# 1NC R5 UT

## 1

### T

#### Interpretation: The affirmative may not specify a just government in which a right to strike ought to be recognized

#### ‘A’ is indefinite – means you have to prove the rez in a vacuum, not a particular instance

CCC (“Articles, Determiners, and Quantifiers”, http://grammar.ccc.commnet.edu/grammar/determiners/determiners.htm#articles, Capital Community College Foundation, a nonprofit 501 c-3 organization that supports scholarships, faculty development, and curriculum innovation)

The three articles — a, an, the — are a kind of adjective. The is called the definite article because it usually precedes a specific or previously mentioned noun; a and an are called indefinite articles because they are used to refer to something in a less specific manner (an unspecified count noun). These words are also listed among the noun markers or determiners because they are almost invariably followed by a noun (or something else acting as a noun). caution CAUTION! Even after you learn all the principles behind the use of these articles, you will find an abundance of situations where choosing the correct article or choosing whether to use one or not will prove chancy. Icy highways are dangerous. The icy highways are dangerous. And both are correct. The is used with specific nouns. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something that is one of a kind: The moon circles the earth. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something in the abstract: The United States has encouraged the use of the private automobile as opposed to the use of public transit. The is required when the noun it refers to represents something named earlier in the text. (See below..) If you would like help with the distinction between count and non-count nouns, please refer to Count and Non-Count Nouns. We use a before singular count-nouns that begin with consonants (a cow, a barn, a sheep); we use an before singular count-nouns that begin with vowels or vowel-like sounds (an apple, an urban blight, an open door). Words that begin with an h sound often require an a (as in a horse, a history book, a hotel), but if an h-word begins with an actual vowel sound, use an an (as in an hour, an honor). We would say a useful device and a union matter because the u of those words actually sounds like yoo (as opposed, say, to the u of an ugly incident). The same is true of a European and a Euro (because of that consonantal "Yoo" sound). We would say a once-in-a-lifetime experience or a one-time hero because the words once and one begin with a w sound (as if they were spelled wuntz and won). Merriam-Webster's Dictionary says that we can use an before an h- word that begins with an unstressed syllable. Thus, we might say an hisTORical moment, but we would say a HIStory book. Many writers would call that an affectation and prefer that we say a historical, but apparently, this choice is a matter of personal taste. For help on using articles with abbreviations and acronyms (a or an FBI agent?), see the section on Abbreviations. First and subsequent reference: When we first refer to something in written text, we often use an indefinite article to modify it. A newspaper has an obligation to seek out and tell the truth. In a subsequent reference to this newspaper, however, we will use the definite article: There are situations, however, when the newspaper must determine whether the public's safety is jeopardized by knowing the truth. Another example: "I'd like a glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put the glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Exception: When a modifier appears between the article and the noun, the subsequent article will continue to be indefinite: "I'd like a big glass of orange juice, please," John said. "I put a big glass of juice on the counter already," Sheila replied. Generic reference: We can refer to something in a generic way by using any of the three articles. We can do the same thing by omitting the article altogether. A beagle makes a great hunting dog and family companion. An airedale is sometimes a rather skittish animal. The golden retriever is a marvelous pet for children. Irish setters are not the highly intelligent animals they used to be. The difference between the generic indefinite pronoun and the normal indefinite pronoun is that the latter refers to any of that class ("I want to buy a beagle, and any old beagle will do.") whereas the former (see beagle sentence) refers to all members of that class

#### Violation: they spec Brazil

#### Standards:

#### 1] Precision – they justify arbitrarily doing away with words in the rez which decks ground and prep. Voter for jurisdiction since the judge can’t vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### 2] Limits – there are 195[[1]](#footnote-1) governments but other metrics means even more – explodes limits since there are tons of affs and combinations with different situations i.e. inherency in France is different from the US – there are no DAs that apply to every aff. Some examples are Hungary, EU, Kazakhstan, US, India, UK, Egypt, etc.

#### 3] TVA – read your advantage under a whole rez aff. Answers PICs – potential doesn’t justify actual abuse and lack of prep means cheaty word and process PICs.

#### Fairness is a voter and outweighs – debate is a competitive activity that requires objective evaluation.

#### Drop the debater to deter future abuse.

#### Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention while encouraging a race to the bottom.

#### No RVIs – A] Logic – you don’t win for being fair, outweighs since arguments must be logical, B] Incentivizes baiting theory which proliferates abuse

#### NC theory first 1] They started the chain of abuse and forced me down this strategy 2] We have more speeches to norm over it 3] It was introduced first so it’s lexically prior.

#### DTA on 1AR shells – they can blow up blippy shells in the 2AR but I have to split time and can’t preempt the 2AR which causes intervention and makes it irresolvable so don’t stake the round on it

## 2

### DA

#### Lula wins now but its close---insert chart.

Spigariol 11-3 (, A., 2021. Lula still polling first for 2022, but no longer pulling away. [online] The Brazilian Report. Available at: <https://brazilian.report/liveblog/2021/11/03/lula-polling-first-bolsonaro-2022/> [Accessed 21 November 2021].)-rahulpenu

Lula still polling first, but no longer pulling away

Lula’s **support** **slipped** by a single point compared with late September, with Mr. **Bolsonaro** polling at a **stable** **28** **percent**. Center left candidate Ciro Gomes is the only “third-way option” above the 10-percent mark, with others at 4 percent or less.

The pollster included a scenario with former Justice Minister Sergio Moro, poised to join the center-right Podemos party, reportedly with presidential ambitions. However, the former federal judge managed no more than 8 percent of support.

Chart, line chart

Description automatically generated

#### Bolsonaro is making key changes.

AP 11-10 (,Associated Press, 2021. Bolsonaro Joins a Centrist Party in Brazil Ahead of 2022 Re-election Bid. [online] Nytimes.com. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/10/world/americas/brazil-bolsonaro-liberal-party.html> [Accessed 21 November 2021].)-rahulpenu

**Bolsonaro** **Joins** a **Centrist** **Party** in Brazil Ahead of 2022 Re-election Bid

President Jair Bolsonaro, who has not belonged to any political party for two years, is joining the centrist Liberals, they said on Wednesday.

BRASILIA, Brazil — After going two years without belonging to a political party, President Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil sealed an agreement with the centrist Liberal Party to back his 2022 re-election bid, according to a party statement released on Wednesday.

The decision followed a meeting between Mr. Bolsonaro and the Liberal Party leader, Valdemar Costa Neto, in Brasília, the capital, the statement said. The president’s formal enrollment in the party’s ranks will take place on Nov. 22.

Joining one of the parties that form part of the so-called Cenbtrao **group** seems to signal that Mr. Bolsonaro, a right-wing populist, is shifting course from his 2018 campaign strategy, when he criticized the group’s old-school political practices.

In early polls ahead of the October 2022 vote, Mr. Bolsonaro trails former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the leftist who led Brazil from 2003 to 2010.

The Liberal Party, or P.L., is known along with other Centrao parties for **ideological** **malleability**, often **exchanging** **support** **for** **gov**ernment **appointments** and earmarks. Mr. Bolsonaro was affiliated with such parties during most of his seven terms as a federal lawmaker, but cast himself as a political outsider during his 2018 presidential campaign. He vowed then not to embrace the horse trading that benefited entrenched actors and enabled corruption.

“It is very **symbolic** **how** **Bolsonaro** has **started** **to** **play** the **traditional** game of Brazilian **politics**,” said Maurício Santoro, a political science professor at the State University of Rio de Janeiro. “The P.L. is helping Bolsonaro survive.”

When Mr. Bolsonaro ran in 2018, it was under the banner of the Social Liberal Party, which he left one year after his election victory amid disagreements with its leadership over funding and regional nominations. He set out to forge his own party, but failed to garner enough signatures and has been without a political home since.

The presidential press office didn’t respond to a request for comment from The Associated Press to confirm the P.L.’s statement. Earlier Wednesday, Mr. Bolsonaro had said in a radio interview that there was a “99.9 percent chance” he would join the P.L.

Reports that Mr. Bolsonaro was seeking a Centrao party to sponsor his re-election bid had already generated commentary from analysts that he was departing from his prior anti-establishment stance. As rumors of his agreement with the P.L. intensified this week, comments criticizing Mr. Costa Neto, the party leader, were deleted from the social media accounts of some of Mr. Bolsonaro’s family members.

Editors’ Picks

‘When Are You Getting Married?’

Taylor Swift’s ‘All Too Well’ and the Weaponization of Memory

The Real Surprise of ‘Passing’: A Focus on Black Women’s Inner Lives

Mr. Bolsonaro himself has previously said that Mr. Costa Neto was corrupt, noted Carlos Melo, a political analyst and professor at Insper University in São Paulo. In 2012, Mr. Costa Neto, then a lawmaker, was convicted of corruption and money laundering in a vast vote-buying scandal that almost brought down Mr. da Silva’s administration. He served time in prison.

Over the past year, Mr. Bolsonaro has turned to the Centrao for political shelter from increasing pressure on his administration, including more than 100 impeachment requests, a Senate investigation into his handling of the Covid-19 pandemic and his plunging popularity. In August, he appointed a senator from the Centrao to be his chief of staff.

“If you take away the Centrao, there’s the left,” the president told a small conservative news outlet, Jornal da Cidade Online, on Tuesday. “So where do I go?”

#### Strike crackdowns is prompting polling for Lula---the plan’s radical change is key to building Bolsonaro voter popularity.

Castanheira 10-14 (, T., 2021. São Paulo teachers and public employees strike against attack on pensions. [online] World Socialist Web Site. Available at: <https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2021/10/15/braz-o15.html> [Accessed 21 November 2021].)-rahulpenu

The criminal agreement between the Unions’ Forum and the government for the unsafe return to in-person classes included the requirement that educators pay back the hours spent on strike. Therefore, teachers are now working grueling overtime, exposing themselves even more to the risk of infection with the coronavirus in order not to have their salaries cut. This situation, which threatens teachers with having their salaries completely cut off if they join the new strike, is seen by many workers as the opportunity the government saw to advance its attacks. In the face of these threats, the **broad** **participation** of workers **in** the **strike** movement **is** a **direct** **response** **to** the terrible **social** **crisis** **facing** the entire Brazilian **working** **class**. With millions having fallen into poverty in Brazil since last year, workers are seeing their purchasing power violently eroded by high inflation, especially in food and fuel prices. Recently, strikes in defense of wages have broken out at General Motors in São Paulo, at the Jurong shipyard in Espírito Santo, among metalworkers in Paraná, and app delivery workers in several Brazilian cities. The World Socialist Web Site interviewed workers participating in Wednesday’s protest in São Paulo. Leandro, who works at a Child Education Center (CEI), serving children under the age of 2, explained to the WSWS what led him to the demonstration. “We who work double shifts, 12 hours a day, pay the maximum income tax rate of 27.5 percent of our salaries and another 14 percent in pension contributions,” he said. “In other words, almost half of what I earn is only for taxes. They want to raise this even more. And after I retire, even though I would have contributed for more than 40 years, I will continue to pay the same tax rate. Today, this percentage is only charged on [monthly] salaries exceeding 6,433 reais (US$ 1,166). With this new change, it will be charged of everyone who earns more than a minimum wage (US$200).” Leandro’s wife, Kauane, an educator at an Early Childhood Education School (EMEI), serving children from 2 to 6 years old, added that it is inconceivable for “a 60-year-old teacher to remain in an early childhood education classroom, with toddlers [as the new bill imposes]. They won’t have the physical or psychological structure to cope with that.” She also noted that “in the last four years we have been without any wage adjustment, not even for inflation. But our latest struggles have been only against the removal of rights. We are losing right after right. We see all the services being scrapped, there is no investment in health care. We are treated as numbers. If something happens to us, tomorrow they’ll put someone new in our place. We are not seen as human beings, who have families.” Kauane and Leandro have children, one of them with asthma, and are seriously concerned about the unsafe reopening of schools. On Wednesday, hours before the demonstration, São Paulo Governor João Doria (PSDB) announced the mandatory return to in-person classes in state schools with 100 percent occupation of classrooms, eliminating any mandatory distancing between students. Later that day, Mayor Nunes announced the same measure will be followed by municipal schools. “Now we’ve had the news that they’re going to fully open schools and we have a very big concern, especially for the children who have not been vaccinated,” said Kauane. “As long as it is not safe and I can, my children will stay at home. But we know that this is not a reality for everyone. There are younger children whose parents need to work, and there are many parents who have no one to leave their children with.” Sheila, a kindergarten teacher, declared that the strike movement is also “in the name of quality public education.” She and her school colleagues denounced the homicidal operation of schools in São Paulo. “How can we take 1-year-old babies, who are just starting to walk, and have distancing? It was really a reckless act by the mayor,” she declared. “In the beginning there were only a few children, but now it is practically full,” said Sheila. “As soon as he approved 60 percent [of occupancy of the CEIs] several children in our CEI had COVID. Only 10 days went by, and children already started to show basic symptoms like coryza, malaise. Now I ask myself, how could we guarantee the safety of such small children? Infection was inevitable.” Sheila said that “in other CEIs near ours, some teachers died of COVID but were not counted. At no time were infections of teachers and children with COVID mentioned by the media. It was simply, ‘teachers return, the families need it,’ they never worried about infections.” The same situation was denounced by educators in Elementary Schools (EMEFs). Márcia, an art educator on the east side of São Paulo, described the situation as “chaos.” She said: “Every week, in my school two or three people are dismissed because of COVID, employees and children. They dismiss only those in the same classroom, but we, who are ‘specialist teachers’ and teach all the classrooms, are not dismissed. These are super unhealthy conditions.” The demonstration had a significant participation by retired teachers and employees, who will immediately suffer a 14 percent cut in their income with the approval of the bill. Amalia, a retired English teacher, declared: “I’ve been in these movements for 40 years and there are few times I haven’t participated. Municipal teachers are always overwhelmed, for lack of staff in the schools, lack of salaries.” “City councilors should have the role of defending us against authoritarian government projects, but what happens is that we have to fight against both the government and the councilors,” she continued. “The public service is scrapped, everyone says that. In my opinion, the intention of these governments is to privatize them. Meanwhile, we pay absurd taxes that nobody can explain. What I’m looking to learn is what the state is for.” Tatiana, an English teacher working with Márcia, said that “as long as these people are in power, I think it’s very difficult for us to solve these problems. **Until** **we** have a really **popular** **government**, **for** the **workers**, **there** **isn’t** much of **a** **perspective**.” Talking about the latest strikes, she said that “the performance of the union was sad. It is the same thing that I saw [with the São Paulo state teacher’s union, APEOESP] in the 2015 90-day strike. I saw them ending the strike despite the vote to continue it, and here it was the same thing. I think it’s sad, because we don’t know who is really on our side.” The unions and political parties linked to them, principally the PT and the Socialism and Freedom Party (PSOL), are once again striving to divert workers from confronting the capitalist system which is responsible for the successive attacks on public employees and the working class as a whole. These **political** **forces** **advance** as the only viable strategy for the workers’ movement the pressuring of “indecisive council members” **to** “**flip their vote**.” In their speeches, the union officials claimed that councilors who vote against the workers should face a settling of scores in the next elections: in 2024! This criminal proposition unequivocally exposes the reactionary character of the trade unions and the pseudo-left, who work to disarm the working class in face of the bourgeois state. Other **union leaders** who took the stage also **claimed** that the **election of** a new PT **government headed by** Luiz Inácio **Lula** da Silva **is the real solution to workers’ problems**. This perspective is a complete fraud. Lula is openly working to reestablish his corrupt alliances with the right-wing parties and to present himself to the capitalist class as their best representative to contain an imminent social explosion in Brazil and defend their economic interests against the working class. São Paulo municipal **workers** **can** **advance** **their** **struggle** **only** **by** **breaking** the **political** **control** of their movement by the unions, the PT and its pseudo-left satellites. They cannot accept new betrayals, and having their strikes broken through the same antidemocratic maneuvers used in 2019 and earlier this year!

Workers in São Paulo must orient themselves not to the bourgeois state, but to their fellow workers throughout Brazil and internationally who face the same attacks from the capitalist class.

A rank-and-file workers’ rebellion is already taking place around the world. On October 1, parents and rank-and-file workers called an independent strike against the unsafe reopening of schools, receiving global support. A second strike has been called for October 15. Across the United States, the strongest wave of strikes in decades is erupting, with workers rejecting rotten contracts promoted by the unions and the companies.

Brazilian workers must unite their struggles with this global movement, building independent rank-and-file committees in every workplace and joining the Rank-and-File Committee for Safe Education in Brazil (CBES-BR). The CBES-BR calls upon all workers to participate in the event How to end the pandemic: The case for eradication that will be held October 24 by the International Workers Alliance of Rank-and-File Committees (IWA-RFC) and the WSWS.

#### And, Lula is hope for workers---plan is a 180.

Fogel 21 (, B., 2021. Brazil: Lula’s Return Means There Is Finally Some Hope for Workers. [online] The Wire. Available at: <https://thewire.in/world/brazil-lulas-return-means-there-is-finally-some-hope-for-workers> [Accessed 21 November 2021].)-rahulpenu

Brazil: **Lula’s** **Return** **Means** There Is Finally Some **Hope** **for** **Workers**

Despite being imprisoned for nearly two years, the centre-left leader enjoys far more popularity than President Jair Bolsonaro, who he could take on in the next elections.

On March 8, Brazilian Supreme Court judge Luiz Edson Fachin ruled to annul all of the former president Lula da Silva’s convictions. Fachin said that the court that convicted Lula in the southern city of Curitiba did not have the legal authority to convict Brazil’s first Workers’ Party (PT) president. As such, he must be retried by a federal court in the capital city of Brasília.

The most important effect of the overturning is that it restores Lula’s political rights, allowing him to run in next year’s presidential election. Under Brazil’s Ficha Limpa (“Clean Slate”) law — ironically passed by the PT government — politicians convicted of crimes or impeached are unable to run for elected office.

Lula was convicted of money laundering and corruption in 2016 for making improvements to a beachfront apartment he never lived in and served 580 days in prison before being released on appeal in November 2019.

The case against Lula was always weak, but it didn’t stop him from getting convicted due to the fact that Sergio Moro, the judge hearing the trial, was illegally colluding with prosecutors to make a case against the former labour leader. His conviction was the crowning achievement of Brazil’s historic Operação Lava Jato (“Operation Car Wash”) investigation, but we now have clear evidence that prosecutors and judges conspired to imprison him explicitly to prevent him from competing in the 2018 elections, which saw the election of the far-right Jair Bolsonaro.

Lula’s legal team declared on Twitter that “The decision that today affirms the incompetence of the Federal Justice of Curitiba is the recognition that we have always been correct in this long legal battle.” Another twist in this saga is possible that is the Supreme Court still has to affirm this ruling, and another court could convict him again. But, for now, the centre-left Lula is back.

Lula versus Bolsonaro

Lula’s return to the political arena has already sent shock waves throughout Brazil, and judging by the latest polling, he is still the most popular politician in Brazil even after being imprisoned and years of media smears. And while he may not have the historic approval ratings he enjoyed after leaving office, his PT is still the largest party in the country.

A recent poll published in the Estado de S. Paulo newspaper found that 50% of those surveyed would definitely or probably vote for Lula as opposed to 38% for Bolsonaro. Lula’s disapproval rate of 44% is also lower than any of the other potential candidates such as right-wing São Paulo governor João Doria and the vacuous TV personality Luciano Huck. In fact, Lula was the only one of the 10 candidates surveyed that outperformed Bolsonaro.

Brazil’s centre-right is also in full-on panic mode as their own electoral chances are going to sink rapidly. Despite their official opposition to Bolsonaro, many of them would prefer a second term of the far-right president to a PT government. The “moderates” have been vainly searching for somebody — a Brazilian Macron — **who can pose as the leader of the broad front for democracy against Bolsonaro**, while pursuing the more or less same economic agenda as Brazil’s president.

For all the moderate opposition’s talk about democracy, it is unlikely that they would back a centre-left candidate in the second round against Bolsonaro. Brazil’s centrists not only removed Dilma Rousseff from office in 2016 but helped elect Bolsonaro in his contest against the PT’s Fernando Haddad. Some of the names being floated as potential candidates like former health minister Luiz Henrique Mandetta served in Bolsonaro’s cabinet and others like Doria and Huck supported Bolsonaro in 2018.

Bolsonaro himself shrugged off the news, claiming that “I believe that the Brazilian people don’t even want to have a candidate like this in 2022, much less think of the possibility of electing him.” The manufactured disasters of the Bolsonaro government could make many who voted against the PT in 2018 or voted null consider Lula as a viable alternative candidate in 2022.

It’s telling, though, that Brazil’s stock market fell by 4%, and the real slipped to record lows against the dollar following the news of the verdict. Investors apparently were not too worried about the apocalyptic COVID-19 death numbers coming out of Brazil — but the return of Lula led to full-on panic.

Last week was the deadliest week for the country since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic with a record 1,910 deaths recorded on Thursday alone. Brazil has recorded over 265,000 deaths and 11 million cases. Intensive care wards across the country are fast running out of space, cities are running out of vaccines, and government appears to be encouraging the virus to rage out of control.

The department of health is warning that Brazil could see as many as three thousand deaths per day in the coming weeks, and the country still lacks a national vaccination campaign. Health experts are warning the effects of letting a pandemic spread uncontained in such a large country could even threaten the global COVID-19 vaccination campaign as the virus mutates and new variants emerge.

Bolsonaro’s latest gambit involves pushing an untested nasal spray as the latest miracle cure. All the while, he continues to attack public health responses and incite his supporters against anyone who tries to control the spread of COVID-19. Congress has so far done almost nothing to hold Bolsonaro and his government accountable for its homicidal response to the pandemic.

Despite Bolsonaro’s murderous response to the COVID-19 crisis, open criminality, and the fact that Lula presided over one of the greatest economic booms in Brazilian history, big capital, much of the mainstream media, and Brazil’s centrists continue to depict Lula and Bolsonaro as two sides of the same coin. This type of mendacious “pox on both sides” type of politics is backed up by the united hostility to the Left among Brazil’s respectable opposition and the forces that back Bolsonaro.

#### American democracy is systematically blamed for liberal erosion under 4 more years of Bolsonaro---spills over and decimates US democratic institutions.

Adler and Long 11-15 (, D. and Long, G., 2021. We need a new observatory of democracy in the Americas | David Adler and Guillaume Long. [online] the Guardian. Available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/15/organization-of-american-states-democracy-observatory> [Accessed 21 November 2021] David Adler is the general coordinator of the Progressive International. Guillaume Long is a senior policy analyst at the Center for Economic and Policy Research and former foreign minister of Ecuador.)-rahulpenu

We need a new observatory of democracy in the Americas

On 20 October, the US secretary of state, Antony Blinken, traveled to Ecuador to set out a vision for democracy in the Americas. Over the past five years, the **hemisphere** has **suffered** an **assault** **on** its **democratic** **institutions**, as political leaders from Donald Trump to Jair Bolsonaro have adopted a new authoritarian playbook: lies, violence, repression, and more lies. Two-thirds of US citizens now believe that democracy is under threat, while a majority of Brazilians fear a military dictatorship will return to the country. “We find ourselves in a moment of **democratic** **reckoning**,” announced Blinken.

But the Biden administration continues to put the US on the wrong side of this reckoning. Consider Blinken’s recent trip. In Quito, he lavished praise on President Guillermo Lasso in the same week that Lasso declared a nationwide state of emergency to intimidate critics of his government and distract from an investigation into alleged tax fraud following his appearance in the Pandora Papers leak. In Bogotá hours later, Blinken applauded the democratic credentials of the Colombian president, Iván Duque – “We have no better ally on the full range of issues that our democracies face in this hemisphere,” Blinken said – while his government stands accused of targeting protesters and allowing an unprecedented number of assassinations of Indigenous, Black, and peasant leaders to take place under his watch.

The **US** government is **complicit** **in** these **attacks** **on** **democracy**, not only as an “ally” but also **as** a **leading** **member** **of** the Organization of American States (**OAS**). Just two days after Blinken’s South America jaunt, the governments of Bolivia, Argentina, and Mexico held their own event at the Washington DC headquarters of the OAS to discuss the organization’s controversial role in the 2019 Bolivian election. The experts’ findings were clear – and damning: while the OAS found no evidence of fraud in the election of President Evo Morales, it lied to the public and manipulated its own findings to help depose him. “It was later reported that the US representative to the OAS actually pressured and steered the observation mission to reach a determination of fraud,” testified Jake Johnston of the Center for Economic and Policy Research.

Bolivia is not an isolated case. In Haiti, for example, the anti-democratic interventions of the OAS stretch over decades. In 2000, the OAS observer mission concluded that the Haitian election had been a “great success” only to change its position under pressure from Washington to claim it was illegitimate. The goal was evident: “to dislodge the Aristide administration”, as Dr Paul Farmer, deputy special envoy for Haiti at the United Nations, testified to Congress. Then, 10 years later, the OAS intervened again to reverse the result of the 2010 presidential election on the basis of faulty statistical methods. It is difficult to overstate the destabilizing consequences of these interventions. Juan Gabriel Valdés, the former head of the UN in Haiti, recently described the 2010 OAS decision as “the origin of the present tragedy” in the country.

The OAS, then, is **no** **longer** a **credible** observer of democracy in the Americas – particularly under the present **leadership** of Luis Almagro, which has been described as the “**worst** **in** **history**”. In the eyes of several member states, the **institution** **is** **too** **beholden** to **US** **interests** to provide an effective defense of democratic institutions, **leading** some to call for “**autonomous**” **organizations** **to** **contest** **it**. “The world is currently going through a very worrying moment, where attacks on democratic institutions happen with frightening frequency,” said Brazil’s former foreign minister Celso Amorim. “The creation of an international electoral observatory – popular and non-partisan – will fill an important gap in defense of democracy and human rights.”

What would such an observatory do? Three capacities are critical. The first would be to organize delegations to countries where democratic institutions are clearly under threat – both by domestic actors and international observers like the OAS. Bringing together data scientists and parliamentary representatives, these delegations would provide independent analysis of the electoral process and a defense against false narratives that threaten to derail it. The goal is not only to observe how votes are cast and counted; it is also to observe the observers.

The second critical capacity would be to launch investigations of unlawful interventions in the democratic process. Over the course of the last decade, the dominant mechanism of democratic undoing has been legal, namely the weaponization of the judicial system to intimidate, exclude, and even incarcerate political opponents – a tactic known across Latin America as legal warfare, or “lawfare”. Deploying a global network of legal experts, a new observatory could challenge these tactics to help ensure a free and fair democratic process.

The third and final capacity of the new observatory would be communications. In the technological era, bad information often travels faster than good. Big tech platforms such as Facebook not only serve to disseminate false stories and stir civic conflict; evidence suggests that their executives intervene to favor some candidates and ban others from the platform altogether. In the context of such bias, this new observatory would need to build an autonomous communications infrastructure to ensure that the findings of its delegations and investigations are rapidly spread, widely read, and well understood.

The call for a new observatory could not be more urgent. Contentious elections lie just on the horizon in 2022. In May, Colombia will head to the polls after a year of roiling protests against government violence, corruption, and a failed pandemic response. Five months later, Jair **Bolsonaro** will **face** **Lula** da Silva after **profiting** **from** his **flagrant** **persecution** on the road to the presidency in 2018. **Bolsonaro** and his allies in Congress have already pushed a legislative package to **rewrite** **Brazil’s** **electoral** **laws**, while **parroting** **lies** **about** potential **fraud** in the country’s electoral system.

Meanwhile, back in Washington DC, Secretary Blinken is moving ahead with plans for a Summit for Democracy. Convening leaders from “a diverse group of the world’s democracies” in early December, the summit aims to encourage commitments to fight corruption and respect human rights – an opportunity, as the White House press release suggests, to “speak honestly about the challenges facing democracy so as to collectively strengthen the foundation for democratic renewal”.

But the crisis of democracy will not be solved by summitry alone. We cannot delegate “democratic renewal” to our presidents, nor to the OAS that claims to represent them. We need an observatory to defend democracy from the bottom up – an institution with the capacity and credibility to fight authoritarian tactics and even the playing field for democracy to flourish. That fight starts now.

#### Internationalism grounded in democratic norms averts a laundry list of existential catastrophes.

Brooks 14 [Rosa; November 14; Professor of Law at Georgetown University, Senior Fellow with the New America and Arizona State University Future of War Project, former Senior Advisor at the U.S. State Department; Foreign Policy, “Embrace the Chaos,” https://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/14/embrace-the-chaos/; RP] – recut rahulpenu

I. The Character of the Mess

Defining the character of the current mess is the easy part. Briefly:

* The last century’s technological revolutions have made our world more globally interconnected than ever.
* Power (along with access to power) has become more democratized and diffuse in some ways, but more concentrated in other ways.
* For most individuals around the globe, day-to-day life is far less dangerous and brutal than in previous eras; for the species as a whole, however, the risk of future global catastrophe has increased.
* The continuously accelerating rate of technological and social change makes it increasingly difficult to predict the geopolitical future.

Nothing is particularly original about these observations; they’re repeated in some fashion in every major national strategic document produced over the last decade. They probably teach this stuff to kindergarteners now. Indeed, we’ve heard it all so often that it’s tempting to dismiss such claims as meaningless platitudes: Been there; theorized that. Can we get please get back to foreign-policy business as usual?

No, we can’t. Not if we want our children and grandchildren to live decent lives. If we care about the future at all, we need to do more than prattle on at cocktail parties about globalization, interconnectedness, complexity, danger, and uncertainty. We need to feel these seismic changes in our bones.

So bear with me. Let’s try to breathe some life into the clichés.

I’ve written about these issues before (here and here), and at risk of being both a narcissist and a broken record, I’ll quote myself:

The world has grown more complex. Believe it. The world now contains more people living in more states than ever before, and we’re all more interconnected. A hundred years ago, the world population was about 1.8 billion, there were roughly 60 sovereign states in the world, the automobile was still a rarity, and there were no commercial passenger flights and no transcontinental telephone service. Fifty years ago, global population had climbed to more than 3 billion and there were 115 U.N. member states, but air travel was still for the wealthy and the personal computer still lay two decades in the future.

Today? We’ve got 7 billion people living in 192 U.N. member states and a handful of other territories. These 7 billion people take 93,000 commercial flights a day from 9,000 airports, drive 1 billion cars, and carry 7 billion mobile phones around with them.

In numerous ways, life has gotten substantially better in this more crowded and interconnected era. Seventy years ago, global war killed scores of millions, but interstate conflict has declined sharply since the end of World War II, and the creation of the United Nations ushered in a far more egalitarian and democratic form of international governance than existed in any previous era. Today, militarily powerful states are far less free than in the pre-U.N. era to use overt force to accomplish their aims, and the world now has numerous transnational courts and dispute-resolution bodies that collectively offer states a viable alternative to the use of force. The modern international order is no global utopia, but it sure beats colonial domination and world wars.

In the 50 years that followed World War II, medical and agricultural advances brought unprecedented health and prosperity to most parts of the globe. More recently, the communications revolution has enabled exciting new forms of nongovernmental cross-border alliances to emerge, empowering, for instance, global human rights and environmental movements. In just the last two decades, the near-universal penetration of mobile phones has had a powerful leveling effect: All over the globe, people at every age and income level can use these tiny but powerful computers to learn foreign languages, solve complex mathematical problems, create and share videos, watch the news, move money around, or communicate with far-flung friends.

All this has had a dark side, of course. As access to knowledge has been democratized, so too has access to the tools of violence and destruction, and greater global interconnectedness enables disease, pollution, and conflict to spread quickly and easily beyond borders. A hundred years ago, no single individual or nonstate actor could do more than cause localized mayhem; today, we have to worry about massive, **bioengineered** threats created by tiny terrorist cells and globally devastating cyberattacks devised by malevolent teen hackers.

Even as many forms of power have grown more democratized and diffuse, other forms of power have grown more concentrated. A very small number of states control and consume a disproportionate share of the world’s resources, and a very small number of individuals control most of the world’s wealth. (According to a 2014 Oxfam report, the 85 richest individuals on Earth are worth more than the globe’s 3.5 billion poorest people).

Indeed, from a species-survival perspective, the world has grown vastly more dangerous over the last century. Individual humans live longer than ever before, but a small number of states now possess the unprecedented ability to destroy large chunks of the human race and possibly the Earth itself — all in a matter of days or even hours. What’s more, though the near-term threat of interstate nuclear conflict has greatly diminished since the end of the Cold War, nuclear material and know-how are now both less controlled and less controllable.

Amid all these changes, our world has also grown far more uncertain. We possess more information than ever before and vastly greater processing power, but the accelerating pace of global change has far exceeded our collective ability to understand it, much less manage it. This makes it increasingly difficult to make predictions or calculate risks. As I’ve written previously:

We literally have no points of comparison for understanding the scale and scope of the risks faced by humanity today. Compared to the long, slow sweep of human history, the events of the last century have taken place in the blink of an eye. This should … give us pause when we’re tempted to conclude that today’s trends are likely to continue. Rising life expectancy? That’s great, but if climate change has consequences as nasty as some predict, a century of rising life expectancy could turn out to be a mere blip on the charts. A steep decline in interstate conflicts? Fantastic, but less than 70 years of human history isn’t much to go on….

That’s why one can’t dismiss the risk of catastrophic events [such as disastrous climate change or nuclear conflict] as “high consequence, low probability.” How do we compute the probability of catastrophic events of a type that has never happened? Does 70 years without nuclear annihilation tell us that there’s a low probability of nuclear catastrophe — or just tell us that we haven’t had a nuclear catastrophe yet?…

Lack of catastrophic change might signify a system in stable equilibrium, but sometimes — as with earthquakes — pressure may be building up over time, undetected….

Most analysts assumed the Soviet Union was stable — until it collapsed. Analysts predicted that Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak would retain his firm grip on power — until he was ousted. How much of what we currently file under “Stable” should be recategorized under “Hasn’t Collapsed Yet”?

This, then, is the character of world messiness in this first quarter of the 21st century. So on to the next question: Where, in all this messiness, does the United States find itself?

II. The United States in the Mess: Goodbye, Lake Wobegon?

For Americans, the good news is that the United States remains an extraordinarily powerful nation. The United States has “the most powerful military in history,” Obama declared in a recent speech. Measured by sheer destructive capacity, he is surely right. The United States spends more on its military than China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and India combined. The U.S. military can get to more places, faster, with more lethal and effective weapons, than any military on Earth.

The United States also manages to gobble up a disproportionate share of the world’s wealth and resources. By the year 2000, wrote Betsy Taylor and Dave Tilford, the United States, with “less than 5 percent of the world’s population,” was using “one-third of the world’s paper, a quarter of the world’s oil, 23 percent of the coal, 27 percent of the aluminum, and 19 percent of the copper.” In 2010, Americans possessed 39 percent of the planet’s wealth.

The bad news for Americans? U.S. power and global influence have been declining. In part, this is because various once-weak states have been growing stronger, and in part, it’s because no state can be as autonomous today as it might have been in the past. The United States’ geographical position long helped protect it from external interference, while its strong military and economy enabled it to dominate or control numerous less powerful states. But globalization has reduced every state’s autonomy, creating collective challenges — from climate change to the regulation of capital — that no state can fully address on its own.

U.S. power and global influence have also declined in absolute terms, as America’s own political and economic health has been called into question. The United States now has greater income inequality than almost every other state in the developed world — and most states in the developing world. American life expectancy ranks well below that of other industrialized democracies, and the same is true for infant mortality and elementary school enrollment. Meanwhile, the United States has the world’s highest per capita incarceration rate, and on international health and quality-of-life metrics, the United States has been losing ground for several decades. This domestic decline jeopardizes the country’s continued ability to innovate and prosper; it also makes American values and the American political and economic systems less appealing to others.

Worse, the political system that Americans rely on for reform and repair seems itself to be broken; the federal government shutdown in 2013 offered the world a striking illustration of U.S. political dysfunction. Add to this the divisive national security policies of George W. Bush’s administration — many of which were continued or expanded by the Obama administration — and it’s no surprise that the United States has recently become less admired and less emulated around the globe, reducing American “soft power.”

No matter how you slice it, it comes to the same thing: Compared with 30 years ago, the United States today has a greatly reduced ability to control its own destiny or the destiny of other states. The United States still has unprecedented power to destroy (Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden both discovered this, to their detriment). But the country’s capacity for destruction is not equaled by its capacity to shape the behavior of other states or their populations, and the United States has less and less ability to insulate itself from the world’s woes.

Unfortunately, American political leaders share a bipartisan inclination to deny these realities. Mostly, they succumb to the Lake Wobegon effect: “Declinism” and “declinist” have entered the American political vocabulary, but only as purely pejorative terms.

This is both stupid and dangerous. How can we adapt our global strategy to compensate for the ways in which U.S. power has been declining if we refuse to admit that decline?

Continued U.S. decline is certainly not inevitable, and some argue that the United States is in fact poised for an economic and political resurgence. There is no way to know for sure — but it’s worth recalling that, historically, every significant empire has eventually declined. Are we prepared to bet that the United States will prove an exception?

There is also no way to know for sure what form continued or eventual U.S. decline will take. We don’t know whether it will be fast or slow; we don’t know whether the American Empire is in for a hard landing or a soft one. Will the United States crash, like the former Soviet Union? Or will a slow decline in power leave the country an intact and influential nation, like the United Kingdom? Will America’s future be more like Canada’s present, or more like Brazil’s?

III. Behind the Veil of Ignorance: Uncertainty as Lodestone

We don’t know what America’s future will look like, and we can make fewer and fewer geopolitical predictions with confidence. The world has changed too much and too fast for us to accurately assess the probabilities of many types of future events. Perhaps this is why it’s so tempting for Americans to stay in Lake Wobegon, with eyes closed and fingers crossed. Uncertainty is frightening.

But paradoxically, this very uncertainty should be a lodestone, pointing realists and idealists alike toward a sensible, forward-looking global strategy. In fact, radical uncertainty can be a powerful tool for strategic planning.

That may seem oxymoronic, but consider one of the 20th century’s most influential thought experiments: In his 1971 book, A Theory of Justice, philosopher John Rawls famously sought to use a hypothetical situation involving extreme uncertainty to derive optimal principles of justice.

Imagine, said Rawls, rational, free, and equal humans seeking to devise a set of principles to undergird the structure of human society. Imagine further that they must reason from behind what Rawls dubbed a “veil of ignorance,” which hides from them their own future status or attributes. Behind the veil of ignorance, wrote Rawls, people still possess general knowledge of economics, science, and so forth, and they can draw on this knowledge to assist them in designing a future society. Their ignorance is limited to their own future role in the society they are designing: “no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.”

If we were collectively designing social structures and rules, but could not know our own individual future positions in that social structure, what structures and rules would we come up with? Applying a version of decision theory, Rawls concluded that in the face of such radical uncertainty, rational, free, and equal beings behind the veil of ignorance would be drawn toward a “maximin” (or “minimax“) rule of decision, in which they would seek to minimize their losses in a worst-case scenario. Since those behind the veil of ignorance don’t know whether they’ll be among the haves or among the have-nots in the society they are designing, they should seek to build a society in which they each will be least badly off — even the luck of the draw leads them to start with the fewest advantages.

Rawls posited that such a rule of decision should lead those behind the veil of ignorance to support two core principles: the first relating to liberty (“each person [should] have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others”), and the second relating to social and economic goods. (Social goods should be distributed equally, unless an unequal distribution would serve the common good and be “to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged,” while “offices and positions [should remain] open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.”)

This is in some ways intuitive: On a national level, it is the reason Americans across the political spectrum continue to express substantial support for the maintenance of unemployment benefits, Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, and so on. Any one of us might someday face a job loss or illness; nearly all of us will eventually face old age. We know we might someday need those benefits ourselves. In the face of uncertainty about the future, we all recognize the value of insurance, savings, and at least some minimal social safety net.

In the international arena, the same is true.

This has obvious implications for global strategy. Empires, like individuals, can sink into poverty, illness, or simple old age — and in an era of uncertainty, empires, like individuals, would do well to hedge against the possibility of future misfortune.

Indeed, two decades after the publication of A Theory of Justice, Rawls sought to apply a form of this thought experiment to derive the core principles that he believed would characterize a just global order. His arguments are complex, and I can’t do justice to them here — but fortunately, unlike Rawls, I am not interested in coming up with abstract principles of global justice. My less lofty agenda is limited to arguing that a crude version of Rawls’s thought experiment can help us delineate the contours of a sensible U.S. global strategy — a “maximin” strategy that is well-suited to protecting the interests of the United States and its people, both in today’s messy world and in a wide range of future messes.

Here’s my thought experiment.

Imagine a crude version of Rawls’s veil of ignorance, with only the United States behind it. This veil of ignorance doesn’t require us to disavow what we know of history (America’s or the world’s), nor does it require us to disavow what we know of recent trends, present global realities, U.S. values, or our current conception of the good. It only hides our future from us: Behind this veil of ignorance, we don’t know whether energy, food, water, and other vital resources will be scarcer or more plentiful in the decades to come; we don’t know whether global power will be more or less centralized; we don’t know whether new technologies and new forms of social organization will make existing technologies and institutions obsolete.

Most of all, we don’t know whether, in the decades to come, the United States will be rich or poor, weak or strong, respected or hated. For that matter, we don’t know whether the United States — or even the form of political organization we call the nation-state — will exist at all a century or two from now. In the face of such radical uncertainty, what kind of grand strategy should a rational United States adopt?

Of course, this shouldn’t really be called a “thought experiment” at all: The United States already operates behind a veil of ignorance, if we could only bring ourselves to admit it. We know the past; we have a reasonable understanding of recent trends; we know that the world is messy and dangerous; we know that the potential for rapid and potentially catastrophic change is real; and we know that our ability to predict future changes and quantify various risks is profoundly limited.

This knowledge is profoundly unsettling. Thus, we try our best to know and not know, at the same time: We speak glibly of complexity, accelerating change, danger, and uncertainty, but then fall back into the comfortable assumption that continued U.S. global dominance is a given and that catastrophic change is unlikely to occur. As long as we remain willfully ignorant of the veil of ignorance that hangs over us, we can avoid asking hard questions and making harder choices.

But this is shortsighted and dangerous. Empires that refuse to accept reality tend to rapidly decline. A clear-eyed acceptance of uncertainty and risk is the surest route to a more secure future. Instead of blinding us or paralyzing us, the uncertainty of our future should motivate us to engage in more responsible strategic planning.

If the United States can manage to be as rational as Rawls’s hypothetical decision-makers, it should adopt a similar maximin rule of decision: It should prefer international rules and institutions that will maximize America’s odds of thriving, even in a worst-case future scenario. In fact, we should wish for international rules and institutions that will be kindest to the individuals living in what is now the United States and their descendants, even if the United States should someday cease to exist entirely.

Could happen, folks. Look around you. Do you see the Roman Empire, or the Aztec Empire, or the Ottoman Empire?

IV. From Messiness to Strategy: A Preliminary Sketch

This has urgent implications for U.S. strategic planning. Precisely because U.S. global power may very well continue to decline, the United States should use the very considerable military, political, cultural, and economic power it still has to foster the international order most likely to benefit the country if it someday loses that power.

The ultimate objective of U.S. grand strategy should be the creation of an equitable and peaceful international order with an effective system of global governance — one that is built upon respect for human dignity, human rights, and the rule of law, with robust mechanisms for resolving thorny collective problems.

We should seek this not because it’s the “morally right” thing for the United States to do, but because a maximin decision rule should lead us to conclude that this will offer the United States and its population the best chance of continuing to thrive, even in the event of a radical future decline in U.S. wealth and power.

But, one might argue, the United States already tries to promote such a global order — right?

Sure it does — but only inconsistently, and generally as something of an afterthought. We pour money into our military and intelligence communities, but starve our diplomats and development agencies. We fixate on the threat du jour, often exaggerating it and allowing it to distort our foreign policy in self-destructive ways (cf. Iraq War), while viewing matters such as United Nations reform or reform of global economic institutions or environmental protection rules as tedious and of low priority. If we take seriously the many potential dangers lurking in the unknowable future, however, fostering a stronger, fairer, and more effective system of international governance would become a matter of urgent national self-interest and our highest strategic priority — something that should be reflected both in our policies and in our budgetary decisions.

An effective global governance system would need to be built upon the recognition that states remain the primary mode of political and social organization in the international sphere, but also upon the recognition that new forms of social organization continue to evolve and may ultimately displace at least some states. An effective and dynamic international system will need to develop innovative ways to bring such new actors and organizations within the ambit of international law and institutions, both as responsible creators of law and institutions and as responsible subjects.

## 3

### PIC

#### CP Text - The Federative Republic of Brazil ought to:

#### recognize an unconditional right of non-Trucker workers to strike.

#### make striking by all Trucker workers a federal crime and implement penalties modelled after New York City Taylor Law including two-for-one fines, lifetime bans from federal jobs, and jail time.

#### Trucker Strikes obliterate Food Security and turns the Economy.

Woody 18 Katherine Woody 7-3-2018 "Economic Impact of the Brazilian Trucker Strike" <https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/report/downloadreportbyfilename?filename=Economic%20Impact%20of%20the%20Brazilian%20Trucker%20Strike_Brasilia_Brazil_7-3-2018.pdf> (Agricultural Attaché at US Foreign Agriculture Service)//Elmer

Report Highlights: On May 21, 2018, hundreds of thousands of **Brazil’s** nearly 2 million **truck drivers began** an 11-day **strike** to protest high diesel prices, a move that **slowed Brazil’s economy**, **crippled** **transportation-dependent industries**, and **caused** estimated **losses of US$ 1.75 billion to Brazil’s agricultural sector**. **A month after** Brazil’s longest trucker strike (and one of the country’s most effective strikes in history), **transportation and logistics challenges still persist** **for Brazil’s exporters**, as shipments of Brazilian commodities are still delayed, **supply chains are still experiencing bottlenecks**, and debate and **uncertainty about** Brazil’s transportation **policies and prices continue to plague the agricultural sector** Background On May 21, 2018, hundreds of thousands of Brazil’s nearly 2 million truck drivers began an 11-day strike to protest high diesel prices, a move that slowed Brazil’s economy, crippled transportation-dependent industries, and caused estimated losses of US$ 1.75 billion to Brazil’s agricultural sector. Truck drivers parked their rigs along roads across the country, refusing to make deliveries of cargo and creating roadblocks on more than half of Brazil’s 500 busiest highways. Within a few days, the **effects** of the strike were **widespread** and painful, as gas stations ran out of fuel, drivers waited for hours in lines for what small fuel supplies remained, **supermarket shelves began to empty** and some **stores rationed perishable products**, and airports began cancelling flights as fuel supplies dwindled. Virtually **all segments of Brazil’s agricultural sector were affected in some way**, but livestock and poultry operations were particularly hard hit by feed delivery disruptions, idled slaughterhouses, export stoppages, and ultimately the culling of tens of millions of animals. A month after Brazil’s longest trucker strike (and one of the country’s most effective strikes in history), transportation and logistics challenges still persist for Brazil’s exporters, as shipments of Brazilian commodities are still delayed, supply chains are still experiencing bottlenecks, and debate and uncertainty about Brazil’s transportation policies and prices continue to plague the agricultural sector. The truckers’ rebellion was particularly painful for Brazil because the country lacks extensive rail and waterway infrastructure to transport goods, instead relying on trucks to carry more than 90 percent of all freight (excluding crude oil and iron ore). Additionally, Brazil’s limited road infrastructure meant that it was easy for striking truckers to create massive bottlenecks by setting up roadblocks along major roads, many of which are only one lane in each direction. Unlike the United States, where many **agricultural goods** are transported to export terminals by railways or river barges, Brazil’s farmers are **dependent on trucks** to move their goods within the domestic market and to ports for sale to the international market. The effects of the strike were wide-ranging, especially as gas stations ran out of fuel, supermarket shelves began to empty of fresh foods, and ports ran low on commodities to load for export. At the Port of Paranagua in the state of Paraná, one of the main soybean routes was interrupted. At the beginning of the strike, authorities warned that the blockage obstructed the arrival of a thousand soybean trucks per day in the terminal. According to the Sao Paulo State Supermarket Association (APAS), Brazilian retailers lost R$1.3 billion due to shortages of perishable items. In Sao Paulo alone, supermarkets losses were estimated at R$400 million. Causes The strike was spurred by rapidly rising fuel prices (diesel prices were up 43 percent since July 2017), combined with the effects of the Brazil real continuing to weaken against the U.S. dollar. Last year, Brazil’s state-controlled oil company, Petrobras, changed its pricing policies allow daily fluctuations of fuel prices pegged to the international oil market and scrapped subsidies that had kept domestic fuel prices lower. Most Brazilian truck drivers are largely self-employed and daily increases in fuel costs had begun to cut deeply into their incomes. Brazilian citizens of all economic classes supported the truck drivers, and by the eighth day of the strike, 87 percent of the population approved of the strike and sympathized with what many saw as another example of the injustice of government taxes, according to one public opinion poll by Brazilian firm Datafolha. However, the same firm on June 11 published results of a separate opinion poll that showed that 69 percent of Brazilians thought the trucker strike was harmful for the Brazilian economy. The survey also showed that Brazilians want more control of gas and fuel prices. Even before the strike, high fuel prices were affecting the competitiveness of Brazilian agricultural exports. Brazil’s transportation lobby, the National Confederation of Transport, estimated that before the strike Brazilian diesel prices were about 15 higher than in the United States, and argued that diesel fuel in Brazil was more expensive than in similarly developed countries such as Mexico and Russia. Roughly half of the Brazilian fuel price paid by consumers goes to government taxes. A study by the College of Agriculture at the University of Sao Paulo (ESALQ) found that farmers were paying an average of 9.05 reals (US$ 2.42) more per ton than early 2017 to transport oilseeds and grains from Mato Grosso to the Port of Santos in Sao Paulo. ESALQ estimated that in 2017, the cost to move Brazilian agricultural goods around the country reached 120 billion reals, with 87.5 percent going to transportation costs. Diesel prices at the pump in the major agriculture-producing states of Mato Grosso, Sao Paulo, and Paraná increased by 13-15 percent between January 2017 and May 2018, according to the ESALQ study. Resolution As the strike dragged on Brazilian President Michel Temer authorized intervention by military and federal police to clear roadblocks and begin escorting some trucks to their destinations, especially rigs carrying fuel to airports and other strategic locations. Desperate to jumpstart the country’s economy, Brazilian officials met with the leaders of several trucker unions, but a deal with union leaders to temporarily cut fuel prices was rejected by large numbers of independent truckers, who used social media apps to coordinate their response and garner public support for the continued strike. On the ninth day of the strike, the Brazilian government agreed to reduce diesel prices by 0.46 reals per liter, hold prices stable for 60 days, reduce tolls for large trucks, and suspend or eliminate some taxes in an effort to coax drivers back to the roads. The measures largely worked, with most truckers returning to the road and deliveries of food, fuel, and medicine beginning to flow again, albeit at a slower, more unreliable pace. Still, the concessions reportedly cost the Brazilian government 9.5 billion reals (US$ 2.48 billion) and contributed to the resignation of the Petrobras CEO. Market analysts have revised upward Brazil’s budget deficit for the year, now estimated at R$151 billion (US$ 40 billion), up more than R$12.5 billion (US$ 3.3 billion) from the previous month’s estimate due to the increased cost of fuel subsidies agreed to under negotiations to end the strike. Effects Although goods of all kinds, including agricultural products, started flowing again by the beginning of June, the strike left lasting scars on the Brazilian economy. Forecasters are estimating total losses of between US$ 25-30 billion to Brazil’s economy as a result of the strike. Brazil’s National Confederation of Agriculture and Livestock (CNA) estimated losses to the agricultural sector due to the trucker strike at 6.6 billion reals (about US$ 1.75 billion). CNA also estimated that it **could take** Brazilian agricultural producers 6 months to **a year to recover fully** from the effects of the strike. Brazil’s central bank released its June report and **cut** **projected** 2018 **GDP** growth **to 1.6 percent**. One of the Brazilian government’s concessions to end the strike, a minimum freight rate guaranteed to truckers, is continuing to wreak havoc on the agricultural industry. The policy, which was implemented by presidential decree on May 30, was immediately criticized by a number of transportation-dependent industries, chief among them agriculture. CNA argued that the policy is unconstitutional and completely **upends** **logistics for agricultural producers**, many of whom have already concluded marketing contracts for 2018 crops. CNA reports that **soy and corn** producers and traders are already **paying** an **additional** R$ 500 million (US**$ 132 million**) for transportation **every day,** for a total of more than R$ 10 billion (US$ 2.65 billion) so far. Analysis by CNA forecasts that the policy is increasing freight rates by approximately 50-150 percent throughout the country, with Brazil’s powerhouse agricultural region in the interior of the country being hit the hardest. CNA and other players in the agricultural sector have challenged the measure in court through more than 50 lawsuits. Brazilian Supreme Court Justice Luiz Fux has been trying to mediate a solution satisfactory to both the transportation sector and the agricultural and industrial sectors dependent on those services. In the meantime, he suspended the pending lawsuits and left in effect the minimum freight rate table published on May 30 by the National Agency for Terrestrial Transportation (ANTT). President Temer has said he will abide by the court’s decision, truck drivers have threatened to strike again if the minimum price policy is invalidated. ANTT has publically estimated that judicial proceedings will continue through at least early August. Count Justice Fux confirmed that a new round of negotiations on this topic is scheduled for August 27, after the Supreme Court recess. The Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture (MAPA) has warned that the lack of certainty over truck freight rates has hindered transportation of commodities to the ports and subsequently caused shipping delays. Nearly two weeks after the end of the strike, MAPA Minister Blairo Maggi told reporters, “There are a lot of products waiting for transportation. We should be moving 450,000 tons of goods to ports every day, but we are not.” He also noted that the situation has affected forward sales of agricultural commodities since traders cannot accurate price the contracts without knowing how much will need to be spent on transportation. CNA argues that since the policy went into effect, **productivity of Brazil’s agricultural sector has slowed by half**, as producers have slowed the volume of shipments they are sending to ports while they wait for a resolution. Meanwhile, the number of ships waiting to load at Brazilian ports has continued to grow. According to shipping agency Williams, the number of ships berthed and loading in mid-June was about 40 percent lower than the same period last year, while the ship line-ups had grown to be about 60 percent larger than 2017, with as many as 70 ships waiting, according to some industry sources. CNA estimated that the shipping delays have cost about R$ 135 million (US$ 36 million) in demurrage charges for ships that have been delayed in loading at Brazilian ports. Moreover, the problems created by continued uncertainty about the policy are expected to worsen as Brazil’s second-crop corn harvest progresses. Brazil’s second-crop corn is currently less than 10 percent harvested, but limited silo capacity in the country means that commodities must generally start flowing to the ports as it comes out of the ground. With a record soybean crop this year and slow delivery to the ports in June, Brazilian corn will be forced to compete with soy for transportation and storage capacity, and freight rates are expected to rise as more Brazilian corn comes onto the market. Impact on the Agricultural Sector Livestock Swine and Poultry: The most significant losses from the strike were born by the chicken and pork production sector. Shortages of fuel and animal feed affected farms and feedlots, while slaughterhouses idled their production lines when transportation to the ports was cut off and refrigerated warehouses filled to capacity. Analysts estimated a loss of R$4 billion (US$ 1.05 billion) in exports, with 120,000 metric tons of chicken and pork meat not exported because of the strike. The Brazilian Association of Animal Protein reported that the strike caused the closure of 137 poultry plants and 30 swine slaughterhouses, forcing 220,000 industry workers to go on temporary leave. As feed rations ran low, some poultry operations were only feeding birds once every 48 hours, considered starvation rations, according to MAPA Minister Maggi. Particularly worrisome for the world’s largest exporter of chicken was the fact that poultry operations were forced to cull an estimated 70 million birds (about 7 percent of Brazil’s flock of 1 billion birds), bringing the level of chicks on breeder farms down to their lowest levels in a decade. Minister Maggi called on President Temer during the strike to ensure security forces were escorting trucks of feed rations to poultry farms. By mid-June, all affected processing plants had resumed operations, according to the Brazilian Association of Animal Protein. However, the disruption in supply was expected to cause a spike in Brazilian chicken prices as the sector could take more than 2 months to fully recover. Wholesale prices for frozen chicken in Brazil were up more than 40 percent. Moreover, Rabobank revised downward their forecast of the Brazilian poultry sector to an estimated 3 percent decline for the year (down from a forecasted 2-percent expansion). Cattle: The trucker strike came at a very unfortunate time for the beef sector. With the beginning of winter in Brazil, cattle on pasture begin to lose weight and needed to be sent to slaughter, but the strike forced the closure of virtually all of Brazil’s more than 100 cattle slaughterhouses. Most of the losses in the beef industry occurred not through the mortality of animals on farm, but rather through estimated lost exports of R$ 620 million (US$ 164 million). More than 40,000 metric tons of beef were unable to reach ports, and the domestic market saw an uncalculated amount of beef spoiled on the road as an estimated 3,750 refrigerated trucks sat idle during the strike, according to meatpacking trade association ABIEC. The industry calculates total losses to the sector could reach R$ 8 billion (US$ 2.1 billion). ABIEC noted that 90 percent of animal protein production was interrupted. On a positive note for beef producers, some analysts expect beef prices to rise in response to lower chicken meat volumes. Dairy Dairy producers across Brazil were severely affected by the transportation paralysis, with news media depicting dire scenes of the disposal of hundreds of millions of liters of milk by farmers who could not store their perishable products. The discarded milk alone was valued at more than R$ 1 billion (US$ 260 million). Milk supply in Brazil is expected to decline 9 percent year over year in the second quarter of 2018 as a consequence of the strike. Moreover, production will take a while to recover and will likely drop 6 percent year-over-year in the third quarter. Market analysts evaluate that milk prices paid to producers are expected to peak in the third quarter of 2018. Following 12 months of low profitability, farmers and processors were forced at a particularly difficult time to absorb the losses caused by the May strike. **Grains** and **Oilseeds** When the strike began in late May, Brazil’s soybean harvest was nearly finished and the harvest for second-crop “safrinha” corn was just beginning. The largest producing area for both of these crops is Brazil’s center-west region in the interior of the country, located very far from points of export in Brazil’s southeast and north arc regions. Loading at some of Brazil’s largest **soybean**-exporting ports, including Santos, Paranagua, Rio Grande, and Santarem, ground to a halt during the strike, as on-port stocks emptied and roadblocks kept trucks from delivering commodities for export. Most export terminals ran out of soybeans for shipment about 8 days into the strike, with soybeans reportedly arriving to the Port of Paranagua in Paraná state on the afternoon of the tenth day when trucks were able to reach the port complex for the first time since the strike had begun. Trucks reportedly unloaded more than 40,000 tons of soybeans at the port in the first 24 hours after the strike concluded. The Port of Santos, Latin America’s largest port, was also idled when trucks could no longer make deliveries. Cargo transported by rail were unaffected by the strike, but this makes up only a small portion of exports from the Port of Santos. Brazil’s soybean crushers association, ABIOVE, reported that all 63 of Brazil’s soy-crushing facilities came to a standstill during the strike due to a lack of supplies. The Mato Grosso Institute for Agricultural Economics (IMEA) reported that the corn harvest stalled out as fuel supplies in the state ran low. The aftermath of the strike and uncertainty about the minimum freight rate have stifled forward sales for soybeans, with traders complaining that they are unable to accurately set prices for futures contracts without a reliable estimate of transportation costs. As of late June, some of the country’s largest grain traders have virtually stopped buying soybeans and **corn** for export, even though IMEA reported that about one-third of Mato Grosso’s safrinha corn is still unsold. Grain and oilseed traders are also reportedly delaying picking up commodities from farmers’ storage facilities while they angle to avoid paying rapidly rising freight rates and wait to see what happens to the government’s minimum transportation price policy. This could be a major problem for a country whose agricultural producers have a lack of on-farm storage and will be faced with tough decisions of where to place safrinha corn. Brazil’s National Association of Cereal Exporters estimated that as of mid-June, about 10 million tons of soybeans were paralyzed in the interior of the country while more than 50 vessels were waiting to be loaded at ports. CNA reported that exports of at least 6.8 million tons of soybeans and soybean meal have been delayed due to surging freight prices under the government’s minimum price policy. Meanwhile, the number of trucks arriving at the Port of Santos was down more than 20 percent from a month earlier, despite abundant soybean supplies in the country ready for export. At the Port of Paranagua, truck volume was down more than 10 percent and while the port has been receiving enough soybean volume to load waiting vessels, it has not been able to begin rebuilding its 1.5 million metric tons of on-port stocks, which were completely depleted during the 11-day strike. This makes the port particularly vulnerable if there is a second truck driver strike if the government’s minimum freight rate policy is rescinded. The backlog of ships at Brazil’s ports are not merely waiting to load commodities for export; they are waiting to unload cargoes of agricultural inputs, especially fertilizer needed by Brazil’s farmers for the wheat planting currently underway, as well as preparing fields for soybean planting, which will commence in a few months. CNA estimated that about 35 ships are currently lined up and waiting to unload fertilizer at Brazilian ports, more than half at the Port of Paranagua in the state of Paraná in southern Brazil. According to Brazil’s Fertilizer Blenders Association, 60 percent of fertilizer deliveries have been delayed as a result of the backlog. Sugarcane and Ethanol The strike began just as the harvest kicked off in the world’s largest sugarcane-growing regions, Brazil’s center-south. Progress on the sugarcane harvest slowed as fuel supplies dwindled and at least 220 sugar mills were forced to close, according to trade group Forum National Sucroenergetico. Meanwhile, UNICA, Brazil’s Sugar Growers Association, reported that 150 sugar mills closed in the state of Sao Paulo alone, where 60 percent of Brazil’s sugar and ethanol production occurs. The state of Sao Paulo produces about 150,000 tons of sugar and 100 million liters of ethanol daily, and the sugar industry in that state suffered losses in revenue of about US$ 48 million daily during the strike. The disruption caused international sugar futures to rise as sugar exports were unable to reach the ports. Once fuel supplies began flowing again, harvest and crushing operations were able to quickly get back up to speed. Losses in the sector are calculated at R$ 740 million (US$ 196 million). However, this calculation does not include lost/delayed sales of ethanol stored at the mills for exports or use in the domestic market, as no data of this type has been released. Brazil is the world’s largest exporter of sugar, with more than 20 million tons exported in the previous season. Coffee Brazil is the world’s largest coffee grower and exporter, and the trucker strike hit just as the country’s main Arabica harvest was commencing, which caused international Arabica futures prices to increase by about 2 percent. According to Brazil’s Coffee Exporters Council (CeCafe), the strike affected issuance of export certificates and delayed shipments, but CeCafe noted that most sales were already concluded and overall exports for the season are expected to remain at roughly the same levels estimated before the strike. According to the Brazilian Coffee Industry Association, coffee producers lost an estimated R$ 70 million (US$ 18.5 million) per day during the protests, while CeCafe estimated export losses and extra port costs of R$ 560 million (US$ 148 million). Seafood Brazil’s seafood industry was affected by a disruption of deliveries between producers and processing centers, according to trade group Peixe BR. The state of Paraná is Brazil’s largest producer of fish, raising more than 100,000 tons of tilapia last year, while the state of Sao Paulo has seen rapid growth of the industry, producing more than 65,000 tons of tilapia last year. These two states’ aquaculture sectors were the hardest hit, according to Peixe BR. At one point during the strike, a large, multi-commodity agricultural cooperative in southern Brazil, was forced to halt tilapia processing operations when truck drivers blocked roadways and cut off supplies for processing, as well as the route for distributing the final product. Fruits and Vegetables As a result of the strike, many of Brazil’s wholesale markets saw supplies of fresh products dwindle and spoilage of other products in cases where usual customers were unable to make routine purchases. The Sao Paulo Warehouse Company (CEAGESP), Latin America’s largest and the world’s third-largest wholesale market, reported losses of nearly R$ 100 million (US$ 26 million) of fruits, vegetables, and nuts, including imported products. During a normal day, CEAGESP would normally see about 1,800- 2,000 trucks come and go from the market with fresh and perishable products. However, during the strike this was reduced to less than 100 trucks per day. In addition to losses of perishable products, the prices of remaining products sored because CEAGESP prices serve as a reference for states in Brazil. Supermarkets The Brazilian Supermarket Association (ABRAS) reported total losses of R$ 2.7 billion (US$ 712 million) due to the truckers strike. In addition to losses with fresh, frozen, and perishable products, ABRAS reported shortages of other consumer goods that could not be delivered to stores. According to the Sao Paulo State Supermarket Association, in Sao Paulo alone supermarkets losses reached R$ 400 million (US$ 105 million).

#### The Counterplan shuts down Trucker Strikes.

Bauernschuster et Al 17, Stefan, Timo Hener, and Helmut Rainer. "When labor disputes bring cities to a standstill: The impact of public transit strikes on traffic, accidents, air pollution, and health." American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 9.1 (2017): 1-37. (Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, University of Passau, Innstra)//Elmer

New York City's **Taylor Law,** which was put into effect **in response to a transit strike** in 1966, represents an example of a particularly draconian measure. Under Section 210, the law **prohibits** any **strike or** other concerted **stoppage** 01 worn or slowdown by public employees (Division of Local Government Services 2009). Instead, it prescribes binding arbitration by a state agency to resolve bargaining deadlocks between unions and employers. **Violations** against the prohibition on strikes are **punishable with hefty penalties**. The fine for an individual worker is **twice** the striking employee's **salary** **for each** **day** the strike lasts. In addition, union leaders face **imprisonment**. Since its inception in 1967, the Taylor Law has generated a lot of controversy. To proponents, it was **successful in averting several potential transit strikes** that would have imposed significant costs on the city and its inhabitants (OECD 2007). Indeed, New York City has only seen two transit strikes over the past four decades—in 1980 and in 2005. In both cases, harsh monetary penalties were imposed on workers and unions. The 2005 transit strike additionally led to the imprisonment of a union leader, and saw the Transport Workers Union (TWU) filing a formal complaint with the ILO. Since then, the ILO has urged the United States government to restore the right of transit workers to strike, arguing that they do not provide essential services justifying a strike ban (Committee on Freedom of Association 2011, 775). So far, the Taylor Law has not been amended in this direction.

#### Brazil key to Global Food Supply

Moreira 21 Assis Moreira 7-5-2021 "Brazil to remain world leader in food supply, OECD and FAO say" <https://valorinternational.globo.com/agribusiness/news/2021/07/05/brazil-to-remain-world-leader-in-food-supply-oecd-and-fao-say.ghtml> (Geneva Correspondent on Agribusiness)//Elmer

**Brazil** will **continue** to increase its **role as a major global food supplier**, including in products such as beef and even with a slower pace of growth in demand from China. These projections are **in the report on agricultural outlook** 2021-2030 released Monday by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). China will continue to have enormous influence on agricultural markets. The Chinese deficit in agricultural trade has grown to $86 billion in 2020 from $2.6 billion in 2000. For the next ten years, Beijing will continue to expand imports, but at a slower pace due to lower population growth, saturation in consumption of some commodities, and efficiency gains in its own production. In addition, the Chinese market will pose tougher competition as trade tensions with the United States ease. The report predicts that China could once again become the main market for U.S. agricultural exports. In this scenario, **abundant land and water** will **make Brazil the dominant producer**, and Latin America as a whole **will see** its **agricultural production grow by 14%** over the next ten years. The **net value of the region’s exports is expected to expand by 31%** — just over half the rate achieved between 2011 and 2020. By 2030, the region will continue to grow its share of global markets for key commodities. It may have 63% of world soybean exports, 56% of sugar exports, 44% of fish, 42% of beef exports, and 33% of chicken shipments.

#### It’s a threat multiplier that causes extinction.

Cribb 19 [Julian; Author, journalist, editor and science communicator. He is principal of Julian Cribb & Associates who provide specialist consultancy in the communication of science, agriculture, food, mining, energy and the environment. His career includes appointments as newspaper editor, scientific editor for director of national awareness for Australia’s science agency CSIRO, member of numerous scientific boards and advisory panels, and president of national professional bodies for agricultural journalism and science communication. His published work includes over 8000 articles, 3000 media releases and eight books. He has received 32 awards for journalism. His internationally-acclaimed book, The Coming Famine explores the question of whether we can feed humanity through the mid-century peak in numbers and food demand; “6 - Food as an Existential Risk,” Cambridge; August 2019; <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/food-or-war/food-as-an-existential-risk/8C45279588CD572FE805B7E240DE7368>] Recut Justin

Extinction and Ecological Collapse More than half of the large animals that once inhabited the Earth have been wiped from it by human action since 1970, according to the Worldwide Fund for Nature’s Living Planet Index.3 So, too, have half the fish in the sea on which humans rely for food.4 Humans are, in the words of the great biologist E. O. Wilson, ‘tearing down the biosphere’, demolishing the very home that keeps us alive.5 Extinction, it should be noted, is a part of life: 99.9 per cent of all species ever to evolve on this planet have disappeared, and new ones like ourselves have arisen to replace them. But extinction rates like today’s – a hundred to a thousand times faster than normal – are a freak occurrence that usually takes tens of millions of years, not mere decades. Animal, plant and marine species are presently vanishing so fast that scientists have dubbed our time “the Sixth Extinction” – the sixth such megadeath in the geological history of the Earth.6 By the end of the present century, Wilson says, it is possible that up to half of the eight million species thought to exist here will be gone. Furthermore, in all previous extinctions, natural events like asteroid strikes and vast volcanic outbursts have been to blame. This will be the only time in the Earth’s history when the wipe-out was caused by a single species. Us.7 [Ommited 178-180] Oxfam, illustrates how just one tenth of humanity consumes five times as much in the way of material resources (expressed here in the form of their carbon footprint) as the poorest half of the world population. The affluent are chiefly responsible for the destruction taking place on a global scale as they seek to sustain lifestyles that the planet can no longer afford or support. The significance of this blind spot around consumption for global food security is very great. As described in earlier chapters, the world food system depends critically on soil, water, nutrients and a stable climate, to supply humanity’s daily need for nutriment – and all of these essential resources are in increasingly short supply, chiefly because of our own mismanagement of them and our collective failure to appreciate that they are finite. On current trends, the existing food system will tend to break down, first regionally and then globally, owing to resource scarcity from the 2020s onward, and especially towards the mid century – unless there is radical change in the world diet and the means by which we feed ourselves. This will lead to increasing outbreaks of violence and war. Nobody, neither rich nor poor, will escape the consequences. It remains an open question whether panicking regimes in Russia, the USA or even France would be ruthless enough to deploy atomic weapons in an attempt to quell invasion by tens of millions of desperate refugees, fleeing famine and climate chaos in their own homelands – but the possibility ought not to be ignored. That nuclear war is at least a possible outcome of food and climate crises was first flagged in the report The Age of Consequences by Kurt Campbell and the US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, which stated ‘it is clear that even nuclear war cannot be excluded as a political consequence of global warming’. 15 Food insecurity is therefore a driver in the preconditions for the use of nuclear weapons, whether limited or unlimited. A global famine is a likely outcome of limited use of nuclear weapons by any country or countries – and would be unavoidable in the event of an unlimited nuclear war between America and Russia, making it unwinnable for either. And that, as the mute hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’ so eloquently admonish, is also the most likely scenario for the premature termination of the human species. Such a grim scenario can be alleviated by two measures: the voluntary banning by the whole of humanity of nuclear weapons, their technology, materials and stocks – and by a global effort to secure food against future insecurity by diverting the funds now wasted on nuclear armaments into building the sustainable food and water systems of the future (see Chapters 8 and 9). Food Security Our demand for food is set to double by the 2060s – potentially the decade of ‘peak people’, the moment in history when the irresistible human population surge may top out at around 10 billion. However, as we have seen, many of the resources needed to supply it agriculturally could halve and the climate for the growing of food outdoors become far more hostile. Why food insecurity is an existential threat to humanity should, by now, be abundantly clear from the earlier chapters of this book: present systems are unsustainable and, as they fail, will pose risks both to civilization and, should these spiral into nuclear conflict, to the future of the human species. The important thing to note in this chapter is that food insecurity plays into many, if not all, of the other existential threats facing humanity. The food sector’s role in extinction, resource scarcity, global toxicity and potential nuclear war has already been explained. Its role in the suppression of conflict is discussed in the next chapter. Its role in securing the future of the megacities, and of a largely urbanised humanity, is covered in Chapter 8. And its role in sustaining humanity through the peak in population and into a sustainable world beyond is covered in Chapter 9. Food clearly has a pivotal role in the future of human population – both as a driver of population growth when supplies are abundant and as a potential driver of population decline, should food chains collapse. It is no exaggeration to state that the fate of civilisation depends on it. Food insecurity affects the progression of pandemic diseases, often in ways that are not entirely obvious. First, new pandemics of infectious disease tend to originate in developing regions where nutritional levels are poor or agricultural practices favour the evolution of novel pathogens such as, for example, the new flu strains seen every year – which arise mainly from places where people, pigs and poultry live side-by-side and shuffle viruses between them – and also novel diseases like SARS and MERS. Second, because totally unknown diseases tend to arise first in places where rainforests are being cut down for farming and viruses hitherto confined to wild animals and birds make an enforced transition into humans. Examples of novel human diseases escaping from the rainforest and tropical savannah in recent times include HIV/AIDS, Hendra, Nipah, Ebola, Marburg, Lassa and Hanta, Lujo, Junin, Machupo, Rift Valley, Congo and Zika.29 And thirdly, because the loss of vital micronutrients from heavily farmed soils and from food itself predisposes many populations to various deficiency diseases – for example, a lack of selenium in the diet has been linked with increased risk from both HIV/AIDS and bowel cancer.30 A key synergy is the way **hunger** and **malnourishment** **exacerbate** the **spread** **of** **disease**, classic examples being the 1918 Global Flu Pandemic which spread rapidly among war-starved populations, or the more recent cholera outbreak in war-torn Yemen. In a fresh twist, Dr Melinda Beck of North Carolina University has demonstrated that obesity – itself a form of malnutrition – may cause increased deaths from influenza by both aiding the virus and suppressing the patient’s immune response.31

## 5

### CP

#### CP Text – [States] should substantially increase their research and deployment of a solar radiation management policy.

* Solar Radiation Management

#### SRM is highly effective and cools to pre-industrial levels incredibly fast – it avoids the Impact Turns since it doesn’t reduce Carbon Emissions

Bickel 13, J. Eric. "Climate engineering and climate tipping-point scenarios." Environment Systems & Decisions 33.1 (2013): 152-167. (PhD in Engineering-Economic Systems @ Stanford University, Associate Professor @ the University of Texas at Austin School of Engineering)//Elmer

SRM differs from air capture in that it seeks to reverse the energy imbalance caused by increased greenhouse gas (GHG) concentrations. This is achieved by reflecting back into space some fraction of the incoming shortwave radiation from the Sun. Calculations show that reflecting one to two percent of the sunlight that strikes the Earth would cool the planet by an amount roughly equal to the warming that is likely from **doubling** the concentration of **GHGs** (Lenton and Vaughan 2009). Scattering this amount of sunlight appears to be possible (Novim 2009). SRM holds the possibility of acting on the climate system on a time-scale that could prevent the abrupt and harmful changes discussed above (Novim 2009). In fact, SRM may be the only human action **that can cool the planet** in an emergency. As Lenton and Vaughan (2009) note, “It would appear that only rapid, repeated, large-scale deployment of potent shortwave geoengineering options (e.g., stratospheric aerosols) could conceivably cool the climate to near its preindustrial state on the 2050 timescale.”

# Case

### Advantage 1

#### Turning the Economy Internal Links –

#### 1] Right to Strike has unintended effects that threaten growth and business confidence.

Tenza 20, Mlungisi. "The effects of violent strikes on the economy of a developing country: a case of South Africa." Obiter 41.3 (2020): 519-537. (lecturer in the field of Labour Law at the School of Law. He holds a LLM Degree.)//Elmer

2 BACKGROUND When South Africa obtained democracy in 1994, there was a dream of a better country with a new vision for industrial relations.5 However, the number of **violent strikes** that have bedevilled this country in recent years seems to have **shattered-down** the **aspirations of a better South Africa**. South Africa recorded 114 strikes in 2013 and 88 strikes in 2014, which **cost** the country about **R6.1 billion** according to the Department of Labour.6 The impact of these strikes has been hugely felt by the mining sector, particularly the platinum industry. The biggest strike took place in the platinum sector where about 70 000 mineworkers’ downed tools for better wages. Three major platinum producers (Impala, Anglo American and Lonmin Platinum Mines) were affected. The strike started on 23 January 2014 and ended on 25 June 2014. Business Day reported that “the five-month-long strike in the platinum sector pushed the economy to the brink of recession”. 7 This strike was closely followed by a four-week strike in the metal and engineering sector. All these strikes (and those not mentioned here) were characterised with violence accompanied by damage to property, intimidation, assault and sometimes the killing of people. Statistics from the metal and engineering sector showed that about 246 cases of intimidation were reported, 50 violent incidents occurred, and 85 cases of vandalism were recorded.8 Large-scale unemployment, soaring poverty levels and the dramatic income inequality that characterise the South African labour market provide a broad explanation for strike violence.9 While participating in a strike, workers’ stress levels leave them feeling frustrated at their seeming powerlessness, which in turn provokes further violent behaviour.10 These **strikes** are not only violent but **take long to resolve**. Generally, a lengthy strike has a **negative effect on employment**, **reduces business confidence** **and increases the risk of economic stagflation**. In addition, such strikes have a **major setback on** the growth of the economy and **investment opportunities**. It is common knowledge that consumer spending is directly linked to economic growth. At the same time, if the economy is not showing signs of growth, employment opportunities are shed, and poverty becomes the end result. The economy of South Africa is in need of rapid growth to enable it to deal with the high levels of unemployment and resultant poverty. One of the measures that may boost the country’s economic growth is by attracting potential investors to invest in the country. However, this might be difficult as **investors** would want to invest in a country where there is a likelihood of getting returns for their investments. The wish of getting returns for investment **may not materialise** **if the labour environment** **is not fertile** for such investments **as a result** **of**, for example, **unstable labour relations**. Therefore, investors may be reluctant to invest where there is an unstable or fragile labour relations environment. 3 THE COMMISSION OF VIOLENCE DURING A STRIKE AND CONSEQUENCES The Constitution guarantees every worker the right to join a trade union, participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union, and to strike. 11 The Constitution grants these rights to a “worker” as an individual.12 However, the right to strike and any other conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike such as a picket13 can only be exercised by workers acting collectively.14 The right to strike and participation in the activities of a trade union were given more effect through the enactment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 199515 (LRA). The main purpose of the LRA is to “advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace”. 16 The advancement of social justice means that the exercise of the right to strike must advance the interests of workers and at the same time workers must refrain from any conduct that can affect those who are not on strike as well members of society. Even though the right to strike and the right to participate in the activities of a trade union that often flow from a strike17 are guaranteed in the Constitution and specifically regulated by the LRA, it sometimes happens that **the right to strike is exercised** **for purposes not intended** by the Constitution and the LRA, generally. 18 For example, it was not the intention of the Constitutional Assembly and the legislature that violence should be used during strikes or pickets. As the Constitution provides, pickets are meant to be peaceful. 19 Contrary to section 17 of the Constitution, the conduct of workers participating in a strike or picket has changed in recent years with workers trying to emphasise their grievances by causing disharmony and chaos in public. A media report by the South African Institute of Race Relations pointed out that between the years 1999 and 2012 there were 181 strike-related deaths, 313 injuries and 3,058 people were arrested for public violence associated with strikes.20 The question is whether employers succumb easily to workers’ demands if a strike is accompanied by violence? In response to this question, one worker remarked as follows: “[T]here is no sweet strike, there is no Christian strike … A strike is a strike. [Y]ou want to get back what belongs to you ... you won’t win a strike with a Bible. You do not wear high heels and carry an umbrella and say ‘1992 was under apartheid, 2007 is under ANC’. You won’t win a strike like that.” 21 The use of violence during industrial action **affects** not only the strikers or picketers, the **employer** and his or her **business** but it also affects **innocent members of the public**, **non-striking employees**, the **environment** **and the economy at large**. In addition, striking workers visit non-striking workers’ homes, often at night, threaten them and in some cases, assault or even murder workers who are acting as replacement labour. 22 This points to the fact that for many workers and their families’ living conditions remain unsafe and vulnerable to damage due to violence. In Security Services Employers Organisation v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union (SATAWU),23 it was reported that about 20 people were thrown out of moving trains in the Gauteng province; most of them were security guards who were not on strike and who were believed to be targeted by their striking colleagues. Two of them died, while others were admitted to hospitals with serious injuries.24 In SA Chemical Catering & Allied Workers Union v Check One (Pty) Ltd,25 striking employees were carrying various weapons ranging from sticks, pipes, planks and bottles. One of the strikers Mr Nqoko was alleged to have threatened to cut the throats of those employees who had been brought from other branches of the employer’s business to help in the branch where employees were on strike. Such conduct was held not to be in line with good conduct of striking.26

#### Business confidence is the best indicator for growth.

Khan 20, Hashmat, and Santosh Upadhayaya. "Does business confidence matter for investment?." Empirical Economics 59.4 (2020): 1633-1665. (Economics Professor at Carleton University)//Elmer

Abstract Business confidence is a well-known leading indicator of future output. Whether it has information about future investment is, however, unclear. We determine how informative business confidence is for investment growth independently of other variables using US business confidence survey data for 1955Q1–2016Q4. Our main findings are: (i) **business confidence has predictive ability for investment growth**; (ii) remarkably, business confidence has **superior** forecasting power, relative **to conventional predictors**, for investment downturns over 1–3-quarter forecast horizons and for the sign of investment growth over a 2-quarter forecast horizon; and (iii) exogenous shifts in business confidence reflect short-lived non-fundamental factors, consistent with the ‘animal spirits’ view of investment. Our findings have implications for improving investment forecasts, developing new business cycle models, and studying the role of social and psychological factors determining investment growth. Introduction Business confidence is a well-known leading indicator of future output, especially during economic downturns, and receives attention from the media, policymakers and forecasters. Somewhat surprisingly, the direct link between business confidence and investment has not yet been investigated. Our paper fills this gap. We provide a quantitative assessment of the information in business confidence for future investment growth, after **controlling for** the conventional determinants such as **user cost, output, cash flow and stock price**. Understanding the predictive power of business confidence is valuable along three dimensions. First, it can help forecasters and policymakers improve their investment forecasts. Second, it can provide a rationale for explicitly including **business confidence**—either **as causal or** as **anticipatory**—**in** theoretical models of **business cycles**. Third, it can help motivate studies on the how investment managers’ social and psychological circumstances influence investment decisions over and beyond rational cost-benefit analyses.Footnote1 We consider the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)’s business confidence index for the USA as a measure of business confidence and ask the following three questions.Footnote2 Does business confidence have independent information about future business investment growth? Does it have forecasting power for investment downturns? Does it help in making directional forecasts—the positive or negative movements in the trajectory of investment growth? Previous literature that used business confidence has primarily studied its predictive properties for variables other than investment. Heye (1993) examines the relationship between business confidence and labour market conditions in the USA and other industrialized countries. Dasgupta and Lahiri (1993) show that business sentiments have explanatory power of forecasting business cycle turning points. Taylor and McNabb (2007) find that business confidence is procyclical and plays an important role in forecasting output downturns. Although we focus on business confidence, our paper is related to a large body of previous research that has studied consumer confidence or sentiment and its ability to forecast macroeconomic variables. Leeper (1992) finds that consumer sentiment does not help predict industrial production and unemployment, especially when financial variables are taken into account. On the other hand, Matsusaka and Sbordone (1995) reject the hypothesis that consumer sentiment does not predict output. Carroll et al. (1994), Fuhrer (1993), Bram and Ludvigson (1998), Ludvigson (2004) and Cotsomitis and Kwan (2006) find that the consumer attitudes have some additional information about predicting household spending behaviour. Lahiri et al. (2016) employ a large real-time dataset and find that the consumer confidence survey has important role in improving the accuracy of consumption forecasts. Christiansen et al. (2014) find that consumer and business sentiments contain independent information for forecasting business cycles. Barsky and Sims (2012) find that consumer confidence reflects news about future fundamentals and a confidence shock has a persistent effect on the economy. More recently, Angeletos et al. (2018) quantify the role of confidence for business cycle from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. They construct a measure of confidence within a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) framework by taking the linear combination of the VAR residuals that maximizes the sum of the volatilities of hours and investment at frequencies of 6–32 quarters. Their measure likely captures a mixture of consumer and business confidence and is, therefore, distinct from the survey-based measure that we use in our analysis. We find that business confidence leads US business investment growth by one quarter. It leads structures investment, which is one of the major components of business investment, by two quarters. Our **empirical analysis shows** that **investors’ confidence has** statistically **significant predictive power for** US business investment **growth** and its components (equipment and non-residential structures) after **controlling for other determinants of investment**. To better gauge the role of business confidence for investment growth, we also perform Out-Of-Sample (OOS) test for 1990Q1–2016Q4. Our findings suggest that the OOS test results are similar to the in-sample test results.Footnote3 While, as we found, business confidence has predictive power for total investment, it may also contain additional information on the trajectory of investment as captured by downturns and directional changes. This information would be of interest to policymakers in assessing the economy’s near-term outlook, over and above the general ability of business confidence to forecast investment. Indeed, we find that contemporaneous correlation between business confidence and investment growth rises during NBER recession dates. This property of the data suggests that it is worthwhile to explore the forecasting ability of business confidence for investment downturns and directional changes. Towards this end, we define investment downturns as business investment growth below the sample average for more than two consecutive quarters.Footnote4 Using a static probit forecasting model, we assess the OOS forecasting ability of business confidence for investment downturns for 1990Q1–2016Q4. A key finding of this approach in the literature is that term spread and stock price contain information for forecasting US recessions (Estrella and Mishkin 1998; Nyberg 2010; Kauppi and Saikkonen 2008). We follow a similar approach and find that business confidence has statistically significant forecasting power for investment downturns over 1–4-quarter forecast horizons in the US economy. It has stronger forecasting ability than the traditional predictors such as term spread, credit spread and stock price at 1–3-quarter forecast horizons. We also find strong evidence that the business confidence has good incremental predictive power for investment downturns over 1–4-quarter forecast horizons, controlling for other predictors of downturns.

#### 2] Increased strikes sabotage the economy – they cause major disruptions and lower income for workers.

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Labor strikes can cause major disruptions to industry, commerce and the lives of many people who aren't even connected to the strike itself. The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Association strike in 1981 resulted in the firing of thousands of air traffic controllers, and the New York City transit strike in late 2005 affected millions of people. The history of strikes and labor unions is a key chapter in the story of the Industrial Revolution.

While the reasons behind strikes can be complex, they all boil down to two key elements: money and power. In this article, we'll find out how labor strikes have affected the balance of power between corporations and workers, what laws regulate strikes and learn about some important strikes in history.

It's difficult to say when the first real labor strike occurred. The word "strike" was first used in the 1700s, and probably comes from to notion of dealing a blow to the employer [ref]. In 1786, a group of printers in Philadelphia requested a raise and the company rejected it. They stopped working in protest and eventually received their raise. Other professionals followed suit in the next few decades. Everyone in a city who practiced the same profession agreed to set prices and wages at the same rate. Members would shun anyone who diverged from the agreement, refusing to work in the same shop and forcing employers to fire them. By the 1800s, formal trade societies and guilds began to emerge.

To have a strike today, you must have a union (though not necessarily an official union) -- an organization of workers that bargain collectively with an employer. Workers form unions because an individual worker is powerless compared to an employer, who can set low wages and long working hours as long as it adheres to labor laws. When workers combine to form a union, they collectively have enough power to negotiate with the employer. The main weapon the union has against the employer is the threat of a strike action.

At its most basic level, a strike occurs when all the workers in the union stop coming to work. With no workers, the business shuts down. The employer stops making money, though it is still spending money on taxes, rent, electricity and maintenance. The longer the strike lasts, the more money the employer loses. Of course, the workers aren't getting paid either, so they're losing money as well. Some unions build up "war chests" -- funds to pay striking workers. But it isn't usually very much, and it's often not enough for a prolonged strike.

Strikes help explain why unions are more powerful than individuals. Imagine if an employer refuses to give a raise to an individual worker. She then decides to stop coming to work in protest. The employer simply fires her for not coming to work. That one worker has no power to influence the employer. However, it can be very costly for an employer to fire every single worker when a union goes on strike (though it has happened).

#### Econ Declines doesn’t cause War – prefer post-COVID evidence.

Walt 20 Stephen M Walt 5-13-2020 "Will a Global Depression Trigger Another World War?" <https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/05/13/coronavirus-pandemic-depression-economy-world-war/> (Stephen M. Walt is the Robert and Renée Belfer professor of international relations at Harvard University.)//Elmer

For these reasons, the pandemic itself may be conducive to peace. But what about the relationship between broader economic conditions and the likelihood of war? Might a few leaders still convince themselves that provoking a crisis and going to war could still advance either long-term national interests or their own political fortunes? Are the other paths by which a deep and sustained economic downturn might make serious global conflict more likely? One familiar argument is the so-called diversionary (or “scapegoat”) theory of war. It suggests that leaders who are worried about their popularity at home will try to divert attention from their failures by provoking a crisis with a foreign power and maybe even using force against it. Drawing on this logic, some Americans now worry that President Donald Trump will decide to attack a country like Iran or Venezuela in the run-up to the presidential election and especially if he thinks he’s likely to lose. This outcome strikes me as unlikely, even if one ignores the logical and empirical flaws in the theory itself. War is always a gamble, and should things go badly—even a little bit—it **would hammer the last nail** in the coffin of Trump’s declining fortunes. Moreover, none of the countries Trump might consider going after **pose an imminent threat** to U.S. security, and even his staunchest supporters may wonder why he is wasting time and money going after Iran or Venezuela at a moment when thousands of Americans are dying preventable deaths at home. Even a successful military action won’t put Americans back to work, create the sort of testing-and-tracing regime that competent governments around the world have been able to implement already, or hasten the development of a vaccine. The same logic is likely to guide the decisions of other world leaders too. Another familiar folk theory is “military Keynesianism.” War generates a lot of economic demand, and it can sometimes lift depressed economies out of the doldrums and back toward prosperity and full employment. The obvious case in point here is World War II, which did help the U.S economy finally escape the quicksand of the Great Depression. Those who are convinced that great powers go to war primarily to keep Big Business (or the arms industry) happy are naturally drawn to this sort of argument, and they might worry that governments looking at bleak economic forecasts will try to restart their economies through some sort of military adventure. I doubt it. It takes a really big war to generate a significant stimulus, and it is **hard to imagine** any country launching a large-scale war—with all its attendant risks—at a moment **when debt** levels are already soaring. More importantly, there are lots of easier and more direct **ways to stimulate the economy**—**infrastructure spending, unemployment insurance, even “helicopter payments**”—and launching a war has to be one of the least efficient methods available. The threat of war usually spooks investors too, which any politician with their eye on the stock market would be loath to do. Economic downturns can encourage war in some special circumstances, especially when a war would enable a country facing severe hardships to capture something of immediate and significant value. Saddam Hussein’s decision to seize Kuwait in 1990 fits this model perfectly: The Iraqi economy was in terrible shape after its long war with Iran; unemployment was threatening Saddam’s domestic position; Kuwait’s vast oil riches were a considerable prize; and seizing the lightly armed emirate was exceedingly easy to do. Iraq also owed Kuwait a lot of money, and a hostile takeover by Baghdad would wipe those debts off the books overnight. In this case, Iraq’s parlous economic condition clearly made war more likely. Yet I cannot think of any country in similar circumstances today. Now is hardly the time for Russia to try to grab more of Ukraine—if it even wanted to—or for China to make a play for Taiwan, because the costs of doing so would clearly outweigh the economic benefits. Even conquering an oil-rich country—the sort of greedy acquisitiveness that Trump occasionally hints at—doesn’t look attractive when there’s a vast glut on the market. I might be worried if some weak and defenseless country somehow came to possess the entire global stock of a successful coronavirus vaccine, but that scenario is not even remotely possible. If one takes a longer-term perspective, however, a sustained economic depression could make war more likely by strengthening fascist or xenophobic political movements, fueling protectionism and hypernationalism, and making it more difficult for countries to reach mutually acceptable bargains with each other. The history of the 1930s shows where such trends can lead, although the economic effects of the Depression are hardly the only reason world politics took such a deadly turn in the 1930s. Nationalism, xenophobia, and authoritarian rule were making a comeback well before COVID-19 struck, but the economic misery now occurring in every corner of the world could intensify these trends and leave us in a more war-prone condition when fear of the virus has diminished. On balance, however, I do not think that even the extraordinary economic conditions we are witnessing today are going to have much impact on the likelihood of war. Why? First of all, if depressions were a powerful cause of war, **there would be a lot more** of the latter. To take one example, the United States has suffered 40 or more recessions since the country was founded, yet it has fought perhaps 20 interstate wars, most of them unrelated to the state of the economy. To paraphrase the economist Paul Samuelson’s famous quip about the stock market, if recessions were a powerful cause of war, they would have predicted “nine out of the last five (or fewer).” Second**, states do not start wars unless they believe they will win a quick** and relatively cheap victory. As John Mearsheimer showed in his classic book Conventional Deterrence, national leaders avoid war when they are convinced it will be long, bloody, costly, and uncertain. To choose war, political leaders have to convince themselves they can either win a quick, cheap, and decisive victory or achieve some limited objective at low cost. Europe went to war in 1914 with each side believing it would win a rapid and easy victory, and Nazi Germany developed the strategy of blitzkrieg in order to subdue its foes as quickly and cheaply as possible. Iraq attacked Iran in 1980 because Saddam believed the Islamic Republic was in disarray and would be easy to defeat, and George W. Bush invaded Iraq in 2003 convinced the war would be short, successful, and pay for itself. The fact that each of these leaders miscalculated badly does not alter the main point: No matter what a country’s economic condition might be, its leaders will not go to war unless they think they can do so quickly, cheaply, and with a reasonable probability of success. Third, and most important, **the primary motivation for most wars is the desire for security, not economic gain**. For this reason, the odds of war increase when states believe the long-term balance of power may be shifting against them, when they are convinced that adversaries are unalterably hostile and cannot be accommodated, and when they are confident they can reverse the unfavorable trends and establish a secure position if they act now. The historian A.J.P. Taylor once observed that “every war between Great Powers [between 1848 and 1918] … started as a preventive war, not as a war of conquest,” and that remains true of most wars fought since then. The bottom line: Economic conditions (i.e., a depression) may affect the broader political environment in which decisions for war or peace are made, but they are only one factor among many and rarely the most significant. Even if the COVID-19 pandemic has large, lasting, and negative effects on the world economy—as seems quite likely—it is not likely to affect the probability of war very much, especially in the short term. To be sure, I can’t rule out another powerful cause of war—stupidity—especially when it is so much in evidence in some quarters these days. So there is no guarantee that we won’t see misguided leaders stumbling into another foolish bloodletting. But given that it’s hard to find any rays of sunshine at this particular moment in history, I’m going to hope I’m right about this one.

#### Diversionary wars are small and don’t escalate, but growth is the implicit trigger

Sung Chul Jung 14. Myongji University, 2014 “Searching for non-aggressive targets,” November, Research Gate, [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/278396883\_Searching\_for\_non-aggressive\_targets //](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/278396883_Searching_for_non-aggressive_targets%20//) Re-Cut Justin

Faced with the possibility of losing their position due to domestic opposition, political leaders may sometimes consider initiating a foreign conflict as a means to redirect attention away from domestic issues. In such instances, which states are most likely to become diversionary targets? This study assumes that unpopular leaders prefer small-scale conflicts that can create rally-round-the-flag effects without triggering substantial domestic opposition to the use of military force abroad. Based on this assumption, hypotheses are developed which predict that states under constraint (i.e. states with democratic institutions or showing high trade openness) tend to attract diversionary-motivated actions, while states likely to reciprocate harshly (i.e. states experiencing their own domestic troubles or in relative decline) are less likely to become diversionary targets. Logit analyses of directed dyad-years from 1960 to 2001 and illustrations of marginal effects provide strong support for three of the four hypotheses - namely, that democracies and trading states are more likely, and that declining powers are less likely to be targets of diversionary actions. This study's findings show that not all potential targets are equally attractive for diversionary actions, and that a state's democratization, economic openness, and power growth can worsen, rather than improve, its security.

#### Austerity. Decreased military funding and conciliatory pressures

Christopher Clary 15. PhD in Political Science from MIT, M.A. in National Security Affairs, Postdoctoral Fellow, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University. “Economic Stress and International Cooperation: Evidence from International Rivalries,” April 25th, Available Online via SSRN Subscription // Re-Cut Justin

Do economic downturns generate pressure for diversionary conflict? Or might downturns encourage austerity and economizing behavior in foreign policy? This paper provides new evidence that economic stress is associated with conciliatory policies between strategic rivals. For states that view each other as military threats, the biggest step possible toward bilateral cooperation is to terminate the rivalry by taking political steps to manage the competition. Drawing on data from 109 distinct rival dyads since 19i9 50, 67 of which terminated, the evidence suggests rivalries were approximately twice as likely to terminate during economic downturns than they were during periods of economic normalcy. This is true controlling for all of the main alternative explanations for peaceful relations between foes (democratic status, nuclear weapons possession, capability imbalance, common enemies, and international systemic changes), as well as many other possible confounding variables. This research questions existing theories claiming that economic downturns are associated with diversionary war, and instead argues that in certain circumstances peace may result from economic troubles. I define a rivalry as the perception by national elites of two states that the other state possesses conflicting interests and presents a military threat of sufficient severity that future military conflict is likely. Rivalry termination is the transition from a state of rivalry to one where conflicts of interest are not viewed as being so severe as to provoke interstate conflict and/or where a mutual recognition of the imbalance in military capabilities makes conflict-causing bargaining failures unlikely. In other words, rivalries terminate when the elites assess that the risks of military conflict between rivals has been reduced dramatically. This definition draws on a growing quantitative literature most closely associated with the research programs of William Thompson, J. Joseph Hewitt, and James P. Klein, Gary Goertz, and Paul F. Diehl.1 My definition conforms to that of William Thompson. In work with Karen Rasler, they define rivalries as situations in which “[b]oth actors view each other as a significant political-military threat and, therefore, an enemy.”2 In other work, Thompson writing with Michael Colaresi, explains further: The presumption is that decisionmakers explicitly identify who they think are their foreign enemies. They orient their military preparations and foreign policies toward meeting their threats. They assure their constituents that they will not let their adversaries take advantage. Usually, these activities are done in public. Hence, we should be able to follow the explicit cues in decisionmaker utterances and writings, as well as in the descriptive political histories written about the foreign policies of specific countries.3 Drawing from available records and histories, Thompson and David Dreyer have generated a universe of strategic rivalries from 1494 to 2010 that serves as the basis for this project’s empirical analysis.4 This project measures rivalry termination as occurring on the last year that Thompson and Dreyer record the existence of a rivalry. Economic crises lead to conciliatory behavior through five primary channels. (1) Economic crises lead to austerity pressures, which in turn incent leaders to search for ways to cut defense expenditures. (2) Economic crises also encourage strategic reassessment, so that leaders can argue to their peers and their publics that defense spending can be arrested without endangering the state. This can lead to threat deflation, where elites attempt to downplay the seriousness of the threat posed by a former rival. (3) If a state faces multiple threats, economic crises provoke elites to consider threat prioritization, a process that is postponed during periods of economic normalcy. (4) Economic crises increase the political and economic benefit from international economic cooperation. Leaders seek foreign aid, enhanced trade, and increased investment from abroad during periods of economic trouble. This search is made easier if tensions are reduced with historic rivals. (5) Finally, during crises, elites are more prone to select leaders who are perceived as capable of resolving economic difficulties, permitting the emergence of leaders who hold heterodox foreign policy views. Collectively, these mechanisms make it much more likely that a leader will prefer conciliatory policies compared to during periods of economic normalcy. This section reviews this causal logic in greater detail, while also providing historical examples that these mechanisms recur in practice.

#### Reject Tonneson—it says unbalanced trade can increase conflict—the examples it cites are the U.S. and China who have extremely unbalanced trade ties and are currently suing each other over steel and other goods in the WTO.

Stein Tønnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among interdependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party.

Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

### Advantage 2

#### No Extinction from Warming – new studies prove over-hype and tech solves.

* Extinction Tipping Point is implausible – we’re on track for 3 degrees, not 4-5 degrees
* Tech and Energy Modernization Solve – Renewable Energy is replacing Fossil Fuels which reduces Climate Mortality by a rate of 5.

Nordhaus 20 Ted Nordhaus 1-23-2020 “Ignore the Fake Climate Debate” <https://www.wsj.com/articles/ignore-the-fake-climate-debate-11579795816>, found by BPS, (American author, environmental policy expert, and the director of research at The Breakthrough Institute, citing new climate change forecasts)//Re-cut by Elmer

Beyond the headlines and social media, where Greta Thunberg, Donald Trump and the online armies of climate “alarmists” and “deniers” do battle, there is a real climate debate bubbling along in scientific journals, conferences and, occasionally, even in the halls of Congress. It gets a lot less attention than the boisterous and fake debate that dominates our public discourse, but it is much more relevant to how the world might actually address the problem. In the real climate debate, no one denies the relationship between human emissions of greenhouse gases and a warming climate. Instead, the disagreement comes down to different views of climate risk in the face of multiple, cascading uncertainties. On one side of the debate are optimists, who believe that, with improving technology and greater affluence, our societies will prove quite adaptable to a changing climate. On the other side are pessimists, who are more concerned about the risks associated with rapid, large-scale and poorly understood transformations of the climate system. But most pessimists do not believe that runaway climate change or a hothouse earth **are plausible** scenarios, much less that human extinction is imminent. And most optimists recognize a need for policies to address climate change, even if they don’t support the radical measures that Ms. Thunberg and others have demanded. In the fake climate debate, both sides agree that economic growth and reduced emissions vary inversely; it’s a zero-sum game. In the real debate, the relationship is much more complicated. Long-term economic growth is associated with both rising per capita energy consumption and slower population growth. For this reason, as the world continues to get richer, higher per capita energy consumption is likely to be offset by a lower population. A richer world will also likely be more technologically advanced, which means that energy consumption should be less carbon-intensive than it would be in a poorer, less technologically advanced future. In fact, a number of the high-emissions scenarios produced by the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change involve futures in which the world is relatively poor and populous and less technologically advanced. Affluent, developed societies are also much better equipped to respond to climate extremes and natural disasters. That’s why natural disasters kill and displace many more people in poor societies than in rich ones. It’s not just seawalls and flood channels that make us resilient; it’s air conditioning and refrigeration, modern transportation and communications networks, early warning systems, first responders and public health bureaucracies. New research published in the journal Global Environmental Change finds that global economic growth over the last decade has reduced climate mortality by a factor of five, with the **greatest benefits documented in the poorest nations.** In low-lying Bangladesh, 300,000 people died in Cyclone Bhola in 1970, when 80% of the population lived in extreme poverty. In 2019, with less than 20% of the population living in extreme poverty, Cyclone Fani killed just five people. “Poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate. The fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development.” So while it is true that poor nations are most vulnerable to a changing climate, it is also true that the fastest way to reduce that vulnerability is through economic development, which requires infrastructure and industrialization. Those activities, in turn, require cement, steel, process heat and chemical inputs, all of which are impossible to produce today without fossil fuels. For this and other reasons, the world is unlikely to cut emissions fast enough to stabilize global temperatures at less than 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels, the long-standing international target, much less 1.5 degrees, as many activists now demand. But recent forecasts also suggest that many of the worst-case climate scenarios produced in the last decade, which assumed unbounded economic growth and fossil-fuel development, are also very unlikely. There is still substantial uncertainty about how sensitive global temperatures will be to higher emissions over the long-term. But the best estimates now suggest that the world is on track for 3 degrees of warming by the end of this century, not 4 or 5 degrees as was once feared. That is due in part to slower economic growth in the wake of the global financial crisis, but also to decades of technology policy and energy-modernization efforts. “We have better and cleaner technologies available today because policy-makers in the U.S. and elsewhere set out to develop those technologies.” The energy intensity of the global economy continues to fall. **Lower-carbon natural gas has displaced coal as the primary source of new fossil energy**. The **falling cost of wind and solar energy** has begun to have an effect on the growth of fossil fuels. Even **nuclear energy** has made a modest comeback in Asia.

#### [Aff] studies about CO2 impact are exaggerated

* peer-reviewed journal shows IPCC exaggeration
* history proves resilience
* no extinction- warming under Paris goals
* rock breaking strategy could offset warming

IBD 18 Investors Business Daily 4-25-2018 “Here's One Global Warming Study Nobody Wants You To See” <https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/global-warming-computer-models-co2-emissions/> (Citing Study from Peer reviewed journal by Lewis and Curry)//Re-cut by Elmer

Settled Science: A new study published in a peer-reviewed journal finds that climate models exaggerate the global **warming from CO2** emissions by as much as 45%. If these findings hold true, it's huge news. No wonder the mainstream press is ignoring it. In the study, authors Nic Lewis and Judith Curry looked at actual temperature records and compared them with climate change computer models. What they found is that the planet has shown itself to be far less sensitive to increases in CO2 than the climate models say. As a result, they say, the planet will warm less than the models predict, even if we continue pumping CO2 into the atmosphere. As Lewis explains: "Our results imply that, for any future emissions scenario, future warming is likely to be substantially lower than the central computer model-simulated level projected by the (United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), and highly unlikely to exceed that level. How much lower? Lewis and Curry say that their findings show temperature increases will be 30%-45% lower than the climate models say. If they are right, then there's little to worry about, even if we don't drastically reduce CO2 emissions. The planet will warm from human activity, but not nearly enough to cause the sort of end-of-the-world calamities we keep hearing about. In fact, the resulting warming would be below the target set at the Paris agreement. This would be tremendously good news. The fact that the Lewis and Curry study appears in the peer-reviewed American Meteorological Society's Journal of Climate lends credibility to their findings. This is the same journal, after all, that recently published widely covered studies saying the Sahara has been growing and the climate boundary in central U.S. has shifted 140 miles to the east because of global warming. The Lewis and Curry findings come after another study, published in the prestigious journal Nature, that found the long-held view that a doubling of CO2 would boost global temperatures as much as 4.5 degrees Celsius was wrong**.** The most temperatures would likely climb is 3.4 degrees. It also follows a study published in Science, which found that **rocks** contain vast amounts of nitrogen that plants could use to grow and absorb more CO2, potentially **offsetting** at least some of the effects of CO2 emissions and reducing future temperature increases.

#### Variations natural and CO2 effects are overstated.

* 10,000 years prove natural range of warming
* No Co2 effect on Warming – No Net Warming despite 8 Percent increase of Co2
* Solar Radiation has net greater effect – close correlation over past 150 years

Carter et al. 15 Robert M Carter 4-12-2015 “Why Scientists Disagree About Global Warming The NIPCC Report on Scientific Consensus” (Craig D. Idso, Ph.D. Robert M. Carter, Ph.D. S. Fred Singer, Ph. D. Chairman Emeritus Fellow Chairman Center for the Study Institute of Public Affairs Science and of Carbon Dioxide Australia) Environmental Policy and Global Change Project (USA) (USA))//Elmer

Modern Warming Is Not Unprecedented IPCC’s second false postulate is that the late twentieth century warm peak was of greater magnitude than previous natural peaks. Comparison of modern and ancient rates of natural temperature change is difficult because of the lack of direct measurements available prior to 1850. However, high-quality proxy temperature records from the Greenland ice core for the past 10,000 years demonstrate a **natural range of warming** and cooling rates between +2.5 and -2.5 °C/century (Alley, 2000; Carter, 2010, p. 46, figure7), significantly greater than rates measured for Greenland or the globe during the twentieth century. Glaciological and recent geological records contain numerous examples of ancient temperatures up to 3°C or more warmer than the peak reported at the end of the twentieth century. During the Holocene, such warmer peaks included the Egyptian, Minoan, Roman, and Medieval warm periods (Alley, 2000). During the Pleistocene, warmer peaks were associated with interglacial oxygen isotope stages 5, 9, 11, and 31 (Lisiecki and Raymo, 2005). During the Late Miocene and Early Pliocene (6–3 million years ago) temperature consistently attained values 2–3°C above twentieth century values (Zachos et al., 2001). Figure 10 summarizes these and other findings about surface temperatures that appear in Chapter 4 of Climate Change Reconsidered-II: Physical Science. Figure 10 Key Facts about Surface Temperature # Whether today’s global surface temperature is seen to be part of a warming trend depends upon the time period considered. # Over (climatic) time scales of many thousand years, temperature is cooling; over the historical (meteorological) time scale of the past century temperature has warmed. Over the past 18 years, there has been no net warming despite an increase in atmospheric CO2 of 8 percent – which represents 34 percent of all human-related CO2 emissions released to the atmosphere since the industrial revolution. # Given an atmospheric mixing time of ~1 year, the facts just related represent a test of the dangerous warming hypothesis, which test it fails. # Based upon the HadCRUT dataset favored by IPCC, two phases of warming occurred during the twentieth century, between 1910–1940 and 1979–2000, at similar rates of a little over 1.5°C/century. The early twentieth century warming preceded major industrial carbon dioxide emissions and must be natural; warming during the second (prima facie, similar) period might incorporate a small human-related carbon dioxide effect, but warming might also be inflated by urban heat island effects. # Other temperature datasets fail to record the late twentieth century warming seen in the HadCRUT dataset. # There was nothing unusual about either the magnitude or rate of the late twentieth century warming pulses represented on the HadCRUT record, both falling well within the envelope of known, previous natural variations. # No empirical evidence exists to support the assertion that a planetary warming of 2°C would be net ecologically or economically damaging. Source: “Chapter 4. Observations: Temperatures,” Climate Change Reconsidered II: Physical Science (Chicago, IL: The Heartland Institute, 2013). **CO2 Does Not Lead Temperature** IPCC’s third false postulate is that increases in atmospheric CO2 precede, and then force, parallel increases in temperature. The remarkable (and at first blush, synchronous) parallelism that exists between rhythmic fluctuations in ancient atmospheric temperature and atmospheric CO2 levels was first detected in polar ice core samples analyzed during the 1970s. From the early 1990s onward, however, higher-resolution sampling has repeatedly shown these historic temperature changes precede the parallel changes in CO2 by several hundred years or more (Mudelsee, 2001; Monnin et al., 2001; Caillon et al., 2003; Siegenthaler et al., 2005). A similar relationship of temperature change leading CO2 change (in this case by several months) also characterizes the much shorter seasonal cyclicity manifest in Hawaiian and other meteorological measurements (Kuo et al., 1990). In such circumstances, changing levels of CO2 cannot be driving changes in temperature, but must either be themselves stimulated by temperature change, or be co-varying with temperature in response to changes in another (at this stage unknown) variable. Solar Influence Is Not Minimal IPCC’s fourth false postulate is that solar forcings are too small to explain twentieth century warming. Having concluded solar forcing alone is inadequate to account for twentieth century warming, IPCC authors infer CO2 must be responsible for the remainder. Nonetheless, observations indicate variations occur in total ocean–atmospheric meridional heat transport and that these variations are driven by changes in solar radiation rooted in the intrinsic variability of the Sun’s magnetic activity (Soon and Legates, 2013). Incoming solar radiation is most often expressed as Total Solar Insolation (TSI), a measure derived from multi-proxy measures of solar activity (Hoyt and Schatten, 1993; extended and re-scaled by Willson, 2011; Scafetta and Willson, 2013). The newest estimates, from satellite-borne ACRIM-3 measurements, indicate TSI ranged between 1360 and 1363 Wm-2 between 1979 and 2011, the variability of ~3 Wm-2 occurring in parallel with the 11-year sunspot cycle. Larger changes in TSI are also known to occur in parallel with climatic change over longer time scales. For instance, Shapiro et al. (2011) estimated the TSI change between the Maunder Minimum and current conditions may have been as large as 6 Wm-2. Temperature records from circum-Arctic regions of the Northern Hemisphere show a close correlation with TSI over the past 150 years, with both measures conforming to the ~60–70 year multidecadal cycle. In contrast, the measured steady rise of CO2 emissions over the same period shows little correlation with the strong multidecadal (and shorter) ups and downs of surface temperature around the world. Finally, **IPCC ignores x-ray, ultraviolet, and magnetic flux variation, the latter having particularly important implications for the modulation of galactic cosmic ray influx and low cloud formation** (Svensmark, 1998; Kirkby, et al., 2011). Figure 11 summarizes these and other findings about solar forcings from Chapter 3 of Climate Change Reconsidered II: Physical Science.Figure 11 Key Facts about Solar Forcing # Evidence is accruing that changes in Earth’s surface temperature are largely driven by variations in solar activity. Examples of solar-controlled climate change epochs include the Medieval Warm Period, Little Ice Age, and Early Twentieth Century (1910–1940) Warm Period. # The Sun may have contributed as much as 66 percent of the observed twentieth century warming, and perhaps more. # Strong empirical correlations have been reported from around the world between solar variability and climate indices including temperature, precipitation, droughts, floods, streamflow, and monsoons. # IPCC models do not incorporate important solar factors such as fluctuations in magnetic intensity and overestimate the role of human-related CO2 forcing. # IPCC fails to consider the importance of the demonstrated empirical relationship between solar activity, the ingress of galactic cosmic rays, and the formation of low clouds. # The respective importance of the Sun and CO2 in forcing Earth’s climate remains unresolved; current climate models fail to account for a plethora of known Sun-climate connections. # The recently quiet Sun and extrapolation of solar cycle patterns into the future suggest a planetary cooling may occur over the next few decades. Source: “Chapter 3. Solar Forcing of Climate,” Climate Change Reconsidered II: Physical Science (Chicago, IL: The Heartland Institute, 2013). Warming Would Not Be Harmful IPCC’s fifth false postulate is that warming of 2°C above today’s temperature would be harmful. The suggestion that 2°C of warming would be harmful was coined at a conference organized by the British Meteorological Office in 2005 (DEFRA, 2005). The particular value of 2°C is entirely arbitrary and was proposed by the World Wildlife Fund, an environmental advocacy group, as a political expediency rather than as an informed scientific opinion. The target was set in response to concern that politicians would not initiate policy actions to reduce CO2 emissions unless they were given a specific (and low) quantitative temperature target to aim for. Multiple lines of evidence suggest a 2°C rise in temperature would not be harmful to the biosphere. The period termed the Holocene Climatic Optimum (c. 8,000 ybp) was 2–3°C warmer than today (Alley, 2000), and the planet attained similar temperatures for several million years during the Miocene and Pliocene (Zachos et al., 2001). Biodiversity is encouraged by warmer rather than colder temperatures (Idso and Idso, 2009), and higher temperatures and elevated CO2 greatly stimulate the growth of most plants (Idso and Idso, 2011). Despite its widespread adoption by environmental NGOs, lobbyists, and governments, no empirical evidence exists to substantiate the claim that 2°C of warming presents a threat to planetary ecologies or human well-being. Nor can any convincing case be made that a warming will be more economically costly than an equivalent cooling (either of which could occur for natural reasons), since any planetary change of 2°C magnitude in temperature would result in complex local and regional changes, some being of economic or environmental benefit and others being harmful. \* \* \* We conclude neither the rate nor the magnitude of the reported late twentieth century surface warming (1979–2000) lay outside normal natural variability, nor was it in any way unusual compared to earlier episodes in Earth’s climatic history. Furthermore, solar forcings of temperature change are likely more important than is currently recognized, and evidence is lacking that a 2°C increase in temperature (of whatever cause) would be globally harmful.

#### CO2 is key to agriculture – stops extinction

Ferrera 14 Peter Ferrera 2-24-2014 “The Period Of No Global Warming Will Soon Be Longer Than the Period of Actual Global Warming” <http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterferrara/2014/02/24/the-period-of-no-global-warming-will-soon-be-longer-than-the-period-of-actual-global-warming/#42cc9ebf8bf0> (J.D. Harvard Law, contributor to Forbes on climate and public policy, Director of Entitlement and Budget Policy for the Heartland Institute, Senior Advisor for Entitlement Reform and Budget Policy at the National Tax Limitation Foundation, General Counsel for the American Civil Rights Union, and Senior Fellow at the National Center for Policy Analysis, served in the White House Office of Policy Development under President Reagan, and as Associate Deputy Attorney General of the United States under President George H.W. Bush)//Elmer

In addition, CO2 is actually essential to all life on the planet. Plants need CO2 to grow and conduct photosynthesis, which is the natural process that creates **food for animals and fish** at the bottom of the food chain. The increase of CO2 in the atmosphere that has occurred due to human emissions has actually increased agricultural growth and output as a result, causing actually an increased greening of the planet. So has any warming caused by such human emissions, as minor warming increases agricultural growth. The report states, “CO2 is a vital nutrient used by plants in photosynthesis. Increasing CO2 in the atmosphere ‘greens’ the planet and helps feed the growing human population.”

### ---Disease

#### Non specific

#### Disease doesn’t cause extinction

Adalja 16 [Amesh Adalja is an infectious-disease physician at the University of Pittsburgh. Why Hasn't Disease Wiped out the Human Race? June 17, 2016. https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2016/06/infectious-diseases-extinction/487514/]

But when people ask me if I’m worried about infectious diseases, they’re often not asking about the threat to human lives; they’re asking about the threat to human life. With each outbreak of a headline-grabbing emerging infectious disease comes a fear of extinction itself. The fear envisions a large proportion of humans succumbing to infection, leaving no survivors or so few that the species can’t be sustained.

I’m not afraid of this apocalyptic scenario, but I do understand the impulse. Worry about the end is a quintessentially human trait. Thankfully, so is our resilience.

For most of mankind’s history, infectious diseases were the existential threat to humanity—and for good reason. They were quite successful at killing people: The 6th century’s Plague of Justinian knocked out an estimated 17 percent of the world’s population; the 14th century Black Death decimated a third of Europe; the 1918 influenza pandemic killed 5 percent of the world; malaria is estimated to have killed half of all humans who have ever lived.

Any yet, of course, humanity continued to flourish. Our species’ recent explosion in lifespan is almost exclusively the result of the control of infectious diseases through sanitation, vaccination, and antimicrobial therapies. Only in the modern era, in which many infectious diseases have been tamed in the industrial world, do people have the luxury of death from cancer, heart disease, or stroke in the 8th decade of life. Childhoods are free from watching siblings and friends die from outbreaks of typhoid, scarlet fever, smallpox, measles, and the like.

So what would it take for a disease to wipe out humanity now?

In Michael Crichton’s The Andromeda Strain, the canonical book in the disease-outbreak genre, an alien microbe threatens the human race with extinction, and humanity’s best minds are marshaled to combat the enemy organism. Fortunately, outside of fiction, there’s no reason to expect alien pathogens to wage war on the human race any time soon, and my analysis suggests that any real-life domestic microbe reaching an extinction level of threat probably is just as unlikely.

Any apocalyptic pathogen would need to possess a very special combination of two attributes. First, it would have to be so unfamiliar that no existing therapy or vaccine could be applied to it. Second, it would need to have a high and surreptitious transmissibility before symptoms occur. The first is essential because any microbe from a known class of pathogens would, by definition, have family members that could serve as models for containment and countermeasures. The second would allow the hypothetical disease to spread without being detected by even the most astute clinicians.

The three infectious diseases most likely to be considered extinction-level threats in the world today—influenza, HIV, and Ebola—don’t meet these two requirements. Influenza, for instance, despite its well-established ability to kill on a large scale, its contagiousness, and its unrivaled ability to shift and drift away from our vaccines, is still what I would call a “known unknown.” While there are many mysteries about how new flu strains emerge, from at least the time of Hippocrates, humans have been attuned to its risk. And in the modern era, a full-fledged industry of influenza preparedness exists, with effective vaccine strategies and antiviral therapies.

HIV, which has killed 39 million people over several decades, is similarly limited due to several factors. Most importantly, HIV’s dependency on blood and body fluid for transmission (similar to Ebola) requires intimate human-to-human contact, which limits contagion. Highly potent antiviral therapy allows most people to live normally with the disease, and a substantial group of the population has genetic mutations that render them impervious to infection in the first place. Lastly, simple prevention strategies such as needle exchange for injection drug users and barrier contraceptives—when available—can curtail transmission risk.

Ebola, for many of the same reasons as HIV as well as several others, also falls short of the mark. This is especially due to the fact that it spreads almost exclusively through people with easily recognizable symptoms, plus the taming of its once unfathomable 90 percent mortality rate by simple supportive care.

Beyond those three, every other known disease falls short of what seems required to wipe out humans—which is, of course, why we’re still here. And it’s not that diseases are ineffective. On the contrary, diseases’ failure to knock us out is a testament to just how resilient humans are. Part of our evolutionary heritage is our immune system, one of the most complex on the planet, even without the benefit of vaccines or the helping hand of antimicrobial drugs. This system, when viewed at a species level, can adapt to almost any enemy imaginable. Coupled to genetic variations amongst humans—which open up the possibility for a range of advantages, from imperviousness to infection to a tendency for mild symptoms—this adaptability ensures that almost any infectious disease onslaught will leave a large proportion of the population alive to rebuild, in contrast to the fictional Hollywood versions.

#### No extinction from pandemics

* Death rates as high as 50% didn’t collapse civilization
* Fossil fuel record caps risk at .1% per century
* health, sanitation, medicine, science, public health bodies, solve
* viruses can’t survive in all locations
* refugee populations like tribes, remote researchers, submarine crews, solve

Ord 20 Ord, Toby. Toby David Godfrey Ord (born 18 July 1979) is an Australian philosopher. He founded Giving What We Can, an international society whose members pledge to donate at least 10% of their income to effective charities and is a key figure in the effective altruism movement, which promotes using reason and evidence to help the lives of others as much as possible.[3] He is a Senior Research Fellow at the University of Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, where his work is focused on existential risk. BA in Phil and Comp Sci from Melbourne, BPhil in Phil from Oxford, PhD in Phil from Oxford. The precipice: existential risk and the future of humanity. Hachette Books, 2020.

Are we safe now from events like this? Or are we more vulnerable? Could a pandemic threaten humanity’s future?10 The Black Death was not the only biological disaster to scar human history. It was not even the only great bubonic plague. In 541 CE the Plague of Justinian struck the Byzantine Empire. Over three years it took the lives of roughly 3 percent of the world’s people.11 When Europeans reached the Americas in 1492, the two populations exposed each other to completely novel diseases. Over thousands of years each population had built up resistance to their own set of diseases, but were extremely susceptible to the others. The American peoples got by far the worse end of exchange, through diseases such as measles, influenza and especially smallpox. During the next hundred years a combination of invasion and disease took an immense toll—one whose scale may never be known, due to great uncertainty about the size of the pre-existing population. We can’t rule out the loss of more than 90 percent of the population of the Americas during that century, though the number could also be much lower.12 And it is very difficult to tease out how much of this should be attributed to war and occupation, rather than disease. As a rough upper bound, the Columbian exchange may have killed as many as 10 percent of the world’s people.13 Centuries later, the world had become so interconnected that a truly global pandemic was possible. Near the end of the First World War, a devastating strain of influenza (known as the 1918 flu or Spanish Flu) spread to six continents, and even remote Pacific islands. At least a third of the world’s population were infected and 3 to 6 percent were killed.14 This death toll outstripped that of the First World War, and possibly both World Wars combined. Yet even events like these fall short of being a threat to humanity’s longterm potential.15 In the great bubonic plagues we saw civilization in the affected areas falter, but recover. The regional 25 to 50 percent death rate was not enough to precipitate a continent-wide collapse of civilization. It changed the relative fortunes of empires, and may have altered the course of history substantially, but if anything, it gives us reason to believe that human civilization is likely to make it through future events with similar death rates, even if they were global in scale. The 1918 flu pandemic was remarkable in having very little apparent effect on the world’s development despite its global reach. It looks like it was lost in the wake of the First World War, which despite a smaller death toll, seems to have had a much larger effect on the course of history.16 It is less clear what lesson to draw from the Columbian exchange due to our lack of good records and its mix of causes. Pandemics were clearly a part of what led to a regional collapse of civilization, but we don’t know whether this would have occurred had it not been for the accompanying violence and imperial rule. The strongest case against existential risk from natural pandemics is the fossil record argument from Chapter 3. Extinction risk from natural causes above 0.1 percent per century is incompatible with the evidence of how long humanity and similar species have lasted. But this argument only works where the risk to humanity now is similar or lower than the longterm levels. For most risks this is clearly true, but not for pandemics. We have done many things to exacerbate the risk: some that could make pandemics more likely to occur, and some that could increase their damage. Thus even “natural” pandemics should be seen as a partly anthropogenic risk. Our population now is a thousand times greater than over most of human history, so there are vastly more opportunities for new human diseases to originate.17 And our farming practices have created vast numbers of animals living in unhealthy conditions within close proximity to humans. This increases the risk, as many major diseases originate in animals before crossing over to humans. Examples include HIV (chimpanzees), Ebola (bats), SARS (probably bats) and influenza (usually pigs or birds).18 Evidence suggests that diseases are crossing over into human populations from animals at an increasing rate.19 Modern civilization may also make it much easier for a pandemic to spread. The higher density of people living together in cities increases the number of people each of us may infect. Rapid long-distance transport greatly increases the distance pathogens can spread, reducing the degrees of separation between any two people. Moreover, we are no longer divided into isolated populations as we were for most of the last 10,000 years.20 Together these effects suggest that we might expect more new pandemics, for them to spread more quickly, and to reach a higher percentage of the world’s people. But we have also changed the world in ways that offer protection. We have a healthier population; improved sanitation and hygiene; preventative and curative medicine; and a scientific understanding of disease. Perhaps most importantly, we have public health bodies to facilitate global communication and coordination in the face of new outbreaks. We have seen the benefits of this protection through the dramatic decline of endemic infectious disease over the last century (though we can’t be sure pandemics will obey the same trend). Finally, we have spread to a range of locations and environments unprecedented for any mammalian species. This offers special protection from extinction events, because it requires the pathogen to be able to flourish in a vast range of environments and to reach exceptionally isolated populations such as uncontacted tribes, Antarctic researchers and nuclear submarine crews. 21 It is hard to know whether these combined effects have increased or decreased the existential risk from pandemics. This uncertainty is ultimately bad news: we were previously sitting on a powerful argument that the risk was tiny; now we are not. But note that we are not merely interested in the direction of the change, but also in the size of the change. If we take the fossil record as evidence that the risk was less than one in 2,000 per century, then to reach 1 percent per century the pandemic risk would need to be at least 20 times larger. This seems unlikely. In my view, the fossil record still provides a strong case against there being a high extinction risk from “natural” pandemics. So most of the remaining existential risk would come from the threat of permanent collapse: a pandemic severe enough to collapse civilization globally, combined with civilization turning out to be hard to re-establish or bad luck in our attempts to do so.

1. https://theconversation.com/how-many-states-and-provinces-are-in-the-world-157847#:~:text=There%20are%20195%20national%20governments,not%20recognized%20by%20the%20U.N. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)