have proved elusive to date. However, if India can achieve this, it has the potential to create a virtuous circle of domestic development and international leadership similar to the one that has underwritten US prosperity for over two generations.

The Need for Renewed Leadership

One of the most dangerous geo-political circumstances is a power vacuum and America’s actions in the last six months in particular, suggest that the execution of the Trump Administration’s ‘America First’ vision is creating vacuums across an increasingly broad range of fields. These are further being exacerbated by the accompanying weakening of (formerly US-led) international and multi-lateral institutions that have until recently underwritten the global order. This order consisted of, among other things, a shared commitment to liberal capitalism, clear rules of engagement in trade, policy and war, a high-level security architecture focused on nuclear non-proliferation, a recognition of states’ fundamental sovereignty and shared access to the earth’s global commons. A number of the key elements of this order were already under attack before America’s current retreat. In fact, the recent withdrawal by the US from what has historically been a muscular international leadership is in many ways a reaction to its own domestic challenges and the global economic, political and security issues that have built up over the past few decades. As pointed out in a previous Sign of the Times[2], many of these challenges are the direct consequences of the current world order, including, the lack of international and national policies to compensate for the uneven nature of growth based on globalisation which while being the key driver of the unprecedented rise in prosperity has also created increasing income divides and continued to cause massive environmental impacts from mass industrialisation. Among the challenges facing the world today are a number of issues of global scope and scale that will require coordinated international action, and that is unlikely to be achieved in the absence of clear leadership by either one country or a small group of tightly aligned countries. The issues, which require this vision and leadership, include:

1. Trade Protectionism and Fairness. The continued growth of global industrial trade is being threatened by increasing protectionism (e.g. a 51% increase in G20 country trade protectionist measures from 2010-15) and major withdrawals by countries from trade frameworks (e.g. the US withdrawal from the TPP and the UK’s Brexit). While this is based on a perception of the unfairness of trade or an infringed sovereignty, it is clear that the countries that have voted for more isolationist leaders and policies have been among free trade’s biggest historic beneficiaries with their economies still reliant on its continued growth.[3]

2. Income Inequality. The gaps between the have and the have nots globally is sharpening across a number of key dimensions, with the traditional north-south divide between countries being exacerbated by growing inequality within nations, too, with the GINI coefficient, a traditional measure of inequality rising by 10% across OECD countries and the ratio of top income decile to bottom income decile reached its highest level in 30 years. [4]

3. Climate Change and Rising Pollution. The global fight against climate change and greenhouse gas emissions, which have increased by 80% since 1970, and has been damaged by the US withdrawal from the Paris Climate Change Accord.

4. Food and Water Security.5bn people today lack adequate access to sanitation, and of the 3bn people projected to be added to the world’s population by 2050, most will be born in countries facing severe food and water shortages.

5. Cross-Border Terrorism. Cross-border terrorism is at an all-time high today, causing nearly 40,000 deaths per year, and creating an urgent need for global co-operation on intelligence and security.

6. Cyber-Crime. Cyber-crime, with over 45m+ incidents annually, is an increasingly critical threat to the global economic and political order.

7. Displacements and Increasing Refugee Flows. Collective action is required to effectively process and integrate refugees and economic migrants around the world, which today total 65m – the highest number in human history.

As pointed out in previous Sign of the Times papers, these issues are interrelated, with the feedback loop between them accelerating the demise of the current US led world order and its governance framework underwritten by multilateral institutions. As the single most powerful nation on earth, America’s current unwillingness or inability to reinvent the rules and institutions that have failed to solve the world’s issues satisfactorily to date creates an opening for other countries to either reform and save or to reinvent these institutions based on a set of new values. China has clearly recognised the importance of the major issues facing the world and shown an interest in leading across a number of them, in particular in the areas of climate change and free trade. However, China’s willingness to lead is neither comprehensive in nature nor universally welcomed, particularly by the established participants of the current global order who fear that increases in China’s influence would come at a cost to their own positions. While unipolar world orders (such as the Pax Britannica in the 19th century or the shorter Pax Americana post the collapse of the Soviet Union) can underpin periods of peace and prosperity, most countries today lean towards preferring one led by a pre-Trump America or a multi-polar order to one dominated by China. However, where ambitious nations form the leadership of a multipolar order, their competitiveness can drive conflict and instability, whereas in a unipolar world, the rivalry is kept in check. Despite the US having built a broader armoury of hard and soft power than China, the two countries seem set up for conflict across a number of issues. So, unless a third country seeks to also enter this fray and create a three-way tug of war, new entrants to the power game will need to think differently about how to participate. It would seem though that given the diversity of global issues today there is space for multiple leaders employing multiple approaches.

In terms of who the new power players might be, while some of the world’s major western countries in theory might partially fill America’s shoes, most will likely be held back by a combination of domestic and geopolitical issues, even if they were able to overcome their fundamental and long-standing lack of willingness to lead. The EU needs more time to recover from its separation from the UK, the UK has been in increasing political and economic turmoil since the Brexit referendum, France is beginning its own domestic political revival and Germany and Japan remain mostly unwilling to be overt leaders for a combination of historic reasons. Having said that, Germany is positioning and being welcomed as a voice of reason by many in favour of salvaging the best of the current liberal world order. However, none of these countries are yet able to provide a credible alternative to China’s bids for leadership or stem its increasing influence and, in the face of American withdrawal, they may have no choice but to welcome another power player.

In the absence of credible alternatives from established economies, there are few with the positioning to play a more central role in world affairs. Among these, India stands out clearly due to its size, growth and most importantly its potential. The country has been an important part of the United States’ ‘Asia Pivot’ strategy, is growing rapidly with an increasingly outward foreign and trade policy, has embarked on an aggressive security and defence programme, has established strong relationships with major Asian countries and is committed to the principles of democracy. In the absence of a renewed American interest in world leadership, which one should certainly not rule out, India alone has the scope and scale to offer credible alternatives to China’s leadership bids across a number of fronts. Moreover, given the imbalance in power that a US withdrawal would leave in the Asia-Pacific region, India will have little choice but to play a more active role in the region and the world if it is to achieve its ambitions. However, while India’s potential to become a more important voice on the international stage is unlikely to be questioned, its actions to date are not yet in line with a country that has global leadership aspirations.

#### Extinction.

Shivshankar Menon 18, distinguished fellow at Brookings India, 12/26/18, “China-US contention has opened up space for other powers, including India,” https://www.business-standard.com/article/international/china-us-contention-has-opened-up-space-for-other-powers-including-india-118122500454\_1.html

We live in an amazing, paradoxical age – an age of contrasts, an age of extremes, and an age of rapid change. Never before in history has such a large proportion of humanity lived longer, healthier, more prosperous or more comfortable lives.

And yet, we have probably never had a stronger sense of standing on the brink of a precipice, of possible extinction and of the fragility of human life — by climate change or nuclear war or other violence. Global battle deaths are back up to the highest levels since the Cold War and the 68.5 million displaced persons around the globe in 2017 are at the levels of 1945-46 (after World War II and during the Chinese civil war).

The global prospect

The world today is between orders. The so-called “rule-based liberal international order” – which was neither liberal, nor particularly orderly for most of us – is no longer attractive to those who created and managed the order from WWII until the 2008 global economic crisis. At its height, that order brought unprecedented prosperity to a large segment of humanity while simultaneously exacerbating inequality, bringing identity, emotion and demagoguery to the fore in politics, and making possible technological revolutions (in energy, information technology, digital manufacturing, genetic engineering, artificial intelligence and other fields) which promise to upend our lives, economies and societies in fundamental ways in the near future.

Indeed, if the world seems out of joint there is an objective reality to support that conclusion. Today the world is effectively multipolar economically — relative shares of global GDP, the location of economic activity in the world, and the contribution of large emerging economies to global growth all show this to be so. At the same time, it remains unipolar militarily. The Royal Navy, at the height of Empire, had a two-power standard, that the Royal Navy should be at least as large as the next two biggest navies put together. The US Navy today is equivalent to the next 13 navies put together, and the US defence budget is equal to the next seven largest national defence budgets in the world.

Politically, the world is confused rather than being orderly or structured. It is the imbalance between the distribution of economic, military and political power in the world that is the source of our sense of insecurity, of events being out of control, and that creates spaces that groups and local powers like the Islamic State and Pakistan exploit. In the past, such imbalances were settled by conflict and war. Today nuclear deterrence prevents conflict at the highest level and pushes it down to lower levels of the spectrum of violence – into civil wars, small wars, asymmetric violence and conflict and the non-state domain.

Since the 2008 crisis, we have seen a slow, weak and hesitant economic recovery in most of the world. We should probably get used to the post-miracle world since the global boom from WWII to 2008 was a blip in historical terms. The world (but not India) now faces depopulation, deleveraging and de-globalisation.

Despite grim prospects for the world economy as a whole, the UN forecasts that if China grows at 3%, India at 4% and the US by 1.5%, by 2050, China’s per capita income would be 40% of US levels, and India’s at 26% – where China is today. China would be the world’s largest economy (in PPP terms), India the second, and the US the third.

By that time, both India and China will be overwhelmingly urban.

This would be an unprecedented situation where the largest economies will be among the most powerful states, but will not also be the richest.

China’s rise and the shifting balance of power

Asia is no exception to the great transition at the global level, indeed it is where the transition is most marked as Asia returns to global centre stage, economically and politically speaking.

What we see in Asia today as a result of decades of globalisation and the rise of China, India and other powers is an unprecedented situation: the continental order in Asia is being consolidated under new auspices and the maritime order in the seas near China is contested.

The balance of power in Asia and the world has shifted. For the first time in history, China is comfortable enough on land – with no real enemies now that the West has pushed Russia into her arms – to turn to the oceans on which she depends for her prosperity. China seeks primacy in the seas around her. This is a historic transition that she has never successfully managed before. Her only previous attempt in the early Ming dynasty failed. What is new for Asia is the attempt to centre both continental and maritime orders on one single power.

The response of existing power holders to this shift in the balance, like Japan and the US, has been to tighten the first island chain security and other ties that China sees as containing her, and to seek partners for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific”, an ill-defined concept that implicitly concedes the continental order to China, and does not fully meet India’s security needs since we are both a continental and a maritime power. Several voices in the present US administration also seek to limit China’s rise by using the US’s technological and other superiorities.

The reaction of other countries in the region such as India, Indonesia and Vietnam has been to balance and hedge against rising Chinese hard power by building military strength and by working together in defence, security and intelligence. This is a natural balancing phenomenon, that has resulted in the world and history’s greatest arms race in Asia in the last three decades, fuelled and made possible by the wealth that globalisation brought to the hard Westphalian states east of India.

To our west, new technologies empowered non-state actors, rogue regimes and radical movements.

East and West, we see a continuous belt of weapons of mass destruction – nuclear and chemical, don’t even mention biological – from the Mediterranean (Israel) to the Pacific (North Korea).

Uncertainty and insecurity

If the rapid shift in the balance of power and uncertainty have led states to behave in ways that exhibit grave insecurity, this has been heightened by worry or disquiet about China’s behaviour as a power. That China seeks primacy has been clear since 2008, but whether she is able or willing to provide the global public goods that the world has got used to remains in doubt.

Will China provide for the security of the commons – the high seas, cyber and outer space – or provide access to her own markets, or build coalitions and work with others to sustain a predictable international order? On present behaviour the answer must be no to all three questions. China’s preference remains to deal with each country bilaterally.

## Advantage 2

### AT: Space War

#### No space arms racing or war—interdependence checks.

Bragg et al 18—(principle research scientist at NSI, Inc. Lecturer in polisci @ Texas A&M). , July 2018.. Allison Astorino-Courtois. Robert Elder. Belinda Bragg. “Contested Space Operations, Space Defense, Deterrence, and Warfighting: Summary Findings and Integration Report,” NSI, <https://nsiteam.com/social/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Space-SMA-Integration-Report-Space-FINAL.pdf>

Everyone needs space While the US may be relatively more dependent on space for national security than are other states, it is far from alone in relying on space. Nuclear armed states are dependent on space for important command and control functions, and major powers are increasingly using space for battlefield situational awareness and communications. China and Russia were identified as having significant (and fairly equal) levels of strategic risk in space (ViTTa Q16), although their regional security priorities and (to date) less spacedependent economies place them at an advantage to the US. They may, therefore, see the strategic risk of conflict is space as lower than does the US. Still, space capabilities remain a source of economic expansion and national pride for both, and their calculations of the cost of conflict involving space may include consideration of these factors. Even now, there is a general consensus that the US and other actors have more to gain from space than they have from the loss of space-based capabilities (ViTTa Q3). This suggests that, although the US is more vulnerable in the space domain than are other states, the likelihood that aggressive action against an adversary’s space assets would be reciprocated may provide a degree of security. It also creates another incentive for actors to use diplomacy and international law to reduce risk and increase transparency in the space domain.

#### Norms, empirics, costs.

Pavur and Martinovic 19 [James Pavur, DPhil Researcher Cybersecurity Centre for Doctoral Training Oxford University, Ivan Martinovic, Professor of Computer Science Department of Computer Science Oxford University, “The Cyber-ASAT: On the Impact of Cyber Weapons in Outer Space,” 2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle, <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2019/06/Art_12_The-Cyber-ASAT.pdf>] lr

3. STABILITY IN SPACE Given the uncomfortable combination of high dependency and low survivability, one might expect to observe frequent attacks against critical military assets in orbit. However, despite decades of recurring prophesies of impending space war, no such conflict has broken out [14]–[18]. It is true that a handful of space security crises have occurred; most notably, the 2007 Chinese anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) test and the 2008 US ASAT demonstration in response [19]. Moreover, a recent Centre for Strategic and International Studies report suggests increasing interest in attacking US space assets, particularly among the Chinese, Russian, North Korean and Iranian militaries [20]. Overall, however, the space domain has remained puzzlingly peaceful. In this section, we outline three major contributors to this enduring stability: limited accessibility, attributable norms, and environmental interdependence. A. Limited Accessibility Space is difficult. Over 60 years have passed since the first Sputnik launch and only nine countries (ten including the EU) have orbital launch capabilities. Moreover, a launch programme alone does not guarantee the resources and precision required to operate a meaningful ASAT capability. Given this, one possible reason why space wars have not broken out is simply because only the US has ever had the ability to fight one [21, p. 402], [22, pp. 419–420]. Although launch technology may become cheaper and easier, it is unclear to what extent these advances will be distributed among presently non-spacefaring nations. Limited access to orbit necessarily reduces the scenarios which could plausibly escalate to ASAT usage. Only major conflicts between the handful of states with ‘space club’ membership could be considered possible flashpoints. Even then, the fragility of an attacker’s own space assets creates de-escalatory pressures due to the deterrent effect of retaliation. Since the earliest days of the space race, dominant powers have recognized this dynamic and demonstrated an inclination towards de-escalatory space strategies [23]. B. Attributable Norms There also exists a long-standing normative framework favouring the peaceful use of space. The effectiveness of this regime, centred around the Outer Space Treaty (OST), is highly contentious and many have pointed out its serious legal and political shortcomings [24]–[26]. Nevertheless, this status quo framework has somehow supported over six decades of relative peace in orbit. Over these six decades, norms have become deeply ingrained into the way states describe and perceive space weaponization. This de facto codification was dramatically demonstrated in 2005 when the US found itself on the short end of a 160-1 UN vote after opposing a non-binding resolution on space weaponization. Although states have occasionally pushed the boundaries of these norms, this has typically occurred through incremental legal re-interpretation rather than outright opposition [27]. Even the most notable incidents, such as the 2007-2008 US and Chinese ASAT demonstrations, were couched in rhetoric from both the norm violators and defenders, depicting space as a peaceful global commons [27, p. 56]. Altogether, this suggests that states perceive real costs to breaking this normative tradition and may even moderate their behaviours accordingly. One further factor supporting this norms regime is the high degree of attributability surrounding ASAT weapons. For kinetic ASAT technology, plausible deniability and stealth are essentially impossible. The literally explosive act of launching a rocket cannot evade detection and, if used offensively, retaliation. This imposes high diplomatic costs on ASAT usage and testing, particularly during peacetime. C. Environmental Interdependence A third stabilizing force relates to the orbital debris consequences of ASATs. China’s 2007 ASAT demonstration was the largest debris-generating event in history, as the targeted satellite dissipated into thousands of dangerous debris particles [28, p. 4]. Since debris particles are indiscriminate and unpredictable, they often threaten the attacker’s own space assets [22, p. 420]. This is compounded by Kessler syndrome, a phenomenon whereby orbital debris ‘breeds’ as large pieces of debris collide and disintegrate. As space debris remains in orbit for hundreds of years, the cascade effect of an ASAT attack can constrain the attacker’s long-term use of space [29, pp. 295– 296]. Any state with kinetic ASAT capabilities will likely also operate satellites of its own, and they are necessarily exposed to this collateral damage threat. Space debris thus acts as a strong strategic deterrent to ASAT usage.

### AT: Gettleman & Kumar

#### Their scenario for escalation is India achieving a first strike advantage against Pakistan.

1AC Gettleman and Kumar 19 [Jeffrey Gettleman, a winner of the Pulitzer Prize in 2012 for international reporting, is The Times’s South Asia bureau chief; and Hari Kumar, reporter in the New Delhi bureau of The New York Times. 3-27-2019. India Shot Down a Satellite, Modi Says, Shifting Balance of Power in Asia. No Publication. <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/world/asia/india-weather-satellite-missle.html?auth=login-email&login=email>.] //aaditg

A big motivation clearly is China. As China has stepped up its satellite launches and space probes, India has been trying to catch up. The test, Mr. Jha said, was “very much the part of the India-China rivalry.” Another factor may have been archrival Pakistan. Last year, China helped Pakistan launch a remote sensing satellite. India’s test showed it could blast apart the Pakistani eye in the sky, turning it into space garbage. This could make the bitter regional contest between India and Pakistan even more dangerous. Before this test, the two militaries were widely viewed as comparable. Each side has been reluctant to start a major conflict, fearing that the other could stage a devastating counterattack. But some analysts said that India might now be able to stage a pre-emptive attack on Pakistan’s satellites. That could unsettle the longstanding doctrine of mutually assured destruction that both countries have followed, and put Pakistan even more on edge. It also could presage a change in Indian nuclear strategy. The country has always promised it would make no first use of nuclear weapons — a limitation that means it might lose one or more major cities in a nuclear exchange before striking back. But if it can leverage its new antisatellite technology to move ahead with basic antimissile defenses, which require hitting an incoming warhead in space, it could change the strategic balance. “The militarization of space is underway, whether anybody likes it or not,” Mr. Jha added. Part of the reason, he said, was that satellite technology had become “the backbone of global communication.”

#### BUT, if this happens, double bind: Either 1] Pakistan wouldn’t attack India because they know they’d lose to a devastating strike, or 2] India would attack Pakistan and completely destroy their ability to retaliate, ensuring escalation won’t occur.