# 1NC vs La Salle ZW

## OFF

### 1NC - Framework

Util

#### I value justice, as implied by the word unjust in the resolution. The standard is maximizing wellbeing.

#### 1] only it can explain degrees of wrongness- it is worse to kill thousands than to lie to a friend- either ethical theories cannot explain comparative badness, or it collapses

#### 2] Use util – it’s impartial, specific to public actors, and resolves infinite regress which explains all value. Reject flawed calc indicts that misunderstand happiness and rely on problematic intuitions.

Greene 15 — (Joshua Greene, Professor of Psychology @ Harvard, being interviewed by Russ Roberts, “Joshua Greene on Moral Tribes, Moral Dilemmas, and Utilitarianism”, The Library of Economics and Liberty, 1-5-15, Available Online at <https://www.econtalk.org/joshua-greene-on-moral-tribes-moral-dilemmas-and-utilitarianism/#audio-highlights>, accessed 5-17-20, HKR-AM) \*\*NB: Guest = Greene, and only his lines are highlighted/underlined

Guest: Okay. So, I think utilitarianism is very much misunderstood. And this is part of the reason why we shouldn't even call it utilitarianism at all. We should call it what I call 'deep pragmatism', which I think better captures what I think utilitarianism is really like, if you really apply it in real life, in light of an understanding of human nature. But, we can come back to that. The idea, going back to the tragedy of common-sense morality is you've got all these different tribes with all of these different values based on their different ways of life. What can they do to get along? And I think that the best answer that we have is--well, let's back up. In order to resolve any kind of tradeoff, you have to have some kind of common metric. You have to have some kind of common currency. And I think that what utilitarianism, whether it's the moral truth or not, is provide a kind of common currency. So, what is utilitarianism? It's basically the idea that--it's really two ideas put together. One is the idea of impartiality. That is, at least as social decision makers, we should regard everybody's interests as of equal worth. Everybody counts the same. And then you might say, 'Well, but okay, what does it mean to count everybody the same? What is it that really matters for you and for me and for everybody else?' And there the utilitarian's answer is what is sometimes called, somewhat accurately and somewhat misleadingly, happiness. But it's not really happiness in the sense of cherries on sundaes, things that make you smile. It's really the quality of conscious experience. So, the idea is that if you start with anything that you value, and say, 'Why do you care about that?' and keep asking, 'Why do you care about that?' or 'Why do you care about that?' you ultimately come down to the quality of someone's conscious experience. So if I were to say, 'Why did you go to work today?' you'd say, 'Well, I need to make money; and I also enjoy my work.' 'Well, what do you need your money for?' 'Well, I need to have a place to live; it costs money.' 'Well, why can't you just live outside?' 'Well, I need a place to sleep; it's cold at night.' 'Well, what's wrong with being cold?' 'Well, it's uncomfortable.' 'What's wrong with being uncomfortable?' 'It's just bad.' Right? At some point if you keep asking why, why, why, it's going to come down to the conscious experience--in Bentham's terms, again somewhat misleading, the pleasure and pain of either you or somebody else that you care about. So the utilitarian idea is to say, Okay, we all have our pleasures and pains, and as a moral philosophy we should all count equally. And so a good standard for resolving public disagreements is to say we should go with whatever option is going to produce the best overall experience for the people who are affected. Which you can think of as shorthand as maximizing happiness--although I think that that's somewhat misleading. And the solution has a lot of merit to it. But it also has endured a couple of centuries of legitimate criticism. And one of the biggest criticisms--and now we're getting back to the Trolley cases, is that utilitarianism doesn't adequately account for people's rights. So, take the footbridge case. It seems that it's wrong to push that guy off the footbridge. Even if you stipulate that you can save more people's lives. And so anyone who is going to defend utilitarianism as a meta-morality--that is, a solution to the tragedy of common sense morality, as a moral system to adjudicate among competing tribal moral systems--if you are going to defend it in that way, as I do, you have to face up to these philosophical challenges: is it okay to kill on person to save five people in this kind of situation? So I spend a lot of the book trying to understand the psychology of cases like the footbridge case. And you mention these being kind of unrealistic and weird cases. That's actually part of my defense.

Russ: Yeah, there's some plus to it, I agree.

Guest: Right. And the idea is that your amygdala is responding to an act of violence. And most acts of violence are bad. And so it is good for us to have a gut reaction, which is really a reaction in your amygdala that's then sending a signal to your ventromedial prefrontal cortex and so on and so forth, and we can talk about that. It's good to have that reaction that says, 'Don't push people off of footbridges.' But if you construct a case in which you stipulate that committing this act of violence is going to lead to the greater good, and it still feels wrong, I think it's a mistake to interpret that gut reaction as a challenge to the theory that says we should do whatever in general is going to promote the greater good. That is, our gut reactions are somewhat limited. They are good for everyday life. It's good that you have a gut reaction that says, 'Don't go shoving people off of high places.' But that shouldn't be a veto against a general idea that otherwise makes a lot of sense. Which is that in the modern world, we have a lot of different competing value systems, and that the way to resolve disagreements among those different competing value systems is to say, 'What's going to actually produce the best consequences?' And best consequences measured in terms of the quality of people's experience. So, that's kind of completing or partially completing the circle between the tragedy of the commons, that discussion, and how do we get to the Trolleys.

#### 3] high magnitude threats outweigh --- we have cognitive biases to underestimate the risks --- overcorrect in favor the NEG’s probability.

--- must preserve infinite lives and generations.

--- question of intergenerational equity.

--- existential threats are underestimated: global public good, intergenerational, unprecedented, scope neglect.

GPP 17 (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute at the University of Oxford, Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>, Accessed 7/22/2017, Kent Denver-jKIM)

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction: I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes: (1) Peace. (2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s existing population. (3) A nuclear war that kills 100%. (2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible history to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65 In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of preventing existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67 Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument. In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71 However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks. 1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY In spite of the importance of existential risk reduction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international cooperation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks. 1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in There are several reasons why existential risk reduction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest. Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs. Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available. Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled. Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People become numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

### 1NC - Contention

Space Manufacturing

#### Commercial space manufacturing is booming --- that creates new treatments to solve diseases, but the AFF kills it --- private sector launch and appropriation is key

Giulianotti et. al 21 [Marc A. Giulianotti1\*, Arun Sharma2,3, Rachel A. Clemens4 , Orquidea Garcia5 , D. Lancing Taylor6, Nicole L. Wagner7 , Kelly A. Shepard8 , Anjali Gupta4, Siobhan Malany9 , Alan J. Grodzinsky10, Mary Kearns‐Jonker11, Devin B. Mair12, Deok‐Ho Kim12,13, Michael S. Roberts1, Jeanne F. Loring14, Jianying Hu15, Lara E. Warren1 , Sven Eenmaa1, Joe Bozada16, Eric Paljug16, Mark Roth17, Donald P. Taylor18, Gary Rodrigue1, Patrick Cantini19, Amelia W. Smith1, William R. Wagner19,20\* 1 Center for the Advancement of Science in Space, Melbourne, FL, USA 2 Board of Governors Regenerative Medicine Institute, Cedars‐Sinai Medical Center, Los Angeles, CA, USA 3 Smidt Heart Institute, Cedars‐Sinai Medical Center, Los Angeles, CA, USA 4 Axiom Space, Inc., Houston, TX, USA 5 Johnson & Johnson 3D Printing Innovation & Customer Solutions, Johnson & Johnson Services, Inc., Irvine, CA , USA. 6 University of Pittsburgh Drug Discovery Institute and Department of Computational and Systems Biology, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA 7 LambdaVision Inc., Farmington, CT, USA 8 California Institute for Regenerative Medicine, Oakland, California, USA 9 Department of Pharmacodynamics, College of Pharmacy, University of Florida, Gainesville, FL USA 10 Departments of Biological Engineering, Mechanical Engineering and Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, USA 11 Department of Pathology and Human Anatomy, Loma Linda University School of Medicine, Loma Linda, CA, USA 12 Department of Biomedical Engineering, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Baltimore, MD, USA 13 Department of Medicine, Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine, Baltimore, MD, USA 14 Scripps Research Institute, San Diego, CA, USA 15 Center for Computational Health IBM Research, Yorktown Heights, NY, USA 16 Joseph M. Katz Graduate School of Business, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA 17 Pittsburgh, PA, USA 18 The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA 19 McGowan Institute for Regenerative Medicine, Pittsburgh, PA, USA 20 Departments of Surgery, Bioengineering, Chemical Engineering, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, USA. “Opportunities for Biomanufacturing in Low Earth Orbit: Current Status and Future Directions.” August 2, 2021. https://www.preprints.org/manuscript/202108.0044/v1/download]

The use of LEO by governments and commercial enterprises is a complex ecosystem for providing opportunities and financing. In the last two decades, governments around the world, led by the U.S. and China, have heavily supported private space companies (2019 Report). These investments have focused on launch technologies, as high launch costs are perceived to be the greatest limiting factor to expanded space exploration and utilization (Werzt et al., 1996) and have led to recent reductions in the cost of transporting cargo to LEO by a factor of more than 20. Between 1970 and 2020, the average cost to launch a kilogram of payload into LEO on the space shuttle remained constant at about $54,500. Now, the cost per kilogram is $2,720 on a SpaceX Falcon 9 rocket (Figure 1) (Jones, H. W. et al., 2020). Preprints (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 2 August 2021 doi:10.20944/preprints202108.0044.v1 4 Figure 1: The cost of launching payloads to LEO has dropped considerably over the last 50 years. Note: Data is not to scale. Additionally, several private companies are now pursuing commercial space stations. Axiom Space, headquartered in Houston, is currently developing what promises to be the first‐ever privately operated space station, with the initial module scheduled to launch to the ISS in 2024. Axiom plans to dock multiple modules to the ISS that will eventually detach to become a standalone station. As the cost of transport to LEO has decreased—and is expected to decrease further—and plans for new platforms in LEO continue to advance (Dinkin S., 2019), opportunities in areas such as satellite deployment, biomedical research, in‐space manufacturing, and space tourism increase. Preprints (www.preprints.org) | NOT PEER-REVIEWED | Posted: 2 August 2021 doi:10.20944/preprints202108.0044.v1 5 As the past half century has witnessed the opening of space for exploration and commercial opportunities, in this same period, we have experienced exponential growth in our understanding of biology and physiology. This knowledge has been translated and commercialized for the benefit of human health and continues to accelerate as new technologies create additional tools to explore and cure. One aspect of this biomedical revolution is in the field of regenerative medicine, built upon advances in stem cell biology, biomaterials, and bioengineering. Remarkable advancements have been made in the design of MPS, also called tissue chips or organs‐on‐chips, and organoids that can mimic complex organ systems outside of the body for drug development or potential implantation to restore function. Stem cell isolation, characterization, and manipulation is advancing, with target applications broadly spread across tissues impacted by disease, trauma, and congenital conditions. Biomaterials and bioengineering advances have created new medical devices, targeted drug delivery platforms, biosensors and new imaging modalities, and the bioprinting of tissue constructs. To take advantage of these significant advances—more frequent and more affordable access to LEO and exponential progress in biomedical technology—the question is: How do these intersect, and what new opportunities arise as both advance? How can the unique LEO environment be leveraged to further advance biomanufacturing? Compelling answers to these questions will introduce economic drivers for investment in space‐based R&D that extend beyond the initial focus on pure discovery and into the expansion of commercial development in LEO. Over the past decade, the ISS National Lab has supported important space‐based research in the areas of tissue engineering and regenerative medicine that lays the groundwork for more complex studies and future investment. This critical research addressed fundamental questions such as: How does the LEO environment affect the organ function mimicked by tissue chips, and how do these changes relate to human disease? How does microgravity affect stem cell proliferation and differentiation? And how might 3D bioprinting benefit from the absence of gravity? Continued access to LEO through the ISS National Lab provides a unique opportunity for R&D that enables the jump from this initial work to the development of a sustainable market for biomanufacturing in space. The ISS is a powerful platform with a limited lifetime and thus limited time left for utilization; therefore, now is the time to leverage this invaluable orbiting laboratory to conduct R&D that demonstrates the value of biomanufacturing in space. This work will set the stage for increased private investment and the transition to larger and more numerous platforms in LEO that can support further discovery and development in the coming decades

#### Future pandemics cause extinction

Diamandis 21 [Eleftheriosi, biochemist specializing in clinical chemistry, Prof and Head of Clinical Biochemistry in the Dept of Laboratory Medicine and Pathobiology at the University of Toronto] “The Mother of All Battles: Viruses vs Humans. Can Humans Avoid Extinction in 50-100 Years?” Preprints, April 13, 2021, <https://www.preprints.org/manuscript/202104.0397/v1> TG

The recent SARS-CoV-2 pandemic, which is causing COVID 19 disease, has taught us unexpected lessons about the dangers of human extinction through highly contagious and lethal diseases. As the COVID 19 pandemic is now being controlled by various isolation measures, therapeutics and vaccines, it became clear that our current lifestyle and societal functions may not be sustainable in the long term. We now have to start thinking and planning on how to face the next dangerous pandemic, not just overcoming the one that is upon us now. Is there any evidence that even worse pandemics could strike us in the near future and threaten the existence of the human race? The answer is unequivocally yes. It is not necessary to get infected by viruses of bats, pangolins and other exotic animals that live in remote forests in order to be in danger. Creditable scientific evidence indicates that the human gut microbiota harbor billions of viruses which are capable of affecting the function of vital human organs such as the immune system, lung, brain, liver, kidney, heart etc. It is possible that the development of pathogenic variants in the gut can lead to contagious viruses which can cause pandemics, leading to destruction of vital organs, causing death or various debilitating diseases such as blindness, respiratory, liver, heart and kidney failures. These diseases could result in the complete shutdown of our civilization and probably the extinction of human race. In this essay, I will first provide a few independent pieces of scientific facts and then combine this information to come up with some (but certainly not all) hypothetical scenarios that could cause human race misery, even extinction. I hope that these scary scenarios will trigger preventative measures that could reverse or delay the projected adverse outcomes.