# 1NC R2 UT

### 1 – Air Strikes PIC

#### Text: A just government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike except for air traffic workers.

#### It competes – unconditional means “not conditional or limited: absolute” as per merriam webster

<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/unconditional>

#### Low Air Traffic Strikes now due to lack of Right to Strike – the plan reverses penalties.

Youn 19 Soo Youn 1-22-2019 "Why TSA and FAA workers can't just go on strike to end the shutdown" <https://abcnews.go.com/US/tsa-faa-workers-strike-end-shutdown/story?id=60540070> (Freelance Journalist)//Elmer

All over Twitter and Facebook, citizen commentators are offering a solution to end the partial U.S. government shutdown: **airport workers should just go on strike**. "How many hours after all the TSA workers went on strike would the government be re-opened?" tweeted consultant David Rothkopf, a sentiment echoed throughout the Twittersphere, calling on Transportation Security Administration workers and air traffic controllers to not show up for work. [Tweet Omitted] "The employees of the TSA can do even more. I propose a MASS sickout in Atlanta, the Monday after the Super Bowl. I'm not saying to disrupt the game...but make it impossible for those people to go back home. MAKE Congress and the President pay attention," radio host Joe Madison tweeted. The employees of the TSA can do even more. I propose a MASS sickout in Atlanta, the Monday after the Super Bowl. I'm not saying to disrupt the game...but make it impossible for those people to go back home. MAKE Congress and the President pay attention.https://t.co/N4nio3yudz — Joe Madison (@MadisonSiriusXM) January 22, 2019 But **striking is illegal for federal workers.** "Federal employees are **governed** chiefly **by** the **F**ederal **S**ervice **L**abor **M**anagement **R**elations **A**ct of 1978. That statute prohibits strikes by federal workers," University of Michigan law professor Kate Andrias told ABC News in an email. Moreover, the act **bars workers from getting a future federal government** job "if he or she 'participates in a strike, or asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States," Andrias added, quoting the act. **For many air traffic controllers**, whose ranks are already at 30-year lows, **the last strike has been seared** into their memories. In **1981**, nearly **13,000 controllers walked out** after contract talks between their union, The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO), and the Federal Aviation Administration broke down. Then-President Ronald **Reagan** **fired 11,000 controllers** within days and the **union was decertified**. Reagan also instituted **a lifetime ban** for working for the FAA for the striking controllers. While then-President Bill Clinton issued an executive order to modify the ban, "it's a short shelf-life profession," Georgetown University history professor Joseph A. McCartin told ABC News. There's also a mandatory retirement age of 56. "That's more than 13 years," McCartin, who wrote a book about the PATCO strike, explained. "Many were not interested in coming back." **Were they to strike** today, **federal workers could face prosecution and even jail time**. "While the clear majority of states make public-sector strikes illegal, the statute covering most federal employees **has some of the toughest penalties for illegal strikes**. Specifically, the statute covering most federal workers makes striking a crime, which is unusual," Joseph E. Slater, a law professor at the University of Toledo and an expert in public sector labor law, told ABC News in an email. "The typical penalties are (i) you can be fired and (ii) you and your union can be fined. But in addition to that, you can be jailed for striking against the federal government. And indeed, a number of the PATCO strikers were back in the early 1980s," Slater explained. The suggestion of a strike, or another way to walk off the job, is something Nick Daniels, president of the National Air Traffic Controller’s Association (NATCO) Fort Worth Center's chapter hears a lot. But as a union leader, he's well aware of the penalties.

#### Trade is rebounding now.

Wood 9-16 Laura Wood 9-16-2021 “Global Terminal Tractor Market (2021 to 2026) - Advancements in Terminal Tractors Presents Opportunities” <https://www.globenewswire.com/en/news-release/2021/09/16/2298189/28124/en/Global-Terminal-Tractor-Market-2021-to-2026-Advancements-in-Terminal-Tractors-Presents-Opportunities.html> (Senior Press Manager at Research and Markets)//Elmer

However, **a strong rebound in global trade** **with** the **recovery of major industries** across the globe since the middle of last year has **helped soften** the **impact of the pandemic** for trade. The **global economic recovery** is also **expected to be fueled by** the **higher production of vaccines** and vaccination rates, allowing businesses to reopen more quickly. According to World Trade Organization (WTO), the **volume** of world merchandise trade is **expected to increase by 8.0%** in 2021 after having fallen 5.3% in 2020, continuing its rebound from the pandemic-induced collapse that bottomed out in the second quarter of 2020.

#### Strong Airline Industry key to global trade and the economy – strikes obliterate these benefits.

PWC 16, Pricewaterhouse Coopers. "Economic impact of air traffic control strikes in Europe." (2016). (PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP)//Elmer

2.2.1 The importance of connectivity The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines connectivity as an indicator of a network’s concentration and its ability to move passengers from their origin to their destination seamlessly22. **Air connectivity is key to economic growth**, in part because it **enables States to attract business investment and human capital**. An increase in air connectivity **also spurs tourism, which is vital to many countries’ economic prosperity**. There is a **range of evidence produced** by airline industry authorities and academics which **suggests** that **as aviation expands, productivity and hence GDP increases**.23 In 2013 PwC completed a **deep-dive analysis** into **how aviation connectivity** **contributes to** the UK’s economy. The study identified five channels through which aviation plays a “positive enabling role”: **trade** in services, trade in goods, tourism, **business investment and innovation**, and productivity. A key finding emerging from academic and industry studies is the **strong linkage that has been observed over the last 20 years between airline industry growth and GDP growth.** In addition, studies have found that **a 10 percent increase in business air usage, or air travel connectivity, leads to an increase in whole economy productivity of between 0.07 percent and 0.9 percent.24** This includes: x reducing air travel times, giving businesses greater efficiency of access to a wider marketplace; x facilitating oversight of far-flung operations and thereby helping control their risks; thus x enabling investment and human capital to flow more freely across borders and exploit comparative advantages. In particular, a 2006 Oxford Economics study highlights the statistical linkage between business air usage and the level of GDP – in technical terms the study found that business air usage and Total Factor Productivity have a robust co-integrating relationship. Their key result implies that, “other things equal, a 10% increase in business air usage could raise GDP by 0.6% in the long run”. The report also notes that the growth in air transport in the 10 years prior to 2006 “boosted long-run underlying productivity by 2.0% across the EU25.”25 Further evidence on the specific channels of impact of aviation on GDP is outlined in the literature review in Section 4.3 of this report. Air transport is an important enabler to achieving economic growth and development. **Air transport facilitates integration into the global economy** **and provides vital connectivity on a** national, regional, and **international scale**. World Bank In the context of this study, if an **air traffic control strike** **causes** a reduction in the ability for airlines to operate flights as scheduled, this reduces the number of passengers and shipments able to reach their desired destinations as planned. Both **cancelled and delayed flights** **obstruct trade and connectivity**. Furthermore, a **pattern of disruptions will create** **uncertainty and discourage businesses** and consumers **from activities** that require air travel, therefore **reducing trade and connectivity further**. Given the importance of the link between the whole economy productivity and the airline sector output, it is therefore crucial to incorporate this linkage directly into our economic modelling of the impact of ATC strikes.

#### Collapse of Trade causes Hotspot Escalation – goes Nuclear.

Kampf 20 David Kampf 6-16-2020 “How COVID-19 Could Increase the Risk of War” <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28843/how-covid-19-could-increase-the-risk-of-war> (Senior PhD Fellow at the Center for Strategic Studies at The Fletcher School)//Elmer

But that overlooked the ways in which the risk of interstate war was already rising before COVID-19 began to spread. Civil wars were becoming more numerous, lasting longer and attracting more outside involvement, with dangerous consequences for stability in many regions of the world. And the global dynamics most commonly cited to explain the falling incidence of interstate war—democracy, economic prosperity, international cooperation and others—were being upended. If the spread of democracy kept the peace, then its global decline is unnerving. **If globalization and** economic **interdependence kept** the **peace, then** a looming global depression and the **rise of** nationalism and **protectionism are disconcerting**. If regional and global institutions kept the peace, then their degradation is unsettling. If the balance of nuclear weapons kept the peace, then growing risks of proliferation are disquieting. And if America’s preeminent power kept the peace, then its relative decline is troubling. Now, the pandemic, or more specifically the world’s reaction to it, is revealing the extent to which the factors holding major wars in check are withering. The idea that war between nations is a relic of the past no longer seems so convincing. The Pessimists Strike Back More than any other individual, it was cognitive scientist Steven Pinker who popularized the idea that we are living in the most peaceful moment in human history. Starting with his 2011 bestseller, “The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined,” Pinker argued that the frequency, duration and lethality of wars between great powers have all decreased. In his 2019 book, “Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress,” he wrote that war “between the uniformed armies of two nation-states appears to be obsolescent. There have been no more than three in any year since 1945, none in most years since 1989, and none since the American-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.” Optimists like Pinker held that, rather than the world falling apart, as a quick glance at headline news might suggest, the opposite was true: Humanity was flourishing. More regions are characterized by peace; fewer mass killings are occurring; governance and the rule of law are improving; and people are richer, healthier, better educated and happier than ever before. In their book, “Clear and Present Safety: The World Has Never Been Better and Why That Matters to Americans,” Michael A. Cohen and Micah Zenko argued that the evidence is so overwhelming that it is difficult to argue against the idea that wars between great powers, and all other interstate wars, are becoming vanishingly rare. Even when wars do break out, they tend to be shorter and less deadly than they were in the past. John Mueller, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, also reasoned that the idea of war, like slavery and dueling before it, was in terminal decline, while Joshua Goldstein, an international relations researcher at American University, credited the United Nations and the rise of peacekeeping operations for helping win the “war on war.” But in recent years, a range of critics have begun to poke holes in these arguments. Tanisha M. Fazal, an international relations professor at the University of Minnesota, contends that the decline in war is overstated. Major advances in medicine, speedier evacuations of wounded soldiers from the field of battle and better armor have made war less fatal—but not necessarily less frequent. Fazal and Paul Poast, who is at the University of Chicago, further assert that the notion of war between great powers as a thing of the past is based on the assumption that all such conflicts resemble World War I and II—both are historical anomalies—and overlooks the actual wars fought between great powers since 1945, from the Korean War and the Vietnam War to proxy wars from Afghanistan to Ukraine. Meanwhile, Bear F. Braumoeller, an Ohio State political science professor, analyzed the same historical data on conflicts used by Pinker, Mueller and Goldstein, and found no general downward trend in either the initiation or deadliness of warfare over the past two centuries. What’s more, Braumoeller contends that the so-called “long peace”—the 75 years that have passed without systemic war since World War II—is far from invulnerable, and that wars are just as likely to escalate now as they used to be. Just because a major interstate war hasn’t happened for a long time, doesn’t mean it never will again. In all probability, it will. And by focusing solely on interstate wars, the optimists miss half the story, at least. Wars between states have declined, but civil wars never disappeared—and these **internal conflicts** **could easily escalate into regional or global wars**. The number of conflicts in the world reached its highest point since World War II in 2016, with 53 state-based armed conflicts in 37 countries. All but two of these conflicts were considered civil wars. To make matters worse, new studies have shown that civil wars are becoming longer, deadlier and harder to conclusively end, and that these internal conflicts are not really internal. Civil wars harm the economies and stability of neighboring countries, since armed groups, refugees, illicit goods and diseases all spill over borders. Some 10 million refugees have fled to other countries since 2012. The countries that now host them are more likely to experience war, which means states with huge refugee populations like Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey face legitimate security challenges. Even after the threat of violence has diminished in refugees’ countries of origin, return migration can reignite conflicts, repeating the brutal cycle. A Yugoslav Federal Army tank. Perhaps most importantly, recent research indicates that civil wars increase the risk of interstate war, in large part because they are attracting more and more outside involvement. In a 2008 paper, researchers Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, Idean Salehyan and Kenneth Schultz explained that, in addition to the spillover effects, two other factors in civil wars increase international tensions and could possibly provoke wider interstate wars: external interventions in support of rebel groups and regime attacks on insurgents across international borders. Immediately after the Cold War, none of the ongoing civil wars around the world were internationalized. According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, there were 12 full-fledged civil wars in 1991—in Afghanistan, Iraq, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and elsewhere—and foreign militaries were not active on the ground in any of them. Last year, by contrast, every single full-fledged civil war involved external military participants. This is due, in part, to the huge growth in U.S. military interventions abroad into civil conflicts, but it’s not only the Americans. All of today’s major wars are in essence proxy wars, pitting external rivals against one another. Conflicts in Syria, Yemen and Libya are best understood not as civil wars, but as international warzones, attracting meddlers including the United States, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, France and many others, which often intervene not to build peace, but to resolve conflicts in a way that is favorable to their own interests. These internationalized wars are more lethal, harder to resolve and possibly more likely to recur than civil wars that remain localized. It is not that difficult to imagine how these conflicts could spark wider international conflagrations. Wars, after all, can quickly spiral out of control. As Risks Increase, Deterrents Decline To make matters worse, most of the global trends that explained why interstate war had decreased in recent decades are now reversing. The theories that democracy, prosperity, cooperation and other factors kept the peace have been much debated—but if there was any truth to them, their reversals are likely to increase the chance of war, irrespective of how long the coronavirus pandemic lasts. Democracy is often considered a prophylactic for war. Fully democratic countries are less likely to experience civil war and rarely, if ever, go to war with other democracies—though, of course, they do still go to war against non-democracies. While this would be great news if democracy and pluralism were spreading, there have now been 14 consecutive years of global democratic decline, and there have been signs of additional authoritarian power grabs in countries like Hungary and Serbia during the pandemic. If democracy backslides far enough, internal conflicts and foreign aggression will become more likely. Other theories posit that **economic bonds between countries** have **limited wars** in recent decades. Dale Copeland, a professor of international relations at the University of Virginia, has argued that **countries work to preserve ties when there are high expectations for future trade**, **but war becomes** increasingly **possible when trade is predicted to fall.** If **globalization brought peace**, the recent wave of far-right nationalism and populism around the world may increase the chances of war, as tariffs and other trade barriers go up—mostly from the United States under President Donald Trump, who has launched trade wars with allies and adversaries alike. The coronavirus pandemic immediately elicited further calls to reduce dependence on other countries, with Trump using the opportunity to pressure U.S. companies to reconfigure their supply chains away from China. For its part, China made sure that it had the homemade supplies it needed to fight the virus before exporting extras, while countries like France and Germany barred the export of face masks, even to friendly nations. And widening economic inequalities, a consequence of the pandemic, are not likely to enhance support for free trade. This assault on open trade and globalization is just one aspect of a decaying liberal international order, which, its proponents argue, has largely helped to preserve peace between nations since World War II. But that old order is almost gone, and in all likelihood isn’t coming back. The U.N. Security Council appears increasingly fragmented and dysfunctional. Even before Trump, the world’s most powerful country ratified fewer treaties per year under the Obama administration than at any time since 1945. Trump’s presidency only harms multilateral cooperation further. He has backed out of the Paris Agreement on climate change, reneged on the Iran nuclear deal, picked fights with allies, questioned the value of NATO and defunded the World Health Organization in the middle of a global health crisis. Hyper-nationalism, rather than international collaboration, was the default response to the coronavirus outbreak in the U.S. and many other countries around the world. It’s hard to see the U.S. reluctance to lead as anything other than a sign of its inevitable, if slow, decline. The country’s institutionalized inequalities and systemic racism have been laid bare in recent months, and it no longer looks like a beacon for others to follow. The global balance of power is changing. China is both keen to assert a greater leadership role within traditionally Western-led institutions and to challenge the existing regional order in Asia. Between a rising China, revanchist Russia and new global actors, including non-state groups, we may be heading toward an increasingly multipolar or nonpolar world, which could prove destabilizing in its own right. Finally, the pacifying effect of nuclear weapons could be waning. While vast nuclear arsenals once compelled the United States and the Soviet Union to reach arms control agreements, old treaties are expiring and new talks are breaking down. **Mistrust is growing**, and the **chance of an** unwanted **U.S.-Russia nuclear confrontation is** arguably as **high** as it has been since the Cuban missile crisis. The theory of nuclear peace may no longer hold if more countries are tempted to obtain their own nuclear deterrent. Trump’s decision to abandon the Iran nuclear deal, for one thing, has only increased the chance that Tehran will acquire nuclear weapons. It’s almost easy to forget that, just a few short months ago, the United States and Iran were one miscalculation or dumb mistake away from waging all-out war. And despite Trump’s efforts to negotiate nuclear disarmament with Kim Jong Un’s regime in Pyongyang, it is wishful thinking to believe North Korea will give up its nuclear weapons. At this point, negotiators can only realistically try to ensure that North **Korea’s** **nuclear menace** **doesn’t get** even **more potent**. In other words, by turning inward, the United States is choosing to leave other countries to fend for themselves. The end result may be a less stable world with more nuclear actors. If leaders are smart, they will take seriously the warning signs exposed by this global emergency and work to reverse the drift toward war. If only one of these theories for peace were worsening, concerns would be easier to dismiss. But **together**, they are unsettling. While the world is not yet on the brink of **World War III** and no two countries are destined for war, the odds of avoiding future conflicts don’t look good. The pandemic is already degrading democracies, harming economies and curtailing international cooperation, and it also seems to be fostering internal instability within states. Rachel Brown, Heather Hurlburt and Alexandra Stark argue that the coronavirus could in fact sow more civil conflict. If this proves accurate, the increase in civil wars is likely to lead to more external meddling, and these next **proxy wars** **could** soon **precipitate all-out international conflicts** if outsiders aren’t careful. **With** the **usual deterrents to conflict declining** around the world, **major wars could soon return**.

#### Any nuclear war causes extinction – ice age and famine.

Steven Starr 15 [Director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the [Physicians for Social Responsibility](http://www.psr.org/). He has worked with the Swiss, Chilean, and Swedish governments in support of their efforts at the United Nations to eliminate thousands of high-alert, launch-ready U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons; he maintains the website [Nuclear Darkness](http://www.nucleardarkness.org/). “Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting To Happen.” Ratical. March 2015. <https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html>] TG Re-Cut Justin

A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that [ends human history](https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StarrNuclearWinterOct09.pdf). There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create [a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockToonSAD.pdf). Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making. The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout, produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to [destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer](https://www2.ucar.edu/atmosnews/just-published/3995/nuclear-war-and-ultraviolet-radiation) and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.

### 2 – Racist Strikes PIC

#### Counterplan: A just government ought to recognize the conditional right of workers to strike with the condition that strikers are not asking for employers to discriminate and don’t utilize violence/discrimination during the strikes.

\*\*TW: semi-graphic depictions of anti-black violence

#### Enforcement in the card.

BPSC [Unfair Labor Practices by Union, <http://bpscllc.com/unfair-labor-practices-by-unions.html>, N.D., Business & People Strategy Consulting Group, California's trusted source for workplace human resources and employment law] [SS]

Causing or Attempting to Cause Discrimination: Section 8(b)(2) makes it **an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to cause** or attempt to cause **an employer to discriminate** against an employee in violation of Section 8(a)(3). The section is violated by agreements or arrangements with employers, other than lawful union-security agreements, that condition employment or job benefits on union membership, on the performance of union membership obligations or on arbitrary grounds. But union action that causes detriment to an individual employee does not violate Section 8(b)(2) if it is consistent with nondiscriminatory provisions of a bargaining contract negotiated for the benefit of the total bargaining unit, or if the action is based on some other legitimate purpose. **A union’s conduct, accompanied by statements advising** or suggesting **that action is expected of an employer,** may be enough to find a violation of this section **if the union’s action can be shown to be a causal factor in the employer’s discrimination.** Contracts or informal arrangements with a union under which an employer gives preferential treatment to union members also violate Section 8(b)(2). However, an employer and a union may agree that the employer will hire new employees exclusively through the union hiring hall if there is no discrimination against nonunion members on the basis of union membership obligations. In setting referral standards, a union may consider legitimate aims such as sharing available work and easing the impact of local unemployment. The union may also charge referral fees if the amount of the fee is reasonably related to the cost of operating the referral service. A union that attempts to force an employer to enter into an illegal union-security agreement, or that enters into and keeps in effect such an agreement, also violates Section 8(b)(2), as does a union that attempts to enforce such an illegal agreement by bringing about an employee’s discharge. Even when a union-security provision of a bargaining contract meets all statutory requirements, a union may not lawfully require the discharge of employees under the provision unless they were informed of the union-security agreement and their specific obligation under it. A union violates Section 8(b)(2) if it tries to use the union-security provisions of a contract to collect payments other than those lawfully required, such as assessments, fines and penalties. Other examples of Section 8(b)(2) violations include: Causing an employer to discharge employees because they circulated a petition urging a change in the union’s method of selecting shop stewards Causing an employer to discharge employees because they made speeches against a contract proposed by the union Making a contract that requires an employer to hire only members of the union or employees “satisfactory” to the union Causing an employer to reduce employees’ seniority because they engaged in anti-union acts **Refusing referral or giving preference on the basis of race** or union activities when making job referrals to units represented by the union Seeking the discharge of an employee under a union-security agreement for failure to pay a fine levied by the union

#### The East St. Louis riots lead to over 200 deaths and were one of the worst race related riots in history – it all started with a racist union striking in favor of discrimination and a lack of government intervention.

People’s World ‘17

[This week in history: East St. Louis rocked by race riot, 1917, <https://www.peoplesworld.org/article/this-week-in-history-east-st-louis-rocked-by-race-riot-1917/>, June 26 2017, voice for progressive change and socialism in the United States. It provides news and analysis of, by, and for the labor and democratic movements to our readers across the country and around the world.] [SS]

\*\*Bracketed for offensive language

**The East St. Louis riots (or massacres**) of May and July 1917 **were an outbreak of labor- and race-related violence** **that caused up to 200 deaths** and extensive property damage. East St. Louis, Ill., is an industrial city on the east bank of the Mississippi River across from St. Louis, Mo. **These incidents** of 100 years ago **have been described** as the worst case of labor-related violence and **among the worst race riots in 20th-century American history**. In 1917 the U.S. had an active economy boosted by World War I. With many workers now absent in the armed forces, industries were in need of labor. Seeking better work and living opportunities, as well as an escape from harsh conditions, the Great Migration of African Americans out of the South toward industrial centers across the North was well underway. Blacks were arriving in St. Louis during Spring 1917 at the rate of 2000 per week. Traditionally **white unions sought to strengthen their bargaining position by** hindering or **excluding black workers**, while industry owners utilized blacks as replacements or strikebreakers, adding to deep-seated societal divisions. At the same time **Louisiana farmers were worried about losing their labor force, and** had **requested** East St. Louis Mayor Fred W. Mollman’s assistance **to help discourage black migration**. Many blacks found work at the Aluminum Ore and the American Steel companies in East St. Louis. Some **whites feared job and wage security from** this **new competition**. That February, **470 African American workers were hired to replace white workers who had gone on strike** against Aluminum Ore. **Tensions** between the groups **escalated, including rumors of black men and white women fraternizing at a labor meeting** on May 28, following which some **3000 white men marched** into downtown East St. Louis **and began attacking African Americans**. The mobs stopped trolleys and streetcars, pulling black passengers out and beating them on the streets. With mobs destroying buildings and assaulting people, Ill. Gov. Frank O. Lowden called in the National Guard to prevent further rioting, and the mood eased somewhat for a few weeks. **The** East St. Louis Central **Labor Council** responded to the rioting **implying that** “southern [**black people]** Negroes **were misled** **by false advertisements and unscrupulous employment agents** to come to East St. Louis in such numbers under false pretenses of secure jobs and decent living quarters.” Little was done to prevent further problems. No precautions were taken to ensure white job security or to grant union recognition. **No reforms were made in the police force which did little to quell the violence**. This further increased the already-high level of hostilities towards African Americans. On July 2, a car occupied by white males drove through a black area of the city and several shots were fired into a standing group. An hour later, a car containing four people, including a journalist and two police officers passed through the same area. Black residents, possibly assuming they were the original suspects, opened fire, killing one officer instantly and mortally wounding another. Later that day, thousands of white spectators who assembled to view the detectives’ bloodstained automobile marched into the black section of town and started rioting. **After cutting the water hoses of the fire department, the rioters burned entire sections of the city, shot inhabitants as they escaped the flames, and lynched several [black people]** blacks. Guardsmen were called in, but according to contemporary accounts, they joined in the rioting rather than stop it. Young white women and girls brandishing clubs chased a black woman and called upon the men to kill her. After the riots, the St. Louis Argus said, “The entire country has been aroused to a sense of shame and pity by the magnitude of the national disgrace enacted by the blood-thirsty rioters in East St. Louis Monday, July 2.” According to the Post-Dispatch of St. Louis, “All the impartial witnesses agree that the police were either indifferent or encouraged the barbarities, and that **the major part of the National Guard was indifferent or inactive.** **No organized effort was made to protect the [black people]** Negroes or disperse the murdering groups…. Ten determined officers could have prevented most of the outrages. **One hundred men acting with authority** and vigor **might have prevented any outrage**.” After the riots, varying estimates of the death toll circulated. The police chief estimated that 100 blacks had been killed. The renowned journalist Ida B. Wells reported in The Chicago Defender that 40-150 black people were killed**. The NAACP estimated deaths at 100–200. Six thousand** blacks **were left homeless** after their neighborhood was burned. The coroner specified nine white deaths, but the deaths of black victims were less clearly recorded: Activists argued that the true number of deaths would never be known because many corpses were neither recovered nor had passed through the hands of undertakers. The ferocious brutality of the attacks and the failure of the authorities to protect innocent lives contributed to the radicalization of many blacks across the nation. Marcus Garvey, president of The Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA), declared, “This is no time for fine words, but a time to lift one’s voice against the savagery of a people who claim to be the dispensers of democracy.” On July 6 the Chamber of Commerce met with the mayor to demand the resignation of top police officials and radical reform. In addition to the lives lost, mobs had caused extensive property damage. The Southern Railway Company’s warehouse was burned, with over 100 carloads of merchandise. A white theatre valued at more than $100,000, 44 freight cars and 312 houses were destroyed. In response to the rioting, the NAACP sent W.E.B. DuBois and Martha Gruening to investigate the incident. They compiled a report entitled “Massacre at East St. Louis,” which was published in the NAACP’s magazine, The Crisis. In New York City on July 28, 10,000 black people carrying signs marched down Fifth Avenue in a Silent Parade, protesting the riots. The march was organized by the NAACP and Du Bois, and other groups in Harlem. Women and children were dressed in white; the men were dressed in black. Authorities were slow to respond to calls for an investigation. President Woodrow Wilson stated that his Department of Justice could not find enough evidence to justify federal action in the matter. A Special Committee formed by the U.S. House of Representatives launched an investigation into police actions during the East St. Louis Riot. It found that the National Guard and the East St. Louis police force had not acted adequately during the riots, revealing that the police often fled from the scenes of murder and arson. Some even fled from station houses and refused to answer calls for help. The investigation also resulted in the indictment of several members of the East St. Louis police force. Among those brought to trial was Dr. LeRoy Bundy, a dentist and prominent leader in the East St. Louis black community, who was formally charged with inciting a riot. The trial was held in the St. Clair county court. Bundy, along with 34 defendants, of whom ten were white, were given prison time in connection to the riot.

### 3 – FW

#### The standard is maximizing expected well-being—to clarify, saving lives.

#### Extinction outweighs:

#### A] Structural violence- death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### B] Objectivity- body count is the most objective way to calculate impacts because comparing suffering is unethical

#### C] Mathematically outweighs.

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information

### Case

#### Turning the Economy Internal Links –

#### 1] Right to Strike has unintended effects that threaten growth and business confidence.

Tenza 20, Mlungisi. "The effects of violent strikes on the economy of a developing country: a case of South Africa." Obiter 41.3 (2020): 519-537. (lecturer in the field of Labour Law at the School of Law. He holds a LLM Degree.)//Elmer

2 BACKGROUND When South Africa obtained democracy in 1994, there was a dream of a better country with a new vision for industrial relations.5 However, the number of **violent strikes** that have bedevilled this country in recent years seems to have **shattered-down** the **aspirations of a better South Africa**. South Africa recorded 114 strikes in 2013 and 88 strikes in 2014, which **cost** the country about **R6.1 billion** according to the Department of Labour.6 The impact of these strikes has been hugely felt by the mining sector, particularly the platinum industry. The biggest strike took place in the platinum sector where about 70 000 mineworkers’ downed tools for better wages. Three major platinum producers (Impala, Anglo American and Lonmin Platinum Mines) were affected. The strike started on 23 January 2014 and ended on 25 June 2014. Business Day reported that “the five-month-long strike in the platinum sector pushed the economy to the brink of recession”. 7 This strike was closely followed by a four-week strike in the metal and engineering sector. All these strikes (and those not mentioned here) were characterised with violence accompanied by damage to property, intimidation, assault and sometimes the killing of people. Statistics from the metal and engineering sector showed that about 246 cases of intimidation were reported, 50 violent incidents occurred, and 85 cases of vandalism were recorded.8 Large-scale unemployment, soaring poverty levels and the dramatic income inequality that characterise the South African labour market provide a broad explanation for strike violence.9 While participating in a strike, workers’ stress levels leave them feeling frustrated at their seeming powerlessness, which in turn provokes further violent behaviour.10 These **strikes** are not only violent but **take long to resolve**. Generally, a lengthy strike has a **negative effect on employment**, **reduces business confidence** **and increases the risk of economic stagflation**. In addition, such strikes have a **major setback on** the growth of the economy and **investment opportunities**. It is common knowledge that consumer spending is directly linked to economic growth. At the same time, if the economy is not showing signs of growth, employment opportunities are shed, and poverty becomes the end result. The economy of South Africa is in need of rapid growth to enable it to deal with the high levels of unemployment and resultant poverty. One of the measures that may boost the country’s economic growth is by attracting potential investors to invest in the country. However, this might be difficult as **investors** would want to invest in a country where there is a likelihood of getting returns for their investments. The wish of getting returns for investment **may not materialise** **if the labour environment** **is not fertile** for such investments **as a result** **of**, for example, **unstable labour relations**. Therefore, investors may be reluctant to invest where there is an unstable or fragile labour relations environment. 3 THE COMMISSION OF VIOLENCE DURING A STRIKE AND CONSEQUENCES The Constitution guarantees every worker the right to join a trade union, participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union, and to strike. 11 The Constitution grants these rights to a “worker” as an individual.12 However, the right to strike and any other conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike such as a picket13 can only be exercised by workers acting collectively.14 The right to strike and participation in the activities of a trade union were given more effect through the enactment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 199515 (LRA). The main purpose of the LRA is to “advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace”. 16 The advancement of social justice means that the exercise of the right to strike must advance the interests of workers and at the same time workers must refrain from any conduct that can affect those who are not on strike as well members of society. Even though the right to strike and the right to participate in the activities of a trade union that often flow from a strike17 are guaranteed in the Constitution and specifically regulated by the LRA, it sometimes happens that **the right to strike is exercised** **for purposes not intended** by the Constitution and the LRA, generally. 18 For example, it was not the intention of the Constitutional Assembly and the legislature that violence should be used during strikes or pickets. As the Constitution provides, pickets are meant to be peaceful. 19 Contrary to section 17 of the Constitution, the conduct of workers participating in a strike or picket has changed in recent years with workers trying to emphasise their grievances by causing disharmony and chaos in public. A media report by the South African Institute of Race Relations pointed out that between the years 1999 and 2012 there were 181 strike-related deaths, 313 injuries and 3,058 people were arrested for public violence associated with strikes.20 The question is whether employers succumb easily to workers’ demands if a strike is accompanied by violence? In response to this question, one worker remarked as follows: “[T]here is no sweet strike, there is no Christian strike … A strike is a strike. [Y]ou want to get back what belongs to you ... you won’t win a strike with a Bible. You do not wear high heels and carry an umbrella and say ‘1992 was under apartheid, 2007 is under ANC’. You won’t win a strike like that.” 21 The use of violence during industrial action **affects** not only the strikers or picketers, the **employer** and his or her **business** but it also affects **innocent members of the public**, **non-striking employees**, the **environment** **and the economy at large**. In addition, striking workers visit non-striking workers’ homes, often at night, threaten them and in some cases, assault or even murder workers who are acting as replacement labour. 22 This points to the fact that for many workers and their families’ living conditions remain unsafe and vulnerable to damage due to violence. In Security Services Employers Organisation v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union (SATAWU),23 it was reported that about 20 people were thrown out of moving trains in the Gauteng province; most of them were security guards who were not on strike and who were believed to be targeted by their striking colleagues. Two of them died, while others were admitted to hospitals with serious injuries.24 In SA Chemical Catering & Allied Workers Union v Check One (Pty) Ltd,25 striking employees were carrying various weapons ranging from sticks, pipes, planks and bottles. One of the strikers Mr Nqoko was alleged to have threatened to cut the throats of those employees who had been brought from other branches of the employer’s business to help in the branch where employees were on strike. Such conduct was held not to be in line with good conduct of striking.26

#### Business confidence is the best indicator for growth.

Khan 20, Hashmat, and Santosh Upadhayaya. "Does business confidence matter for investment?." Empirical Economics 59.4 (2020): 1633-1665. (Economics Professor at Carleton University)//Elmer

Abstract Business confidence is a well-known leading indicator of future output. Whether it has information about future investment is, however, unclear. We determine how informative business confidence is for investment growth independently of other variables using US business confidence survey data for 1955Q1–2016Q4. Our main findings are: (i) **business confidence has predictive ability for investment growth**; (ii) remarkably, business confidence has **superior** forecasting power, relative **to conventional predictors**, for investment downturns over 1–3-quarter forecast horizons and for the sign of investment growth over a 2-quarter forecast horizon; and (iii) exogenous shifts in business confidence reflect short-lived non-fundamental factors, consistent with the ‘animal spirits’ view of investment. Our findings have implications for improving investment forecasts, developing new business cycle models, and studying the role of social and psychological factors determining investment growth. Introduction Business confidence is a well-known leading indicator of future output, especially during economic downturns, and receives attention from the media, policymakers and forecasters. Somewhat surprisingly, the direct link between business confidence and investment has not yet been investigated. Our paper fills this gap. We provide a quantitative assessment of the information in business confidence for future investment growth, after **controlling for** the conventional determinants such as **user cost, output, cash flow and stock price**. Understanding the predictive power of business confidence is valuable along three dimensions. First, it can help forecasters and policymakers improve their investment forecasts. Second, it can provide a rationale for explicitly including **business confidence**—either **as causal or** as **anticipatory**—**in** theoretical models of **business cycles**. Third, it can help motivate studies on the how investment managers’ social and psychological circumstances influence investment decisions over and beyond rational cost-benefit analyses.Footnote1 We consider the Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD)’s business confidence index for the USA as a measure of business confidence and ask the following three questions.Footnote2 Does business confidence have independent information about future business investment growth? Does it have forecasting power for investment downturns? Does it help in making directional forecasts—the positive or negative movements in the trajectory of investment growth? Previous literature that used business confidence has primarily studied its predictive properties for variables other than investment. Heye (1993) examines the relationship between business confidence and labour market conditions in the USA and other industrialized countries. Dasgupta and Lahiri (1993) show that business sentiments have explanatory power of forecasting business cycle turning points. Taylor and McNabb (2007) find that business confidence is procyclical and plays an important role in forecasting output downturns. Although we focus on business confidence, our paper is related to a large body of previous research that has studied consumer confidence or sentiment and its ability to forecast macroeconomic variables. Leeper (1992) finds that consumer sentiment does not help predict industrial production and unemployment, especially when financial variables are taken into account. On the other hand, Matsusaka and Sbordone (1995) reject the hypothesis that consumer sentiment does not predict output. Carroll et al. (1994), Fuhrer (1993), Bram and Ludvigson (1998), Ludvigson (2004) and Cotsomitis and Kwan (2006) find that the consumer attitudes have some additional information about predicting household spending behaviour. Lahiri et al. (2016) employ a large real-time dataset and find that the consumer confidence survey has important role in improving the accuracy of consumption forecasts. Christiansen et al. (2014) find that consumer and business sentiments contain independent information for forecasting business cycles. Barsky and Sims (2012) find that consumer confidence reflects news about future fundamentals and a confidence shock has a persistent effect on the economy. More recently, Angeletos et al. (2018) quantify the role of confidence for business cycle from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. They construct a measure of confidence within a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) framework by taking the linear combination of the VAR residuals that maximizes the sum of the volatilities of hours and investment at frequencies of 6–32 quarters. Their measure likely captures a mixture of consumer and business confidence and is, therefore, distinct from the survey-based measure that we use in our analysis. We find that business confidence leads US business investment growth by one quarter. It leads structures investment, which is one of the major components of business investment, by two quarters. Our **empirical analysis shows** that **investors’ confidence has** statistically **significant predictive power for** US business investment **growth** and its components (equipment and non-residential structures) after **controlling for other determinants of investment**. To better gauge the role of business confidence for investment growth, we also perform Out-Of-Sample (OOS) test for 1990Q1–2016Q4. Our findings suggest that the OOS test results are similar to the in-sample test results.Footnote3 While, as we found, business confidence has predictive power for total investment, it may also contain additional information on the trajectory of investment as captured by downturns and directional changes. This information would be of interest to policymakers in assessing the economy’s near-term outlook, over and above the general ability of business confidence to forecast investment. Indeed, we find that contemporaneous correlation between business confidence and investment growth rises during NBER recession dates. This property of the data suggests that it is worthwhile to explore the forecasting ability of business confidence for investment downturns and directional changes. Towards this end, we define investment downturns as business investment growth below the sample average for more than two consecutive quarters.Footnote4 Using a static probit forecasting model, we assess the OOS forecasting ability of business confidence for investment downturns for 1990Q1–2016Q4. A key finding of this approach in the literature is that term spread and stock price contain information for forecasting US recessions (Estrella and Mishkin 1998; Nyberg 2010; Kauppi and Saikkonen 2008). We follow a similar approach and find that business confidence has statistically significant forecasting power for investment downturns over 1–4-quarter forecast horizons in the US economy. It has stronger forecasting ability than the traditional predictors such as term spread, credit spread and stock price at 1–3-quarter forecast horizons. We also find strong evidence that the business confidence has good incremental predictive power for investment downturns over 1–4-quarter forecast horizons, controlling for other predictors of downturns.

#### 2] Increased strikes sabotage the economy – they cause major disruptions and lower income for workers.

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Labor strikes can cause major disruptions to industry, commerce and the lives of many people who aren't even connected to the strike itself. The Professional Air Traffic Controllers Association strike in 1981 resulted in the firing of thousands of air traffic controllers, and the New York City transit strike in late 2005 affected millions of people. The history of strikes and labor unions is a key chapter in the story of the Industrial Revolution.

While the reasons behind strikes can be complex, they all boil down to two key elements: money and power. In this article, we'll find out how labor strikes have affected the balance of power between corporations and workers, what laws regulate strikes and learn about some important strikes in history.

It's difficult to say when the first real labor strike occurred. The word "strike" was first used in the 1700s, and probably comes from to notion of dealing a blow to the employer [ref]. In 1786, a group of printers in Philadelphia requested a raise and the company rejected it. They stopped working in protest and eventually received their raise. Other professionals followed suit in the next few decades. Everyone in a city who practiced the same profession agreed to set prices and wages at the same rate. Members would shun anyone who diverged from the agreement, refusing to work in the same shop and forcing employers to fire them. By the 1800s, formal trade societies and guilds began to emerge.

To have a strike today, you must have a union (though not necessarily an official union) -- an organization of workers that bargain collectively with an employer. Workers form unions because an individual worker is powerless compared to an employer, who can set low wages and long working hours as long as it adheres to labor laws. When workers combine to form a union, they collectively have enough power to negotiate with the employer. The main weapon the union has against the employer is the threat of a strike action.

At its most basic level, a strike occurs when all the workers in the union stop coming to work. With no workers, the business shuts down. The employer stops making money, though it is still spending money on taxes, rent, electricity and maintenance. The longer the strike lasts, the more money the employer loses. Of course, the workers aren't getting paid either, so they're losing money as well. Some unions build up "war chests" -- funds to pay striking workers. But it isn't usually very much, and it's often not enough for a prolonged strike.

Strikes help explain why unions are more powerful than individuals. Imagine if an employer refuses to give a raise to an individual worker. She then decides to stop coming to work in protest. The employer simply fires her for not coming to work. That one worker has no power to influence the employer. However, it can be very costly for an employer to fire every single worker when a union goes on strike (though it has happened).

#### 3] Strikes hurt Small Businesses.

Inc Magazine 21 1-5-2021 “Employee Strikes” <https://www.inc.com/encyclopedia/employee-strikes.html>

**Strikes** may **affect** a **small business in** one of **two ways**. **First**, **its own employees may go on strike** or carry out some collective action functionally equivalent to a strike. **Second**, the small business may be **unable to carry on** as usually **because** some **other company** or industry **is experiencing labor disruptions** and thus denies the business vital services or supplies. STATUS AND TRENDS IN UNIONIZATION Employee or labor strikes are called by labor unions usually after a strike-vote by its membership. The strike may be directed at a single organization or may be industry-wide. Two major tends in unionization suggest that small business is very unlikely to be unionized and therefore directly threatened by a strike. Based on data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, in the 40-year period from 1964 to 2005, union members have declined from 29.3 percent to 12.5 percent of the labor force. Even as the total unionized work-force has declined, the private-sector's share of total union labor has declined and the share of the public-sector has increased. In 1983, for example, private-sector union employees were 67.2 percent of all union laborers; the public-sector share was 32.4 percent. By 2005, the private-sector share was 52.6 percent, the public-sector share 47.4 percent. As a consequence of this general decline in the unionized workforce, labor stoppages have also declined. Major work stoppages involving 1,000 or more workers averaged 352 in the 1950s, 283 in the 1960s, 289 in the 1970s, 83 in the 1980s, 35 in the 1990s, and 28 in the five-year period 2000—2005. In 2005, union membership was highest in the transportation and utilities industries in the private-sector (24 percent) and lowest in finance and related services (2.3 percent). In construction and manufacturing, union membership was 13 percent of the labor force; in wholesale and retail (where the highest proportion of small businesses operate) the rate was 5.2 percent. In professional and business services, another important small business sector, the rate was 2.7 percent. Furthermore, unions target for organization efforts large operations rather than small for pure cost/benefit reasons. Therefore unionized small businesses are rare. Finally, unions call strikes only when grievances are of long standing and long unresolved. Not surprisingly, a search of the business literature does not turn up any cases of small businesses struck by strikes. TYPES OF STRIKES The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) provides legal protections for economic strikes and strikes based on unfair labor practices. In the first category, workers attempt to garner improvements in their wages, benefits, hours, or working conditions. An unfair labor practices strike is called when the employer allegedly violates NLRA rules that protect workers during collective bargaining. The small business owner faced with a labor organizing action is well advised, early in the process, to consult with a competent labor lawyer in order to get guidance on how to comply with NLRA regulations. Fundamental rules to observe include: The business must bargain in good faith throughout the process. Workers have a fundamental right under U.S. law to organize and to bargain collectively. The business must provide the union with all information to which the latter is legally entitled. Under U.S. labor law, unions can request information about management's plans regarding various operational aspects of the business during the strike. For example, the union can ask for information about where the business plans to get replacement workers and the wages that they will be paid. The business has and can exercise rights of its own. It can freely communicate its own plans to employees, point out how they differ from the union's proposals, and ask employees to vote on the business's final offer. In many strike situations, the business has the option of utilizing replacement workers without penalty. AVOIDING/MANAGING A STRIKE In the case of a small business especially—where contact between management and the work force is closer—avoiding a strike is obviously the best strategy. If the shop was unionized during the current ownership's tenure, that fact alone should have signaled to the management that something was drastically out of order. Unionization is fundamentally an adversarial process intended to force the business to behave in certain ways by threatening to deny the business an indispensable resource. If the union shop was acquired, the new owner can build a new relationship with labor and, often, after some period of time—during which the labor force has learned to trust the management—even succeed in decertifying the union. If, despite best efforts, a strike appears unavoidable, early planning and effective implementation are the only ways to minimize damage. Such planning will include at minimum: Obtaining early legal counsel to determine if hiring replacement workers will be possible and, if yes, making early arrangements for such help. Effectively communicating with suppliers and customers to tailor deliveries to the new situation and to warn customers of impending problems affecting prompt shipment of products. Where possible, inventories might be built up in advance. Communicating effectively with non-striking employees to maintain morale In the most drastic situation (more likely in a small than a large business) planning termination of operations, up to bankruptcy, if the strike will cripple the business. MANAGING SUPPLIER'S STRIKES **Employee strikes** **most likely to damage** a **small business are** likely to be **strikes by other people's employees**, not its own. In the industrial climate of the mid-2000s such **disruptions** were most likely to result **from** **transportation strikes**, **especially if a business was highly dependent on a single delivery channel.** As John Boyd pointed out in Traffic Word, "With a host of U.S. air cargo carriers locked in labor disputes as 2006 gets under way, shippers are bracing for what could be a turbulent year in the air but one they're hoping doesn't leave them grounded." Boyd cited a shipping manager who said: "I'm not panicking. But I am starting to think 'What if,' and planning ahead." Boyd pointed out that FedEx, UPS, and DHL were all negotiating with union pilots. The situation described by Boyd could arise, of course, in some other sector than transportation and affect for the small business, but the generic aspects are the same. The forward-looking manager will keep up-to-speed on the issues that impact its most important suppliers of goods and services, anticipate problems, plan for a workaround, and do the necessary contingency planning and budgeting that may be necessary. For example, large customers might be notified if the business anticipates shipment delays or shortages of parts—thus giving customer's opportunities to acquire additional supplies early.

#### Turning Wages – this answers their Internal Link to Education Innovation AND the Economy.

#### 1] Unions reduce wages for the majority and harm general employment rates – flips their labor shortage links

Hazlitt 19 [Henry Hazlitt; Author on Economics; 12/17/2019; " How Unions Reduce Real Wages"; Mises Institute; https://mises.org/wire/how-unions-reduce-real-wages] //Miller

For more than a century the economic thinking not only of the public but of the majority of economists has been dominated by a myth — the myth that labor unions have been on the whole a highly beneficent institution, and have raised the level of real wages far above what it would have been without union pressure. Many even talk as if the unions had been chiefly responsible for whatever gains labor has made. Yet the blunt truth is that labor unions cannot raise the real wages of all workers. We may go further: the actual policies that labor unions have systematically followed from the beginning of their existence have in fact reduced the real wages of the workers as a whole below what they would otherwise have been. Labor unions are today the chief antilabor force. To realize why this is so we must understand what determines wages in a free market. Wage rates are prices. Like other prices they are determined by supply and demand. And the demand for labor is determined by the marginal productivity of labor. If wage rates go above that level, employers drop their marginal workers because it costs more to employ them than they earn. They cannot long be employed at a loss. If, on the other hand, wage rates fall below the marginal productivity of workers, employers bid against each other for more workers up to the point where there is no further marginal profit in hiring more or bidding up wages more. So assuming mobility of both capital and labor, assuming free competition between workers and free competition between employers, there would be full employment of every person wanting and able to work, and the wage rate of each would tend to equal his marginal productivity. It will be said — it has in fact repeatedly been said — that such an analysis is merely a beautiful abstraction and that in the actual world this mobility and competition of labor and capital do not exist. There is, some economists have argued, in fact a wide range of "indeterminacy" in wages, and it is the function of unions to make sure that wage rates are fixed at the top rather than the bottom of this range or zone. We cannot reply that this indeterminacy theory is wholly wrong; but what we can say is that in relation to the problem of unions it is unimportant. The indeterminacy theory is true of wages only to the extent that it is true of other prices: it is true where the market is narrow or specialized. It is true, say, of highly specialized jobs in journalism, or in the universities, or in scientific research, or in the professions. But wherever we have large numbers of unskilled workers, or large numbers of approximately equal special but widespread skills — such as carpenters, bricklayers, painters, plumbers, printers, train-men, truckdrivers — this zone of indeterminacy shrinks or disappears. It is the craft unions themselves who insist that their individual members are so nearly equal to each other in competence that all should be paid on equal "standard" wage. And so we have the paradox that the unions exist and flourish precisely where they are least necessary to assure that their members get a market wage equal to their marginal productivity. It is true, of course, that an individual union can succeed in forcing the money wage rates of its members above what the free market rate would be. It can do this through the device of a strike, or often merely through the threat of a strike. Now a strike is not, as it is constantly represented as being, merely the act of a worker in "withholding his labor," or even merely a collusion of a large group of workers simultaneously to "withhold their labor" or give up their jobs. The whole point of a strike is the insistence by the strikers that they have not given up their jobs at all. They contend that they are still employees — in fact, the only legitimate employees. They claim an ownership of the jobs at which they refuse to work; they claim the "right" to prevent anybody else from taking the jobs that they have abandoned. That is the purpose of their mass picket lines, and of the vandalism and violence that they either resort to or threaten. They insist that the employer has no right to replace them with other workers, temporary or permanent, and they mean to see to it that he doesn't. Their demands are enforced always by intimidation and coercion, and in the last resort by actual violence. So wherever a union makes a gain by a strike or strike threat, it makes it by forcibly excluding other workers from taking the jobs that the strikers have abandoned. The union always makes its gains at the expense of these excluded workers. Overlooking the Victims It is amazing to find how systematically the self-proclaimed humanitarians, even among professional economists, have managed to overlook the unemployed, or the still more poorly paid workers, who are the victims of the union members' "gains." It is important to keep in mind that the unions cannot create a "monopoly" of all labor, but at best a monopoly of labor in certain specific crafts, firms, or industries. A monopolist of a product can get a higher monopoly price for that product, and perhaps a higher total income from it, by deliberately restricting the supply, either by refusing to produce as much as he can of it, or by withholding part of it, or even by destroying part of it that has already come into existence. But while the unions can and do restrict their membership, and exclude other workers from it, they cannot reduce the total number of workers seeking jobs. Therefore whenever the unions gain higher wage rates for their own members than free competition would have brought, they can do this only by increasing unemployment, or by increasing the number of workers forced to compete for other jobs and so comparatively reducing the wage rates paid for such jobs. All union "gains" (i.e., wage rates above what a competitive free market would have brought) are at the expense of lower wages than otherwise for at least some if not most nonunion workers. The unions cannot raise the average level of real wages; they can at best distort it. As the gains of union workers are made at the expense of nonunion workers, it is instructive to ask what proportion union members constitute of the whole working population. The answer for the United States is that union members now number about 20 million, or not more than 25 percent of the total civilian labor force of 87 million. So the unions are in a distinct minority. This might not be a fact worth emphasizing if there were reason to think that the average earnings of union workers were below the average earnings of nonunion workers. But while statistical comparisons cannot be exact, the evidence is conclusive that the case is the other way round. It is the most skilled occupations that are most unionized. In brief, we have a one-quarter minority of already higher paid union workers exploiting a three-quarters majority consisting mainly of already lower paid nonunion workers. People could save themselves a good deal of misplaced sympathy if next time they read in their newspapers of a strike for a "decent wage," they take the trouble to compare what the strikers were already getting with, say, the official statistics of average wages for all nonagricultural workers. The "gains" of union labor, of course, need not be solely at the expense of nonunion labor; they may be at the expense of some union members themselves. The higher wage rates gained in a particular industry (assuming an elastic demand for its product) will lead to less employment than otherwise in that industry. This may force unemployment on some of the members of the "successful" union. The result may then be that smaller aggregate wages will be paid in that industry than if the higher wage rate had not been successfully imposed. In addition, any union's "gains" (continuing to use "gains" in the sense of any excess over what would have been free-market wage rates) will be at the expense not only of unemployment or lower pay for other workers, but at the expense of consumers, by forcing them to pay higher prices. But as the great bulk of consumers consists of other workers, this means that these gains will be at the expense not only of nonunion workers but also of other union workers. The real wages of the mass of workers are reduced whenever they have to pay higher prices. Once it is clearly recognized that the strike-threat gains of each union are at the expense of all other unions, in forcing their members to pay higher prices for products, the whole myth of "labor solidarity" collapses. It is this myth that has kept the strike-threat system going. It has created sympathy for strikes and tolerance of the public harm they do. The mass of the working population has been taught to believe that all workers should support every strike, no matter how disorderly or for what unreasonable demands, and always to "respect the picket lines," because "Labor's" interests are unified. The success of any strike is thought to help all labor and its failure to hurt all labor. The Great Illusion This is the modern Great Illusion. In fact, each union's extorted "gains," by raising a specific industry's costs and therefore its prices, reduce the real wages of all other workers. The interests of the unions are mutually antagonistic. I have been talking so far about the damage done by strike settlements, or by "gains" extorted under the threat of strikes; I have not yet talked about the damage done by the strike itself. While strikes are ostensibly directed against the employers, most of them are in fact directed against the public. The idea is that if enough hardship is inflicted on the public, then the public will insist that the employer capitulate to the strikers' demands. There are too many instances of this to list. For examples one need not go outside of New York City in recent years. A bus and subway strike. A strike of garbage collectors, bringing filth, stench, and the threat of an epidemic. A strike in late December, 1968, of fuel-oil deliverers and oil-burner repairmen, during an extreme cold spell and flu epidemic, when at least 40,000 persons in thousands of multiple dwellings were reported to be seriously ill and were deprived of heat. A strike of 20,000 employees of the Consolidated Edison Co., which supplies the electric power for New York. Grave-diggers' strikes. Hospital employees' strikes. The chief leverage of the strikers, in securing capitulation to their demands, was the amount of hardship and suffering they were able to inflict, not directly on the employers, but primarily on the public. Yet who are the public? They are in the main other workers, including other union members. They may even be members of the striking union itself and of their families. A striking fuel-oil deliverer's own children, for example, may be sick and shivering because no fuel has been delivered. This is the absurdity of "labor solidarity." This is the folly of a "general strike." Such a strike is suicidal for the workers themselves.

#### 2] Strikes empirically reduce wages, job opportunities, and hurt economic recovery – reject their surface level studies that don’t account for specific factors

Sherk 09 [James Sherk; Bradley Fellow in Labor Policy in the Center for Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation; 5-21-2009; "What Unions Do: How Labor Unions Affect Jobs and the Economy"; Heritage Foundation; https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/report/what-unions-do-how-labor-unions-affect-jobs-and-the-economy; 11-16-2021] //Miller

Unions function as labor cartels. A labor cartel restricts the number of workers in a company or industry to drive up the remaining workers' wages, just as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) attempts to cut the supply of oil to raise its price. Companies pass on those higher wages to consumers through higher prices, and often they also earn lower profits. Economic research finds that unions benefit their members but hurt consumers generally, and especially workers who are denied job opportunities. The average union member earns more than the average non-union worker. However, that does not mean that expanding union membership will raise wages: Few workers who join a union today get a pay raise. What explains these apparently contradictory findings? The economy has become more competitive over the past generation. Companies have less power to pass price increases on to consumers without going out of business. Consequently, unions do not negotiate higher wages for many newly organized workers. These days, unions win higher wages for employees only at companies with competitive advantages that allow them to pay higher wages, such as successful research and development (R&D) projects or capital investments. Unions effectively tax these investments by negotiating higher wages for their members, thus lowering profits. Unionized companies respond to this union tax by reducing investment. Less investment makes unionized companies less competitive. This, along with the fact that unions function as labor cartels that seek to reduce job opportunities, causes unionized companies to lose jobs. Economists consistently find that unions decrease the number of jobs available in the economy. The vast majority of manufacturing jobs lost over the past three decades have been among union members--non-union manufacturing employment has risen. Research also shows that widespread unionization delays recovery from economic downturns. Some unions win higher wages for their members, though many do not. But with these higher wages, unions bring less investment, fewer jobs, higher prices, and smaller 401(k) plans for everyone else. On balance, labor cartels harm the economy, and enacting policies designed to force workers into unions will only prolong the recession. Push for EFCA Organized labor's highest legislative priority is the misnamed Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA).[1] This legislation replaces traditional secret-ballot organizing elections with publicly signed cards, allowing union organizers to pressure and harass workers into joining a union. EFCA would also allow the government to impose contracts on newly organized workers and their employers. Both of these changes are highly controversial. Supporters defend EFCA by sidestepping concerns about taking away workers' right to vote. They argue that the bill will make it easier for unions to organize workers. They contend that unions are the path to the middle class and that expanding union membership will raise wages and help boost the economy out of the recession.[2] The official case for EFCA rests on the argument that greater union membership benefits the economy. Opponents of EFCA largely confine their critique to the legislation itself: its undemocratic nature and the problems with giving government bureaucrats the power to dictate work assignments, benefit plans, business operations, and promotion policies. They also argue, however, that increasing union membership will harm the economy.[3] Economists have exhaustively examined what unions do in the economy. When debating EFCA, Congress should look to the body of academic research to determine whether unions help or hurt the economy. Unions in Theory Unions argue that they can raise their members' wages, but few Americans understand the economic theory explaining how they do this. Unions are labor cartels. Cartels work by restricting the supply of what they produce so that consumers will have to pay higher prices for it. OPEC, the best-known cartel, attempts to raise the price of oil by cutting oil production. As labor cartels, unions attempt to monopolize the labor supplied to a company or an industry in order to force employers to pay higher wages.[4] In this respect, they function like any other cartel and have the same effects on the economy. Cartels benefit their members in the short run and harm the overall economy. Imagine that General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler jointly agreed to raise the price of the cars they sold by $2,000: Their profits would rise as every American who bought a car paid more. Some Americans would no longer be able to afford a car at the higher price, so the automakers would manufacture and sell fewer vehicles. Then they would need--and hire--fewer workers. The Detroit automakers' stock prices would rise, but the overall economy would suffer. That is why federal anti-trust laws prohibit cartels and the automakers cannot collude to raise prices. Now consider how the United Auto Workers (UAW)--the union representing the autoworkers in Detroit--functions. Before the current downturn, the UAW routinely went on strike unless the Detroit automakers paid what they demanded-- until recently, $70 an hour in wages and benefits. Gold-plated UAW health benefits for retirees and active workers added $1,200 to the cost of each vehicle that GM produced in 2007.[5] Other benefits, such as full retirement after 30 years of employment and the recently eliminated JOBS bank (which paid workers for not working), added more. Some of these costs come out of profits, and some get passed to consumers through higher prices. UAW members earn higher wages, but every American who buys a car pays more, stock owners' wealth falls, and some Americans can no longer afford to buy a new car. The automakers also hire fewer workers because they now make and sell fewer cars. Unions raise the wages of their members both by forcing consumers to pay more for what they buy or do without and by costing some workers their jobs. They have the same harmful effect on the economy as other cartels, despite benefiting some workers instead of stock owners. That is why the federal anti-trust laws exempt labor unions; otherwise, anti-monopoly statutes would also prohibit union activity. Unions' role as monopoly cartels explains their opposition to trade and competition. A cartel can charge higher prices only as long as it remains a monopoly. If consumers can buy elsewhere, a company must cut its prices or go out of business. This has happened to the UAW. Non-union workers at Honda and Toyota plants now produce high-quality cars at lower prices than are possible in Detroit. As consumers have voted with their feet, the Detroit automakers have been brought to the brink of bankruptcy. The UAW has now agreed to significant concessions that will eliminate a sizeable portion of the gap between UAW and non-union wages. With competition, the union cartel breaks down, and unions cannot force consumers to pay higher prices or capture higher wages for their members. Unions in Practice Economic theory consequently suggests that unions raise the wages of their members at the cost of lower profits and fewer jobs, that lower profits cause businesses to invest less, and that unions have a smaller effect in competitive markets (where a union cannot obtain a monopoly). Dozens of economic studies have examined how unions affect the economy, and empirical research largely confirms the results of economic theory. What follows is a summary of the state of economic research on labor unions. The Appendix summarizes the papers referenced in the main body of this paper. Unions in the Workplace Unionizing significantly changes the workplace in addition to its effects on wages or jobs. Employers are prohibited from negotiating directly with unionized employees. Certified unions become employees' exclusive collective bargaining representatives. All discussions about pay, performance, promotions, or any other working conditions must occur between the union and the employer. An employer may not change working conditions--including raising salaries--without negotiations. Unionized employers must pay thousands of dollars in attorney's fees and spend months negotiating before making any changes in the workplace. Unionized companies often avoid making changes because the benefits are not worth the time and cost of negotiations. Both of these effects make unionized businesses less flexible and less competitive.[6] Final union contracts typically give workers group identities instead of treating them as individuals. Unions do not have the resources to monitor each worker's performance and tailor the contract accordingly. Even if they could, they would not want to do so. Unions want employees to view the union--not their individual achievements--as the source of their economic gains. As a result, union contracts typically base pay and promotions on seniority or detailed union job classifications. Unions rarely allow employers to base pay on individual performance or promote workers on the basis of individual ability.[7] Consequently, union contracts compress wages: They suppress the wages of more productive workers and raise the wages of the less competent. Unions redistribute wealth between workers. Everyone gets the same seniority-based raise regardless of how much or little he contributes, and this reduces wage inequality in unionized companies.[8] But this increased equality comes at a cost to employers. Often, the best workers will not work under union contracts that put a cap on their wages, so union firms have difficulty attracting and retaining top employees.[9] Effect on Wages Unions organize workers by promising higher wages for all workers. Economists have studied the effects of unions on wages exhaustively and have come to mixed conclusions. Numerous economic studies compare the average earnings of union and non-union workers, holding other measurable factors--age, gender, education, and industry--constant. These studies typically find that the average union member earns roughly 15 percent more than comparable non-union workers.[10] More recent research shows that errors in the data used to estimate wages caused these estimates to understate the true difference. Estimates that correct these errors show that the average union member earns between 20 percent and 25 percent more than similar non-union workers.[11] Correlation Is Not Causation But these studies do not show that unionizing would give the typical worker 20 percent higher wages: Correlation does not imply causation. Controlling for factors like age and education, the average worker in Silicon Valley earns more than the average worker in Memphis, but moving every worker in Memphis to Silicon Valley would not raise his or her wages. Workers in Silicon Valley earn more than elsewhere because they have specialized skills and work for high-paying technology companies, not because they picked the right place to live. Similarly, it is not necessarily unions that raise wages. They may simply organize workers who would naturally earn higher wages anyway. Unions do not organize random companies. They target large and profitable firms that tend to pay higher wages. Union contracts also make firing underperforming workers difficult, so unionized companies try to avoid hiring workers who might prove to be underperformers. High-earning workers do not want seniority schedules to hold them back and therefore avoid unionized companies. Estimates from the Same Worker Economists have attempted to correct this problem by examining how workers' wages change when they take or leave union jobs. This controls for unobservable worker qualities such as initiative or diligence that raise wages and may be correlated with union membership--the worker has the same skills whether he belongs to a union or not. These studies typically show that workers' wages rise roughly 10 percent when they take union jobs and fall by a similar amount when they leave those jobs.[12] Data errors become particularly problematic when following workers over time instead of comparing averages across groups. Some economists argue that these errors artificially diminish the union effect.[13] More recent research explicitly correcting for measurement errors has found that taking union jobs causes workers' wages to rise between 8 percent and 12 percent.[14] One Canadian study expressly examined how much of the difference between union and non-union wages was caused by unions and how much came from unmeasured individual skills. Over three-fifths of the higher wages earned by union members came from having more valuable skills, not from union membership itself.[15] Just as the land surrounding Silicon Valley does not itself raise wages, most of the difference between union and non-union wages has little or nothing to do with unions themselves. Wage Changes After Unionization Studies tracking individual workers also do not prove that unionizing necessarily raises wages. Individual data do not account for firm-specific factors, such as large firms both paying higher wages and being targeted more commonly for organizing drives. To discover the causal affect of organizing on wages, researchers compare wage changes at newly organized plants with wage changes at plants where organizing drives failed. Such studies look at the same workers and same plants over time, thereby controlling for many unmeasured effects. These studies come to the surprising conclusion that forming a union does not raise workers' wages.[16] Wages do not rise in plants that unionize relative to plants that vote against unionizing. Several of the authors of these studies have endorsed EFCA, but their research argues that expanding union membership will not raise wages. This should not come as a complete surprise. Unions in competitive markets have little power to raise wages because companies cannot raise prices without losing customers. Additionally, some unions-- such as the Service Employees International Union--have expanded by striking deals promising not to seek wage increases for workers if the employer agrees not to campaign against the union. Total Wage Effects While economic research as a whole does not conclusively disprove that unions raise wages, some studies do come to this conclusion. It is difficult to reconcile these studies with the large body of other research showing that union members earn more than non-union members, or with the strong evidence that unions reduce profits. A better summary of the economic research is that unions do not increase workers' wages by nearly as much as they claim and that, at a number of companies, they do not raise wages at all. Once researchers control for individual ability, unions raise wages between 0 percent and 10 percent, depending on the circumstances of the particular companies and workers. Effect on Businesses Union wage gains do not materialize out of thin air. They come out of business earnings. Other union policies, such as union work rules designed to increase the number of workers needed to do a job and stringent job classifications, also raise costs. Often, unionized companies must raise prices to cover these costs, losing customers in the process. Fewer customers and higher costs would be expected to cut businesses' earnings, and economists find that unions have exactly this effect. Unionized companies earn lower profits than are earned by non-union businesses. Studies typically find that unionized companies earn profits between 10 percent and 15 percent lower than those of comparable non-union firms.[17] Unlike the findings with respect to wage effects, the research shows unambiguously that unions directly cause lower profits. Profits drop at companies whose unions win certification elections but remain at normal levels for non-union firms. One recent study found that shareholder returns fall by 10 percent over two years at companies where unions win certification.[18] These studies do not create controversy, because both unions and businesses agree that unions cut profits. They merely disagree over whether this represents a feature or a problem. Unions argue that they get workers their "fair share," while employers complain that union contracts make them uncompetitive.