# 1NC - Wiki

### 1NC - OFF

T-A

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may not specify a subset of governments.

#### “Government” is a generic indefinite singular.

Leslie 12 Leslie, Sarah-Jane. “Generics.” In Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Language, edited by Gillian Russell and Delia Fara, 355–366. Routledge, 2012. <https://www.princeton.edu/~sjleslie/RoutledgeHandbookEntryGenerics.pdf> SM

GENERICS VS. EXISTENTIALS The interpretation of sentences containing bare plurals, indefinite singulars, or definite singulars can be either generic as in (1) respectively or existential/specific as in (2): (1) Tigers are striped A tiger is striped The tiger is striped. (2) Tigers are on the front lawn A tiger is on the front lawn The tiger is on the front lawn. The subjects in (1) are prima facie the same as in (2), yet their interpretations in (1) are intuitively quite different from those in (2). In (2) we are talking about some particular tigers, while in (1) we are saying something about tigers in general. There are some tests that are helpful in distinguishing these two readings. For example, the existential interpretation is upward entailing, meaning that the statement will always remain true if we replace the subject term with a more inclusive term. For example, if it is true that tigers are on the lawn, then it will also be true that animals are on the lawn. This is not so if the sentence is interpreted generically. For example, it is true that tigers are striped, but it does not follow that animals are striped (Lawler 1973 Laca 1990; Krifka et al 1995). Another test concerns whether we can insert an adverb of quantification (in the sense of Lewis 1975) with minimal change of meaning (Krifka et al 1995). For example, inserting “usually” in the sentences in (1) (e.g. “tigers are usually striped”) produces only a small change in meaning, while inserting “usually” in (2) dramatically alters the meaning of the sentence (e.g. “tigers are usually on the front lawn). (For generics such as “mosquitoes carry malaria”, the adverb “sometimes” is perhaps better used than “usually”.)

#### A. Tests of upward entailment prove that government is a generic indefinite singular --- “A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike” doesn’t imply that “A just place ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike” because it may not in a non-capitalist regime.

#### B. Adverb of quantification applies --- “A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike” has the same meaning as “A just government usually ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike.”

#### Violation: They spec the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

#### Standards:

#### Semantics --- anything other than strict adherence to the resolution means they can arbitrarily jettison any word in the resolution which kills topic stasis. Semantics outweighs pragmatics A) All pragmatic arguments concede the authority of semantics in order to convey pragmatic messages B) Key to predictability- the topic is the only thing that we have beforehand. Explodes neg prep burden and outweighs every other pragmatic consideration C) Jurisdiction – it’s not in the judge’s jurisdiction to vote for an illegitimate aff. Independent voter -- even if they prove pragmatics they lose for not defending the resolution.

#### Limits --- they can specify anything from Nigeria to China to the US --- there’s no unifying generics since each country has different geopolitical nuances. That explodes NEG prep and leads to random country of the week AFFs, which makes cutting stable links for DAs or CP competition impossible.

#### TVA --- read the AFF as an advantage to a whole rez AFF --- the only reason to specify is to cut out NEG ground

#### Voters:

#### Education is a voter because it’s the only portable impact to debate.

#### Fairness is a voter because it’s necessary to have in-round competitive equity to ensure that both debaters an equal chance to win.

#### T is DTD ---

#### The round is unfair --- the abuse skewed the round from the start

#### Norm creation --- deterrence, you’ll change your strategy if you lose for it

#### Use CI on T ---

#### T is binary --- either you’re topical or you’re not

#### CI is better for norm creation --- it figures out the best model of debate.

#### Reasonability causes a race to bottom by incentivizing more and more abusive arguments.

#### No RVIs on T ---

#### T is k2 to check AFF abuse

#### Encourages baiting which destroys clash --- outweighs because if the shell is frivolous it’s easy to beat

#### Illogical --- T is an expected burden, you shouldn’t win just for proving you’re fair.

### 1NC - OFF

Tech DA

#### Global tech innovation high now.

Mercury News et al 6/4 [Mercury News and East Bay Times Editorial Boards, June 4, 2021, “Editorial: How America can Win the Global Tech War” <https://www.mercurynews.com/2021/06/04/editorial-why-silicon-valley-needs-endless-frontier-bill/> //gord0]

The nation that wins the global tech race will dominate the 21st century. This has been true since the 1800s. Given the rapid pace of innovation and tech’s impact on our economy and defense capabilities in the last decade, there is ample evidence to suggest that the need for investment in tech research and development has never been greater. China has been closing the tech gap in recent years by making bold investments in tech with the intent of overtaking the United States. This is a tech war we cannot afford to lose. It’s imperative that Congress pass the Endless Frontier Act and authorize the biggest R&D tech investment in the United States since the Apollo years. Rep. Ro Khanna, D-Santa Clara, made a massive increase in science and technology investment a major part of his platform while campaigning for a seat in Congress in 2016. Now the co-author of the 600-page legislation is on the cusp of pushing through a bipartisan effort that has been years in the making. Khanna and his co-authors, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., Sen. Todd Young, R-Ind., and Rep. Mike Gallagher, R-Wisc., are shepherding the bill through the Senate, which is expected to approve it sometime later this month. That would set up a reconciliation debate between the House and Senate that would determine the bill’s final language. The ultimate size of the investment is still very much up in the air. Khanna would like Congress to authorize $100 billion over a five-year period for critical advancements in artificial intelligence, biotechnology, cybersecurity, semiconductors and other cutting-edge technologies. The Senate is talking of knocking that number down to $50 billion or $75 billion. They should be reminded of China Premier Li Keqiang’s March announcement that China would increase its research and development spending by an additional 7% per year between 2021 and 2025. The United States still outspends China in R&D, spending $612 billion on research and development in 2019, compared to China’s $514 billion. But the gap is narrowing. At the turn of the century, China was only spending $33 billion a year on R&D, while the United States was spending nearly 10 times that amount. The bill would authorize 10 technology hubs throughout the nation designed to help build the infrastructure, manufacturing facilities and workforce needed to help meet the nation’s tech goals. Building tech centers throughout the United States should also create more support for the industry across the country. Tech’s image has taken a beating in recent years — the emergence of the term “Big Tech” is hardly a positive development — and the industry will need all the support it can muster in Congress. The United States continues to have a crucial tech edge over its competitors, most notably China. The only way we can hope to win the 21st century is to make significant investments in research and development that will spark the next wave of innovation.

#### Strikes hurt innovation – empirics prove.

Frick ‘15

[ When Treating Workers Well Leads to More Innovation, <https://hbr.org/2015/11/when-treating-workers-well-leads-to-more-innovation>, Walter Frick, November 3 2015] [SS]

But not everything that’s good for workers is necessarily good for innovation. A forthcoming paper in **Management Science examined the impact of unionization on innovation. It looked at U.S. firms from 1980 to 2005** that voted to unionize, but where the vote was close. The idea was that a close vote mirrored an experiment – the vote could plausibly have gone either way, so it was somewhat random whether the firm ended up unionized. The **researchers found that unionization caused a** significant **decline in innovation**, measured by the number and quality of patents issued. (Previous research on how unionization impacts innovation, measured by R&D spending, has been more mixed.) Why might some worker benefits make firms more innovative, but not others? Economic theory suggests the answer may have to do with long-term incentives. If workers feel pressure to deliver results in the short-term, either for fear of being fired or in order to be promoted, they may be less likely to pursue riskier innovations. On the other hand, **if** failure in the short-term is acceptable or even rewarded, and **if workers have a stake in the company’s long-term performance, they should be more likely to innovate**. Employee stock options clearly meet these criteria, by tying workers’ incentives to the long-term fate of the company. Other worker benefits may also encourage workers to take a longer view, at least indirectly; more satisfied workers stay at the firm longer, and therefore have more of a stake in the company’s long-term success. Labor laws may have a similar effect. So what’s different about unions? Daniel Bradley, a professor at the University of South Florida and co-author of the unionization study, suggested **the answer is loyalty. “Union employees invest significantly less in their company’s 401k** compared to non-union workers,” he told me, citing a 2009 study which interprets this fact as evidence that **union workers are less loyal** to their employer. “Unionization inhibits employee loyalty,” he continued, “because **having a too loyal workforce would jeopardize the collective bargaining process**.” “Ultimately, firms must find a way of motivating employees to be willing to take risks in order to come up with innovative inventions,” said Edward Podolski-Boczar, professor at LaTrobe, and co-author of the worker treatment paper. “Not all forms of improved employee conditions naturally translate into improved innovation outcomes,” he added, when I asked about the unionization result. But as his research demonstrates, many do. Treating workers well is part of building an innovative company, but it isn’t enough. **Employees also need to have a long-term stake in the company’s success**.

#### Victories like the aff mobilizes unions in the IT sector.

Vynck et al 21 [Gerrit De; Carleton University, BA in Journalism and Global Politics, tech reporter for The Washington Post. He writes about Google and the algorithms that increasingly shape society. He previously covered tech for seven years at Bloomberg News; Nitashu Tiku; Columbia University, BA in English, New York University, MA in Journalism, Washington Post's tech culture reporter based in San Francisco; Macalester College, BA in English, Columbia University, MS in Journalism, reporter for The Washington Post who is focused on technology coverage in the Pacific Northwest; “Six things to know about the latest efforts to bring unions to Big Tech,” The Washington Post; https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/01/26/tech-unions-explainer/]//SJWen

In response to tech company crackdowns and lobbying, gig workers have shifted their strategy to emphasize building worker-led movements and increasing their ranks, rather than focusing on employment status as the primary goal, says Veena Dubal, a law professor at the University of California Hastings College of the Law in San Francisco. The hope is that with President Biden in the White House and an even split in the Senate, legislators will mobilize at the federal level, through the NLRA or bills such as the PRO Act, to recognize gig worker collectives as real unions.

#### Technological innovation solves every existential threat – which outweighs.

Matthews 18 Dylan. Co-founder of Vox, citing Nick Beckstead @ Rutgers University. 10-26-2018. "How to help people millions of years from now." Vox. https://www.vox.com/future-perfect/2018/10/26/18023366/far-future-effective-altruism-existential-risk-doing-good

If you care about improving human lives, you should overwhelmingly care about those quadrillions of lives rather than the comparatively small number of people alive today. The 7.6 billion people now living, after all, amount to less than 0.003 percent of the population that will live in the future. It’s reasonable to suggest that those quadrillions of future people have, accordingly, hundreds of thousands of times more moral weight than those of us living here today do. That’s the basic argument behind Nick Beckstead’s 2013 Rutgers philosophy dissertation, “On the overwhelming importance of shaping the far future.” It’s a glorious mindfuck of a thesis, not least because Beckstead shows very convincingly that this is a conclusion any plausible moral view would reach. It’s not just something that weird utilitarians have to deal with. And Beckstead, to his considerable credit, walks the walk on this. He works at the Open Philanthropy Project on grants relating to the far future and runs a charitable fund for donors who want to prioritize the far future. And arguments from him and others have turned “long-termism” into a very vibrant, important strand of the effective altruism community. But what does prioritizing the far future even mean? The most literal thing it could mean is preventing human extinction, to ensure that the species persists as long as possible. For the long-term-focused effective altruists I know, that typically means identifying concrete threats to humanity’s continued existence — like unfriendly artificial intelligence, or a pandemic, or global warming/out of control geoengineering — and engaging in activities to prevent that specific eventuality. But in a set of slides he made in 2013, Beckstead makes a compelling case that while that’s certainly part of what caring about the far future entails, approaches that address specific threats to humanity (which he calls “targeted” approaches to the far future) have to complement “broad” approaches, where instead of trying to predict what’s going to kill us all, you just generally try to keep civilization running as best it can, so that it is, as a whole, well-equipped to deal with potential extinction events in the future, not just in 2030 or 2040 but in 3500 or 95000 or even 37 million. In other words, caring about the far future doesn’t mean just paying attention to low-probability risks of total annihilation; it also means acting on pressing needs now. For example: We’re going to be better prepared to prevent extinction from AI or a supervirus or global warming if society as a whole makes a lot of scientific progress. And a significant bottleneck there is that the vast majority of humanity doesn’t get high-enough-quality education to engage in scientific research, if they want to, which reduces the odds that we have enough trained scientists to come up with the breakthroughs we need as a civilization to survive and thrive. So maybe one of the best things we can do for the far future is to improve school systems — here and now — to harness the group economist Raj Chetty calls “lost Einsteins” (potential innovators who are thwarted by poverty and inequality in rich countries) and, more importantly, the hundreds of millions of kids in developing countries dealing with even worse education systems than those in depressed communities in the rich world. What if living ethically for the far future means living ethically now? Beckstead mentions some other broad, or very broad, ideas (these are all his descriptions): Help make computers faster so that people everywhere can work more efficiently Change intellectual property law so that technological innovation can happen more quickly Advocate for open borders so that people from poorly governed countries can move to better-governed countries and be more productive Meta-research: improve incentives and norms in academic work to better advance human knowledge Improve education Advocate for political party X to make future people have values more like political party X ”If you look at these areas (economic growth and technological progress, access to information, individual capability, social coordination, motives) a lot of everyday good works contribute,” Beckstead writes. “An implication of this is that a lot of everyday good works are good from a broad perspective, even though hardly anyone thinks explicitly in terms of far future standards.” Look at those examples again: It’s just a list of what normal altruistically motivated people, not effective altruism folks, generally do. Charities in the US love talking about the lost opportunities for innovation that poverty creates. Lots of smart people who want to make a difference become scientists, or try to work as teachers or on improving education policy, and lord knows there are plenty of people who become political party operatives out of a conviction that the moral consequences of the party’s platform are good. All of which is to say: Maybe effective altruists aren’t that special, or at least maybe we don’t have access to that many specific and weird conclusions about how best to help the world. If the far future is what matters, and generally trying to make the world work better is among the best ways to help the far future, then effective altruism just becomes plain ol’ do-goodery.

### 1NC - OFF

Adv Counterplan

#### Counterplan Text: The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ought to:

#### Ban nuclear weapons

#### Establish a government funded super trees program.

#### The CP solves nukes - this card also explains implementation

Van Der Meer '16 (Sico Van Der Meer; research Fellow at the Clingendael Institute. His research is focussing on non-conventional weapons like Weapons of Mass Destruction and cyber weapons from a strategic policy perspective. He also has a special interest in North Korea and relations between North and South Korea. He graduated from the Radboud University Nijmegen in 1999 with a Master’s in History. Before joining the Clingendael Institute, he worked as a journalist and as a Fellow of a think tank on civil-military relations. In 2016 he was seconded to the Taskforce International Cyber Policies of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 2-15-2016; "Accelerating global nuclear disarmament: a menu of 16 policy options"; https://www.clingendael.org/publication/accelerating-global-nuclear-disarmament-menu-16-policy-options, No Publication, accessed 12-2-2019; JPark)

* This card also explains the scope of durable fiat

An important consideration is that nuclear disarmament policies will not guarantee any success as long as the states possessing these weapons are not engaged. To get them on board, it may be important to recognize that nuclear weapons have both a humanitarian dimension and a security dimension. It will be a difficult balancing act to combine these two in the same policy. Nevertheless, in order to effectively achieve **the** global elimination of nuclear weapons, it is crucial that the states possessing the weapons should participate in measures to that end, otherwise these measures would be mainly symbolic. Even if one argues that such symbolic measures will increase the pressure on nuclear weapon states to disarm, one may question if such pressure is really contributing to the elimination of nuclear weapons or is only creating a fragmentation of international support for existing nuclear taboos as established in the NPT. Nevertheless, it should be noted as well that only five of the current nine nuclear weapon states are a member state of the NPT (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France and China). The other four (Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea) are not. One could argue that many of the policy steps being discussed within the Humanitarian Initiative could be applicable to all states, regardless of membership of the NPT or any other treaty. Yet, confidence in and an ongoing commitment to the current multilatera system of non-proliferation and disarmament efforts, especially but not exclusively embodied by the NPT and CD, can be reinforced by the demonstrated implementation of concrete nuclear disarmament measures by the current nuclear weapon states. Constructive diplomacy has always proven to be the best method to increase international security and stability. The menu of choice below consists of 16 steps. The policy options described are of course all interconnected. Moreover, the order in which they are described is not static; although the aim is to start with the least drastic step and to end with the most radical option, combinations of measures could certainly be thought of. It is not necessary that every step should follow the previous one; parallel and simultaneous steps are also certainly possible. 1. Relying on existing disarmament fora The simplest policy option for any state involved is, of course, doing nothing new. This means sticking to the traditional disarmament efforts within the NPT and CD, trying to solve the deadlock on disarmament currently perceived by many member states within these fora themselves. Without doubting the importance of the NPT and CD, it is debatable whether this option is in itself the most effective one. Considering the many states and NGOs asking for increased disarmament efforts, one could question whether the option to stick to traditional fora and methods is enough. The discomfort concerning the pace of nuclear disarmament must be dealt with in a positive way to channel this energy into the right direction – doing nothing new may harm the massive support for existing non-proliferation and disarmament arrangements even more than looking for extra steps towards disarmament measures. Nevertheless, the five nuclear weapon states within the NPT appear to prefer this path, convinced that the NPT and CD are the best fora to negotiate on further disarmament. These negotiations could be combined with their own self-designated ‘P5 Process’ in which the five nuclear weapon states within the NPT discuss the issue among themselves. There have also been meetings of the so-called ‘P5 Plus Group’, but even this group, with the non-NPT nuclear weapon states India and Pakistan on board, still misses the participation of Israel and North Korea, who are considered to have nuclear weapons as well. Without any hesitation, it is positive that these states discuss disarmament efforts with each other, although this does not mean that more inclusive discussions, with the non-nuclear weapon states and the nuclear weapon states which are not party to the NPT being included as well, should be sidelined as counter-productive. Nevertheless, the P5 Process, or preferably an extended P5 Plus Process, could certainly be helpful in discussing more far-reaching policy options as will discussed in the options below. 2. Increased transparency measures While non-nuclear weapon states are obliged under the NPT to provide full transparency on their nuclear activities (if any), the nuclear weapon states are not. Their nuclear weapons programmes are generally dealt with as top secret. This entails that any discussion about nuclear weapons, including the issue of nuclear disarmament, is to some extent always speculative. From this perspective, further transparency in the form of (public) reporting by the nuclear weapon states on their nuclear weapons inventories and policies, as well as their fissile material stockpiles, would be helpful in enhancing informed debate and increased confidence between states. Such transparency measures could be implemented unilaterally, bilaterally or multilaterally by (any of) the nuclear weapon states. 3. Confidence-building measures An important problem of the current discontent regarding nuclear disarmament efforts is a lack of confidence by many state and non-state actors in the sincerity of nuclear weapon states to effectively work towards a further reduction of the threat of nuclear weapons – threats of use as well as accidents. A first step to increase confidence could be measures to minimize the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. The initiative for this kind of measure should come from the nuclear weapon states – unilaterally or in cooperation with each other. The main focus should be increasing the predictability of states’ behaviour regarding the use of nuclear weapons, thus preventing misperceptions leading to inadvertent nuclear escalation.2 Various examples of confidence-building measures could be thought of. Developing and the sharing of guidelines and principles, as well as verification and accountability instruments regarding decreasing the risks of accidents with and/or inadvertent use of nuclear weapons could be effective measures to increase confidence. The same holds true for sharing best practices and lessons learned on risk reduction regarding the inadvertent use of nuclear weapons. Information sharing on nuclear postures and procedures could also increase confidence. Guarantees or standardization regarding decision making and judgement processes on the use of nuclear weapons could add to confidence in the prevention of misuse and accidents as well; decision makers on the use of nuclear weapons must, for example, have enough time and information tools for prudent judgement so as to resolve potential misperceptions and to receive vital pieces of information. Only if nuclear weapon states are able to show other states that they are serious in this kind of risk-reducing 2 Wolfgang Ischinger, Steven Pifer and Andrei Zagorski, Confidence Building Measures Are Now Needed More Than Ever, European Leadership Network, 30 June 2014. measures could confidence be increased as a first step towards a further reduction and elimination efforts. 4. Preparing measures for disarmament verification An important step preceding actual nuclear disarmament is discussing how, at any moment, it will be accomplished. A disarmament process can only be successful if it is irreversible, verifiable and transparent. Currently, a coalition of both nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon states is discussing this issue within the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV). This partnership, led by the United States, is aimed at developing (technical) solutions for monitoring and verifying potential future nuclear disarmament efforts. It would be helpful if this initiative would be able to come up with practical recommendations in the short term. Increasing the inclusiveness of the partnership would be helpful as well; in the end, verification mechanisms could be developed that will be supported by all states. From this perspective, cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) may be helpful as well. 5. Reduced role of nuclear weapons in security policies As long as nuclear weapon states retain an important role for nuclear weapons in their security policies, including doctrines and postures, they do not demonstrate much priority for the elimination of these weapons. As a first step to increase the credibility of their NPT obligations of nuclear disarmament, nuclear weapon states could reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines. By doing so, they will demonstrate that they are sincere in both decreasing their importance as well the risks of (inadvertent) use. This policy measure could be implemented unilaterally or in coordination with other nuclear weapon states. 6. De-alerting nuclear weapons Especially the United States and Russia have nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles that are on high alert and ready to be launched within only a few minutes. France and the United Kingdom also keep some of their nuclear weapons on alert, although at lower readiness levels than the United States and Russia. As far as is known, the other nuclear weapon states have no nuclear weapons on alert status.3 The very little time that decision makers in these states have to judge whether or not to use the nuclear weapons significantly increases the risk of inadvertent use. In the past, several cases have become public in which such inadvertent use – because of miscommunications, misperceptions, or technical errors – brought the world close to nuclear warfare with catastrophic results.4 To reduce the risks of the inadvertent use of high alert nuclear weapons, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral measures could be taken to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear forces. Reducing the alert status of nuclear weapons could be achieved through a phased approach, and should preferably be verified (at least by other nuclear weapon states de-alerting their weapons as well). This measure would decrease the risk of inadvertent use to some extent as well as demonstrate a commitment to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security policies. 3 Hans M. Kristensen and Matthew McKinzie, Reducing Alert Rates of Nuclear Weapons, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2012. 4 For examples of cases, see: Patricia Lewis, Heather Williams, Benoît Pelopidas and Sasan Aghlani, Too Close for Comfort: Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy, Chatham House Report, April 2014, pp. 7-23. An extra option within a process of de-alerting could be programming all nuclear missiles on alert to a default target in the middle of any ocean. This would give decision makers some more response time in (perceived) crisis situations, because the weapons should be retargeted before being used. Moreover, this would limit the risk of nuclear weapons accidently being used against real targets. According to some sources, the United States has already implemented such a default ocean targeting.5 7. Improved ‘No First Use’ guarantees and security guarantees Some nuclear weapon states have declared that they will use nuclear weapons only in response to a nuclear attack, while others do not exclude ‘first use’. Unilateral, bilateral or multilateral measures could be taken to increase the confidence that nuclear weapons will not be used by a state before it is attacked by such weapons itself. Nuclear weapon states could develop nuclear doctrines clearly stating the No First Use principle, and establish protocols to guarantee this principle in their command and control procedures. A No-First-Use Treaty or No-First-Use Convention is a possibility as well, but currently this does not seem to be realistic.6 Closely linked to No First Use guarantees are security assurances to non-nuclear weapon states. It would be a positive sign if such assurances would be extended by all nuclear weapon states, publicly giving an absolute guarantee that they will not use nuclear weapons to threaten or attack any nonnuclear weapon state.7 8. Banning nuclear weapons tests Already in 1996 the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signature. Since then many states have signed and ratified the treaty. However, the Treaty has not so far entered into force, because the required signatures and/or ratifications by various states are lacking, especially (but not exclusively) the nuclear weapon states of China, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan and the United States.8 It would be an important positive signal if those states would sign and/or ratify the CTBT as well. Even though the entry into force of the treaty will not depend on only one or a few of these states, their membership would demonstrate to the international community that they acknowledge the need for a ban on nuclear test explosions. Supporting a ban on nuclear weapons testing to some extent shows the willingness to end the development and modernisation of nuclear weapons as well, even though digitally simulated tests are always still possible. As long as the CTBT cannot enter into force, states could unilaterally decide to stop testing and/or to declare a moratorium on nuclear test explosions; currently all nuclear weapon states have already done so, except for North Korea. 7 On the importance of clear language in this regard, see: Michael S. Gerson, ‘No First Use. The Next Step for U.S. Nuclear Policy’, International Security, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Fall 2010), pp. 7-47. 8 Situation of 23 January 2016, according to CTBTO figures. 9. Reduction or removal of forward deployed nuclear weapons As far as is known, one nuclear weapon state, the United States, has some of its tactical nuclear weapons deployed in other NATO states in Western Europe – so-called ‘forward deployment’. Although, technically speaking, this forward deployment possibly cannot be labelled as illegal under NPT obligations (the weapons are not transferred but remain in possession and under the control of the US), it certainly is against the spirit of the treaty. Moreover, the greater the number of locations where nuclear weapons are stored, the more risks there are of accidents and inadvertent use. Measures to reduce or eliminate the number of forward deployed nuclear weapons – which ideally would consist of cooperative action by the US, NATO and the actual host countries – would be a symbolically important step towards further nuclear disarmament. Considering the increasing tensions between NATO and Russia in the past few years, one could question whether NATO is currently ready for this step. However, even starting serious deliberations within NATO on such measures would already be an important signal of a serious willingness to work on further nuclear reduction and disarmament. 10. Reduction of or ending deployment in border regions Nuclear weapons deployed in border regions between (potential) adversaries may contribute to increased tensions. Especially in the case of relatively low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, one may speculate that the threshold of use could be considered somewhat lower compared to strategic nuclear weapons or tactical nuclear weapons deployed further away from borders. The risk of use, inadvertent use (for example, in case local military commanders may decide on use in crisis situations), or accidents may be higher.9 Specific border areas where (as far as is known) tactical nuclear weapons are currently deployed are at the borders between India and Pakistan and between Russian and NATO territory (including forward deployed US nuclear weapons as described in the previous step). Unilateral or bilateral steps to end the deployment of (tactical) nuclear weapons in border regions may decrease the risks of accidents or (inadvertent) use as well as demonstrate a willingness to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in security policies. 11. Banning the production of fissile materials Discussions on achieving a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) have stalled within the CD for many years already. Such a treaty would ban the production of fissile materials which can be used to build nuclear weapons (plutonium and highly enriched uranium). Some states even favour a Fissile Material Treaty (FMT) which would also limit existing stockpiles of fissile materials.10 As one of the steps towards nuclear disarmament it would be helpful if negotiations on such a treaty would be given new impetus in a constructive way. Although an FMCT, or even an FMT, will not directly bring about nuclear disarmament, it will at least be helpful in building confidence that states with fissile material production facilities will not further increase their nuclear weapons resources. As long as negotiations towards such a treaty will not be successful, unilateral, bilateral or multilateral initiatives could be launched to make a start in limiting and/or 9 Shashank Joshi, ‘Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Nightmare: De’ja’ Vu?’, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2013, pp. 159-172. 10 A Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty. Understanding the Critical Issues, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 2010. halting the production of fissile materials. Facilities used for the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons could be dismantled or converted, and existing stockpiles of fissile materials could also be converted to materials which are useful for peaceful purposes only (for example, by ‘down blending’ highly enriched uranium). Such measures, especially if transparency and verification mechanisms are included, could be an important step in building confidence that nuclear weapon states are serious about limiting their nuclear weapon programmes.11 12. Moratorium on nuclear weapons modernisation Various nuclear weapon states are currently modernizing their nuclear weapons arsenal or are suspected of doing so.12 Although one may contend that in some cases it is merely maintenance rather than modernisation, or a modernisation that is aimed at increasing the security of the weapons (which few would oppose), in various cases it seems like modernisation to make nuclear weapons more effective within the context of national security policies. It is difficult not to consider such modernisation efforts as contradictory to any disarmament pledge. To demonstrate their sincerity regarding nuclear disarmament, nuclear weapon states could – via unilateral, bilateral or multilateral measures – end or forego efforts to modernize their nuclear weapons (preferably including ending and foregoing the development of new missions for their nuclear weapons). This could result in a moratorium on nuclear weapons modernisation. Ideally, any kind of verification arrangements should be included in such measures to ensure confidence in such a moratorium. 13. Reduction of (deployed) nuclear weapons numbers Considering nuclear disarmament as a phased process, starting with a reduction and ending with the elimination of nuclear weapons, accelerating the reduction phase is an important step towards the ultimate aim of ‘global zero’. Unilateral, bilateral or multilateral measures in which nuclear weapon states reduce the number of their nuclear weapons are thus essential steps. Any reduction of nuclear weapons would contribute to decreasing the risks of them being used (on purpose or by accident) and would increase the confidence in commitments towards the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons in the long term. Some nuclear weapon states may contend that the United States and Russia should make a start with their nuclear weapons stockpile reduction, since they currently possess some 93% of the global number of nuclear weapons.13 However, this does not necessarily exclude reduction measures by other states as well – states have even eliminated their nuclear weapons without taking such figures into account (in the case of South Africa). Some nuclear weapon states use the principle of ‘strict sufficiency’, meaning something like maintaining their arsenal of nuclear weapons at the lowest possible level with regard to their perceived strategic context.14 This may sound interesting in theory, but how this lowest possible level 13 According to the most accurate estimates: ‘World nuclear forces, January 2015’, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). 14 Jenny Nielsen and Marianne Hanson, The European Union and the humanitarian initiative in the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty review cycle, NonProliferation Papers No. 41, EU Non-Proliferation Consortium, December 2014, p. 13. should be measured in practice is hard to define. Although an actual reduction through the dismantlement of nuclear weapons would be the most optimal decision in this context, a preliminary step of only reducing the number of deployed nuclear weapons may also be considered as a first step. Although this would not be disarmament in itself, only removing some of the nuclear weapons from deployment into storage, it reduces the risk of these weapons being used in the short term and could at least be considered as a confidence-building measure. Settings to accomplish any steps on this topic could be, for example, the P5 Process or the P5 Plus Process, as well as bilateral dialogue like past arms reduction negotiations between the United States and Russia. During the last few years, however, little to no progress has been made in such processes.

#### Artificial trees are sufficient to solve warming internationally.

Vince 12 [Gaia Vince is an award winning environmental journalist and author. “Sucking CO2 from the skies with artificial trees”. 10-03-2012. BBC News. https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20121004-fake-trees-to-clean-the-skies. Accessed 7-1-2021]

Even if we stopped burning fossil fuels today, there is enough carbon dioxide in the atmosphere - and it is such [a persistent, lasting gas](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2012/jan/16/greenhouse-gases-remain-air) – that temperatures will continue to rise for a few hundred years. We won't stop emitting carbon dioxide today, of course, and it is now very likely that within the lifetime of people born today we will increase the temperature of the planet [by at least 3C more](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-17488450) than the average temperature before the industrial revolution. Seek and capture Hence, the idea of finding ways of removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. One way to do this is to grow plants that absorb a lot of carbon dioxide and store it. But although we can certainly improve tree-planting, we also need [land to grow food](http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20120828-enriching-the-soil) for an [increasing global population](http://www.bbc.com/future/story/20120725-population-overload), so there's a limit to how much forestry we can fit on the planet. In recent years there have been attempts to remove the carbon dioxide from its source in power plants. [Scrubber devices](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scrubber) have been fitted to the chimneys in different pilot projects around the world so that the greenhouse gas produced during fossil fuel burning can be removed from the exhaust emissions. The carbon dioxide can then be cooled and pumped for storage in deep underground rock chambers, for example, replacing the fluid in saline aquifers. Another storage option is to use the collected gas to replace crude oil deposits, helping drilling companies to pump out oil from hard to reach places, in a process known as advanced oil recovery. Removing this pollution from power plants – called [carbon capture and storage](http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/interactive/2008/jun/12/carbon.capture) – is a useful way of preventing additional carbon dioxide from entering the atmosphere as we continue to burn fossil fuels. But what about the gas that is already out there? The problem with removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere is that it’s present at such a low concentration. In a power plant chimney, for instance, carbon dioxide is present at concentrations of 4-12% within a relatively small amount of exhaust air. Removing the gas takes a lot of energy, so it is expensive, but it’s feasible. To extract the 0.04% of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere would require enormous volumes of air to be processed. As a result, most scientists have baulked at the idea. Fake plastic trees [Klaus Lackner](http://www.columbia.edu/~kl2010/members_lackner.htm), director of the Lenfest Center for Sustainable Energy at Columbia University, has come up with a technique that he thinks could solve the problem. Lackner has designed an artificial tree that passively soaks up carbon dioxide from the air using “leaves” that are 1,000 times more efficient than true leaves that use photosynthesis. "We don't need to expose the leaves to sunlight for photosynthesis like a real tree does," Lackner explains. "So our leaves can be much more closely spaced and overlapped – even configured in a honeycomb formation to make them more efficient." The leaves look like sheets of papery plastic and are coated in a resin that contains sodium carbonate, which pulls carbon dioxide out of the air and stores it as a bicarbonate (baking soda) on the leaf. To remove the carbon dioxide, the leaves are rinsed in water vapour and can dry naturally in the wind, soaking up more carbon dioxide. Lackner calculates that his tree can remove one tonne of carbon dioxide a day. Ten million of these trees could remove 3.6 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide a year – equivalent to about 10% of our global annual carbon dioxide emissions. "Our total emissions could be removed with 100 million trees," he says, "whereas we would need 1,000 times that in real trees to have the same effect." If the trees were mass produced they would each initially cost around $20,000 (then falling as production takes over), just below the price of the average family car in the United States, he says, pointing out that 70 million cars are produced each year. And each would fit on a truck to be positioned at sites around the world. "The great thing about the atmosphere is it's a good mixer, so carbon dioxide produced in an American city can be removed in Oman," he says.

Condo good:

1. **Neg flex – condo is key to allowing the neg to test the aff from multiple perspectives – that outweighs aff strategy – the aff gets infinite prep, but the neg is purely reactionary**
2. **Info processing – condo teaches us to think quickly and deal with overwhelming amounts of info – most real world. Simulating information overload best prepares students to cope—most valuable skill.**

### 1NC - OFF

Worker Rights CP

#### CP Text: The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

#### - affirm in statutory language that labor law’s purpose is to encourage organization and collective bargaining

#### - expand ability to discuss unionization at the workplace

#### - allow workers to determine bargaining unit and structure

#### - protect the right to refuse hazardous work and ensure benefits for workers who do so

McNicholas et. al. 20 [Celine McNicholas is EPI’s director of government affairs and labor counsel. Lynn Rhinehart is a senior fellow at EPI, where she works on labor and employment policy, with a focus on collective bargaining. Margaret Poydock joined EPI in 2016. As the policy analyst, she assists the policy team in managing EPI’s legislative and policy initiatives to build a more just economy. Heidi Shierholz leads EPI’s policy team, which monitors wage and employment policies coming out of Congress and the administration and advances a worker-first policy agenda. Daniel Perez is a research assistant at the Economic Policy Institute. “Why unions are good for workers—especially in a crisis like COVID-19.” August 25, 2020. https://www.epi.org/publication/why-unions-are-good-for-workers-especially-in-a-crisis-like-covid-19-12-policies-that-would-boost-worker-rights-safety-and-wages/]

3. Reaffirm in statutory language that the purpose of labor law is to promote and encourage organizing and collective bargaining Reaffirm in statutory language that the purpose of labor law is to promote and encourage organizing and collective bargaining and that the NLRB’s actions must further this goal. Promoting and encouraging organizing and collective bargaining was the purpose and goal of the original Wagner Act (the NLRA). However, after the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, employers have argued that the law is not pro-union but is neutral. The statutory language must be strengthened to provide that NLRB actions that do not meet the statutory standard of promoting organizing and collective bargaining could be invalidated by a reviewing court as contrary to the governing law under the Administrative Procedures Act. This approach is similar to that taken under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which states that health standards must provide the maximum level of protection to workers that is technologically feasible, and standards that fall short of this level of protection can be invalidated by the courts.21 4. Amend the NLRA to expand access for workers and union organizers to discuss unionization at the workplace Workers need a fair chance to hear from union representatives about the benefits of unionization, including the ways in which unions help strengthen health and safety protections at the workplace. Currently, employers are able to deliver their anti-union messages at the workplace and on work time, because the employer controls the workplace and directs how work time is spent. Employers use this advantage to bombard workers with anti-union messages in their paychecks, in one-on-one meetings with their supervisors, and in employer anti-union “captive-audience” meetings that workers are required to attend or face discipline or discharge. Nine out of 10 employers require workers to attend captive-audience meetings during organizing campaigns (Bronfenbrenner 2009). Workers have only a limited ability to hear from union supporters at the workplace, and their access has been further curtailed by the Trump NLRB, which has restricted the ability of workers and organizers to organize at their workplace (McNicholas et al. 2019; Fawaz 2020). This imbalance undermines the ability of workers to organize together. The law should be amended to require employers to grant reasonable access to union organizers, off-duty employees, and off-duty contractor employees to nonworking areas to talk with workers on their nonworking time. The law should also make clear that workers may use their employer’s internal e-mail system for union-related messages. In addition, workers who have not yet organized a union should be able to designate a union representative as their representative during an OSHA inspection and related proceedings. The COVID-19 crisis shows that workers with union representation have fared better than nonunion workers in terms of advocating for safety equipment and protocols. Workers should not have to go through the formal NLRB election process to gain the benefit of union advocacy and expertise when it comes to their health and safety on the job. 6. Amend the NLRA to let workers determine the bargaining unit and bargaining structure When workers organize, they determine the group of workers—called the “bargaining unit”—that will be the group covered by the organizing and collective bargaining agreement, and they describe the bargaining unit in their petition to the NLRB. Employers try to gerrymander the bargaining unit by adding workers they think will vote against the union or removing those who support representation. Here again, it should be workers’ choice, and not up to the employer, to determine the group that is organizing and bargaining. As EPI has previously recommended, the law should make clear that the petitioning union’s description of the bargaining unit is determinative, unless the employer can make a compelling case as to why the proposed unit is unworkable (Rhinehart and McNicholas 2020). Similarly, workers should be able to designate a multi-employer bargaining arrangement, and their proposed arrangement should be certified unless the employer can make a compelling case as to why its participation in a multi-employer bargaining unit is unworkable (Rhinehart and McNicholas 2020). 7. Enact federal and state measures that strengthen the right to refuse hazardous work and continue eligibility for UI benefits for workers refusing unsafe work At the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, essential workers in health care, food service, warehouses, grocery stores, meatpacking plants, and other settings raised concerns about the risk of workplace exposure to COVID-19 and the lack of personal protective equipment and other safety protections. Too often, these workers were fired or faced other retaliation for raising these concerns (Hiltzik 2020; Kruzel 2020; Davenport, Bhattarai, and McGregor 2020). In other places, workers were called back to work at workplaces that did not have sufficient health and safety protections and were faced with the prospect of working at an unsafe job and risking contracting a deadly disease, or refusing to work and risking losing their unemployment benefits. Workers should not be faced with choosing between their health and their livelihood. The law must be strengthened to explicitly protect workers who refuse to perform hazardous work from being fired or retaliated against. These protections exist to some extent now under the Occupational Safety and Health Act and the NLRA, but the protections are weak and the enforcement is up to the government agency. Also, workers who refuse to work because of unsafe working conditions that the employer fails to address should not be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits: States should be required to consider the refusal to perform unsafe work as “good cause” to not work, so that unemployment benefits continue (Berkowitz and Sonn 2020). And because strikes have shown themselves to be effective and often necessary to force action on safety and health, states should be required to provide unemployment insurance for strikers (Block and Sachs 2020).22