## OFF

### 1NC - OFF

T-Unjust

#### Interp – Unjust refers to a negative action – it means contrary. The affirmative must only garner offense on a negative action on outer space that limits the amount of appropriation ABSENT creating a new commons and concept for treating space.

Black Laws No Date "What is Unjust?" <https://thelawdictionary.org/unjust/> //Elmer

Contrary to right and justice, or to the enjoyment of his rights by another, or to the standards of conduct furnished by the laws.

#### Violation – they fiat a “global commons” approach

#### 3] Standards –

#### a] Limits – making the topic bi-directional explodes predictability – it means that Aff’s can both increase non-exist property regimes in space AND decrease appropriation by private actors – makes the topic untenable.

#### b] Ground – wrecks Neg Generics – we can’t say appropriation good since the 1AC can create new views on Outer Space Property Rights that circumvent our Links since they can say “Global Commons” approach solves. It also makes private sector good impossible since they could always say “we maintain the private sector”

Private multi-actor fiat

#### Use competing interps - Topicality is a binary question, you can’t be reasonably topical

#### Drop the debater – dropping the argument doesn’t rectify abuse since winning T proves why we don’t have the burden of rejoinder against their aff.

#### No RVIS – it’s your burden to be topical and incentivizes baiting theory

### 1NC - OFF

PPWT DA

#### The plan requires clarifying international space law---causes strategic bargaining to extract concessions

Alexander William Salter 16, Assistant Professor of Economics, Rawls College of Business, Texas Tech University, "SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS", 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 (2016), https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/19-2-2-salter-final\_0.pdf

V. MITIGATION VS. REMOVAL

Relying on international law to create an environment conducive to space debris removal initially seems promising. The Virginia school of political economy has convincingly shown the importance of political-legal institutions in creating the incentives that determine whether those who act within those institutions behave cooperatively or predatorily.47 In the context of space debris, the role of nation-states, or their space agencies, would be to create an international legal framework that clearly specifies the rules that will govern space debris removal and the interactions in space more generally. The certainty afforded by clear and nondiscriminatory48 rules would enable the parties of the space debris “social contract” to use efficient strategies for coping with space debris. However, this ideal result is, in practice, far from certain. To borrow a concept from Buchanan and Tullock’s framework,49 the costs of amending the rules in the case of international space law are exceptionally high. Although a social contract is beneficial in that it prevents stronger nation-states from imposing their will on weaker nation-states, it also creates incentives for the main spacefaring nations to block reforms that are overall welfare-enhancing but that do not sufficiently or directly benefit the stronger nations.

The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (more commonly known as the Outer Space Treaty) is the foundation for current international space law.50 All major spacefaring nations are signatories. Article VIII of this treaty is the largest legal barrier to space debris removal efforts. This article stipulates that parties to the treaty retain jurisdiction over objects they launch into space, whether in orbit or on a celestial body such as the Moon. This article means that American organizations, whether private firms or the government, cannot remove pieces of Chinese or Russian debris without the permission of their respective governments. Perhaps contrary to intuition, consent will probably not be easy to secure.

A major difficulty lies in the realization that much debris is valuable scrap material that is already in orbit. A significant fraction of the costs associated with putting spacecraft in orbit comes from escaping Earth’s gravity well. The presence of valuable material already in space can justifiably be claimed as a valuable resource for repairs to current spacecraft and eventual manufacturing in space. As an example, approximately 1,000 tons of aluminum orbit as debris from the upper stages of launch vehicles alone. Launching those materials into orbit could cost between $5 billion and $10 billion and would take several years.51 Another difficulty lies in the fact that no definition of space debris is currently accepted internationally. This could prove problematic for removal efforts, if there is disagreement as to whether a given object is useless space junk, or a potentially useful space asset. Although this ambiguity may appear purely semantic, resolving it does pose some legal difficulties. Doing so would require consensus among the spacefaring nations. The negotiation process for obtaining consent would be costly.

Less obvious, but still important, is the 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, normally referred to as the Liability Convention. The Liability Convention expanded on the issue of liability in Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty. Under the Liability Convention, any government “shall be absolutely liable to pay compensation for damage caused by its space objects on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft, and liable for damage due to its faults in space.”52 In other words, if a US party attempts to remove debris and accidentally damages another nation’s space objects, the US government would be liable for damages. More generally, because launching states would bear costs associated with accidents during debris removal, those states may be unwilling to participate in or permit such efforts. In theory, insurance can partly remediate the costs, but that remediation would still make debris removal engagement less appealing.

A global effort to remediate debris would, by necessity, involve the three major spacefaring nations: the United States, Russia, and China.53 However, any effort would also require—at a minimum—a significant clarification and—at most —a complete overhaul of existing space law.54 One cannot assume that parties to the necessary political bargains would limit parleying to space-related issues. Agreements between sovereign nation-states must be self-enforcing.55 To secure consent, various parties to the change in the international legal-institutional framework may bargain strategically and may hold out for unrelated concessions as a way of maximizing private surplus. The costs, especially the decision-making costs, of changing the legal framework to secure a global response to a global commons problem are potentially quite high.

#### Russia uses negotiations to push the PPWT---erodes US space dominance---unilat solves

Michael Listner 18, JD, Regent University School of Law, the founder and principal of the legal and policy think-tank/consultation firm Space Law and Policy Solutions, Sept 17 2018, "The art of lawfare and the real war in outer space", The Space Review, www.thespacereview.com/article/3571/1

A battle for primacy in outer space took place on August 14, 2018, among the Russian Federation, the United States, and, indirectly, the People’s Republic of China. This battle did not involve the exotic technology of science fiction, antisatellite weapons (ASATs), or the incapacitation of satellites; it was not part of a hot war and did not even occur in outer space. Rather, it took place in the halls of the Conference of Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland, and concerned the interdiction of the hypothetical deployment of instrumentalities of a hot war in outer space. The carefully orchestrated arena for this battle by the proponents of banning so-called space weapons involved methodologies, institutions, and agents of international law but was undermined by a vigorous counterattack by the United States using the same forum and suite of instruments so skillfully levied against it.1 This battle, of course, is not a single instance but the latest skirmish of a much larger conflict involving real war in space.

There’s been significant attention—and overstatem­ent— about the effect of a proposed Space Force by the United States, including an arms race and dominance as articulated by the United States,2 yet little attention has been given to the contest that continues to be fought over outer space using the tools of international law and policy, both of which are instruments of “lawfare.” Maj. General Charles N. Dunlap, Jr. (retired)3 first defined lawfare in the paper “Law and Military Interventions: Preserving Humanitarian Values in 21st Conflicts,” as “a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective.”4 This definition can be expanded to the use of hard law, soft law, and non-governmental organizations and institutions within the international arena to achieve a national objective and geopolitical end that would otherwise require the use of hard power. As observed by General Dunlap, lawfare imputes the teachings of Sun Tzu in particular this teaching: “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.”5

Lawfare is not a new concept and has been used in many domains, but the tools brought to bear have become more prolific, and the domain of outer space has been and continues to be a theater where it is applied. The earliest example of lawfare (even though the term was not yet coined) in outer space occurred pre-Sputnik with Soviet Union attempting to use customary law to make claims of sovereignty extending beyond the atmosphere to the space above its territory. This claim was preempted by the launch of Sputnik 1 and the act of the satellite flying over the territory of other nations.6 The Eisenhower Administration saw this as an opportunity to meet a national space policy goal and likewise used customary law as an implement of lawfare and successfully created the principle of free access to outer space, which it utilized for photoreconnaissance activities in lieu of overflights of another nation’s sovereign airspace.7 The Soviet Union unsuccessfully attempted to defeat this move using lawfare in the United Nations through a proposal that would have prohibited the use of outer space for the purpose of intelligence gathering.8

Since that setback, the art of lawfare in outer space has settled on the objective ascribed to another teaching of Sun Tzu:

“With regard to precipitous heights, if you proceed your adversary, occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up. Remember, if the enemy has occupied precipitous heights before you, do not follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.”9

The second part of this teaching exemplifies the role of lawfare in the present war in outer space: to employ the tools and institutions of international law as a means to legally corner an adversary and gain geopolitical advantage in soft power, with the aim of slowing and eroding the advantage that adversary has attained through preeminence in the domain of outer space, and replace it with their own. This objective is accomplished by two general means: legally-binding measures, most commonly in the form of treaties, and so-called non-binding measures couched as sustainability.

Lawfare in space continued in the intervening years between Sputnik-1 and the signature and ratification of the Outer Space Treaty and afterward. The weapon of choice: disarmament proposals for outer space. Provisions for banning so-called space weapons in the Outer Space Treaty were rejected by the Soviet Union in favor of separate arms control measures.10 These measures included proposals, some of which related to the proscription of ASATs, designed to not only gain an advantage in outer space but to gauge political intent and resolve.11

The lawfare offensive escalated after the proposed Strategic Defense Initiative with an effort curtail space-based missile defense technology through a ban on so-called space weapons and a proverbial arms race in outer space. The Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS), introduced in 1985, continues to seek a legally binding measure to place any weapon in outer space, including those designed for self-defense. It spawned measures such as the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects (PPWT), co-sponsored by Russia and China. This and other measures have met resistance as unverifiable and certainly are not likely to gain the advice and consent of the US Senate for ratification. The end game of the use of lawfare in the form of efforts like PAROS—the latest attempt at which was defeated in Geneva—is to propose legally binding measures that proponents would ignore to their advantage in any event. The sponsors and advocates of these hard-law measures recognize they will not come to fruition but, in the process of promoting them, will enhance their soft power and moral authority, which can be applied to entice their adversary down.

Non-binding resolutions and measures in the form of political agreements and guidelines are being used concurrently in the lawfare engagement in outer space, where proposals for legally binding measures alone fall short of the goal of creating hard law and challenging dominance in outer space. These resolutions and measures, which emphasize sustainability, are designed to perform an end run around the formalities of a treaty to entice agreement on issues that would otherwise be unacceptable in a hard-law agreement. These measures have the dual effect to create soft-power support on the one hand and hard law on the other. This tool of lawfare, which uses clichés of cooperation and sustainability, is a ploy that applies the ambiguous nature of customary international law to achieve what cannot be done through treaties: to “entice the adversary away” and create legal and political constraints to bind and degrade its use of outer space or prevent it from maintaining its superiority, all the while allowing others to play catchup and replace one form of dominance with another. While lawfare is by nature asymmetric, this indirect approach could be considered a subset an irregular tactic of lawfare, as opposed to the use of formal treaties in lawfare.

The crux is that, like space objects used in outer space, international law and its implements are dual-use in that they can be used for proactive ends or weaponized, with those using the appliances of lawfare to encourage cession of the high ground choosing the latter rather than the former. The decision to weaponize international law and its institutions to prosecute this war in space brings into question the efficacy of new rules or norms. Indeed, the idea of expanding the jurisprudence of outer space through custom, as being suggested by the United States, and more recently gap-filling rules being suggested by academia that could become custom, presents the real chance that, rather than the creation of the ploughshare of sustainability, new and more effective swords for lawfare will be forged.

To paraphrase Sun Tzu, “all war is deception.” In the case of outer space, the pretext in the current war in space is that an arms race and a hot war in outer space is inevitable, and can only be avoided by formal rules or international governance. Conversely, a hot war can be prevented in no small part by using lawfare to engage in the contemporary war in space using the tools of, and the abundant resources found in, the experience of attorneys and litigators in particular to supplement and support diplomats to extend the velvet glove when applicable, and bare knuckles when necessary. If the August 14 statement in Geneva is any indicator, the United States may have just done that and begun the shift from light-touch diplomacy to bringing its legal warriors to bear in full-contact lawfare to engage and win the current war in outer space and help deter a more serious hot war from occurring without sacrificing the superiority it possesses in outer space.

#### The PPWT prohibits space-based missile defense

Jack M. Beard 16, Associate Professor of Law at the University of Nebraska College of Law, Feb 15 2016, "Soft Law ’s Failure on the Horizon: The International Code of Conduct for Outer Space Activities", University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, Vol. 38, No. 2, 2016, <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1086&context=spacelaw>

B. Avoid Arms Control Traps in Space

Any successful effort to achieve legally binding restrictions on military activities or weapons in space must focus on specific, definable, and limited objectives or run afoul of issues that have historically ensured deadlock among suspicious and insecure adversaries.306 Some seemingly desirable goals, however, are likely to ensure failure.

The first such problematic goal involves attempting to use arms control agreements or other instruments to comprehensively ensure peace in space. Unfortunately, the integration of modern military systems on earth, sea, air and space guarantees that at some point states seeking to disrupt or deny the ability of an adversary (such as the United States) to project power will find space capabilities to be a particularly appealing target, especially in the early stages of a crisis or conflict.307 The presence of so many things of military value in space thus makes actions by an adversary to neutralize, disrupt or destroy these things likely during a major conflict on earth.308

The second problematic arms control goal in space that seems certain to ensure stalemate involves attempting to define and prohibit military technologies with a view to broadly prevent the weaponization of space. Clearly defining a space weapon for purposes of any legally binding arms control agreement is a daunting task, one which is made particularly challenging by the “essentially military nature of space technology.”309 As noted, space technologies are routinely viewed as dual-use in nature, meaning that they can be readily employed for both civilian and military uses. Determining the ultimate purpose of many space technologies may thus depend on discerning the intentions of states, a process perhaps better suited for psychological than legal evaluation. 310

Further complicating the classification of space military technologies is the inherent difficulty in distinguishing most space weapons on the basis of their offensive and defensive roles or even their specific missions.311 For example, this problem lies at the heart of debates over the status and future of ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs, since the technology underlying BMD systems and offensive ASAT weapons is often indistinguishable.312 Vague and broad soft law instruments do not resolve this problem, but create instead their own confusion and insecurity. Vague and broad provisions in legally binding agreements that do not or cannot distinguish between these missions are similarly problematic.

These issues, particularly difficulties in distinguishing ASAT and BMD systems, have figured prominently in complicating negotiations on space weapons over previous decades.313 Similarly, these concerns were a significant factor in initial U.S. opposition to the arms control measure proposed by China and Russia (the PPWT) since it prohibits states from placing any type of weapon in outer space (regardless of its military mission), thus effectively prohibiting the deployment of ballistic missile defense systems. 314 Furthermore, even if clear legal restrictions could be developed, verifying compliance with respect to technology in orbit around Earth would be very difficult (a point conceded even by China with respect to its own proposed PPWT).315

#### Causes rogue state missile threats---that escalates

Patrick M. Shanahan 19, Acting Secretary of Defense from January to June 2019, previously vice president and general manager of Boeing Missile Defense Systems, Jan 2019, "2019 MISSILE DEFENSE REVIEW", US Department of Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Jan/17/2002080666/-1/-1/1/2019-MISSILE-DEFENSE-REVIEW.PDF

U.S. Homeland Missile Defense will Stay Ahead of Rogue States’ Missile Threats

Technology trends point to the possibility of increasing rogue state missile threats to the U.S. homeland. Vulnerability to rogue state missile threats would endanger the American people and infrastructure, undermine the U.S. diplomatic position of strength, and could lead potential adversaries to mistakenly perceive the United States as susceptible to coercive escalation threats intended to preclude U.S. resolve to resist aggression abroad. Such misperceptions risk undermining our deterrence posture and messaging, and could lead adversaries to dangerous miscalculations regarding our commitment and resolve.

It is therefore imperative that U.S. missile defense capabilities provide effective protection against rogue state missile threats to the homeland now and into the future. The United States is technically capable of doing so and has adopted an active missile defense force-sizing measure for protection of the homeland. DoD will develop, acquire, and maintain the U.S. homeland missile defense capabilities necessary to effectively protect against possible missile attacks on the homeland posed by the long-range missile arsenals of rogue states, defined today as North Korea and Iran, and to support the other missile defense roles identified in this MDR.

This force-sizing measure for active U.S. missile defense is fully consistent with the 2018 NPR, and in order to keep pace with the threat, DoD will utilize existing defense systems and an increasing mix of advanced technologies, such as kinetic or directed-energy boost-phase defenses, and other advanced systems. It is technically challenging but feasible over time, affordable, and a strategic imperative. It will require the examination and possible fielding of advanced technologies to provide greater efficiencies for U.S. active missile defense capabilities, including space-based sensors and boost-phase defense capabilities. Further, because the related requirements will evolve as the long-range threat posed by rogue states evolves, it does not allow a static U.S. homeland defense architecture. Rather, it calls for a missile defense architecture that can adapt to emerging and unanticipated threats, including by adding capacity and the capability to surge missile defense as necessary in times of crisis or conflict.

In coming years, rogue state missile threats to the U.S. homeland will likely expand in numbers and complexity. There are and will remain inherent uncertainties regarding the potential pace and scope of that expansion. Consequently, the United States will not accept any limitation or constraint on the development or deployment of missile defense capabilities needed to protect the homeland against rogue missile threats. Accepting limits now could constrain or preclude missile defense technologies and options necessary in the future to effectively protect the American people.

As U.S. active defenses for the homeland continue to improve to stay ahead of rogue states’ missile threats, they could also provide a measure of protection against accidental or unauthorized missile launches. This defensive capability could be significant in the event of destabilizing domestic developments in any potential adversary armed with strategic weapons, and as long-range missile capabilities proliferate in coming years.

U.S. missile defense capabilities will be sized to provide continuing effective protection of the U.S. homeland against rogue states’ offensive missile threats. The United States relies on nuclear deterrence to address the large and more sophisticated Russian and Chinese intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities, as well as to deter attacks from any source consistent with long-standing U.S. declaratory policy as re-affirmed in the 2018 NPR.

### 1NC - OFF

Share Liability CP

#### The United States should

#### establish a proportional share liability agreement with all relevant private and public actors for future damage to functional space objects caused by interference with unidentifiable orbital space debris.

#### increase space debris remediation with the Russian Federation

**Share liability forces polluters to internalize costs, and encourages remediation and mitigation**

Mark **Sundahl**, Ph.D. from Brown, 2000; J.D. candidate, Hastings College of the Law, 2001; B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 1993, **2000**,“Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for a Market-Share Liability Regime” 24 HastingsInt'l & Comp. L. Rev. 125

Market-share liability will benefit the space industry by (1) **providing compensation** to the injured party where none existed before, (2) **creating an incentive for states to mitigate debris production**, (3) creating an **equal incentive to remove existing debris**, (4) **promoting the registration and tracking** of space objects, (5) **encouraging states to cooperate** in the prevention of collisions, and (6) **ultimately lowering the economic barrier to entering** the space industry.

The immediate benefit of market-share liability will be the creation of a compensation system where none now exists. Currently, the victims of unidentified debris damage must absorb the cost of any collision while the parties who created the debris incur no liability. A market-share liability amendment will fill this gap in the Liability Convention.

Of greater importance in the long run is the fact that marketshare liability would create an incentive for states to reduce the production of large debris. The production of trackable debris will increase a state's contribution index and, hence, its liability exposure. Launching entities would therefore take measures to minimize large debris production in order to minimize liability. Venting excess fuel, for example, would reduce the risk of explosions in orbit." A state can also reduce its contribution index by deorbiting defunct satellites. This can be achieved by either retrieving the satellites or by propelling the "dead" satellites into the Earth's atmosphere so that they are vaporized. 5

Market-share liability will not only promote debris mitigation measures but also encourage the improvement of debris removal technologies. Entities will be able to reduce their contribution index, as explained above, by removing debris that is already in orbit. Currently, debris can be removed by sending the Space Shuttle to retrieve defunct satellites. Other options include using an Earthbased laser to push objects out of their orbits so that they reenter the Earth's atmosphere and are destroyed. The Orion laser is currently being developed for this purpose by the United States government.'56 One commentator has even suggested using a "giant Neff ball" to catch debris, in effect "sweeping" the orbits clean.57 Those states and private entities that do not have easy access to debris retrieval technology or do not have a laser of their own would be able to buy these services from the United States. The United States and Russia, as well as other states, would also have a two-fold incentive to improve their systems for registering, tracking, and cataloguing space objects. First, states would strive to **improve their tracking capabilities** so that they would be able to show that another state owned a specific debris fragment that caused damage. Once the responsible state is identified, only that state would be liable. Second, the United States and Russia would be eager to identify as many pieces of debris as possible that belong to each other. The United States, for example, would want to increase the number of catalogued fragments identified as Russian. By doing so, the Russian contribution index would grow and the contribution index of all other states would simultaneously fall. Improvements in tracking capabilities would be beneficial because they would allow a fairer apportionment of liability and would assist in debris evasion.

Spacefaring states would also make efforts to improve **debris evasion** technology out of the fear of incurring liability. After all, the most effective method of avoiding liability is to ensure that collisions do not occur. More effective evasion capabilities could be achieved by establishing a communications system whereby states with tracking facilities, such as the United States, could warn other states when their satellites or spacecraft were in the path of approaching debris. Upon receiving this information, the spacecraft owner would be able to engage in evasive maneuvers. This warning system could make use of sensitive ground-based debris detection technology as well as debris-detecting satellites.

**Share estimation is feasible.**

Justine S. **Hastings**,Professor of Economics and International and Public Affairs at Brown University and **and** Michael A. **Williams** Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. t Competition Economics, LLC, **’19**, “Market Share Liability: Lessons from New Hampshire v. Exxon Mobil,” 34 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 219, 252

Growth in the amount of orbital debris has resulted in numerous collisions. 2 15 Given the rate of increase in the volume of debris, the increasing costs of collisions are likely to adversely affect the growth of the satellite industry.2 16

Applying market share liability in the context of orbital debris has been suggested, but specific methods of assigning market share liability in potential orbital debris litigation have yet to be developed.2 17 A major challenge with applying market share liability in the orbital debris context relates to determining each launching party's share in the existing problematic debris. 218 **Estimating the total mass of orbital debris through statistical and mathematical methods is feasible**.219 However, determining the percentage of the total mass attributable to a given party is difficult.220

In principle, the shares of the total mass of debris that can be tracked back to specific parties could be used to assign shares of the remaining, untraceable debris.221 Untraceable debris is composed primarily of pieces of debris generated in collisions and explosions of larger pieces of debris.222 Thus, smaller pieces of debris are the products of larger pieces of debris. Therefore, if a percentage of large pieces of traceable debris belongs to a certain party, it can be inferred that approximately the same percentage of smaller, untraceable debris likely belongs to the same party.223

According to NASA, there were 17,817 identified objects in Earth orbit as of October 4, 2016.224 Of this total, 5699 objects belonged to the United States, 6354 to Russia, and 3782 to China.225 This means that the contribution indices associated with the United States, Russia, and China were 32.0% [thirty two], 35.7 [thirty five point seven]%, and 21.2 [twenty one point two]% [percent] respectively. The remaining 11.1% was attributable to other countries including France, Japan, and India.2 26 The dollar amount of each party's damages could be calculated by multiplying the total damages amount by the share of the party's traceable debris. 227

#### Plank 2 solves:

#### 86% of debris

Wright 12 — David Wright (Received his PhD in physics from Cornell University in 1983 and worked for five years as a research physicist, SSRC-MacArthur Foundation Fellow in International Peace and Security in the Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, and a Senior Analyst at the Federation of American Scientists), 2012, “Who Owns the Most Space Debris? Depends What You Measure”. <https://allthingsnuclear.org/dwright/who-owns-the-most-space-debris-depends-what-you>.

The number of debris particles in orbit is a concern since if these particles collide with a satellite they can damage or destroy it. The plot on the right shows that the US and Russia together own more than 85% of the debris mass in LEO, while China owns a small slice. This is because these two countries have many more large-mass objects in orbit, like defunct satellites and the rocket stages used to put them in orbit. These large-mass objects are a concern because they are the potential sources of large amounts of debris in the future, since in a collision these objects could fragment into enormous clouds of debris. As a result, these are the objects you most want to remove from orbit to reduce the likelihood of large future increases of debris. Removing these objects can be thought of as pulling down large amounts of debris that are currently all in one place. Figuring out how to remove the large objects in a safe and affordable way is an area of active research. What the plot on the right makes clear is that despite the 2007 Chinese ASAT test, the responsibility for debris remediation—i.e., removing the most problematic debris already in space—is overwhelmingly a US-Russian issue.