# 1NC vs Wyoming Virtual JC

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### 1NC - OFF

Fem IR K

#### Discourses of state security *render* entire categories of life disposable and *reifies* ongoing structural violence – only rejecting the 1ac’s scholarship can avert a self-fulfilling cycle of militarization and war

Wibben 18 --- PhD, Int Politics at University of Wales (Annick TR, “Why we need to study (US) militarism: A critical feminist lens,” Security Dialogue 2018, Vol. 49(1-2) 136– 148, CMR)

Here, feminist reflexivity and a willingness to constantly rethink one’s engagements and prejudices are explicitly foregrounded – as is a commitment to thinking about how scholarship is always already political (see Åhäll, 2016; Baker et al., 2016; Enloe, 2016). In my contribution to the roundtable, I agreed with Enloe and noted the distinctiveness of feminist security studies: while many critical security scholars have been sympathetic to feminist concerns and might embrace an emancipatory agenda, they ‘tend not to ask feminist research questions … and do not base their research on women’s experiences. As a result, they find themselves with strikingly different research agendas, findings, and policy recommendations’ (Wibben, 2011: 112). In paying detailed attention to the ways in which everyday experiences of differently located subjects (not just those identified as women!) are gendered, but also raced, classed, sexualized, and more, critical feminists have developed an impressive and innovative body of work, especially also concerning militarism and militarization.4 ‘Militarisation as a security puzzle forms part of sensemaking in the everyday’, proposes Åhäll, and consequently ‘feminist contributions to security studies have a different “entry-point” … a focus on the everyday as the site where the political Wibben 139 puzzle is found’ (Åhäll, 2016: 155, emphasis in original). This contrasts sharply with international relations, where, since ‘one can concentrate exclusively on states and their “behavior,” questions of human agency and identity fall to the wayside. No children are ever born, and nobody ever dies, in this constructed world. There are states, and they are what is’ (Elshtain, 1987: 91). Feminist scholarship on security as a concept (e.g. Detraz, 2012; Sjoberg, 2013; Stern, 2005; Tickner, 1992, 2001; Wibben, 2011) reveals how security is profoundly gendered and how the parameters of traditional, and even critical, security narratives make the inclusion of (women’s) everyday experience difficult. Feminist security studies hence provides complex and fruitful analyses of some of the core issues of security studies – by eschewing this work, security studies impoverishes itself.5 Paying close attention to the impact of security policies on the everyday lives of people during peace- and wartime and questioning the purportedly neat separation of pre- and postwar spheres, feminist scholars poignantly identify a continuum of violence that spans these spatial and temporal locales (e.g. Cockburn, 1998, 2004, 2007; Reardon, 1993). They map how (in)securities shift and slide along with subjectivities on axes of oppression, particularly when gender, race, or class are foregrounded. Maria Stern’s work on Guatemala, for example, reveals complex formations of Mayan women’s identity, which are tied to their gender, their relation to the dominant Ladino society, and to class. Further, their identification as campesina highlights ‘the spiritual and cultural connection to the land’ (Stern, 2005: 115). Taken together, this means that any ‘in/security configuration that was formed in tandem with these identity constellations could neither be partitioned off into separate “security” needs, nor for that matter, specific threats’ (Stern, 2005: 115). By focusing on everyday (in)securities, feminist scholars challenge static understandings of security (see e.g. Kinsella, 2007; Sjoberg, 2013; Stern, 2005; Tickner, 1992) and provide ample evidence that state or national security frameworks not only fail to deliver security, especially for marginalized members of society, but are themselves significantly implicated in producing insecurities. Studying militarism, as ideology but also in terms of how its logics are actualized in the lives of civilians and service members as well as in society in general through processes of militarization, has long allowed feminist researchers to take a closer look at a range of security policies and their effects.

At the same time, traditional security studies has remained largely static in its approach to security. While critical scholarship on security has deepened and broadened the agenda to explore a wider scope of security issues, as long as security studies aims to identify threats and develop means to counter or contain them, therewith treating security as an achievable condition or thing, it continuously fails to grasp the shifting (in)security configurations feminist scholars point to. What is more, security as currently imagined and exemplified in (state) practices remains thoroughly dependent on militarist logics (i.e. militarized). Consequently, critical and feminist scholars who study non-military security issues still need to be cognizant of militarism and its effects. Otherwise their scholarship risks contributing to the militarization of ever more areas in the process of securitizing new issues, as many critics have pointed out (e.g. Deudney, 1990, Mabee and Vucetic, this issue).

Let us unpack these claims: if security is indeed a self-referential practice, as critical scholars propose, then it establishes a security situation through a process of securitization rather than referring to an external ‘reality’ – and this is an intensely political move (Wibben, 2016b). Indeed, ‘“security” is not a universal need nor a universal concept, but a function of discourse, a function within a specific and modern discursive economy of the political’ (Dillon, 1990: 110). Security orders social relations, it positions people, and it has effects on life and death. Responding to Ole Wæver’s (1995) introduction of the idea of securitization, Jef Huysmans proposes that we think in terms of logics of security, ‘an ensemble of rules that is immanent to a security practice and that defines that practice in its particularity’ (Huysmans, 1998: 232; see also Huysmans, 2006). Crucially, this description of security as a self-referential practice is based on an attempt to make sense of the concept of security as states employ it, as Buzan et al. (1998) explicitly acknowledge in their classic statement on securitization. These state practices, however, depend on a close alignment of security and militarism.6

This alignment exists not least because the concept of ‘security’ developed from ‘military strategy’, alongside the move from War Departments to Defense Departments, without a corresponding process of demilitarization. For the US context, Bradley Klein (1997: 362) has described this shift from strategic studies to security studies as a deliberately political move:

The postwar shift in the United States from the War Department to the Defense Department suggests that the manipulation of force must find politically acceptable guises for itself…. [S]ecurity studies was entirely a product of the post-World War II environment, when liberal societies uendertook projects of both decolonizing and maintaining global order under Western protection and coordination.

Consequently, more often than not, securitization does not just ring the alarm bell of security (Glasius, 2008) and provide much-needed attention to important issues, but potentially militarizes ever more areas of life. This is notable in the way in which the UN’s Women, Peace and Security Agenda, despite its emergence from an anti-militarist feminist activist tradition, has become increasingly narrowly focused on gender mainstreaming in militaries (Shepherd, 2016; Wright, 2016), as well as in the deployment of militaries in response to disasters (Parashar, this issue). To go beyond the self-referential logic of security, it is necessary therefore to tackle the militarist logics embedded in conceptions of security as they are currently employed in security studies. Meanwhile, military power in various guises remains one of the primary means by which key states like the USA seek security. This militarist mindset is not just reflected in the use of militaries to achieve policy aims, but also entails the subscription to militarist logics that value hierarchical orders and the promotion of limited violence to ensure peace. Importantly, while large areas of life are militarized in this manner, militarism itself is also changing. As Andrew Bacevich argues in The New American Militarism, the rise of US militarism that finds its expression in the ongoing war on terror ‘has deep roots in the American past [and] represents a bipartisan project’ (Bacevich, 2013: 5). The current developments, he proposes, started in the aftermath of the Vietnam War when the officer corps of the US military attempted to achieve a professional revival by reimagining war itself – and in the process eroded the heretofore-assumed distinction between military and civilian arenas. This finds expression in the now well-established figures of the soldier-diplomat and, more recently, the soldier-scholar (Khalili, 2010). ‘With the events of the 1990s [Desert Storm in Kuwait, Operation Allied Force in Kosovo] blurring the distinction between war and politics, field commanders began to fancy themselves clever enough to straddle both worlds and master the art of “coercive diplomacy”’ (Bacevich, 2013: 58).

#### The affirmative makes possible hypermasculine war-making --- claims of objectivity are patently flawed because they are based in gendered decision-making

Sjoberg 13 (Laura, associate professor of Political Science @ University of Florida, University of Chicago; Ph.D., University of Southern California School of International Relations; J.D. Boston College Law School, “Relations International and War(s),” Gendered Lenses Look at War(s), online book, CMR)

Rationality in Interaction This skew is particularly evident in the assumption of rationality." The rationality assumption implies that the knower/actor can separate himself/herself from the “other” in interactions with that other. Feminists have argued that knowledge is always perspectival and political; therefore, states and their leaders’ decisions about how to interact with others are not rational, but informed by their situational and political biases. In this view, the rationality assumption may be seen as at once itself a political bias and obscuring other political biases. As Naomi Scheman argues, perceived rational cost-beneﬁt analysis about war-making and war-fighting should “always be seen as especially problematical when... constructed only by those in positions of privilege... [which provide] only distorted views about the world.”78 In this view, rational calculation is not an objective, attainable, and desirable end, but a partial representation of both interest and actors’ representation of those interests. In this way, through gender lenses, rationality has been seen as importantly incomplete, leaving out signiﬁcant (if not the most significant) factors that go into decision-making.79 In addition to understanding the rationality assumption as partial (and therefore unrepresentative), feminist research has pointed out links between rationality and mascuIinism.8° As Karen Jones notes, advocates of rationality as a guide for interstate interactions“ assume: 1. Available... conceptions of rationality and reason represent genuinely human norms and ideals; 2. The list of norms and ideals contained within available conceptions of rationality and reason are sufficiently complete; and 3. The external normative functions assigned to reason and rationality are unproblematic.82 Looking through gender lenses shows problems with each of these assumptions. Feminists have argued that “the identity of the modern subject-in models of human nature, citizenship, the rational actor, the knowing subject, economic man, and political agency-is not gender-neutral but masculine (and typically European and heterosexua|).”83 This impacts not only how we see the rational subject, but how we predict and understand his decisions, at the state level as well as at the individual level. According to Margaret Atherton, the possibility of rationality has “been used in a disturbing fashion to mark a gender distinction. We have, for example, on the one hand, the man of reason, and, on the other, the woman of passion.”84 In rationality assumptions, traits associated with masculinity are normalized and traits associated with femininity are excluded. The impact is compounded because (masculinized) rationality and its (feminized) alternatives are not on equal playing ﬁelds. As a result, Karen Jones notes that “women’s assumed deficiency in rationality” has been used to exclude both women and knowledge associated with femininity from accepted views of the world.85 The alleged gender neutrality of rationality, then, “is often a covert form of privileging maleness”85 and omission of “what has traditionally counted as ‘feminine.’”87 Still, adding women and values associated with femininity to current concepts of rationality is unlikely to create a gender-neutral concept of rationality.88 This is because, epistemologically, the sovereign rational subject constructs artificial gendered boundaries between rationality and emotion, male and female, and knower and known.89 Among states, those boundaries are not benign. Instead, they breed competition and domination that inspire and foster war(s) and conﬂict(s).90 This competition frequently relies on contrasting the state’s own masculinity to the enemy’s (actual or perceived) femininity. This cycle of genderings is not a series of events but a social continuum. In these gendered relationships, as Zillah Eisenstein argues, “gender differentiation will be mobilized for war and peace,” especially moving forward into the age of an American empire focused on manliness.9‘ Feminists have long argued that competitions between hegemonic masculinities and subordinate masculinities play a role in causing war(s).92 Hidden beneath the assumed independence, rationality, and unity of state interaction leading to war are gendered interstate interactions that cause, constitute, and relate to war and wars. Feminist scholars have recognized the extent to which the preeminence of masculine values dominates (particularly conﬂictual) accounts of interstate interactions, wherein “rational” interactions often become “a self-reproducing discourse of fear, suspicion, anticipated violence, and violence” in which “force is used to checkmate force.”93 Interstate interactions leading to wars often show the gendered nature of war narratives, war logics, and war languages, which produce (and reproduce) gendered cycles of violence.

**This hegemonic masculinity guarantees extinction through global warfare and resource overconsumption.**

**Clark 4** (Mary E. Clark, Drucie French Cumbie Professor of Conflict Resolution at George Mason University, Women and Language 27 no2 21-8 Fall)

Today's Western patriarchal world view now dominates globalwide dialogue among the "leaders" of Earth's nearly two hundred nation-states. Its Machiavellian/Realpolitik assumptions about the necessity of military power to preserve order within and between groups of humans trumps--and stifles--other potential viewpoints. Founded on the belief that "evil" is innate, it dictates that human conflict must be "controlled": global "law" backed by coercive force. This view, when cross-culturally imposed, becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, thus "legitimating" an escalating use of force. Western leaders (male and female) use a rhetoric couched in a "hegemonic masculinity" to justify their ready use of military force to coerce "those who are against us " into compliance. This translates globally as "national leaders must never lose face!" Changing this dominant paradigm requires dismantling the hierarchic hegemony of masculine militarism and its related economic institutions, through global cross-cultural dialogues, thus replacing a hegemonic world view and institutions with new, more adaptive visions, woven out of the most useful remnants of multiple past cultural stories. The paper concludes with a few examples where people around the world are doing just this--using their own small voices to insert their local "sacred social story " into the global dialogue. This global process--free from a hegemonic militaristic rhetoric--has the potential to initiate a planetary dialogue where "boundaries " are no longer borders to be defended, but sites of social ferment and creative adaptation. When the call came for papers on War, Language, and Gender, referring us to Carol Cohn's seminal paper "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals,"(FN1) I at first felt that little more could be added on the subject. But events in Washington in the ensuing weeks stimulated me to a broader "take" on this topic. Defense intellectuals, after all, are embedded in a whole culture, and the interaction is two-way. Not only does their strategic framework with its euphemistic language about war and killing have the outcome of forcing society to think in their terms; their framework and language developed in response to our deeply embedded, Western cultural image of a Machiavellian/neo-Darwinian universe. In other words, militarism and the necessity for organized physical force(FN2) emerge out of culturewide assumptions about human nature. Throughout historical times these assumptions have repeatedly proved to be self-fulfilling prophecies. The pervasive perception of enemy-competitors has generated violent conflicts that flared up and died back, only to flare up again through our failure to achieve deep resolution and, especially, to alter our basic beliefs about human nature and our consequent social institutions. Today our species, politically, comprises some 180-190 "nations" of varying cultural homogeneity and moral legitimacy, not to mention size and physical power. Regardless of their indigenous, internal cultural preferences, their cross-national interactions are institutionalized to fit a framework long established by former Western colonial powers among themselves. In other words, the global "reality" constructed by Western patriarchies--a Realpolitik, ultimately grounded in military power--has come to define day-to-day cross-national politics. During the era of the Cold War, this resulted in small, powerless nations seeking alliances with one or other superpower, which offered not only development aid but military protection, and, for locally unpopular, but "cooperating" leaders, small arms to maintain order at home. The "end" of the Cold War brought little change in this pervasive global militarism (though it did strengthen the role of economic hegemony by the remaining superpower(FN3)). The enormous technological "improvements"--i.e. efficiency in killing power--in weaponry of all types over the past few decades has now resulted in a dangerously over-armed planet that simultaneously faces a desperate shortage of resources available for providing the world's people with water, energy, health care, education, and the infrastructure for distributing them. While our environmental and social overheads continue to mount, our species seems immobilized, trapped in an institutionalized militarism--an evolutionary cul-de-sac! We need new insights--as Cohn said, a new language, a new set of metaphors, a new mental framework--for thinking, dialoguing and visioning new patterns of intersocietal interaction.

#### The alternative is to reject the aff in favor of an ontological revisionism that deconstructs the myth of the masculine western subject. This is a politics that destabilizes the masculine subject by revealing how its false universality underwrites gender violence globally.

Youngs 4 (Gillian, Professor of Digital Economy at the University of Brighton, “Feminist International Relations: a contradiction in terms? Or: why women and gender are essential to understanding the world ‘we’ live in”, International Affairs, 80, pgs 77-80)

This discussion will demonstrate, in the ways outlined above, the depth and range of feminist perspectives on power—a prime concern of International Relations and indeed of the whole study of politics. It will illustrate the varied ways in which scholars using these perspectives study power in relation to gender, a nexus largely disregarded in mainstream approaches. From feminist positions, this lacuna marks out mainstream analyses as trapped in a narrow and superficial ontological and epistemological framework. A major part of the problem is the way in which the mainstream takes the appearance of a pre- dominantly male-constructed reality as a given, and thus as the beginning and end of investigation and knowledge-building. Feminism requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the social relations that form that reality. ¶ While it may be empirically accurate to observe that historically and contemporaneously men have dominated the realms of international politics and ¶ economics, feminists argue that a full understanding of the nature of those realms must include understanding the intricate patterns of (gendered) inequalities that shape them. Mainstream International Relations, in accepting that because these realms appear to be predominantly man-made, there is no reason to ask how or why that is the case, stop short of taking account of gender. As long as those who adhere to this position continue to accept the sufficiency of the appearances and probe no further, then the ontological and epistemological limitations will continue to be reproduced. ¶ Early work in feminist International Relations in the 1980s had to address this problem directly by peeling back the masculinist surface of world politics to reveal its more complex gendered (and racialized) dynamics. Key scholars such as Cynthia Enloe focused on core International Relations issues of war, militarism and security, highlighting the dependence of these concepts on gender structures—e.g. dominant forms of the masculine (warrior) subject as protector/conqueror/exploiter of the feminine/feminized object/other—and thus the fundamental importance of subjecting them to gender analysis. In a series of works, including the early Bananas, beaches and bases: making feminist sense of international politics (1989), Enloe has addressed different aspects of the most overtly masculine realms of international relations, conflict and defence, to reveal their deeper gendered realities.3 This body of work has launched a powerful critique of the taboo that made women and gender most invisible, in theory and practice, where masculinity had its most extreme, defining (and violent) expression. Enloe’s research has provided one of the most comprehensive bodies of evidence for the ontological revisionism required of mainstream International Relations, especially in relation to its core concerns. ¶ When Enloe claimed that ‘gender makes the world go round’,4 she was in fact turning the abstract logic of malestream International Relations inside out. This abstract logic saw little need to take theoretical and analytical account of gender as a social force because in practical terms only one gender, the male, appeared to define International Relations. Ann Tickner has recently offered the reminder that this situation persists: ‘During the 1990s, women were admitted to most combat positions in the U.S. military, and the U.S. president appointed ¶ the first female secretary of state, but occupations in foreign and military policy- making in most states remain overwhelmingly male, and usually elite male.’5 ¶ Nearly a decade earlier, in her groundbreaking work Gender in International Relations: feminist perspectives on achieving global security,6 she had asked the kinds of questions that were foundational to early feminist International Relations: ‘Why is the subject matter of my discipline so distant from women’s lived experiences? Why have women been conspicuous only by their absence in the worlds of diplomacy and military and foreign policy-making?’ Tickner, like Enloe, has interrogated core issues in mainstream International Relations, such as security and peace, providing feminist bases for gendered understanding of issues that have defined it. Her reflection on what has happened since Gender in International Relations was published indicates the prominence of tensions between theory and practice. ‘We may have provided some answers to my questions as to why IR and foreign policymaking remain male-dominated; but breaking down the unequal gender hierarchies that perpetuate these androcentric biases remains a challenge.’7 ¶ The persistence of the overriding maleness of international relations in practice is part of the reason for the continued resistance and lack of responsiveness to the analytical relevance feminist International Relations claims. In other words, it is to some extent not surprising that feminist International Relations stands largely outside mainstream International Relations, because the concerns of the former, gender and women, continue to appear to be subsidiary to high politics and diplomacy. One has only to recall the limited attention to gender and women in the recent Afghanistan and Iraq crises to illustrate this point.8 So how have feminists tackled this problem? Necessarily, but problematically, by calling for a deeper level of ontological revisionism. I say problematically because, bearing in mind the limited success of the first kind discussed above, it can be anticipated that this deeper kind is likely to be even more challeng- ing for those in the mainstream camp. ¶ The second level of ontological revisionism required relates to critical understanding of why the appearance of international relations as predominantly a sphere of male influence and action continues to seem unproblematic from mainstream perspectives. This entails investigating masculinity itself: the nature of its subject position—including as reflected in the collective realm of politics— and the frameworks and hierarchies that structure its social relations, not only in relation to women but also in relation to men configured as (feminized) ‘others’ ¶ because of racial, colonial and other factors, including sexuality. Marysia Zalewski and Jane Parpart directly captured such an approach as ‘the “man” question in international relations’.9 I would like to suggest that for those sceptical about feminist International Relations, Zalewski’s introductory chapter, ‘From the “woman” question to the “man” question in International Relations’, offers an impressively transparent way in to its substantive terrain.10 Reflecting critically on the editors’ learning process in preparing the volume and working with its contributors, both men and women, Zalewski discusses the various modifications through which the title of the work had moved. These included at different stages the terms ‘women’, ‘masculinity’ and ‘feminism’, finally ending with ‘the “man” question’—signalling once again, I suggest, tensions between theory and practice, the difficulty of escaping the concrete dominance of the male subject position in the realm of international relations. ¶ The project’s starting point revealed a faith in the modernist commitment to the political importance of bringing women into the position of subjecthood. We implicitly accepted that women’s subjecthood could be exposed and revealed in the study and practice of international relations, hoping that this would also reveal the nature of male dominance and power. Posing the ‘man’ question instead reflects our diminishing belief that the exclusion of women can be remedied by converting them into subjects.11 ¶ Adding women appeared to have failed to ‘destabilize’ the field; so perhaps critically addressing its prime subject ‘man’ head-on could help to do so. ‘This leads us to ask questions about the roles of masculinity in the conduct of international relations and to question the accepted naturalness of the abundance of men in the theory and practice of international relations’ (emphasis added).12 ¶ The deeper level of ontological revisionism called for by feminist Inter- national Relations in this regard is as follows. Not only does it press beyond the appearance of international relations as a predominantly masculine terrain by including women in its analysis, it goes further to question the predominant masculinity itself and the accepted naturalness of its power and influence in collective (most significantly state) and individual forms.

#### You should prefer the research process and product of Feminist IR \*over their moralizing “but what do you do tho”

Sjoberg 11

(Laura is bae, Sjoberg is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, Looking Forward, Conceptualizing Feminist Security Studies, Politics and Gender, 2011, doi:10.1017/S1743923X11000420, JKS)

Along these lines, I have come to see the substance of Feminist Security Studies as a dialectical-hermeneutic argument, an approach that has implications for its process and its product. In this understanding, the purpose of doing research in Feminist Security Studies is to raise problems, not to solve them; to draw attention to a field of inquiry, rather than survey it fully; to provoke discussion, rather than serve as a systematic treatise. The conflicts and contestations both among feminists in Feminist Security Studies and between feminists and security that have come up in this conversation are not an outline of problems that need to be solved or divides that need to be crossed, healed, or closed. Instead, those debates, along with how they are handled and addressed, constitute Feminist Security Studies. Feminist Security Studies, then, neither needs to solve nor ignore either the fundamental differences among feminists or the dissonance between Feminist Security Studies and security studies as a discipline. Instead, Feminist Security Studies is defined not only by its fundamental contestabilities but also by its actual contestations. Feminist Security Studies is not the sum of the different approaches or the winner of the debate between them, but the narrative generated from their arguments, disagreements, and compromises.

### 1NC - OFF

Consult EU CP

#### The European Union should <affirm that the colonization of outer space by private entities is unjust >, opening the project to United States participation.

#### EU solves---they already have a framework for cooperation and the US will buy in---key to *credible EU leadership*.

Villarino 19 --- José-Miguel Bello y Villarino, member of the Diplomatic Corps of Spain, PhD candidate at the University of Sydney, previously served as a policy and legal officer of the European Commission on space research and policy issues ("Preventing a Cold War in Space Using European Research and Innovation Programs," 6-7-2019, Science & Diplomacy, http://sciencediplomacy.org/article/2019/preventing-cold-war-in-space-using-european-research-and-innovation-programs, accessed 9-3-2019) bm

Along with the ability to lead, the EU has every reason to act. Against the backdrop of escalating tensions in space, the EU and its member states appear to be peaceful bystanders. However, as one of the leaders in outer space activities, especially commercial satellite activities, the EU and its members have much to lose from an outright conflict. By bringing the three space powers together, the EU could achieve better security and reliability of space assets, which would benefit its population as well as the whole planet. Additionally, it could project its economic and research power as a powerful diplomatic tool, casting itself as a key international player and global broker in space affairs. The “smart” strategy[43,](http://sciencediplomacy.org/article/2019/preventing-cold-war-in-space-using-european-research-and-innovation-programs#note43%20rel=) envisioned here would combine both hard and soft power under a humble leadership that only the EU seems able to exercise. Europe would not be a resolute leader in the usual sense. Confrontation is beyond its power and not in its DNA. Instead, “[i]n a dangerous world, Europe is the holder of the balance”.[44,](http://sciencediplomacy.org/article/2019/preventing-cold-war-in-space-using-european-research-and-innovation-programs#note44%20rel=)In the context of space, the EU “represents a natural bridge between space competitors and possesses the track record and credibility to serve as the principal ‘middle diplomat’ of the global space community”.[45,](http://sciencediplomacy.org/article/2019/preventing-cold-war-in-space-using-european-research-and-innovation-programs#note45%20rel=) The European Framework for Enhancing Cooperation The framework needed to foster cooperation in space between China, Russia, and the United States (as well as other nations) is already in place in the EU. The EU’s official position regarding the international projection of its research and innovation is formalized in Horizon 2020 (H2020), the Framework Programme for Research and Innovation (2014-2020).[46](http://sciencediplomacy.org/article/2019/preventing-cold-war-in-space-using-european-research-and-innovation-programs#note46%20rel=) The H2020 Regulation envisions large-scale projects, carried out with international cooperation.[47](http://sciencediplomacy.org/article/2019/preventing-cold-war-in-space-using-european-research-and-innovation-programs#note47%20rel=) It anticipates working with partners in third countries to address many of its objectives, particularly those relating to the Union’s external and development policies and international commitments.[48](http://sciencediplomacy.org/article/2019/preventing-cold-war-in-space-using-european-research-and-innovation-programs#note48%20rel=) It further establishes that space activities should “support the European research and innovation contribution to long term international space partnerships,” acknowledging that “space undertakings have a fundamentally global character”.[49](http://sciencediplomacy.org/article/2019/preventing-cold-war-in-space-using-european-research-and-innovation-programs#note49%20rel=) This was built on international cooperation under the previous framework program (FP7), which recorded a significant participation of entities from those three countries:[50](http://sciencediplomacy.org/article/2019/preventing-cold-war-in-space-using-european-research-and-innovation-programs#note50%20rel=) United States: 517 instances of participation, in 410 projects, with a total contribution of €80 million, Russia: Participation in 545 projects, with a total contribution of €73 million; and China: 383 instances of participation, with a total contribution of €35 million. Concerning space in particular, a search in the European Commission database on participation in previous EU research and innovation (R&I) programs[51](http://sciencediplomacy.org/article/2019/preventing-cold-war-in-space-using-european-research-and-innovation-programs#note51%20rel=) shows that the European Union has contributed to several projects with Russian, Chinese and U.S. participation. In total, there have been around twenty projects with at least one participant from one of those countries. A small but significant number of these projects received technical or advisory input from individuals from those countries on a personal basis.[52](http://sciencediplomacy.org/article/2019/preventing-cold-war-in-space-using-european-research-and-innovation-programs#note52%20rel=) Some of those individuals were working for government agencies within those countries. Based on H2020 and its predecessor, it is clear that international scientific cooperation is desired by the EU, it is legal, and that there is precedent. By aligning space-related diplomatic policy with parts of space-related R&I policy, the EU can continue to catalyze efforts to solve global problems with the participation of the most active space-faring nations. By specifically targeting China, Russia, and the United States, the EU can help establish confidence and de-escalate tensions.

#### EU legitimacy and norm-setting prevent global conflict and transnational threats---extinction.

Dr. Rosa Balfour 19, Senior Transatlantic Fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, PhD in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science, MA in History from Cambridge University, MSc in European Studies from the London School of Economics and Political Science, Senior Advisor to the European Policy Centre, Associate of LSE Ideas, “The European Foreign Policy in a Hostile Environment”, The Progressive Post, 4/11/2019, https://progressivepost.eu/debates/next-economy/european-foreign-policy-hostile-environment

In a brittle world without enduring strong international alliances, the debate on Europe’s ‘strategic autonomy’ has gained new resonance, but it should not shadow the EU’s unique key international assets in the global economy and multilateral order. Working with global networks to promote norms and public goods is key to push back on nationalism, the rise of geopolitics and transactionalism. Strategic autonomy’ and ‘complementarity with NATO’ usually appear in the same sentence in the European debate – the latest doctrinal iteration to be found in the EU Global Strategy of June 2016. The ensemble reflects Europe’s need to rely on its transatlantic relationship for security and territorial defence, empowering it to carry out foreign policy too. The EU’s greatest foreign policy achievement of enlarging to Central Europe after the Cold War, pursued in tandem with NATO expansion, is testimony to this pairing. Since the end of 2016, the US President’s international preferences undermine directly or indirectly Europe’s security. Whether it is the insistence on greater burden-sharing, US action in the Middle East, or trade disputes with China, current US policies put Europe’s security – already challenged by Russian action in Eastern Europe and the Middle East – at risk. European leaders have started to question whether the transatlantic relationship needs to be preserved no matter what, or whether Europe should emancipate from it. The debate on ‘strategic autonomy’ is animating recent efforts in the field of security and defence. It refers to the ability to make and carry out decisions on defence, to conduct military operations autonomously, and to have the industrial capabilities to do so. Even if this level of strategic autonomy were agreed upon, it would take a generation for Europe to affect the world stage. The focus on strategic autonomy speaks to present insecurities in European societies, but not to the EU’s international legitimacy where, possibly, the European Union has better opportunities to develop means of political autonomy which befit its history and international identity. The emerging debate on economic sovereignty is addressing for the first time the degree to which the EU can make political use of some of its economic and financial tools, such as the Euro as an international currency. After all, the EU and its Member States remain the world’s largest trade bloc and donor. On the multilateral stage, Europe faces an increasingly hostile environment but remains the best hope to pursue universal principles, such as human rights and the rule of law, which underpin the resilience of that multilateral system. How to partner with other countries and actors around the globe to push back on attacks to international order is no longer a second order priority. If the way ahead appears clear, achieving it is a tall order. The rationale for collective action for the EU seems obvious – the ‘politics of scale’, or to be stronger together rather than weaker apart – but historically difficult to achieve. The multiple threats and risks on Europe’s doorsteps have only minimally bridged the strategic divergence that continues to beset the continent, and the rise of the populist radical right is beginning to undermine existing European external policies, not to speak of a higher level of ambition. Looking at global politics from a non-European perspective, how Europe’s friends and partners around the world will welcome a bid for greater autonomy – politically, economically, and strategically – still needs to be seen. The EU’s worldview that it has acted as a ‘force for good’ is not uncritically accepted. After all, that ethical stand was also possible thanks to the EU’s belonging to a stable and hegemonic West. If Europe wants to engage with the world and simultaneously strengthen its strategic identity it needs to square some circles. Without giving into the facile critique that realism and geopolitics render multilateral principles obsolete and warrant hard-nosed politics, Europe should leverage its assets, which are irrevocably embedded in multilateralism and cooperation. Climate change, conflict prevention and mediation, and an open and fairer international trade system are among the assets that the EU can concretely work towards globally. To do so it needs to engage flexibly with global actors, focusing more on multilevel networks including civil society rather than on the traditional partnerships between governments, some of which are no longer benign or useful. Both will require a dose of humility in listening to non-European world views and of pragmatism in seeking appropriate strategies and paths forward. Last but not least, if Europe wants to imagine its own history of prosperity, democracy and peace as still relevant to the debates taking place in the rest of the world, it also needs to think about the global future sustainability of welfare, taking progressive politics outside national boundaries and engaging in a more global and open debate about public common goods.