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Psychoanalysis K

#### Signifiers such as language remove us from the real --- that causes alienation when we attempt to fulfill our desires. Therefore, the role of the ballot is to endorse the best model for exposing drives.

Matheson 15 [Calum Matheson PhD, University of North Carolina, is the author of Desiring the Bomb: Communication, Psychoanalysis, and the Atomic Age. “Desired Ground Zeroes: Nuclear Imagination and the Death Drive.” 2015. Pp. 45-49.]

Jacques Lacan’s notion of the Real is notoriously difficult to define. In his book on the subject, Tom Eyers calls it the “most elusive” of Lacan’s concepts, but one that is also one that is “central” and “determining” for psychoanalysis (1). There are common elements of the various definitions. First, an agreement that both the economy of tropes that allows the conditions for meaning to emerge (the Symbolic) and the meanings and values invested in these tropes, including the subject itself (the Imaginary), do not and cannot perfectly capture all of existence or experience. Second, this unassimilable remainder structures the Symbolic and Imaginary, just as they structure each other, and thus all three registers are knitted together as demonstrated in Lacan’s famous “Borromean Knot.” The Real is what escapes mediation, what disrupts language itself. To explain its significance and relationship to desire requires examining its foundational role in the formation of the subject. The Real can be understood as the constitutive lack of the subject, its separation from the rest of existence by the self-definition necessary for it to come into being in the first place. This is made clear in the mirror stage, where the subject moves from a fragmented, disorganized concept of the body to the “finally donned armor of an alienating identity that will mark his [sic] entire mental development with its rigid structure” (Lacan, “Mirror Stage” 78). The formation of a discrete subject (a function in the Imaginary register) is a compromise. Its formation allows for participation in the Symbolic because to participate in that economy of exchange requires a “social I” (Lacan, “Mirror stage,” 79). This participation comes at the cost of alienation because the subject trades in a world of symbols which by their nature stand in for what is not present, and thus inescapably mediate the (Real) world outside of the subject, rather than making it present. This lack built in to the subject is the engine of desire: the subject’s divide from an object is a prerequisite for the desire of such an object, but the condition of mediation makes it impossible to ever incorporate it in a perfectly satisfying way. Thus desire remains unfulfilled and each chase for a symbol leads to another in loop which the very constitution of the subject dictates must be endless. This is the basic operation of the death drive which is not distinct from Eros. Were the impossible to occur and the drive of Eros to be fulfilled, it would be extinguished, as there would be nothing left to desire. Thus all drives aim, in a sense, at their own extinction, and therefore there is in a sense only one—the drive that aims towards the extinction of desire through its complete fulfillment in continuity with the world that was lost when the subject became distinct from it in the mirror stage. Although the death drive might stand in for the singular character of the drive, it should not be understood as a desire for the actual biological death of the subject’s body, or even the desire to inflict death on others. The self-destruction of the death drive is a desire to break the limits of the self as the alienating armor of the subject by experiencing unmediated contact with the Real. Death still defines its operation in other ways. The last portion of Lacan’s “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis” explains the metaphorical centrality of death as the center of a torus formed by incessant symbolization. The fort-da game is most significant not because it shows that the child wishes to destroy its mother or even inoculate itself against that possibility, but because it assimilates the child into the Symbolic order through the repetition of the signifiers fort and da, which stand in for presence and absence. Death is central to language because the symbol itself invokes the absence and loss of non- existence since its function is to stand in for something that is gone. Language swirls around this absent center of death, a primordial absence encased in the inner ring of the torus, while the outer surfaces of language hold all else that cannot be symbolized at bay on the outside (Lacan, “Function and Field” 260-264). Paradoxically, death is necessarily evoked by the symbol as that which is absent and also made possible in the first place by that same symbol. The separation of the subject into its alienating identity as a social object makes a meaningful concept of death possible because without it there is no dasein, no individual, no singular human to die. George Bataille explains this with an entomological example. If a scientist picks one fly from a swarm, that fly is subject to death, because its end means the end of the discontinuous being selected by the entomologist. Without differentiation of its members, however, the swarm lives on; the selection of the fly is for the entomologist, not the animal (Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice” 14-16). Thus it is with human beings. The subject is founded by a rejection of its sole animal nature by participating in a world of work and accumulation, mediated by language—essentially Lacan’s Symbolic. Thus individuals are made discontinuous with the general economy of matter and energy from which all things are formed by a conceptual separation inextricably bound up in death. Our existences are thus defined by discontinuity from a world of continuity, and for Bataille as for Lacan, our drives are singular in the sense that sex is a coupling that unifies with another and momentarily overcomes discontinuity just as death is the end of the subject’s brief separation from a universe differentiated only by the dismembering violence of our imposition of symbols upon it (Bataille, Erotism 13-17). The experience of death may still be unique because it suggests the absence implied by the sign and because it can be experienced only once by the subject—and for obvious reasons, cannot be symbolized by anyone with first-hand experience. As Freud argues in “Thoughts For The Times On War and Death,” we cannot even hope to imagine our own deaths because to do so demands that we imagine them from some perspective which would be destroyed in the experience itself. Death and the Real are therefore not identical, but are closely linked. The most important characteristic of the Real is not just that it suggests existence beyond language, but that this world-for-itself (to borrow from Eugene Thacker) intrudes on human reality and reveals it to be incomplete. Encompassing Max Picard’s concept of silence, the Real is not the absence of human reality so much as the traumatic revelation that that reality was always incomplete, always feigned in the face of existence so much more than human mediation has already covered. Chris Lundberg uses Lacan’s distinction between reality, being the social world of human construction, and the Real, being the occasional but inevitable failure of that reality, to develop his own distinction between failed unicity and feigned unicity. The Symbolic operates as an economy of interconnected and mutually-referential tropes weaving a kind of fabric that is the precondition for meaning, an environment in which social relationships can be understood in context. When the unified illusion of the social fails, we are compelled to stitch the tears in that fabric to maintain the world that gives us meaning (Lacan in Public 2-3). An account by Bill Laurence, the only journalist allowed to witness the Trinity test, provides evidence for this rupture and repair. While “not a sound could be heard” for the period after the flash and before the thunder, Laurence saw civilization itself collapse in an instant: The big boom came about one hundred seconds after the great flash—the first cry of a newborn world. It brought the silent, motionless silhouettes to life, gave them a voice. A loud cry filled the air. The little groups that had hitherto stood rooted to the earth like desert plants broke into a dance—the rhythm of primitive man dancing at one of his fire festivals at the coming of spring. They clapped their hands as they leaped from the ground...The dance of the primitive man lasted but a few seconds, during which an evolutionary period of about 10,000 years telescoped. Primitive man was metamorphosed into modern man—shaking hands, slapping his fellow on the back, all laughing like happy children. (12)

#### Fantasies about a utopian economy inevitably fail, but the process of fantasizing addicts us to the problem, creating an attachment that prevents solutions, instead causing an infinite deferral of problems onto an external source

Byrne and Healy 06 [Ken Byrne and Stephen Healy. “Co-operative Subjects: Towards a Post-Fantasmic Enjoyment of the Economy.” 2006. Rethinking Marxism. http://www.communityeconomies.org/sites/default/files/paper\_attachment/cooptopiapaper.pdf]

Returning to our three familiar subjects of economy we can see that, in each case, the individual upholds a Utopian dream of harmonious unity, completion, or wholeness. Jim has a dream of a precapitalist, premodern community of unalienated, actualized individuals; Stanley has a dream of a fully efficient, ecologically minded, sustainable society; Ellen has a dream of a neoliberal society in which the market and competition inevitably lead to the harmonious allocation of resources and rewards. Clearly, the ‘‘currently existing economy’’ in each of these fantasies has different emotional associations and attached values. But what we can point out here is that in each case there is an ideal economy, an economy in which needs would be met, desires would be satisfied, proper human and social development would be achieved. If only .... Another key element of fantasy is that it produces, paradoxically, the object that frustrates its consummation: the symptom. This is so because fantasy cannot actually find that final meaning in the Other, eliminate the lack in the identity of the self, or provide a pure language beyond the corruption of the sliding signifier. Fantasy protects us from the anxiety of the lack, and it gives a name to\*/symbolizes\*/the thing that blocks us from getting what we desire. It gives a name to our desire and to why it is unattainable, without confronting or acknowledging the unavoidable lack. It allows us to domesticate the lack, but in such a way that the impossible fullness moves from being impossible to being prohibited. Thus, Zˇizˇek (1991) says that fantasy is not the commonplace notion of fantasy (the fantasy of the successful sexual relationship, for example) but is, rather, the story of why it went wrong. With our three fantasizing subjects, we can see how the prohibition of the impossible is played out. In the anticapitalist fantasy, it is capitalism that stands SUBJECTS OF ECONOMY 243 in the way of what should be the Utopic true economy. For the sustainable development fantasy, the alien figure obstructing the reconciliation of community, environment, and economy is profligate, short-term gain. For the neoliberal, the Utopian vision is of a society composed of responsible, rational individuals each seeking to maximize their resources; the obstacle is government regulation.2 If the symptom provides the arbitrary, contingent content while filling the necessary structural role of giving consistency to the fantasy, we can project that if each of these obstacles were removed, these particular individuals would still be left with a sense of disappointment and dissatisfaction. Indeed, their reliance on these symptoms, on the alien figure or the scapegoat, suggests that these individuals get a certain degree of pleasure or enjoyment out of the frustration of their fantasies. Ellen is both horrified and secretly pleased by her explanation of how sentimental environmentalists get in the way of progress in the Valley; Stanley is visibly gleeful when he itemizes the wastefulness of those less committed to environmentalism than he is. Freud described the look on the face of the Rat Man as he recounted a recurring horrific image as a mixture of horror and pleasure. But the Rat Man was only aware of his horror, not of his pleasure. It is our experience that many of the fantasizing subjects of economy we’ve encountered are, indeed, Rat Men. The Problem with Fantasy Those who have applied the Lacanian theory of the fantasy and symptom to social and political theory have asserted that the Left must struggle against the dangerous 2. We should point out that these caricatures are presented here as full and fully defined subjects, almost wholly without identity beyond their resentment and frustration. Our commitment to an overdeterminist understanding of subjectivity (acknowledging that subjects are complex, multiple, contradictory, and changing) and of effectivity (accepting that the political outcomes of any particular action or subjective position are also complex, multiple, contradictory, and changing) does not preclude us here from fixing these characters, for the moment, to tell a particular story, the telling of which we hope will have certain positive outcomes. If you recognize yourself in these characters’ attachment to fantasy, or identify with our frustrations with them, then one such positive effect may have already occurred. In addition, at this point it is fair to inquire about the fantasies of the authors. There are at least three responses to this inquiry that come to mind: (1) to deny that we have a fantasy about the economy, because we have overcome fantasy and replaced it with something more like true knowledge; (2) to argue that we have replaced one fantasy with another, better fantasy, one that leads us to a better place and one that if widely shared would produce a better society; and (3) to suggest that if one can never be outside fantasy, one can at least develop a different relationship to it, predicated on acknowledging the structure of fantasy and the Utopian impulse. Taking this third approach, we acknowledge that Hilton, Grimm, and Bellow are the symptoms of our particular fantasy; we recognize our desire to believe that without subjects like them, without leftist subjectivity built around resentment, our particular vision of a future society would be realizable. 244 BYRNE AND HEALY fantasies that have historically suffused its projects.3 This desire to get beyond fantasy is motivated by the belief that fantasies, when politicized, attempt to enforce a closure on the social; the inevitable by-product is a scapegoat who must be eliminated. This is one of the reasons that Stavrakakis and others raise the specters of Nazism or Stalinism, as the dark clouds inevitably appearing on the horizon of Utopian thought. Our emphasis in applying Lacanian psychoanalytic theory to economic subjectivity is somewhat different. We are less concerned with the dark social consequences of fantasy and more concerned with what fantasy, and especially leftist fantasy, prevents us from imagining, what possible politics and what other orientations of the desiring (economic) subject are precluded\*/how different approaches to economic, social, and environmental justice are stymied by fantasies in which the world is already too full of meaning, where the identity of (economic) subjects is anchored in relation to a frustrating symptom of which these subjects are unwilling to let go. In our reading, psychoanalytic and Marxian theory are complementary. Building on Gibson-Graham (1996), Graham, Healy, and Byrne (2002), and the Community Economies Collective (2001), we regard Marxian class analysis as a proliferative discourse, allowing us to see the richness of what, in class terms, is in the already socialized character of work, and motivating us to be inspired by things as they could be in the absence of the social theft that is exploitation. The power of psychoanalysis, on the other hand, is subtractive: It removes us from old ways of being, in light of the already socialized nature of the subject, altering our relationship 3. As people who identify with the Marxian tradition, we recognize that there is a vast literature from this perspective that addresses the connection between subjectivity and economy, and the role of desire, fantasy, and consciousness from a variety of perspectives. Since this discussion stretches from Marx through Lenin and Luka´cs to Althusser and Zˇizˇek, it would be exceedingly difficult to chart our agreements with and divergences from this tradition. What we wish to distance ourselves from here is a certain strain within the Marxist tradition that is enmeshed in the fantasy of an unalienated individual or an economy freed from conflict and contradiction. This wish places us at odds with fantastic versions of Marxism and with those within the Marxist tradition that attempt to restore an ‘‘integral wholeness’’ to the economic subject. Fantasy is defined here for us by the existence of the frustrating symptom that permits desire to remain in play by constantly throwing up obstacles to its ‘‘realization.’’ Many have observed that Soviet orthodoxy under Stalin evoked and continually deferred socialist paradise by pointing to threats both internal and external (Zˇizˇek 2001). In a different way, the notion of ‘‘false consciousness,’’ the idea that there is some technique of analysis or performance that allows oneself or one’s ‘‘class’’ to arrive at their true self-interest, can be understood as another type of fantasy. One particularly useful approach squarely within the Marxist tradition, which does not view the issue through the lens of psychoanalysis, is that taken by Amariglio and Callari (1989), who argue that Marx’s very formulation of the terms ‘‘commodity fetishism’’ and ‘‘value’’ contain within them Marx’s rejection of economic determinism and express his understanding of subjectivity as overdetermined. ‘‘The key to the concept of value lies not in any universal law of value,’’ they write ‘‘but in the historical conjunctures which reproduce that objectification of human relations which is the content of bourgeois consciousness and which Marx began to theorize with the concept of commodity fetishism. Far from being proof of the closure of Marx’s discourse at the level of the economy, the concept of commodity fetishism is Marx’s way of overturning the discursive privilege of the economy’’ (1989, 44). SUBJECTS OF ECONOMY 245 with the real and with our selves in relation to our attachments and resentments. If Marxism is about becoming, the psychoanalysis we seek to highlight is about giving up. Put another way, as leftists interested in social transformation, we believe that unsettling people’s fantasies is an unavoidable aspect of doing politics. What we don’t want to do is simply replace one fantasy with another, ‘‘more correct’’ one. That is, the goal of analysis is not reaching some point free of or outside fantasy, but traversing it, arriving at a different relationship to fantasy. Intriguingly, a number of authors\*/in particular Zˇizˇek, Stavrakakis, and Chow\*/ have seen equivalencies between this traversing of fantasy and the ‘‘institutionalization of lack,’’ or the political practice of nonclosure over the void, that marks the Radical Democracy project of Laclau and Mouffe. The Radical Democrats themselves have acknowledged their debt to psychoanalysis in their formulation of the politics of dislocation; just as the analysand in psychoanalysis comes to question the fantastic scene that both defines and frustrates him, social movements come to confront, challenge, and change the content of liberal democratic society, the provisionally fixed content or social fantasies of who is determined to be a legitimate rightsbearing political subject (Butler, Laclau, and Zˇizˇek 2000).

#### The attempt to “fix” class antagonism through struggles for surplus belies a libidinal investment in the phantasy structure of a world without class antagonism that hamstrings solutions

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Here, we see the relevance of calling upon the psychoanalytic category of the real in order to encircle the irreducible status of class antagonism: class antagonism qua real does not refer to the particular antagonisms between the serf and the lord, the proletariat and the capitalist, the slave and the master, or any distributor and recipient of surplus. Rather, class antagonism is the very impossibility of achieving an ideal class structure that can ultimately fix the struggles over living labor: [T]o grasp the notion of antagonism in its most radical dimension, we should invert the relationship between the two terms: it is not the external enemy who is preventing me from achieving identity with myself, but every identity is already in itself blocked, marked by an impossibility, and the external enemy is simply the small piece, the rest of reality upon which we ‘project’ or ‘externalize’ this intrinsic, immanent impossibility. (Zizek, 1990, p 252) The real of class antagonism, therefore, refers to the very impossibility of instituting a class formation that would designate the quantum and the various destinations of surplus-labor once and for all. In fact, various concrete configurations of class positions (the lord and the serf, the employer and the employee, and so on) are socially invented in order to make up for the nonexistence of the class relation. Each and every concrete classed site (a capitalist corporation, a slave plantation, a feudal household, or a worker-owned cooperative) is a complex assemblage of social devices, such as legal constellations, cultural identifications, technologies of production and labor management, accounting practices, social norms, and political ideologies. Through these social inventions or institutional devices, concrete communities try to make up for the absence of a set of rules that would realize a smoothly functioning class relation. We propose to read the totality of the social conditions of in/existence of each form of appropriation of surplus to be structured like a contradictory fantasy formation. 3 Put differently, each concrete class structure, even a particular class antagonism like the one between the ‘‘bosses’’ and the ‘‘workers,’’ is ‘‘already a ‘reactive’ or ‘defense’ formation, an attempt to ‘cope with’ (to come to terms with, to pacifyy) the trauma of class antagonism’’ (Zizek, 1998, p 81). Taking jouissance into account Nevertheless, such domestication can never be fully accomplished. Sooner or later, the real will always erupt and lead to the dissolution of a particular configuration of the social order. This return of the real, however, should not be imagined as an exogenous shock that undermines the smooth functioning of the system. Rather, the destructive forces of the real emerge from within: the Lacanian subject is the subject of jouissance and will do everything to make sure ‘‘to sustain and advance’’ her ‘‘particular relationship to enjoyment’’ (McGowan, 2004, p 3); the subject will ‘‘sacrifice anything and everything (even life itself) for [that] particular Thing’’ (p 5). This is the logic of what Freud called the death drive, and we will return below to explore how it figures in the context of capitalist competition. However, precisely because the subject is a subject of jouissance, and not a subject of rational calculation, this possibility of dissolution should not be overstated. To begin with, we have to assert that there are no pure ‘‘economic interests’’ that are not caught up within, shaped by, and colored with the smear of jouissance. In fact, as class analysts, we find it necessary to take into account the psychic ‘‘investments’’ and fantasy scenarios that organize and impart coherence to the identifications of these classed subjects: ypsychoanalysis [clarifies] the status of this paradoxical jouissance as the payment that the exploited, the servant, receives for serving the Master. This jouissance, of course, always emerges within a certain phantasmic field; the crucial precondition for breaking the chains of servitude is thus to ‘traverse the fantasy’ which structures our jouissance in a way which keeps us attached to the Master F makes us accept the framework of the social relationship of domination. (Zizek, 1997, p 48) By foregrounding the economy of jouissance, by taking into account the particular ways in which classed subjects may also be implicated in the reproduction of the relations of exploitation, psychoanalysis reminds us that the dissemination of the knowledge of class exploitation in itself (e.g., the righteous attitude of ‘‘Speaking truth to power’’) can seldom be enough to occasion class transformation. Something extra, something that takes into account the libidinal economy, something akin to what Zizek calls ‘‘the traversal of fantasy,’’ seems to be necessary to occasion deliberate social transformation that will enable us to break into the future. Up to this point, we have argued that ‘‘class’’ should be conceptualized as the process of performance, appropriation, and distribution of surplus-labor and that there is no ‘‘normal’’ way of instituting it. Moreover, rather than tacking particular modes of subjectivity onto a pre-constituted class structure, we have maintained that particular modes of subjectivity and formations of fantasy constitute the class structure. Yet, we have also argued that all attempts at ‘‘fixing’’ class are bound to fail. In what follows, we argue that there are two distinct modalities of failure. In other words, we will ‘‘sexuate’’ the multiple ways in which communities organize their relation to surplus. In doing so, our aim is to formulate a feminine ethics of ‘‘non-all’’ that will enable us to move beyond the capitalist present and its masculine logic of ‘‘all.’’

#### A Deleuzian analysis fails at the level of subjectivity and only serves to mystify the function of the lack in structuring how subjects function --- this allows the death drive to persist

Hallward 10 (“You Can’t Have it Both Ways: Deleuze or Lacan” by Peter Hallward, Professor of Modern European Philosophy. BA, University of Oxford PhD, Yale University. “Deleuze and Psychoanalysis Philosophical Essay on Deleuze’s Debate with Psychoanalysis” Edited by Leen De Bolle © 2010 by Leuven University Press pg 39-41) EG

For Deleuze, the 'human' denotes nothing more than a sort of local enclosure, an especially stubborn set of strata or territorial constraints. The human denotes the condition that any active or creative force must strive to escape, since "becoming-reactive is constitutive of man" (Deleuze 1962, 64): if an active force does what it is, and immediately creates, desires, or destroys, a reactive force introduces a gap between action and actor. Reactive force privileges the created over the creating. An active force creates or destroys; the bearer of a reactive force asks why it is being destroyed, resents its destroyer, and attributes malice to it. In the Nietzschean terms that Deleuze adopts and intensifies, "ressentiment, bad conscience and nihilism are not psychological traits but the foundation of the humanity in man. They are the principle of the human being as such" (Deleuze 1962, 64). The human being is simply that being which has taken on such resentment as its organising principle. An envious, belittling negativity or nihilism is constitutive of the human, and with the human "the whole world sinks and sickens, the whole of life is depreciated, everything known slides towards its own nothingness." Conversely, since humanity is indistinguishable from ressentiment, "to move beyond ressentiment is to attain the end of history as history of man" (Deleuze 1962, 34-35). If truly creative life is to live it will require the death of man. Genuine affirmation will only proceed "above man, outside man, in the overman [Ubermensch] which it produces and in the unknown that it brings with it" (Deleuze 1962, 177). To reverse in this way our creatural passage from 'the immediate to the useful' would allow us to go back to 'the dawn of our human experience.'15 This dawn - the dawn of the world, of'the world before man, before ouV^wn\_dawn' - is a moment to which Deleuze will never cease to return.16 Lacan's work, by contrast, begins (with his 1932 thesis, De la psychose paranoiaque dans ses rapports avec la personalite) with an insistence on the irreducible need, in any analysis of human behaviour, of a social and semantic dimension, a dimension that cannot be subsumed within any more general science or metaphysics. Lacan's work begins with an analysis of how the emergence of human personality is mediated by the intersubjective work of interpretation and speech. 2. This brings us to a second difference, concerning the status of subjectivity and intersubjectivity Lacan locates the object and method' of analysis 'in this specific reality of interpersonal relations.'17 The peculiar concern, medium, and milieu of psychoanalysis is speech, and speech is by definition a trans-subjective activity. Speech is bound up in the need and struggle for recognition, the constitution of a subject in its relations with the other: "Language, prior to signifying something, signifies to someone."18 Speech is a matter of seduction, dependence, deception, aggression, and so on, before it is a matter of information , " Lacan's I is / because I speak to and with the Other, and my' unconscious is structured by the language that I share or contest with others - "the fact that the symbolic is located outside of man is the very notion of the unconscious."19 At the most general level, "what I seek in speech is the response of the other," and in this sense speech is always a pact, a form of symbolic being with whose dynamic is most clearly exemplified by the logic of a password.10 A password means nothing, other than the institution of a shared or socialised sphere of meaning itself- a sphere in which people can speak with (rather than assault) each other. For instance, if what is decisive in Lacan's analysis of Poe's 'Purloined Letter' is the way 'the signifier's displacement determines subjects' acts,' this signifier remains 'the symbol of a pact,' and its determination itself proceeds via the mediation of a stable and repetitive pattern of intersubjective relationships: what most interests Lacan "is the way in which the subjects, owing to their displacement, relay each other in the course of the intersubjective repetition."21 What Lacan here calls the 'register of truth' is situated "at the very foundation of intersubjectivity. It is situated where the subject can grasp nothing but the very subjectivity that constitutes an Other as an absolute."22 Along with the intersubject, Deleuze rejects the category of the subject as well. As everyone knows, the subject in Lacan is the subject of unconscious speech, the subject defined by castration and lack, by its incorporation into a symbolic order that lacks any natural plenitude or positive orientation. There is no sub-symbolic or 'instinctual' order of things, no domain of being or nature, that can subsume the domain of the subject and speech. The subject of speech is both forever 'cut off from nature' and forever 'grafted' into his sociosymbolic milieu, the milieu in which 'desire is a relation of being to lack.'23 The subject that constitutes itself (through the 'mirror stage') in its reflected disjunction with itself'consists' only in this lack of coincidence.24 In Deleuze, by contrast, operators of displacement or differentiation do not proceed in terms of negation and lack but in terms of continuous creation and dynamic metamorphosis. The Deleuzian 'subject' (the schizo, the nomad, the rhizome ...) does not consist of a negative indetermination or non-coincidence, instead it 'coincides' with a wholly positive force of self-differentiation. Deleuze and Guattari s schizophrenic "is not simply bisexual, or between the two, or intersexual. He is transexual. He is trans-parentchild [...]. He does not abolish disjunction by identifying the contradictory elements by means of elaboration; instead, he affirms it through a continuous overflight spanning an indivisible distance." The schizo does not inhabit the lack of a sexual relationship between man and woman: "he is himself this distance that transforms him into a woman" (Deleuze & Guattari 1972, 76-77). More generally, Deleuze and Guattari insist, "one does not reach becoming or the molecular, as long as a line is connected to two distant points [...]. A becoming is neither the one nor the two, nor the relation of the two; it is the in-between [...], it constitutes a zone of proximity and indiscernibility, a no-mans land, a nonlocalisable relation sweeping up the two distant or contiguous points, carrying one into the proximity of the other" (Deleuze & Guattari 1980, 293). For the same reason, "you will not have reached the ultimate and irreducible terms of the unconscious so long as you find or restore a link [lien] between two elements" (Deleuze & Guattari 1972, 314). In other words, Deleuze rejects the category of the subject for the same reason that Lacan embraces it. He rejects it as a dimension of negation and lack, on account of its radical disorientation, its exclusion from the domain of creation, being, or nature. When Deleuze affirms a version of Lacan's signifier or phallus, he reinterprets it as an instance of creative self-differentiation pure and simple (more on this below). When Deleuze affirms a version of Lacan's desire or speech, he deprives it precisely of its subjective dimension. In doing so, Deleuze makes a version of the mistake made by Foucault, when the latter claims an allegiance with Lacan insofar as he purportedly "shows how [...] structures, the very system of language itself—and not the subject—are what speak through the discourse of the patient and the symptoms of his neurosis," such that what speaks through the subject is simply an anonymous system without subject' (the anonymous murmur' of 'on parle or one speaks'): as Bertrand Ogilvie points out, such interpretations attribute to Lacan 'the opposite of what he says,' i.e. the effective elimination of the subject, its reduction to nothing more than a derivative nodal point in a network.'25

#### This desire to fulfill the lack causes extinction, genocide, climate change, and mass violence, through the death drive’s insistence on destructive behaviors culminating in a jouissance that inverts the Symbolic’s value system

Gilligan 16 [Dr. James Gilligan is an American psychiatrist and author, husband of Carol Gilligan and best known for his series of books entitled Violence, where he draws on 25 years of work in the American prison system to describe the motivation and causes behind violent behavior. “Can psychoanalysis help us to understand the causes and prevention of violence?” May 26, 2016. Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy. https://sci-hub.se/10.1080/02668734.2016.1169768]

The point of this article will be to summarize some of what we have learned so far concerning the causes and prevention of violence, the term that I will use to refer to the infliction of injuries, especially lethal injuries, on a human (whether oneself or another person) by a human. This is arguably the most important problem in public health and preventive medicine today, and it occurs in at least three different forms. First, behavioral violence, from homicide and suicide to war and genocide (the contemporary version of which has taken the form called terrorism). Now that we are in the age of thermonuclear weapons, which are increasingly in the hands of rulers of questionable sanity and rationality, we possess the ability to become the first species in evolutionary history to bring about its own extinction through its own behavior, rather than as a result of environmental changes beyond its power to control. Secondly, structural violence, meaning the political and economic policies that create a social and economic structure that divides the population into the rich and powerful, vs. the poor and the weak, which has the effect of disproportionately killing the poor and the weak; in fact, killing far more of them than have died from all the different forms of behavioral violence put together (so far), as well as being the most powerful cause of behavioral violence, i.e. the most clearly identified cause of epidemics of homicide, suicide, war, revolution, and genocide. And thirdly, ecological violence, or climate change, which begins by killing the poor and the weak first, but which could end by killing us all, if we do not succeed in overcoming the forces that want to continue saying ‘after us, the deluge (or rather, the flooding ocean, and lethal temperatures).’ In this short article I will only have space to discuss the first of these three forms of violence, but I do want to mention that all three of them, in addition to having the same ultimate consequences (mass death, potentially on an Downloaded by [University of Lethbridge] at 03:56 26 June 2016 Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy 5 apocalyptic scale), also have the same ultimate psychological and social causes – namely, the desire to realize certain over-riding emotional and ideological goals even if those can only be reached at the cost of physical survival – as individuals, as groups, or even as a species. One of the emotional goals that motivate potentially unlimited violence is the wish to divide the population into the superior and the inferior, and to guarantee that oneself, and the group with which one identifies, will always be in a position that is superior, rather than inferior, to that of everyone else (as opposed to maximizing social, economic, and political equality) – even if that requires maximizing the amount of violence in the world, and risks or even requires the physical death of oneself or the extermination of the group with which one has identified. For example, mass murderers, from the Kamikaze pilots in World War II to the suicide-bombers of today, have always been at extremely high risk of suicide as well as homicide (in fact, the same is true of individual murderers). Japanese soldiers were notorious for preferring death to the shame and disgrace of surrender, and many of their political and military leaders thought the Japanese nation as a whole should act according to the same values. And Hitler not only committed suicide, to avoid the shame and humiliation of being tried as a war criminal by those who had defeated him (saying he would rather be a dead Achilles than a living dog); his last order to his surviving subordinates before his death was for the complete extermination of the German people – the very nation, ostensibly, for whose sake he had started the war in the first place, and concerning whom he made the moral judgment that they deserved death because they had lost his war. As clinicians, we have had no opportunities to study or interview Hitler himself or the Kamikaze pilots, directly and personally, so our knowledge about them is inevitably indirect and second-hand. However, mass murderers and the equivalent of suicide-bombers do exist in all too great an abundance in our prisons and jails, in our high-security mental hospitals for the ‘criminally insane,’ and sometimes even in our juvenile detention centers. And to an increasing degree, psychoanalytically trained therapists are availing themselves of the opportunity to work with these populations in these institutions. For example, the sub-specialty of applied psychoanalysis that is devoted to the treatment of people who engage in destructive, anti-social, and violent behavior was named ‘forensic psychotherapy,’ in acknowledgment of the fact that such individuals usually come to our attention through the legal system, by Estela Welldon at the Portman Clinic,1 when she founded the International Association for Forensic Psychotherapy in 1991, together with a program designed to train and educate clinicians as to how to engage in psychotherapy with this population (Welldon, 2012). But that association, and the work it specializes in, was also inspired by the psychoanalyst Edward Glover’s founding both of that clinic and of the Association for the Scientific Treatment of Crime and Violence some sixty years before that, in 1931. In the United States, Stuart Twemlow and his colleagues have created the International Journal of Applied Psychoanalysis, with the similar goal of finding ways to adapt Downloaded by [University of Lethbridge] at 03:56 26 June 2016 6 J. Gilligan and apply psychoanalytic insights and approaches to populations, and to human problems, beyond those that it could usefully address by means of traditional, conventional ‘orthodox’ psychoanalyses. And they are now editing the first textbook of applied psychoanalysis. Even before the invention of thermonuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, Freud (1930) recognized with great foresight the danger to human survival caused by our propensity to engage in violent behavior, when he wrote: The fateful question of the human species seems to me to be whether and to what extent the cultural process developed in it will succeed in mastering the derangements of communal life caused by the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction. In this connection, perhaps the phase through which we are at this moment passing deserves special interest. Men have brought their powers of subduing the forces of nature to such a pitch that by using them they could now very easily exterminate one another to the last man. They know this – hence arises a great part of their current unrest, their dejection, their mood of apprehension. (Freud, 1930, p. 145) I do not want to leave the impression, however, that my own decision to specialize in the study and treatment of violent criminals was the result of rationally assessing all the evidence and theories that I have just cited concerning the appropriateness of applying psychoanalysis to this subject. When I began my clinical training in psychiatry at the Harvard Medical School, I had no conscious intention at all of going nearer to anyone who was violent than I could avoid. I planned to devote my career to a reasonably conventional psychoanalytic practice. Then in the second year of my residency training, when the salary my teaching hospital was paying me was insufficient to enable me to support my family, which by that point included a wife and three children, I discovered that I could earn extra money by taking an elective rotation in something I had never heard of before, called ‘Prison Psychiatry,’ which would require me to spend one day a week in a local prison practicing individual and group psychotherapy with a selected group of convicted criminals. Prior to that point in my training, I had been taught that the people who wound up in prisons were psychopaths or sociopaths, and that such people were – by definition – dishonest and would not tell me the truth; that they had no interest in introspection or self-examination; that their only motive for seeing me would be to manipulate me into supporting their ability to be paroled and released from prison; that they were, in short, untreatable. I had been taught that the reason they raped, robbed, or even killed others was because it was to their rational advantage and self-interest to do so, and that they merely lacked the internalized inhibitions against such behavior that the rest of us have. In other words, I thought they were in effect like graduates of the Harvard Business School, who had studied cost-benefit analysis and were behaving according to the same principles of rational self-interest and common sense. That implied that the only experience they would learn from was punishment, and the only effective way to teach Downloaded by [University of Lethbridge] at 03:56 26 June 2016 Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy 7 criminals to stop harming others was to harm them even more, by punishing them more severely the more violently they behaved. It seemed reasonable to suppose that increasing the costs of their criminal behavior, while the benefits remained constant, would increase the cost-benefit ratio, and they would stop breaking the law. Neither psychiatrists nor psychoanalysts, I had been taught up to that point, should waste their time trying to treat these untreatable people; all we could do was hope that the courts would send them to prison, and that their punishments would teach them to behave themselves. As a result, I expected my experience as a prison psychotherapist to be boring and an exercise in futility. But I needed the money. So into the prison I went. To my surprise, I found it to be the most emotionally moving experience I had had in my psychiatric training up to that point, for I found myself face to face with the depths of human tragedy on a daily basis – both the tragedies that these men had inflicted on their victims, but also the tragedies of which they themselves had been the victims. The most violent among them were the survivors of their own attempted murders, at the hands of a parent, or of the actual murders of their closest family members, often in front of their eyes. I also found the task of attempting to understand these men, to learn what could possibly motivate one human being to treat another human being in ways that we call ‘inhuman,’ the most intellectually and scientifically challenging mystery I had ever attempted to solve. Finally, I felt that the magnitude of the danger posed to our whole society, and indeed our whole species, by the human propensity to commit acts of horrendous violence made it the most socially important problem to which I could devote my career. Fortunately for me, my training in working with this challenging population was conducted by an inspiring psychoanalyst who was the author of some of the first American articles on prison psychiatry, Adler (1972, 1982). I also had as a mentor another psychoanalyst, Elvin Semrad, who had introduced me to the notion that a psychoanalytic approach could enable us to understand and treat even the most deeply disturbed individuals, a population that even Freud had initially considered untreatable (though that did not stop him from realizing that psychoanalysis could in fact add to our understanding of even the severely psychotic when he chose to analyze Schreber’s memoirs (Freud, 1911). As a result of my initial prison experience, I came to the conclusion that the main reason criminals had been considered untreatable was because almost no one had made a serious attempt to treat them. One of the most widespread myths about violence is that the criminals who commit it behave the way they do because they are simply amoral and never developed a moral value system. In fact, I had never heard such a constant preoccupation with moral questions as I have since I began to sit down and talk with murderers and rapists; they can hardly talk about anything else but central moral issues such as unfairness and neglect, exploitation and abuse. They would rather die than submit to what they perceive as neglect or injustice (and these are not Downloaded by [University of Lethbridge] at 03:56 26 June 2016 8 J. Gilligan empty words – the death rate of those who engage in serious violence is many times higher than that of others of their age, class, caste, and sex). The moral ideology typically expressed by those who commit criminal violence is exactly the same as conventional morality – except that the value signs are reversed, so that what is positively valued according to conventional moral and cultural values is negatively valued by the criminal personality and subculture. Where someone with a ‘normal’ value system (i.e. one that is socially acceptable in our culture) might typically be expected to feel guilt, the person with an ‘antisocial’ value system typically feels pride. In fact, I have often seen this reversal of conventional morality be so explicit as to take the form of a person’s boasting (not apologizing) about how ‘bad’ he is, as a way of demonstrating how ‘tough’ he is (as in ‘I’m the baddest mother-fucker you ever saw’); or even reversing the conventional symbols and rituals of religion (joining cults that worship Satan or ‘Anti-Christ’) or politics (idolizing Hitler and the Nazis).

#### Thus, the alt is to let go. The process of accepting limitations allows us to reclaim the surplus, accepting our boundaries, and re-orient anti-capitalist struggles through a communist axiom.

Ozselcuk and Madra 05 [Ceren Ozselcuk, PhD is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Bogazici University. Yahya M. Madra teaches Economics at Boğaziçi University. “Psychoanalysis and Marxism: From Capitalist-All to Communist Non-All.” 2005. Psychoanalysis, Culture, & Society. https://sci-hub.se/10.1057/palgrave.pcs.2100028]

In these passages, we find a Marx that traverses the Lockean fantasy that organizes our relationship towards surplus qua objet petit a. When he enumerates the series of social expenses one by one and refuses to impose an exception that would condition the list, we find a Marx that lets go of the surplus. The relation to surplus that Marx describes in these passages is neither one of desire (for surplus qua lost object) nor one of deadly drive (for the expansion of value). In this sense, we read Marx’s Critique as an invitation to communists to re-orient their relation to surplus, to traverse the fantasy of ‘‘fixing’’ class. But how can we concretize this vision? How could it inform concrete political struggles today? To begin with, we should refrain from defining communism as a social utopia that promises to deliver what the bourgeois program of equality has failed to achieve. Why should we turn communism into an unrealizable ideal, an unachievable end point, a utopian destination, that promises to accomplish something that no conceivable social order – let alone bourgeois – can ever fulfill? Why should we burden the communist project with such an unattainable task of delivering the impossible fullness of community? In contrast, we propose to define communism explicitly as a starting point, a principle, an axiom that asserts that no one can have exclusive rights over the dispatching of the surplus. 5 An important condition of possibility of this social reclaiming of surplus is precisely its psychic letting go. Blatant presumptuousness that makes exploitation possible will become perceivable only if we let go of the idea that the right to enjoy surplus can be exclusive. This is what we mean by traversing the fantasy in the context of class transformation. Once this shift in perspective is achieved, it would become possible for us to assert the axiom of communism on each occasion when communist class structures are being instituted, rendering each concrete communism always inconsistent and ultimately a failed attempt. In fact, we think that the axiom of communism is already addressed in many of the decisions of collective enterprises that pertain to the division of labor, business expansion, use of workspace, remuneration, and distribution. In some cases of worker cooperatives, for instance, decisions are rigorously debated and assumed with reference to a contestable notion of ‘‘fairness’’ that implicates not only the existing and potential members, but also the broader community (Byrne and Healy, 2003). In fact, such cooperatives are distinguished from others by their fidelity to a ‘‘politics of antagonism’’ (Byrne and Healy, 2003) and commitment to an ‘‘ethical economy’’ (Gibson-Graham, 2003). For us, such characterizations of collective enterprises are intimately linked to the question of whether and to what extent the axiom of communism is exercised over the appropriation and distribution of communal surplus. Equally important though is to hold up the axiom of communism against the capitalist-all, that is, on each occasion when someone or some social group claims his/her/their right to participate in the negotiation of the capitalist surplus. Since there is nothing inherently wrong about surplus, it is possible to make use of it for purposes that do not necessarily reproduce the capitalist-all. In fact, such acts of reclaiming are always happening within contemporary capitalist formations. Whenever governments levy taxes on corporate profits to finance public services, or whenever ecological movements force corporations to clean up, the surplus is socially reclaimed. While it is quite tempting to read these ‘‘acts of reclaiming’’ to be in the service of an enlightened and ‘‘green’’ capitalist-all, the struggle, as we see it, is precisely over how these acts are socially signified. In the absence of a counterhegemonic nodal point, these disparate ‘‘acts of reclaiming’’ could indeed easily be co-opted by the capitalist-all. We believe that the axiom of communism could serve as a useful counter-hegemonic nodal point that would impart a ‘‘surplus’’ meaning to each and every act of reclaiming. Overdetermined by the axiom of communism, each act of reclaiming will have at least two meanings: on the one hand, it will be a particular act of reclaiming with a concrete goal, and on the other hand, it will be a particular instance of the universal contestation of the exception of appropriation that sustains the capitalist-all.

### 1NC - OFF

Deleuze K

#### Their scholarship is bad and a reason to lose the round—their author endorsed pedophilia and actively advocated against the age of consent law.

Doezema 18 [Marie Doezema (Parisian Journalist). “France, Where Age of Consent Is Up for Debate.” The Atlantic, 10 March 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/03/frances-existential-crisis-over-sexual-harassment-laws/550700/ //WWDH]

After May 1968, French intellectuals would challenge the state’s authority to protect minors from sexual abuse. In one prominent example, on January 26, 1977, Le Monde, a French newspaper, published a petition signed by the era’s most prominent intellectuals—including Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Gilles Deleuze, Roland Barthes, Philippe Sollers, André Glucksmann and Louis Aragon—in defense of three men on trial for engaging in sexual acts with minors. “French law recognizes in 13- and 14-year-olds a capacity for discernment that it can judge and punish,” the petition stated, “But it rejects such a capacity when the child's emotional and sexual life is concerned.” Furthermore, the signatories argued, children and adolescents have the right to a sexual life: “If a 13-year-old girl has the right to take the pill, what is it for?” It’s unclear what impact, if any, the petition had. The defendants were sentenced to five years in prison, but did not serve their full sentences.

#### Comes first:

#### [1] Reversibility: once oppressive rhetoric is used it cannot be taken back

#### [2] Norm setting: we are part of a larger debate community with extensive norms – letting bad discourse be rampant kills the community

**[3] Competition: debate is an educational competition with no place for offensive rhetoric – that kills access to the lasting benefit debate provides**