# 1NC vs Bellarmine AK

## OFF

### 1NC - OFF

T-Member nations

#### Interp and violation: "The member nations" denotes the totality of member nations in the WTO. The aff may not defend actors outside the WTO ought to reduce IP protections for medicines.

Sharvy 80 [Richard Sharvy, philosopher. "A More General Theory of Definite Descriptions on JSTOR," The Philosophical Review, Vol. 89, No. 4, Oct. 1980, accessed 8-22-2021, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2184738] HWIC

3. Definite Plural Descriptions. Phrases like 'the sheep in New Zealand' and 'the people in Auckland' are also ordinary and common definite descriptions, and they do denote. But because their contained predicates are plural predicates like 'are people in Auckland', which apply to more than one object, such expressions are not subject to a Russellian analysis. There is no such thing as (ax \* x are people in Auckland), since a number of distinct items satisfy the predicate-the men in Auckland are people in Auckland, and so are the women in Auckland and the children in Auckland. The definite plural description 'the people in Auckland' designates the sum or totality of all the people in Auckland. This is the sum of all that to which the predicate 'are people in Auckland' applies: the sum of all the items such as the women in Auckland, the children in Auckland, etc., that satisfy the plural predicate 'are people in Auckland'. What sort of entity is the denotation of a definite plural description such as 'the children in Auckland'? A first attempt might be to say that such expressions denote sets or classes. Then a sum of such items would be the union of such classes. Russell would insist on calling the people in Auckland a "class as many" (1903, pp. 68-72, 76-77). But if the predicate 'are people in Auckland' is taken to apply to x just if x is a set of people in Auckland,5 then the definite plural description 'the people in Auckland' refers to the union of these sets: U {x: x is a set of people in Auckland). So let us first consider set-theoretic union as a candidate for the sort of sum needed here in the analysis of definite plural descriptions. This might seem more complicated than '{x: x is a person in Auckland)', which refers to the same class. But the former expression has the advantage of preserving the predicate as a plural predicate, as it appeared in the original definite plural description. A standard definition of union is U a = {x: (ay) (x ecy .y E a)) (cf. Quine 1963, p. 53). In my notation this would be written: Ua = {x:xe(Qy yEa)) -the x's that are a member of some member of a. Quine observes 5I do not say 'nonempty' simply because it would be redundant: no class of people is empty. I do include the singletons, so that {Sharvy} are people in Auckland. This might seem odd. However, the instances or instantiations of 'all men are mortal' include sentences like 'Sharvy is mortal' along with sentences like 'the men in Auckland are mortal'; thus, the plural does include the singular. Notice that 'all men are mortal' should be symbolized '(x) (x are men D x are mortal)'; logic students are generally wrongly taught to write '(x) (x is a man D x is mortal)', which is more properly a symbolization of 'every man is mortal', which has the singular subject 'every man'. 616 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS that if everything is a class, this definition implies that the union U {x} of a singleton is its member x; this effect is preserved for an apparent nonclass by identifying it with its own unit class. So with this convention, if G applies to exactly one object, then U {x: Gx} = ( 7x . Gx ). So the Russellian definite singular description again emerges, here as a species of definite plural description.6 This would occur with, e.g., 'the men in this room' if there were exactly one man in the room. Notice also that plural predicates, like mass predicates, are cumulative: any sum of parts which are cats are cats. So 'G(the G)' holds for any instantiated plural predicate when 'the G' is defined as such a sum: the men in Auckland are men in Auckland, the poor are poor, etc. The analysis of definite plural description as union is not entirely satisfactory. One reason is that it explicitly uses the mechanism of class abstraction and the membership relation in a way that requires that such definite plural descriptions do denote classes. Now there is no problem about what 'the people in Auckland' denotes: it denotes the people in Auckland. Whether the people in Auckland are a set or class is an ontological question that should be discussed elsewhere. (Indeed, ontological questions generally should be independent of a theory of descriptions: we should be able to explain phrases like 'the first symphony of Beethoven' without discussing the ontological nature of symphonies.) My aim here is simply to explain plural definite descriptions like 'the people in Auckland' in a way that remains neutral on that ontological question by avoiding explicitly settheoretic notions. Another reason to turn away from the above analysis of 'the C as 'U {x: Gx}' is that it lacks generality. It lets in too much 6 I thank W. V. Quine for calling my attention to this passage. 'one object' means 'one class'. Consider the predicate 'are men and women in this room', and suppose the room contains just one man, m, and one woman, w. Then only one object, {m,w} satisfies that predicate, and U {a: a are men and women in this room) = U {{m,w}} = {m,w} = (7a a are men and women in this room). See note 8 also. Consider the definite description 'the square root of 2'. This is ordinarily used to refer to the positive square root of 2. My theory explains this; if real numbers are defined in the usual way as lower cuts of rationals (cf. Russell 1903, ch. 33), the positive root is the union of the negative and positive roots. 617 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RICHARD SHARVY when applied to a singular definite description whose contained predicate applies to more than one object: 'the author of PM' would denote {Whitehead, Russell). This was Frege's convention (?1 1), but it is clearly artificial; 'the author of PM' should fail to denote. And finally, 'U {x: Gx)' just doesn't look enough like the analysis given earlier of definite mass descriptions. Mass terms and plural terms are alike in numerous ways, and it would be nice if their uses in forming definite descriptions had analyses that reflected this similarity. Specifically, we should express summation without using the membership relation e, which has no analogue in the semantics of mass terms. The solution is to observe that there is a part of relation available: the men in Auckland are part of the people in Auckland. (This relation looks very much like the relation of being a nonempty subset of.) Writing it as '<', we may then define 'the G' for plural predicates as (4) above: sm G that all G are part of. The requirement in (4) that x satisfy G is useful for distinguishing the definite plural description 'the authors of PM' from the definite singular description 'the author of PM'. The former denotes Whitehead and Russell, as it should.7 Without the requirementhat x satisfy G, using (1) or simply union, so would the latter. But although Whitehead and Russell are authors of PM, they are not an author of PM. That requirement also leads to the intuitively correct results for expressions like 'the Wilmington Ten' and 'the five men in this room'. If there are only four men in this toom, the description 'the five men in this room' fails to denote because the predicate 'are five men in this room' applies to nothing. If there are six men in this room, then that description also fails to denote-not because that predicate applies to more than one item (i.e., to every part of the six containing just five men), but because it fails to apply to their sum. A word of caution about part is needed here. I am taking it in what I think is its plain and ordinary sense. However, Goodman, Quine, and other writers on the theory of parts (mereology) have used it in an extended sense which is not appropriate here. 7 But it does not denote Whitehead, and it does not denote Russell. The property of being denoted by an expression is not dissective. I may refer to something without referring to each of its parts. 618 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS The difference is that these writers combine mereology with a kind of materialism. (An exception is Foradori.) Thus Quine writes, "there are parts of water, sugar, and furniture too small to count as water, sugar, furniture" (1960, p. 99). Here, by 'parts of furniture' he means something like 'spatiotemporally determined parts of the material constituting the world's furniture'; by 'parts of water' he means 'spatiotemporally determined parts of the world's water'. However, in the ordinary sense of 'part', the parts of water are hydrogen and oxygen. In the ordinary sense of part, shrimp is a part of shrimp salad. Here, the words 'shrimp' and 'shrimp salad' refer to types or kinds, and not to the world's shrimp and the world's shrimp salad. Indeed, the world's shrimp is not part of the world's shrimp salad. Now, my furniture is part of the world's furniture, and the chair in my billiard room is part of my furniture. But is a leg of that chair part of my furniture? I doubt it. In a distinguishable sense of 'part', a leg of my chair is a part of that chair and a part of my furniture. In the plural of that same sense, the legs are parts of my furniture. But those legs are not part of my furniture. The matter of the legs is part of the matter of the furniture; also, the chairs in my billiard room are part of my furniture. But the legs of the chairs are not part of the furniture. The men in Auckland are part of the men and women in Auckland, but the arms of the men in Auckland are not part of the men and women in Auckland. The explanation is not that the arms fail to satisfy the contained predicate 'are men and women in Auckland', for the men in Auckland also fail to be men and women in Auckland. Rather, the explanation is that x are part of y in this ordinary sense just if x are some ofy. Notice the difference between 'some' and 'some of. It's true that some of the men and women in Auckland are men, but false that some men and women in Auckland are men. It's true that some of the whiskey-and-water inmy glass is water, but false that some whiskey-and-water inmy glass is water. 'part of' and 'some of' seem to be synonymous here; examples like these occur with mass and plural predicates that are not dissective. The legs of my chair are not part of my furniture, because 619 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RICHARD SHARVY it's false that they are some of my furniture. Given our understanding of 'part' then, being furniture and being men in Auckland are dissective properties; it is compounds like 'are men and women' that fail to be dissective. So only articles of furniture count as part of my furniture. It is a totally distinct feature of Goodman's system that causes his notion of 'part' to be broader than mine, so that, e.g., the chair legs are also part of my furniture. That feature is a sort of materialism. The set of my tables # the set of my table tops and legs; but the matter of my tables = the matter of my tops and legs. If we remove this materialism from mereology, we have a purer theory of part and whole, and consequently of sum. The mereological sum, then, of my articles of furniture is my furniture, and not the matter of my furniture. With this ordinary and intended sense of 'part', then, the expressions 'the counties of Utah' and 'the townships of Utah' will have distinct denotations, as they should. Without the distinction made above, they might appear to collapse into the same object, since the territory occupied by the counties is identical to that occupied by the townships; (px) (x is territory of (b.y) (y are counties, etc.) ) = etc. What sort of entity is denoted by the definite plural description 'the men in Auckland'? This question contains the mistaken implication that this phrase denotes a single entity. But the phrase 'the men in Auckland' obviously denotes the men in Auckland. One might ask, "What sort of entities are those?" But the answer is easy: they are entities that eat, drink, sleep, and are numerous. The error to avoid is an insistence on the singular. 'the men in Auckland' is not a singular term-it is a plural term. This should hardly need to be said. But some writers have gone astray by failing to see that plurals are plural, and so insisting that they must denote something singular. For example, Richard E. Grandy says that in the sentence 'Lions are widespread', " 'lions' must be a singular [sic] term denoting the class of lions" (p. 297). Given this, it will follow that a certain class is widespread (which does not seem as odd to me as it might to many). But what seems odd is that Grandy claims that it does not follow from his statement that any class is widespread; apparently 620 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS he prefers to give up the indiscernibility of identicals rather than the dogma that classes are "abstract." Now the words 'set' and 'class' have uses as dummy nominal measure words whose only function is the syntactic one of turning a plural into an apparent singular: the rational numbers are countable -- the set of rational numbers is countable. But no semantic consequences follow from such a use of the words 'set' and 'class'. The rational numbers are the set of rational numbers; the set of rational numbers is the rational numbers. The people in this room weigh 1000 kilograms; the set of people in this room weighs 1000 kg. The men in this room are not abstract; the set of men in this room is not abstract. We can avoid Grandy's contortions simply by taking the plural seriously as a plural, and abandoning the fetish for the singular that pervades contemporary decadent Western ontology. Along these same lines we can affirm that (i) 'the world's lions are widespread' and (ii) 'the world's lions are mammalian' do have the same logical form. In particular, the form of (ii) is 'Ml' and not '(x)(Lx D Mx)'; this is clear for (i). Question: how, then, does (ii), along with 'Aslan is a lion' imply 'Aslan is mammalian'? Answer: the implication is not a formal one at all, but depends on the fact that 'are mammalian' is dissective; 'are widespread' is not dissective. This situation is quite familiar: 'Ben weighs less than 60 kg' and 'Ben's nose is part of Ben' imply 'Ben's nose weighs less than 60 kg'. But again, the implication is not formal-it is not due to the logical form of these statements (this is easily seen by putting 'more' for 'less'). Rather, the implication holds because 'weighs less than 60 kg' is dissective. 4. Conclusion. For any given predicate G there is an appropriate part of or some of relation ? on the extension of G.8 Notice that 8The structure <{x: Gx},?) is often a mereology, i.e., a model of the so-called calculus of individuals. But it may fail to be a mereology. Idefine a quasi-mereology to be any structure (S, ?) where ? partially orders S (reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric), and where the <-least upper bound of a is a member of S for every nonempty subset a of S. One interesting type of quasi-mereology results from taking the algebraic direct product of two 621 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions RICHARD SHARVY for most singular count predicates, < is just the identity relation: for 'is a shoe I own' < is the identity relation, for the extension of that predicate contains no two objects of which either is part of the other. Regardless of how many shoes I own, x - y only if x = y, for every x and y in that domain. In all such cases, '( px Gx )' defined as (4) comes out as desired, designating the gold in Zurich or the men in Auckland; and if I own just one shoe, '( pxS x is a shoe I own)' designates it, but otherwise that description fails. The analysis of 'the G' as (4) is therefore a general theory of definite descriptions, of which definite mass descriptions, definite plural descriptions, and Russellian definite singular count descriptions are species.9 full mereologies. (This description of the situation is due to Mark Nixon.) For example, (M, ) X <W. 5), where M is the set of sets of men and W is the set of sets of women, is isomorphic to (MW, 5), where MW is the set of sets of men and women, i.e., of sets containing at least one man and one woman. (MW, C ) is simply the corresponding quasi-mereology of the predicate 'are men and women'; this predicate is satisfied by the people in Auckland (they are men and women), but not by the men in Auckland. The structure fails to be a mereology because it is not properly closed under subtraction: there are sets a, b, each of which are men and women, and where a - b is not null yet fails to be men and women; a - b might just be men. However, we can combine the mereologies (M, C) and <W, 5) so that a mereology results. Add the null element to each, take the direct product, and then remove the null element: ((M U {4}, 5) X (W U {4}, 5))- ((4,4), 5). This is isomorphic to the mereology corresponding to the predicate 'are adults', i.e., to the set of nonempty subsets of the set of all men and women, under subset: V(P(U (M U W)) - {4}, C). 9 We have an account of the generic 'the' along these same lines. The New Zealand Flag is a New Zealand flag to which every New Zealand flag bears a certain relation ?. This seems a little more natural if we add the syllables 'akes' or 'icipates' to the word 'part' in reading '<' here: the New Zealand Flag is that New Zealand flag in which every New Zealand flag participates. The fact that it participates in itself does not lead to a "third man" regress, because participation in, as a variant of the part of relation, is not used to explain predication; predication remains primary. Of course, nothing in my discussion requires that there be such an entity (nor does anything here count against it). My theory is quite neutral. If there is such an entity, '( px x is a New Zealand flag)' picks it out. If there is no such entity, but merely a number of flags none of which bears ? to anything but itself, then ? is coextensive with the identity relation on those flags, and the situation is the same as for 'my shoe'. John Bacon, however, claims 622 This content downloaded from 92.63.104.30 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:30 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS With this analysis and some thought about examples of definite mass descriptions and definite plural descriptions, we see that the primary use of 'the' is not to indicate uniqueness. Rather, it is to indicate totality; implication of uniqueness is a side effect.

**1] Semantics outweigh:**

**A] Topicality is a constitutive rule of the activity and a basic aff burden, they agreed to debate the topic when they came to the tournament**

**B] Jurisdiction -- you can’t vote affirmative if they haven’t affirmed**

**C] It’s the only stasis point we know before the round so it controls the internal link to engagement, and there’s no way to use ground if debaters aren’t prepared to defend it**

**2] Limits:**

**A] Quantitative – there are over 22k affs just with country combos, they explode it to not even countries – unlimited topics incentivize obscure affs that negs won’t have prep on – limits are key to reciprocal prep burden**

**B] Qualitative – take away generic turns like WTO bad and jettison "WTO" from the topic, which shifts away from the core topic lit of the WTO as an institution and means there is no universal DA**

**5] Ground --- allows them to add on extra planks to solve anything --- makes it impossible to negate**

**4] TVA solves – read the aff as advantage – most authors advocate for a change in WTO policy or TRIPS**

**D] Paradigm Issues –**

**1] T is DTD – A] their abusive advocacy skewed the debate from the start B] DTA is incoherent because we indict their advocacy**

**2] Comes before 1AR theory -- A] If we had to be abusive it’s because it was impossible to engage their aff B] T outweighs on scope because their abuse affected every speech that came after the 1AC C] Topic norms outweigh on urgency – we only have a few months to set them**

**3] Use competing interps on T – A] topicality is a yes/no question, you can’t be reasonably topical B] only our interp sets norms -- reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention C] reasonability causes a race to the bottom of questionable argumentation**

**4] No RVIs – A] Forcing the 1NC to go all in on the shell kills substance education and neg strat B] discourages checking real abuse C] Encourages baiting – outweighs because if the shell is frivolous, they can beat it quickly**

### 1NC - OFF

Util NC

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being:

1. **Moral uncertainty means preventing extinction should be our highest priority.  
   Bostrom 12** [Nick Bostrom. Faculty of Philosophy & Oxford Martin School University of Oxford. “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority.” Global Policy (2012)]  
   These reflections on **moral uncertainty suggest** an alternative, complementary way of looking at existential risk; they also suggest a new way of thinking about the ideal of sustainability. Let me elaborate.¶ **Our present understanding of axiology might** well **be confused. We may not** nowknow — at least not in concrete detail — what outcomes would count as a big win for humanity; we might not even yet **be able to imagine the best ends** of our journey. **If we are** indeedprofoundly **uncertain** about our ultimate aims,then we should recognize that **there is a great** option **value in preserving** — and ideally improving — **our ability to recognize value and** to **steer the future accordingly. Ensuring** that **there will be a future** version of **humanity** with great powers and a propensity to use them wisely **is** plausibly **the best way** available to us **to increase the probability that the future will contain** a lot of **value.** To do this, we must prevent any existential catastrophe.

#### Death is the worst evil – destroys the subject

Paterson 03 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island. (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81 In conclusion, concerning wille d human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

### 1NC - OFF

Nanotech PIC

#### CP Text: Piracy should be used as a method to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines except in the case of nanotech.

#### Patent thickets are preventing private sector nanotech acquisition

Pearce 12 [Joshua Pearce, Departments of Materials Science & Engineering and of Electrical & Computer Engineering, Joshua M. Pearce is associate professor in the Open Sustainability Technology Lab, Michigan Technological University. “Make nanotechnology research open-source.” November 21, 2012. *Nature.* https://www.nature.com/articles/491519a]

This thicket of patents, including entire classes of nanotechnologies, basic methods and science, is hindering nanotechnology. Excessive patenting is increasing costs, slowing technical development and removing from the public domain fundamental knowledge about the understanding and control of matter on the atomic or molecular scale (1–100 nanometres). Patent thickets occur in other high-tech fields, but the consequences for nanotechnology are dire because of the potential power and immaturity of the field. Advances are being stifled at birth because downstream innovation almost always infringes some early broad patents. By contrast, computing, lasers and software grew up without overzealous patenting at the outset2. Nanotechnology offers the promise of enabling matter to be manipulated as easily as software. I believe that those working with it should adopt the open-source approach3 that has proved so successful for software development. All publicly funded nanotechnology research and innovation should be made available to everyone for free. A moratorium should be placed on patenting fundamental nanotechnologies and basic quantum-science applications, from which most developments stem. Intellectual-property shackles Nanotechnology is big business. According to a 2011 report by technology consultants Cientifica, governments around the world have invested more than US$65 billion in nanotechnology in the past 11 years. The sector contributed more than $250 billion to the global economy in 2009 and is expected to reach $2.4 trillion a year by 2015, according to business analysts Lux Research. Since 2001, the United States has invested $18 billion in the National Nanotechnology Initiative; the 2013 US federal budget will add $1.8 billion more. This investment is spurring intense patent filing by industry and academia. The number of nanotechnology patent applications to the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is rising each year and is projected to exceed 4,000 in 2012. Anyone who discovers a new and useful process, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent that prevents others from using that development unless they have the patent owner's permission. With universities increasingly operating like corporations, faculty members are pressured into locking away their results as intellectual property (IP), even though their research is largely funded by taxpayers. In the United States, the passage of the 1980 Bayh–Dole Act enabled US universities to retain ownership of the products of federally funded research that had previously been non-exclusively licensed to anyone on request4. Broad patents covering the 'building blocks' of nanotechnology — such as quantum dots, nanowires and fullerenes, carbon nanotubes and methods for making them — hamper conscientious innovators, who must spend time and money to acquire all the necessary licences to avoid lawsuits5. Examples of patents that cover basic components include one owned by the multinational chip manufacturer Intel, which covers a method for making almost any nanostructure with a diameter less than 50 nm; another, held by nanotechnology company NanoSys of Palo Alto, California, covers composites consisting of a matrix and any form of nanostructure. And Rice University in Houston, Texas, has a patent covering “composition of matter comprising at least about 99% by weight of fullerene nanotubes”. The vast majority of publicly announced IP licence agreements are now exclusive, meaning that only a single person or entity may use the technology or any other technology dependent on it6. This cripples competition and technological development, because all other would-be innovators are shut out of the market. Exclusive licence agreements for building-block patents can restrict entire swathes of future innovation. An evaluation of the carbon-nanotube patent thicket in 2006 found that of 446 carbon-nanotube patents issued in the United States, in which 8,557 claims were made, 420 of those claims were of a building-block type7. Imagine how equivalent patenting of the idea of a semiconductor or basic programming would have stifled electronics and computing. These dense webs of overlapping rights are created partly as a result of the complex nature of the underlying science. Beating into this patent thicket is made difficult for innovators and patent examiners alike because of the field's interdisciplinary nature and its span across a range of industries. Nanoscience uses a rich and fast-evolving lexicon of technical language — carbon nanotubes can, for example, be described as nanofibres, fibrils, shells, nanocylinders, buckytubes or nanowires. For nanotechnology patent examiners at the USPTO, incomplete availability of information and inadequate training are recognized problems8. Licences can be costly, but the potential expense of litigation for not acquiring them is often much greater. Multimillion-dollar legal fees have overwhelmed nanotechnology companies such as Evident Technologies (legal fees of $1 million compared with $4 million in assets) and Luna Innovations (ordered by a jury to pay $36 million despite assets of $20 million). Such risks dissuade other companies from working in the nanotechnology field.

#### Nanotech is dual use --- greater access causes terrorism, rogue states, and arms racing

Winstead 20 [Nicholas Winstead is a graduate student in the School of International Service at American University. “The applications and implications of nanotechnology.” April 15, 2020. https://www.american.edu/sis/centers/security-technology/the-applications-and-implications-of-nanotechnology.cfm]

There are three distinct threats posed by nanotechnology. First, the diffusion of nanotech may increase the likelihood of nano-enabled bioterrorism. Nanotechnology is becoming increasingly cheap and user-friendly. “Do-It-Yourself” nanotechnology hardware and open-source instructions are readily available online. For example, one site provides instructions for building a DNA nanotechnology lab for under $500. Another site advertises nanotechnology experiments for the whole family, ages 4 and up. This “democratization” of nanotech creates more opportunities for bad actors to engineer weapons (from “the comfort of your own home!” as the site advertises). Second, nanotechnology will make it easier for state actors to develop or use advanced CB weapons. Nanotech will make these weapons cheaper to produce and easier to conceal and transport, which will facilitate their proliferation to rogue states. Furthermore, existing national and international laws designed to prevent the spread of dangerous chemicals may be unable to keep pace with the rapid changes brought on by nanotech. Third, the potential for new nano-enabled capabilities may accelerate arms races and undermine strategic stability between the U.S. and its authoritarian great power competitors. Militaries around the world are already fielding expensive - and secretive - research and development programs to harness the technology’s potential. This risks offense-defense spirals that could make war more likely - and bloodier if it occurs.

#### Instability, opaque tech development, and great power conflict escalate to nuke war

Aftergood 7-6 [Steven Aftergood directs the FAS Project on Government Secrecy. The Project works to reduce the scope of national security secrecy and to promote public access to government information. He writes Secrecy News, which reports on new developments in secrecy policy and provides direct access to significant official records that are otherwise unavailable or hard to find. “Pentagon Sees “Increased Potential” for Nuclear Conflict.” Jully 6, 2021. https://fas.org/blogs/secrecy/2021/07/increased-potential/]

The possibility that nuclear weapons could be used in regional or global conflicts is growing, said a newly disclosed Pentagon doctrinal publication on nuclear war fighting that was updated last year. “Despite concerted US efforts to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs and to negotiate reductions in the number of nuclear weapons, since 2010 no potential adversary has reduced either the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy or the number of nuclear weapons it fields. Rather, they have moved decidedly in the opposite direction,” the Department of Defense document said. “As a result, there is an increased potential for regional conflicts involving nuclear-armed adversaries in several parts of the world and the potential for adversary nuclear escalation in crisis or conflict.” The publication presents an overview of U.S. nuclear strategy, force structure, targeting and operations. See Joint Nuclear Operations, JP 3-72, April 2020. The document replaces a 2019 edition titled Nuclear Operations that was briefly disclosed and then withdrawn from a DoD website. (See “DoD Doctrine on Nuclear Operations Published, Taken Offline,” Secrecy News, June 19, 2019.) The current document no longer includes some of the more unfiltered and enthusiastic language about achieving “decisive results” through nuclear strikes and “prevail[ing] in conflict” that appeared in the 2019 version. The statement that “The President authorizes the use of nuclear weapons” was changed to a more restrained declaration that “Only the President can authorize the use of nuclear weapons.” Meanwhile, new material has been added, including an assessment that the threat from potential adversaries has grown even as the US nuclear posture is said to have been moderated: “While the United States has continued to reduce the number and salience of nuclear weapons, others, including Russia and China, have moved in the opposite direction. They have added new types of nuclear capabilities to their arsenal, increased the salience of nuclear forces in their strategies and plans, and engaged in increasingly aggressive behavior.” “Russia’s strategic nuclear modernization has increased, and will continue to increase, its warhead delivery capability, which provides Russia with the ability to rapidly expand its deployed warhead numbers.” “China continues to increase the number, capabilities, and protection of its nuclear forces.” “North Korea’s continued pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities poses the most immediate and dire proliferation threat to international security and stability.” “Iran’s development of increasingly long-range ballistic missile capabilities, and its aggressive strategy and activities to destabilize neighboring governments, raises questions about its long-term commitment to forgoing nuclear weapons capability.”

### 1NC - OFF

Psycho K

#### Their politics can only lead to an endless quest for jouissance that causes ressentiment and psychic violene.

Hook 17 [Derek Hook; Duquesne University and University of Pretoria; “What Is ‘Enjoyment as a Political Factor’?” *Political Psychology;* 2017; Date Accessed: 27 July 2019.] DG

Jouissance of the Drive We can now add a further qualification, namely that jouissance and affect should not be equated. It is more accurate to understand jouissance as a mode of intensity, a type of arousal—a thrilling twist—that occurs when affect moves beyond the bounds of what is comfortable, reasonable, or satisfying. Bearing this in mind prevents us from making the error of thinking jouissance as itself a variety of affect that permits for easy categorization (as in types such as anger, frustration, joy, etc.). Enjoyment should not be delimited in thus way; it is neither a subcategory of affect nor the preserve of a limited range of affects. We can further refine our understanding of the concept by stressing, as Lacan (1992), that **“jouissance appears not purely and simply as the satisfaction of a need, but as the satisfaction of a drive”** (p. 209). Furthermore, any drive impulse—be it “blind” physiological sensation or a more overly “goal-directed” activity—can serve as the basis of jouissance. It helps here to signal the omnipresence of enjoyment in everyday life, to indicate that any drive activity—”drive” understood here as the psychical elaboration of pressing bodily impulses—is linked to the pursuit of jouissance. **We should evoke here the notion of the death drive**; doing so allows us to offer a succinct formulation: [J]ouissance is a form of enjoyment willing to exceed the parameters of life. Miller (1992) is once again instructive: To understand the concept of jouissance in Lacan as unique is to understand “that it concerns at the same time libido and death drive, libido and aggression, not as two antagonistic forces external to one another, but as a knot” (pp. 25–26). Lacan (2007) goes so far as to declare that **jouissance is “the path towards death”** (p. 17), a comment which calls to mind Freud’s earlier (1924) observation that “even the subject’s destruction of himself cannot take place without libidinal satisfaction” (p. 170). This opens a further dimension of the concept, which, as we will go on to see, must be related both to the notions of the law and the superego. Hence, Eagleton’s (2003) description of jouissance as “the lethal pleasure of Freud[’s] primary masochism, in which we reap delight from the way that the law or superego unleashes its demented sadism upon us” (p. 198). Jouissance, then, to review the key points made above is: (1) diametrically opposed to pleasure and desire; (2) bodily and subliminal rather than unconscious in nature; (3) less an affect than an excess of affect, a mode of intensity produced by pursuing drive impulses; (4) necessarily “negative” (excessive, traumatic) in the sense that it is inflected with the death drive; (5) takes the form of contravention (is transgressive) inasmuch as it pushes the subject painfully (enjoyably) beyond the law or socially prescribed limits. “Negative Dialectics” Our own enjoyment—let alone that of others—is, for the most part, repulsive to us, and needs to be kept at arm’s length. The subject’s stance regards their own enjoyment is thus necessarily conflicted. Jouissance exacerbates the split in the subject who at once reviles their enjoyment and yet, periodically, succumbs to it. So, ordinary (neurotic) subjects want more jouissance, feels they deserve more enjoyment than they are receiving, and yet they are also appalled and repulsed by it, more readily identifying it in the deplorable enjoyments of others. Contrary then to the tendency to view enjoyment within the frame of isolated individuality, we need rather approach it in terms of prospective relations to others. Jouissance, insists Macey (1988), “is not...a category of pure subjectivity” (p. 203). Rather, it implies “a dialectic of possession and enjoyment of and by the other” (p. 203). The revulsion we feel toward our own jouissance is, as already noted, all too readily displaced onto others (as Lacan [1992] laments in Seminar VII: “[W]hat is more of a neighbor to me than this...my jouissance...which I don’t dare go near” [p. 186]). These **others**, moreover, **are always ready to blame for having too much jouissance**, for having procured improper or malignant enjoyments that appear to compromise given social or cultural norms or laws. Given neurotic subjects’ presumption that they have surrendered a crucial quantity of enjoyment—an effect of socialization, of the symbolic overwriting the bodily experience of drives—they maintain a preexisting condition of resentment toward such enjoying others. Differently put: **This resentment comes before, and thus in a sense determines, what the subject perceives to be the illegitimate or disproportionate enjoyments of others.** The perceived existence of jouissance thus implies a social relationship, one that exists before the other upon whom this jouissance will be projected. So, what even the most elementary experience of jouissance necessitates is a type of hating object-relation, a conflicted mode of intersubjectivity, which is always already there, prior to the racial/cultural/social other who will be assigned a position in this negative interpersonal dialectic. The construction of otherness is thus not merely an effect of social construction. It involves also a libidinal component, a prior attribution of stolen enjoyment, a readymade form of resentment awaiting a blameworthy subject upon whom this crime can be pinned. Enjoyment in the Form of Lack Jouissance, certainly once approached as a type of possession, exhibits an odd characteristic: It is never more real than when we have been dispossessed of it. Enjoyment, that is to say, comes most forcefully into being, is most intensely experienced, when: (1) It is seen to be in the possession of others, or (2) when it is perceived as endangered, about to be snatched away. Put differently**, jouissance seems most typically to exist in an “already stolen” or precarious state; it only takes form in the shadow of a potential castration.** This helps us understand Vighi’s (2010) initially puzzling description. Jouissance, he says, is a type of libidinal excess, most typically experienced as a lack. This experience of surplus, he insists, corresponds to a void: “[E]very enjoyment is structured around a lack...a paradoxical lack of enjoyment” (p. 25). Furthermore: We perceive enjoyment not as lack but as fullness, a ubiquitous substance that fills our lives and gives it meaning. Here we are faced by what we might call the “enjoyment parallax,” with parallax naming the different aspects of the same object viewed from...different lines of sight. **Although enjoyment in its deepest connotation is always a lack, we...perceiv[e] it as fullness.** (p. 25) This facet of enjoyment—that it oscillates between surplus and absence, a “too much” and a “not enough”—once again highlights the intersubjective aspect of the concept. Moreover, if it is the case, as Vighi (2010) argues, that attributions of enjoyment invariably spring from the experience of lack, then it is unsurprising that this lack should be allocated a cause, and, more importantly yet, a suspect who is responsible for this lack. Jouissance, that is to say, entails an elementary narrative component. The most rudimentary experience of **jouissance implies** already therole—the **fantasy**—**of a culprit, someone who enjoys more than I,** or who is poised to steal the little enjoyment that I do possess. One of the most articulate expressions of this idea is offered by Stavrakakis (1999) who insists that the festivals of jouissance by means of which we constitute our “national ways of enjoyment” are always in some way lacking: No matter how much we love our national ways of enjoyment, our national real, this real is never enough, it is already castrated... this loss can be attributed to the existence of an alien culture or people: the enjoyment lacking from our national community is being denied to us because “they” stole it.... What is not realised within such a schema is the fact...**that we never had at our disposal the surplus enjoyment that we accuse the Other of stealing.** (p. 156) The modes of jouissance that we have been discussing cannot be dismissed merely as individual or idiosyncratic quirks (which, of course, is not to say there will not be considerable latitude in terms of how these forms of enjoyment are experienced by individuals). How though is this “structured” quality of enjoyment to be explained? This is a particularly important question given that the notion of jouissance as developed in the clinic is always attuned to the singularity of a subject’s enjoyment.

#### Fantasies about a utopian economy inevitably fail, but the process of fantasizing addicts us to the problem, creating an attachment that prevents solutions, instead causing an infinite deferral of problems onto an external source.

Byrne and Healy 06 [Ken Byrne and Stephen Healy. “Co-operative Subjects: Towards a Post-Fantasmic Enjoyment of the Economy.” 2006. Rethinking Marxism. http://www.communityeconomies.org/sites/default/files/paper\_attachment/cooptopiapaper.pdf]

Returning to our three familiar subjects of economy we can see that, in each case, the individual upholds a Utopian dream of harmonious unity, completion, or wholeness. Jim has a dream of a precapitalist, premodern community of unalienated, actualized individuals; Stanley has a dream of a fully efficient, ecologically minded, sustainable society; Ellen has a dream of a neoliberal society in which the market and competition inevitably lead to the harmonious allocation of resources and rewards. Clearly, the ‘‘currently existing economy’’ in each of these fantasies has different emotional associations and attached values. But what we can point out here is that in each case there is an ideal economy, an economy in which needs would be met, desires would be satisfied, proper human and social development would be achieved. If only .... Another key element of fantasy is that it produces, paradoxically, the object that frustrates its consummation: the symptom. This is so because fantasy cannot actually find that final meaning in the Other, eliminate the lack in the identity of the self, or provide a pure language beyond the corruption of the sliding signifier. Fantasy protects us from the anxiety of the lack, and it gives a name to\*/symbolizes\*/the thing that blocks us from getting what we desire. It gives a name to our desire and to why it is unattainable, without confronting or acknowledging the unavoidable lack. It allows us to domesticate the lack, but in such a way that the impossible fullness moves from being impossible to being prohibited. Thus, Zˇizˇek (1991) says that fantasy is not the commonplace notion of fantasy (the fantasy of the successful sexual relationship, for example) but is, rather, the story of why it went wrong. With our three fantasizing subjects, we can see how the prohibition of the impossible is played out. In the anticapitalist fantasy, it is capitalism that stands SUBJECTS OF ECONOMY 243 in the way of what should be the Utopic true economy. For the sustainable development fantasy, the alien figure obstructing the reconciliation of community, environment, and economy is profligate, short-term gain. For the neoliberal, the Utopian vision is of a society composed of responsible, rational individuals each seeking to maximize their resources; the obstacle is government regulation.2 If the symptom provides the arbitrary, contingent content while filling the necessary structural role of giving consistency to the fantasy, we can project that if each of these obstacles were removed, these particular individuals would still be left with a sense of disappointment and dissatisfaction. Indeed, their reliance on these symptoms, on the alien figure or the scapegoat, suggests that these individuals get a certain degree of pleasure or enjoyment out of the frustration of their fantasies. Ellen is both horrified and secretly pleased by her explanation of how sentimental environmentalists get in the way of progress in the Valley; Stanley is visibly gleeful when he itemizes the wastefulness of those less committed to environmentalism than he is. Freud described the look on the face of the Rat Man as he recounted a recurring horrific image as a mixture of horror and pleasure. But the Rat Man was only aware of his horror, not of his pleasure. It is our experience that many of the fantasizing subjects of economy we’ve encountered are, indeed, Rat Men. The Problem with Fantasy Those who have applied the Lacanian theory of the fantasy and symptom to social and political theory have asserted that the Left must struggle against the dangerous 2. We should point out that these caricatures are presented here as full and fully defined subjects, almost wholly without identity beyond their resentment and frustration. Our commitment to an overdeterminist understanding of subjectivity (acknowledging that subjects are complex, multiple, contradictory, and changing) and of effectivity (accepting that the political outcomes of any particular action or subjective position are also complex, multiple, contradictory, and changing) does not preclude us here from fixing these characters, for the moment, to tell a particular story, the telling of which we hope will have certain positive outcomes. If you recognize yourself in these characters’ attachment to fantasy, or identify with our frustrations with them, then one such positive effect may have already occurred. In addition, at this point it is fair to inquire about the fantasies of the authors. There are at least three responses to this inquiry that come to mind: (1) to deny that we have a fantasy about the economy, because we have overcome fantasy and replaced it with something more like true knowledge; (2) to argue that we have replaced one fantasy with another, better fantasy, one that leads us to a better place and one that if widely shared would produce a better society; and (3) to suggest that if one can never be outside fantasy, one can at least develop a different relationship to it, predicated on acknowledging the structure of fantasy and the Utopian impulse. Taking this third approach, we acknowledge that Hilton, Grimm, and Bellow are the symptoms of our particular fantasy; we recognize our desire to believe that without subjects like them, without leftist subjectivity built around resentment, our particular vision of a future society would be realizable. 244 BYRNE AND HEALY fantasies that have historically suffused its projects.3 This desire to get beyond fantasy is motivated by the belief that fantasies, when politicized, attempt to enforce a closure on the social; the inevitable by-product is a scapegoat who must be eliminated. This is one of the reasons that Stavrakakis and others raise the specters of Nazism or Stalinism, as the dark clouds inevitably appearing on the horizon of Utopian thought. Our emphasis in applying Lacanian psychoanalytic theory to economic subjectivity is somewhat different. We are less concerned with the dark social consequences of fantasy and more concerned with what fantasy, and especially leftist fantasy, prevents us from imagining, what possible politics and what other orientations of the desiring (economic) subject are precluded\*/how different approaches to economic, social, and environmental justice are stymied by fantasies in which the world is already too full of meaning, where the identity of (economic) subjects is anchored in relation to a frustrating symptom of which these subjects are unwilling to let go. In our reading, psychoanalytic and Marxian theory are complementary. Building on Gibson-Graham (1996), Graham, Healy, and Byrne (2002), and the Community Economies Collective (2001), we regard Marxian class analysis as a proliferative discourse, allowing us to see the richness of what, in class terms, is in the already socialized character of work, and motivating us to be inspired by things as they could be in the absence of the social theft that is exploitation. The power of psychoanalysis, on the other hand, is subtractive: It removes us from old ways of being, in light of the already socialized nature of the subject, altering our relationship 3. As people who identify with the Marxian tradition, we recognize that there is a vast literature from this perspective that addresses the connection between subjectivity and economy, and the role of desire, fantasy, and consciousness from a variety of perspectives. Since this discussion stretches from Marx through Lenin and Luka´cs to Althusser and Zˇizˇek, it would be exceedingly difficult to chart our agreements with and divergences from this tradition. What we wish to distance ourselves from here is a certain strain within the Marxist tradition that is enmeshed in the fantasy of an unalienated individual or an economy freed from conflict and contradiction. This wish places us at odds with fantastic versions of Marxism and with those within the Marxist tradition that attempt to restore an ‘‘integral wholeness’’ to the economic subject. Fantasy is defined here for us by the existence of the frustrating symptom that permits desire to remain in play by constantly throwing up obstacles to its ‘‘realization.’’ Many have observed that Soviet orthodoxy under Stalin evoked and continually deferred socialist paradise by pointing to threats both internal and external (Zˇizˇek 2001). In a different way, the notion of ‘‘false consciousness,’’ the idea that there is some technique of analysis or performance that allows oneself or one’s ‘‘class’’ to arrive at their true self-interest, can be understood as another type of fantasy. One particularly useful approach squarely within the Marxist tradition, which does not view the issue through the lens of psychoanalysis, is that taken by Amariglio and Callari (1989), who argue that Marx’s very formulation of the terms ‘‘commodity fetishism’’ and ‘‘value’’ contain within them Marx’s rejection of economic determinism and express his understanding of subjectivity as overdetermined. ‘‘The key to the concept of value lies not in any universal law of value,’’ they write ‘‘but in the historical conjunctures which reproduce that objectification of human relations which is the content of bourgeois consciousness and which Marx began to theorize with the concept of commodity fetishism. Far from being proof of the closure of Marx’s discourse at the level of the economy, the concept of commodity fetishism is Marx’s way of overturning the discursive privilege of the economy’’ (1989, 44). SUBJECTS OF ECONOMY 245 with the real and with our selves in relation to our attachments and resentments. If Marxism is about becoming, the psychoanalysis we seek to highlight is about giving up. Put another way, as leftists interested in social transformation, we believe that unsettling people’s fantasies is an unavoidable aspect of doing politics. What we don’t want to do is simply replace one fantasy with another, ‘‘more correct’’ one. That is, the goal of analysis is not reaching some point free of or outside fantasy, but traversing it, arriving at a different relationship to fantasy. Intriguingly, a number of authors\*/in particular Zˇizˇek, Stavrakakis, and Chow\*/ have seen equivalencies between this traversing of fantasy and the ‘‘institutionalization of lack,’’ or the political practice of nonclosure over the void, that marks the Radical Democracy project of Laclau and Mouffe. The Radical Democrats themselves have acknowledged their debt to psychoanalysis in their formulation of the politics of dislocation; just as the analysand in psychoanalysis comes to question the fantastic scene that both defines and frustrates him, social movements come to confront, challenge, and change the content of liberal democratic society, the provisionally fixed content or social fantasies of who is determined to be a legitimate rightsbearing political subject (Butler, Laclau, and Zˇizˇek 2000).

#### Thus, the alt and role of the judge is to let go. The process of accepting limitations allows us to reclaim the surplus, accepting our boundaries, and re-orient anti-capitalist struggles through a communist axiom.

Ozselcuk and Madra 05 [Ceren Ozselcuk, PhD is an Associate Professor of Sociology at Bogazici University. Yahya M. Madra teaches Economics at Boğaziçi University. “Psychoanalysis and Marxism: From Capitalist-All to Communist Non-All.” 2005. Psychoanalysis, Culture, & Society. https://sci-hub.se/10.1057/palgrave.pcs.2100028]

In these passages, we find a Marx that traverses the Lockean fantasy that organizes our relationship towards surplus qua objet petit a. When he enumerates the series of social expenses one by one and refuses to impose an exception that would condition the list, we find a Marx that lets go of the surplus. The relation to surplus that Marx describes in these passages is neither one of desire (for surplus qua lost object) nor one of deadly drive (for the expansion of value). In this sense, we read Marx’s Critique as an invitation to communists to re-orient their relation to surplus, to traverse the fantasy of ‘‘fixing’’ class. But how can we concretize this vision? How could it inform concrete political struggles today? To begin with, we should refrain from defining communism as a social utopia that promises to deliver what the bourgeois program of equality has failed to achieve. Why should we turn communism into an unrealizable ideal, an unachievable end point, a utopian destination, that promises to accomplish something that no conceivable social order – let alone bourgeois – can ever fulfill? Why should we burden the communist project with such an unattainable task of delivering the impossible fullness of community? In contrast, we propose to define communism explicitly as a starting point, a principle, an axiom that asserts that no one can have exclusive rights over the dispatching of the surplus. 5 An important condition of possibility of this social reclaiming of surplus is precisely its psychic letting go. Blatant presumptuousness that makes exploitation possible will become perceivable only if we let go of the idea that the right to enjoy surplus can be exclusive. This is what we mean by traversing the fantasy in the context of class transformation. Once this shift in perspective is achieved, it would become possible for us to assert the axiom of communism on each occasion when communist class structures are being instituted, rendering each concrete communism always inconsistent and ultimately a failed attempt. In fact, we think that the axiom of communism is already addressed in many of the decisions of collective enterprises that pertain to the division of labor, business expansion, use of workspace, remuneration, and distribution. In some cases of worker cooperatives, for instance, decisions are rigorously debated and assumed with reference to a contestable notion of ‘‘fairness’’ that implicates not only the existing and potential members, but also the broader community (Byrne and Healy, 2003). In fact, such cooperatives are distinguished from others by their fidelity to a ‘‘politics of antagonism’’ (Byrne and Healy, 2003) and commitment to an ‘‘ethical economy’’ (Gibson-Graham, 2003). For us, such characterizations of collective enterprises are intimately linked to the question of whether and to what extent the axiom of communism is exercised over the appropriation and distribution of communal surplus. Equally important though is to hold up the axiom of communism against the capitalist-all, that is, on each occasion when someone or some social group claims his/her/their right to participate in the negotiation of the capitalist surplus. Since there is nothing inherently wrong about surplus, it is possible to make use of it for purposes that do not necessarily reproduce the capitalist-all. In fact, such acts of reclaiming are always happening within contemporary capitalist formations. Whenever governments levy taxes on corporate profits to finance public services, or whenever ecological movements force corporations to clean up, the surplus is socially reclaimed. While it is quite tempting to read these ‘‘acts of reclaiming’’ to be in the service of an enlightened and ‘‘green’’ capitalist-all, the struggle, as we see it, is precisely over how these acts are socially signified. In the absence of a counterhegemonic nodal point, these disparate ‘‘acts of reclaiming’’ could indeed easily be co-opted by the capitalist-all. We believe that the axiom of communism could serve as a useful counter-hegemonic nodal point that would impart a ‘‘surplus’’ meaning to each and every act of reclaiming. Overdetermined by the axiom of communism, each act of reclaiming will have at least two meanings: on the one hand, it will be a particular act of reclaiming with a concrete goal, and on the other hand, it will be a particular instance of the universal contestation of the exception of appropriation that sustains the capitalist-all.