# 1NC vs Strake Jesuit NW

## OFF

### 1NC – OFF

Topicality

#### Interpretation --- the AFF should defend a just government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike.

#### The resolution defines the division of ground --- it was announced in advance, providing both sides with a reasonable opportunity to *prepare to engage* one another’s arguments --- this doesn’t require any particular style, type of evidence, or role of the judge --- AND only a textual reading provides a predictable basis for research.

1. **Resolved denotes a proposal to be enacted by law**   
   **Words and Phrases 1964** Permanent Edition   
   Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “**to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;**” It is of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is **defined** by Bouvier **as** meaning “**to establish by law**”.

#### Ought means should

Merriam Webster, No Date – Merriam Webster’s Learner’s Dictionary, “ought”, <http://www.learnersdictionary.com/definition/ought>  
ought /ˈɑːt/ verb  
Learner's definition of OUGHT [modal verb] 1 ◊ Ought is almost always followed by to and the infinitive form of a verb. The phrase ought to has the same meaning as should and is used in the same ways, but it is less common and somewhat more formal. The negative forms ought not and oughtn't are often used without a following to. — used to indicate what is expected They ought to be here by now. You ought to be able to read this book. There ought to be a gas station on the way. 2 — used to say or suggest what should be done You ought to get some rest. That leak ought to be fixed. You ought to do your homework.

#### Should requires legal effect

Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

¶4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"[13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13) in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling *in praesenti*.[14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14) The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;[15](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn15) it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record. [CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE] [13](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn13) "*Should*" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with *ought* but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an *obligation* *and to be more than advisory*); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, [802 P.2d 813](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=802&box2=P.2D&box3=813) (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an *obligation* to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). [14](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker2fn14) *In praesenti* means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is *presently* or *immediately effective*, as opposed to something that *will* or *would* become effective *in the future [in futurol*]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, [106 U.S. 360](http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/deliverdocument.asp?box1=106&box2=U.S.&box3=360), 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

#### Strikes are work stoppages

Britannica [https://www.britannica.com/topic/strike-industrial-relations]

strike, collective refusal by employees to work under the conditions required by employers. Strikes arise for a number of reasons, though principally in response to economic conditions (defined as an economic strike and meant to improve wages and benefits) or labour practices (intended to improve work conditions). Other strikes can stem from sympathy with other striking unions or from jurisdictional disputes between two unions. Illegal strikes include sit-down strikes, wildcat strikes, and partial strikes (such as slowdowns or sick-ins). Strikes may also be called for purely political reasons (as in the general strike).

#### Worker is

Merriam Webster [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/worker]

Definition of worker

1a: one that works especially at manual or industrial labor or with a particular material

#### Violation --- the AFF doesn’t defend the instrumental adoption of *USFG action* --- vote NEG:

#### 1. Fairness --- unlimited deviation from the topic alters the *balance of prep* --- open subjects create incentives for avoidance and monopolization of moral high ground, which denies a *role for the neg* --- any artificially created advantage is a reason they should lose because the *competitive factor* of debate makes it unique.

#### 2. Refinement --- thorough debates over a stable stasis point incentivize in-depth research and argumentative refinement --- the practice of defending our positions against well prepared opponents is valuable *regardless* of the content, because it makes us more persuasive, informed, and capable advocates.

#### 3. Clash --- debates about scholarship in a vacuum are myopic and breed reactionary generics --- allowing the AFF to cement their infinite prep *crushes clash* because all negative strategies are based on *praxis*, and lack of a stable advocacy zaps 90% of NEG ground, but the AFF still retains traditional competition standards like perms to make being neg impossible --- clash is an *intrinsic good* and it’s vital to the overall practice of debate.

#### 4. Switch-side debate --- topical debate is the only way to facilitate it by clearly delineating aff and neg ground --- it’s good for challenging dogmatic ideological predispositions, fostering a skeptical worldview that ensures debaters arrive at more ethical and effective ideas. 1AC topic supercharges --- read them as links on the NEG.

#### 5. TVA --- embrace strikes as a public demonstration to refuse to let the government and public forget the injustices of internment

Fukarai and Yang 18—Professor of Sociology and Legal Studies AND Associate Professor of History, UC-Santa Cruz (Hiroshi and Alice, “The History of Japanese Racism, Japanese American Redress, and the Dangers Associated with Government Regulation of Hate Speech,” 45 Hastings Const. L.Q. 533 (2018), dml)

Activists in the 1960s and 1970s also dismantled claims that the camps were necessary for national security by publicizing studies that documented the racism behind mass exclusion and incarceration. To gain credibility outside the community, it was important that a growing list of books by non-Japanese-American researchers could be cited as evidence for the injustice of the incarceration. 128 Accounts by historian Roger Daniels and journalist Allan R. Bosworth denounced government euphemisms that called mass ",129 removal an "evacuation" and labeled the camps as "relocation centers. Instead, these authors argued that the camps should be called "concentration camps" because they had caused widespread suffering. Documenting the racist views of DeWitt and other architects of the incarceration, this scholarship helped Japanese Americans recognize the camps were not just a wartime "mistake," but reflected a long history of anti-Asian racism. 130 Researchers also began presenting evidence of suffering within the camps, including the fact that several prisoners were shot and killed by trigger happy guards, which helped activists persuade former prisoners that there was no shame in sharing their personal accounts of trauma they experienced during and after the war. Activists frequently quoted this scholarship to convince Americans who had no familiarity with the Japanese-American community that the damage mass incarceration inflicted on individuals, families and the community was significant and pervasive.131 To counter claims that Japanese Americans should "move on" and avoid dwelling on the past, activists Edison Uno and Raymond Okamura organized a grassroots campaign in 1967 to repeal Title II of the 1950 Internal Security Act to prevent other groups from being incarcerated without due process. 132 This act provided funding for detention sites, including the former Japanese-Amenican camp at Tule Lake, to imprison individuals labeled as subversives without hearings. While the act specifically targeted communist agitators, black power and antiwar protesters feared that they also might be placed in "concentration camps." After the campaign gained momentum within the ethnic community and increasing media coverage, more conservative JACL lobbyists, Senator Daniel Inouye, and Congressman Spark Matsunaga shepherded the legislation through Congress in 197 1.133 This history of militant community activists putting pressure on more conservative leaders who then used their political contacts to achieve legislative changes became a model for redress' passage. In 1970, Edison Uno persuaded the JACL to pass a resolution calling on the government to "compensate on an individual basis a daily per diem requital for each day spent in confinement and/or legal exclusion."l34 Uno passed away in 1976 without seeing any significant progress. Two years later, however, the JACL elected an outsider, Clifford Uyeda, as president and he, in turn, recruited John Tateishi, the son of a famous critic of the wartime JACL, to serve as JACL's redress chair.1 3 5 Under this new leadership, the JACL developed a multifaceted campaign to build support for redress. To overcome redress opponents and skeptics within the JACL, Uyeda wrote thirty-five articles for the JACL's newsletter defending the concept of redress and explaining that the campaign's goal was not to "put a price tag on freedom or justice" but "to acknowledge the mistake by providing proper redress for the victims of the injustice, and thereby make such injustices less likely to recur. "136 To help marshal support for one plan, the redress committee reviewed various proposals that defined redress eligibility, form, and scope in different ways. Seattle activists maintained that redress compensation should be determined by the amount of time spent behind barbed wire. Critics of this plan argued that it would penalize Japanese Americans who left camp early to serve in the military, to attend college, and to find jobs to support their families.13 7 JACL old guard leaders, offended by the concept of individual compensation, called for the creation of a community trust fund that could support educational programs and charity projects. Critics of this plan questioned who would administer the program and worried that public relations programs would take priority over housing and health services for low-income Japanese Americans.138 To achieve consensus, Uyeda and Tateishi incorporated components from multiple proposals. Their 1978 proposal called for both a community trust fund and payments of $25,000 to each individual, or their heirs, who had experienced removal and incarceration regardless of age, national origin, or camp experience. Ironically, the $25,000 figure was based on a fabricated claim made by a JACL leader during hearings for the 1948 Evacuation Claims Act that the Federal Reserve had calculated Japanese Americans lost $400 million in property during the war. 139 Realizing that Japanese Amencans needed to project an image of unity before the government, JACL leaders designed a survey that disguised conflicting views of redress eligibility and compensation. They simply asked if "the injustice of internment affected your life" and if people favored the concept of redress without wading into more specific definitions. 140 As a result, the campaign could claim a mandate based on support by ninety-four percent of the organization for redress and eighty-three percent for compensation.' 4 JACL activists then developed a media campaign to educate other Japanese Amenicans and the mainstream public about the injustice Japanese Americans experienced during the war. They were unintentionally assisted by redress opponents who made inflammatory comments that attempted to minimize or deny Japanese American suffering. The most prominent critic, S. I. Hayakawa, a Canadian-born semanticist and Republican senator from California who spent the war in Chicago, actually claimed the camps were "the best thing that could have happened" to Japanese Americans because they "forced them out of their segregated existence" and allowed them to take "advantage of new opportunities." 42 News outlets spread Hayakawa's claims along with redress criticism by others who continued to blame Japanese Americans for Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March, and more recent trade wars with Japan. Instead of diminishing support for redress, this publicity boosted the campaign by enraging former prisoners who felt compelled to counter Hayakawa's depiction of the benefits of mass removal and incarceration and to debunk the racist conflation of Japan and Japanese Americans.1 4 3 Such accounts made it difficult to argue that racism was an irrelevant vestige of history and convinced more Japanese Americans to become activists. 44 The creation of a federal commission to investigate the causes and consequences of the wartime removal and incarceration became a vital component in the passage of redress. Japanese-American members of Congress advised JACL redress leaders that such a commission was necessary to educate the public about what happened during the war. JACL leaders knew that this proposal would be controversial and would be criticized as a stalling tactic or a replacement for meaningful redress. JACL reformers, especially within the Seattle chapter, denounced this strategy and argued there was no need for an investigation given the large body of scholarship that documented the racism behind Executive Order 9066.145 Declaring that redress delayed was redress denied, JACL redress leaders noted that increasing numbers of former prisoners were passing away each month. Political leaders, however, recognized that having a government commission provide an official determination of the injustice was critical to win congressional support. Senator Daniel Inouye and Congressmen Spark Matsunaga, Norman Mineta, and Robert Matsui cosponsored the legislation that created the Commission on the Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians in 1980.146 This Commission held hearings in twenty cities around the country and included testimony from more than 750 witnesses.1 47 As the National Coalition for Redress and Reparations ("NCRR") activist Lillian Nakano explained, "the burden of guilt has finally shifted onto the government, where it rightly belongs." "Bitter tears," she proclaimed, "intermingled with pride and determination as we reaffirmed our resolve to continue our quest for justice." "At every city hearing," she noted, "the united demand for monetary reparations was virtually unanimous, and irresistible."4 s Media portrayals of the incredibly moving testimony completely obliterated "model minority" images of Japanese Americans and increased public understanding of the trauma experienced by former prisoners and their children. For example, Time's 1981 article, "Burden of Shame," noted the "terrible ironies" of Fourth of July celebrations held "behind barbed wire, in the shadow of sentry towers" and "parents wasting away in tar-paper camp shacks" that "proudly displayed starred banners indicating that their sons were American soldiers." 49 While some Japanese Americans worried that this focus on loyalty and patriotism obscured a history of protest and resistance within the camps, it clearly helped in winning support for redress outside of the Japanese American community.150

#### Fairness is a voting issue --- without some form of competitive equity, it’s impossible to win, means debaters will quit debate.

#### T is a voting issue ---

#### T indicts you reading the AFF at all --- which means that it’s impossible for you to leverage the AFF because we can’t determine if it’s true or not.

#### The AC is the starting point of the round --- if prove a flaw with the AC, then the starting point is wrong, we can’t evaluate substance.

#### T is the codified way to evaluate fairness --

#### Use competing interps –

#### Drop the debater –

#### (a) it’s incoherent with T since you’d drop the advocacy which is functionally the same and (b) deters abuse – empirically proven with a prioris.

#### No RVI’s –

#### (a) the aff can just frontline the finite number of T interps and prep a long counter-interp in the 1ar and can weigh and contextualize in the 2ar, chilling legit checks on abuse,

#### (b) logic – you shouldn’t proactively win for proving you meet your burden of being fair. Logic comes first since args need to make sense to be evaluated.

### 1NC – OFF

Ballot K

#### The ballot is a form of interest convergence between the judge and the aff --- this pacifying inclusive gesture replicates academic domination through liberal appropriation and serves to maintain the status quo.

Chow 93 --- (Rey, Andrew W. Mellon Professor of the Humanities @ Brown, Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies, p. 16-17)

While the struggle for hegemony remains necessary for many reasons-especially in cases where underprivileged groups seek equality of privilege-I remain skeptical of the validity of hegemony over time, especially if it is a hegemony formed through intellectual power. The question for me is not how intellectuals can obtain hegemony (a question that positions them in an oppositional light against dominant power and neglects their share of that power through literacy, through the culture of words), but **how they can resist**, as Michel Foucault said, “the forms of power that transform [them] into its object and instrument in the sphere of ‘knowledge,’ ‘truth,’ ‘consciousness, and ‘discourse.’ “ Putting it another way, how do intellectuals struggle against **a hegemony which already includes them** and which can no longer be divided into the state and civil society in Gramsci’s terms, nor be clearly demarcated into national and transnational spaces? Because “borders” have so clearly meandered Into so many intel lectual issues that the more stable and conventional relation be tween borders and the field no longer holds, intervention cannot simply be thought of in terms of the creation of new ‘fields.” Instead, it is necessary to think primarily in terms of borders—of borders, that Is, as parasites that never take over a field in Its en tirety but erode it slowly and tactically. The work of Michel de Certeau Is helpful for a formulation of this para-sitical intervention. De Certeau distinguishes between “strategy” and another practice—”tactic”—in the following terms. A strategy has the ability to “transform the uncertainties of history into readable spaces” (de Certeau, p. 36). The type of knowledge derived from strategy is one sustained and determined by the power to provide oneself with one’s own place” (de Certeau, p. 36). Strategy therefore belongs to “an economy of the proper place” (de Certeau, p. 55) and to those who are committed to the building, growth, and fortification of a “field. A text, for instance, would become in this economy “a cultural weapon, a private hunting pre serve.” or a means of social stratification” in the order of the Great Wall of China (de Certeau, p. 171). A tactic, by contrast, is a cal culated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (de Certeau, p’ 37). Betting on time instead of space, a tactic concerns an operational logic whose models may go as far back as the age-old ruses of fishes and insects that disguise or transform themselves in order to survive, and which has in any case been concealed by the form of rationality currently dominant in Western culture” (de Certeau, p. xi). Why are “tactics useful at this moment? As discussions about multiculturalism,’ “interdisciplinary,” the third world intellectual,” and other companion issues develop in the American academy and society today, and as rhetorical claims to political change and difference are being put forth, **many** deep-rooted, **politically reactionary forces return** to haunt us. Essentialist notions of culture and history; conservative notions of territorial and linguistic propriety, and the otherness’ ensuing from them; unattested **claims** **of oppression and victimization** that **are used** merely **to guilt-trip and to control**; sexist and racist reaffirmations of sexual and racial diversities that are made merely in the name of righteousness—all these forces create new “solidarities whose ideological premises **remain unquestioned**. These new solidarities are often informed by a strategic attitude which repeats what they seek to overthrow. The weight of old ideologies being reinforced over and over again is immense, We need to remember as intellectuals that the battles we fight are **battles of words**. Those who argue the oppositional standpoint are not doing anything different from their enemies and are most certainly **not** directly **changing the** downtrodden **lives of those who seek** their **survival** in metropolitan and nonmetropolitan spaces alike. What academic intellectuals must confront is thus not their victimization by society at large (or their victimization-in-solidarity-with-the oppressed), but the power, wealth, and privilege that Ironically accumulate **from their** “oppositional” **viewpoint**, and the widening gap between the professed contents of their words and the upward mobility they gain from such words. (When Foucault said intellectuals need to struggle against becoming the object and instrument of power, he spoke precisely to this kind of situation.) The predicament we face in the West, where Intellectual freedom shares a history with economic enterprise, Is that “If a professor wishes to denounce aspects of big business, . . . he will be wise to locate in a school whose trustees are big businessmen. “ Why should we believe in those who continue to speak a language of alterity-as-lack while their salaries and honoraria keep rising? How do we resist the turning-Into-propriety of oppositional discourses, when the Intention of such discourses has been that of displacing and disowning the proper? How do we prevent what begin as tactics—that which is ‘without any base where it could stockpile its winnings” (de Certeau. p. 37)—from turning into a solidly fenced-off field, in the military no less than in the academic sense?

### 1NC - OFF

Psycho K

#### Their politics can only lead to an endless quest for jouissance that causes ressentiment and psychic violene.

Hook 17 [Derek Hook; Duquesne University and University of Pretoria; “What Is ‘Enjoyment as a Political Factor’?” *Political Psychology;* 2017; Date Accessed: 27 July 2019.] DG

Jouissance of the Drive We can now add a further qualification, namely that jouissance and affect should not be equated. It is more accurate to understand jouissance as a mode of intensity, a type of arousal—a thrilling twist—that occurs when affect moves beyond the bounds of what is comfortable, reasonable, or satisfying. Bearing this in mind prevents us from making the error of thinking jouissance as itself a variety of affect that permits for easy categorization (as in types such as anger, frustration, joy, etc.). Enjoyment should not be delimited in thus way; it is neither a subcategory of affect nor the preserve of a limited range of affects. We can further refine our understanding of the concept by stressing, as Lacan (1992), that **“jouissance appears not purely and simply as the satisfaction of a need, but as the satisfaction of a drive”** (p. 209). Furthermore, any drive impulse—be it “blind” physiological sensation or a more overly “goal-directed” activity—can serve as the basis of jouissance. It helps here to signal the omnipresence of enjoyment in everyday life, to indicate that any drive activity—”drive” understood here as the psychical elaboration of pressing bodily impulses—is linked to the pursuit of jouissance. **We should evoke here the notion of the death drive**; doing so allows us to offer a succinct formulation: [J]ouissance is a form of enjoyment willing to exceed the parameters of life. Miller (1992) is once again instructive: To understand the concept of jouissance in Lacan as unique is to understand “that it concerns at the same time libido and death drive, libido and aggression, not as two antagonistic forces external to one another, but as a knot” (pp. 25–26). Lacan (2007) goes so far as to declare that **jouissance is “the path towards death”** (p. 17), a comment which calls to mind Freud’s earlier (1924) observation that “even the subject’s destruction of himself cannot take place without libidinal satisfaction” (p. 170). This opens a further dimension of the concept, which, as we will go on to see, must be related both to the notions of the law and the superego. Hence, Eagleton’s (2003) description of jouissance as “the lethal pleasure of Freud[’s] primary masochism, in which we reap delight from the way that the law or superego unleashes its demented sadism upon us” (p. 198). Jouissance, then, to review the key points made above is: (1) diametrically opposed to pleasure and desire; (2) bodily and subliminal rather than unconscious in nature; (3) less an affect than an excess of affect, a mode of intensity produced by pursuing drive impulses; (4) necessarily “negative” (excessive, traumatic) in the sense that it is inflected with the death drive; (5) takes the form of contravention (is transgressive) inasmuch as it pushes the subject painfully (enjoyably) beyond the law or socially prescribed limits. “Negative Dialectics” Our own enjoyment—let alone that of others—is, for the most part, repulsive to us, and needs to be kept at arm’s length. The subject’s stance regards their own enjoyment is thus necessarily conflicted. Jouissance exacerbates the split in the subject who at once reviles their enjoyment and yet, periodically, succumbs to it. So, ordinary (neurotic) subjects want more jouissance, feels they deserve more enjoyment than they are receiving, and yet they are also appalled and repulsed by it, more readily identifying it in the deplorable enjoyments of others. Contrary then to the tendency to view enjoyment within the frame of isolated individuality, we need rather approach it in terms of prospective relations to others. Jouissance, insists Macey (1988), “is not...a category of pure subjectivity” (p. 203). Rather, it implies “a dialectic of possession and enjoyment of and by the other” (p. 203). The revulsion we feel toward our own jouissance is, as already noted, all too readily displaced onto others (as Lacan [1992] laments in Seminar VII: “[W]hat is more of a neighbor to me than this...my jouissance...which I don’t dare go near” [p. 186]). These **others**, moreover, **are always ready to blame for having too much jouissance**, for having procured improper or malignant enjoyments that appear to compromise given social or cultural norms or laws. Given neurotic subjects’ presumption that they have surrendered a crucial quantity of enjoyment—an effect of socialization, of the symbolic overwriting the bodily experience of drives—they maintain a preexisting condition of resentment toward such enjoying others. Differently put: **This resentment comes before, and thus in a sense determines, what the subject perceives to be the illegitimate or disproportionate enjoyments of others.** The perceived existence of jouissance thus implies a social relationship, one that exists before the other upon whom this jouissance will be projected. So, what even the most elementary experience of jouissance necessitates is a type of hating object-relation, a conflicted mode of intersubjectivity, which is always already there, prior to the racial/cultural/social other who will be assigned a position in this negative interpersonal dialectic. The construction of otherness is thus not merely an effect of social construction. It involves also a libidinal component, a prior attribution of stolen enjoyment, a readymade form of resentment awaiting a blameworthy subject upon whom this crime can be pinned. Enjoyment in the Form of Lack Jouissance, certainly once approached as a type of possession, exhibits an odd characteristic: It is never more real than when we have been dispossessed of it. Enjoyment, that is to say, comes most forcefully into being, is most intensely experienced, when: (1) It is seen to be in the possession of others, or (2) when it is perceived as endangered, about to be snatched away. Put differently**, jouissance seems most typically to exist in an “already stolen” or precarious state; it only takes form in the shadow of a potential castration.** This helps us understand Vighi’s (2010) initially puzzling description. Jouissance, he says, is a type of libidinal excess, most typically experienced as a lack. This experience of surplus, he insists, corresponds to a void: “[E]very enjoyment is structured around a lack...a paradoxical lack of enjoyment” (p. 25). Furthermore: We perceive enjoyment not as lack but as fullness, a ubiquitous substance that fills our lives and gives it meaning. Here we are faced by what we might call the “enjoyment parallax,” with parallax naming the different aspects of the same object viewed from...different lines of sight. **Although enjoyment in its deepest connotation is always a lack, we...perceiv[e] it as fullness.** (p. 25) This facet of enjoyment—that it oscillates between surplus and absence, a “too much” and a “not enough”—once again highlights the intersubjective aspect of the concept. Moreover, if it is the case, as Vighi (2010) argues, that attributions of enjoyment invariably spring from the experience of lack, then it is unsurprising that this lack should be allocated a cause, and, more importantly yet, a suspect who is responsible for this lack. Jouissance, that is to say, entails an elementary narrative component. The most rudimentary experience of **jouissance implies** already therole—the **fantasy**—**of a culprit, someone who enjoys more than I,** or who is poised to steal the little enjoyment that I do possess. One of the most articulate expressions of this idea is offered by Stavrakakis (1999) who insists that the festivals of jouissance by means of which we constitute our “national ways of enjoyment” are always in some way lacking: No matter how much we love our national ways of enjoyment, our national real, this real is never enough, it is already castrated... this loss can be attributed to the existence of an alien culture or people: the enjoyment lacking from our national community is being denied to us because “they” stole it.... What is not realised within such a schema is the fact...**that we never had at our disposal the surplus enjoyment that we accuse the Other of stealing.** (p. 156) The modes of jouissance that we have been discussing cannot be dismissed merely as individual or idiosyncratic quirks (which, of course, is not to say there will not be considerable latitude in terms of how these forms of enjoyment are experienced by individuals). How though is this “structured” quality of enjoyment to be explained? This is a particularly important question given that the notion of jouissance as developed in the clinic is always attuned to the singularity of a subject’s enjoyment.

#### The shared tropes of what it means to be the Model Minority at the center of the affirmative’s project of resistance reifies the color line. Their Asian spaces of resistance sustain their coherence off this homogenization which creates the model Model Minority through processes of coercive mimeticism.

Gaztambide 14 (Daniel Gaztambide is a professor at the Graduate School of Applied and Professional Psychology at Rutgers University, “I’m not black, I’m not white, what am I? The illusion of the color line”, Psychoanalysis, Culture, & Society) AqN

I also think of Amy, a South Asian social work student. During her participation in a cultural consciousness workshop, the ethnic minorities in the room were asked by the group leader to sit in the center of the circle and discuss their experiences of discrimination and mistreatment. This was intended as an exercise in which white students could learn from the experiences of their peers of color. Over the course of the training, Amy noted that she felt conflicted. On the one hand she could readily bring to awareness her own experiences with prejudice due to being a Brown woman. Yet she also had an awareness of herself as economically privileged due to her family’s class background. She verbalized this ambivalence to the group. The group leader responded that it was not their job to help Amy feel comfortable. Amy clarified that this was not her intent – she was not looking for comfort – but to expand the conversation in terms of different identities and levels of privilege. Other Black group members commented on the conversation. Some believed that as a Brown woman, a South-Asian woman, she wasn’t really a minority. Others said that Asians and Southeast Asians were “model minorities” and basically White by association, and hence didn’t need any legal protection from discrimination. Her presence in the group was in question. It almost seemed that so long as her narrative was one of being a discriminated-against, underprivileged minority, she was an ethnic minority. When she added complexity by noting how she was both underprivileged and privileged, depending on whether one focused on her racial identity or her class status, she was color-checked and judged to be White. These examples can be conceptualized in terms of in-group and out-group dynamics, and there is certainly no lack of writing on this topic in the psychoanalytic and social psychology literature. Important as these are, the perspective I am elucidating points us toward a different angle of vision. Part of what I am talking about here is what the Lacanian Latino Studies scholar Antonio Viego (2007) refers to as “coercive mimeticism,” an institutional and social practice whereby there are certain ways in which ethnic minorities must act, believe, dress, and be in order to present themselves as “recognizably ethnic,” as Latino-enough, as Black-enough, as Asian-enough, and so forth. It is mimetic insofar as one has to look into the mirror of ethnic identity and adapt oneself to that image, reproducing a very particular ego-identity, one that is often a poor fit to one’s more immediate subjective experience. It is also coercive in that there are institutional, cultural, and societal pressures to conform to that notion of identity in order to find one’s place in the coordinates of race and ethnicity – essentially, to be allotted a place on the color line. We are to take up our respective place on the chessboard as Black or White, pawns in a much bigger and deadlier game. Here we can glean both the imaginary and symbolic functions of racial object maps. These object maps provide coherence and integration in the imaginary to an otherwise chaotic collection of signifiers – the racialized bodies in which we exist. At the same time, racial object maps yield symbolic categories of me and not-me, Black and White, and a language with which to organize and regulate closeness, distance, and racial desire. Conversely, what is contained, or to be more precise, excluded, through the symbolic and imaginary operations of the object map is the Real dimension of race – the ever shifting, anxiety-producing, formless nature of the color line. When ambiguously ethnic subjects fail to see their image in the mirror, when they are unable to play the language games of race and racial signification, there is a noticeable discomfort and anxiety that sets in among those who partake in the production of coercive mimeticism. The illusion of the color line comes into focus, disrupting how we see and define racialized bodies, evoking the fragmented and uncoordinated nature of the child’s body prior to Lacan’s (2005a, b) mirror stage. The illusion of wholeness, of being a whole body-ego – whether White, Black, or Brown – falters, revealing the destitute, undifferentiated, and broken nature of race and racial identity. To survive the encounter with the Real of race, I argue, paves the way for a unique kind of freedom. To give one example, a Puerto Rican-ness is more malleable, flexible, and non-linear than one bound into one static form and yields a fluidity that fosters experimental and novel ways of responding to oppression. This fluidity at the same time can validate the ghosts of one’s ancestors while integrating their wisdom into new, emancipatory potentialities. To be clear, I am not denying the importance of addressing colorism, racism, and the privileging of white skin that exists in the Latino community and other ethnic minorities (not to mention society as a whole). It is important for us to have that conversation, and point out how notions of mestizaje, of hybridity in the Latino experience, may mask underlying tensions around race and skin color, and render the relative privilege of light-skinned Latinos such as myself invisible. At the same time, I am proposing that we also have a conversation that is perpendicular to a critique of racism and colorism, intersecting with it but going towards a different vector. How we exclude one another based on not meeting certain expectations about what it means to be Latino, Asian, Black, etc., threatens to disempower us further, limiting our political power by carving out a “minority of a minority” as opposed to sustaining often difficult conversations about our sameness and difference. Similarly, as Baratunde Thurston (2011) points out in his recent book, How to be Black, often this kind of black-checking or color-checking narrows our vision of what it means to be Black (or Latino, or Asian, etc.). Reflecting on his own sense of his Blackness, he writes, “One of the most consistent themes in my own experience… is this notion of discovering your own Blackness by embracing the new, the different, the uncommon, and, simply, yourself” (p. 218). Color-checking prevents us from experimenting with different forms of dis-identification which enrich, challenge, and nourish us, and which hold the promise of new forms of resistance, emancipation, and psychosocial revolt. As I argue, these perpendicular conversations push and pull toward different trajectories, but have as their intersection the most crucial nexus of political, cultural, and social justice.

#### The alternative is a no to the AFF’s demand – the frustration of demand is productive and critical for subject formation. Only this interrogation of morality escapes the endless repetition of enjoyment and is a pre-requisite for political change.

Lundberg 12 (Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric by Christian O. Lundberg 201. Co-Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies, Associate Professor) EG

As a mode of individuation and subjectivization, egos are economies of frustration and compensation. This economy relies on a split in the freudian demand, which is both a demand to satiate a specific need and a demand for the addressee to provide an automatic fulfillment of a need. The generative power of the demand relies on two things: the split between the demand and the need that it attempts to redress, and the fact that some demands will be refused. This economy of need and frustration works because the refusal of a specific need articulated as a demand on another is also a refusal of the idea that the addressee of the demand can fulfill all the subject’s needs, requiring a set of compensatory economic functions to negotiate the refusal of specific demands.

“Ego,” then, names the economy of compensatory subjectivization driven by the repetition and refusal of demands. The nascent subject presents wants and needs in the form of the demand, but the role of the demand is not the simple fulfillment of these wants and needs. The demand and its refusal are the fulcrum on which the identity and insularity of the subject are produced: an unformed amalgam of needs and articulated demands is transformed into a subject that negotiates the vicissitudes of life with others. Put in the metaphor of developmental psychology, an infant lodges the instinctual demands of the id on others but these demands cannot be, and for the sake of development, must not be fulfilled. Thus, pop psychology observations that the incessant demands of children for impermissible objects (“may i have a fourth helping of dessert”) or meanings that culminate in ungroundable authoritative pronouncements (the game of asking never ending “whys”) are less about satisfaction of a request than the identity-producing effects of the parental “no.” in “The Question of Lay Analysis,” freud argues that “if . . . demands meet with no satisfaction, intolerable conditions arise . . . [and] . . . the ego begins to function. . . . [T]he driving force that sets the vehicle in motion is derived from the id, the ego . . . undertakes the steering. . . . The task of the ego [is] . . . to mediate between the claims of the id and the objections of the external world.”31 Later, in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* and *Civilization and Its Discontents,* freud relocates the site of the ego’s genesis beyond the parent/child relationship and in the broader social relationships that animate it. Life with others inevitably produces blockages in the individual’s attempts to fulfill certain desires, since some demands for the fulfillment of desires must be frustrated. This blockage produces feelings of guilt, which in turn are sublimated as a general social morality. The frustration of demand is both productive in that it authorizes social moral codes and, by extension, civilization writ large, although it does so at the cost of imposing a contested relationship between desire and social mores.32

Confronted by student calls to join the movement of 1968 Lacan famously quipped: “as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!” understanding the meaning of his response requires a treatment of Lacan’s theory of the demand and its relationship to hysteria as an enabling and c onstraining political subject position. Lacan’s theory of the demand picks up at freud’s movement outward from the paradigmatic relationships between the par ent/ child and individual/civilization toward a more general account of the subject, sociality, and signification. The infrastructure supporting this theoretical movement transposes freud’s comparatively natural and genetic account of development to a set of metaphors for dealing with the subject’s entry into signification.

As already noted, the Lacanian aphorism that “the signifier represents a subject for another signifier inverts the conventional wisdom that a pre-g iven subject uses language as an instrument to communicate its subjective intentions.”33 The paradoxical implication of this reversal is that the subject is simultaneously produced and disfigured by its unavoidable insertion into the space of the Symbolic. An Es assumes an identity as a subject as a way of accommodating to the Symbolic’s demands and as a node for producing demands on its others or of being recognized as a subject.34 As i have already argued, the demand demonstrates that the enjoyment of one’s own subjectivity is useless surplus produced in the gap between the Es (or it) and the ideal i. As a result, there is excess jouissance that remains even after its reduction to hegemony. This remainder may even be logi cally prior to hegemony, in that it is a useless but ritually repeated retroactive act of naming the self that produces the subject and therefore conditions possibility for investment in an identitarian configuration.