# **Framework**

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#### **I value morality, as the word ought in the resolution implies a moral obligation.**

#### **Thus, the value criterion must be maximizing well-being for everyone.**

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**Moen 16** [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281]

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value.

**Prefer Util:**

**1] Util is a lexical pre-requisite to any other framework: Threats to bodily security and life preclude the ability for moral actors to effectively utilize and act upon other moral theories since they are in a constant state of crisis that inhibit the ideal moral conditions which other theories presuppose – so, util comes first and my offense outweighs theirs under their own framework.**

**2] actor-specificity: side constraints freeze action because government policies always require trade-offs—the only justifiable way to resolve those conflicts is by benefiting everyone. Actor-specificity comes first because different agents have different ethical obligations.**

**3] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences explain why the second one is much worse than the first.**

**4] Reversibility- we can’t improve society if we are all dead – it can’t be reversed (sequence of timeframe and magnitude)**

**5] Extinction outweighs**

**MacAskill 14** [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the

# past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

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# **Thus, I affirm the resolution**

# **Resolved: In a democracy, a free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy.**

**To clarify, the aff defends that in the Republic of China, a free press should support objectivity over advocacy**

# **First, Some Definitions:**

## Advocacy, in the context of journalism, is defined as:

**Oxford Encyclopedia 19**, Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Communication, 6-25-2019, "Advocacy Journalism," https://oxfordre.com/communication/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228613-e-776

A contested term with defenders and critics, advocacy journalism refers to a genre of journalism that combines reporting with a point of view. With roots as far as the origins of journalism itself, as a contemporary practice it can be found—to varying degrees—in all kinds of media outlets across the globe. Its key premise is that journalists participate in the mass-mediated public sphere and that their work deliberately and transparently stands for specific perspectives, with stories actively championing for certain ideas and values. While some authors have labeled advocacy as the binary opposite of objective (factual) reporting, in recent decades several journalism scholars and practitioners have argued that this is not the case, and that advocacy and informing are not necessarily mutually exclusive. At the core of this discussion are normative considerations of how journalism should be, the role of objectivity in news reporting, and professional models shaping news cultures and news content in different regions. Ethical concerns are also common arguments in this debate.

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## Objectivity, in the context of journalism, is defined as:

**Oxford Encyclopedia 19,** Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Communication, 3-26-2019, "Objectivity and Bias in Journalism," https://oxfordre.com/communication/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228613.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228613-e-853?rskey=T791lq&amp;result=1/sjjy

Journalism objectivity or news objectivity had its origins in Western media cultures, especially in the United States, in the early 20th century. The principle, however, has found its way into codes of ethics and journalism education in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In 2018, objectivity is a controversial norm. Within the field of journalism ethics, the issue is whether objectivity as traditionally understood—a neutral reporting of “just the facts”—remains a valid ideal. In society, the debate swirls around the future of democratic public spheres and the need for reliable news sources. Misinformation and partisan voices threaten to swamp public channels of information. How can citizens distinguish truth from falsity in journalism? Objective from subjective reports? Informed analysis from biased opinion? The prehistory of objectivity is, in large part, the history of objectivity, truth, and fact in the culture. This is because journalists defined their notion of objectivity by adapting notions from philosophy, science, and the ambient culture. The central notion of news objectivity is that reporters should be neutral stenographers of fact, eliminating their opinions and interpretations from their reports. By the middle of the 1900s onward, this idea of objectivity as just the facts was subjected to a withering critique by journalists who sought a more engaged journalism and academics who rejected the idea of neutral facts. Also, the early 21st-century digital revolution created online communication that favored an interpretive journalism skeptical of neutrality and objectivity.

# **1AC Taiwan**

## Propaganda is a non-objective reporting that advocates for a certain view - prioritizing objectivity inherently decreases propaganda.

**Walton 97**, Douglas Walton, October 1997, "WHAT IS PROPAGANDA, AND WHAT EXACTLY IS WRONG WITH IT?," No Publication, https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.521.1100&amp;rep=rep1&amp;type=pdf/sjjy

As Marlin (1989, p. 47) notes, the word 'propaganda,' as used in the modern English-speaking world, still has the strong negative connotations set in place by its use, in the two world wars. Politicians and bureaucrats would definitely avoid this term to describe their own public relations and promotional activities, and would use it only to describe those of their opponents (when it is meant to be used to detract from them). Generally, to describe any discourse or message as "propaganda" is to downgrade it by suggesting that the information content of the message, or its usefulness as reliable evidence, is suspect, and not of high quality. More than that, the use of this word even suggests that the message referred to is intentionally manipulative and deceptive. For example, to describe a story in a newspaper, or a televised report, as "propaganda," would be to say that the story or report is not an objective presentation of the facts, or a balanced account of both sides of an issue, but is a biased argument with a "spin" where some "cause" or particular viewpoint or interest is being advocated. Generally, to say something is propaganda is to say that it is the output of some interest group or organization that is pushing a particular viewpoint in a way designed to promote it to a mass audience

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## The PRC uses the media to spread propaganda in Taiwan

**Zhang 19** Linda Zhang, 1-2-2019, "How to Counter China’s Disinformation Campaign in Taiwan," https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/September-October-2020/Zhang-Disinformation-Campaign/sjjy

Early PRC cross-strait propaganda methods included using megaphones to broadcast announcements and playing music to encourage defections in the 1950s.6 Technology and tactics have advanced significantly since then, and the PRC started what it calls “information warfare” (信息化战争) against Taiwan in the early 2000s. The PRC encouraged sympathetic Taiwanese businessmen to purchase media outlets, bought advertising in Taiwan’s media to influence public opinion, and pressured media proprietors who had investments in China to stop publishing criticism of the PRC.7

Due to its financial resources, the PRC has made significant progress in infiltrating Taiwanese television and print media, even though Chinese entities cannot directly own Taiwanese media companies without government approval.8 In 2008, pro-Beijing businessman Tsai Eng-meng, the owner of snack food company Want Want, purchased China Times Group, a media company that owns one newspaper and two TV channels.9 Since the purchase, reporting from *The China Times* took on a tone less critical of China and decreased its coverage of human rights issues in China.10 Want Want’s China subsidiaries received NT$2.9 billion (US$96 million) in subsidies from the PRC government between January 2017 and March 2018, indicating the PRC’s leverage against businessmen like Tsai.11 In the social media realm, the PRC has made even more direct “investments” by buying the social media accounts of Taiwanese politicians and social media influencers.12 Fan pages with large amounts of followers suddenly switched over to using simplified Chinese and began helping PRC disinformation go viral (the Taiwanese use traditional Chinese characters). Influencer accounts on Professional Technology Temple (PTT), a local online bulletin board, sold for as much as US$6,500 prior to the 2018 elections.13

## China uses the media to destroy Taiwanese democracy and stability

**Michael 17**, J. Michael 17, 7-30-2017, "Will China's Disinformation War Destabilize Taiwan?," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/will-chinas-disinformation-war-destabilize-taiwan-21708/sjjy

Thus, while the shadow of China’s growing military is—and will remain—a matter of concern for Taiwan, it should not be treated as the foremost threat facing the island nation. In fact, focusing too much on the military threat risks distracting us from other, more pressing developments. Saber-rattling by the PLA is background noise. It is continuous and part of China's larger, non-kinetic strategy underpinning efforts to annex Taiwan without use of force.

The more immediate threat instead lies in the intensification of political-warfare efforts against Taiwan, from ramped up efforts by China’s United Front apparatus to recruit and co-opt academics, journalists and local officials in Taiwan and abroad to a major campaign of (dis)information saturation to distract from the real issues and create a sense of permanent crisis in Taiwan. The campaign is aimed at undermining democratic processes, eroding public support for the Tsai Ing-wen administration, and overwhelming the Taiwanese government by sapping its finite resources.

# **Impact I - Global Democracy**

## Taiwanese democracy is key to global democracy

**Ing-Wen 21**,Tsai Ing-Wen, December 2021, "Taiwan and the Fight for Democracy," Foreign Affairs, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/taiwan/2021-10-05/taiwan-and-fight-democracy?check\_logged\_in=1&amp;utm\_medium=promo\_email&amp;utm\_source=lo\_flows&amp;utm\_campaign=registered\_user\_welcome&amp;utm\_term=email\_1&amp;utm\_content=20220309/yates

Emerging from [the COVID-19 pandemic](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2021-03-08/pandemic-wont-end), authoritarian regimes are more convinced than ever that their model of governance is better adapted than democracy to the requirements of the twenty-first century. This has fueled a contest of ideologies, and Taiwan lies at the intersection of contending systems. Vibrantly democratic and Western, yet influenced by a Chinese civilization and shaped by Asian traditions, Taiwan, by virtue of both its very existence and its continued prosperity, represents at once an affront to the narrative and an impediment to the regional ambitions of the Chinese Communist Party.

Taiwan’s refusal to give up, its persistent embrace of democracy, and its commitment to act as a responsible stakeholder (even when its exclusion from international institutions has made that difficult) are now spurring the rest of the world to reassess its value as a liberal democracy on the frontlines of a new clash of ideologies. As countries increasingly recognize the threat that the Chinese Communist Party poses, they should understand the value of working with Taiwan. And they should remember that if Taiwan were to fall, the consequences would be catastrophic for regional peace and the democratic alliance system. It would signal that in today’s global contest of values, authoritarianism has the upper hand over democracy.

### INDO-PACIFIC FUTURES

The course of the Indo-Pacific, [the world’s fastest-growing region](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-03-12/americas-indo-pacific-folly), will in many ways shape the course of the twenty-first century. Its emergence offers myriad opportunities (in everything from trade and manufacturing to research and education) but also brings new tensions and systemic contradictions that, if not handled wisely, could have devastating effects on international security and the global economy. Chief among the drivers of these tensions is the rise of more assertive and self-assured authoritarianism, which is challenging the liberal democratic order that has defined international relations since the end of World War II.

Beijing has never abandoned its ambitions toward Taiwan. But after years of double-digit investment in the Chinese military, and expansionist behavior across the Taiwan Strait and in surrounding maritime areas, Beijing is replacing its commitment to a peaceful resolution with an increasingly aggressive posture. Since 2020, People’s Liberation Army aircraft and vessels have markedly increased their activity in the Taiwan Strait, with almost daily intrusions into Taiwan’s southern air defense identification zone, as well as occasional crossings of the tacit median line between the island and the Chinese mainland (which runs along the middle of the strait, from the northeast near Japan’s outlying islands to the southwest near Hong Kong).

Taiwan is on the frontlines of the global contest between liberal democracy and authoritarianism.

Despite these worrying developments, the people of Taiwan have made clear to the entire world that democracy is nonnegotiable. Amid almost daily intrusions by the People’s Liberation Army, our position on cross-strait relations remains constant: Taiwan will not bend to pressure, but nor will it turn adventurist, even when it accumulates support from the international community. In other words, the maintenance of regional security will remain a significant part of Taiwan’s overall government policy. Yet we will also continue to express our openness to dialogue with Beijing, as the current administration has repeatedly done since 2016, as long as this dialogue proceeds in a spirit of equality and without political preconditions. And we are investing significant resources to deepen our understanding of the administration in Beijing—which will reduce the risks of misinterpretation and misjudgment and facilitate more precise decision-making on our cross-strait policies. We look to maintain a clear-eyed understanding of the external environment, both threats and opportunities, in order to ensure that Taiwan is prepared to meet its challenges.

At the same time, Taiwan is fully committed to working with other regional actors to ensure stability. In March, for example, Taiwan and the United States signed a memorandum of understanding on the establishment of a coast guard working group. This working group will improve communication and information sharing between the U.S. and Taiwanese coast guards, while also facilitating greater collaboration on shared objectives, such as preserving maritime resources and reducing illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. Such an understanding should serve as a springboard for greater collaboration on nonmilitary matters with other partners in the Indo-Pacific.

Taiwan has also launched a series of initiatives to modernize and reorganize its military, in order to be better prepared for both present and future challenges. In addition to investments in traditional platforms such as combat aircraft, Taiwan has made hefty investments in asymmetric capabilities, including mobile land-based antiship cruise missiles. We will launch the All-Out Defense Mobilization Agency in 2022, a military reform intended to ensure that a well-trained and well-equipped military reserve force stands as a more reliable backup for the regular military forces. Such initiatives are meant to maximize Taiwan’s self-reliance and preparedness and to signal that we are willing to bear our share of the burden and don’t take our security partners’ support for granted.

## Independently Global Democracy solves a laundry list of impacts---economic growth, public goods, alliances, and war

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However, reducing the United States’ emphasis on a values-driven foreign policy is wrong, and contrary to the strategic interests of the United States. **Democracy promotion** in particular serves a **key role in safeguarding U.S. interests** and promoting global, long-term growth in ways fundamentally compatible with U.S. strategic interests. After all, **democracies protect private property** in important ways, **invest in public goods**, are more politically stable, make for **more dependable allies**, and empirically **do not go to war with one another**. Ultimately, a world full of democratic governments is safer, more prosperous, and more stable — all states of being that the United States has an interest in promoting. Democracy guarantees that the public has a stake in its own institutions and government, which leads to **investor confidence and growth**. Since elected politicians are accountable to property owners and are held in check by an independent judiciary, democracies tend to have better mechanisms for **protecting private property** than their autocratic counterparts. This makes democracies a **particularly attractive type of country for investors** — both public and private — because checks and balances make it difficult for the state to nationalize industries. Further, private property rights protected by the legal system **encourage entrepreneurship and small business development**, both of which are **key to a growing and modernizing economy**. As a result, democracies tend to be wealthier and more economically stable than their autocratic counterparts. This is fundamentally in the interest of the United States in that both private and public investors have an interest in seeing returns on their investments, thereby potentially making **countries less willing to go to war if that would require severing economic ties**. Democratic institutions ensure that citizens with both economic and political power are heard. Democracies also **invest in public goods at much higher rates than autocratic governments**. Because politicians must cater to the median voter, they **approve policies that invest in public education and healthcare**, both of which promote long-term growth and development. Public education invests in a country’s human capital, setting the stage for long-term innovation, adaptability, and advancement. Public healthcare, meanwhile, has been shown to **increase overall societal productivity** and well-being as people take fewer sick days, citizens are able to afford their healthcare without going bankrupt, and ultimately, the overall **costs of healthcare are driven down** as citizens become healthier. Productive, innovative societies are also better for the United States — innovation around the world improves global quality of life, results in more educational and vocational opportunities for Americans (both because other universities and jobs become more attractive to Americans who want to go abroad and because potential immigrants are more likely to want to stay in their own country, opening up opportunities for U.S. citizens at home), and may reduce friction between countries over resources and labor. Democracies are also generally more politically stable because regular election cycles ensure an established process for the habitual and peaceful removal of leaders

from power. Elections ensure the non-violent transition of power and reduce the need for mass protest, rioting, and revolution — which **makes countries more politically stable**. Further, when citizens are granted rights and protections from government abuse, enforced by an independent judiciary, they have fewer grievances against the government and are thus less able to mobilize large numbers of people to violently overthrow the regime. Revolution, while not always violent, often leads to political instability, challenges to growth, **increased incentives for diversionary war and conflict**, and oftentimes civil war. The externalities of civil war and international conflict then put pressure on the United States to intervene, protect human rights, and otherwise expend resources on other countries’ issues. Further, civil wars are highly destructive to institutions, human capital, and resources, and can have significant security spillover effects, increasing global risk of political instability and **violent extremism**. This political stability, in addition to institutional checks and balances, makes **democracies better international partners and allies in the long-term**. Treaties ratified by multiple branches of government are more durable than executive agreements signed by a single leader who may be replaced within a short period of time. While democracies may be more reluctant to commit to alliances and formal security pacts, once a party to them, they are more dependable than other states with concentrated power at the executive level. **These kind of durable commitments are of interest to the United States as it seeks to preserve the liberal world order**; it is far more effective to ally with partners whose institutions make withdrawal from the alliance costly. Finally, it has been empirically observed that **democracies do not go to war with one another**. While there is a robust debate around the exact nature of the so-called “democratic peace,” it appears that there are qualities particular to democracies that make war between them particularly unlikely: a **dovish public constrains leaders’ ability to wage war**, competitive elections and a free press make it **easier to credibly communicate resolve to potential adversaries**, consolidated democracies tend to be **more wealthy and economically interdependent**, like-minded people are more hesitant to wage war against one another, and so on. Regardless of the precise mechanisms, however, a world of democracies is inherently safer, more prosperous, and less likely to initiate a war against the United States — a key factor in protecting American security and interests.

# **Impact II - China War**

## The destruction of Taiwanese democracy would lead to a military response against China

**Reuters 21**, 10-4-2021, "Taiwan president warns of 'catastrophic' consequences if it falls to China," https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/taiwan-president-warns-catastrophic-consequences-if-it-falls-china-2021-10-05/sjjy

Taiwan does not seek military confrontation, and wants peaceful, stable, predictable and mutually beneficial coexistence with its neighbours, she wrote.

"But if its democracy and way of life are threatened, Taiwan will do whatever it takes to defend itself," Tsai said, adding Taiwanese people would "rise up" should Taiwan's existence be threatened having made clear that democracy is non-negotiable.

She reiterated a call for talks with China, as long as it happens in a spirit of equality and without political preconditions, something Beijing has repeatedly rejected.

"Amid almost daily intrusions by the People's Liberation Army, our position on cross-strait relations remains constant: Taiwan will not bend to pressure, but nor will it turn adventurist, even when it accumulates support from the international community."

## Taiwan military defense goes Nuclear.

**Talmadge 18** [Caitlin, Associate Professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, “Beijing’s Nuclear Option: Why a U.S.-China War Could Spiral Out of Control,” accessible online at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-10-15/beijings-nuclear-option, published Nov/Dec 2018]//re-cut by Elmer

As China’s power has grown in recent years, so, too, has the risk of war with the United States. Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its political and economic pressure on Taiwan and built military installations on coral reefs in the South China Sea, fueling Washington’s fears that Chinese expansionism will threaten U.S. allies and influence in the region. U.S. destroyers have transited the Taiwan Strait, to loud protests from Beijing. American policymakers have wondered aloud whether they should send an aircraft carrier through the strait as well. Chinese fighter jets have intercepted U.S. aircraft in the skies above the South China Sea. Meanwhile, U.S. President Donald Trump has brought long-simmering economic disputes to a rolling boil. A war between the two countries remains unlikely, but the prospect of a military confrontation—resulting, for example, from a Chinese campaign against Taiwan—no longer seems as implausible as it once did. And the odds of such a confrontation going nuclear are higher than most policymakers and analysts think. Members of China’s strategic community tend to dismiss such concerns. Likewise, U.S. studies of a potential war with China often exclude nuclear weapons from the analysis entirely, treating them as basically irrelevant to the course of a conflict. Asked about the issue in 2015, Dennis Blair, the former commander of U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific, estimated the likelihood of a U.S.-Chinese nuclear crisis as “somewhere between nil and zero.” This assurance is misguided. If deployed against China, the Pentagon’s preferred style of conventional warfare would be a potential recipe for nuclear escalation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States’ signature approach to war has been simple: punch deep into enemy territory in order to rapidly knock out the opponent’s key military assets at minimal cost. But the Pentagon developed this formula in wars against Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia, none of which was a nuclear power. China, by contrast, not only has nuclear weapons; it has also intermingled them with its conventional military forces, making it difficult to attack

one without attacking the other. This means that a major U.S. military campaign targeting China’s conventional forces would likely also threaten its nuclear arsenal. Faced with such a threat, Chinese leaders could decide to use their nuclear weapons while they were still able to. As U.S. and Chinese leaders navigate a relationship fraught with mutual suspicion, they must come to grips with the fact that a conventional war could skid into a nuclear confrontation. Although this risk is not high in absolute terms, its consequences for the region and the world would be devastating. As long as the United States and China continue to pursue their current grand strategies, the risk is likely to endure. This means that leaders on both sides should dispense with the illusion that they can easily fight a limited war. They should focus instead on managing or resolving the political, economic, and military tensions that might lead to a conflict in the first place. A NEW KIND OF THREAT There are some reasons for optimism. For one, China has long stood out for its nonaggressive nuclear doctrine. After its first nuclear test, in 1964, China largely avoided the Cold War arms race, building a much smaller and simpler nuclear arsenal than its resources would have allowed. Chinese leaders have consistently characterized nuclear weapons as useful only for deterring nuclear aggression and coercion. Historically, this narrow purpose required only a handful of nuclear weapons that could ensure Chinese retaliation in the event of an attack. To this day, China maintains a “no first use” pledge, promising that it will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The prospect of a nuclear conflict can also seem like a relic of the Cold War. Back then, the United States and its allies lived in fear of a Warsaw Pact offensive rapidly overrunning Europe. NATO stood ready to use nuclear weapons first to stalemate such an attack. Both Washington and Moscow also consistently worried that their nuclear forces could be taken out in a bolt-from-the-blue nuclear strike by the other side. This mutual fear increased the risk that one superpower might rush to launch in the erroneous belief that it was already under attack. Initially, the danger of unauthorized strikes also loomed large. In the 1950s, lax safety procedures for U.S. nuclear weapons stationed on NATO soil, as well as minimal civilian oversight of U.S. military commanders, raised a serious risk that nuclear escalation could have occurred without explicit orders from the U.S. president. The good news is that these Cold War worries have little bearing on U.S.-Chinese relations today. Neither country could rapidly overrun the other’s territory in a conventional war. Neither seems worried about a nuclear bolt from the blue. And civilian political control of nuclear weapons is relatively strong in both countries. What remains, in theory, is the comforting logic of mutual deterrence: in a war between two nuclear powers, neither side will launch a nuclear strike for fear that its enemy will respond in kind. The bad news is that one other trigger remains: a conventional war that threatens China’s nuclear arsenal. Conventional forces can threaten nuclear forces in ways that generate pressures to escalate—especially when ever more capable U.S. conventional forces face adversaries with relatively small and fragile nuclear arsenals, such as China. If U.S. operations endangered or damaged China’s nuclear forces, Chinese leaders might come to think that Washington had aims beyond winning the conventional war—that it might be seeking to disable or destroy China’s nuclear arsenal outright, perhaps as a prelude to regime change. In the fog of war, Beijing might reluctantly conclude that limited nuclear escalation—an initial strike small enough that it could avoid full-scale U.S. retaliation—was a viable option to defend itself. STRAIT SHOOTERS The most worrisome flash point for a U.S.-Chinese war is Taiwan.

## Nuke war causes extinction AND outweighs other existential risks

**PND 16**. internally citing Zbigniew Brzezinski, Council of Foreign Relations and former national security adviser to President Carter, Toon and Robock’s 2012 study on nuclear winter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Gareth Evans’ International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament Report, Congressional EMP studies, studies on nuclear winter by Seth Baum of the Global Catastrophic Risk Institute and Martin Hellman of Stanford University, and U.S. and Russian former Defense Secretaries and former heads of nuclear missile forces, brief submitted to the United Nations General Assembly, Open-Ended Working Group on nuclear risks. A/AC.286/NGO/13. 05-03-2016. http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/OEWG/2016/Documents/NGO13.pdf //Re-cut by Elmer

Consequences human survival 12. Even if the 'other' side does NOT launch in response the smoke from 'their' burning cities (incinerated by 'us') will still make 'our' country (and the rest

of the world) uninhabitable, potentially inducing global famine lasting up to decades. Toon and Robock note in ‘Self Assured Destruction’, in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists 68/5, 2012, that: 13. “A nuclear war between Russia and the United States, even after the arsenal reductions planned under New START, could produce a nuclear winter. Hence, an attack by either side could be suicidal, resulting in self assured destruction. Even a 'small' nuclear war between India and Pakistan, with each country detonating 50 Hiroshima-size atom bombs--only about 0.03 percent of the global nuclear arsenal's explosive power--as air bursts in urban areas, could produce so much smoke that temperatures would fall below those of the Little Ice Age of the fourteenth to nineteenth centuries, shortening the growing season around the world and threatening the global food supply. Furthermore, there would be massive ozone depletion, allowing more ultraviolet radiation to reach Earth's surface. Recent studies predict that agricultural production in parts of the United States and China would decline by about 20 percent for four years, and by 10 percent for a decade.” 14. A conflagration involving USA/NATO forces and those of Russian federation would most likely cause the deaths of most/nearly all/all humans (and severely impact/extinguish other species) as well as destroying the delicate interwoven techno-structure on which latter-day 'civilization' has come to depend. Temperatures would drop to below those of the last ice-age for up to 30 years as a result of the lofting of up to 180 million tonnes of very black soot into the stratosphere where it would remain for decades. 15. Though human ingenuity and resilience shouldn't be underestimated, human survival itself is arguably problematic, to put it mildly, under a 2000+ warhead USA/Russian federation scenario. 16. The Joint Statement on Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences signed October 2013 by 146 governments mentioned 'Human Survival' no less than 5 times. The most recent (December 2014) one gives it a highly prominent place. Gareth Evans’ ICNND (International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament) Report made it clear that it saw the threat posed by nuclear weapons use as one that at least threatens what we now call 'civilization' and that potentially threatens human survival with an immediacy that even climate change does not, though we can see the results of climate change here and now and of course the immediate post-nuclear results for Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well.

# EXTRA CARDS

## China uses fake news to destroy Taiwan’s democratic processes

**Maizland 19**,Lindsay Maizland 19, 11-7-2019, "How China Is Interfering in Taiwan’s Election," Council on Foreign Relations, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-china-interfering-taiwans-elections/sjjy

With Taiwan’s presidential election approaching, China’s aggressive disinformation campaign appears to be in full force. Its strategy seems designed to sow confusion on the island and tilt the race against incumbent Tsai Ing-wen and in favor of Beijing’s apparently preferred candidate.

#### How is China spreading disinformation?

China has a long history of [meddling in Taiwan](https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-taiwan-relations). It allegedly used disinformation in Taiwan’s local elections in 2018 and continues to deluge the island with disinformation. A report by V-Dem, a program at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden that assesses democracies, found that Taiwan is [subjected to more disinformation](https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/99/de/99dedd73-f8bc-484c-8b91-44ba601b6e6b/v-dem_democracy_report_2019.pdf) [PDF] from Beijing and other governments than any other place in the world. These campaigns use fake news stories, bots and falsified social media accounts, and propaganda, among other tactics, to [manipulate and deceive](https://www.aclweb.org/anthology/D11-1147/) recipients.

China’s approach mixes several strategies:

* Hackers and bots [spread disinformation](https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/democratic-taiwan-battling-disinformation-11062018111310.html) through social media platforms such as Facebook, microblogging services such as Weibo, and popular chat apps such as Line. For instance, Chinese media outlets [disseminated a false story](https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/22/world/asia/taiwan-elections-meddling.html) in 2018 claiming that Su Chii-cherng, a Taiwanese diplomat in Japan, failed to help Taiwanese people trapped during a typhoon. The stories were widely shared in Taiwan, and Su later took his own life, noting in a letter that he had been troubled by the viral posts.
* Beijing is increasing its control over Taiwanese media as pro-China tycoons buy media outlets there. Earlier this year, Taiwan’s National Security Bureau divulged that several Taiwanese media outlets [collaborate with](https://china-journal.org/2019/05/06/taiwanese-government-says-some-local-media-work-with-china-send-content-to-beijing-for-approval/) the Chinese Communist Party. Some of these outlets, including the powerful Want Want China Times Media Group, also [coordinate with](https://www.ft.com/content/036b609a-a768-11e9-984c-fac8325aaa04) the Chinese government’s Taiwan Affairs Office, the *Financial Times* reported. Other Taiwanese websites appear to publish Chinese propaganda.
* Additionally, China reportedly launches [tens of millions of cyberattacks](https://www.ft.com/content/8e5b26c0-75c5-11e8-a8c4-408cfba4327c) per month in Taiwan.

#### What are Beijing’s goals?

Taiwanese citizens will vote on January 11 for either President Tsai of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) or Han Kuo-yu of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT). There is no doubt that China prefers the opposition, as it appears to be spreading disinformation in Han’s favor.

The KMT historically has been willing to accept that Taiwan and China are [part of the same country](https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/04/taiwanese-populist-han-kuo-yu-china/587146/). Han, the mayor of Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s second-most-populous city, has supported stronger cross-strait relations and has held meetings in China with Communist Party officials in recent months.

Meanwhile, the DPP has been known for having the toughest China policy of any Taiwanese party. Tsai has pushed Taiwan to become [less financially dependent](https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/assessing-taiwans-new-southbound-policy/) on China, and in an October speech, she called on Taiwanese to “[defend ourselves](https://www.ft.com/content/e69e642a-eb15-11e9-85f4-d00e5018f061),” labeling China a threat to regional security.

More generally, Beijing uses disinformation to undermine the island, including by weakening Taiwan’s institutions, chipping away at public trust in its leaders, demoralizing its citizens, and causing confusion.