# 1NC Dubs Yale

## 1

### TFW

#### Interpretation: Debaters must defend that the member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines and ought not generate offense external to the policy implementation.

#### “Resolved” means to enact by law.

Words & Phrases ’64

(Words and Phrases; 1964; Permanent Edition)

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

#### Nations are defined territories with governments

**Merriam Webster** [Merriam Webster, 8-22-2021, accessed on 9-6-2021, Merriam-webster, "Definition of NATION", <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nation>] Adam

Definition of nation (Entry 1 of 2) 1a(1): [NATIONALITY sense 5a](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationality)three Slav peoples … forged into a Yugoslavia without really fusing into a Yugoslav nation— Hans Kohn (2): a politically organized [nationality](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationality) (3)in the Bible : a non-Jewish nationalitywhy do the nations conspire— Psalms 2:1 (Revised Standard Version) b: a community of people composed of one or more [nationalities](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/nationalities) and possessing a more or less defined territory and government Canada is a nation with a written constitution— B. K. Sandwell c: a territorial division containing a body of people of one or more nationalities and usually characterized by relatively large size and independent statusa nation of vast size with a small population— Mary K. Hammond 2archaic : [GROUP](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/group), [AGGREGATION](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aggregation) 3: a tribe or federation of tribes (as of American Indians)the Seminole Nation in Oklahoma

#### Medicines refer to physical substances.

American Heritage Dictionary of Medicine 18 The American Heritage Dictionary of Medicine 2018 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company <https://www.yourdictionary.com/medicine> //Elmer

"A **substance**, **especially a drug**, **used to treat** the signs and symptoms of a **disease**, condition, or injury."

#### There are 4 types of IP the aff could reduce.

**Brewer 19** [Trevor Brewer, 5-16-2019, accessed on 8-11-2021, BrewerLong, "What Are The 4 Types of Intellectual Property Rights? BrewerLong", <https://brewerlong.com/information/business-law/four-types-of-intellectual-property/>] Adam

There are four types of intellectual property rights and protections (although multiple types of intellectual property itself). Securing the correct protection for your property is important, which is why consulting with a lawyer is a must. The four categories of intellectual property protections include: TRADE SECRETS Trade secrets refer to specific, private information that is important to a business because it gives the business a competitive advantage in its marketplace. If a trade secret is acquired by another company, it could harm the original holder. Examples of trade secrets include recipes for certain foods and beverages (like Mrs. Fields’ cookies or Sprite), new inventions, software, processes, and even different marketing strategies. When a person or business holds a trade secret protection, others cannot copy or steal the idea. In order to establish information as a “trade secret,” and to incur the legal protections associated with trade secrets, businesses must actively behave in a manner that demonstrates their desire to protect the information. [Trade secrets are protected without official registration](https://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/protection.htm); however, an owner of a trade secret whose rights are breached–i.e. someone steals their trade secret–may ask a court to ask against that individual and prevent them from using the trade secret. PATENTS As defined by the [U.S. Patent and Trademark Office](https://www.uspto.gov/help/patent-help#patents) (USPTO), a patent is a type of limited-duration protection that can be used to protect inventions (or discoveries) that are new, non-obvious, and useful, such a new process, machine, article of manufacture, or composition of matter. When a property owner holds a patent, others are prevented, under law, from offering for sale, making, or using the product. COPYRIGHTS Copyrights and patents are not the same things, although they are often confused. A copyright is a type of intellectual property protection that protects original works of authorship, which might include literary works, music, art, and more. Today, copyrights also protect computer software and architecture. Copyright protections are automatic; once you create something, it is yours. However, if your rights under copyright protections are infringed and you wish to file a lawsuit, then registration of your copyright will be necessary. TRADEMARKS Finally, the fourth type of intellectual property protection is a trademark protection. Remember, patents are used to protect inventions and discoveries and copyrights are used to protect expressions of ideas and creations, like art and writing. Trademarks, then, refer to phrases, words, or symbols that distinguish the source of a product or services of one party from another. For example, the Nike symbol–which nearly all could easily recognize and identify–is a type of trademark. While patents and copyrights can expire, trademark rights come from the use of the trademark, and therefore can be held indefinitely. Like a copyright, registration of a trademark is not required, but registering can offer additional advantages.

#### Violation –

#### At best they’re Extra-T, which is a voter for Limits since they can add any amount of infinite planks to the aff to solve for all neg arguments, or Effects-T which is worse, since any small aff can spill up to the res.

#### First, competitive equity –

#### 1] Ground: they get to pick the topic ex post facto which incentivizes vague argumentation that’s not grounded in a consistent, stable mechanism – they’re playing dodgeball with hand grenades – caselists are concessionary, unpredictable, beaten by perms, and don’t justify their model.

#### 2] Limits: their model has no resolutional bound and creates the possibility for literally an infinite number of 1ACs. Not debating the topic allows someone to specialize in one area of the library for 4 years giving them a huge edge over people who switch research focus ever 2 months. Cutting negs to every possible aff is a commitment even large squads can’t handle, let alone small schools like us. Counter-interpretations are arbitrary, unpredictable, and don’t solve the world of neg prep because there’s no grounding in the resolution

#### 3] Causality- debating the resolution forces the affirmative to defend a cause and effect relationship, the state doing x results in y. Non topical affs establish their own barometer “I think x is good for me” that aren’t negatable.

#### 4] Fairness is an impact –

#### A] it’s an intrinsic good – some level of competitive equity is necessary to sustain the activity – if it didn’t exist, then there wouldn’t be value to the game since judges could literally vote whatever way they wanted regardless of the competing arguments made

#### B] probability – your ballot can’t solve their impacts but it can solve mine – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but can rectify skews

#### C] internal link turns every impact – a limited topic promotes in-depth research and engagement which is necessary to access all of their education

#### D] comes before substance – deciding any other argument in this debate cannot be disentangled from our inability to prepare for it – any argument you think they’re winning is a link, not a reason to vote for them, since it’s just as likely that they’re winning it because we weren’t able to effectively prepare to defeat it. This means they don’t get to weigh the aff.

#### Second, switch-side debate –

#### 1] It forces debaters to consider a controversial issue from multiple perspectives. Non-T affs allow individuals to establish their own metrics for what they want to debate leading to ideological dogmatism. Even if they prove the topic is bad, our argument is that the process of preparing and defending proposals is an educational benefit of engaging it. That’s good – cross was clear that having engagement is key to recognition and spreading literature

#### 2] TVA –

#### Reduce copyright as a form of breaking down barriers to collective poetry

#### Defend reducing IP as a way to destroy US hegemonic primacy in the medicine industry.

#### DAs to the TVA are neg ground

#### Their method is incomplete–conscientization requires praxis, reflection AND action–cannot be purely intellectual like the aff but must give us some way to transform society

McCowan 06 Tristan, [Institute of Education, University College London] “Approaching the political in citizenship education: the perspectives of Paulo Freire and Bernard Crick,” Educate, VOl. 6, No. 1, 2006. RFK

The concept used most commonly by Freire in relation to this liberation is conscientization. This is the processes of gaining critical awareness as a means of transforming society: To surmount the situation of oppression, people must first critically recognize its causes, so that through transforming action they can create a new situation, one which makes possible the pursuit of a fuller humanity. (Freire, 1972, p. 29) Conscientization in relation to the individual learner is the process of developing the sense of being a subject, of appreciating one's ability to intervene in external reality. The conscientized person is ‘subject of the processes of change, actor in the management and development of the educational process, critical and reflexive, capable of understanding his or her reality in order to transform it….’ (Gajardo, 1991, p. 40). In Freire’s early work (1976), the process of conscientization was described as having three stages, with the learner moving from magical, to naive, and finally to critical consciousness. However, according to Roberts (1996), this categorization does not appear in his later work, and he moves towards a view of conscientization: …not as a progression through a finite series of steps with a fixed set of attitudes and behaviours to be achieved, but rather as an ever-evolving process. Constant change in the world around us requires a continuous effort to reinterpret reality. (Roberts, 1996, p. 187) Freire is emphatic that this learning process is one of praxis, a dialectic of reflection and action. The gaining of critical consciousness will not of itself transform the world: ‘this discovery cannot be purely intellectual but must involve action; nor can it be limited to mere activism, but involve serious reflection’ (Freire, 1972, p. 47). In addition, conscientization cannot be a purely individual development, and must take place in the context of the collective, in mutually supportive horizontal relationships. There are two key pedagogical features in the process of conscientization: dialogue and problematization. The former, in Freire’s conception, is much more than verbal interaction. Traditional education is seen to be ineffective as it involves a mono-directional transmission of knowledge from teacher to student: the so-called banking education. Conscientization can only be achieved through a dialogical encounter, where the student is fully involved in the educational process. This is the fundamental difference between Freire’s concept of education and that associated with the state-socialist movements of the twentieth century. In the latter, there is an intention to ‘conscientize’ the masses, making them aware of their exploitation at the hands of the bourgeoisie, yet this is a transmission of pre-established content with little engagement with the learners’ conception of reality. As such, in Freire’s view, it cannot fully educate even if the information transmitted is itself ‘correct’. Problematization involves the presentation of learners’ reality so as to reveal its problems or contradictions. This allows learners to distance themselves from their immediate situation, and gain a critical perspective on it. Freire emphasizes that education must start from learners’ own experience of the world: Accordingly, the point of departure must always be with men and women in the ‘here and now’, which constitutes the situation within which they are submerged, from which they emerge, and in which they intervene. Only by starting from this situation – which determines their perception of it – can they begin to move. (Freire, 1972, p. 66) Freire’s vision of educational change, involving a quasi-religious awakening leading to a radical transformation of society, makes Crick’s proposals seem rather modest. There are, however, a number of common elements. Both involve a rejection of content-based approaches and assert the importance of action. Both see the key to political learning as grappling with problems that have as their base the real lives of the learners. They both oppose the telling of official lies, and aim to allow people access to the truth, even if it is uncomplimentary to the state.

#### Third, method failure – the forwarding of the resolution is a call for recognition – instead of changing violent policies, the 1AC becomes obsessed and dependent on them.

Lundberg 12 – Dr. Christian Lundberg, Co-Director of the University Program in Cultural Studies and Professor of Rhetoric at the University of North Carolina, PhD in Communication Studies from Northwestern University, MA in Divinity from Emory University, BA from the University of Redlands, Lacan in Public: Psychoanalysis and the Science of Rhetoric, p. 174-177 // Re-Cut Justin

Thus, "as hysterics you demand a new master: you will get it!" At the register of manifest content, demands are claims for action and seemingly powerful, but at the level of the rhetorical form of the demand or in the register of enjoyment, demand is a kind of surrender. As a *relation of address* the hysterical demand is more a demand for recognition and love from an ostensibly repressive order than a claim for change. The limitation of the students' call on Lacan does not lie in the end they sought but in the fact that the hysterical address never quite breaks free from its framing of the master. The fundamental problem of democracy is not articulating resistance over and against hegemony but rather the practices of enjoyment that sustain an addiction to mastery and a deferral of desire.

Hysteria is a politically effective subject position in some ways, but it is politically constraining from the perspective of organized political dissent. If not a unidirectional practice of resistance, hysteria is at best a politics of interruption. Imagine a world where the state was the perfect and complete embodiment of a hegemonic order, without interruption or remainder, and the discursive system was hermetically closed. Politics would be an impossibility: with no site for contest or reappropriation, politics would simply be the automatic extension of structure. Hysteria is a site of interruption, in that hysteria represents a challenge to our hypothetical system, refusing straightforward incorporation by its symbolic logic. But, stepping outside this hypothetical non-polity, on balance, hysteria is politically constraining because the form of the demand, as a way of organizing the field of political enjoyment, requires that the system continue to act in certain ways to sustain its logic. Though on the surface it is an act of symbolic dissent, hysteria represents an affirmation of a hegemonic order and is therefore a particularly fraught form of political subjectivization.

The case of the hysteric produces an additional problem in defining jouissance as equivalent with hegemony. One way of defining hysteria is to say that it is a form of enjoyment that is defined by its very disorganization. As Gerard Wajcman frames it, the fundamental analytical problem in defining hysteria is precisely that it is a paradoxical refusal of organized enjoyment by a constant act of deferral. This deferral functions by asserting a form of agency over the Other while simultaneously demanding that the Other provide an organizing principle for hysterical enjoyment, something the Other cannot provide. Hysteria never moves beyond the question or the riddle, as Wajcman argues: the "hysteric ... cannot be mastered by knowledge and therefore remains outside of history, even outside its own .... [I]f hysteria is a set of statements about the hysteric, then the hysteric is what eludes those statements, escapes this knowledge .... [T]he history of hysteria bears witness to something fundamental in the human condition-being put under pressure to answer a question.T'" Thus, a difficulty for a relatively formal/ structural account of hegemony as a substitute for jouissance without reduction: where is the place for a practice of enjoyment that by its nature eludes nanling in the order of knowledge? This account of hysteria provides a significant test case for the equation betweenjouissance and hegemony, for the political promise and peril of demands and ultimately for the efficacy of a hysterical politics. But the results of such a test can only be born out in the realm of everyday politics.

*On Resistance: The Dangers of Enjoying One's Demands*

The demands of student revolutionaries and antiglobalization protestors provide a set of opportunities for interrogating hysteria as a political practice. For the antiglobalization protestors cited earlier, demands to be added to a list of dangerous globophobes uncannily condense a dynamic inherent to all demands for recognition. But the demands of the Mexico Solidarity Network and the Seattle Independent Media project demand more than recognition: they also demand danger as a specific mode of representation. "Danger" functions as a sign of something more than inclusion, a way of reaffirming the protestors' imaginary agency over processes of globalization. If danger represents an assertion of agency, and the assertion of agency is proportional to the deferral of desire to the master upon whom the demand is placed, then demands to be recognized as dangerous are doubly hysterical. Such demands are also demands for a certain kind of love, namely, the state might extend its love by recognizing the dangerousness of the one who makes the demand. At the level the demand's rhetorical function, dangerousness is metonymically connected with the idea that average citizens can effect change in the prevailing order, or that they might be recognized as agents who, in the instance of the list of globalophobic leaders, can command the Mexican state to reaffirm their agency by recognizing their dangerousness. The rhetorical structure of danger implies the continuing existence of the state or governing apparatus's interests, and these interests become a nodal point at which the hysterical demand is discharged. This structure generates enjoyment of the existence of oppressive state policies as a point for the articulation of identity. The addiction to the state and the demands for the state's love is also bound up with a fundamental dependency on the oppression of the state: otherwise the identity would collapse. Such demands constitute a reaffirmation of a hysterical subject position: they reaffirm not only the subject's marginality in the global system but the danger that protestors present to the global system. There are three practical implications for this formation.

First, for the hysteric the simple discharge of the demand is both the beginning and satisfaction of the political project. Although there is always a nascent political potential in performance, in this case the performance of demand comes to fully eclipse the desires that animate content of the demand. Second, demand allows institutions that stand in for the global order to dictate the direction of politics. This is not to say that engaging such institutions is a bad thing; rather, it is to say that when antagonistic engagement with certain institutions is read as the end point of politics, the field of political options is relatively constrained. Demands to be recognized as dangerous by the Mexican government or as a powerful antiglobalization force by the WTO often function at the cost of addressing how practices of globalization are reaffirmed at the level of consumption, of identity, and so on or in thinking through alternative political strategies for engaging globalization that do not hinge on the state and the state's actions.

Paradoxically, the third danger is that an addiction to the refusal of demands creates a paralyzing disposition toward institutional politics. Grossberg has identified a tendency in left politics to retreat from the "politics of policy and public debate.":" Although Grossberg identifies the problem as a specific coordination of "theory" and its relation to left politics, perhaps a hysterical commitment to marginality informs the impulse in some sectors to eschew engagements with institutions and institutional debate. An addiction to the state's refusal often makes the perfect the enemy of the good, implying a stifling commitment to political purity as a pretext for sustaining a structure of enjoyment dependent on refusal, dependent on a kind of paternal "no." Instead of seeing institutions and policy making as one part of the political field that might be pressured for contingent or relative goods, a hysterical politics is in the incredibly difficult position of taking an addressee (such as the state) that it assumes represents the totality of the political field; simultaneously it understands its addressee as constitutively and necessarily only a locus of prohibition.

These paradoxes become nearly insufferable when one makes an analytical cut between the content of a demand and its rhetorical functionality. At the level of the content of the demand, the state or institutions that represent globalization are figured as illegitimate, as morally and politically compromised because of their misdeeds, Here there is an assertion of agency, but because the assertion of agency is simultaneously a deferral of desire, the identity produced in the hysterical demand is not only intimately tied to but is ultimately dependent on the continuing existence of the state, hegemonic order, or institution. At the level of affective investment, the state or institution is automatically figured as the legitimate authority over its domain. As Lacan puts it: "demand in itself ... is demand of a presence or of an absence ... pregnant with that Other to be situated within the needs that it can satisfy. Demand constitutes the Other as already possessing the 'privilege' of satisfying needs, that it is to say, the power of depriving them of that alone by which they are satisfied."46

#### Vote negative –

#### A] this procedurally evaluates whether their model is good, which is a prior question

#### B] they can’t get offense: we don’t exclude them, only persuade you that our methodology is best. Every debate requires a winner and loser, so voting negative doesn’t reject them from debate, it just says they should make a better argument next time

#### C] Exclusions are inevitable like the Cap K – we should draw them around reciprocal grounds

## 2

### PIC

#### PIC: We endorse the aff besides reading it against another Asian debater in debate

#### Solves all of your offense—allows you to engage in poetry against other debaters besides Asians

#### DAs:

#### 1] Negation---if your aff is true, you force us to negate our own identity by defending the model minority as good or that there is no impact etc which is psychologically violent. Two impacts:

#### A] That fractures collectivity for your movement and destroys coalitions by pitting Asians against each other which is a tool of the white man.

#### B] Causes psychological violence for Asian debaters which outweighs by making the debate space non-inclusive

# Case

## 1NC

### 1NC – Counter poem

### 1NC – Presumption

#### Presumption flips neg against K affs – they have the burden of proof since they aren’t defending the rez. That’s key to ensure the neg has a shot at engagement.

#### Vote neg on presumption:

#### 1] Systems- the 1AC says institutions create social realities that replicate violence but in-round discourse does nothing to alter conditions. All you do is encourage teams to write better framework blocks.

#### 2] Spillover- they are missing an internal link as to why they need the ballot or why the reading of the aff forwards change. Empirically denied – judges vote on [x] all the time and nothing happens.

#### 3] Competition- debate is the wrong forum for change and competition moots any ethical value of the aff. Winning rounds just makes it seem like you want to win and a loss is internalized as a technical mistake.

#### 4] Voting aff doesn’t access social change, but voting neg resolves our procedural impacts. Have a high threshold for evidence not specific to debate.

Ritter ‘13 (JD from U Texas Law (Michael J., “Overcoming The Fiction of “Social Change Through Debate”: What’s To Learn from 2pac’s Changes?,” National Journal of Speech and Debate, Vol. 2, Issue 1)

The structure of competitive interscholastic debate renders any message communicated in a debate round virtually **incapable of creating any social change**, either in the debate community or in general society. And to the extent that the fiction of social change through debate can be proven or disproven through empirical studies or surveys, academics instead have analyzed debate with **nonapplicable** rhetorical **theory** that **fails to account for the unique aspects** of competitive interscholastic debate. Rather, the current debate relating to activism and competitive interscholastic debate concerns the following: “What is the best model to promote social change?” But a more fundamental question that must be addressed first is: **“Can debate cause social change?”** Despite over two decades of opportunity to conduct and publish empirical studies or surveys, academic proponents of the fiction that debate can create social change have chosen **not to prove this fundamental assumption**, which—as this article argues—is **merely a fiction** that is **harmful in** most, if not **all, respects**. The position that competitive interscholastic debate can create social change is more properly characterized as a **fiction** than an argument. A fiction is an invented or fabricated idea purporting to be factual but is **not provable** by any human senses or rational thinking capability or is unproven by valid statistical studies. An argument, most basically, consists of a claim and some support for why the claim is true. If the support for the claim is false or its relation to the claim is illogical, then we can deduce that the particular argument does not help in ascertaining whether the claim is true. Interscholastic competitive debate is premised upon the assumption that debate is argumentation. Because fictions are necessarily not true or cannot be proven true by any means of argumentation, the competitive interscholastic debate community should be **incredibly critical** of those fictions and adopt them only if they promote the activity and its purposes.

#### 5] The framing of identity as solely based on personal experience absolves the oppressor of responsibility and limits emancipatory potential.

Bhambra 10 [U Warwick and Victoria Margree (School of Humanities, U Brighton, Identity Politics and the Need for a ‘Tomorrow’, [https://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity\_Politics\_and\_the\_Need\_for\_a\_Tomorrow\_)] Re-Cut Justin](https://www.academia.edu/471824/Identity_Politics_and_the_Need_for_a_Tomorrow_)%5d%20Re-Cut%20SJWen)

We suggest that alternative models of identity and community are required from those put forward by essentialist theories, and that these are offered by the work of two theorists, Satya Mohanty and Lynn Hankinson Nelson. Mohanty’s ([1993] 2000) post-positivist, realist theorisation of identity suggests a way through the impasses of essentialism, while avoiding the excesses of the postmodernism that Bramen, among others, derides as a proposed alternative to identity politics. For Mohanty ([1993] 2000), identities must be understood as theoretical that enable subjects to read the world in particular ways; as such, substantial claims about identity are, in fact, implicit explanations of the social world and its constitutive relations of power. Experience – that from which identity is usually thought to derive– is not something that simply occurs, or announces its meaning and signiﬁcance in a self-evident fashion: rather, experience is always a work of interpretation that is collectively produced (Scott 1991). Mohanty’s work resonates with that of Nelson (1993), who similarly insists upon the communal nature of meaning of knowledge-making. Rejecting both foundationalist views of knowledge and the postmodern alternative which announces the “death of the subject” and the impossibility of epistemology, Nelson argues instead that, it is not individuals who are the agents of epistemology, but communities. Since it is not possible for an individual to know something that another individual could not also (possibly) know, it must be that the ability to make sense of the world proceeds from shared conceptual frameworks and practices. Thus, it is the community that is the generator and repository of knowledge. Bringing Mohanty’s work on identity as theoretical construction together with Nelson’s work on epistemological communities therefore suggests that, “identity” is one of the knowledges that is produced and enabled for and by individuals in the context of the communities within which they exist. The post-positivist reformulation of “experience” is necessary here as it privileges understandings that emerge through the processing of experience in the context of negotiated premises about the world, over experience itself producing self-evident knowledge (self-evident, however, only to the one who has “had” the experience). This distinction is crucial for, if it is not the experience of, for example, sexual discrimination that “makes” one a feminist, but rather, the paradigm through which one attempts to understand acts of sexual discrimination, then it is not necessary to have actually had the experience oneself in order to make the identiﬁcation “feminist”. If being a “feminist” is not a given fact of a particular social (and/or biological) location – that is, being designated “female” – but is, in Mohanty’s terms, an “achievement” – that is, something worked towards through a process of analysis and interpretation – then two implications follow. First, that not all women are feminists. Second, that feminism is something that is “achievable” by men. 3 While it is accepted that experiences are not merely theoretical or conceptual constructs which can be transferred from one person to another with transparency, we think that there is something politically self-defeating about insisting that one can only understand an experience (or then comment upon it) if one has actually had the experience oneself. As Rege (1998) argues, to privilege knowledge claims on the basis of direct experience, or then on claims of authenticity, can lead to a narrow identity politics that limits the emancipatory potential of the movements or organisations making such claims. Further, if it is not possible to understand an experience one has not had, then what point is there in listening to each other? Following Said, such a view seems to authorise privileged groups to ignore the discourses of disadvantaged ones, or, we would add, to place exclusive responsibility for addressing injustice with the oppressed themselves. Indeed, as Rege suggests, reluctance to speak about the experience of others has led to an assumption on the part of some white feminists that “confronting racism is the sole responsibility of black feminists”, just as today “issues of caste become the sole responsibility of the dalit women’s organisations” (Rege 1998). Her argument for a dalit feminist standpoint, then, is not made in terms solely of the experiences of dalit women, but rather a call for others to “educate themselves about the histories, the preferred social relations and utopias and the struggles of the marginalised” (Rege 1998). This, she argues, allows “their cause” to become “our cause”, not as a form of appropriation of “their” struggle, but through the transformation of subjectivities that enables a recognition that “their” struggle is also “our” struggle. Following Rege, we suggest that social processes can facilitate the understanding of experiences, thus making those experiences the possible object of analysis and action for all, while recognising that they are not equally available or powerful for all subjects. 4 Understandings of identity as given and essential, then, we suggest, need to give way to understandings which accept them as socially constructed and contingent on the work of particular, overlapping, epistemological communities that agree that this or that is a viable and recognised identity. Such an understanding avoids what Bramen identiﬁes as the postmodern excesses of “post-racial” theory, where in this “world without borders (“racism is real, but race is not”) one can be anything one wants to be: a black kid in Harlem can be Croatian-American, if that is what he chooses, and a white kid from Iowa can be Korean-American”(2002: 6). Unconstrained choice is not possible to the extent that, as Nelson (1993) argues, the concept of the epistemological community requires any individual knowledge claim to sustain itself in relation to standards of evaluation that already exist and that are social. Any claim to identity, then, would have to be recognised by particular communities as valid in order to be successful. This further shifts the discussion beyond the limitations of essentialist accounts of identity by recognising that the communities that confer identity are constituted through their shared epistemological frameworks and not necessarily by shared characteristics of their members conceived of as irreducible. 5 Hence, the epistemological community that enables us to identify our-selves as feminists is one that is built up out of a broadly agreed upon paradigm for interpreting the world and the relations between the sexes: it is not one that is premised upon possessing the physical attribute of being a woman or upon sharing the same experiences. Since at least the 1970s, a key aspect of black and/or postcolonial feminism has been to identify the problems associated with such assumptions (see, for discussion, Rege 1998, 2000). We believe that it is the identiﬁcation of injustice which calls forth action and thus allows for the construction of healthy solidarities. 6 While it is accepted that there may be important differences between those who recognise the injustice of disadvantage while being, in some respects, its beneﬁciary (for example, men, white people, brahmins), and those who recognise the injustice from the position of being at its effect (women, ethnic minorities, dalits), we would privilege the importance of a shared political commitment to equality as the basis for negotiating such differences. Our argument here is that thinking through identity claims from the basis of understanding them as epistemological communities militates against exclusionary politics (and its associated problems) since the emphasis comes to be on participation in a shared epistemological and political project as opposed to notions of ﬁxed characteristics – the focus is on the activities individuals participate in rather than the characteristics they are deemed to possess. Identity is thus deﬁned further as a function of activity located in particular social locations (understood as the complex of objective forces that inﬂuence the conditions in which one lives) rather than of nature or origin (Mohanty 1995:109-10). As such, the communities that enable identity should not be conceived of as “imagined” since they are produced by very real actions, practices and projects.

### 1NC – Asian Political Engagement Good

#### Micropolitical action such as what happens in this debate must be supplemented with calls for legal reform – that is key for Asian Americans to actually institute political change in any meaningful fashion.

McCann 12 (Michael McCann, "Inclusion, Exclusion, and the Politics of Rights Mobilization: Reflections on the Asian American Experience," Seattle Journal for Social Justice: Vol. 11: Iss. 1, Article 9. Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sjsj/vol11/iss1/9\*\*)

IV. T HE P OLITICS OF RIGHTS : L EARNING FROM THE ASIAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE It is tempting to draw from my comments so far a fairly cynical view of law and rights. In short, law and rights simply reflect contests over power, at any moment just registering the ongoing trench war over who gets what and, specifically, who is included and excluded from full protection by the legal agents of dominant groups. I think there is much truth in such a skeptical view, but I also think it is simplistic. Framing struggles over power, position, and interest as claims of rights can impart a historically grounded ethical dimension to struggle. This framework can then open the possibility for changing relationships of power, in part by mobilizing the official legal establishment, but even more by potentially mobilizing citizens and organizations in civil society who stand up to challenge either the abuses of rights or the uses of rights to justify abuse, as in these two hist orical cases. Rights are words, often written on paper, but they become materially powerful when people, ordinary and extraordinary, invest in them meaning and faith through action to challenge the unjust and often arb itrary practices of dominant groups through and beyond states. And that is just the message preached and exemplified by Gordon Hirabayashi: rights must be mobilized and demanded routinely for them to matter in guiding governmental and social power. “As fine a document as the Constitution is,” Gordon Hirabayashi famously told a reporter, “it is nothing but a scrap of paper if citizens are not willing to defend it.” 23 Such mobilization of rights in the cause of justice is hardly easy or natural, however, and Gordon’s legacy exemplifies what the struggle takes. For one thing, rights mobilization requires personal virtues of courage and willingness to make personal sacrifices . Gordon displayed such selfless bravery in his refusal to accept the or der of internment, a defiant challenge to the illegitimate government denial of basic rights to him and other Japanese Americans. In waging hi s campaigns against criminalizing subjugation, he also had to resist the pressures of others in his community who discouraged “rocking the boat” and making a bad situation worse by challenging government injustice. Gordon made a “lonely stand” in his initial resistance. 24 Young Filipino American activists in the 1970s, including Silme Domingo and Gene Viernes, displayed that same type of independent courage and persistence in the face of many obstacles and dangers. Indeed, they not only challenged powerful corporations and the American legal establishment that protected their unjust practices, but the young activists boldly opposed a dictator (who declared martial law) as well as his elite supporters in the American government. 25 The young reformers also persisted when other workers, especially senior manongs , 26 were wary about defiant challenges to the status quo. Gordon was willing to go to prison; Gene and Silme lost their liv es to assassins. Defiant action to demand rights can be risky business, and often requires such commitment and willingness to make sacrifices for larger causes. Personal courage and persistence alone are rarely sufficient. Struggles for rights also require organizational support, financial resources, and allied experts, usually including cause-oriented lawyers . Indeed, struggles for rights typically require movements that enlist many forms of organized support. The struggle for the ruling on coram nobis and legislated reparations during the 1980s, in particular, illustrates the important role of committed lawyers, community mobilization, and organizational alliance, both within and beyond the Japanese American communities. The Filipino Americans workers who initially foug ht for citizenship and workplace organizing rights, and later for work place justice and democracy in the Philippines, likewise understood the political imperative to build a movement within the union, as well as within the broader Filipino community and beyond, including among diverse progressive organizations. Finally, each of these legacies illustrates that struggles for rights must be willing to go beyond exclusive reliance on litigation to produce change . In each campaign, efforts to mobilize media support, to influence public opinion, and to lobby members of government, the business community, and the academy were critical to success. Struggles over rights are most productive when they can convince dominant groups that it is both a matter of public principle and in the political interest of the majority, including the dominant group, to do the right thing. 27 As Gordon put it, “I never look at my case as just my own, or just as a Japanese American case. It is an American case, with principles that affect the fundamental human rights of all Americans,” and, I might add, all peoples. 28

#### Asian American engagement with the law is empirically robust and produces meaningful progress – there’s still a long way to go but their apolitical stance is counterproductive.

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In late May 2001, U.S. Representative David Wu (D-OR) was invited to speak at the Department of Energy’s (DOE) Asian Pacific American Heritage Month program. When Representative Wu and his Legislative Director Ted Lieu— another Chinese American—checked in at security, DOE security guards questioned their citizenship status and the authenticity of Wu’s Congressional identification card.1 \*\*\*\*\* In late May 2002, legislators in Kansas repealed the seventy-seven-year-old “alien land laws” that banned Asian immigrants from owning land and inheriting property in Kansas. The state’s legislators acted in response to an information campaign organized by law professor Jack Chin and students working at the Immigration and Nationality Law Review at the University of Cincinnati (Akers, 2002). The Alien Land Law Project led to the successful repeal of the provision in 2001. In Florida and New Mexico, however, similar laws remain on the books. A ballot initiative in New Mexico to strike the laws from the books failed in November 2002. \*\*\*\*\* In early July 2002, mayor David Chiu of San Marcos, Texas narrowly lost his reelection bid by twenty-three votes. Chiu was among the targets of a racist campaign letter just before the runoff election, which also attacked Hispanics, blacks, gays, singles, and abortion rights supporters. The letter, which claimed to be “paid for by San Marcos Citizens for Traditional Values,” petitioned its recipients to elect “a council that reflects traditional Texas family values.” It attacked Chiu’s governing style because of his immigrant refugee background from Communist China.2 \*\*\*\*\* In November 2002, Democrat Swati Dandekar defeated her Republican opponent by a margin of 57 percent to 43 percent, and became the first Asian to be elected to the state house of Iowa. Dandekar is an immigrant woman from India who has lived in Iowa for the past thirty years. Five weeks prior to the election, her Republican opponent, Karen Balderston, circulated an e-mail questioning Dandekar’s loyalty and value as an American.3 The state’s Republican leaders withdrew their support of candidate Balderston after the incident was made public one week prior to the election (Dvorak, 2002). \*\*\*\*\* To what extent have Asian Americans progressed in American politics? These four cases occurring at the dawn of the twenty-first century demonstrate that, although Asian Americans have been settled in this country for at least a hundred and fifty years, and despite profound progress made since their initial arrival as sailors, “coolies,” and indentured laborers, their quest toward social and political integration in the United States is still far from over. Their Asian immigrant background, along with their race, ethnicity, class, and gender status, is still the subject of contention and attacks in U.S. society and politics. Regardless of their personal or family histories in the United States and degree of acculturation, their present experiences can be haunted by the anti-Asian sentiment of a racist past. What characterizes and explains the political and social experiences of today’s Asian Americans? How do average Asian Americans think and act politically and why? This book represents an attempt to understand the contours and sources of political attitudes and behavior of Asian Americans—a nonwhite, long-standing, but majority-immigrant American community that is relatively small but rapidly growing. We approach this task from an angle that is slightly different than the majority of the book-length manuscripts on Asian American politics. Our emphasis is on studying mass political opinion and behavior. The main goal is to develop an understanding and conceptualization of Asian American political behavior that challenges popular misconceptions about Asian Americans as politically apathetic, disloyal, fragmented, unsophisticated, and inscrutable. Toward that end, based primarily on a groundbreaking survey, we present a social and political profile of the contemporary Asian American community, and chart the extent to which it is becoming socially integrated and politically incorporated into the U.S. system.

#### There’s a long history of active political engagement by Asian Americans.

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Conclusion This book focuses on Asian Americans and their political attitudes and behavior. In this opening chapter, we present thirteen observations to help debunk the popular myths about a U.S. population group with a rich history that is expanding rapidly, but remains relatively small due to institutionalized racism and exclusion. Although we argue that the Asian American experience is uniquely complex and cannot be readily understood with any of the leading theoretical frameworks discussed in this opening chapter, we believe by studying Asians this project can contribute to improving understanding of American minority political behavior, racial and ethnic politics, and the shape of the American democracy in general. First, Asian Americans have been and will continue to be a critical component of American political life. Asian Americans have historically played a key, though often unrecognized, role in American politics through worker organizing, fighting Asian American immigrant exclusion, and expanding naturalization laws through the courts. Their growing numbers in the population, along with their involvement at different levels of government and in various civic institutions, further ensures the continued importance of Asian Americans in American politics today.25

### 1NC – AT: MM

#### 1] **Access DA - Asian Americans knowingly accept the Myth in order bypass discrimination. It’s a survival strategy**

**Lee et al. 16** (Stacey J. Lee, a Professor of Educational Policy Studies at the University of Wisconsin. Eujin Park, a Professor of Educational Policy Studies at the University of Wisconsin Madison & Jia-Hui Stefanie Wong, a Professor of Educational Policy Studies at Trinity College; 2016/12/14; “Racialization, Schooling, and Becoming American: Asian American Experiences” <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00131946.2016.1258360>, DMW)

In Mississippi, Chinese were officially barred from White schools until the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision, but some Chinese families had managed to negotiate access to White public schools for their children in some Mississippi Delta towns by the late 1930s, and most districts accepted Chinese children in White schools by the late 1940s (Jung, 2008; Lim de Sánchez, 2003; Loewen, 1988). To gain access to White schools during Jim Crow, Chinese immigrants living in the Mississippi Delta had to convince Whites that the Chinese were closer to Whites than Blacks. In particular, Chinese immigrants had to develop social ties with prominent Whites in their towns, which many did by joining local churches and, simultaneously, distancing themselves socially from Blacks (S. J. Lee, in press; Loewen, 1988). In short, Chinese immigrants gained access to White schools in the Mississippi Delta during Jim Crow by following the rules of White supremacy and performing an early expression of model minority behavior. The stories of how Chinese immigrants gained access to White schools in the Mississippi Delta during the Jim Crow era reveal the relational nature of Asian American racialization and demonstrate that Chinese immigrants were active agents in challenging their racial positioning (S. J. Lee, in press). In contrast to earlier Asian immigrants, post-1965 Asian immigrants entered the nation at a time when the model minority image of Asian Americans was being established in the national imagination. Although the prominence of the model minority image may appear to suggest that Asian Americans have gained status, the review of the research suggests that Asian Americans may embrace the model minority image and behaviors associated with the stereotype in response to racism. Louie’s (2004) Chinese American participants were aware of the “clear racial hierarchy” (p. 56) in the United States. They also understood that perpetual foreigner and model minority discourses shaped how dominant society viewed them. In response, Chinese families turned to education as a “credentialing mechanism to safeguard against potential discrimination” (Louie, 2004, p. 56). Parents believed that because of racism their children would face, they would have to try even harder in school to lessen its impacts. Thus, even middle-class Chinese parents, who presumably would not have the same financial concerns as working-class parents, stressed higher education in technical and licensed professions and discouraged children from pursuing 500 LEE, PARK, AND WONG majors in social sciences or liberal arts. They reasoned that their children would face less racial discrimination in professions that were more technical and skill-based. Similarly, J. Lee and Zhou (2015) discovered that Chinese immigrant parents and Vietnamese refugee parents pushed a success frame, which centered around getting a good education that would lead to a good job, for their second-generation children. Furthermore, their strategies, including steering their children away from creative fields, were framed by the recognition that as Asian Americans their children would face racial bias. Thus, J. Lee and Zhou (2015) found that “Asian immigrant parents directed their children into elite colleges, specific majors, and particular occupations so that they would be better protected from subjective evaluations” (p. 58). In other words, the immigrant parents in Louie’s (2004) study and those in J. Lee and Zhou’s (2015) study encouraged a model minority performance as a strategy to cope with racism, but their actions have simply been read as evidence that they are model minorities. Lew (2006) also found that both middle-class and working-class Korean Americans recognized that the strictly racialized hierarchy in the United States would prevent them from achieving authentic, unhyphenated Americanness. However, middle-class participants’ class position made it possible for them to aspire to a class-based understanding of Americanness. They were able to pursue this definition of American through the high-quality education and social capital that their middle-class positions afforded them. Concerns about protecting and advancing the model minority image have also been found to influence relationships among Asian Americans (S. J. Lee, 2009). In writing about South Asian educational migrants in the post-1965 era, Thomas (2015) found that South Asians embraced the model minority as a way to understand and perform their racial and class positions. Thomas (2015) argues that highly educated South Asian immigrants were invested in reinforcing a model minority narrative, which they feared was being challenged by subsequent waves of working class South Asians who were unable to live up to model minority standards. Scholarship suggests that many Asian immigrant and second-generation youth are invested in performing model minority behavior (Cheng, 2013; Chhuon & Hudley, 2011; J. Lee & Zhou, 2015; S. J. Lee, 2009; G. C. Park, 2011). For example, in his research on working class Korean immigrant high school youth, G. C. Park (2011) found that participants believed they would never be accepted as authentic Americans because of their race and ethnicity. Thus, students performed a model minority identity as a coping strategy, which they believed got them closer to Whiteness. Furthermore, G. C. Park found that the students sought “to achieve social distance from other Koreans who could not or did not conform to the stereotype via social rewards and punishments” (p. 123). Not only do some Asian Americans perform the model minority, they may actively discipline those who do not or cannot perform.

#### 2] Recreation DA: The 1AC’s interrogation of the Myth fails and reinforces the very hegemonic discourses it tries to disrupt.

OiYan Poon et al., June 2016, “A Critical Review of the Model Minority Myth in Selected Literature on Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders in Higher Education”, AERA, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.3102/0034654315612205//JY

Many scholars have identified the persistence of the MMM framing of AAPIs in public discourse as a key problem for this diverse population in higher education. Applying the concept of framing, in our analysis of literature, we were interested in the implications of the routine evocation of the MMM. How are research problems informed by scholarship that discusses, or does not mention, the MMM? A significant amount of research on AAPIs in higher education has sought to undermine the validity of the MMM by countering this hegemonic framework point for point. Much of this intended counterhegemonic work has assumed the logic of oppressive dominant frameworks like deficit thinking and has consequently reinforced hegemonic frames and systems. For example, some research that ahistorically defines the MMM as a stereotype of universal high academic achievement among AAPIs has focused attention on the deficiencies found among some AAPIs to counter the stereotype of universal high academic achievement among Asian Americans. This project of highlighting AAPI educational failure. In seeking to counter the MMM, research that presents ahistorical definitions of the myth ironically maintains the invisibility of the process of racial triangulation and reinforces deficit assumes, and advances, a deficit framework. As Willis (1977) explained, projects of countering hegemonic ideas that do not also shift fundamental viewpoints can actually lead to unintentional bolstering of hegemonic ideologythinking. Other research has also highlighted the paradox of efforts in counterhegemonic frames that unintentionally reinforce oppressive structures. For example, K. Yeung, Stombler, and Wharton (2006) examined the attempt of gay men to challenge notions of hegemonic masculinity within the college fraternity world by establishing a fraternity for gay men. By adopting the traditional structure and characteristics of a fraternal organization, however, the fraternity and its members ended up inadvertently Poon et al. 476 endorsing and reproducing aspects of hegemonic masculinity (K. Yeung et al., 2006). Without a fundamental shift in the foundational understanding of the ways the MMM operates in higher education, research in this field will fall short of reframing and advancing knowledge about AAPIs.

#### 3] There is no internal link to debate, either the myth doesn’t exist or debate sees through it. Brian Zhou won TOC, Matt Chen won TFA and Isaac Chao, Elmer Yang prove Asians can be vocal and heard.

#### 4] Backlash DA – The Aff’s use of Identity inevitably alienates other groups, fragments the left, empowers the alt-right, causes immediate white backlash, and dooms the movement to failure.

The Guardian, 3/1/18, “How America’s Identity Politics Went From Inclusion to Division”, https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/mar/01/how-americas-identity-politics-went-from-inclusion-to-division//JY

We are at an unprecedented moment in America. For the first time in US history, white Americans are faced with the prospect of becoming a minority in their “own country.” While many in our multicultural cities may well celebrate the “browning of America” as a welcome step away from “white supremacy”, it’s safe to say that large numbers of American whites are more anxious about this phenomenon, whether they admit it or not. Tellingly, a 2012 study showed that more than half of white Americans believe that “whites have replaced blacks as the ‘primary victims of discrimination’.” Meanwhile, the coming demographic shift has done little to allay minority concerns about discrimination. A recent survey found that 43% of black Americans do not believe America will ever make the changes necessary to give blacks equal rights. Most disconcertingly, hate crimes have increased 20% in the wake of the 2016 election. When groups feel threatened, they retreat into tribalism. When groups feel mistreated and disrespected, they close ranks and become more insular, more defensive, more punitive, more us-versus-them. In America today, every group feels this way to some extent. Whites and blacks, Latinos and Asians, men and women, Christians, Jews, and Muslims, straight people and gay people, liberals and conservatives – all feel their groups are being attacked, bullied, persecuted, discriminated against. Of course, one group’s claims to feeling threatened and voiceless are often met by another group’s derision because it discounts their own feelings of persecution – but such is political tribalism. This – combined with record levels of inequality – is why we now see identity politics on both sides of the political spectrum. And it leaves the United States in a perilous new situation: almost no one is standing up for an America without identity politics, for an American identity that transcends and unites all the country’s many subgroups. ••• This is certainly true of the American left today. Fifty years ago, the rhetoric of pro–civil rights, Great Society liberals was, in its dominant voices, expressly group transcending, framed in the language of national unity and equal opportunity. After being the 'Tiger Mom', Amy Chua turns to political tribalism Read more In his most famous speech, Dr Martin Luther King Jr proclaimed: “When the architects of our republic wrote the magnificent words of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, they were signing a promissory note to which every American was to fall heir. This note was a promise that all men – yes, black men as well as white men – would be guaranteed the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.” King’s ideals – the ideals of the American Left that captured the imagination and hearts of the public and led to real change – transcended group divides and called for an America in which skin color didn’t matter. Leading liberal philosophical movements of that era were similarly group blind and universalist in character. John Rawls’s enormously influential A Theory of Justice, published in 1971, called on people to imagine themselves in an “original position”, behind a “veil of ignorance”, in which they could decide on their society’s basic principles without regard to “race, gender, religious affiliation, [or] wealth”. At roughly the same time, the idea of universal human rights proliferated, advancing the dignity of every individual as the foundation of a just international order. Thus, although the Left was always concerned with the oppression of minorities and the rights of disadvantaged groups, the dominant ideals in this period tended to be group blind, often cosmopolitan, with many calling for transcending not just ethnic, racial, and gender barriers but national boundaries as well. Perhaps in reaction to Reaganism, and a growing awareness that “colorblindness” was being used by conservatives to oppose policies intended to redress racial inequities, a new movement began to unfold on the left in the 1980s and 1990s – a movement emphasizing group consciousness, group identity, and group claims. Many on the left had become acutely aware that color blindness was being used by conservatives to oppose policies intended to redress historical wrongs and persisting racial inequities. Many also began to notice that the leading liberal figures in America, whether in law, government, or academia, were predominantly white men and that the neutral “group-blind” invisible hand of the market wasn’t doing much to correct long-standing imbalances. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the anti-capitalist economic preoccupations of the old Left began to take a backseat to a new way of understanding oppression: the politics of redistribution was replaced by a “politics of recognition”. Modern identity politics was born. As Oberlin professor Sonia Kruks writes, “What makes identity politics a significant departure from earlier [movements] is its demand for recognition on the basis of the very grounds on which recognition has previously been denied: it is qua women, qua blacks, qua lesbians that groups demand recognition ... The demand is not for inclusion within the fold of ‘universal humankind’ ... nor is it for respect ‘in spite of’ one’s differences. Rather, what is demanded is respect for oneself as different.” But identity politics, with its group-based rhetoric, did not initially become the mainstream position of the Democratic Party. At the 2004 Democratic National Convention in Boston, Barack Obama famously declared, “There’s not a black America and white America and Latino America and Asian America; there’s the United States of America.” A decade and a half later, we are very far from Obama’s America. ••• For today’s Left, blindness to group identity is the ultimate sin, because it masks the reality of group hierarchies and oppression in America. It’s just a fact that whites, and specifically white male Protestants, dominated America for most of its history, often violently, and that this legacy persists. The stubborn persistence of racial inequality in the wake of Barack Obama’s supposedly “post-racial” presidency has left many young progressives disillusioned with the narratives of racial progress that were popular among liberals just a few years ago. When a grand jury failed to indict a white cop who was videotaped choking a black man to death, black writer Brit Bennett captured this growing mistrust in an essay entitled, “I Don’t Know What to Do with Good White People”: We all want to believe in progress, in history that marches forward in a neat line, in transcended differences and growing acceptance, in how good the good white people have become … I don’t think Darren Wilson or Daniel Pantaleo set out to kill black men. I’m sure the cops who arrested my father meant well. But what good are your good intentions if they kill us? For the Left, identity politics has long been a means to “confront rather than obscure the uglier aspects of American history and society”. But in recent years, whether because of growing strength or growing frustration with the lack of progress, the Left has upped the ante. A shift in tone, rhetoric, and logic has moved identity politics away from inclusion – which had always been the Left’s watchword – toward exclusion and division. As a result, many on the left have turned against universalist rhetoric (for example, All Lives Matter), viewing it as an attempt to erase the specificity of the experience and oppression of historically marginalized minorities. The new exclusivity is partly epistemological, claiming that out-group members cannot share in the knowledge possessed by in-group members (“You can’t understand X because you are white”; “You can’t understand Y because you’re not a woman”; “You can’t speak about Z because you’re not queer”). The idea of “cultural appropriation” insists, among other things, “These are our group’s symbols, traditions, patrimony, and out-group members have no right to them.” For much of the Left today, anyone who speaks in favor of group blindness is on the other side, indifferent to or even guilty of oppression. For some, especially on college campuses, anyone who doesn’t swallow the anti-oppression orthodoxy hook, line, and sinker – anyone who doesn’t acknowledge “white supremacy” in America – is a racist. When liberal icon Bernie Sanders told supporters, “It’s not good enough for somebody to say, ‘Hey, I’m a Latina, vote for me,’ ” Quentin James, a leader of Hillary Clinton’s outreach efforts to people of color, retorted that Sanders’s “comments regarding identity politics suggest he may be a white supremacist, too”. ••• Once identity politics gains momentum, it inevitably subdivides, giving rise to ever-proliferating group identities demanding recognition. Today, there is an ever-expanding vocabulary of identity on the left. Facebook now lists more than fifty gender designations from which users can choose, from genderqueer to intersex to pangender. Or take the acronym LGBTQ. Originally LGB, variants over the years have ranged from GLBT to LGBTI to LGBTQQIAAP as preferred terminology shifted and identity groups quarreled about who should be included and who come first. Because the Left is always trying to outleft the last Left, the result can be a zero-sum competition over which group is the least privileged, an “Oppression Olympics” often fragmenting progressives and setting them against each other. Although inclusivity is presumably still the ultimate goal, the contemporary Left is pointedly exclusionary. During a Black Lives Matter protest at the DNC held in Philadelphia in July 2016, a protest leader announced that “this is a black and brown resistance march”, asking white allies to “appropriately take [their] place in the back of this march”. The war on “cultural appropriation” is rooted in the belief that groups have exclusive rights to their own histories, symbols, and traditions. Thus, many on the left today would consider it an offensive act of privilege for, say, a straight white man to write a novel featuring a gay Latina as the main character. Transgressions are called out daily on social media; no one is immune. Beyoncé was criticized for wearing what looked like a traditional Indian bridal outfit; Amy Schumer, in turn, was criticized for making a parody of Beyoncé’s Formation, a song about the black female experience. Students at Oberlin complained of a vendor’s “history of blurring the line between culinary diversity and cultural appropriation by modifying the recipes without respect for certain Asian countries’ cuisines”. And a student op-ed at Louisiana State University claimed that white women styling their eyebrows to look thicker – like “a lot of ethnic women” –was “a prime example of the cultural appropriation in this country”. Not everyone on the Left is happy with the direction that identity politics has taken. Many are dismayed by the focus on cultural appropriation. As a progressive Mexican American law student put it, “If we allowed ourselves to be hurt by a costume, how could we manage the trauma of an eviction notice?” He added: “Liberals have cried wolf too many times. If everything is racist and sexist, nothing is. When Trump, the real wolf, came along, no one listened.” ••• As a candidate, Donald Trump famously called for “a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States”, described illegal Mexican immigrants as “rapists”, and referred disparagingly to an Indiana-born federal judge as “Mexican”, accusing the judge of having “an inherent conflict of interest” rendering him unfit to preside over a suit against Trump. Making the argument that Trump used identity politics to win the White House is like shooting fish in a barrel. But us-versus-them, anti-Muslim, anti-immigrant sentiments were bread and butter for most conservatives on the 2016 campaign trail. Senator Marco Rubio compared the war with Islam to America’s “war with Nazis”, and even moderate Republicans like Jeb Bush advocated for a religious test to allow Christian refugees to enter the country preferentially. We are also seeing on the right – particularly the alt-right – political tribalism directed against minorities perceived as “too successful”. For example, Steve Bannon, Trump’s former White House chief strategist, has complained that America’s “engineering schools are all full of people from South Asia and East Asia ... They’ve come in here to take these jobs” while Americans “can’t get engineering degrees ... [and] can’t get a job”. This brings us to the most striking feature of today’s right-wing political tribalism: the white identity politics that has mobilized around the idea of whites as an endangered, discriminated-against group. In part this development carries forward a long tradition of white tribalism in America. But white identity politics has also gotten a tremendous recent boost from the Left, whose relentless berating, shaming, and bullying might have done more damage than good. One Trump voter claimed that “maybe I’m just so sick of being called a bigot that my anger at the authoritarian left has pushed me to support this seriously flawed man.” “The Democratic party,” said Bill Maher, “made the white working man feel like your problems aren’t real because you’re ‘mansplaining’ and check your privilege. You know, if your life sucks, your problems are real.” When blacks blame today’s whites for slavery or ask for reparations, many white Americans feel as though they are being attacked for the sins of other generations. Or consider this blog post in the American Conservative, worth quoting at length because of the light it sheds: I’m a white guy. I’m a well-educated intellectual who enjoys small arthouse movies, coffeehouses and classic blues. If you didn’t know any better, you’d probably mistake me for a lefty urban hipster. And yet. I find some of the alt-right stuff exerts a pull even on me. Even though I’m smart and informed enough to see through it. It’s seductive because I am not a person with any power or privilege, and yet I am constantly bombarded with messages telling me that I’m a cancer, I’m a problem, everything is my fault. I am very lower middle class. I’ve never owned a new car, and do my own home repairs as much as I can to save money. I cut my own grass, wash my own dishes, buy my clothes from Walmart. I have no clue how I will ever be able to retire. But oh, brother, to hear the media tell it, I am just drowning in unearned power and privilege, and America will be a much brighter, more loving, more peaceful nation when I finally just keel over and die. Trust me: After all that, some of the alt-right stuff feels like a warm, soothing bath. A “safe space,” if you will. I recoil from the uglier stuff, but some of it— the “hey, white guys are actually okay, you know! Be proud of yourself, white man!” stuff is really VERY seductive, and it is only with some intellectual effort that I can resist the pull … If it’s a struggle for someone like me to resist the pull, I imagine it’s probably impossible for someone with less education or cultural exposure. ••• Just as the Left’s exclusionary identity politics is ironic in light of the Left’s ostensible demands for inclusivity, so too is the emergence of a “white” identity politics on the right. For decades, the Right has claimed to be a bastion of individualism, a place where those who rejected the divisive identity politics of the Left found a home. For this reason, conservatives typically paint the emergence of white identity as having been forced on them by the tactics of the Left. As one political commentator puts it, “feeling as though they are under perpetual attack for the color of their skin, many on the right have become defiant of their whiteness, allowing it into their individual politics in ways they have not for generations”. At its core, the problem is simple but fundamental. While black Americans, Asian Americans, Hispanic Americans, Jewish Americans, and many others are allowed – indeed, encouraged – to feel solidarity and take pride in their racial or ethnic identity, white Americans have for the last several decades been told they must never, ever do so. People want to see their own tribe as exceptional, as something to be deeply proud of; that’s what the tribal instinct is all about. For decades now, nonwhites in the United States have been encouraged to indulge their tribal instincts in just this way, but, at least publicly, American whites have not. On the contrary, if anything, they have been told that their white identity is something no one should take pride in. “I get it,” says Christian Lander, creator of the popular satirical blog Stuff White People Like, “as a straight white male, I’m the worst thing on Earth.” But the tribal instinct is not so easy to suppress. As Vassar professor Hua Hsu put it in an Atlantic essay called “The End of White America?” the “result is a racial pride that dares not speak its name, and that defines itself through cultural cues instead.” In combination with the profound demographic transformation now taking place in America, this suppressed urge on the part of many white Americans – to feel solidarity and pride in their group identity, as others are allowed to do – has created an especially fraught set of tribal dynamics in the United States today. Just after the 2016 election, a former Never Trumper explained his change of heart in the Atlantic: “My college-age daughter constantly hears talk of white privilege and racial identity, of separate dorms for separate races (somewhere in heaven Martin Luther King Jr is hanging his head and crying) … I hate identity politics, [but] when everything is about identity politics, is the left really surprised that on Tuesday millions of white Americans … voted as ‘white’? If you want identity politics, identity politics is what you will get.”

#### 5] Essentialism DA: The Aff’s use of “Asian Americans” ignores the diverse experience of various individuals and ethnicities in favor of painting a coherent, homogenous picture. This turns case – means they continue the myth of Asian Homogenization.

Keith Osajima, 1995, “Postmodern Possibilities: Theoretical and Political Directions for Asian American Studies”, Amerasia Journal, http://uclajournals.org/doi/pdf/10.17953/amer.21.1-2.pj92k27g43811214//JY

The postmodern direction toward inclusion, multiplicity, and heterogeneity is particularly well-suited to an analysis of the contemporary Asian American experience. The tremendous influx of immigrants and refugees over the past thirty years has dramatically altered the composition of the Asian American population. ”Asian America” now signifies an extremely diverse entity, composed of people from widely different cultural, ethnic, gender, educational, class, generational, and political backgrounds. Postmodern theories, which focus on the complexly constructed nature of social conditions and identities, can provide a framework for understanding the dynamic changes in the Asian American experience. We need not go far to realize the analytic benefits of postmodern perspectives. Lisa Lowe’s article ”Heterogeneity, Hybridity, Multiplicity: Marking Asian American Differences”6 is an excellent example of how postmodern perspectives can contribute to insightful analyses of Asian Americans. Taking a critical stance against modernist metanarratives, Lowe argues that the representations of Asian American culture and identity in novels and films are often dominated by conceptualizations which essentialize and homogenize the Asian American experience, producing images that oversimplify a complex phenomena. She notes, for example, that many Asian American novels cast cultural issues exclusively in terms of ”generational conflict and filial relation(s) .”7 Similarly, discussions of Asian American identity 80 Postmodern Possibilities often simplistically characterize identity issues in binary terms-as conflicts between those who identify closely with the immigrant or nationalist positions versus those who are more Americanized and assimilated.\* Avoiding the homogenizing effects of the master narratives, Lowe advocates an analysis that examines the multiplicity and complexity of the Asian American experience. She maintains that “what is referred to as ‘Asian America’ is clearly a heterogeneous entity”7 and Asian American identity is better understood as a matter of ”cultural hybridity” than of simple binary categories. ”The boundaries and definitions of Asian American culture are continually shifting and being contested from pressures both ”inside” and ”outside” the Asian origin c~mmunity.”

**THEY CONTINUE**

An ”essentializing” Asian American identity may suppress our differences and suggest an oversimplified Asian American experience which “inadvertently supports the racist discourse that constructs Asians as a homogeneous group” and excludes the experiences of the more recently arrived Asian groups.15 An Asian American studies that ”generalizes Asian American identity as male” is also problematic for it renders women, gays and lesbians invisible.16 Extending this analysis further, an Asian American studies that is grounded in elite, middle-class academic institutions may be unable to address the needs of working class Asian

#### 6] Fluiditiy DA– the 1AC’s framework renders it static and monolithic, excluding Mixed Race Asians

Bonnie Tsui, 12/14/15, “Choose Your Own Identity”, The New York Times Magazine, <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/14/magazine/choose-your-own-identity.html>

Who was “white” [evolved](http://scholar.harvard.edu/jlhochschild/publications/racial-reorganization-and-united-states-census-1850-1930-mulattoes-half-br) over time: From the 1870s to 1930s, a parade of [court rulings](http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=aalj) pondered the “whiteness” of Asian immigrants from China, Japan and India, often [changing definitions](http://www.pbs.org/race/003_RaceTimeline/003_01-timeline.htm) by the ruling in order to exclude yet another group from citizenship. When mixed-race people became more prevalent, things got murkier still. Who the U.S. Census Bureau designated “colored” or “black” [varied](http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/interactives/multiracial-timeline/), too, before and after slavery, and at times including subcategories for people of mixed race, all details often left up to the whims of the census taker. In 1930, nativist lobbyists succeeded in getting Mexicans officially labeled nonwhite on the census; up until then, they were considered white and allowed citizenship. By 1940, international political pressure had reversed the decision. It wasn’t until 2000 that the Census Bureau started letting people choose more than one race category to describe themselves, and it still only recognizes five standard racial categories: white, black/African-American, American Indian/Alaska Native, Asian, Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander. Racial categories formed the historical basis for so many of America’s societal and political decisions, and yet even the Census Bureau has [admitted](http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/18/census-considers-new-approach-to-asking-about-race-by-not-using-the-term-at-all/) that its categories are in flux, recognizing that race is not a fixed, “quantifiable” value but a fluid one. White or black or Asian America isn’t monolithic and never was. Everyone’s story can be parsed ever more minutely: Haitian-Hawaiian, Mexican-Salvadorean, Cuban-Chinese. And when you start mixing up stories, as my family has, much of the institutional meaning of race falls away; it becomes, instead, intensely individual. In a strange way, the renewed fluidity of racial identity is a homecoming of sorts, to a time before race — and racism — was institutionalized. In the San Francisco Bay Area, where I live, the once-derogatory term hapa — from the Hawaiian word for “half”; it’s a Hawaiian pidgin term long used to refer to people of mixed-race background — is now part of the everyday lexicon. In my sons’ preschool and kindergarten classes, hapais fast becoming the norm because there are so many mixed-race children in attendance. There’s power in the word: a reclaiming of territory, a self-determination. To me, the idea of hapa as a racial definition is inclusive rather than exclusive and thus a step in the right direction. The term is mostly used to refer to people of part Asian heritage, but increasingly it’s used for anyone of mixed race. And it’s a term that tends to be a self-identifying choice, rather than an outside imposition. There’s a difference, you know. A critical element in the long-running [Hapa Project,](http://kipfulbeck.com/the-hapa-project/) for which the artist and filmmaker Kip Fulbeck traveled the country and photographed thousands of multiracial people, is that photo subjects speak for themselves. One woman states to her observers: “I am a person of color. I am not half-‘white.’ I am not half-‘Asian.’ I am a whole ‘other.’” There is a resistance to fragmentation, a taking control of the narrative. Fulbeck, as a mixed-race person himself, came up with the idea as a kid in elementary school, when he struggled with what he calls the “check one box only” question. Here, we aren’t talking about getting rid of the boxes or just adding more boxes but creating more flexible ones that can hold more going forward. There will be surprises in my own household when it comes to racial identity. According to the Pew study, biracial Asian-whites are more likely to identify with whites than they are with Asians. This line made me sit up: It never occurred to me that my sons could possibly identify only as white. I’m forced to think more carefully about what it is that actually makes me uncomfortable with that idea: It’s not that I want my sons to experience discrimination, but if they do choose to identify as white, there is something about being a racial minority in America that I would want them to know. As a child, I most wanted to fit in. As a young adult, I learned how I stood apart and to have pride in it. In the experience of being an “other,” there’s a valuable lesson in consciousness: You learn to listen harder, because you’ve heard what others have to say about you before you even have a chance to speak. But the truth is, I can’t tell my sons what to feel: more white than Asian, more Asian than white, neither, both. Other. I can only tell them what I think about my own identity and listen hard to what they have to tell me in turn. If that isn’t practicing good race relations, what is? Much as I hate to admit it, what they choose to be won’t necessarily have to do with me. Because my sons are going to be the ones who say who — not what — they are.

#### 7] Red-lining DA The term “Asian American” is rooted in phenotypical traits that exclude South Asian’s physical and cultural dissimilarities. Their continued usage of the term “yellow” as a mechanism of self-identification perpetuates the drawing of new boundaries of who is or isn’t Asian American around these phenotypes which delineate the Asian American as disparate from the brown body. Turns case

Kibria, Nazli. 1998. “The Racial Gap: South Asian American Identity and the Asian American Movement.” In *A Part Yet Apart: South Asians in Asian America*, edited by Lavina Dhingra Shankar and Rajini Srikanth. Philadelphia: Temple University Press./NV

“Asian American" emerged in the 1960s from a political movement provoked by a variety of issues, notably the autonomous control of institutions in ethnic enclaves (Chinatowns, Japantowns, Manilatowns) as well as in universities (Ethnic Studies). Activists fought for autonomy from the bureaucrats at city hall in order to fashion the space and texture of their own neighborhoods (which became the concrete manifestation of control over one's community). The political project around the term "Asian American" still endures among seasoned veterans of the movement and those who acknowledge its heritage. For historical reasons, the term Asian American largely refers to those who claim East Asian ancestry. West Asians (Iraqis, Israelis, Iranians, Syrians, etc.) operate under the rubric "Arab American" or "Jewish American," while there has not been a historically significant Central Asian migration (except Armenians, but their consciousness of "Asian" is rather limited). North Asians (Russians) are more likely to be seen as, and nominate themselves as, Slavic Americans or as European Americans. The only significant addition under the umbrella term ''Asian American" has been from South Asians and that development begins in the late 1980s under pressure from South Asians in the academy. In the main, the term "Asian American" refers to East Asian Americans and this, I argue, has more to do with a racist ethnology than with the “historical fact of the movement's origins.” “The new racism of the 1960s, which fostered the ethnoracialization of terms such as "Asian American," has a simple logic: the Enlightenment's anthropology (written by ” “Buffon, Cuvier, Gobineau, Maupertuis, et al.) is borrowed wholesale (particularly the typology of "races": Caucasoid, Mongoloid, Negroid) and transformed from a zoological classification to a statement about "culture." In one of the more confused gestures of modern logic, this transformation takes a theory saturated in blood and genetics and aims to make it tell us something of culture. The use of black (for Negroid) as an adjective is supposed to tell us something about the cultural system of blacks, for example. While "Asian American" becomes a "cultural" designation (from its origins as a political organizing category), it remains rooted in phenotypes (yellow skin and "slant" eyes). The liberal version of this racial hierarchy exists today in the guise of cultural or national differences, which rest on presumptions of racial division (European, Chinese, Indian, African, etc.). The new racism drew new boundaries for "Asian America" in terms of phenotypes. Culture and ethnicity, despite being understood as socially constructed, are grounded upon a zoological Chain of Being. That is, as a result of a historical homology between culture and race, cultural categories are based upon and governed by racial categories. The discourse of race, in other words, forms the bedrock upon “which our categories of cultural groups rest.”