# UH R3 – 1NC v Coppell RM

## 1

#### Interp: The affirmative debater must defend the hypothetical world in which appropriation of space is banned. Defending implementation is a logical extension of the rez because if space appropriation is unjust it means we ought to enact its removal.

#### “Resolved” means enactment of a law.

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition (Multi-volume set of judicial definitions). “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word **“resolve,”** given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It **is** of **similar** force **to the word “enact,”** which is defined by Bouvier as **meaning “to establish by law”.**

#### Violation: aff says they won’t defend implementation.

#### Standards:

#### [1] Ground – I lose access to all policy based disadvantages because you refuse to defend implementation. I can’t go for the Mining DA, the PLA DA, almost every cp, solvency turns, etc. In order to answer the 1NC, you’ll just delink my offense in the 1AR by claiming implementation is irrelevant. Few impacts:

#### A. Link turns critical ed good – you stop a key part of critical discussion because we don’t get to read policy vs critical theory discussions.

#### B. Kills key neg ground because certain principles like adhering to free speech are good in the abstract; it only makes sense taking everything into context. Ground is key to fairness since equal access to arguments controls equal access to the ballot.

#### C. Pigeonholes the negative out of util – Aff shouldn’t be able to make the debate just about cap because they’re most comfortable on that layer.

#### D. Kills policy ed – In your world the we can never have any discussion of policies. Policy education is an independent voter since it is a skill that we can apply to the real world outweighs critical education on reversibility. Also outweighs on size of link—we still can have cap debates in my interp.

#### [2] TVA – just defend implementation. You can still read cap in my world that claims implementation is irrelevant, just allow the neg to read a framework that claims implementation is relevant and garner offense on arguments that depend on it.

**Fairness is a voter—debate is a competitive activity that is governed by wins and losses so the judge cannot evaluate who did the better debating if there’s a skew in their evaluation.**

**Drop the debater—the abuse has already occurred and my time allocation has shifted—also the shell indicts your whole aff—justifies severance which skews my strat.**

**Use competing interps—leads to a race to the top since we figure out the best possible norm and avoids judge intervention since there’s a clear brightline.**

**No RVIs—**

**a. Baiting—they’ll just bait theory and prep it out—justifies infinite abuse and results in a chilling effect**

**b. Illogical—you don’t reward them for meeting the burden of being fair**

## 2

#### Interp: The affirmative must define “outer space” in a delimited text in the 1AC.

#### “Outer Space” is flexible and has too many interps – normal means shows no consensus

Leepuengtham 17 [Tosaporn Leepuengtham (Research Judge, Intellectual Property and International Trade Division, Supreme Court of Thailand). "International space law and its implications for outer space activities." 01-27-2017, Accessed 12-9-2021. https://www.elgaronline.com/view/9781785369612/06\_chapter1.xhtml // duongie

Those states which favor the precise demarcation of outer space support the spatial approach, whereas those who oppose to such demarcation prefer the functional approach, as the latter allows more flexibility in terms of the development of space technology.34 This lack of a definition and delimitation of outer space is problematic, since certain particular areas are neither explicitly defined as ‘air space’ or ‘outer space’. For example, it is vague whether an area located between 80 km and 120 km above sea level would be classified as either air space or outer space in the absence of demarcation, since 80 km is the maximum attitude for convention aircraft, and 120 km is the lowest attitude in which space activities could be carried out.35 Satellites which are stationed in a geostationary orbit are a good example of this ambiguity. Owing to this lack of any internationally recognized delimitation, equatorial states claim sovereignty over that part of the geostationary orbit which is located over their respective territories;36 whereas technologically developed countries believe that the geostationary orbit is an integral part of outer space.37 This uncertain status of areas leads to legal jurisdictional problems. According to international law, a state has sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.38 However, national sovereignty does not extend into outer space.39 Thus, it is necessary to determine where a state’s airspace ends to ensure that the appropriate legal regime is applied. One possible scenario which might occur and which is relevant to the subject of this book is the creation or infringement of an intellectual work is in just such an ambiguous location. This would cast doubt on the ‘legal’ location of creation or infringement, and the question of which applicable legal regime arises. Should we apply the law of the underlying state or is there no law to apply? For example, would satellite signals transmitted from a satellite stationed in a geostationary orbit located over equatorial countries be considered as works created or, if intercepted, be infringed, in outer space or in the sovereign air space of those respective countries? These hypothetical examples highlight why a boundary is necessary if unpredictability arising from different legal application is to be avoided. While it might be argued that this issue is being overemphasized at this stage, given increasing use of space technology, this problem is worth considering now rather than later.

#### Violation – you don’t.

#### Prefer –

#### 1] Stable Advocacy – they can redefine in the 1AR to wriggle out of DA’s which kills high-quality engagement and becomes two ships passing in the night –We lose access to Tech Race DA’s, Asteroid DA’s, basic case turns, and core process counter plans that have different definitions and 1NC pre-round prep.

#### 2] Real World – Policy makers will always define the entity that they are recognizing. It also means zero solvency, absent spec, private entities can circumvent since there is no delineated way to enforce the aff and means their solvency can’t actualize.

#### 3] CX doesn’t check – a] Judges don’t listen to cx, b] text is more verifiable, c] debaters are trained to be shifty, d] doesn’t solve for pre-round prep

#### Spec is a voting issue that should be evaluated through competing interpretations a] it tells the negative what they do and do not have to prepare for b] reasonability is arbitrary and incentivizes judge intervention

## 3

#### Behold the image of the disgusting disabled child, which causes one to wince in the face of egoistic empathy. This is self-reflection, a process constitutive of the psyche that results in the disability drive, the culmination of primary pity where the non-disabled subject embodies itself in the position of the disabled object, and secondary pity, which portrays the ego’s overcompensation to regain its position and pushes a desire from lack for the eradication of disability.

**Mollow 15** Anna (2015): The Disability Drive, A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 <https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Mollow_berkeley_0028E_15181.pdf> SJCP//JG

A Tale of Two Pities “Piss on pity,” declares a well-known disability activist bumper sticker. A more polite companion to this tag, the slogan “No pity” is a rallying cry of the disability rights movement.119 For disability studies, a field that since its inception has vigorously resisted the imposition of pity upon disabled people, Tiny Tim is anathema. Understandably so: every year, the image of Tiny Tim is used to drum up pity for disabled people; the widespread circulation of this affect, disability scholars have compellingly argued, does not alleviate the social barriers that we face but instead reinforces our oppression. Indispensable as this disability studies analysis is, it leaves some important questions about pity unanswered. For example: if, as is commonly said, “No one wants to be pitied,” then why is this so? And also, if nobody wants to be pitied, who, if anyone, wants to feel pity? At first glance, the answer to the latter question might seem to be “everyone.” Certainly, multitudes of moviegoers appear to enjoy our culture’s annual recitations of Tiny Tim’s pity inducing tale. If it can be fun to perform pity, perhaps this is because pity gives a boost to the ego of the pitying person. “You are broken, and I am whole,” the pitier says to the one who is pitied. “I look down on you because you suffer.” Naturally, disabled people resist performing this service for the nondisabled. “Spare us your pity,” we say, because pity is felt to be demeaning. 73 Yet an incoherence structures this familiar account of pity: if pity fortifies the ego of the subject who feels it, then why do people so often resist feeling pity? Some folks get pissed when they are prodded to pity. “Your appeals to pity won’t work,” they say. “I have no pity for you.” This is the attitude that Scrooge takes toward Tiny Tim. It’s also the stance that Edelman invites queers to take in relation to the Child—and not only to the Child per se, but also to anyone who calls for a performance of pity. Edelman argues that compassion (which, of course, is a close relative of pity) is fundamentally narcissistic (73). When we call ourselves compassionate, we think we’re feeling for the other; but, Edelman contends, we’re really only feeling for ourselves (83). That is, compassion involves projecting one’s own ego onto the object of one’s compassion. In this schema, the pitied person is used as a vehicle for the pitier to feel sorry for his or her own self. But in calling compassion a cover for narcissism, Edelman may inadvertently point to a connection between compassion and the drive. Freud’s theorization of narcissism, which is a precursor to his idea of the death drive, suggests that although some forms of narcissism can bolster the ego, other forms can do just the opposite. “On Narcissism” posits a distinction between what Freud calls “primary” and “secondary” narcissism; this distinction provides the basis for a contrast that I wish to draw between what could be called primary and secondary pity. To elucidate these two pities, let us look at the tale that Freud tells about two narcissisms. The story begins, as many Freudian narratives do, with the image of a child at its mother’s breast. Freud gives the name “primary narcissism” to the perfect autoerotic pleasure in which the child luxuriates. This pleasure takes place in the absence of a stable self, as the child does not yet conceive of itself as a distinct entity, undifferentiated from its external environment (87-88). It’s the best of times, but it can’t last: the child’s primary narcissism, Freud recounts, is exposed to numerous “disturbances,” ranging from the castration complex (in which boys fear losing the penis and girls, Freud assumes, wish that they had one) to parental discipline and criticism.120 But still, we keep seeking that lost, best time: because humans are “incapable of giving up a satisfaction” that we have “once enjoyed,” we continually try to return to the primary narcissism of childhood. We do this by engaging in secondary narcissism. All the familiar attitudes and behaviors that one tends to think of when one disparages someone as “narcissistic” fall into the category of what Freud defined as secondary narcissism: the puffed up ego, the feeling of superiority over others. But even secondary narcissism, with its many patent problems, does not only aim to aggrandize the ego. The impetus of secondary narcissism, after all, is to return to a state in which the ego as such does not exist. The child’s autoerotic enjoyment at its mother’s breast is pleasurable in part because the child is not yet a subject. As with the death drive’s impulsion to return to “an earlier state of things,” secondary narcissism draws the subject back toward a prior time when the ego did not exist (Beyond 45). Yet if primary narcissism is looked back upon as the best of times, it must, from the vantage point of a fully constituted ego, appear as the worst of times, too. To be drawn back to primary narcissism would be to imagine the abolition of one’s self. For this reason, even though secondary narcissism may threaten to break down the ego, it also entails a defense against the threat/pleasure of that breaking down. Much as the differentiation between the inseparable processes of primary and secondary narcissism rests on a distinction between building up and breaking down the ego, a similar heuristic distinction gives structure to my concepts of primary and secondary pity. To be clear, pity and narcissism are not the same thing: if narcissism can be understood as love of the self, pity involves a complex affective reaction to the suffering of someone else. Primary pity entails a response to the image of another person succumbing to what I have termed the “tragedy of disability.”121 Primary pity arises when one witnesses a fall of the self, a collapse of the ego; such falling is at once painful and pleasurable to observe. In other words, primary pity could be described as a vicarious experience of the tragedy of disability. A great deal of the pain and pleasure of primary pity center on questions about what, or who, this fallen self is. When most people think about pity, we refer to an affect in which, to adopt Edelman’s phrase, we purport to “feel for the other.” But as with primary narcissism, in which the self has not yet been constituted, and therefore cannot be said to enter into intersubjective relations with an “other,” primary pity entails a mixing up of self and other such that the ego, in becoming permeable to pain that may properly belong to “someone else,” is profoundly threatened in its integrity. Primary pity is that intense pain-pleasure complex that is provoked by the image of a suffering other who, it seems momentarily, both is and is not one’s self. This affective response can feel unbearable, as seen in Siebers’s formulation: one “cannot bear to look…but also cannot bear not to look.” Primary pity is difficult to bear because it involves a drive toward disability (one cannot bear not to look), which menaces the ego’s investments in health, pleasure, and control—because to contemplate another person’s suffering is to confront the question, “Could this happen to me?” Such a prospect, although frightening, may also be compelling; in this way, primary pity replicates the self-rupturing aspects of sexuality. Indeed, the unbearability of primary pity reflects its coextensiveness with sexuality. Sex, or the Unbearable, a book coauthored by Edelman and by Lauren Berlant, argues that sex “unleashes unbearable contradictions that we nonetheless struggle to bear” (back cover). This claim accords with Freud’s account of sexuality as a “pleasurable” “unpleasure” that the ego can never fully master or control (Three 49,75). As Leo Bersani puts it in his reading of Freud, “the pleasurable unpleasurable tension of sexual enjoyment occurs when the body’s „normal‟ range of sensation is exceeded, and when the organization of the self is momentarily disturbed”; thus, “sexuality would be that which is intolerable to the structured self” (Freudian 38). Primary pity is also intolerable to the structured self, because it entails a fascination with the fantasy of a self in a state of disintegration or disablement. Secondary pity is something else, although it cannot wholly be differentiated from primary pity. Secondary pity attempts to heal primary pity’s self-rupturing effects by converting primary pity into a feeling that is bearable. As with secondary narcissism, secondary pity involves both an attempt to get back to that ego-shattering state of painfully pleasurable primary pity, and at the same time to defend against that threat to the ego by aggrandizing oneself at someone else’s expense. Secondary pity refers to all those ego-bolstering behaviors that most people think of when they talk about pity. Disabled people are all too familiar with these behaviors: the saccharin sympathy, the telethon rituals of “conspicuous contribution,” the insistence that “they” (i.e., nondisabled people) could never endure such suffering. More commonly known in our culture simply as “pity,” secondary pity encompasses our culture’s most clichéd reactions to disability: charity, tears, and calls for a cure. Correlatives of these commonplace manifestations of secondary pity are the obligatory claims that disabled people’s suffering is “inspiring.” Indeed, the speed with which conventional cultural representations of disability segue from overt expressions of pity to celebrations of “the triumph of the human spirit” highlights the ways in which secondary pity, as a defense against primary pity’s incursions, reinforces the ego’s fantasy of sovereignty. Secondary pity, in other words, can be seen as a variation of secondary narcissism: these affects enlarge the ego of the pitier or the narcissist at the expense of someone else. But primary pity is not the same as either primary narcissism, secondary narcissism, or secondary pity. Unlike primary narcissism, a feeling that emerges out of a relation to the world in which notions of “self” and “other” do not obtain, primary pity does depend upon the constructs of self and other, although these constructions are unstable and are continually threatening to come undone. Primary pity can thus be envisioned as a threshold category occupying a liminal position between the total denial of the other that is inherent to primary narcissism and the rigid structure of (superior) self and (inferior) other that constitutes secondary narcissism and secondary pity. My concept of primary versus secondary pity also differs from Freud’s primarysecondary narcissism distinction at the level of genealogy. Like Freud’s account of primary and secondary narcissisms, my model of primary and secondary pities involves a temporal transition; but whereas Freud imagines the movement from primary to secondary narcissism as a passage from an earlier to a later stage of an individual’s development, the temporal shift from primary to secondary pity happens much more quickly than this. It happens in an instant: that moment in which we feel primary pity and then, almost before we can blink, deny that we feel or have felt it. The denial is understandable: who wants to admit that one gets pleasure from the sight of another person’s suffering—or, to make matters worse, that this pleasure derives in part from the specter of disability’s transferability, the possibility that this suffering could be—and, fantasmatically, perhaps already is—an image of one‟s own self undone? Indeed, the model of primary pity that I have been constructing may sound a bit too close to sadism for some people’s liking. Pity does come close to sadism, and at the same time, to masochism, which Freud theorizes as sadism’s obverse. In “Mourning and Melancholia,” an essay that can be read as a sequel to “On Narcissism,” Freud approaches a distinction between primary and secondary masochism, which accords with my primary-secondary pity heuristic.122 If the story that I traced in “On Narcissism” could be summarized as “child gets breast; child loses breast; child gets breast back, albeit in a secondary, adulterated form,” the tale that Freud tells about masochism takes much the same form. In this story, subject loves object; subject loses object; and subject tries to get object back by becoming object, that is, by identifying with the object in such a way that object starts to seem—and perhaps in some ways is—part of subject’s self. This last phase is a dysfunctional and disabling form of identification, Freud makes clear. Subject is still angry at object for having left it, and it takes out that anger on the object that is now part of itself. This is the reason that people suffering from melancholia are so hard on themselves, Freud says; the “diminution in…self-regard” that typically accompanies melancholia results from the subject’s attacks on the loved-and-lost object that the subject has incorporated into its ego (“Mourning” 246). Freud had not wanted there to be such a thing as primary masochism; for a long time, he had insisted that sadism, or “aggression,” was the primary instinct, and that masochism was only a turning-inward of this originary aggression. But in “Mourning and Melancholia,” although Freud does not yet use the term “primary masochism,” he nonetheless gets at this concept. The problem of suicide, Freud notes in this essay, raises the possibility that the ego “can treat itself as an object” that it wants to destroy (252). When it comes to such an extreme act as suicide, the possibility of carrying “such a purpose through to execution” must, Freud surmises, involve more than a sadistic wish to punish others. Perhaps, then, there is an innate desire to destroy one’s own self, Freud hypothesizes. If so, this self would not be a single thing: it would be “me” and at the same time, the lost object whose image “I” have internalized. Freud’s notion of a primary masochism is tied very closely to his conceptualization of the drive. Beyond the Pleasure Principle, the text in which Freud first used the term “death drive,” was published three years after “Mourning and Melancholia.” In the later text, Freud’s speculations about the death drive lead him to acknowledge that “there might be such a thing as primary masochism” (66). After all, Freud points out, the idea that either sadism or masochism definitively takes precedence over the other does not ultimately make much sense, as “there is no difference in principle between an instinct turning from the object to the ego and its turning from the ego to an object” (66). If sadism and masochism are ultimately indistinguishable obverses of each other, then pity, in both its primary and its secondary forms, would have to be both sadistic and masochistic. This is a deeply troubling possibility, but I suggest that trying to overcome pity will only make matters worse. There are many ways of trying to overcome primary pity, and each one ultimately aggravates the violence of primary pity. One way is the “pitiless” refusal of compassion that Edelman advocates (70). Another is the disability activist “No pity” injunction. A third example is secondary pity, as in the query, commonly addressed to disabled people, “Have you ever thought of killing yourself?”123 In this question, disabled people correctly hear the wish, “I’d like to kill you.” Indeed, primary pity is so unsettling that our culture has been driven to “mercifully” kill people in the name of secondary pity. We have also been driven to lock people in institutions, to let them languish on the streets, to stare, to punish, and to sentimentalize—all, I would suggest, in the interest of not owning, not naming, not acknowledging that self-shattering, ego-dissolving, instantaneous and intolerable moment of primary pity. Because primary pity is tied up with the disability drive, it must, like the drive itself, be regarded as unrepresentable. However, I will quote at length from a passage of writing that comes close not only to representing primary pity but also perhaps to producing it. In his memoir, One More Theory About Happiness, Paul Guest describes an experience that he had in the hospital after sustaining a spinal cord injury when he was twelve years old: My stomach still roiled and it was hard to keep anything down. Late one night, a doctor came to my bedside, leaning over me, his hands knotted together. He seemed vexed, not quite ready to say anything. Used to the look, I waited. And then he began. “The acids in your stomach, Paul, because of everything you’re going through, it’s like your body, everything about it, is upset. That’s why you feel so nauseous all the time. We’re going to treat that by putting a tube into your nose and down into your stomach, so we can give you medicine, OK?” When he walked away, I felt something begin to give way inside me. Up until then, I’d faced more misery and indignity than I would have thought possible. I lay there, numb and sick in a diaper, helpless. It was too much to bear, too frightening, a last invasion I could experience and not break, utterly. When he returned with nurses, I was already sobbing. Anyone so limited could hardly fight, but I tried. I tried. The neck collar prevented much movement, and any was dangerous, but I turned my head side to side, just slightly, a pitiful, unacceptable range. Fat tears rolled down my face like marbles. I begged them all, no, no, no, please no. “Hold him, hold him still,” the doctor said. Nurses gripped my head on either side. From a sterile pack, the doctor fished out a long transparent tube and dabbed its head in a clear lubricant. He paused almost as if to warn me but then said nothing. 77 Then the tube entered one nostril, its gauge slight enough to pass through, down my throat and into my stomach. I couldn’t thrash or resist. I could only relent. To the pain, the discomfort, but most distressingly the feeling of powerlessness, of violation. It was in that moment, I think, that the weight of everything which had happened fell upon me, undeniably, and the knowledge of it crushed me. (23-24) “Too much to bear,” Guest writes. The word “unbearable” would indeed be an accurate descriptor of this passage: both the experience of violence that it narrates and also the retelling of that experience produce sensations that, as in Berlant and Edelman’s account of sexuality, one cannot bear but must nonetheless “struggle to bear” (back cover). Guest’s account of a nonconsensual administration of an unwanted medical treatment is especially difficult to bear because it gives the reader no recourse to secondary pity: the passage offers no “lesson” to be learned, no invitation to feel “inspired,” nothing to make one feel in any way okay about what has happened. The medical violence that Guest recounts seems particularly devastating because it is readable as sexual: it takes the form of forced penetration, and it results in a “feeling of powerlessness, of violation” that resonates with experiences recounted by survivors of sexual assault.

#### The affirmative’s politics are tied to a rehabilitative futurism where the signifier of the fantasmatic child is placed forward to eradicate and cure disability – this deems the disabled child a threat and excludes disability from the political. The idea that conversation and awareness about disability can cause progress results in further violence. They don’t get to weigh case – if we win their starting point is violent, they don’t get to weigh their end point since we indict the process of how they got there.

**Mollow 2** Anna (2015): The Disability Drive, A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in English in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in charge: Professor Kent Puckett, Chair Professor Celeste G. Langan Professor Melinda Y. Chen Spring 2015 <https://digitalassets.lib.berkeley.edu/etd/ucb/text/Mollow_berkeley_0028E_15181.pdf> SJCP//JG

Elsewhere, I have argued that No Future’s impassioned polemic is one that disability studies might take to heart.109 Indeed, the figure that Edelman calls “the disciplinary image of the “innocent” Child” is inextricable not only from queerness but also from disability (19). For example, the Child is the centerpiece of the telethon, a ritual display of pity that demeans disabled people. When Jerry Lewis counters disability activists’ objections to his assertion that a disabled person is “half a person,” he insists that he is only fighting for the Children: “Please, I’m begging for survival. I want my kids alive,” he implores (in Johnson, Too Late 53, 58). If the Child makes an excellent alibi for ableism, perhaps this is because, as Edelman points out, the idea of not fighting for this figure is unthinkable. Thus, when Harriet McBryde Johnson hands out leaflets protesting the Muscular Dystrophy Association, a confused passerby cannot make sense of what her protest is about. “You’re against Jerry Lewis!” he exclaims (61). The passerby’s surprise is likely informed by a logic similar to that which, in Edelman’s analysis, undergirds the use of the word “choice” by advocates of legal abortion: “Who would, after all, come out for abortion or stand against reproduction, against futurity, and so against life?” (16). Similarly, why would anyone come out for disability, and so against the Child who, without a cure, might never walk, might never lead a normal life, might not even have a future at all? The logic of the telethon, in other words, relies on an ideology that might be defined as “rehabilitative futurism,” a term that I coin to overlap and intersect with Edelman’s notion of “reproductive futurism.” If, as Edelman maintains, the future is envisaged in terms of a fantasmatic “Child,” then the survival of this future-figured-as-Child is threatened by both queerness and disability. Futurity is habitually imagined in terms that fantasize the eradication of disability: a recovery of a “crippled” or “hobbled” economy, a cure for society’s ills, an end to suffering and disease. Eugenic ideologies are also grounded in both reproductive and rehabilitative futurism: procreation by the fit and elimination of the disabled, eugenicists promised, would bring forth a better future.110

#### The endorsement of debate isa link – communicative spaces such as debate privilege those who can conform to marketable forms of affect and marginalizes those deemed incompetent. The drive to perform means disabled bodies are always regulated to the bottom of the communicative register.

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My talk investigates the means through which **disability is constituted by affective labour** and neoliberalism. Paralleling the shift from modernization to postmodernization of labor, the constitution of disability has likewise been changed. There are accordingly two questions that will structure my exploration: 1) how are disabled subjects marginalized within an information economy and 2) what kind of disabled subjectivity does informationalization produce? This is largely a new area of inquiry for me and as such I welcome ideas of how to further these questions. To start off, allow me to rehearse a simple truism: capitalism produces competition. Simon Clarke notes that “the intensiﬁcation of the demands of capital throws more and more people into the ranks of the unemployable. The accumulation of capital necessarily leads to the polarisation of overwork and unemployment, prosperity and destitution” (25). As has been well noted within disability studies, this competition notoriously privileges the able-bodied since those bodies **which cannot move** quickly or efficiently, unable to meet the demands of labour intensification, are the first to be cut from employment. If this resulting exclusion was true within industrial capitalism, then it is even more so within neoliberalism. Here, knowledge and education are translated as human capital to be exploited, and asetheticization gains centre stage. Here,the performance of competencies is a necessary trait since skill no longer determines competency; what is furteher needed for full-participation in the socio-economic system **is to project the right sort of image as a marketable and desirable embodied subject**. In this way, it is not uncommon for the compulsion to appear normal and able-bodied to overshadow one’s actual skills. The phenomenon of advertising and marketing the self trades upon communication. Unlike human knowledge and education, I suggest that communication is not capital per se, but serves a more basic function as the conductive medium through which human capital becomes salient and exploitable. Communicative disabilities are the most obvious examples of disabilities marginalized here, but **the drive to perform competencies in normalized fashion allows all disabled bodies to be exploited** in ways impossible within industrial capitalism. To explain this move, I turn to Michael Hardt and affective labour. In his ground-breaking piece “Affective Labor,” Hardt outlines the succession of economic paradigms since the middle ages: “a first paradigm, in which agriculture and the extraction of raw materials dominated the economy; a second, in which industry and the manufacture of durable goods occupied the privilege position; and the current paradigm in which providing services and manipulating information are at the heart of economic production” (90). **The most recent shift of post-modernization, from the secondary sector to the tertiary, marks the overshadowing economic importance of knowledge, information, communication, and affect**. It is not that industrial production and the extraction of raw materials cease to play an important role, but rather that their role has been redefined through the informational economy such that production has become informationalized. Hardt argues that **within this economy, the quality and nature of labour has shifted from material—the production and selling of “stuff”—to immaterial labour—labour that produces immaterial goods.** In particular, there are three types of immaterial labour: 1) industrial production that has been informationalized 2) labour of analytic and symbolic tasks 3) production and manipulation of affect (which requires actual or virtual human contact and proximity). This third category is the one that most interests both Hardt and myself, for while those with communicative disabilities are generally disadvantaged by the move to an informational economy and immaterial labour, affective labour **significantly** reshapes the terrain of disability. The first two forms of immaterial labour are directly concerned with the exchange of information and knowledge; affective labour produces affect: “a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, passion—even a sense of connectedness or community” (96). In the most obvious sense, affective labour describes the service industry—Disneyland is in the business of selling a particular experience—but affective labour has also reconstituted the socio-economic terrain such that material goods are not sold anymore; that is, Starbucks does not sell coffee, but Zen, wholeness, and friendship while Mazda sells not cars but a lifestyle of freedom and adventure. **The creation and manipulation of affect is central**. Affective labour collides economy and culture, insofar as “production has become communicative, affective, de-instrumentalized, and ‘elevated’ to the level of human relations” (96). Through affective labour the human is constituted as a node of informational conductivity in relation to systems of communication between the production and consumption of commodities. Since communication is that which holds the fluid socio-economic structure of post-modernization together, informational conductivity becomes key to competing and surviving. Existing as informational nodes, **those with communicative disabilities distort and put stress on the mechanisms of production and are therefore disadvantaged in highly competitive markets** that exploit human capital. Yet labor is not only produced communicatively, but reciprocally produces informationally structured subjectivities. While Hardt does not here make this connection, affective labour dissolves the informationally closed body-as-organism/body-as-machine constituted by industrialism and ushers in the informationally open posthuman. Through affective labour, communicative disability thus threatens posthuman subjectivity by being unmalleable and impermeable to information flow. Those who are disabled communicatively are further marginalized insofar as affective labour is particularly concerned with producing marketable affects. This has led to the aestheticization of socio-economic space. The common fear, anxiety, and discomfort experienced in the presence of disability—the disruption of the perceptual field—is now internal to the production of capital. The marketable product of affective labour depends upon aesthetically normalized human contact, communication, and projection of ability and the self. The drive to advertise ourselves troubles the borders of ‘disability’ and oppresses those who, for example, stutter, far beyond what was experienced in industrialized capitalism. In this way, neoliberal ableism and affective labour stretch the conception of a normalized body to often unlivable proportions. It is of course true that the stigmatization and enfreakment of the disabled body was economically marginalizing within industrial capitalism (and before), however, the turn to affective labour collapses any previously existing space between asethetics and economics. Consider this response of one forthright interviewer to Marty Jezer, a stutterer: “I’m going to be frank. You’ve got all the qualifications to be a good copywriter. But in advertising it is image that counts. Executives aren’t as impressed by talent and creativity as they are by a person’s ability to fit in . . . Take care of your speech and come back. You’ll never get a job in advertising until you learn to talk.” Jezer’s marginalization is twofold: in the first place, he is marginalized by disrupting information flow since according to post-modernization, the entirety of journalism is structured by informationalization. Yet secondly, **the drive to perform competencies in a normalized fashion runs roughshod over bodies affectively abnormal**. Jezer’s marginization is inseperable from the asethetics of human interaction and the production of marketable affect. **While people with explicit communicative disabilities are the most obvious examples of those sidelined within an informational economy, all disabilities are reconfigured by neoliberalism and affective labour.** Through the logic of affective labour all disabilities, like all abilities, are now communicative. Bodies now primarily produce not material goods but affect and are situated within communicative socio-economic networks. Thinking seriously about communication and disability may thus be an important move in pushing disability theory further, into uncharted territory.

#### The 1AC is a *fantasy* of the medical model – the idea that solvency or ‘good things’ or emancipation can come from Academia or supporting the 1AC is an illusion that the medical model has created – their attempt at liberation actively pathologize disability by overshadowing the physical barrier that is required to come into the space in the first plance and the barriers that continue to exist in that space.

Siebers 06 (Tobin, Prof of Literary and Cultural Criticism at the U of Michigan, “Disability Studies and the Future of Identity Politics”) DR 16

**The attack on identity by social constructionists is designed to liberate individuals constrained by unjust stereotypes and social prejudices. The example of disability in particular reveals with great vividness the unjust stereotypes imposed on identity by cultural norms and languages as well as the violence exercised by them.** It also provides compelling evidence for the veracity of the social model**. Deafness was not, for instance, a disability on Martha’s Vineyard for most of the eighteenth century because 1 in 25 residents was deaf and everyone in the community knew how to sign**. Deaf villagers had the same occupations and incomes as people who could hear.3 This example shows to what extent **disability is socially produced.** In fact, **it is tempting to see disability exclusively as the product of a bad match between society and some human bodies because it is so often the case. But disability also frustrates theorists of social construction because the disabled body and mind are not easily aligned with cultural norms and codes. Many disability scholars have begun to insist that the social model either fails to account for the difficult physical realities faced by people with disabilities or presents their body and mind in ways that are conventional, conformist, and unrecognizable to them. These include the habits of privileging pleasure over pain, making work a condition of independence, favoring performativity to corporeality, and describing social success in terms of intellectual achievement, bodily adaptability, and active political participation.** David Mitchell and Sharon Snyder have noticed that **the push to link physical difference to cultural and social constructs, especially ideological ones, has actually made disability disappear** from the social model. They cite a variety of recent studies of the body that use “corporeal aberrancies” to emblematize social differences, complaining that “physical difference” within common critical methodologies “exemplifies the evidence of social deviance even as the constructed nature of physicality itself fades from view.”4 As Davis puts it, **cultural theory abounds with “the fluids of sexuality, the gloss of lubrication, the glossary of the body as text,** the heteroglossia of the intertext, the glossolalia of the schizophrenic. **But almost never the body of the differently abled.”5 Recent theoretical emphases on “performativity,” “heterogeneity,” and “indeterminancy” privilege a disembodied ideal of freedom, suggesting that emancipation from social codes and norms may be achieved by imagining the body as a subversive text. These emphases are not only incompatible with the experiences of people with disabilities; they mimic the fantasy, often found in the medical model, that disease and disability are immaterial as long as the imagination is free. Doctors and medical professionals have the habit of coaxing sick people to cure themselves by thinking positive thoughts, and when an individual’s health does not improve the failure is ascribed to mental weakness**. Sontag was perhaps the first to understand the debilitating effects of **describing illness as a defect of imagination or will power**. She traces the notion that disease springs from individual mental weakness to Schopenhauer’s claim that “recovery from a disease depends on the will assuming ‘dictatorial power in order to subsume the rebellious forces’ of the body” (43-44). **She also heaps scorn on the idea that the disabled or sick are responsible for their disease concluding that “theories that diseases are caused by mental states and can be cured by will power are always an index of how much is not understood about the physical terrain of a disease**” (55**). The rebellious forces of the body and the physical nature of disease represent a reality untouched by metaphor.** Sontag insists that “the reality has to be explained” (55).

#### Vote negative to endorse an unwavering pessimism and radical failure – we reject notions of futurism in exchange for an affirmation of disability’s abjection as something beautiful.

**Selck 16** Michael (2016): Crip Pessimism: The Language of Dis/ability and the Culture that Isn't, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, SJCP//JG

The disabled are dying and with them dis/abled culture is being eradicated. In the time between formulating this project and its completion already too many disabled souls have been taken from this world, including pivotal disability studies influences for this research. I barely had enough time to mourn the loss of disability advocate and inspiration porn critic Stella Young before grieving the loss of disability studies exemplar Tobin Siebers. Attached to the grief I feel as a result of the fading disability studies community is the perpetual grief I harbor since my disabled Father’s suicide and in turn the grief concomitant to the claiming of a disabled identity. I choose to start out this project with grief because it communicates the tenor of this research; this is not the disability studies project of inspiration or utopia. My entry point to the disability studies dialogue is riddled with grief, anger, and pain and it is as such that this project plots a course of disability research that attempts to make a space free from the ideological constraints of optimism. The language surrounding dis/ability is highly political. Entire words, phrases, and identities are stretched between, in, and out of the nexus of dis/ability. The choice, for instance, to include a backslash in the word dis/ability represents for Goodley (2014) a desire to delineate and expand each of the categories in the face of global neoliberalism. My initial research inquired about the impact of dis/abled terms and phrases. I went to interrogate rhetoric like “special education”, “handicapable”, and one of the most glaringly overused insults in the American education system “retard”. The scholarship I was coming up with was plentiful but was for the most part located entirely outside of intercultural communication programs like the one I was attending. For the most part the few and far between intercultural communication projects about dis/ability I was able to locate were without modal complexity and didn’t bear semblance to so many of my own experiences. I was beginning to notice a layer of optimism that has been communicatively imprinted upon the negotiation of dis/abled identity. The angst started to manifest as I questioned if I was in the correct field or if dis/ability even was ‘cultural’. I felt a very real cultural erasure of dis/ability in academia and ultimately that glaring lack of consideration is what pushed me to performance studies. I first worked to close the apparent research gap by crafting a collaborative performance titled Under the Mantle (UTM), which put dis/ability, communication scholarship, and pessimist philosophy on stage. The larger purpose of this research report is to antagonize the erasure of dis/ability from communication studies by autoethnographically analyzing the crip-pessimist performance art project Under The Mantle. This research report will first detail the components of the theoretical work that was drawn on to create UTM. Next I offer a literature review to demonstrate the combination of optimism and neglect dis/ability has undergone in intercultural communication models. Following that section I mark my shift to performance methods as I explain how narrative autoethnography can illuminate cultural misconceptions regarding the dis/abled. In the last sections of this report I offer a textual analysis of the performance UTM and analyze three significant arguments of the instillation before concluding. Contextualizing Critical Dis/Ability Theory Often used interchangeably, critical disability theory (CDT) and critical disability studies (CDS) contest dis/ablism (Goodley, 2011, 2014; Devlin & Pothier, 2006; Hosking, 2008). There are several unique additions made to CDS with every new instantiation. Scholars in European countries and Canada attend to the theory, with United States academics often underrepresented. There are three concurrent themes of CDT that I will synthesize in this section with some dis/ability studies authors claiming there are as many as seven themes of CDT (Hosking, 2008). In the introduction to their edited collection of dis/ability essays, Richard Devlin and Dianne Pothier (2006) present three themes of CDT as, first, to highlight the unequal status to which persons with disabilities are confined; second, to destabilize necessitarian assumptions that reinforce the marginalization of persons with disabilities; and third, to help generate the individual and collective practical agency of persons with disabilities in the struggles for recognition and redistribution. (p. 18, emphasis mine) Already the connections between the CDT and the critical communication paradigm are visible as each respectively forefronts notions of power, privilege, identity, and agency. Outlined in more detail, the first theme of CDT argues that there is systemic micro and macro level discrimination against bodies with disabilities. To some critical communication scholars, this theme might be obvious, but it seldom is when “the resulting exclusion of those who do not fit able-bodied norms may not be noticeable or even intelligible” (Delvin & Pothier, 2006, p. 7). As the bumper sticker on my laptop proudly disclaims, “Not all disabilities are visible,” which necessarily adds a level of nuance and complexity to the way that dis/ability studies attend to the prospect of discrimination and violence. Often times, “social organization according to able-bodied norms is just taken as natural, normal, inevitable, necessary, even progress” (Delvin & Pothier, 2006, p. 7). It might be true that the lack of collaborative work between critical communication studies and dis/ability studies is because neoliberalism is supremely effective at rebranding marginalized oppression as a marker of its progress. The implications of this assertion are dire but essential to the basis of crip-pessimism. Theoretical approaches based in pessimism and skepticism are often necessary to distinguish the instruments of self destruction that have been mistaken for those of self betterment. Thus, a key question remains, what is regarded as progress and to whom does it count? The politics of progress call for the second tenet of CDT, which is a destabilization of neoliberal practices that strip power and agency from bodies with disabilities. Devlin and Pothier (2006) use the language of “anti-necessitarian” (p. 2), which refers to the efficacy of social organizations and an unflinching skepticism of liberalism. For Shildrick and Price (1999), “disabled bodies call into question the ‘giveness’ of the ‘natural body’ and, instead, posit a corporeality that is fluid in its investments and meanings” (p. 1). Anti-necessitarian logics ask questions that remain innocuous to the critical communication paradigm. Can the architectural proliferation of stairs and multiple levels on buildings be attributed to neoliberalism and active disablism? If stairs seem to focus too exclusively on physical impairments, then what about the sensitivity of the building’s lighting, acoustics, and spatiality? Finally, if neoliberalism fights to protect its grand narrative of progress then is the social exclusion of bodies with disabilities necessary for the day-to-day operation of our globalized world? As Donaldson (2002) posits: “theories of gendered, raced, sexed, classed, and disabled bodies offer us critical languages for ‘denaturalising’ impairment’” (p. 112) at the level of the subjective and inter-subjective. The third theme of CDT is to attend to the agency of bodies with disabilities in the struggle for recognition. One key element of extending agency to the disabled is the use of social experience. Experience is subjective “but experience remains intimately connected to political and social existence, and therefore individuals and societies are capable of learning from their experiences” (Siebers, 2008, p. 82). Though absolutely necessary, it is not enough to write treatises on the oppression of the disabled over time. Academics, theorists, intercultural trainers, and storytellers alike should be aware of the constant risks of representation. Representation and context are at the core of critical disability studies. The notion of agency is as unstable as the notions of dis/ability. There is no one-size-fits-all human rights based approach that will be suitable to address all disabled experiences, as the theoretical call for crip-pessimism will remind us. Instead of a universal abstract Rawlsian concept of social justice, CDS “attend(s) to the relational components of dis/ablism” (Goodley, 2011, p. 159). By a Rawlsian concept of social justice I mean a model that relies on distributive justice with utopist equality at its core. Where utopist equality projects highlight human sameness to the point of purity. CDT unavoidably invites a discussion about difference into the folds as postmodern and post-structural thinkers position the self as defined constantly in relation to others. Therein lies the difference between an equality model and a justice model of social identity. Often in the attempt to open up spaces for reconsidering self and other, CDS celebrates disability as a positive identity marker. This essay offers a strong argument of caution that the inclusion of CDS in critical communication studies might rely too heavily on celebrations of disabled identity. Nothing better demonstrates that reliance on celebrating identity than the myriad language choices used to describe a disabled identity including: differently-abled, special needs, person with disability, disabled person, temporarily able-bodied, and others. Often, able- bodied audiences have a tendency to sensationalize the presence of disability in a space that has not traditionally welcomed it. Examples of this are highlighted by the increasingly popular discussion of ‘inspiration porn’ (Young, 2014) and Hollywood’s representation of disability. The tendency is to inspirationalize the disabled for achieving tasks that would not be celebrated if they were accomplished by an unimpaired body. Crossing the street, showing up on time, entering a building by oneself are all tasks profoundly routine to the non-disabled and yet simultaneously cherished as markers of progress for the disabled. Philosophical pessimism is articulated next as a way to temper the risk of sensationalizing dis/ability. The theories ultimately fuse together like orchids and wasps to generate the larger theme of crip-pessimism. Philosophical Pessimism Throughout the 19th century pessimism was one of the most popular intellectual and philosophical strains, crossing countries and continents. Authors such as Rousseau, Leopardi, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche overwhelmingly created and lead the spirit of pessimism. Contemporarily however, the word ‘pessimism’ is pejorative and describes a body’s emotional discontent rather than intellectual engagement with the world. Dienstag (2009) writes, “Since pessimism is perceived more as a disposition than as a theory, pessimists are seen primarily as dissenters from whatever the prevailing consensus of their time happens to be, rather than as constituting a continuous alternative” (p. 3). Power is responsible for ontological shifts, and during shifts some populations benefit while others are harmed. The turn in thinking about pessimism from an intellectual position to an emotional state has been particularly gratuitous for bodies with disabilities. I come to pessimism because of my experience with disability. My anxiety disorder comes with an exteriority of anti-social behavior that has branded me pessimistic. The concern for my anxiety in public situations is often commented on as overly critical, negative, narcissistic, and most often pessimistic. I experience an anxious state of becoming different, and after years of failing to rehabilitate my sameness to able-bodied standards, I have come to a comfort with pessimism. I choose to include pessimism as a theoretical crutch to avoid communication studies’ sensationalism of disability. I imagine that when critical communication studies does bridge the dis/ability research gap that it might, at least initially, extend some neoliberal logics at the expense of CDS. This might manifest by scholars simply asserting disabled personhood where it does not institutionally, culturally, or individually exist. I find that CDT and philosophical pessimism combine in unique and valuable ways, particularly around tensions of personhood, abstract ideal humanism, and neoliberalism. Neoliberalism should be understood as “the superiority of individualized, market-based competition over other modes of organization. This basic principle is the hallmark of neo-liberal thought— one with old roots that lay partly in Anglo economics and partly in German schools of liberalism” (Mudge, 2008, p. 706-707). There are four components of pessimism outlined by Joshua Foa Dienstag (2006) in his book Pessimism: Philosophy, Ethic, Spirit that I wish to explore difference through. They are as following that: (1) time is a burden, (2) history is ironic, (3) human existence is absurd, and finally (4) resignation or affirmation. To write about pessimism necessarily involves questions of time, temporality, and history. The development of philosophical pessimism, specifically, the theories regarding the burden of time-consciousness, begins with difference. For the pessimist, the concept of time begets a differentiation between human and animal. Being a dog-owner myself, I have heard the colloquial aphorism that dogs, as all animals, have no concept of time. Pessimists understand time consciousness as a unique, but ultimately loathsome, trait of the human condition. Even in projects that appear to be geared toward sameness there are always unperceived and neglected populations. For example, even the U.S. constitution alleges persons of color were (and still are often) racially subjugated as property instead of considered to be fully human. The notion of difference is at the center of the pessimist’s position on time-consciousness because the philosophy accepts that the conditions of our existence are subject to relentless unpredictable change. “To the pessimists, however, the human condition is existentially unique— its uniqueness consisting precisely in the capacity for time-consciousness” (Dienstag, 2009, p. 20). For the pessimist nothing is ever the same, everything is always different, and to inhabit linear time means that everything in existence is always rushing off into the past. The advent of human time consciousness is also what leads the pessimist to find the course of history to be ironic. History is ironic for the pessimist because progress is always related to a greater set of unperceived consequences. As suggested above, philosophical pessimism acknowledges that change occurs; technologies develop and improve over time. Pessimists ask if those improvements are related to a greater set of costs that are not immediately recognizable. (Dienstag, 2006, p. 25) Similar to critical disability theory, pessimism interrogates power and privilege. Pessimists rely on the logic of difference to chart consequences. Consequences go unperceived because they occur across populations with disproportionate access to power, populations that are often culturally unintelligible. For instance, the massive boom in mobile technologies like cell phones and laptops has created vast pits of ‘e-waste’ in Africa, surges in child labor, and conflict over rare earth minerals (Vidal, 2013). Pessimists use difference to tease out the distinction between the instruments of suffering and those of betterment. The third philosophical pessimistic position is that human existence is absurd. The absurdity of existence “is illustrated by the persistent mismatch between human purposes and the means available to achieve them: or again, between our desire for happiness and our capacity to encounter or sustain it” (Dienstag, 2006, p. 32). Difference is built upon exanimations of power, which is both fluid and transferable but ultimately permanent. Classical western philosophy has an optimistic pragmatism built into it that posits there must be an answer to our questions. Alternatively, the pessimist embraces uncertainty, ambiguity, and intersubjectivity. Pessimism encourages a sense of comfort around the idea of multiple, coexistent, and perhaps competing histories. Neoliberal optimism is the logic of conflict as materially reconcilable, rather than antagonistically irreconcilable. The fourth and final tenet of pessimism that we are to examine asks what we are to do about our dire human condition. There are multiplicities of rationales that ultimately inform the pessimistic dualism to either resign from life or affirm it entirely. I defer to an existential or Nietzschean pessimism that recognizes suffering is inevitable for two reasons. First, human time-consciousness necessitates an awareness of our impending death. Second, mutually assured value systems will always intersubjectively exist. The choice to affirm life in its entirety is a pessimistic choice. Embracing life as both miserable and beautiful, fleeting and enduring, validates the perpetually fragmented subject seeking a world that exists beyond good and evil and instead just is.

## Case

#### Cap is good:

#### 1] It’s sustainable – data proves we’re entering the golden age

**Hausfather 21** – a climate scientist and energy systems analyst whose research focuses on observational temperature records, climate models, and mitigation technologies. He spent 10 years working as a data scientist and entrepreneur in the cleantech sector, where he was the lead data scientist at Essess, the chief scientist at C3.ai, and the cofounder and chief scientist of Efficiency 2.0. He also worked as a research scientist with Berkeley Earth, was the senior climate analyst at Project Drawdown, and the US analyst for Carbon Brief. He has masters degrees in environmental science from Yale University and Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam and a PhD in climate science from the University of California, Berkeley. (Zeke, "Absolute Decoupling of Economic Growth and Emissions in 32 Countries," Breakthrough Institute, 4-6-2021, https://thebreakthrough.org/issues/energy/absolute-decoupling-of-economic-growth-and-emissions-in-32-countries, Accessed 4-11-2021, LASA-SC)

The past 30 years have seen immense progress **in improving the quality of life for much of humanity**. Extreme poverty — the number of people living on less than $1.90 per day — has fallen by nearly two-thirds, from 1.9 **billion to** around 650 **million**. Life expectancy has risen in most of the world, along with literacy and access to education, while infant mortality has fallen. Despite perceptions to the contrary, **the average person born today is likely to have access to more opportunities and have a better quality of life than at any other point in human history**. Much of this increase in human wellbeing has been propelled by rapid economic growth driven largely by state-led industrial policy, particularly in poor-to-middle income countries. However, this growth has come at a cost: between 1990 and 2019, global emissions of CO2 **increased by 56%.** Historically, economic growth has been closely linked to increased energy consumption — and increased CO2 emissions in particular — leading some to argue that a more prosperous world is one that necessarily has more impacts on our natural environment and climate. There is a lively academic debate about our ability to “absolutely decouple” emissions and growth — that is, the extent to which the adoption of clean energy technology can allow emissions to decline while economic growth continues. Over the past 15 years, however, **something has begun to change.** Rather than a 21st century dominated by coal that energy modelers foresaw, **global coal use peaked in 2013 and is now in structural decline**. We have succeeded in making clean energy cheap, with solar power and battery storage costs falling 10-fold since 2009. The world produced more electricity from clean energy — solar, wind, hydro, and nuclear — than from coal over the past two years. And, according to some major oil companies, **peak oil is upon us** — not because we have run out of cheap oil to produce, but because demand is falling and companies expect further decline as consumers increasingly shift to electric vehicles. The world has long been experiencing a relative **decoupling** between economic growth and CO2 emissions, with the emissions per unit of GDP **falling for the past 60 years**. This is the case even in countries like **India and China** that have been undergoing rapid economic growth. But relative decoupling alone is inadequate in a world where global CO2 emissions need to peak and decline in the next decade to give us any chance at limiting warming to well below 2℃, in line with Paris Agreement targets. Thankfully, there is increasing evidence that the world is on track **to absolutely decouple CO2 emissions and economic growth** — with global CO2 emissions potentially having peaked in 2019 **and unlikely to increase substantially in the coming decade**. While an emissions peak is just the first and easiest step towards eventually reaching the net-zero emissions required to stop the world from continuing to warm, it demonstrates that linkages between emissions and economic activity are not an immutable law, but rather simply a result of our current means of energy production. In recent years we have seen more and more examples of absolute decoupling — economic growth accompanied by falling CO2 emissions. Since 2005, 32 countries with a population of at least one million people **have absolutely decoupled** emissions from economic growth, both for terrestrial emissions (those within national borders) and consumption emissions (emissions embodied in the goods consumed in a country). This includes the United States, Japan, Mexico, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Spain, Poland, Romania, Netherlands, Belgium, Portugal, Sweden, Hungary, Belarus, Austria, Bulgaria, El Salvador, Singapore, Denmark, Finland, Slovakia, Norway, Ireland, New Zealand, Croatia, Jamaica, Lithuania, Slovenia, Latvia, Estonia, and Cyprus. Figure 1, below, shows the declines in territorial emissions (blue) and increases in GDP (red). To qualify as having experienced absolute decoupling, we require countries included in this analysis to pass four separate filters: a population of at least one million (to focus the analysis on more representative cases), declining territorial emissions over the 2005-2019 period (based on a linear regression), declining consumption emissions, and increasing real GDP (on a purchasing power parity basis, using constant 2017 international $USD). We chose not to include 2020 in this analysis because it is not particularly representative of longer-term trends, and consumption and territorial emissions estimates are not yet available for many countries. There is a wide range of rates of economic growth between 2005-2019 among countries experiencing absolute decoupling. Somewhat counterintuitively, there is no significant relationship between the rate of economic growth and the magnitude of emissions reductions within the group. **While it is unlikely that there is not at least some linkage between the two factors, there are plenty of examples of countries (e.g., Singapore, Romania, and Ireland) experiencing both extremely rapid economic growth and large reductions in CO2 emissions.** One of the primary criticisms of some prior analyses of absolute decoupling is that they ignore **leakage**. Specifically, the offshoring of manufacturing from high-income countries over the past three decades to countries like China has led to “illusory” drops in emissions, where the emissions associated with high-income country consumption are simply shipped overseas and no longer show up in territorial emissions accounting. There is some truth in this critique, as there was a large increase in emissions embodied in imports from developing countries between 1990 and 2005. After 2005, however, structural changes in China and a growing domestic market led to a reversal of these trends; the amount of emissions “exported” from developed countries to developing countries **has actually declined over the past 15 years.** This means that, for many countries, both territorial emissions and consumption emissions (which include any emissions “exported” to other countries) **have jointly declined**. In fact, on average, consumption emissions have been declining slightly faster than territorial emissions since 2005 in the 32 countries we identify as experiencing absolute decoupling. Figure 2, below, shows the change in consumption emissions (teal) and GDP (red) between 2005 and 2019. There is a pretty wide variation in the extent to which these countries have reduced their territorial and consumption emissions since 2005. Some countries — such as the UK, Denmark, Finland, and Singapore – have seen territorial emissions fall faster than consumption emissions, while the US, Japan, Germany, and Spain (among others) have seen consumption emissions fall faster. Figure 3 shows reductions in consumption and territorial emissions for each country, with the size of the dot representing the size of the population in 2019. **Absolute decoupling is possible.** There is no physical law requiring economic growth — and broader increases in human wellbeing — to necessarily be linked to CO2 emissions. All of the **services that we rely on today that emit fossil fuels** — electricity, transportation, heating, food — can in principle **be replaced by near-zero carbon alternatives**, though these are more mature in some sectors (electricity, transportation, buildings) than in others (industrial processes, agriculture).

#### 2] Tech dematerialization secures sustainability.

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There is **no shortage** of examples of dematerialization. I chose the ones in this chapter because they illustrate a set of fundamental principles at the intersection of business, economics, innovation, and our impact on our planet. They are:

We do want more all the time, but **not more resources**. Alfred Marshall was right, but William Jevons was wrong. Our wants and desires keep growing, evidently without end, and therefore so do our economies. But our use of the earth’s resources **does not**. We do want more beverage options, but we don’t want to keep using more aluminum in drink cans. We want to communicate and compute and listen to music, but we don’t want an arsenal of gadgets; we’re happy with a single smartphone. As our population increases, we want more food, but we don’t have any desire to consume more fertilizer or use more land for crops.

Jevons was correct at the time he wrote that total British demand for coal was increasing even though steam engines were becoming much more efficient. He was right, in other words, that the price elasticity of demand for coal-supplied power was greater than one in the 1860s. But he was wrong to conclude that this would be permanent. Elasticities of demand can change over time for several reasons, the most fundamental of which is **technological change**. Coal provides a clear example of this. When fracking made natural gas much cheaper, total **demand** for coal in the United States **went down** even though its price decreased.

With the help of **innovation** and **new technologies**, economic growth in America and other rich countries—growth in all of the wants and needs that we spend money on—has become **decoupled** from resource **consumption**. This is a recent development and a **profound** one.

Materials cost money that companies locked in competition would rather **not spend**. The root of Jevons’s mistake is simple and **boring**: resources cost **money**. He realized this, of course. What he didn’t sufficiently realize was how strong the **incentive** is for a company in a contested market to **reduce** its spending on **resources** (or anything else) and so eke out a bit more profit. After all, a penny saved is a penny earned.

Monopolists can just pass costs on to their customers, but companies with a lot of competitors can’t. So American farmers who battle with each other (and increasingly with tough rivals in other countries) are eager to cut their spending on land, water, and fertilizer. Beer and soda companies want to minimize their aluminum purchases. Producers of magnets and high-tech gear run away from REE as soon as prices start to spike. In the United States, the 1980 Staggers Act removed government subsidies for freight-hauling railroads, forcing them into **competition** and **cost cutting** and making them all the more eager to not have expensive railcars sit idle. Again and again, we see that **competition** spurs **dematerialization**.

There are multiple paths to dematerialization. As profit-hungry companies seek to use fewer resources, they can go down four main paths. First, they can simply find ways to use **less** of a **given material**. This is what happened as beverage companies and the companies that supply them with cans teamed up to use less aluminum. It’s also the story with American farmers, who keep getting bigger harvests while using less land, water, and fertilizer. Magnet makers found ways to use fewer rare earth metals when it looked as if China might cut off their supply.

Second, it often becomes possible to **substitute** one resource for **another**. Total US coal consumption started to decrease after 2007 because fracking made natural gas more attractive to electricity generators. If nuclear power becomes more popular in the United States (a topic we’ll take up in chapter 15), we could use both less coal and less gas and generate our electricity from a small amount of material indeed. A kilogram of uranium-235 fuel contains approximately 2–3 million times as much energy as the same mass of coal or oil. According to one estimate, the total amount of energy that humans consume each year could be supplied by just seven thousand tons of uranium fuel.

Third, companies can use **fewer molecules** overall by making better use of the materials they **already own**. Improving CNW’s railcar utilization from 5 percent to 10 percent would mean that the company could cut its stock of these thirty-ton behemoths in half. Companies that own expensive physical assets tend to be fanatics about getting as much use as possible out of them, for clear and compelling financial reasons. For example, the world’s commercial airlines have improved their load factors—essentially the percentage of seats occupied on flights—from 56 percent in 1971 to more than 81 percent in 2018.

Finally, some materials get replaced by **nothing** at all. When a telephone, camcorder, and tape recorder are separate devices, three total microphones are needed. When they all collapse into a smartphone, only one microphone is necessary. That smartphone also uses no audiotapes, videotapes, compact discs, or camera film. The iPhone and its descendants are among the world champions of dematerialization. They use vastly less metal, plastic, glass, and silicon than did the devices they have replaced and don’t need media such as paper, discs, tape, or film.

If we use more renewable energy, we’ll be replacing coal, gas, oil, and uranium with **photons** from the **sun** (solar power) and the **movement** of **air** (wind power) and water (hydroelectric power) on the earth. All three of these types of power are also among dematerialization’s **champions**, since they use up essentially **no resources** once they’re up and running.

I call these four paths to dematerialization slim, swap, optimize, and evaporate. They’re not mutually exclusive. Companies can and do pursue all four at the same time, and all four are going on all the time in ways both obvious and subtle.

Innovation is **hard** to **foresee**. Neither the fracking revolution nor the world-changing impact of the iPhone’s introduction were well understood in advance. Both continued to be underestimated even after they occurred. The iPhone was introduced in June of 2007, with no shortage of fanfare from Apple and Steve Jobs. Yet several months later the cover of Forbes was still asking if anyone could catch Nokia.

Innovation is not **steady** and **predictable** like the orbit of the Moon or the accumulation of interest on a certificate of deposit. It’s instead inherently jumpy, uneven, and **random**. It’s also **combinatorial**, as Erik Brynjolfsson and I discussed in our book The Second Machine Age. Most new technologies and other innovations, we argued, are combinations or recombinations of preexisting elements.

The iPhone was “just” a cellular telephone plus a bunch of sensors plus a touch screen plus an operating system and population of programs, or apps. All these elements had been around for a while before 2007. It took the vision of Steve Jobs to see what they could become when combined. Fracking was the combination of multiple abilities: to “see” where hydrocarbons were to be found in rock formations deep underground; to pump down pressurized liquid to fracture the rock; to pump up the oil and gas once they were released by the fracturing; and so on. Again, none of these was new. Their effective combination was what changed the world’s energy situation.

Erik and I described the set of innovations and technologies available at any time as **building blocks** that ingenious people could combine and recombine into useful new configurations. These new configurations then serve as more blocks that later innovators can use. Combinatorial innovation is exciting because it’s unpredictable. It’s not easy to foresee when or where powerful new combinations are going to appear, or who’s going to come up with them. But as the number of both building blocks and innovators increases, we should have **confidence** that more breakthroughs such as fracking and smartphones are ahead. Innovation is highly decentralized and largely uncoordinated, occurring as the result of **interactions** among **complex** and **interlocking** social, technological, and economic systems. So it’s going to keep surprising us.

As the Second Machine Age progresses, dematerialization **accelerates**. Erik and I coined the phrase Second Machine Age to draw a contrast with the Industrial Era, which as we’ve seen transformed the planet by allowing us to overcome the limitations of muscle power. Our current time of great progress with all things related to **computing** is allowing us to **overcome** the **limitations** of our mental power and is **transformative** in a different way: it’s allowing us to **reverse** the Industrial Era’s bad habit of taking **more** and **more** from the earth every year.

Computer-aided design tools help engineers at packaging companies design generations of aluminum cans that keep getting lighter. Fracking took off in part because oil and gas exploration companies learned how to build **accurate** computer **models** of the rock formations that lay deep underground—models that predicted where hydrocarbons were to be found.

Smartphones took the place of many separate pieces of gear. Because they serve as GPS devices, they’ve also led us to print out many fewer maps and so contributed to our current trend of using less paper. It’s easy to look at generations of computer paper, from 1960s punch cards to the eleven-by-seventeen-inch fanfold paper of the 1980s, and conclude that the Second Machine Age has caused us to chop down ever more trees. The year of peak paper consumption in the United States, however, was 1990. As our devices have become more capable and interconnected, always on and always with us, we’ve sharply turned away from paper. Humanity as a whole probably hit peak paper in 2013.

As these examples indicate, computers and their kin help us with all four paths to **dematerialization**. Hardware, software, and networks let us slim, swap, optimize, and evaporate. I contend that they’re the **best tools** we’ve **ever invented** for letting us tread more **lightly** on our planet.

All of these principles are about the **combination** of technological **progress** and **capitalism**, which are the first of the two pairs of forces causing **dematerialization**.

#### 3] Yes absolute decoupling – consumption is declining

Nordhaus 20 [Ted Nordhaus is an American author, environmental policy expert, and the director of research at The Breakthrough Institute, “Must Growth Doom the Planet?”, https://www.thenewatlantis.com/publications/must-growth-doom-the-planet]

As both population and economic growth rates flatten out over the course of this century, it is likely that resource-productivity gains will overtake global economic growth rates, resulting in falling global demand for material resources over the long term. As a 2019 Breakthrough Institute report showed, global pasture land, the largest single human use of land, peaked in 2000 and continues to decline even as global beef production continues to rise. In a 2013 paper, Ausubel and colleagues argued that global cropland too appears close to peaking, even as global crop production continues to rise.

As with all growth curves, peak consumption of various material resources is not guaranteed to last. These trends could represent the top of a bell curve, the bottom of a new S-curve, or just a long plateau. But what they do demonstrate is that absolute decoupling of resources from economic growth is possible, even given a global economy today that still features robust population and income growth.

#### 4] The alternative locks in warming – its Try-Or-Die.

**Klein** 8/31/**21**, Opinion Writer at the New York Times, former Founder of Vox, and author of “Why We’re Polarized” (Ezra, “Transcript: Ezra Klein Answers Listener Questions” from ‘The Ezra Klein Show’ podcast, *The New York Times*, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/31/podcasts/transcript-ezra-klein-ask-me-anything.html>, Accessed 09-1-2021)

But now let me talk about degrowth more in the terms of it is a direct political project, which is as an answer to climate change. I would cut this into a few pieces. Is degrowth necessary for addressing climate change? Is it the fastest way to address climate change? And is it desirable? It has to be at least one of those things to be the strategy you’d want to take. And I don’t think it is. Let’s start with necessary. Many countries in Europe, even the United States, are **growing while reducing their carbon footprint**. Now, you could say they’re not doing so fast enough depending on the country. But they could all do so much faster if there was enough political will to deploy more renewable technology, to tax carbon, to do a bunch of things that we have not been able to pass. So it is clearly true that we **can decouple growth and energy usage**. Hickel, to be fair, will say that that may be true. But given the speed at which we need to act, we can’t just be deploying renewable energy technology. It would also help the situation if we stopped using as much through material consumption. That is, I think, conceptually true and politically false. I mean, let’s just state that **speed** is, first and foremost, a **political problem**. There is a delta between where we are right now in terms of what we are doing on climate change and where we could be. That delta is big, and that delta gets bigger every year because it gets harder every year. And the time we have to act before we start getting some of the really truly catastrophic feedback loops in play is **shortening**. So you’re now talking here about the speed at which you can move politics. So for something to be faster, it doesn’t just need to be faster if you implemented it. It needs to be something you can implement such it **accelerates the politics** of radical climate action. And that’s where I think **degrowth** completely **falls apart**. And I have tried to look for the answer people give on this, and I’ve never found one that is convincing.

#### 5] People use low-cost fuels instead of renewables.

George MONBIOT 9. Fellowship and Professorships, Oxford. “Is There Any Point in Fighting to Stave Off Industrial Apocalypse.” *Guardian*. August 17. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cif-green/2009/aug/17/environment-climate-change>.

The problem we face is not that we have too little fossil fuel but too much. As oil declines, economies will switch to tar sands, shale gas and coal; as accessible coal declines they’ll switch to ultra-deep reserves (using underground gasification to exploit them) and methane clathrates. The same probably applies to almost all minerals: we will find them, but exploiting them will mean trashing an ever greater proportion of the world’s surface. We have enough non-renewable resources of all kinds to complete our wreckage of renewable resources: forests, soil, fish, fresh water, benign weather. Collapse will come one day, but not before we have pulled everything else down with us.¶ And even if there were an immediate economic cataclysm, it’s not clear that the result would be a decline in our capacity for destruction. In east Africa, for example, I’ve seen how, when supplies of paraffin or kerosene are disrupted, people don’t give up cooking; they cut down more trees. History shows us that wherever large-scale collapse has occurred, psychopaths take over. This is hardly conducive to the rational use of natural assets.

#### 6] Capitalism solves war – its anti-imperialist.

Mousseau 19, Michael. "The end of war: How a robust marketplace and liberal hegemony are leading to perpetual world peace." International Security 44.1 (2019): 160-196. Props to DML for finding. (Professor in the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida)//Elmer

Is war becoming obsolete? There is wide agreement among scholars that war has been in sharp decline since the defeat of the Axis powers in 1945, even as there is little agreement as to its cause.1 Realists reject the idea that this trend will continue, citing states' concerns with the “security dilemma”: that is, in anarchy states must assume that any state that can attack will; therefore, power equals threat, and changes in relative power result in conflict and war.2 Discussing the rise of China, Graham Allison calls this condition “Thucydides's Trap,” a reference to the ancient Greek's claim that Sparta's fear of Athens' growing power led to the Peloponnesian War.3 This article argues that there is no Thucydides Trap in international politics. Rather, the world is moving rapidly toward permanent peace, possibly in our lifetime. Drawing on economic norms theory,4 I show that what sometimes appears to be a Thucydides Trap may instead be a function of factors strictly internal to states and that these factors vary among them. In brief, leaders of states with advanced market-oriented economies have foremost interests in the principle of self-determination for all states, large and small, as the foundation for a robust global marketplace. War among these states, even making preparations for war, is not possible, because they are in a natural alliance to preserve and protect the global order. In contrast, leaders of states with weak internal markets have little interest in the global marketplace; they pursue wealth not through commerce, but through wars of expansion and demands for tribute. For these states, power equals threat, and therefore they tend to balance against the power of all states. Fearing stronger states, however, minor powers with weak internal markets tend to constrain their expansionist inclinations and, for security reasons, bandwagon with the relatively benign market-oriented powers. I argue that this liberal global hierarchy is unwittingly but systematically buttressing states' embrace of market norms and values that, if left uninterrupted, is likely to culminate in permanent world peace, perhaps even something close to harmony. My argument challenges the realist assertion that great powers are engaged in a timeless competition over global leadership, because hegemony cannot exist among great powers with weak markets; these inherently expansionist states live in constant fear and therefore normally balance against the strongest state and its allies.5 Hegemony can exist only among market-oriented powers, because only they care about global order. Yet, there can be no competition for leadership among market powers, because they always agree with the goal of their strongest member (currently the United States) to preserve and protect the global order

#### 7] Cap solves war on a massive scale

Dafoe 14, Political Science and International Economics (Allan & Nina Kelsey; assistant professor in political science at Yale & research associate in international economics at Berkeley; Journal of Peace Research, “Observing the capitalist peace: Examining market-mediated signaling and other mechanisms,” http://jpr.sagepub.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/51/5/619.full)

Countries with liberal political and economic systems rarely use military force against each other. This anomalous peace has been most prominently attributed to the ‘democratic peace’ – the apparent tendency for democratic countries to avoid militarized conflict with each other (Maoz & Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995; Dafoe, Oneal & Russett, 2013).More recently, however, scholars have proposed that the liberal peace could be partly (Russett & Oneal, 2001) or primarily (Gartzke, 2007; but see Dafoe, 2011) attributed to liberal economic factors, such as commercial and financial interdependence. In particular, Erik Gartzke, Quan Li & Charles Boehmer (2001), henceforth referred to as GLB, have demonstrated that measures of capital openness have a substantial and statistically significant association with peaceful dyadic relations. Gartzke (2007) confirms that this association is robust to a large variety of model specifications. To explain this correlation, GLB propose that countries with open capital markets are more able to credibly signal their resolve through the bearing of greater economic costs prior to the outbreak of militarized conflict. This explanation is novel and plausible, and resonates with the rationalist view of asymmetric information as a cause of conflict (Fearon, 1995). Moreover, it implies clear testable predictions on evidential domains different from those examined by GLB. In this article we exploit this opportunity by constructing a confirmatory test of GLB’s theory of market-mediated signaling. We first develop an innovative quantitative case selection technique to identify crucial cases where the mechanism of market-mediated signaling should be most easily observed. Specifically, we employ quantitative data and the statistical models used to support the theory we are probing to create an impartial and transparentmeans of selecting cases in which the theory – as specified by the theory’s creators –makes its most confident predictions.We implement three different case selection rules to select cases that optimize on two criteria: (1) maximizing the inferential leverage of our cases, and (2) minimizing selection bias. We examine these cases for a necessary implication of market-mediated signaling: that key participants drew a connection between conflictual events and adverse market movements. Such an inference is a necessary step in the process by which market-mediated costs can signal resolve. For evidence of this we examine news media, government documents, memoirs, historical works, and other sources. We additionally examine other sources, such as market data, for evidence that economic costs were caused by escalatory events. Based on this analysis, we assess the evidence for GLB’s theory of market mediated costly signaling. Our article then considers a more complex heterogeneous effects version of market-mediated signaling in which unspecified scope conditions are required for the mechanism to operate. Our design has the feature of selecting cases in which scope conditions are most likely to be absent. This allows us to perform an exploratory analysis of these cases, looking for possible scope conditions. We also consider alternative potential mechanisms. Our cases are reviewed in more detail in the online appendix.1 To summarize our results, our confirmatory test finds that while market-mediated signaling may be operative in the most serious disputes, it was largely absent in the less serious disputes that characterize most of the sample of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). This suggests either that other mechanisms account for the correlation between capital openness and peace, or that the scope conditions for market-mediated signaling are restrictive. Of the signals that we observed, strategic market-mediated signals were relatively more important than automatic market-mediated signals in the most serious conflicts. We identify a number of potential scope conditions, such as that (1) the conflict must be driven by bargaining failure arising from uncertainty and (2) the economic costs need to escalate gradually and need to be substantial, but less than the expected military costs of conflict. Finally, there were a number of other explanations that seemed present in the cases we examined and could account for the capitalist peace: capital openness is associated with greater anticipated economic costs of conflict; capital openness leads third parties to have a greater stake in the conflict and therefore be more willing to intervene; a dyadic acceptance of the status quo could promote both peace and capital openness; and countries seeking to institutionalize a regional peace might instrumentally harness the pacifying effects of liberal markets. The correlation: Open capital markets and peace The empirical puzzle at the core of this article is the significant and robust correlation noted by GLB between high levels of capital openness in both members of a dyad and the infrequent incidence of militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and wars between the members of this dyad (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). The index of capital openness (CAPOPEN) is intended to capture the ‘difficulty states face in seeking to impose restrictions on capital flows (the degree of lost policy autonomy due to globalization)’ (Gartzke & Li, 2003: 575). CAPOPEN is constructed from data drawn from the widely used IMF’s Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Controls; it is a combination of eight binary variables that measure different types of government restrictions on capital and currency flow (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 407). The measure of CAPOPEN starts in 1966 and is defined for many countries (increasingly more over time). Most of the countries that do not have a measure of CAPOPEN are communist.2 GLB implement this variable in a dyadic framework by creating a new variable, CAPOPENL, which is the smaller of the two dyadic values of CAPOPEN. This operationalization is sometimes referred to as the ‘weak-link’ specification since the functional form is consonant with a model of war in which the ‘weakest link’ in a dyad determines the probability of war. CAPOPENL has a negative monotonic association with the incidence of MIDs, fatal MIDs, and wars (see Figure 1).3 The strength of the estimated empirical association between peace and CAPOPENL, using a modified version of the dataset and model from Gartzke (2007), is comparable to that between peace and, respectively, joint democracy, log of distance, or the GDP of a contiguous dyad (Gartzke, 2007: 179; Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 412). In summary, CAPOPENL seems to be an important and robust correlate of peace. The question of why specifically this correlation exists, however, remains to be answered. The mechanism: Market-mediated signaling? Gartzke, Li & Boehmer (2001) argue that the classic liberal account for the pacific effect of economic interdependence – that interdependence increases the expected costs of war – is not consistent with the bargaining theory of war (see also Morrow, 1999). GLB argue that ‘conventional descriptions of interdependence see war as less likely because states face additional opportunity costs for fighting. The problem with such an account is that it ignores incentives to capitalize on an opponent’s reticence to fight’ (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001: 400.)4 Instead, GLB (see also Gartzke, 2003; Gartzke & Li, 2003) argue that financial interdependence could promote peace by facilitating the sending of costly signals. As the probability of militarized conflict increases, states incur a variety of automatic and strategically imposed economic costs as a consequence of escalation toward conflict. Those states that persist in a dispute despite these costs will reveal their willingness to tolerate them, and hence signal resolve. The greater the degree of economic interdependence, the more a resolved country could demonstrate its willingness to suffer costs ex ante to militarized conflict. Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s mechanism implies a commonly perceived costly signal before militarized conflict breaks out or escalates: if market-mediated signaling is to account for the correlation between CAPOPENL and the absence of MIDs, then visible market-mediated costs should occur prior to or during periods of real or potential conflict (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). Thus, the proposed mechanism should leave many visible footprints in the historical record. This theory predicts that these visible signals must arise in any escalating conflict, involving countries with high capital openness, in which this mechanism is operative Clarifying the signaling mechanism Gartzke, Li & Boehmer’s signaling mechanism is mostly conceptualized on an abstract, game-theoretic level (Gartzke, Li & Boehmer, 2001). In order to elucidate the types of observations that could inform this theory’s validity, we discuss with greater specificity the possible ways in which such signaling might occur. A conceptual classification of costly signals The term signaling connotes an intentional communicative act by one party directed towards another. Because the term signaling thus suggests a willful act, and a signal of resolve is only credible if it is costly, scholars have sometimes concluded that states involved in bargaining under incomplete information could advance their interests by imposing costs on themselves and thereby signaling their resolve (e.g. Lektzian & Sprecher, 2007). However, the game-theoretic concept of signaling refers more generally to any situation in which an actor’s behavior reveals information about her private information. In fact, states frequently adopt sanctions with low costs to themselves and high costs to their rivals because doing so is often a rational bargaining tactic on other grounds: they are trying to coerce their rival to concede the issue. Bargaining encounters of this type can be conceptualized as a type of war-of-attrition game in which each actor attempts to coerce the other through the imposition of escalating costs. Such encounters also provide the opportunity for signaling: when states resist the costs imposed by their rivals, they ‘signal’ their resolve. If at some point one party perceives the conflict to have become too costly and steps back, that party ‘signals’ a lack of resolve. Thus, this kind of signaling arises as a by-product of another’s coercive attempts. In other words, costly signals come in two forms: self-inflicted (information about a leader arising from a leader’s intentional or incidental infliction of costs on himself) or imposed (information about a leader that arises from a leader’s response to a rival’s imposition of costs). Additionally, costs may arise as an automatic byproduct of escalation towards military conflict or may be a tool of statecraft that is strategically employed during a conflict. The automatic mechanism stipulates that as the probability of conflict increases, various economic assets will lose value due to the risk of conflict and investor flight. However, the occurrence of these costs may also be intentional outcomes of specific escalatory decisions of the states, as in the case of deliberate sanctions; in this case they are strategic. Finally, at a practical level, we identify three different potential kinds of economic costs of militarized conflict that may be mediated by open capital markets: capital costs from political risk, monetary coercion, and business sanctions. T

#### 8] Cap is key to space exploration and development

**Blundell 4** [John, director general of the Institute of Economic Affairs, “Mission to Mars must go private to succeed”, Feb 2, http://news.scotsman.com/marsexploration/Mission-to-Mars-must-go.2499794.jp]

Bush is not finding the billions himself. Rather the tab will be picked up by US taxpayers in perhaps 20 years’ time. **What arrests me is the** unchallenged **assumption that space exploration must be a nationalised industry**. The Soviet effort may be stalled but the Chinese seem committed to joining the race. The European Space Agency is a strange combination of nationalised bodies. NASA is a pure old-fashioned nationalised entity. I argue **we should relinquish the expectationthat space has to be limited to vast quangos.** The mindset we all share is an echo of the rivalry between the evaporated USSR and the still dynamic US. The first bleeps of the Sputnik galvanised the US into accelerating its space effort.   **What we need is capitalists in space. Capitalism needs property rights, enforcement of contracts and the rule of law.** The ideological tussle does not cease once we are beyond the ionosphere.   With the exception of Arthur C Clarke, **none of us imagined the entertainment potential from satellites**. Geostationary lumps of electronic gadgetry beam us our BSkyB television pictures. I remain in awe that Rupert Murdoch can place a device in the skies above Brazil that sends a signal to every home in each hemisphere. Who could have foreseen that mobile phones could keep us chattering without any wiring, or that global position techniques could plot where we all are to within a metre? **These are business applications. Business is already in space.**   Markets detect and apply opportunities that are not envisaged by even the most accomplished technicians. I’m not saying Murdoch has special competences. I imagine he is as baffled by digital miracles as I am. The point is that **companies define and refine what public bodies cannot achieve**. Lift the veil of course and all those **satellite firms are an intricate web of experts supplying ideas and services. We have an infant space market.**   What use will the Moon be? Is there value on Mars other than the TV rights? The answer is nobody can know. We can only make some guesses. The Spanish ships that set off for the US thought they would get to India. The Portuguese knew they’d reach China. The English followed them westwards seeking gold. In fact, they got tobacco. Events always confound expectations.   The arguments for putting men on Mars are expressly vague from President Bush. Perhaps he was really bidding for votes.   From my reading the **best results may be medical. Zero, or low, gravity techniques may allow therapies of which we are ignorant.** It seems facetious to suggest tourism may be a big part of space opportunity but as both the North and South poles are over-populated and there is a queue at the top of Mount Everest, a trip to the Sea of Tranquility may prove a magnet for the wealthy. **Instead of NASA’s grotesque bureaucracy it may be Thomas Cook will be a greater force for exploration.**   NASA could be a procurement body. It need not design and run all space ventures. It could sub-contract far more extensively. Without specialised engineering expertise it is not easy to criticise projects such as the shuttle. It seems to be excessively costly and far too fragile.   **There are private space entrepreneurs already.** They are tiddlers up against the mighty NASA. Yet Dan **Goldin, the NASA leader, says he favours the privatisation of space: "We can’t afford to do solar system exploration until we turn these activities over to the cutting edge private sector**

#### 9] Space k2 solve long-term extinction.

**Pelton 3** [Joseph N. Pelton is director of the Space & Advanced Communications Research Institute at George Washington University and executive director of the Arthur C. Clarke Foundation “COMMENTARY: Why Space? The Top 10 Reasons”, Sept 12, http://www.space.com/news/commentary\_top10\_030912.html]

Actually **the lack of a space program could get us all killed**. I dont mean you or me or my wife or children. I mean that **Homo sapiens as a species are** actually **endangered**. Surprising to some, **a well conceived space program may well be our only hope for long-term survival**. The right or wrong decisions about space research and exploration may be key to the futures of our grandchildren or great-grandchildren or those that follow.  Arthur C. Clarke, the author and screenplay writer for 2001: A Space Odyssey, put the issue rather starkly some years back when he said: The dinosaurs are not around today because they did not have a space program. He was, of course, referring to the fact that we now know **a quite largish meteor crashed into the earth, released poisonous** Iridium **chemicals into our atmosphere and created a killer cloud above the Earth that blocked out the sun for a prolonged period of time.  This could have been foreseen and averted with a sufficiently advanced space program**. But this is only one example of how space programs, such as NASAs Spaceguard program, help protect our fragile planet. **Without a space program we would not know about the large ozone hole in our atmosphere, the hazards of solar radiation, the path of killer hurricanes or many other environmental dangers**.