# TFA R3 – 1AC v Memorial DX

## Pets

My tortoise (Pegu) and my axolotls (Leo(nardo) and Theo(pold))

## Advantage

#### The Populist PiS is in control of Poland. EU sanctions are effective, but the PiS continues to rebel

**Moskwa and Jefferson 20** Moskwa, Wojciech, and Rodney Jefferson. “Poland's Populist Turn.” Bloomberg.com, Bloomberg, 31 Oct. 2020, <https://www.bloomberg.com/quicktake/poland>.//SJEP

PiS- Law and Justice Party

If Poland had a tumultuous 20th century, the 21st started off pretty well. Having just joined NATO, the country entered the European Union and cemented its transition to capitalism with unrivaled economic growth. **Then a 2015 election unleashed a populist backlash, delivering unprecedented power to a party that promised a shakeup in the name of ordinary Poles. They were fed up with uneven wealth and tossed out what they saw as a self-serving elite that had misruled the country. The Law & Justice Party’s drive to control the courts and remove checks on its power sparked sporadic protests and criticism from the EU, which accuses Poland’s leaders of flouting the rule of law.** Former Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned in 2017 that the country was moving “backwards and eastwards.” Is eastern Europe’s biggest economy risking the democratic order it has built since escaping communism? In October, there was a national outcry after a Constitutional Court ruling tightened what was already one of Europe’s most restrictive abortion laws. Women staged a strike and protesters flooded the streets in the biggest threat to the government since it came to power. **The Law & Justice Party had won followers by reducing the tax burden on the poor and providing bigger subsidies for raising children. Winning a second term in 2019, it pushed through more judicial reforms after revamping the constitutional court, nearly doubled the minimum wage and exerted more control over the media. The EU, which gives more money to Poland than any other country on a net basis, has pursued a series of disciplinary measures against Poland for failing to adhere to democratic values; it’s talked of tying future funds to rule-of-law standards, though little has been done.** Poland’s ruling party struck a nerve at home and abroad by calling for the country to assert its national identity, uphold Catholic values and control its borders. It’s also sought to rewrite history, turning Solidarity freedom fighter Lech Walesa into a communist collaborator, making it illegal to suggest that the Polish nation had a role in the Holocaust and backing the creation of “LGBT Free” zones. While it re-nationalized banks and power companies, the economy has remained robust, though the coronavirus pandemic created new challenges. **Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the Law & Justice leader and the man who pulls the strings in Poland, says the government upholds the rule of law and that history shows Poland suffers when outsiders interfere in its politics. He says EU leaders in Brussels should focus on their own problems. He has an ally in Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, who is also challenging the European mainstream. The Polish government has replaced much of the country’s establishment since it came to power, justifying the moves with the same “drain the swamp” appeal used by U.S. President Donald Trump. Foreign banks and retailers have also been criticized for not sharing enough of their profit. Critics say Poland’s leaders have eroded civil liberties, turned the media into a party mouthpiece and transformed state companies into political machines.**

#### The PiS controlled Polish media is key to guarantee future elections and sway voters to the PiS.

**Kalan 19** Kalan, Dariusz. “Poland's State of the Media.” Foreign Policy, 25 Nov. 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/25/poland-public-television-law-and-justice-pis-mouthpiece/.//SJEP

**WARSAW, Poland—Asked about the difference between Poland’s public television station, TVP, before 2015 and after, a veteran journalist who works at the network was quick to respond. “Ruling politicians,” they said, “had never had that kind of impact on television” before. “They have audacity and courage to approach reporters and say, ‘I want to say something, and you have to record me.’ This is our everyday life,” the journalist, who insisted on anonymity, said in early October. After a long moment of reflection, they added: “You will not find true information in our television.” TVP, whose two flagship channels were among the country’s** [**most popular**](https://businessinsider.com.pl/media/tv-radio/najpopularniejsze-programy-i-kanaly-w-2018-roku/24lx5c1) **in 2018, has for the last several years been squarely under the control of Poland’s right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, which clung to power in elections in mid-October. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, these elections were “administratively prepared well.” But the voters’ “informed choice was undermined by a lack of impartiality in the media, especially the public broadcaster,”** [noted](https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/435941) Jan Petersen, the head of an election observation mission**. It was not the first time TVP’s reporting raised concerns. This fall, 54 members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe** [**called**](https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=28221&lang=en) **TVP “a propaganda channel for the ruling party.” Reporters Without Borders similarly** [**stated**](https://rsf.org/en/poland) **that Poland’s public media outlets “have been transformed into government propaganda mouthpieces.” This fall, in interviews with almost a dozen current and former TVP journalists and executives, most asked to go unnamed. None argued that TVP’s political news has been objective. In fact, many openly admitted that TVP is purposefully keeping quiet about PiS scandals, gives airtime almost exclusively to pro-PiS voices, and has campaigned against the party’s opponents. Those I spoke to who back PiS largely argued that the hard line was both necessary to ensure a second PiS term and a legitimate response to the private media’s alleged support of the opposition. Interlocutors on both sides believe that there is nothing unique in what is happening in Poland. Rather, their country is just one among many suffering the rise of fake news. According to Ryszard Bankowicz, the head of the Polish Council of Media Ethics, a nonpartisan body promoting principles of ethical journalism, readers and viewers around the world have ceased to want real information.** “They chose a given newspaper or TV station not in order to find the truth but to confirm their own beliefs or take a side against or for someone,” Bankowicz said. “And many journalists do not know principles of ethical journalism. This is a worldwide trend, and Poland is its victim.” But not everyone has given up. This year, Bankowicz, took a public stand on one of the [most serious accusations](https://www.rp.pl/Platforma-Obywatelska/190119723-Borusewicz-To-skutek-nagonki-na-Adamowicza.html) against TVP, made by Bogdan Borusewicz, a former democratic opposition activist under the communist regime and a former speaker of the Senate, among others: that it had incited hatred against Pawel Adamowicz, Gdansk’s mayor, who was stabbed to death at a January charity event. Adamowicz, a popular liberal politician, had been a target of numerous TVP reports that had suggested he was corrupt and had close ties with local businessmen. In a [report](http://www.rem.net.pl/data/20190211.pdf) published in February, Bankowicz wrote that “the authors of these publications manipulated the facts … in order to present Adamowicz as an unreliable person.” He concluded that “TVP spews propaganda, which serves to destroy opponents of the ruling party.” However, he refused to comment on whether violations of journalistic ethics contributed to Adamowicz’s death. “TVP is certainly not to blame for this tragic event,” said Maciej Stanecki, who was TVP’s deputy chairman from 2016 to 2019. But he was quick to add: “But for allowing the radicalization of the public opinion, of the crowd … well, I think that every media person must be aware that such responsibility exists.” Stanecki, a film producer, is proud of his achievements at TVP during his leadership, which include the television’s technological development, but he is aware that the network’s reputation has been tarnished.

#### Biased polish media shifts public perception to the PiS and alters election outcomes.

**Gipson 21** Gipson, Abigail. “New Report: Poland's Public Media Serve as Propaganda Tool.” International Press Institute, 17 Dec. 2021, https://ipi.media/new-report-polands-public-media-serve-as-propaganda-tool/.//SJEP

**A** [**recent report**](http://www.batory.org.pl/upload/files/Programy%20operacyjne/Masz%20Glos/RaportTDEnglFin_June%2010N.pdf) **by Poland’s Society of Journalists and the Batory Foundation finds that public media in Poland do not fulfil their role as a source of independent and balanced news, but rather function as a propaganda tool for the government. “We saw that the government was using public service media, which is under its control, to support its own programme and its own candidates in the election”, Krzysztof Bobiński, who is a board member for the Society of Journalists, explained in an interview with the International Press Institute (IPI). The report observes that Wiadomości, the main news programme on Poland’s public broadcasting station TVP, demonstrates notable bias in favour of the ruling Law and Justice party (PiS). The bias manifests in both proportionally higher screen time for members of PiS and overwhelmingly positive coverage of the party and its interests. In addition to favourable coverage of the ruling party, the programme often casts opposition politicians and their supporters in a negative light.** At times it neglects to cover the opposition at all and omits stories that may reflect poorly on PiS. TVP receives about 28 percent of viewing share, the highest among Polish broadcasters, and Wiadomości averages 2.4 million viewers daily. However, according to a poll conducted earlier this year, Wiadomości ranked very low in public trust, Andrzej Krajewski, the author of the report, said in an interview. Public broadcasters should be independent, giving fair and balanced coverage to all political parties. But according to the report, Wiadomości has neglected to live up to that standard. The report concludes that Wiadomości has “failed to observe the conditions of [article 21.1 of Poland’s law](http://prawo.sejm.gov.pl/isap.nsf/download.xsp/WDU19930070034/O/D19930034.pdf) on radio and TV, which requires public service television to be ‘pluralistic, unbiased and independent’.” “This is public media we are all paying for, it’s our public media, and they’re breaking the law”, Bobiński commented. “They’re not only breaking the law because they’re biased, but also they’re breaking the law because they’re [PiS] using this media as part of their election campaign, and that should be in their election campaign expenses. Really, they are using our money to bamboozle us.” In a statement accompanying the report, the Society of Journalists, an independent group affiliated with the European Federation of Journalists, noted that in 2019 TVP received a one billion złoty (250 million euro) subsidy from the government on top of its advertising and license fee income. From 2016 TVP budget subsidies were more than two billion złoty (500 million euro). Poland’s media regulator, the National Council for Radio and Television (KRRiT), is legally obligated to monitor media activity and ensure Poland’s public broadcast laws are implemented. However, when the Council was approached with complaints about TVP’s failure to comply with impartiality laws, it failed to take action, Bobiński said. This inaction by the KRRiT is part of what spurred the media monitoring behind the report. “At that point, what does a citizen do? You either don’t do anything or you try to fill the gap that’s been left by a state institution, which is mandated by the constitution to do this work”, Bobiński said. **The report examined Wiadomości coverage from May 10 to 23, the period leading up to the 2019 European Union parliamentary elections. During this time, two-thirds of the news items reported by Wiadomości were election-related. All but one of the stories covering PiS were positive, and the outlier was neutral. The opposition European Coalition was covered negatively in all 33 news items in which it appeared. Liberal and left-wing parties contesting the election were not mentioned at all. The report also notes that Wiadomości “did not mention climate change, a key issue in many other member states.” Shortly after coming to power in the fall of 2015, PiS made moves to disrupt and reform Polish public media.** Parliament passed a law that terminated the contracts of the heads of Poland’s public television and radio broadcasters. The treasury minister was given the power to hire and fire broadcasting directors, a matter that was previously decided by a media supervisory committee. In early 2016, Jacek Kurski, a former PiS member of the European Parliament, was appointed director of TVP, and he remains in this role today. **TVP has not been PiS’s only target. Recently PiS officials** [**announced plans**](https://www.ft.com/content/1a4f9232-9358-11e9-aea1-2b1d33ac3271) **to “re-polonize” media in Poland if they maintain the majority in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Bringing private media in Poland under Polish ownership has been part of PiS’s agenda for several years, though legally it would be difficult to force out non-Polish media companies that are from within the EU, Krajewski explained. However, these companies could be bought out by Polish enterprises.** Foreign-owned broadcasters are some of the most critical in the Polish media landscape, and the threat of their capture by the government presents a serious risk to plurality in Polish news PiS’s [capture of Polish public media](http://ipi.media/polish-public-broadcaster-veers-from-impartial-mission/) poses ominous repercussions not only for Poland but for the European Union as well. **In its statement, the Society of Journalists expressed concern that the “transformation of the public service media into a propaganda tool violates the right […] to a fair election”, and that this transformation “poses the question of whether the election of the Polish members of the European Parliament in May 2019 was conducted in an honest and fair manner”. Wiadomości’s election coverage will continue, as Poland will hold parliamentary elections this fall. Wiadomości and TVP have the potential to significantly affect voters’ perceptions of both PiS and the opposition. “Watching Wiadomości every day, they are doing exactly what they did during the previous election period”, Krajewski said. “It’s propaganda. For instance, almost every day they denigrate [President of the European Council and former Polish Prime Minister] Donald Tusk because possibly he will be a candidate for Polish president, so they want to lower his chances in the local elections.” Without fair, balanced, and transparent coverage of all political parties, Polish citizens cannot make informed decisions at the polling booths. “With such strong propaganda by public media, which is illegal, the results of the elections are questionable”, Krajewski said.**

#### Poland will never leave the EU, but PiS power ensures packed courts and decisions that deck legitimacy-that spills over and causes a massive crisis

**Economist 21** Economist, Oct 21 2021, "Poland is a problem for the EU precisely because it will not leave," https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/10/14/poland-is-a-problem-for-the-eu-precisely-because-it-will-not-leave//SJJK

Brexit, before it happened, was imagined in many forms. Hard, soft, Norwegian, Swiss or Turkish. Briefly, an Albanian option was discussed. Often it was just “clean”. A “clean Brexit” would free Britain from the eu’s single market, customs union and its courts, advocates said. Just as there are many ways of leaving the eu, there are many ways of remaining. There is the clean version, in which countries quietly accept the eu’s strictures. Then there is the messy version, where governments foul up the club. Think of it as “dirty remain”. **To see dirty remain in action, look at Poland. Its Constitutional Tribunal challenged the legal order of the club in a ruling on October 7th. In a case brought by the Polish prime minister, the court, which is stuffed with allies of the government**, **ruled that fundamental parts of eu law do not trump Poland’s constitution. The judgment, which was exactly what the government wanted, has punctured six decades of European case law. In short, the eu’s supreme court is no longer supreme, as far as Poland is concerned. Poles protested in droves, claiming that the government was attempting to drag the country out of the bloc against their will. But anyone expecting a British-style “Polexit” will be disappointed**. S**upport for the eu within the country is among the highest in the union. Standing for an election in Poland on a platform of quitting the eu would be akin to a manifesto promising to drown puppies.** **The problem is not that Poland is trying to leave the eu; the problem is that it intends to stay.** Dirty remain is more pernicious than Polexit. **The risk is that the eu’s legal order in Poland slowly fades,** argues Daniel Sarmiento of the Complutense University of Madrid**. A domino effect takes over**. **If courts across the eu cannot trust their Polish peers, then the eu’s legal system starts to gum up**. An arrest warrant here is not honoured there; a banking licence granted in one country may not be honoured in another. **Over time, an area over which people, goods, capital and services can flow freely turns into one where they can move only with trouble. Bad behaviour can spread**. Eurosceptics have mostly given up on leaving the eu. It is, as Britain has shown, rather stressful. **Eric Zemmour, the nationalist radical mulling a run in the French presidential election, has pledged to restore the primacy of French law over eu law**. Even more mild-mannered figures, such as Michel Barnier, the eu’s Brexit negotiator, toy with the same idea. **If one government can avoid abiding by unpopular rulings by the eu’s top court with little fear of sanction, it becomes a tempting option for all**. As an idea, “dirty remain” has a veneer of respectability. Its Polish proponents argue that everyone else does it, but only Poland is attacked. Polish judges are fond of citing their German counterparts, who have accused the European Court of Justice (ecj) of overstepping the mark in recent years. In such rulings, the medium counts as much as the message. No one doubts the independence of Germany’s constitutional court. No one believes in the independence of Poland’s. The messages are different, too. The German court accused the ecj of exceeding its mandate in approving a programme of bond-buying by the European Central Bank. **The Polish court said the country’s constitution trumped fundamental parts of eu law, such as “ever closer union”, a much more sweeping ruling**. The German court was playing with matches; **its Polish counterpart doused the eu’s legal system in petrol and deliberately started a fire. On paper, the solution to such a disagreement is simple: leave the eu**. Britain made things easy for the club when it departed. Rather than hanging around blocking things and generally causing a fuss, it followed the procedures as laid down in Article 50 of the treaties it was so keen to leave. Doing this without a clear plan was “like putting a gun in your mouth and pulling the trigger” according to Dominic Cummings, the man who led the Vote Leave campaign. Yet to the surprise of eu diplomats this is exactly what the British government did. **Instead, Poland is following a strategy that played out in Watchmen, a comic**. **In it, Rorschach, a vigilante, is sent to jail, where he greets a fellow inmate in the canteen by tipping the contents of a deep-fat fryer over his head**. “None of you seem to understand,” he says to his now-crispy foe. **“I’m not locked in here with you. You’re locked in here with me.”** **In the eu, destinies are linked. If one person starts hurling a fryer, everyone must duck**. David Cameron, Britain’s prime minister at the time, begged for concessions from the eu ahead of Britain’s referendum on leaving it, including an opt-out from “ever closer union”. **Poland threw its fryer without warning.** Such dirty **tricks are difficult to deal with inside the club**. **A nation-state can enforce its will internally, sending in the police or even, in extremis, the army to quell insurrection. The eu has no such tools.** The European Commission could refuse to sign off on Poland’s share of its covid-19 recovery fund, depriving the country of €57bn ($66bn), for instance. **The danger is that this will prompt Poland to bring the eu’s workings to a halt in protest.** Amicable divorce or poisonous marriage Bad behaviour outside the club is less of a problem. After doing things by the book as a member, Britain has discovered a rebellious streak, trying to renege on the terms of its deal with the eu. This causes little trouble for the eu. Rather than an existential problem, Brexit is a tedious one involving the movement of sausages across the Irish sea. Britain has been cauterised. By contrast, **the rule of law in Poland is an open wound**. **It is a long-term threat, which needs to be solved if the eu is to thrive**. **Just as a financial crisis in one country can spread to another, so can a constitutional crisis.** Dealing with a departure is relatively easy for the eu. Handling dirty remain is much harder.

#### And the EU is already weak and Poland is at the front of their issues-further legitimacy crisis destroys global democracy and emboldens further russian invasions

**Tisdall 21** Simon Tisdall Guardian, 11-21-2021, "Instability grips a weakened Europe as global predators smell blood," https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/21/instability-grips-a-weakened-europe-as-global-predators-smell-blood//SJJK

**Threats from Russia and China, a weaker US security alliance and internal discord expose fundamental strategic weaknesses** Is [Europe](https://www.theguardian.com/world/europe-news) entering a dangerous new age of instability? **Not since the height of the cold war with the Soviet Union has it looked so vulnerable to hostile forces.** Accumulating external threats and internal divisions, coupled with a weakening US security alliance, relentless Russian subversion, and power-hungry China’s war on western values are exposing fundamental strategic weaknesses. Europe increasingly resembles a beleaguered democratic island in an anarchic world, where a rising tide of authoritarianism, impunity and international rule-breaking threatens to inundate it. Some European leaders understand this, notably French president [Emmanuel Macron](https://www.theguardian.com/world/emmanuel-macron), yet long-term policy remedies elude them. For example, Belarus dictator Alexander Lukashenko’s use of migrants to pressure the EU is plainly outrageous. Yet it worked, in the sense that Germany’s caretaker chancellor, Angela Merkel, phoned him for a chat, ending his post-coup isolation. [Her unilateral demarche](https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20211117-merkel-and-lukashenko-agree-to-talks-about-belarusian-border-crisi) understandably infuriated Baltic states. It was a concession to a thug, not a lasting solution. Talking of thugs, Russian president Vladimir Putin’s ongoing intimidation of Ukraine risks widening conflagration. The latest border build-up of 90,000 Russian troops may be [sabre-rattling,](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/nov/14/uk-must-be-ready-for-war-with-russia-says-armed-forces-chief) similar to provocations in the Donbas and Black Sea last spring. If not, Europe will only have itself to blame. Putin’s importunities stem directly from its de facto acquiescence in his illegal 2014 annexation of Crimea. Instability on Europe’s periphery extends to the Balkans amid well-founded fears that Bosnia-Herzegovina is slipping back into conflict 26 years after the [Dayton peace accords.](https://www.theguardian.com/world/from-the-archive-blog/2020/nov/18/the-dayton-accords-a-peace-agreement-for-bosnia-archive-1995) Resurgent ethnic nationalism, embodied by the separatist Bosnian Serb leader, Milorad Dodik, is fuelled by Belgrade and Moscow. **A larger, strategic problem is the EU’s inability** [**to fulfil promises**](https://ecfr.eu/article/western-balkans-in-trouble-why-the-eu-should-make-a-new-offer-to-the-region/) **of closer integration with the region**. Europe’s relationship with Turkey, a key gatekeeper, is dysfunctional, too, thanks partly to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, its deeply unpleasant president. When he menaced EU members Greece and Cyprus last year, Macron [sent naval forces](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/29/greece-turkey-standoff-france-send-warships-east-mediterranean) to the eastern Mediterranean. The rest of Europe sat on its hands. Erdoğan is also meddling in Ukraine and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, which [flared up again](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/tensions-high-after-deadly-clashes-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan-gwmpfqgdd) last week. Yet Brussels pays him to keep out Middle Eastern refugees, so it **hardly dares challenge him. The vice-like circle of instability squeezing Europe is about more than actual or potential armed conflict.** One of its bigger dilemmas is migration. Despite the searing 2015 Syrian refugee crisis, **the EU still lacks an agreed, humane policy**. **That guarantees more trouble down the road.** **One of the main objectors, ironically,** [**is Poland,**](https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/11/10/eu-council-president-visits-poland-to-express-solidarity-in-face-of-hybrid-attack-by-belarus/) **which rejects migrant quotas.** **Yet faced by border mayhem, its hypocritical rightwing leaders who, like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, are in a bitter fight with Brussels over rule of law and democracy issues, appealed for EU solidarity.** Disturbing, too, is the way **much European opinion appears to have accepted illegal pushbacks and routine mistreatment of asylum-seekers**, whether in camps in Libya or on the beaches of Greece, in breach of EU law. This reflects another self-inflicted wound: the increased influence of xenophobic, rightwing populists and the re-normalisation of circa 1914 ultra-nationalist politics across Europe. **If Europeans will not stand up for western democratic values in a world overrun by Donald Trump clones and copycats, who will?** Sadly, they cannot look to Britain. No longer a trusted friend, the UK under Boris Johnson, sniping and sneering from the sidelines, has become another peripheral conflict zone for the EU. Britain is more irritant than ally. Defence minister Ben Wallace used the linked Belarus-Ukraine crises last week to advance the Brexit agenda and seal arms deals with Warsaw and Kiev. Tellingly, the [UK sent troops,](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/18/british-soldiers-to-give-more-support-to-poland-amid-belarus-border-crisis) not humanitarian aid, to the Polish border. Europe’s age of instability also owes much to events beyond its control. Few forecast Trump would try to blow up what Franklin D Roosevelt called the “arsenal of democracy”, and the western alliance with it. [He may yet try again](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/15/us/politics/republicans-2022-redistricting-maps.html). Likewise, few predicted, as [Merkel now admits,](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-germany-may-have-been-naive-china-first-merkel-says-2021-11-17/) that China would emerge as such a domineering, economically aggressive, anti-democratic global competitor. **US president Joe Biden reassures Europeans that Nato, even after Afghanistan, is as vital as ever. But his** [**edgy video summit**](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/16/biden-xi-summit-highlights-tensions-and-desire-for-cooperation) **with China’s Xi Jinping last week showed where his true focus lies. Putin sees this, and smells blood. Europe’s gas supply is one pressure point. Covert cyber-attacks are another. Russia’s reckless anti-satellite missile test, scorning European safety concerns, was the first recorded act of** [**hooliganism in outer space.**](https://www.theguardian.com/science/2021/nov/16/a-wild-west-out-there-russian-satellite-debris-worsens-space-junk-problem) **Europe’s inability to make Putin pay a serious price for aggression in Georgia and Crimea, his decimation of Russian democracy, his foreign election meddling, and his murderous attacks on Alexei Navalny – and other opponents on European soil – heightens a sense of decline. On China, there is nothing close to a united front. Such weakness encourages other predators. So what is to be done?** Europe, as ever, is a house divided. East Europeans continue to place their faith in Washington rather than Brussels, despite clear portents of another transatlantic rupture if the Democrats lose the White House in 2024. **The EU bureaucracy is feebly led, its parliament toothless. Germany lacks a proven leader. In France, Macron faces** [**a vicious spring election**](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/eric-zemmour-macrons-far-right-rival-wins-backing-from-russia-t25c086kc) **scrap against the Russian-backed far right.** Yet it is Macron’s ideas about enhanced European political, security and military “strategic autonomy”, and a stronger, more fiscally and economically integrated EU, that offer the most hopeful path forward. EU defence ministers last week discussed [a “Strategic Compass” plan](https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-policy-document-against-russia-china/) to boost joint capabilities. But agreement on proposed “rapid-deployment forces” and the like seems a long way off. As [France](https://www.theguardian.com/world/france) prepares to assume the EU presidency, will other leaders recognise this critical moment and back Macron? In a world of sharks, snakes and scary monsters, Europe’s independence, cohesion and values are on the line like never before.

#### And Russian invasions beyond Ukraine cause NATO draw in-they wont let Putin go beyond Ukraine

**Finnis 3-3** Alex Finnis, 3-3-2022, "Whether Russia could attack other countries after Ukraine and if Nato members are under threat," inews.co.uk, https://inews.co.uk/news/world/will-russia-attack-other-countries-what-putin-after-ukraine-invasion-nato-members-threat-1495774//SJJK

[Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is days behind schedule](https://inews.co.uk/news/ukraine-russia-advance-kyiv-little-progress-three-days-uk-officials-1495416?ico=in-line_link), but **fears remain Vladimir Putin** [**may still have eyes on pushing further into Europe**](https://inews.co.uk/news/world/russia-will-stop-ukraine-what-putin-want-invasion-how-likely-attack-other-countries-1491685?ico=in-line_link)**.** [Officials say a 40-mile Russian convoy heading for Kyiv](https://inews.co.uk/news/world/ukraine-live-stream-watch-latest-video-updates-kyiv-as-russian-convoy-approaches-capital-1494144?ico=in-line_link) has made little progress in several days, and remains 30km away from the centre of the capital, having been thwarted by [Ukrainian resistance](https://inews.co.uk/news/ukrainian-civilians-block-russian-troops-throw-themselves-on-ground-video-1494371?ico=in-line_link), mechanical breakdown and congestion. President Putin’s forces have managed to capture the city of Kherson, but Kharkiv, Chernihiv and Mariupol are still in Ukrainian hands despite days of heavy shelling. The [Ukrainian Government has claimed](https://inews.co.uk/news/ukraine-war-death-toll-human-cost-russias-invasion-growing-civilians-killed-unclear-1494274?ico=in-line_link) that more than 5,300 Russians and more than 2,000 Ukrainian civilians have died, although these numbers have not been verified. The United Nations said the real toll was likely to be “much higher”. [Russia has ramped up the ferocity of its attacks](https://inews.co.uk/news/russias-war-on-ukraine-who-is-winning-the-war-one-week-in-1495000?ico=in-line_link) in response to the frustration, and has been accused of war crimes for its use of cluster bombs. [Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said the UK and its allies need “to do more to contain this aggression”](https://inews.co.uk/news/ukraine-russia-attack-baltic-states-war-europe-nato-warns-liz-truss-eu-allies-1495619?ico=in-line_link), with fears President Putin could attack the Baltic region. Here’s what we know about the chances of Russia’s invasion going beyond Ukraine. Will Russia attack other countries? Russia has not stated any intentions to push beyond Ukraine, but Moscow also previously said it would not invade Ukraine. Karin von Hippel, who was a nonpolitical senior adviser at the US State Department during the Obama administration told [NBC](https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/finland-nato-baltics-putin-threat-ukraine-invasion-europe-rcna17805) President Putin could potentially target non-Nato nations in Eastern Europe, [such as Moldova and Georgia](https://inews.co.uk/news/world/moldova-part-nato-ukraine-not-member-russia-invasion-mean-for-country-1493549?ico=in-line_link). He added that if **the Russian leader “starts to slowly expand his empire, there will be several other places that are in Nato that are going to be getting extremely stressed out”. “It’s very unclear at this stage that anyone can convince Putin to do anything other than what he wants to do,”** he said. [**Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko**](https://inews.co.uk/news/world/belarus-nato-why-isnt-part-russia-invasion-ukraine-lukashenko-helping-putin-explained-1491006?ico=in-line_link) **may have revealed Russian** [**plans to invade Moldova**](https://inews.co.uk/news/world/moldova-part-nato-ukraine-not-member-russia-invasion-mean-for-country-1493549?ico=in-line_link)**.** [His troops are believed to have joined Russia’s invasion of Ukraine](https://inews.co.uk/news/world/belarus-troops-ukraine-join-russia-invasion-president-lukashenko-army-1491050?ico=in-line_link), having reportedly entered the Chernihiv region in the north of the country on Tuesday morning. [The UK has imposed sanctions on Belarus](https://inews.co.uk/news/belarus-sanctions-uk-punishes-alexander-lukashenkos-military-allies-role-ukraine-invasion-1492829?ico=in-line_link) for its role in the war. President Lukashenko is a close ally of President Putin, and Russia has been able to use his country as a launchpad for attacks. [**But their plans could go beyond Ukraine**](https://inews.co.uk/news/world/russia-will-stop-ukraine-what-putin-want-invasion-how-likely-attack-other-countries-1491685?ico=in-line_link) **based on a map shown during a televised broadcast from President Lukashenko. The map showed attack plans for Ukraine, but also displayed a possible route into Moldova from the Ukrainian port city of Odessa, via a large red arrow.** It also showed red shading around the Moldovan border, potentially indicating plans for an occupation. If Russia were to invade Moldova or Georgia the situation is likely to be similar to that of Ukraine, in that Nato forces including the UK and US would support Moldova by sending both military and non-military aid, but would not engage in battle with Russian troops directly. Are Nato members under threat? The Foreign Secretary has said the UK will join its Baltic allies in moving from “deterrence to defence” on its borders. Speaking at a press conference in Lithuania, she said: “The UK’s commitment to the Baltics and to Article 5 are unyielding.” Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are all part of Nato. [Nato uses a principle of collective defence under Article 5 of its treaty](https://inews.co.uk/news/world/article-5-nato-what-pact-explained-collective-defence-russia-ukraine-war-1484451?ico=in-line_link). It means an attack against one Nato member is considered an attack against all. “We are reinforcing Nato’s eastern flank and supporting European security through the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force,” Ms Truss added. “We are here in the Baltic region. We lead and have doubled our enhanced forward presence in Estonia. Our allies are leading troops across the Baltics. “At the Nato foreign ministry meeting tomorrow we will be working together to strengthen our collective defensive in light of the changed security situation across Europe.” The Foreign Secretary echoed comments made by Lithuanian foreign minister Gabrielius Landsbergis, who said it is vital the Baltic states move from “deterrence to defence”. “This is why we need a change in political approach,” he said. “We also need practical means for that and they are needed for all three Baltic states. “So that if Putin decides to test Nato resistance in this region it would be responded right way. “It would get a political response and also a clear defensive response, if that would be needed.” **The comments imply that if Russia were to attempt to annex any of the Baltic states, Nato would respond with full military might, plunging the West into a war with Russia.**

#### Ukraine wont go nuclear but if other countries get drawn in nuclear escalation is inevitable

**Majumdar 17** Dave Majumdar, 9-7-2017, "A War with Russia Would Go Nuclear. Here's Why.," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/war-russia-would-go-nuclear-heres-why-22202//SJJK

Simply put, **if Russia were faced with a large-scale attack that could defeat its conventional forces, Moscow might resort to nuclear weapons.** While a recent [RAND Corporation study](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf) concluded that **Russia could overrun NATO’s member states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the Baltics within sixty hours**, the war games did not simulate the use of nuclear weapons. **If, however, a war were to breakout between NATO and Russia, nuclear weapons would certainly come into play**—especially if the conflict were going poorly for Moscow. **Unlike the Soviet Union, which had a stated “no first use” policy, modern Russia explicitly rejected that pledge in 1993**. In fact, as Moscow’s conventional forces continued to atrophy during the economic and social meltdown of the 1990s, Russia developed a doctrine [called de-escalation in 2000](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/dc3ma00). Simply put, if Russia were faced with a large-scale attack that could defeat its conventional forces, Moscow might resort to nuclear weapons. In 2010, Russia revised the doctrine somewhat as its conventional forces started to recover from the aftermath of the Soviet collapse—the current version states [Moscow would use nuclear weapons in](https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf) situations “that would put in danger the very existence of the state.” While the RAND study shows that Russia would be able to take the Baltics fairly easily, the war game didn’t explore what would happen in the event of a NATO counter offensive. The RAND study simply states: Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options, all bad: a bloody counteroffensive, fraught with escalatory risk, to liberate the Baltics; to escalate itself, as it threatened to do to avert defeat during the Cold War; or to concede at least temporary defeat, with uncertain but predictably disastrous consequences for the Alliance and, not incidentally, the people of the Baltics. A NATO counter-offensive would be bloody and fraught with escalatory risk—but it’s one of the probable outcomes of a Russian invasion. **In that eventuality, Russian conventional forces—of which only a portion are well trained and well equipped—would likely be severely damaged or even destroyed**. Moreover, if NATO forces hit targets inside Russia or crossed over into Russian territory, Moscow might conclude that there is a danger to the existence of the state. After all, Moscow has expressed concerns in the past that regime change by the West is an all too real danger. **In that situation, Russia might counter advancing NATO forces with its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons**. The Russian tactical nuclear arsenal is not nearly as large as the Soviet arsenal had once been, but concrete numbers are hard to come by. The Soviet Union was thought to have possessed between 15,000 and 25,000 tactical nuclear weapons of all types ranging from suitcase-sized containers and nuclear mines to short-range aircraft delivered missiles, nuclear gravity bombs and artillery shells—as well as short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile warheads. While Moscow has been slowly eliminating its non-strategic arsenal since the end of the Cold War, Russia many still have as many as [4,000 tactical nuclear weapons](https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf), according to the Congressional Research Service. However, other analyses suggest that Russia has as few as [2,000 operational tactical nuclear weapons.](http://bos.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/04/13/0096340215581363.full) A more recent analysis by [Royal United Service Institute’s Igor Sutyagin suggests](https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf) that Russia has a maximum of 1,040 non-strategic nuclear weapons. Of those about 128-210 warheads are assigned to the Russian ground forces. The Russian navy has about 330 tactical nuclear weapons, while the Russian air force has 334 non-strategic weapons. Meanwhile, Russian air defense forces have a further sixty-eight to 166 tactical nuclear weapons mounted on various surface-to-air missiles. Another report, this one by the [Federation of American Scientists, suggests that](http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/) Russia doesn’t have any deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons. “All are declared to be in central storage. Several thousand retired non-strategic warheads are awaiting dismantlement,” reads the FAS’s Status of World Nuclear Forces.

#### Nuclear detonations cause nuclear winter and extinction, and the rainout effect is wrong – self-lofting means soot goes above the clouds

**Starr 15** Steven Starr, 10-14-2015, "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction," Federation Of American Scientists, [Steven Starr is the director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility. He has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology.], https://fas.org/pir-pubs/nuclear-war-nuclear-winter-and-human-extinction/, SJBE

While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. **That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs**. **Following the detonation** (in conflict) **of** US and/or Russian launch-ready **strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke** (up to [180 million tons](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/ToonRobockTurcoPhysicsToday.pdf), according to peer-reviewed studies), **which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere.** [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see [Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf).] **The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more**. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. **Once in the stratosphere, the smoke** (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) **would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a** [**dense stratospheric smoke layer**](http://www.nucleardarkness.org/warconsequences/hundredfiftytonessmoke/). **The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere.** Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. **For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia.** [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see [Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockNW2006JD008235.pdf).] Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. **Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer.** Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? The results of such a scenario are obvious. **Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed,** resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet. Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment? It is, of course, debatable whether or not nuclear winter could cause human extinction. There is essentially no way to truly “know” without fighting a strategic nuclear war. Yet while it is crucial that we all understand the mortal peril that we face, **it is not necessary to engage in an unwinnable academic debate as to whether any humans will survive.**

## Solvency

#### Plan text – In the Peoples Republic of Poland, the free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy

#### Objectivity means consistent and transparent methods of testing factual claims.

Dean (Committee of Concerned Journalists training director and API Executive Director Tom Rosenstiel formerly co-chaired the committee). No Date, American Press Institute, The lost meaning of ‘objectivity’, <https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/journalism-essentials/bias-objectivity/lost-meaning-objectivity/>

One of the great confusions about journalism, write Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel in The Elements of Journalism, is **the concept of objectivity**. When the concept originally evolved, it **was not meant to imply that journalists were free of bias. Quite the contrary.** The term began to appear as part of journalism after the turn of the 20th century, particularly in the 1920s, out of a growing recognition that journalists were full of bias, often unconsciously. **Objectivity called for journalists to develop a consistent method of testing information – a transparent approach to evidence – precisely so that personal and cultural biases would not undermine the accuracy of their work.** In the latter part of the 19th century, journalists talked about something called “realism” rather than objectivity. This was the idea that if reporters simply dug out the facts and ordered them together, truth would reveal itself rather naturally. Realism emerged at a time when journalism was separating from political party affiliations and becoming more accurate. It coincided with the invention of what journalists call the inverted pyramid, in which a journalist lines the facts up from the most important to the least important, thinking it helps audiences understand things naturally. At the beginning of the 20th century, however, some journalists began to worry about the naïveté of realism. In part, reporters and editors were becoming more aware of the rise of propaganda and the role of press agents. At a time when Freud was developing his theories of the unconscious and painters like Picasso were experimenting with Cubism, journalists were also developing a greater recognition of human subjectivity. In 1919, Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, an associate editor for the New York World, wrote an influential and scathing account of how cultural blinders had distorted the New York Times coverage of the Russian Revolution. “In the large, the news about Russia is a case of seeing not what was, but what men wished to see,” they wrote. Lippmann and others began to look for ways for the individual journalist “to remain clear and free of his irrational, his unexamined, his unacknowledged prejudgments in observing, understanding and presenting the news.” Journalism, Lippmann declared, was being practiced by “untrained accidental witnesses.” Good intentions, or what some might call “honest efforts” by journalists, were not enough. Faith in the rugged individualism of the tough reporter, what Lippmann called the “cynicism of the trade,” was also not enough. Nor were some of the new innovations of the times, like bylines, or columnists. **The solution, Lippmann argued, was for journalists to acquire more of “the scientific spirit … There is but one kind of unity possible in a world as diverse as ours. It is unity of method, rather than aim; the unity of disciplined experiment.” Lippmann meant by this that journalism should aspire to “a common intellectual method and a[n] common area of valid fact.”** To begin, Lippmann thought, the fledgling field of journalist education should be transformed from “trade schools designed to fit men for higher salaries in the existing structure.” Instead, the field should make its cornerstone the study of evidence and verification. Although this was an era of faith in science, Lippmann had few illusions. “It does not matter that the news is not susceptible to mathematical statement. In fact, just because news is complex and slippery, good reporting requires the exercise of the highest scientific virtues.”

#### Advocacy means to be biased for a specific viewpoint.

Cambridge Dictionary No Date [Cambridge Dictionary, No Date, "advocacy," https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/advocacy]/Kankee

public support for an idea, plan, or way of doing something:

However, despite internal disagreements, most journalists generally agree that journalistic objectivity aspires to having news reports’ depiction of what occurred as being close as possible to what actually happened, focusing on facts over opinions and values. Lofty as that goal may be, there are still two major hiccups of note that cause the line between objectivity and advocacy to be blurry.

(1) Though reality itself is objective given the actual existence of one set of true facts, individuals’ perceptions and interpretations of what is real isn’t. Journalist’s attempts to make objective conclusions about what actually happened may come to drastically different beliefs about those facts and what they entail. One may say one’s view of what is objective is within itself subjective.

(2) Reporters often use statements from eyewitnesses to an event as testimony to what happened during an event – these eyewitnesses may advocate a specific belief about what happened. Given the reporter themselves isn’t advocating anything, and is just using the testimony of someone else, they could in effect be advocating something while saying their reporting is objective.

(3) Reporters quoting both sides of a story can falsely conflate both sides of having equal weight on an issue in the form of false balance. This is explained further in neg contention 1.

What’s also important to note is that journalist’s adherence to objectivity has drastically changed over time. Originally, most journalism was subjective and partisan, but slowly became more and more objective to expand to a wider audience (and sell more papers), which led to several decades of strong journalistic ethics until the 1990s. With the rise of the internet and Fox News, objectivity again became lackluster.

#### Free press is a country’s

Cambridge Dictionary, ND, "free press," No Publication, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/free-press

If a country has a [free](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/free) pres[s](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/press), [its](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/its) newspapers, magazines, and [television](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/television) and [radio](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/radio) stations are [able](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/able) to express any opinions they want, even if these [criticize](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/criticize) the government and other organizations:

#### Advocacy is at the root of the problem – journalists become politically involved and ignore facts-only framing media through objectivity can reverse the trends. Even if advocacy can be good it is drowned out by populist media turning its impacts

**Dzięciołowski 17** Krzysztof Dzięciołowski 2017 Reuters <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2017-12/Is%20there%20a%20chance%20for%20non-partisan%20media%20in%20Poland%20-%20Krzysztof%20Dzieciolowsk%20Paper.pdf> //SJJK

**As the journalists take a tougher stance on so many issues, the public has lost trust in the media. A 2012 poll showed that people’s perception of journalists partisanship has in- creased by 12% since 2002 (from 34 to 46). At the same time, respondents pointed to impar- tiality and objectivism (59%)57 as the virtues they most desire from journalism**. In 2017 79% of **Poles agree that “the message in the media is so diverse that Poles no longer know where the truth lies” while 64% of those polled think journalists express their views instead of pro- viding information**.58 Bartosz Węglarczyk observes his colleagues: sometimes write quite well. **I personally know journalists who privately admit that there is a war in Poland and you need to take one of the sides**. They say it openly in private talks, but soon they will say it publicly. It has nothing to do with journalism. These are politicians, who can write and can Once on the same side of the political anti-communist struggle, Adam Michnik and Jarosław Kaczyński are today in stark opposition to each other. Poland is locked in the narratives of the post Second World War generation that has shaped the country post-1989 and influenced younger generations of journalists. There is no better illustration of this di- vision than the Kurski brothers. Jarosław and Jacek Kurski were young and politically en- gaged students in the rebellious city of Gdańsk59 in the 1980s. Over time Jarosław Kurski has become Adam Michnik’s deputy at Gazeta Wyborcza while the younger Jacek Kurski, was appointed the head of the state broadcaster TVP by the Law and Justice party led by Jarosław Kaczyński. Polish politicians and journalist to a large extent share the same background, come from the same anti-communist opposition groups, universities or student organisations, such as NZS.60 In 2005, two post-Solidarność political parties dominated the elections effectively eliminating the post-communist party. The Civic Platform and the Law and Justice party promised a grand coalition and a big change in the campaign. Both parties have been con- servative with the Civic Platform appealing to the winners of the transformation and the Law and Justice addressing poorer and less successful class of the society. One was out- ward looking the other inward looking. The Law and Justice party’s surprise victory stunned the campaign frontrunner. Televised negotiations to form the promised grand coalition government failed. The political rivalry between Kaczyński brothers and Donald Tusk was growing day by day. And so **the journalists were pulled into the political game**. But it was the Smolensk air crash that helped to turn those two splitting tribes of politicians and journalists from the same anti-communist camp into warring factions. **The logic of tribal war has led to a situa- tion when both sides use the same language, fight for the same symbols but have built their position in opposition to each other**. Krzysztof Skowroński sees these divisions as the two faces of the same coin: There were two manifestations in Warsaw: of the Law and Justice and the Committee for the Defence of Democracy. There were two ladies there and they were telling the same sto- ry. In 1981 my husband was imprisoned for political activism and I am here to fight for freedom. In 1981 my husband was a political prisoner and I fight for freedom today. Two groups that think in the exact same way. The trauma of the crash in the national psyche drives divisions in the world of politics that runs through the society and increases the level of partisanship of the journalistic commu- nity. Krzysztof Skowroński notes: There is the planet of the conservative journalists who say that Poland is this and that. And the second planet is composed of the liberal journalists, who say this and that. The conser- vative journalists say: “Poland is a country who has been regaining its freedom, indepen- dence” and there is the second group that says: “the end of freedom of speech, dictatorship, evolution towards the totalitarian regime.” From this perspective this narrative is absurd like a train with wings. Agnieszka Romaszewska-Guzy has seen **Polish journalists getting close to politicians for many years. She notes two attitudes rooted deeply in the experience of communism**. One was a submissive and service-like attitude of a journalist working for the regime media and the other was rebellious. That is why, in my journalistic opinion, we have this on-going fight ethos. **It means, that in general as a journalist you are more of a politician than a politician himself. Journalists are this more aggressive side, not politicians.** Not always of course, but very often. Therefore, on both sides of this political spectrum, we find journalists who turn out to be more dedicated to the politics than the politicians themselves. In pursuit of audience and with little funding available, the cheapest television or radio shows have been made of politicians with opposing views invited to the studio to fight each other. So the Polish political debate has been largely reduced to the contest of values where there is no more middle ground, as Bartosz Węglarczyk notes: about emotions now. Poland’s media market has been heavily influenced by the Western style and capital but not by its values and standards. So the market has undergone the process of tabloidisation and commercialisation without any proper debate on the journalistic role of private and public media. As Bartosz Węglarczyk **notes journalists “become politicians and political ac- tivists and in fact the readers have accepted that”. As Polish journalists continue to solidify their opinions, Skowroński says the narrative has replaced truth**: **hat’s what the journalists do — they deliver a narrative. Those** in politics send them text messages “say this and that”. We do it, we go to the TV stations, a journalist accepts that and says “ok”. But it’s not! Journalists’ partisanship and political bias have become a sought-after commodity in the new market economy driven by internet, social media, speed and simplification. And, with the arrival and spread of the internet, the entry barrier to the market fell. Jacek Karnowski together with his twin brother Michał have successfully built the conservative Fratria media group behind wSieci weekly and the wPolityce.pl web portal. The brothers had a solid work experience in legacy media; Jacek Karnowski worked for the BBC Polish Service and TVP. Michał Karnowski worked for Newsweek Polska and Polska the Times. Jacek Karnowski says this experience helped them understand “the media are businesses. Apart from fulfilling an important role, they are businesses.” **They too have embraced a form of jour- nalistic engagement that has emerged in Poland under the name of “dziennikarstwo tożsamościowe” or “journalism of identity” that offers ideologically engaged narratives that help build a community of like-minded readers**.61 A joint wPolityce.pl and wSieci sub- scription call reads: We invite you to the **bevy of the members of our community**. We believe that thanks to a fixed subscription of our publications prepared especially for our Friends we will be **last- ing guests in Your houses** — on computer screens, on tablets and mobile devices. Thanks to technology development we can offer You access to a bigger collection of interesting arti- cles, good political writing and opinions, to media created with passion and mission, with belief in **strength of the national interest**, media based on Polish capital and conservative values.

## FW

#### The standard is maximizing expected wellbeing-hedonistic act util

#### 2] Death is bad and outweighs – a] agents can’t act if they fear for their bodily security which constrains every ethical theory, b] it destroys the subject itself – kills any ability to achieve value in ethics since life is a prerequisite which means it’s a side constraint since we can’t reach the end goal of ethics without life

#### 3] Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions

Moen 16, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267.

Let us start by observing, empirically, that **a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value** and disvalue **is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable**. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for **there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels**, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” **are** here **understood inclusively**, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store**, I might ask: “What for**?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. **The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good**. 3 As Aristotle observes: “**We never ask** [a man] **what** his **end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself**.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that **if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad**. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that **pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value**. Although **pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue**, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difﬁculty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one speciﬁc individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More speciﬁcally, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justiﬁed punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

#### 4] Extinction outweighs

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.


#### 6] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first which is the most intuitive.

#### Outweighs- A] Parsimony- metaphysics relies on long chains of questionable claims that make conclusions less likely. B] Hijacks- intuitions are inevitable since even every framework must take some unjustified assumption as a starting point.

## Theory

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all constructive positions in cite boxes on the 2021-22 NDCA LD wiki.

#### Violation: see the screenshot in the doc. No novice excuses – you read complicated phil FWs, spec shells, you have great upperclassmen at Memorial, you didn’t say cites broken, so you should have a thorough understanding of cites norms.



#### [a] Prep Skew – prep becomes atrocious and difficult when you make people sift through 20 word docs to figure out which links you’re reading and which impacts to prep. That outweighs – debates can’t be won without prep.

#### [b] Clash – encourages debaters to hide tricky arguments in their open source docs knowing how hard it is to go through them. That outweighs – clash is intrinsic to education in debate.

#### [c] Inclusion – disadvantaged debaters have computers more prone to lag and even 3 or 4 docs can crash the program for them—outweighs because debate had to be accessible for you to participate.

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Outweighs because each debater assumes the judge fairly evaluates their arguments.

#### Drop the debater – a] deter future abuse and b] we didn’t read this against an argument.

#### Competing interps – [a] reasonability is arbitrary and encourages judge intervention since there’s no clear norm, [b] it creates a race to the top where we create the best possible norms for debate.

#### No RVIs on 1AC theory – a] it gives the 1NC 7 minutes to dump on the shell which the 4 minute 1AR cannot come back from, b] it encourages the 1NC to go all in on theory which leads to maximal substance crowdout, c] 1AR is too short to win theory and substance so 1AC theory has to be no risk

## Underview

**[1] Aff gets 1AR theory and RVIs to check infinite neg abuse**

**1AR theory is drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer of the round – [A] the 1ARs too short to be able to rectify abuse and adequately cover substance, [B] the 2NR has 6 minutes to win a shell and beat back mine, while the 2AR has 3 minutes and must heg their bets on something**

#### [2] You should give me a 30 – I’m a senior and this is my last in-person tournament so it should be memorable

#### [3] Presumption and permissibility affirm –

#### A] We always default to assuming something true until proven false ie if I told you my name is Jarvis you would believe me

#### B] If agents have to justify why every action is morally good we would have to justify actions that are morally neutral i.e. drinking water

#### C] Lack of offense means it’s ok to do something, but it’s never okay to do something which is prohibited which means that the neg has to win offense.