# Prag AC

## Framing

#### I value morality.

#### Prefer contextualism: ethics only arises as a solution to problems identified in relation to our context

#### [1] describes real world judgements: doctors make prescriptions after diagnosing issues, any a priori judgement is informed by what we understand of our contexts.

#### [2] solves skep: skep claims that we don’t know whether moral judgements are infinitely true, but we need solutions to solve problems in our specific context.

#### And, deliberation and testing are key to ensuring that ethics can respond to changing circumstances

Serra 09 [Juan Pablo Serra. What Is and What Should Pragmatic Ethics Be? Some Remarks on Recent Scholarship*.* EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY. 2009. Francisco de Vitoria College, Humanities Department, Faculty member.]

This separation of theory and practice runs parallel to another split, namely, that of ethics and morals or, better put, of ethical theory and moral practice. Peirce denies that morality is subject to rationality and thinks that ethics is valuable as a science in a broad sense. But he also regards ethics as a science which bears on human conduct only indirectly, through the examination of past actions and the self-correction of the self in view of future action. In addition, ethics would be a normative knowledge only in so far as it analyzes the adjustment of actions to ends and in so far as it studies the general way in which a good life can be lived. In morals Peirce appeals to instinct and sentiment, and in ethics he recommends the use of logical thinking —just as scientists do. However, even within the framework of his system, it’s not obvious that scientists may so easily set aside their instincts —in fact, instinct (or ‘rational instinct’ as he called it in 1908) plays a significant role in the economy of re- search. Moreover, the statement that in moral issues there may be no possibility of carrying out an inquiry that is truth-oriented is not an uncontroversial one. After all, moral inquiry is performed in a deliberative[ly] way, weighing up argumentations, beliefs and principles, and comparing them either with their probable or conceivable consequences or with lived as well as possible experiences that can be forceful or impinge upon the deliberative subject in such a way as to acquire the compulsory resistance due to reality. As Misak puts it succint- ly, “the practice of moral deliberation is responsive to experience, reason, argument, and thought experiments... Such responsiveness is part of what it is to mak[ing]e a moral decision[s] and part of what it is to try to live a moral life” (2000: 52)3. Likewise, this same deliberative activity implies an effort to acquire habits, beliefs and principles that contribute to a truly free deliberation which, in turn, can result in creative conclusions. For Peirce, as you get more habit-governed, you become more creative and free, and your selfhood acquires plas- ticity and receptiveness to experience4. Vincent Colapietro has referred to Peirce’s description of human reason in terms of a deliberative rationality (1999: 24). Also, in another place he has explained that deliberation for Peirce is a process of preparation for future action which has to do with the checking of previous acts, the rehearsal in imagination of different roads to be followed by possible conduct and the nurturing of ideals (Colapietro 1997: 270, 281). It is precisely this experi- ment carried out within imagination [by] that generates habits, because, as Peirce says in “A Survey of Pragmaticism”, “it is not the muscular action but the accompanying inward ef-forts, the acts of imagination, that produce the habit” (CP 5.479, 1907). Habits are regular ways of thinking, perceiving and interpreting that generate actions. As such, habits have a huge influence on human behavior, manifest themselves in the con- crete things we do and, at the same time, are formed within those same activities. Even more, according to Peirce, the activity takes the form of experimentation in the inner world; and the conclusion (if it comes to a definite conclusion), is that under given conditions, the interpreter will have formed the habit of acting in a given way whenever he may desire a given kind of result. The real and living logical conclusion is that habit (CP 5.491, 1907). Much more evidence could be given to support the view that habits are virtually decided (CP 2.435, c.1893) and also that intelligence comprises inward or potential actions that in- fluence the formation of habits (CP 6.286, 1893). Suffice it to say that, according to Peirce, deliberation is a function of the imagination, and that imagination is in itself an experiment which may have unexpected consequences that impose themselves upon the deliberative subject.

#### The standard and role of the ballot is to endorse consistency with democratic deliberation. It’s key to ensuring students can keep up with updated theories used in practice.

**Taatila & Raij 12** [TAATILA, V., & RAIJ, K. (2012). Philosophical Review of Pragmatism as a Basis for Learning by Developing Pedagogy. Educational Philosophy and Theory, 44(8), 831–844. doi:10.1111/j.1469-5812.2011.00758.] cw//az

The authors of this paper do not claim that a natural world would not exist without social construction made by humans. However, if the goal is to have an effect on social practices, there should be a strong emphasis in any research activities on social construc- tion, acceptance and delivery mechanisms of revealed ‘truths’. A university needs to pay attention to the learning practices that are most effective in creating a social and personal acceptance of the subjects in curriculum and the competence to use this information in practice (Fugate & Jefferson, 2001). There is also a need to pass on the understanding and willingness to act on the ever-changing nature of science. As we know, in any academic subject some theories may be outdated at any time, and the alumni should be able to accept these changes and accommodate them into their own practices. Thus university graduates should be in a constant learning cycle, always acquiring new knowledge in addition to and replacement of the old truths (Chisholm, 2000). Learning is in a central position within a pragmati[sm]c framework. Since pragmatism [it] aims at translating useful knowledge of real-life problems into action, people must constantly acquire new knowledge and skills. The goal of learning is to create constantly new competence to fit the contemporary situation, or in Dewey’s words: ‘Instead of repro- ducing current habits, better habits shall be formed, and thus the future adult society can be an improvement of their own’ (Parker, 2003, xviii). Pragmatism does not see[s] education only as an academic exercise to increase general knowledge, but also as an answer to why and what should one learn, and what the student will use learning for. Pragmatic learning is vocationally directed, so every learning situation should lead toward increased practical competence. This view is held in all types of learning situations, from deep science to very practical skills. ‘According to lecture method [realism] we live in order to learn, but according to the case method [pragmatism] we learn in order to live’ (Ardalan, 2008, p. 22). The pragmatic approach to education strongly critiques transmission-type teaching. Dewey in particular opposed this approach. He saw that the world was frequently presented to students as a set of ready-made knowledge, facts and laws, which scien- tists know to be untrue. For Dewey, the educative process was created by development and growth that takes place in intelligent inquiries into the environment (Seltzer-Kelly, 2008, pp. 293–294). An important aspect of teaching was not on the subject per se, but on making students learn to use scientific methods, and think and act on their own initiative. The requirements on the teacher in a pragmatic context are enormous. It is not sufficient to know the subject matter, but to be able to focus on the individual growth of the students, and to be able to ‘teach’ in open situations to solve problems with no fixed amount of variables. ‘The teacher must ... pay close attention to the particularities, to the individual students and their environmental influences, so that every instructional strategy can be adjusted in light of these’ (Seltzer-Kelly, 2008, p. 299). Dewey saw the teacher’s job as constant interactive intervention to contemporary problems with and by the students, to cultivate[s] the students with a caring but firm hand like that of a gardener (Seltzer-Kelly, 2008, p. 299). All this leads to a requirement for strong pedagogical skills. A teacher must master a large number of different methods to support learning, and be able to vary them according to situational needs ‘Only knowledge of the principles upon which all methods are based can free the teacher from dependence upon the educational nostrums which are recommended like patent medicines, as panaceas for all educational ills’ (McLellan & Dewey, 1908, p. 10). Still, the teacher is not the most important individual in a pragmatic learning process. The learner, the student, is most important. All learning takes place within the student. No amount of given support, instructions and facts can force her to learn if she actively opposes learning. In the pragmatic approach the student must be placed within the situation to personally experience the problems. In pragmatic learning environments, the students ‘... impose a meaningful framework on the unruliness of the case facts. They search for the key pieces of data, distinguishing central facts from peripheral ones. They organize the conflicting explanations and alternatives presented to them, and arrive at a reasonable recommendation for action. They express their views, feelings, reactions, attitudes, and prejudices which are reinforced or rejected by their colleagues. They have the opportunity to re-evaluate and re-appraise their recommendation, character, and personality’ (Ardalan, 2008, p. 28).

#### Deliberation is key to the evaluation of experience

Pappas 09 (Gregory Pappas is a professor of Philosophy at Texas A&M and is the President of the Society for the Advancement of American Philosophy (SAAP) for 2016-2018. Dr. Pappas is a long-standing and distinguished member of the SAAP, known for his leadership within SAAP, and, with his, his contributions within the society and in the profession to Pragmatism, Classical American Philosophy, Ethics, and Latin American Philosophy. “What Difference Can “Experience” Make to Pragmatism?” EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY. 2009. <http://lnx.journalofpragmatism.eu/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Pappas.pdf>) **//WW JA 1/9/18**

The view that intuition precedes reasoning (reason giving and justification) has received considerable support in recent research in social psychology and cognitive science. Psychologists Hauser and Haidt have presented a model of **moral** cognition in which **judgments are** primarily **intuitive**, “gut-level”, **emotionally guided evaluations that occur prior to** explicit reasoning or **deliberation**41. “Intuition...is the main cause of moral judgment...and then reasoning typically follows that judgment...to construct post hoc justifications”42. For Dewey the model of thinking suggested by this recent research is true of all thinking, not just moral cognition. This reversal of the traditional function of reasoning may seem like Hume’s view that the intellect is at the mercy of the passions, but some qualifications are necessary to avoid confusing it with the Humean view or with what we usually call “rationalizations”. First, for Dewey there is no dualism between intuition and our more reflective judgments. On the contrary, there is continuity and in proper inquiry one ensues on the other. Second, while the qualitative as intuition starts and guides explicit reasoning or articulated propositional thought, it is itself transformed in the process by reflection. Third, even though our first intuitions are immediate, qualitative, and noncognitive, they are funded by previous experience. This is why they are such an important resource to inquiry. Dewey claims that sometimes our immediate experiences of pervasive quality have “intellectual import” because they are not mere immediate responses; they are well funded, i.e., they “sum up and integrate prolonged previous experience and training, and bring to a unified head the results of severe and consecutive reflection” (LW 5: 250).

#### Other ethical theories are founded on minimalistic criteria, ours resolves this by using these criteria to better inform our judgments, LaFollete 2K[[1]](#footnote-1):

Employs criteria, but is not criterial. The previous discussions enable us to say more precisely why pragmatists reject a criterial view of morality. Pragmatism's core contention that practice is primary in philosophy rules out the hope of logically prior criteria. Any meaningful criteria evolve from our attempt to live morally – in deciding what is the best action in the circumstances. Criteria are not discovered by pure reason, and they [which] are not fixed. As ends of action, they are always revisable. As we obtain new evidence about ourselves and our world, and as our worlds changes, we find[s] that what was appropriate for the old environment may not be conducive to survival in the new [world] one. A style of teaching that might have been ideal for one kind institution (a progressive liberal arts college) at one time (the 60s) may be wholly ineffective in another institution (a regional state university) at another time (the 80s). But that is exactly what we would expect of an evolutionary ethic. Neither could criteria be complete. The moral world is complex and changeable. No set of criteria could give us univocal answers about how we should behave in all circumstances. If we cannot develop an algorithm for winning at chess, where there are only eighteen first moves, there is no way to develop an algorithm for living, which has a finitely large number of "first moves." Moreover, while the chess environment (the rules) stays constant, our natural and moral environments do not. We must adapt or fail. While there is always one end of chess -- the game ends when one player wins – the ends of life change as we grow, and as our environments change. Finally, we cannot resolve practical moral questions simply by applying criteria. We do not make personal or profession decisions by applying fixed, complete criteria. Why should we assume we should make moral decisions that way? Appropriates insights from other ethical theories Nonetheless, there is a perfectly good sense in which a pragmatic ethic employs what we might call criteria, but their nature and role dramatically differ from that in a criterial morality (Dewey 1985/1932) . Pragmatic criteria are not external rules we apply, but are tools we use in making informed judgements. They embody learning from previous action, they express our tentative efforts to isolate morally relevant features of those actions. These emergent criteria can become integrated into our habits, thereby informing the ways that we react to, think about, and imagine our worlds and our relations to others. This explains why pragmatists think other theories can provide guidance on how to live morally. Standard moral theories err not because they offer silly moral advice, but because they misunderstand that advice. Other moral theories can help us isolate (and habitually focus on) morally relevant features of action. And pragmatists take help wherever they can get it. Utilitarianism does not provide an algorithm for deciding how to act, but it shapes habits to help us "naturally" attend to the ways that our actions impact others. Deontology does not provide a list of general rules to follow, but it sensitizes us to ways our actions might promote or undermine respect for others. Contractarianism does not resolve all moral issues, but it sensitizes us to the need for broad consensus. That is why it is mistaken to suppose that the pragmatist makes specific moral judgements oblivious to rules, principles, virtues, and the collective wisdom of human experience. The pragmatist absorbs these insights into her habits, and thereby shapes how she habitually respon[se]ds, and how she habitually deliberates when deliberation is required. This also explains why criterial moralities tend to be minimalistic. They specify minimal sets of rules to follow in order to be moral. Pragmatism, on the other hand, like virtue theories, is more concerned to emphasize exemplary behavior – to use morally relevant features of action to determine the best way to behave, not the minimally tolerable way.

#### Impact Calc: Deliberation is procedural not substantive, it’s the decision-making procedure that generates habits not the evaluation of what impacts matter most:

Serra 2 Juan Pablo Serra. What Is and What Should Pragmatic Ethics Be? Some Remarks on Recent Scholarship*.* EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY. 2009. Francisco de Vitoria College, Humanities Department, Faculty member. Cw//az

BY WAY OF CONCLUSION As LaFollette presents it, the key to understanding pragmatist ethics is that it is not an ethical theory per se, but rather it is an anthropology, a way of understanding the human being and his moral action. Therefore, pragmatist ethics in reality does not propose a new ethical theory, but rather “reconstructs” through a new prism the basic intuitions of the best ethical theories. The fundamental element on which the attention of pragmatist ethics centers is deliberation. Deliberation is not directly responsible for directing action, but only does so indirectly, by means of a critique of past actions, the effort to correct or reinforc[ing]e certain habits and mental experiments that each actor performs in order to determine his own future conduct, and even to determine in a general manner the way in which one wishes to live one’s life (or, what amounts to the same thing, the type of person one wishes to be). The task of a pragmatist ethics, therefore, is not to provide final solutions, but rather to indicate that it is only via the testing and communication of experiences that the [can] superiority of one moral idea over another can be demonstrated. In this sense, one of the principal missions of any given version of pragmatist ethics is to indicate some general manner in which habits can be acquired which, later, will facilitate personal deliberation – both internal and external – in the broad variety of circumstances which make up the moral life.

#### Prefer: 1] Self-justification: To question against deliberation is deliberation which proves that it’s constitutive to us as agents. Two impacts:

#### A] Solves infinite regress - frameworks are only applicable if they unify and guide action, all of agency is unified by deliberation on what course of action to take next.

#### B] Bindingness – morality must prevent agents from opting out– we solve by appealing to deliberation as a constitutive element of agency

#### 2] Explanatory coherence – we don’t automatically know what things are good or bad; we first deliberate on instances of violence to develop rules that let us consistently condemn these instances. Prereq to other theories, there’s never a complete certainty so we must deliberate to break down outdated habits.

#### 3] Epistemic Reliability: disagreement is rife in the squo so most theories are wrong - prefer relative reliability. The law of large numbers proves when we test more we get progressively more accurate results so when we test theories under this fw we’ll get the best calculus.

#### A] Even if my framework is wrong it’s non-unique we assume every theory is wrong – if ours is more reliable, independent of the actual framework it is truer on the higher epistemic layer.

#### B] Other advantages are non-unique – through deliberation we take other premises into practice, if a theory is true it’ll become a habit through deliberation.

#### C] Serves as a tiebreaker – continued deliberation is necessary to resolve competing methods, otherwise we don’t know which to prefer which freezes action

## Offense

#### I affirm the resolution: A just government ought to recognize an unconditional right of workers to strike. I defend it as a general principle, so spec is irrelevant but I’ll spec the following, anything else must be checked in cx.

#### Oxford defines just as “based on or behaving according to what is morally right and fair.”, recognize as “acknowledge the existence, validity, or legality of.”, and unconditional as “not subject to any conditions.”

#### 1: Collective bargaining – worker strikes are effective in facilitating bargaining between employers and employees, which is a form of deliberation. Government support is key to protecting negotiations.

Bahn, 19 Kate Bahn, 8-29-2019, "The once and future role of strikes in ensuring U.S. worker power," Equitable Growth, https://equitablegrowth.org/the-once-and-future-role-of-strikes-in-ensuring-u-s-worker-power/

At the same time, there is an increasing consensus today that unions are a positive force for increasing worker power and [balancing against economic inequality](https://equitablegrowth.org/examining-the-links-between-rising-wage-inequality-and-the-decline-of-unions/). In polling of support for unions and specific aspects of collective bargaining, Equitable Growth grantee Alex Hertel-Fernandez of Columbia University, along with William Kimball and Thomas Kochan of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, find that [support for unions](https://equitablegrowth.org/what-kind-of-labor-organizations-do-u-s-workers-want/) has grown overall, with nearly half of U.S. workers in 2018 saying they would vote for a union if given the opportunity. This is a significant increase from one-third of workers supporting unionization in 1995. According to their research, workers primarily value unions’ role in collective bargaining and ensuring access to benefits such as healthcare, retirement, and unemployment insurance. Strikes have historically been one of the strongest tools used by unions to ensure they have power to engage in collective bargaining. But striking was viewed as a negative attribute in the survey done by Hertel-Fernandez, Kimball, and Kochan. Yet, when they presented workers with the hypothetical choice of a union exercising strike power with other attributes of unions, such as collective bargaining, support increased. But strikes, of course, do not take place in a bubble. The wider climate of worker bargaining power and institutions that support labor organizing plays a role in making this historically crucial tool effective again. So, too, does the power of employers to resist these organizing efforts when the labor market lacks competition that would increase worker bargaining power. The role of monopsony power in the U.S. labor market [Monopsony power](https://equitablegrowth.org/understanding-the-importance-of-monopsony-power-in-the-u-s-labor-market/) is a situation in the labor market where individual employers exercise effective control over wage setting rather than wages being set by competitive forces (akin to monopoly power, where a limited number of firms exercise pricing power over their customers.) In a new Equitable Growth [working paper](https://equitablegrowth.org/working-papers/how-does-market-power-affect-wages-monopsony-and-collective-action-in-an-institutional-context/) by Mark Paul of New College of Florida and Mark Stelzner of Connecticut College, the role of collective action in offsetting employer monopsony power is examined in the context of institutional support for labor. Paul and Stelzner construct an abstract model with the assumption of monopsonistic markets and follow the originator of monopsony theory Joan Robinson’s insight that unions can serve as a countervailing power against employer power. Their model shows that institutional support for unions, such as legislation protecting the right to organize, is necessary for this dynamic process of balancing employers’ monopsony power. In an accompanying [column](https://equitablegrowth.org/rethinking-collective-action-and-u-s-labor-laws-in-a-monopsonistic-economy/), the two researchers write that they “find that a lack of institutional support will devastate unions’ ability to function as a balance to firms’ monopsony power, potentially with major consequences … In turn, labor market outcomes will be less socially efficient.” In short, policies and enforcement that support collective action such as strikes not only creates benefits for workers directly but also addresses a larger problem of concentrated market power.

#### 2: Labor unions are ethical communities and spaces of deliberation. The aff is key to promoting those – workers will be comfortable joining these unions only after the government recognizes their legitimacy and it doesn’t cost workers their jobs.

Youngdahl 09 Jay Youngdahl, “Solidarity First”, New Labor Forum, winter 2009, https://ecommons.cornell.edu/bitstream/handle/1813/76089/Compa71\_Should\_Labor\_Defend\_Worker\_Rights\_as\_Human\_rights.pdf

Unions are all about obligations to our fellow workers. The perceptive political scientist, C.B. Macpherson, argued that a narrowly selfish and rationalistic view of individualism makes it impossible to find a valid theory of obligation to each other in a system that stresses possessive individualism. He writes, “[t]he difficulties . . . [are in the] conception of the individual as essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to society for them.”10Historically, the labor movement has stood in opposition to this philosophy. Labor unions are communities in which tremendous nascent power resides. Contemporary liberal theory and cultural practice, out of which the rights reframing emanates, has devalued the role of solidarity, and diminished the crucial component of community in movements for social change.11 Philosophically, in contrast to an individualistic focus, for all but the most advantaged, entering into a community provides moral meaning. Participation in a community of struggle, such as a strike or job action, can lead to practical answers to existential anxieties, as well as to economic concerns. A conception of unity and solidarity as the intentional ideology of labor communities promotes a strong ethical foundation in a world in which globalized capitalism only offers a “dog eat dog” mentality.12 It is in such communities that workers can find the passion and enthusiasm necessary for the movement of the less powerful against the institutions that strive to divide resources in a manner favorable to the elite.

## Underview

#### [1] aff theory and metatheory is legit else the neg gets away with infinite NC abuse. It’s drop the debater – the 2AR is too short to win theory and substance simultaneously. Competing interps and no RVIs – else the 6 minute 2NR dump on reasonability or the RVI is unbeatable

#### [2] Presumption and permissibility affirm: [A] We assume statements are true unless we’re given reason otherwise: if I told you my name is Maxwell you would believe it. [B] We are psychologically biased toward doing nothing, which means if we came to a stalemate that’s because I was the better debater. [C] We couldn’t do anything if we didn’t trust others in what we were told, means trust is necessary and if we’re at a stalemate you should trust that the res is true

#### [3] Aff gets RVIs on counterinterps [A] The 2N has the option of going for either substance or theory with the layer I undercover, the RVI forces the 2N go for theory [B] The 2AR is the shortest speech which means I need to be able to collapse to the highest layer otherwise I have to beat back every layer in 3 min [C] Neg gets T so give an RVI to rectify reciprocity of opportunity

#### [4] the negative debater must concede either the aff framework or the offense under the aff framework. To clarify, it’s afc or acc but not both.

#### Violation: preemptive

#### Standards:

#### Strat Skew: I can’t win offense under their framework – they get 13 minutes to develop it, I get 7 to respond. But to win my framework’s offense I must win my framework and offense, meaning the 2NR can collapse to offense under either framework and beat back a split 1AR. The interp ensures we both get 13 minutes to win either our framework or our offense.

#### Clash: choosing to contest one or the other means we can go super into depth into whether one part of the aff is true instead of spreading the debate across multiple layers. Outweighs because clash separates debate from speech

#### [5] utilitarianism fails:

#### [A] There’s always infinite pleasure and pain in the universe—util is incoherent since we can’t add or subtract from that..

**Bostrom ’08** (Bostrom, Nick [Professor at University of Oxford, director of Oxford’s Future of Humanity Institute, PhD from London School of Economics]. The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggregative Ethics. 2008. http://www.nickbostrom.com/ethics/infinite.pdf)

In the standard Big Bang model, assuming the simplest topology (i.e., that space is singly connected), there are three basic possibilities: the universe can be open, flat, or closed. **Current data suggests a flat or open universe**, although the final verdict is pending. **If the universe is either open or flat, then it [that] is spatially infinite at every point in time and the model entails that it contains an infinite number of galaxies, stars, and planets**. There exists a common misconception which confuses the universe with the (finite) ‘observable universe’. But **the observable part**—the part that coulsd causally affect us—**would be just an infinitesimal fraction of the whole**. Statements about the “mass of the universe” or the “number of protons in the universe” generally refer to the content of this observable part; see e.g. [1]. **Many cosmologists [also] believe that our universe is just one in an infinite ensemble of universes** (a multiverse), **and this adds to the probability that the world is canonically infinite**; for a popular review, see

#### [B] End states aren’t good in themselves since goodness is indexed – no way to aggregate these interests.

**Geach 56**

Peter T, philosopher, “Good and Evil,” Analysis Vol 17, 32-42, http://fair-use.org/peter-t-geach/good-and-evil

Secondly, though we can sensibly speak of a good or bad human act, **we cannot sensibly speak of a good or bad event**, a good or bad thing to happen. **Event**, like thing, **is too empty a word to convey either a criterion of identity or a standard of goodness**; to ask Is this a good or bad thing (to happen)? is as useless as to ask Is this the same thing that I saw yesterday? or Is the same event still going on?, unless the emptiness of thing or event is filled up by a special context of utterance. **Caesar's murder was a bad thing to happen to a living organism, a good fate for a man who wanted divine worship for himself, and again a good or bad act on the part of his murderers; to ask whether it was a good or bad event would be senseless**.

#### [C] Aggregation is impossible – multiple chemicals in the brain make me happy, so there’s no way to compare or weigh between them.

#### [D] Evolution explains our evaluative judgements, which leaves no room for independent moral facts.

**Street ‘6** [Sharon Street, phil prof at NYU, “A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value, *Philosophical Studies* (2006) 127:109-166] AG

At the end of the day, then, the dilemma at hand is not distinctly Darwinian, but much larger. Ultimately, **the fact that there are any** good **scientific explanations of** our **evaluative judgements is a problem** for the realist about value. It is a problem **because** *realism must* **either** *view the causes described* **by these explanations** *as distorting***, choosing the path that leads to normative skepticism or the claim of an incredible** *coincidence***, or else it must enter into the game of** *scientific explanation***, claiming that the truths it posits actually play a role in the explanation in question**. **The problem with this latter option, in turn, is that they don’t. The best causal accounts of our evaluative judgements, whether Darwinian or otherwise,** *make no reference to* **the realist’s independent** *evaluative truths*. Consider again the old dilemma whether things are valuable because we value them or whether we value

1. "Pragmatic Ethics" [Hugh LaFollette](http://www.hughlafollette.com/index.htm) In [Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory](http://www.hughlafollette.com/papers/b-guide.htm) 2000. Hugh LaFollette is Marie E. and Leslie Cole Professor in Ethics at the University of South Florida St. Petersburg. He is editor-in-chief of The International Encyclopedia of Ethics [↑](#footnote-ref-1)