# AC v Westwood PM

#### Plan – The appropriation of outer space through the production of space debris by private entities is unjust.

#### Revising the Outer Space Treaty curbs the impact of space debris – timeframe is crucial.

Shah 20 – Sachin, 8/30/20, [“Aug 30 The International Legal Regulation of Space Debris,” CORNELL UNDERGRADUATE LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW, Administrative, Policy, Technology, <https://www.culsr.org/articles/the-international-legal-regulation-of-space-debris>] Justin

In this article, I have demonstrated that the existing laws and regulations pertaining to space debris are best captured in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. While many scholars do believe that Articles VII and IX of the Treaty does provide basic accountability for space debris, many also agree that its vague, non-technical legal language creates problems in mitigating the ever-growing problem of space debris in orbit around Earth. Despite this lack of legal clarity, some scholars have proposed solutions to the space debris issue. Some have simply called for a revised, specific version of the Outer Space Treaty. Others have recommended implementing an entire regulatory regime with the authority to create laws which specifically pertain to holding actors accountable for space debris production. While lawmakers have yet to update the existing regulations regarding space debris, more effective space debris mitigation techniques lie in the private sector. The profit-based incentives of private satellite companies ensure their responsibility in and around Earth's orbit. In the example of SpaceX, the loose legal regulations of satellite use by the FCC and the ITU have allowed the company to send thousands of satellites into orbit. We live in a different world today than we did in 1967. In order to maintain our current safety and our future ability to voyage outer space, stronger legal frameworks must be created to prevent the uncontrollable expansion of space debris around Earth. Used effectively, legal action can accomplish these goals, but lack thereof may result in disaster.

#### Private entities are non-governmental.

Dunk 11 – Frans G. von der Dunk, 2011, [“The Origins of Authorisation: Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty and International Space Law,” University of Nebraska] Justin

4. Interpreting Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty One main novel feature of Article VI stood out with reference to the role of private enterprise in this context. Contrary to the version of the concept applicable under general international law, where “direct state responsibility” only pertained to acts somehow directly attributable to a state and states could only be addressed for acts by private actors under “indirect,” “due care”/“due diligence” responsibility,18 Article VI made no difference as to whether the activities at issue were the state’s own (“whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies” . . .) or those of private actors (. . . “or by non-governmental entities”). The interests of the Soviet Union in ensuring that, whomever would actually conduct a certain space activity, some state or other could be held responsible for its compliance with applicable rules of space law to that extent had prevailed. However, the general acceptance of Article VI as cornerstone of the Outer Space Treaty unfortunately was far from the end of the story. Partly, this was the consequence of key principles being left undefined.

#### Exemptions destroy the coercive power of legal regimes – causes circumvention across the board.

Hickman and Dolman 2 – John and Everett, 2002, Associate professor in the Department of Government and International Studies at Berry College in Mt. Berry, [“Resurrecting the Space Age: A State–Centered Commentary on the Outer Space Regime,” Volume 21 Number 1, <https://doi.org/10.1080/014959302317350855>] Elmer Recut Justin

Thus a state party need merely announce its intention to withdraw and then wait one year. Withdrawal of a single state party to the treaty, however, would not necessarily terminate the treaty between the other state parties. Yet, the decision of an important state not to be bound by a regime–creating treaty obviously endangers the entire treaty. The decision of the United States or China to withdraw from the OST would have far greater implications for the survival of the international space regime than the same decision by Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, or Papua New Guinea—the equality of states under international law remains nothing more than a useful  ction. For the OST to remain good international law, it must be accepted as such by the major space faring states of the 21st Century: the United States, Russia, the European Union, Japan, and China. One defection from the regime by a member of this group would no doubt lead to its effective collapse, as the remaining space faring states are unlikely to use the kind of coercion necessary to enforce the regime. A more likely response to such a defection is a scramble to make similar claims to sovereignty, based on historical precedent and effective occupation. Similar rushes to stake claims for territory sovereignty in other celestial bodies might follow.

#### The advantage is Debris:

#### Privatization of space is unsustainable and increases debris – triggers the Kessler Syndrome

Thompson 21 [Clive, 11/17/21, Clive Thompson is a contributing writer for the New York Times Magazine, a columnist for Wired and Smithsonian magazines, and a regular contributor to Mother Jones. He’s the author of Coders: The Making of a New Tribe and the Remaking of the World, and Smarter Than You Think: How Technology is Changing our Minds for the Better. He’s @pomeranian99 on Twitter and Instagram, “Get Ready for the “Kessler Syndrome” to Wreck Outer Space,” OneZero, <https://onezero.medium.com/get-ready-for-the-kessler-syndrome-to-wreck-outer-space-7f29cfe62c3e>] Justin

Back in 1978, the astrophysicist Donald Kessler made an alarming prediction: Space junk could wreck our ability to keep satellites aloft. In a fascinating paper, Kessler noted that “low earth orbit” — a region between 99 miles and 1,200 miles up — was getting pretty crowded. In 1978 there were already 3,866 objects being tracked in space. That included satellites used by scientists (say, to monitor weather) or spy agencies. It also included a lot of debris: Every time a rocket launches a satellite into orbit, it tends to leave stray bits of material. The thing is, when objects are zooming through space about 2 km/s, even something as tiny as a chip of paint can smash through glass or steel. Pieces of debris become bullets. What Kessler predicted is that sooner or later, objects in low-earth orbit would start colliding, and produce chain effects, like billiard balls colliding on a crowded pool table. If a piece of debris hit a satellite, it would produce more debris, which would to increase the risk of other collisions … and so on, and so on. At some point, you could reach a tipping point. There’d be so many chunks of debris that collisions would be inevitable, leaving low-earth orbit a junkyard where no satellites could survive. Remember the scene in Wall-E where they blast off Earth, and the planet is utterly ringed with crap? That’s what Kessler worried about. Except in our situation the pieces of junk could be quite small — billions of objects the size of grains of sand, which is actually a lot harder to deal with, because you can’t see it coming. In essence, Kessler predicted we could create an artificial asteroid belt of junk: The result would be an exponential increase in the number of objects with time, creating a belt of debris around the earth. This process of mutual collisions is thought to have been responsible for creating most of the astroids from larger planetlike bodies. Space folks began calling this the “Kessler Syndrome”. It was hard to predict when this might start happening. Kessler worried that conditions could be ripe by as early as 2000. Thankfully, that estimate turned out to be premature. But wow, it looks like it might happen soon. What’s happened recently that makes the “Kessler Syndrome” more likely? A couple of things: Way more satellites are going up The pace at which satellites are going up in the sky is simply exploding. Back when Kessler wrote his paper in 1978, we humans were launching about 53 new satellites a year. Going to space was hard. But now launches are an order of magnitude more common, and they’re increasing in pace rapidly. SpaceX in particular is launching oodles of satellites as it builds its orbital Internet-access service Starlink. In the last two years, it has put 1,740 satellites in low-earth orbit, with plans to eventually shoot 30,000 up there. This is part of a larger trend, which is … The privatization of outer space The private sector is rapidly becoming the dominant actor in space. There’s a huge demand for satellite data — everyone wants better info about weather, crops, traffic patterns, tree coverage, emissions, you name it, on top of the explosive use of satellites for communication and Internet. SpaceX’s remarkable innovations in rocketry (the leading folks, though others are following in their footsteps) have made it cheaper than ever to get a satellite into orbit. It is unlocking a huge pent-up demand for near-earth-orbit tech. More launches mean not only more intentional objects in orbit but unintentional ones — bits of rocket parts and detritus from launches.

#### Privatization exponentially increases the curve but ending dangerous missions prevents it.

Bernat 20 [Pawel, 2020, Military University of Aviation, “ORBITAL SATELLITE CONSTELLATIONS AND THE GROWING THREAT OF KESSLER SYNDROME IN THE LOWER EARTH ORBIT,” SAFETY ENGINEERING OF ANTHROPOGENIC OBJECTS, Volume 4, PDF] Justin

5. Orbital satellite constellations and the growing threat of the Kessler syndrome Space 2.0 – the new era of space exploration that we witness now in the 21st century means, in words of Buzz Aldrin, “moving human enterprise into space” (Pyle, 2019, p. xiv). The process of commercialization of outer space has already begun and is not limited to private companies providing technologies and services for national or international space agencies, as it was in the past. On the contrary, private companies from the space sector have now matured to carry out their own independent projects. As for 2020, SpaceX is a company that serves as the best example – it launches satellites to the orbit, both for state and private contractors, it successfully realized two crew missions to the International Space Station, and is in the process of constructing Starlink satellite constellation that will provide high-speed internet access across the planet. Each satellite weighs around 260 kg, is equipped with an ion propulsion system, autonomous collision avoidance system, and orbits Earth at approximately 540-560 km altitude (Starlink, 2020). At the beginning of November 2020, more than 860 Starlink satellites were orbiting the Earth (Jewett, 2020). Immediate plans include launching 12,000 satellites, but they assume a potential later extension to 42,000 (Henry, 2019a). Of course, SpaceX has employed, at least declaratively, all necessary measures to keep the space clean – the satellites are equipped with the deorbiting system, and in the event of inoperability of the propulsion system (Starlink, 2020). The orbital collisions are, however, inevitable. As it was shown before, the possibility of collisions grows with the number of orbital objects. Bastida Virgili with the team compared (2016, p. 154-155) orbital debris environment development without and with a large hypothetical constellation consisting of merely 1080 satellites, distributed across 20 orbital planes at 1,100 km altitude (Fig. 5).

Chart, line chart

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It has to be noted that although SpaceX’s Starlink is the only constellation that is being built in orbit, it is not the only one planned. There are at least a few initiatives aiming at the same goal – to construct internet infrastructure at the Earth’s orbit. The planned Kuiper Systems LLC, which is a subsidiary of Amazon and intends to place 3,236 broadband satellites in the LEO, is one of Starlink’s biggest competitors (Henry, 2019b). Now, there is even a rivalry between the two companies because Kuiper’s lowest orbital shell is planned to be 590 km, with a tolerance of 9 km either above or below (Cao, 2020), which is the altitude of Starlink satellites. Moreover, the race for space in orbit is now at the beginning. The outer space is vast. It increasingly becomes more cluttered with both operational satellites and space debris. The threat of collisions increases and no institution or body has enough power to license, coordinate and regulate what is sent to the orbit. The UNOOSA has not such power. National states decide what the companies from the space industry can launch to space. In the United States, which is most advanced in the area of private constellations, it is the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) that issues the appropriate approvals. The race to put broadband internet satellites bears similarities to the gold rush – there are no rules, at the global level, apart from first-come, first-served.

#### Debris causes nuclear war---Noko, Iran, and China.

Beauchamp 14 – Zack, 4/21/14, Zack Beauchamp is a senior correspondent at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, and a host of Worldly, Vox's podcast on foreign policy and international relations. His work focuses on the rise of the populist right across the West, the role of identity in American politics, and how fringe ideologies shape the mainstream. Before coming to Vox, he edited TP Ideas, a section of Think Progress devoted to the ideas shaping our political world. He has an MSc from the London School of Economics in International Relations and grew up in Washington, DC, where he currently lives with his wife, daughter, and two (rescue) dogs [“How space trash could start a nuclear war,” Vox, <https://www.vox.com/2014/4/21/5625246/space-war-china-north-korea-iran>] Justin \*Brackets added for ableist language

If debris from a Chinese test destroys a US military satellite, the US could mistake it as a preemptive strike against its space capabilities — some of which are designed to detect nuclear missile launches. If the US thinks China is trying to take out its ability to detect a nuclear launch, things could get very bad, very quickly. Accidents aren't the only concern. Zenko also worries about intentional space attacks, either during peacetime or a crisis. Here, Iran and North Korea are probably bigger threats, though their ASAT capabilities are far from proven. North Korea has a pattern of ~~crazy~~ [irrational] military moves designed to extort concessions from South Korea and the West; it could extend that behavior to space. Iran, according to Zenko, "already views space as a legitimate arena in which to contest US military power." He worries that Iran might fire missiles into space "during a major crisis, especially if it believes war is imminent — an assessment that could have self-fulfilling consequences."

#### Any nuclear war causes extinction – ice age and famine.

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A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that [ends human history](https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StarrNuclearWinterOct09.pdf). There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create [a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSAD.pdf). Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making. The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout, produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to [destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer](https://www2.ucar.edu/atmosnews/just-published/3995/nuclear-war-and-ultraviolet-radiation) and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.

#### The alt cedes the celestial commons to the hands of global imperialism. Only IR education can create momentum to demilitarize space.

Raymond Duvall 6 – Professor of Political Science @ Univ of Minnesota, Taking Sovereignty Out of This World: Space Weapons and Empire of the Future, October 2006, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/111193/Taking%20Sovereignty%20Out%20of%20This%20World.pdf>

III. Space Weapons, Sovereignty, and the Constitution of Empire Each of the three new forms of military use of space, if brought into effect, will dramatically affect political societies on Earth. Missile defense has as its aim the creation of a shield for the territory of the U.S. (and possibly some selected allies). To the extent that it is accomplished, this would partially re-inscribe, through a truly three-dimensional shield, the borders of the United States—in Herz’s terms, its “hard shell”—and accordingly its effective sovereignty as political subject. At the same time, it would reduce or even eliminate the capacity of other political subjects to exercise an effective deterrent defense against U.S. intervention in their affairs—that is to say, it would further erode their sovereignty. The second type of militarization—space control—is both a form of “privatizing” the commons of orbital space and a form of military exclusion, an extra-territorial complement to the effort to create an exclusive territorial “hard shell” for just one state (and perhaps its “friends”) through missile defense. In the first respect, it can be understood as a type of “primitive accumulation”,48 whereby the commons of orbital space is effectively colonized and “made safe” for the capitalist interests that flow through it—primarily information services at this point in time. Here, the project of space control is constitutive of the U.S. as expressly capitalist state—sovereign subject of a particular global socio-economic order. In the second respect, that moment of constitution is conjoined with the constitution of an exclusive—a singular—sovereignty in regard to the workings of that socio-economic order through the global commons of orbital space. Finally, the placing of weapons in space capable of targeting objects on or near the Earth’s surface creates a new form of territorial rule. Whereas modern military action has been concerned principally with occupying and controlling territory, and whereas modern sovereignty is accordingly territorially defined, this form of weaponization of space would dispense with the need for such cumbersome military practices, and the pretense of sovereign territorial authority. Instead, through increased precision in space-based weapons systems, combined with the ability to target and attack anywhere on the Earth on a very short notice—ranging from minutes to seconds depending upon the weapon system—it becomes possible to “surveil and punish” any potential enemy of such a system.49 This is constitutive of a globally singular sovereign, capable of deciding the exception for the entirety of humanity, with no terrestrial “outside” to the scope of its sovereignty.50 Our argument, in simple terms, is that the militarization of space reconstitutes and alters the social production of political society in three interlocked ways that are rooted respectively in three distinct forms of putting economies/cartographies of violence into practice in outer space. The conjoint effect of those three processes of reconstitution is to substitute the consolidation of an extra-territorial system of rule—which we refer to as empire of the future—for the competitive sovereignties of the modern states-system. Missile defense The first instance of weaponization of space will probably be the deployment of a spacebased missile defense system. Indeed, the U.S. military is already testing several prototypes of components of such a system. Two of the most notable examples of this are NFIRE (Near Field Infrared Experiment) and the MDA (Missile Defense Agency) Space Test Bed. “NFIRE … is an experimental satellite to be launched in on (sic) a rocket in 2006 that is designed to distinguish between a ballistic missile’s fiery plume and the rocket itself, according to an official at the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)”.51 The MDA Space Test Bed is slated to receive funding in 2008, with the aim of integrating already existing space technologies into a system that can intercept ballistic missiles in their boost phase from orbital space.52 Such a system replaces deterrence with defense. In realist literature, the sovereignty of states is often closely linked to their ability to deter enemies from attacking. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons, through their capacity to deter attack, were cited as one of the potential means by which states could protect their territorial integrity, and, in turn, their sovereignty.53 Kenneth Waltz has argued that the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their deterrent effects actually stabilizes international relations, making the world safer and, implicitly, strengthening the security of sovereign states.54 A missile defense system, developed by and operative for only one state (or that state and its allies), undermines the logic of deterrence. States lacking the missile defense system become increasingly vulnerable to (even nuclear) attack by the state that has such a system.55 In a fashion entirely consistent with the logic of John Herz’s predictions made in the 1950s, the “hard shell” of defensible territory is thereby lost for those states. The realist argument that has largely carried the day for the past half century in critical response to Herz—that the deterrent effect of mutual assured destruction of two states possessing nuclear weapons re-inscribes the logic of territorial state sovereignty—accordingly is brought into doubt. With the advent of exclusive missile defense, it is worth re-examining—indeed reinvigorating—Herz’s original argument, because if the U.S. were to develop a sufficiently sophisticated missile defense shield the deterritorializing effect on the sovereignty of other states would be precisely those that he forecasted. There would be a significant twist, however, because, for the U.S., control of an effective missile defense system would markedly re-inscribe its territorial “hard shell” and its sovereignty in exclusively shielding it from the threat of (missile-based) nuclear attack by others. The sovereignty of one state is reproduced, while that of other states is eroded. Space control The doctrine of space control has emerged in the U.S. military out of the belief that assets in space represent a potential target for enemies of the U.S.56 There are two kinds of vulnerable U.S. assets: private-commercial; and military. One concern is that rivals may attack commercial satellites, thereby disrupting the flow of information and potentially inflicting significant harm on global markets. Militarily, a second concern is that, through its increasing reliance on satellites for its Earth-based military operations, the U.S. has created an “asymmetrical vulnerability”. An adversary (including a non-state, “terrorist” organization) could effectively immobilize U.S. forces by disabling the military satellites that provide communication, command, and control capabilities. As noted above, U.S. military planners are already warning about a possible “Space Pearl Harbor”. Consequently, the doctrine of space control is designed to protect commercial and military satellites from potential attacks, and ultimately to prevent rivals from having access to space.57 As of the year 2000 there were over 500 satellites in orbit owned by 46 countries, worth in excess of $250 billion. With the rise of the information economy, satellites are playing an increasing role in international trade and finance. As such, U.S. military planners are concerned about commercial satellites. One rationalization for the weaponization of space is that these commercial assets represent a vulnerability to economic sabotage and terrorism. As Lambeth has argued, The most compelling reason for moving forward for dispatch toward acquiring at least the serious elements of space control capability is that the United States is now unprecedentedly invested and dependent upon on-orbit capabilities, both military and commercial. Since these equities can only be expected to grow in sunk cost, it is fair to presume that they will eventually be challenged by potential opponents.58 Notice how this description of space control discusses space in terms of a set of capital assets that should be protected from external threats. While scholars have for a long time debated whether one, if not the, primary objective of U.S. military endeavors is to protect the interests of business, when it comes to questions of space control it is one of only two things in space to protect. There are no human populations in space—with the exception of the two or three occupants on the International Space Station—that could be killed by conflict in space, so the thing that is being secured through the project of space control is technology—either commercial satellites or military assets. In Volume One of Capital, Marx chided classical political economists for their inability to explain how workers became separated from the means of production. Whereas political economists such as Adam Smith argued that a previous accumulation of capital was necessary for a division of labor, Marx argued that this doctrine was an absurd doctrine. Division of labor existed in pre-capitalist societies where workers were not alienated from their labor. Instead, Marx argued that the actual historical process of primitive accumulation of capital was carried out through brute force. The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the indigenous population of that continent, the beginnings of the conquest and plunder of India, and the conversion of Africa into a preserve for the commercial hunting of blackskins, are all things which characterize the dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation.59 While not a perfect analogy, because of the lack of labour occurring in orbital space, the doctrine of space control is part and parcel of an ongoing process of such primitive accumulation. One of the purposes of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty was to keep outer space a commons where all states, regardless of technical ability or economic or military power, could participate in the potential benefits space has to offer. In the years since this treaty was signed, the primary economic use of space has been for commercial communications satellites. This industry has expanded dramatically in the last two decades. Total revenues for commercial space-related industries in 1980 were 2.1 billion dollars; by 2003 this figure had expanded to $91 billion and it was expected to increase at least as rapidly into the foreseeable future.60 On the economic front, space control is about determining who has access to this new economy. Positions in orbit for satellites are a new form of “real estate,” and by controlling access to outer space the U.S. would be forcibly appropriating the orbits around Earth, thereby placing the U.S. in a position to determine which governments and corporations could use space. In effect, orbital slots around earth would be turned into private property. This process of primitive accumulation is of importance to our concerns in two ways. First, the doctrine of space control represents the extension of U.S. sovereignty into outer space. In addition to being a clear violation of international law, it reinforces the constitutive effect identified in the previous section on missile defense, namely to re-inscribe the “hard shell” borders of the U.S., which are now extended to include the “territory” of outer space. This simultaneously constitutes the exclusive sovereignty of the U.S., while displacing the sovereignty of other states Second, space control bears significantly on the production of political subjectivities. The original Star Trek series would begin with the voice of Captain Kirk describing space as the “final frontier”. While presenting the exploration of space as a largely peaceful enterprise, the TV show was also drawing upon its viewers’ “memories” of the “western frontier” of 19th century U.S. expansion. At least since the writings of Frederick Turner, there has been the notion that the frontier represents the well-spring of U.S. ingenuity, freedom, and creativity. According to Turner, because as they expanded westward settlers in the U.S. had to continually adapt to a new environment, they became increasingly “American”. The theme of the frontier as essential for American identity has had a significant discursive role in U.S. imperialist expansion.61 Although Turner concluded that the American frontier had closed by the late 1890s, he argued that the U.S. could extend it frontier into new countries, such as Latin America. Theodore Roosevelt, influenced by the Turner thesis, concluded that in order to maintain the exceptional American identity new frontiers had to be opened overseas. The notion of frontiers, then, has been integral to the U.S. imperialist project since its outset. The doctrine of space control, seen in this light, is simply an extension of the imperial logic. By expanding into and taking control of the “final frontier” the U.S. is continuing to renew an exceptional—an exclusive—identity by adapting itself to the harsh realities of a new environment. So, the doctrine of space control can be read as extending U.S. sovereignty into orbit. While a clear violation of international law, this de facto expansion of U.S. sovereignty will have two effects. First, it enables a process of primitive accumulation, whereby orbital spaces around earth are removed from the commons initially established by the Outer Space Treaty, and places them under the control of the U.S. for use and perhaps even ownership by businesses sympathetic to U.S. interests. The U.S. becomes even more than it is now the state for global capitalism, the global capitalist state. Second, this doctrine of space control is part of the ongoing re-production of American subjects as “Americans”. Embedded within space control is the notion that space is a new frontier. Following the Turner thesis and Roosevelt’s doctrine of imperialist expansion, there has long been a drive for Americans to seek out new frontiers as a way of renewing the American identity and promoting American values of individuality, innovation, and exceptionalism. Force application from orbital space Force application entails using weapons either based in space or passing through space to attack targets within Earth’s atmosphere. For technical reasons, such weapons systems are still many years off, but substantial research is being conducted, and military strategists and policy analysts are already discussing how these weapons might be used.62 The major advantage of space-based weapons aimed at Earth-based targets is that they can deliver an attack to any point on the Earth in an extremely short period of time, and it is virtually impossible to defend against them. They become the violent parallel to the surveillance panopticon. In order to investigate what the constitutive effects on sovereignty and political subjectivities would be of force application from outer space, we need to look at two aspects of these weapons: what they can do—their technical aspects—and how they would be useful—their tactical aspects.63 Technically, the two types of weapons systems discussed in the previous section—laserenergy and kinetic-energy—would have different uses. Laser weapons are the quickest and most precise, but they also apply the least amount of force. In theory, such weapons would take only seconds to use and could reach any target on earth instantaneously. They are not very destructive, however, and as such would not be very useful against large-scale and/or heavily shielded targets. Conversely, kinetic-energy weapons have the potential to deliver very destructive amounts of force. They would take a few hours to deploy, however. While they could also be designed to attack any point on earth, they are only useful against fixed targets, because of the time they take to deploy. In addition to laser and kinetic-energy systems, conventional weapons, such as bombs and missiles, might also be placed in space. They would occupy a middle ground. It would take approximately ten minutes to launch these weapons from space, and they could attack any targets that earth-based conventional weapons do.64 The tactical advantages of these types of weapons are obvious. Their tremendous range enables space-based weapons to reach targets that other weapons cannot, and because they are based in outer space there are no concerns about violating the airspace of other states in transit. They can also be used on very short notice, in contrast to the days to weeks typically required to deploy earth-based weapons, such as airplanes, ships, or troops. The major drawback of these weapons is their cost. In addition to the very high cost of developing state-of-the-art weaponry, there is also the high cost associated with placing these weapons into orbit.65 As such, they would likely have relatively limited use,66 particularly if other types of military forces can accomplish the same mission for a lower cost. Why, for instance, would the military use a kinetic-energy weapon orbiting in space against a terrestrial target when a similar result could be produced by an Earth-based system, such as a cruise missile or a bomb? The prime advantage of these weapons is their ability to be used on short notice at targets that are out of the reach of conventional weapons. In what kind of military operations, then, would space-based weapons be primarily useful? Military policy analysts have speculated on just such questions of the political utility of these weapons. Alternatively, a space weapon might be the weapon of choice for an otherwise lower-value target if the space weapon were the only choice available in time, particularly for a time critical political effect. For example, a locomotive might not be worth a space-delivered smart munition. However, it might be well worth the use of a space-delivered smart munition to target a locomotive pulling a train full of people forced from their homes for transport to the border or to a concentration camp at the beginning of an ethnic cleansing campaign – particularly if aircraft and helicopters cannot reach the train because air defenses have not been suppressed, basing and overflight rights have not been granted, or coalition consensus on the action has not been reached.67 This scenario is fascinating for the political logic at work within it—space weapons are required to launch an attack at an otherwise inaccessible target. The three reasons that the target might be inaccessible all have to do with potential gaps in imperial power. Either the defenses of the target country have not been suppressed, or other states have not consented to let the forces fly through their airspace, or other coalition members—presumably in NATO or the UN—have not consented to the action. The first “justification” for the use of the weapon involves clear erasure of the sovereignty of the targeted state, as it eliminates any pretense of that country’s defensibility. The second and third “justifications” diminish, by circumvention, the sovereignty of other states. All three buttress the exclusive capacity of the U.S. to act unilaterally in deciding the exception globally. In all three cases, the only practical use for this weapon is in an imperial project! The chief advantage of space weapons is their ability on very short notice to attack a target that is out of reach of conventional forces. What places these targets “out of reach” is the sovereignty of other states as exercised through those states’ abilities to defend their territory, control their airspace, and/or participate (jointly) in authorized decision of the (global) exception. The constitutive effect of these weapons, then, is to strip states of their sovereignty—they are constituted as subjects lacking authorization of decision, and lacking boundary effectively demarcating inside from outside. What modern sovereignty does (as identified in section I. above) is taken from them. Furthermore, given the potential targets that these weapons could destroy, and how they are used, space-based systems are most useful against small groups and individuals. While the purpose of the use of space-based weapons in the above example was to prevent genocide, the means by which this attack was carried out was essentially assassination—the assassination of those driving the vehicle to carry out the ethnic cleansing. Space-based weapons, then, are most useful at targeting individuals and groups on short notice in order to achieve a political objective. We have already seen potential glimpses of this type of warfare in recent years. Consider, for example, that the Iraq War began with a so called “decapitation strike” aimed at assassinating Saddam Hussein in the hope of ending the war before it began. Similar tactics have been used by the Israeli Defense Forces to kill specific leaders of the Palestinians. Also, the U.S. has used Unmanned Aerial Vehicles equipped with missiles to target specific members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Placing weapons in space aimed at terrestrial targets would only accelerate the ability to carry out these types of “targeted killings” (a.k.a. assassinations). Space weapons would enable those who control them to kill any person at any point on Earth on extremely short notice. Thus, application of force from outer space would have at least three crucially important constitutive effects. First, it would constitute the possessor of these weapons—presumably the U.S.—as the center of a globally extensive, late-modern empire,68 a sovereign of the globe. But this global sovereign would exercise its power in a new way. Rather than needing to control the land, sea, and airspace of all of the Earth, it could rely on space weapons— because they enable the precise application of force at any point on earth, on short notice— to control the globe. While these weapons are not particularly useful in fighting large-scale wars, or in the conquest of territory, they make such conventional uses of military power moot, in large part. There is no longer a need to exercise sovereign power through the control of territory, all one has to do is kill—or perhaps even threaten to kill—potential adversaries around the world in order to gain one’s wishes. In short, the type of power potentially wielded by such a sovereign would be far more absolute than any encountered throughout history.69 Second, these weapons, just as space-based missile defense was seen above to do, would effectively strip states of their ability to exercise sovereignty over their territories. While de jure sovereignty may remain intact, their de facto sovereignty would be effectively erased. For decades, realist international relations scholars have promoted the idea that states secure their sovereignty through self-help.70 If states lack the capacity to defend themselves from adversaries they are particularly vulnerable to attack and conquest. While other scholars from liberal and constructivist schools of thought have questioned how closely sovereignty is linked to military capability, throughout history states with disproportionate military power have repeatedly violated the sovereignty of weaker states.71 While space-based weapons in and of themselves would not enable conquest of another state, they could be used very effectively to achieve precise political objectives without a credible possibility of retaliation. Imagine what impact these weapons would have on U.S. foreign policy with respect to two of its most pressing objectives at this point in time. Consider, for one, how useful such weapons might be with respect to preventing a rival state such as Iran or North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons. While there has been speculation that the U.S. or Israel may launch air strikes against potential nuclear weapons manufacturing facilities in these countries, the logistics—getting access to airspace from neighboring countries, and the possibility of retaliation against military forces in the area—make such operations difficult to carry out. Using weapons in space to conduct such missions would avoid these logistical difficulties, thereby making them easier (and presumably more likely). The threat of using space weapons on either the manufacturing sites of weapons of mass destruction or on the political leadership of an adversary in most cases probably would be sufficient to alter the behaviour of governments. In short, if the U.S. were to deploy such weapons in space, they would likely be used to much the same effect as the gunboat diplomacy of the 19th century. A second contemporary policy objective is to fight specific non-state actors. The 9/11 Commission Report discussed in great detail the logistical obstacles that prevented the Clinton administration from capturing or killing Osama Bin Laden.72 The primary obstacle was the difficulty in either launching cruise missiles into Afghanistan through another state’s airspace or deploying U.S. Special Forces in an area so remote from U.S. military bases. Again, had the U.S. had space-based weapons at the time, they probably would have been the weapons of choice. When combined with intelligence about the location of a potential target, they could be used to kill that target on very short notice without violating the air space of other states, or needing to have a military base nearby to offer a support role. In effect, any person or group of people anywhere on Earth could be targeted on very short notice, thereby constituting everyone everywhere as objects of the global sovereign. All would be subject to the rule of the U.S. state. The sovereignty of states would no longer be an obstacle to killing enemies, and these assassinations could be carried out rather easily without the threat of retaliation by the state whose sovereignty has been violated. The example of using space weapons to target non-state actors such as Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda points to a third constitutive effect of space weapons. Because these weapons could target anyone, anywhere, at anytime, everyone on the Earth is effectively reduced to “bare life.”73 As Agamben demonstrates in Homo Sacer (1998), one of the constitutive powers of the sovereign is to determine who is outside the laws and protections of the state. While human rights regimes and the rule of law may exist under a late-modern global empire policed by space weapons,74 the global sovereign will have the ability to decide the exception to this rule of law, and this state of exception in many cases may be exercised by the use of space weapons that constituted this sovereign in the first place. Constituting empire of the future Each of the three forms of space weaponization has important constitutive effects on modern sovereignty, and, in turn, productive effects on political subjectivities. Exclusive missile defense constitutes a “hard shell” of sovereignty for one state, while erasing the sovereign political subject status of other states. Space control reinforces that exclusive constitution of sovereignty and its potentiality for fostering unilateral decision. It also constitutes the ‘space-controlling’ state, the U.S., as sovereign for a particular global social order, a global capitalism, and as a state populated by an exceptional people, “Americans.” Space weaponization in the form of capacities for direct force application obliterate the meaning of territorial boundaries for defense and for distinguishing an inside from an outside with respect to the scope of policing and law enforcement—that is authorized locus for deciding the exception. States, other than the exceptional “American” state, are reduced to empty shells of sovereignty, sustained, if at all, by convenient fiction—for example, as useful administrative apparatuses for the governing of locals. And their “citizens” are produced as “bare life” subject to the willingness of the global sovereign to let them live. Together, these three sets of effects constitute what we believe can appropriately be identified as late-modern empire, the political subjects of which are a global sovereign, an exceptional “nation” linked to that sovereign, a global social order normalized in terms of capitalist social relations, and “bare life” for individuals and groups globally to participate in that social order. If our argument is even half correct, the claim with which this paper began—that modes of political killing have important effects—would be an understatement! IV. Coping with Empire of the Future If the logic of space weaponization is to constitute a new, historically unprecedented form of empire, there are significant theoretical and practical implications. By way of conclusion, we take up some of the most important of those implications briefly in this section. Re-theorizing empire Broadly speaking, recent theorizing on imperialism has posited two competing pictures of empire. On the one hand, scholars have put forward a global hegemonic view of empire in which a great power – presumably the United States – through a combination of hard and soft power dominates the international system to such an extant that it becomes the de facto sovereign of a global order.75 On the other hand, theorists such as Hardt and Negri have posited a de-centered version of Empire in which a network of loosely integrated institutions govern the various facets of the lives of subjects to such an extent that all political subjects on the planet are governed under a single, dispersed regime that they have labeled Empire. Our paper rejects both these images of Empire, and uses the site of space weaponization to posit a third version of Empire that is neither the de-centered late modern vision of Hardt and Negri, nor the centralized hegemonic vision of both advocates and opponents of American Imperialism. Imagining resistance Given these grim prospects for a de-territorialized global rule of late-modern empire, are there any possibilities for resistance? Historically, every advance in the weaponry of imperial powers has always been met with an advance in counter hegemonic weaponry. Most recently, insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq have been able to counter the technological superiority of the U.S. forces with very simple yet effective Improvised Explosive Devices. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that space weaponry could be countered through a variety of asymmetrical tactics such as disabling space weapons while in orbit through energy, kinetic or even nuclear anti-satellite attacks, attacking the locations where space weapons are produced or launched, attack the research and development centers (such as universities) that are integral to the production of these systems, organizing strikes for the workers involved in harvesting the raw materials for these systems, and refusing to pay taxes to the political apparatuses that control these systems. While it is difficult to imagine what precise form resistance to these systems might take, it is not unreasonable to conclude that even in a context of space-based empire, some for of political and military resistance will be possible. That being said, just because resistance to space-based empire is a possibility, it by no means follows that such space-based empires are either inevitable or desirable. That is why we believe that resistance to placing weapons in space must begin now. Such resistance could take several forms. In the last 15 years social constructivists have made a convincing case that taboos against the use of chemical weapons, nuclear weapons and land mines have shamed states into abstaining from using these weapons.76 IR scholars should build on this research to focus on creating a taboo against the use and hopefully even the development of space weapons. Second, there is a need to educate the public about the dangerous consequences of placing weapons in space. As of this moment, most information about weapons in space is produced by defense agencies and related think tanks with a vested interest in them. As such, most research largely ignores the dangers of these weapons. An increased awareness of those dangers, not only to those potentially targeted by such weapons but also citizens of countries such as the U.S. that may deploy them, may create public pressure to cut funding to the development programs. If action is not taken now, we believe that the possibilities for resistance to these weapons will decrease dramatically once they are placed in orbit. The state of global domination constituted by such a weapons regime would mean that those who dared to speak out against such a regime might themselves become potential targets of such weapons.

### FW

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being

#### Prefer:

#### 1] Death is bad and o/w bc it ontologically destroys the subject.

Paterson 1 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island. (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81  In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### 2] Evolution proves our theory true

**Johnson and Thayer 16** – Dominic D. P. Johnson, D.Phil., Ph.D.\* and Bradley A. Thayer, Ph.D., “The evolution of offensive realism Survival under anarchy from the Pleistocene to the present,” https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/56B778004187F70B8E59609BE7FEE7A4/S073093841600006Xa.pdf/div-class-title-the-evolution-of-offensive-realism-div.pdf

Few principles unite the discipline of international relations, but one exception is anarchy—the absence of government in international politics. Anarchy is, ironically, the ‘‘ordering’’ principle of the global state system and the starting point for most major theories of international politics, such as neoliberalism and neorealism.42,43,44,45 Other theoretical approaches, such as constructivism, also acknowledge the impact of anarchy, even if only to consider why anarchy occurs and how it can be circumvented.46,47 Indeed, the anarchy concept is so profound that it defines and divides the discipline of political science into international politics (politics under conditions of anarchy) and domestic politics (politics under conditions of hierarchy, or government). Given the prominence of the concept in present-day international relations theory, it is striking that anarchy only took hold as a central feature of scholarship in recent decades, since the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics in 1979. In fact, however, **anarchy has been a constant feature of the entire multimillion year history of the human lineage (and indeed the 3.5 billion–year history of the evolution of all life on Earth before that). It is not just that we lack a global Leviathan today; humans never had such a luxury. The fact that human evolution occurred under conditions of anarchy, that we evolved as hunter-gatherers in an ecological setting of predation, resource competition, and intergroup conflict, and that humans have been subject to natural selection** for millions of years **has profound consequences for understanding human behavior**, not least how humans perceive and act toward others. Scholars often argue over whether historically humans experienced a Hobbesian ‘‘state of nature,’’ but—whatever the outcome of that debate—it is certainly a much closer approximation to the prehistoric environment in which human brains and behavior evolved. **This legacy heavily influences our decision-making and behavior today, even—perhaps especially—in the anarchy of international politics**. We argue that **evolution under conditions of anarchy has predisposed human nature toward the behaviors predicted by offensive realism: Humans**, particularly men, **are strongly self-interested, often fear other groups, and seek more resources, more power, and more influence** (as we explain in full later). **These strategies** are not unique to humans and, in fact, **characterize a much broader trend in behavior among mammals as a whole—especially primates**—as well as many other major vertebrate groups, including birds, fish, and reptiles. **This recurrence of behavioral patterns** across different taxonomic groups **suggests that the behaviors characterized by offensive realism have broad and deep evolutionary roots**. This perspective does not deny the importance of institutions, norms, and governance in international politics. On the contrary, it provides or adds to the reasons why we demand and need them, and indeed why they are so hard to establish and maintain. Until recently, **international relations theorists rarely used insights from the life sciences to inform their understanding of human behavior**. However, **rapid advances in the life sciences offer increasing theoretical and empirical challenges to scholars in** the social sciences in general and **international relations** in particular, who are therefore under increasing pressure to address and integrate this knowledge rather than to suppress or ignore it. Whatever one’s personal views on evolution, **the time has come to explore the implications of evolutionary theory for mainstream theories of international relations**. **The most obvious challenge that evolutionary theory presents to international relations concerns our understanding of human nature**. Theories purporting to explain human behavior make explicit or implicit assumptions about preferences and motivations, and mainstream theories in international politics are no exception. Many **criticisms of international relations theories focus on these unsubstantiated or contested assumptions about underlying human nature. The parsimony of general theories depends on how well they explain phenomena across space and time**; in other words, the more closely they coincide with empirical observations across cultures and throughout history. The most enduring theories of international relations, therefore, will be ones that are able to incorporate (or at least do not run against the grain of) evolutionary theory. Although Thomas Hobbes claimed to have deduced Leviathan scientifically from ‘‘motion’’ and the physical senses, he was writing two hundred years before Darwin and so had no understanding of evolution. International relations scholars have tended to claim to deduce their own theories from Hobbes, or subsequent philosophers who followed him, and we suggest it is time to revisit the idea of foundational scientific principles. **Starting with biology, or with human evolutionary history, has never been typical in international relations scholarship**, but this approach is now less exotic than it once seemed as innovators in a range of social sciences, including economics, psychology, sociology, and political science, pursue this line of inquiry. **International relations stands to gain from** similar **interdisciplinary insights**. At the dawn of the 21st century, an era that will be dominated by science at least as much as philosophy, **we have the opportunity to move away from untested assumptions about human nature. Instead, we can make more concrete predictions about how humans tend to think and act in different conditions, based on new scientific knowledge about human cognition** and behavior, **and in particular a greater understanding of the social and ecological context in which human brains and behaviors evolved**. But what was that context?

#### Impact calc –

#### 1] Extinction outweighs:

#### A] Structural violence- death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### B] Objectivity- body count is the most objective way to calculate impacts because comparing suffering is unethical

#### C] Mathematically outweighs.

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

### UV

#### 1] Aff gets 1AR theory since the neg can be infinitely abusive and I can’t check back. It’s drop the debater since the 1ar is too short to win both theory and substance. No RVI or 2NR paradigm issues since they’d dump on it for 6 minutes and my 3-minute 2AR is spread too thin. Competing interps since reasonability is arbitrary and bites judge intervention.

#### 2] Apocalyptic images challenge dominant power structures to create futures of social justice

Jessica Hurley 17, Assistant Professor in the Humanities at the University of Chicago, “Impossible Futures: Fictions of Risk in the Longue Durée”, Duke University Press, https://read.dukeupress.edu/american-literature/article/89/4/761/132823/Impossible-Futures-Fictions-of-Risk-in-the-Longue

If contemporary ecocriticism has a shared premise about environmental risk it is that genre is the key to both perceiving and, possibly, correcting ecological crisis. Frederick Buell’s 2003 From Apocalypse to Way of Life: Environmental Crisis in the American Century has established one of the most central oppositions of this paradigm. As his title suggests, Buell tells the story of a discourse that began in the apocalyptic mode in the 1960s and 70s, when discussions of “the immanent end of nature” most commonly took the form of “prophecy, revelation, climax, and extermination” before turning away from apocalypse when the prophesied ends failed to arrive (112, 78). Buell offers his suggestion for the appropriate literary mode for life lived within a crisis that is both unceasing and inescapable: new voices, “if wise enough….will abandon apocalypse for a sadder realism that looks closely at social and environmental changes in process and recognizes crisis as a place where people dwell” (202-3). In a world of threat, Buell demands a realism that might help us see risks more clearly and aid our survival.¶ Buell’s argument has become a broadly held view in contemporary risk theory and ecocriticism, overlapping fields in the social sciences and humanities that address the foundational question of second modernity: “how do you live when you are at such risk?” (Woodward 2009, 205).1 Such an assertion, however, assumes both that realism is a neutral descriptive practice and that apocalypse is not something that is happening now in places that we might not see, or cannot hear. This essay argues for the continuing importance of apocalyptic narrative forms in representations of environmental risk to disrupt conservative realisms that maintain the status quo. Taking the ecological disaster of nuclear waste as my case study, I examine two fictional treatments of nuclear waste dumps that create different temporal structures within which the colonial history of the United States plays out. The first, a set of Department of Energy documents that use statistical modeling and fictional description to predict a set of realistic futures for the site of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico (1991), creates a present that is fully knowable and a future that is fully predictable. Such an approach, I suggest, perpetuates the state logics of implausibility that have long undergirded settler colonialism in the United States. In contrast, Leslie Marmon Silko’s contemporaneous novel Almanac of the Dead (1991) uses its apocalyptic form to deconstruct the claims to verisimilitude that undergird state realism, transforming nuclear waste into a prophecy of the end of the United States rather than a means for imagining its continuation. In Almanac of the Dead, the presence of nuclear waste introjects a deep-time perspective into contemporary America, transforming the present into a speculative space where environmental catastrophe produces not only unevenly distributed damage but also revolutionary forms of social justice that insist on a truth that probability modeling cannot contain: that the future will be unimaginably different from the present, while the present, too, might yet be utterly different from the real that we think we know.¶ Nuclear waste is rarely treated in ecocriticism or risk theory, for several reasons: it is too manmade to be ecological; its catastrophes are ongoing, intentionally produced situations rather than sudden disasters; and it does not support the narrative that subtends ecocritical accounts of risk perception in which the nuclear threat gives rise to an awareness of other kinds of threat before reaching the end of its relevance at the end of the Cold War.2 In what follows, I argue that the failure of nuclear waste to fit into the critical frames created by ecocriticism and risk theory to date offers an opportunity to expand those frames and overcome some of their limitations, especially the impulse towards a paranoid, totalizing realism that Peter van Wyck (2005) has described as central to ecocriticism in the risk society. Nuclear waste has durational forms that dwarf the human. It therefore dwells less in the economy of risk as it is currently conceptualized and more in the blown-out realm of deep time. Inhabiting the temporal scale that has recently been christened the Anthropocene, the geological era defined by the impact of human activities on the world’s geology and climate, nuclear waste unsettles any attempt at realist description, unveiling the limits of human imagination at every turn.3 By analyzing risk society through a heuristic of nuclear waste, this essay offers a critique of nuclear colonialism and environmental racism. At the same time, it shows how the apocalyptic mode in deep time allows narratives of environmental harm and danger to move beyond the paranoid logic of risk. In the world of deep time, all that might come to pass will come to pass, sooner or later. The endless maybes of risk become certainties. The impossibilities of our own deaths and the deaths of everything else will come. But so too will other impossibilities: talking macaws and alien visitors; the end of the colonial occupation of North America, perhaps, or a sudden human determination to let the world live. The end of capitalism may yet become more thinkable than the end of the world. Just wait long enough. Stranger things will happen.¶

#### 3] Policy education is key to advocacy – that outweighs on portable skills.

Nixon 2KMakani Themba-Nixon, Executive Director of The Praxis Project. “Changing the Rules: What Public Policy Means for Organizing.” Colorlines 3.2, 2000.

Getting It in Writing Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decision maker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decision makers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, stories that are designed to affect the public conversation [and]. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision

of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

#### 4] Framing settler colonialism through a totalizing lens makes indigenous liberation impossible by setting the terms of victory as all-or-nothing—pessimism actively reifies settler dominance – this is a straight turn to fatalism.

Busbridge 18 [Research Fellow at the Centre for Dialogue, La Trobe University (Rachel, “Israel-Palestine and the Settler Colonial ‘Turn’: From Interpretation to Decolonization,” Theory, Culture & Society Vol 35, Issue 1, 2018.]

**The prescription for decolonisation**—that is, **a normative project committed to the** liberation of the colonised and the overturning of colonial relationships of power (Kohn & McBride, 2011: 3)—is indeed **one of the** most counterhegemonic implications **of the settler colonial paradigm** as applied to IsraelPalestine, **potentially shifting it from a diagnostic frame to a prognostic one which offers a ‘proposed solution to the problem, or at least a plan of attack’** (Benford & Snow, 2000: 616). **What**, however, **does the settler colonial paradigm offer by way of** envisioning decolonisation? As Veracini (2007) notes, while settler colonial studies scholars have sought to address the lack of attention paid to the experiences of Indigenous peoples in conventional historiographical accounts of decolonisation (which have mostly focused on settler independence and the loosening of ties to the ‘motherland’), **there is** nevertheless **a ‘**narrative deficit’ when it comes to imagining settler decolonisation. While Veracini (2007) relates this deficit to a matter of conceptualisation, it is apparent that the structural perspective **of the paradigm** in many ways closes down possibilitiesof imagining the type of social **and** political transformation **to which the** notion of decolonisation aspires. In this regard, there is a worrying tendency (**if not** tautological discrepancy) **in settler colonial studies, where the** only solution to settler colonialism is decolonisation**—which a faithful adherence to the paradigm** renders largely unachievable**, if not** impossible**.**

To understand why this is the case, it is necessary to return to Wolfe’s (2013a: 257) account of settler colonialism as guided by a ‘zero-sum logic whereby settler societies, for all their internal complexities, uniformly require the elimination of Native alternatives’. The **structuralism** of this account has immense power as a means of mapping forms of injustice and indignity as well as strategies of resistance and **refusal**, and Wolfe is careful to show how transmutations of the logic of elimination are complex, variable, discontinuous and uneven. **Yet, in** seeking to elucidate the logic of elimination as the overarching historical force guiding settler-native relations there is an operational weakness in the theory, whereby such a logic is simply there, omnipresent and manifest even when (and perhaps especially when) it appears not to be; the settler colonial studies scholar need only read it into a situation or context**. It** thushurtles from the past to the present into the future, never to be fully extinguished until the native is, or until history itself ends**. There is thus a** powerful ontological (if not metaphysical) dimension to Wolfe’s account, **where there is such thing as a ‘**settler will’ thatinherently desires the elimination of the native **and the distinction between the settler and native** can only ever be categorical**, founded as it is on the ‘primal binarism of the frontier’** (2013a: 258). It is here that the differences between earlier settler colonial scholarship on Israel-Palestine and the recent settler colonial turn come into clearest view. While Jamal Hilal’s (1976) Marxist account of the conflict, for instance, engaged Palestinians and Jewish Israelis in terms of their relations to the means of production, Wolfe’s account brings its own ontology: the bourgeoisie/proletariat distinction becomes that of settler/native, and the class struggle the struggle between **settler**, who **seeks to** destroy and replace the native**, and native**, who can only ever push back. Indeed, **if the settler colonial paradigm views history in** similar **teleological terms** to the Marxist framework, **it** does not offer **the same hopeful vision of** a liberated future. After all, **settler colonialism has** only one story to tell—‘either total victory or total failure’ (Veracini, 2007).

Veracini’s attempt to disaggregate different forms of settler decolonisation is revealing of the difficulties that come along with this zero-sum perspective. It is significant to note that beyond settler evacuation (which may decolonise territory, he cautions, but not necessarily relationships) the picture he paints is a relatively bleak one. For Veracini (2011: 5), claims for decolonisation from Indigenous peoples in settler societies can take two broad forms: an ‘anticolonial rhetoric expressing a demand for indigenous sovereign independence and self-determination… and an “ultra”-colonial one that seeks a reconstituted partnership with the [settler state] and advocates a return to a relatively more respectful middle ground and “treaty” conditions’. While both, he suggests, are tempting strategies in the struggle for change, though ‘ultimately ineffective against settler colonial structures of domination’ (2011: 5), it is the latter strategy that invites Veracini’s most scathing assessment. As he writes,

under settler colonial conditions the independent polity is the settler polity and sanctioning the equal rights of indigenous peoples has historically been used as a powerful weapon in the denial of indigenous entitlement and in the enactment of various forms of coercive assimilation. This decolonisation actually enhances the subjection of indigenous peoples… it is at best irrelevant and at worst detrimental to indigenous peoples in settler societies (2011: 6-7).

The ‘primal binarism of the frontier’ plays a particularly ambivalent role in Veracini’s (2011: 6) formulation, where the categorical distinction between settler and native obstructs the ‘possibility o**f a genuinely decolonised relationship’** (by virtue of its lopsidedness) **yet is** a necessary political strategy to guard against the absorption of Indigenous people into the settler fold, which would represent settler colonialism’s final victory. **The battle here is between a ‘settler colonialism [that] is designed to produce a fundamental discontinuity as its “logic of elimination” runs its course until it actually extinguishes the settler colonial relation’ and an anti-colonial struggle that ‘**must aim to keep the settler-indigenous relationship going’ (2011: 7). In other words, **the categorical distinction produced by the frontier** must be maintained in order to struggle against its effects. Given the lack of options presented to Indigenous peoples by Veracini (2014: 315), his conclusion that settler decolonisation demands a ‘radical, post-settler colonial passage’ is perhaps not surprising – although he has ‘no suggestion as to how this may be achieved and [is] pessimistic about its feasibility’.

Scholars have long reckoned with the ambivalence of the settler colonial situation, which is simultaneously colonial and postcolonial, colonising and decolonising (Curthoys, 1999: 288). **Given the generally dreadful** Fourth World **circumstances facing many Indigenous peoples** in settler societies, **it** could be argued that **there is good reason for** such pessimism. The settler colonial paradigm, in this sense, offers an important caution against celebratory narratives of progress. Wolfe (1994), it must be recalled, wrote the original articulation of his thesis precisely against the idea of ‘historical rupture’ that dominated in Australia post-Mabo, and was thus as much a scholarly intervention as it was a political challenge to the idea of Australia having broken with its colonial past. Nonetheless**, the** fatalism **of the settler colonial paradigm**—whereby decolonisation is by and large put beyond the realms of possibility—**has** seen it **come** under considerable critique for reifying settler colonialism as a **transhistorical meta-structure where colonial relations of domination are** inevitable (Macoun & Strakosch, 2013: 435; Snelgrove et al., 2014: 9). Not only does Wolfe’s **ontology** erase contingency**,** heterogeneity **and (crucially) agency** (Merlan, 1997; Rowse, 2014), **but its polarised framework** effectively ‘puts politics to death’ (Svirsky, 2014: 327). In response to such critiques, Wolfe (2013a: 213) suggests that ‘the repudiation of binarism’ may just represent a ‘settler perspective’. However, as Elizabeth Povinelli (1997: 22) has astutely shown, it is in this regard that **the** totalising logic **of** Wolfe’s **structure of invasion** rests on a disciplinary gesture where ‘any discussion which does not insist on the polarity of the [settler] colonial project’ is assimilationist, worse still, genocidal in effect if not intent. Any attempt to ‘explore the dialogical or hybrid nature of colonial subjectivity’—which would entail working beyond the bounds of absolute polarity—is disciplined as complicit in the settler colonial project itself, leaving ‘the only nonassimilationist position one that adheres strictly and solely to a critique of [settler] state discourse’. This gesture not only disallows the possibility of counter-publics and strategic alliances (even limited ones), but also comes dangerously close to ‘resistance as acquiescence’ insofar as the settler colonial studies scholar may malign the structures set in play by settler colonialism, but only from a safe distance unsullied by the messiness of ambivalences and contradictions of settler and Native subjectivities and relations. Opposition is thus left as our only option**, but**, as we know from critical anti-colonial and postcolonial scholarship, **opposition** in itself **is** not decolonisation.

#### 5] Failure to recognize the contingent nature of the world fractures solidarity by foreclosing discussion of other forms of oppression in favor of an over-determined, essentialized structuralism.

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I’d like to re-frame my critique of **the constraints** of settler colonialism with the twelve little women in mind. I am going to try to show that a certain analytic within the studies has, however unwittingly, foreclosed and even chilled understandings of **Black and Indigenous histories** and identities in ways **that** derail our understandingsof U.S. imperialism as a social formation and so our work with one another. One of the consequences of this goes to our ability to think through how #**B**lack**L**ives**M**atter, #**SayHerName**, #**NoDAPL**, and #MMIW **are** co-generative — even as I recognize the reasons why each of these movements have at different times demanded we respect their particularity. Drawing from Marxist structuralism, Patrick Wolfe defines the **settler colonial society** through two key differentiations. The first is between the structure and the event of invasion. Wolfe maintains that the permanence of invasion distinguishes the structure of a settler society, which originates with the withdrawal of the empire and the rise to power of a land-holding class who always intended to stay. Wolfe defines the ideology that cements this structure together as the logic of elimination. The settler exploits Indigenous labor but more importantly seeks to eliminate all vestiges of Indigenous land claims by the elimination of Indigenous cultures and identities. The quickest way I can explain my concerns with Wolfe’s definition is to mark how it rearticulates the problematics of structuralism. It treats society as a fixed, coherent thing that can be objectively described. The **descriptions are** simultaneously over‑determined **by the historical event** of the empire’s withdrawal and the exceptionalism of a permanent invasion. We’ve been in this trouble before – we know **structuralism generates** all kinds of ahistorical and apolitical problems**,** not to mention essentialisms, even as it is conditioned by the intersectionalities of originary events and political identities. For instance, Lorenzo Veracini argues that settler colonialism is “characterized by a settler capacity to control the population economy” as a marker of sovereignty and that this situation is “associated with a particular state of mind” and “narrative form” so powerful that “the possibility of ultimately discontinuing/decolonizing settler colonial forms remains problematic.” Veracini maintains that “settlers do not discover: they carry their sovereignty and lifestyles with them. As they move towards what amounts to a representation of the world, as they transform the land into their image, they settle another place without really moving.” I would argue that **the settler colonial is a** contested and unstable concept. Drawing from critical Indigenous, race, and feminist approaches — such as those developed by Jodi Byrd, Mishuana Goeman, Jennifer Denetdale, and Elle-Máijá Tailfeathers — that understand colonialism, racism, sexism, and homophobia as permanent features of U.S. society, I would argue that **society is** not an objectively settled structure to be described, nor an imaginary that travels as an integral whole around the world. It is **a set of** contested meaningscaught up in struggles over power and knowledge. And resistance is most certainly not futile. The second differentiation on which Wolfe’s settler colonialism rests is between the settler and the Indigenous. While many assume the settler to be white – and perhaps more so to be a white heterosexual male – Wolfe, Veracini, and others characterize the settler as both white and all other non-Indigenous people irrespective of gender and sexuality. Pressed on the politics of such characterizations, particularly of figuring Blacks as settlers, Wolfe explains: Willingly or not, enslaved or not, at the point of a run or not, they arrived as part of the settler-colonial project. That doesn’t make them settlers in the same sense as the colonizers who coerced them to participate—of course not—but it does make them perforce part of the settler-colonial process of dispossession and elimination. — Patrick Wolfe (2012) As the work of Circe Sturm, Tiya Miles, Sharon Patricia Holland, and so many others have demonstrated, **Black and Indigenous** histories and **identities** (not necessarily distinct) **are intersectional** messes of racialized and gendered contestation over and within the ongoing colonial forces of U.S. imperialism. **We need their analyses** to understand these histories and identities and the ways we have inherited them. We need to **be careful about** grouping **all** racial, ethnic, diaspora, and immigrant **communities** in **with settlers** and pitting them **and** their presumably shared struggles **for** civil **rights** against **Indigenous sovereignty** and territorial claims. The kinds of polemics that result are not helpful. What if reparations and return are not antithetical political objectives? Who decides their antithesis? Creation, Generation In 1985, during a speech at the United Nations Decade for Women Conference in Nairobi, Lilla Watson said: If you have come here to help me, you are wasting your time. But if you have come because your liberation is bound up with mine, then let us work together. Watson, a member of the Murri indigenous to Queensland, has said since and repeatedly that she was “not comfortable being credited for [saying] something that had been born of a collective process” and preferred that the words and their meaning be credited to “Aboriginal activist groups, Queensland, 1970s.” She thus held herself – and the practice of citing her – accountable to the community to whom she belonged. That ethic is further reflected in her — in her community’s — perspective that **genuine decolonization will happen as our movements address** our **shared conditions of oppression**. Our liberation is bound together. “But,” Oklahoma-based Black activist tells me, “I want Indigenous peoples to take responsibility for the way they enslaved Black bodies and internalized white racism towards Blacks in the conduct of their tribal sovereignty.” “But,” Mississippi Choctaw scholar says to me, “I want Blacks to take responsibility for the way they grabbed at Indian lands after the Civil War. For the way the U.S. illegally and violently acquired the lands from us that they promised to give to Freedmen. That Freedmen and their descendants ignore this when they call for reparations.” But… I’m still trying to figure out how in the difficult moments when the transgenerational trauma of land dispossession, slavery, and racism so profoundly precludes our perceptions and expectations of one another, **we can** find a way to **affirm one another’s concerns and** move our liberation struggles forward. A way that rejects the “respectability” of U.S. recognition and the containment politics of financial settlement. As Glen Coulthard argues, recognition is a bullshit lie of capitalism that dresses up exploitation in liberal inclusion. As Alyosha Goldstein argues, settlements “foreclose the lineages of historical injustice” and “individualize” in liberal fashion what is a matter of collective and sovereign claims to territories and economic reckoning. A way that rejects the kinds of legally and economically inconsequential responsibility-taking performance of church and government apologia. A way that refuses to be settled up or settled down to negligible levels of financial compensation that change nothing. I believe we must draw from what Leanne Simpson argues are our cultural teachings for behaving towards one another. She offers compassion, generosity, and humility as the points at which genuine restoration of ourselves and our relationships are possible. From there, as Coulthard argues, we must carve a way forward through a “disciplined maintenance of resentment,” a “politicized anger” towards state oppression that refuses to accept guilt ridden, meaningless gestures of acknowledgment and payouts for genuine reparations and land return. Conclusions As a conclusion I want to think about Black Lives Matter supporting the #NoDAPL actions at Standing Rock. I don’t think it’s an accident that it is water that has brought the movements together. As **the Black community of Flint and** the **Lakota** peoples **of Standing Rock** have **taught us, water links us together** in our struggles for life. It points our attentions to what is destroyed by military, security, and corporate concerns in Ferguson, Mexico, Palestine, and British Columbia; what highlights the illegal seizing of lands for the illegal construction of pipelines; what has been contaminated with hubris in the Delaware River basin, Flint Michigan, the Dakotas, and too many other places to name. Melissa Nelson writes that, Most of us find it easier to separate ourselves from nature than to embrace the liquid mystery of our union with it. As freshwater disappears on the earth, so do the water stories that remind us that we too can freeze, melt, conceive, and evaporate. We too can construct a confluence of cultural rivulets where the natural and cultural coalesce. — Melissa Nelsen