## 1NC

### Speaks

A person with blonde hair

Description automatically generated with medium confidence

### 1NC – NC

#### Permissibility and presumption negate

#### 1] Falsity- Statements are more often false than true because proving one part of the statement false disproves the entire statement. Presuming all statements are true creates contradictions which would be ethically bankrupt.

#### 2] Negation Theory- negate means to deny the truth of. The resolution indicates the affirmative has to prove an obligation, and permissibility would deny the existence of an obligation.

Negate: to deny the existence or truth of

That’s Merriam-Webster “negate” https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate

#### 3] Trichotomy Triple- there is a trichotomy between obligation, prohibition and permissibility. Proving one disproves the other two because they are three intertwined moral terms which coexist within each other. Outweighs because it interacts with each term/obligation.

#### The meta-ethic is moral naturalism. Non-natural moral facts are epistemically inaccessible

Papineau 7 [David, Academic philosopher. He works as Professor of Philosophy of Science at King's College London, having previously taught for several years at Cambridge University and been a fellow of Robinson College, Cambridge, “Naturalism”. [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/))]

Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If **all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world** (Harman, 1986). At first sight **this** may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it **has** **very awkward epistemological consequences.** For beings like us, **knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them.**

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. Pleasure and pain *are* intrinsic value and disvalue – everything else *regresses* – robust neuroscience.

Blum et al. 18 – Kenneth Blum, 1Department of Psychiatry, Boonshoft School of Medicine, Dayton VA Medical Center, Wright State University, Dayton, OH, USA 2Department of Psychiatry, McKnight Brain Institute, University of Florida College of Medicine, Gainesville, FL, USA 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA 5Department of Precision Medicine, Geneus Health LLC, San Antonio, TX, USA 6Department of Addiction Research & Therapy, Nupathways Inc., Innsbrook, MO, USA 7Department of Clinical Neurology, Path Foundation, New York, NY, USA 8Division of Neuroscience-Based Addiction Therapy, The Shores Treatment & Recovery Center, Port Saint Lucie, FL, USA 9Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary 10Division of Addiction Research, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC. North Kingston, RI, USA 11Victory Nutrition International, Lederach, PA., USA 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA, Marjorie Gondré-Lewis, 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA 13Departments of Anatomy and Psychiatry, Howard University College of Medicine, Washington, DC US, Bruce Steinberg, 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA, Igor Elman, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, David Baron, 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA, Edward J Modestino, 14Department of Psychology, Curry College, Milton, MA, USA, Rajendra D Badgaiyan, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, Mark S Gold 16Department of Psychiatry, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA, “Our evolved unique pleasure circuit makes humans different from apes: Reconsideration of data derived from animal studies”, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 28 February 2018, accessed: 19 August 2020, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/>, R.S.

**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10]. Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14]. Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals. Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it. It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring. Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding. There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health. Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage. Finding happiness is different between apes and humans As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure. Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even produce **the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered. Desire and reward centers It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation. In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41]. Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42]. Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans. In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45]. Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations. Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50] In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders. In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS. Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

#### Prefer:

#### 1] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

#### 2] No intent-foresight distinction for states.

Enoch 07 Enoch, D [The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew Unviersity, Mount Scopus Campus, Jersusalem]. (2007). INTENDING, FORESEEING, AND THE STATE. Legal Theory, 13(02). doi:10.1017/s1352325207070048 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/article/intending-foreseeing-and-the-state/76B18896B94D5490ED0512D8E8DC54B2

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves 39. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38. I will use this text as my example of an expressive theory here. 40. See id. at 1554, 1564. 41. For a general critique, see Mathew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1999–2000). 42. As Adler repeatedly notes, the understanding of expression Anderson & Pildes work with is amazingly broad, so that “To express an attitude through action is to act on the reasons the attitude gives us”; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38, at 1510. If this is so, it seems that expression drops out of the picture and everything done with it can be done directly in terms of reasons. 43. This may be true of what Anderson and Pildes have in mind when they say that “expressive norms regulate actions by regulating the acceptable justifications for doing them”; id. at 1511. http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Aug 2014 IP address: 134.153.184.170 Intending, Foreseeing, and the State 91 to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance. This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.44 In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken. Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows45 the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the dxeath of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable. Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):46 perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments. They have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.47 States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

#### 3] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to not kill. Only consequences explain why which is intuitive. Outweighs—a) parsimony—metaphysics relies on long chains of questionable claims that make conclusions less likely b) hijacks—intuitions are inevitable since every framework must take some starting point.

#### Impact calc –

#### 1] Extinction outweighs:

#### A] Structural violence- death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### B] Mathematically outweighs.

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### 2] Calc indicts fail: A] Ethics- it would indict everything cuz they use events to understand how ethics have worked B] Reciprocity- they are NIBs that create a 2:1 skew where I have to answer them to access offense while they only have to win one C] Internalism- asking why we value life is nonsensical since it’s intrinsic and we just do.

#### 3] Value fluctuates.

Bernstein 02 (Richard J., Vera List Prof. Phil. – New School for Social Research, “Radical Evil: A Philosophical Interrogation”, p. 188-192)

There is a basic value inherent inorganic being, a basic affirmation, "The Yes' of Life" (IR 81). 15 "The self-affirmation of being becomes emphatic in the opposition of life to death. Life is the explicit confrontation of being with not-being. . . . The 'yes' of all striving is here sharpened by the active `no' to not-being" (IR 81-2). Furthermore — and this is the crucial point for Jonas — this affirmation of life that is in all organic being has a binding obligatory force upon human beings. This blindly self-enacting "yes" gains obligating force in the seeing freedom of man, who as the supreme outcome of nature's purposive labor is no longer its automatic executor but, with the power obtained from knowledge, can become its destroyer as well. He must adopt the "yes" into his will and impose the "no" to not-being on his power. But precisely this transition from willing to obligation is the critical point of moral theory at which attempts at laying a foundation for it come so easily to grief. Why does now, in man, that become a duty which hitherto "being" itself took care of through all individual willings? (IR 82). We discover here the transition from is to "ought" — from the self-affirmation of life to the binding obligation of human beings to preserve life not only for the present but also for the future. But why do we need a new ethics? The subtitle of The Imperative of Responsibility — In Search of an Ethics for the Technological Age — indicates why we need a new ethics. Modern technology has transformed the nature and consequences of human action so radically that the underlying premises of traditional ethics are no longer valid. For the first time in history human beings possess the knowledge and the power to destroy life on this planet, including human life. Not only is there the new possibility of total nuclear disaster; there are the even more invidious and threatening possibilities that result from the unconstrained use of technologies that can destroy the environment required for life. The major transformation brought about by modern technology is that the consequences of our actions frequently exceed by far anything we can envision. Jonas was one of the first philosophers to warn us about the unprecedented ethical and political problems that arise with the rapid development of biotechnology. He claimed that this was happening at a time when there was an "ethical vacuum," when there did not seem to be any effective ethical principles to limit ot guide our ethical decisions. In the name of scientific and technological "progress," there is a relentless pressure to adopt a stance where virtually anything is permissible, includ-ing transforming the genetic structure of human beings, as long as it is "freely chosen." We need, Jonas argued, a new categorical imperative that might be formulated as follows: "Act so that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life"; or expressed negatively: "Act so that the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such a life"; or simply: "Do not compromise the conditions for an indefinite continuation of humanity on earth"; or again turned positive: "In your present choices, include the future wholeness of Man among the objects of your will."

### 1NC – DA

#### The plan is perceived as a claim to sovereignty that violates international space law – scares Russia – their evidence.

1AC Fessl 19 – Sophie Fessl, PhD King’s College London, BA Oxford, 7/10/19 [JSTOR Daily, “Should the Moon Landing Site Be a National Historic Landmark?” <https://daily.jstor.org/should-the-moon-landing-site-be-a-national-historic-landmark/>] Justin

But how to preserve and protect human artifacts on the moon? In 1999, the anthropologist Beth O’Leary, with the Lunar Legacy Project, proposed that Tranquility Base become a National Historic Landmark. As a first step, the group of archaeologists, curators, and physicists documented artifacts in Tranquility Base for a preliminary archaeological site plan. However, when O’Leary approached NASA, she was rebuffed: “taking steps to preserve it would be perceived as a U.S. claim of sovereignty over the Moon,” according to Roger Launius, a former NASA chief historian.

All attempts to protect sites on the moon have to grapple with space law. At the height of the Space Race, in 1967, the Outer Space Treaty was drafted, ratified, and came into force. “Both the United States and the Soviet Union feared that the other nation would claim sovereignty over a celestial body such as the moon, place weapons there, and exclude the other from those same privileges by virtue of being first,” Kyle Ellis writes in the Fordham Environmental Law Review. The treaty prohibits states from owning territory on the moon. “Space junk,” however, continues to belong to the state that sent the craft or equipment into space.

This leaves space custodians with a conundrum, writes Capelotti (the anthropologist). “If the U.S. owns the archaeological remains of Apollo 11 but not the ground underneath it, how to protect the former without disturbing the latter? Does America own Neil Armstrong’s famous first footprints on the Moon but not the lunar dust in which they were recorded?”

Artifacts in Orbit

In 2011, NASA issued guidelines for how missions to the moon should avoid crashing into artifacts or spraying rocket exhaust onto historic sites. These guidelines include no-fly zones over the landing sites of Apollo 11 and Apollo 17, and boundaries to how close rovers approach landers.

But these are, for the moment, just recommendations. In 2010, efforts by O’Leary led to the listing of objects and structures at Tranquility Base on the California and New Mexico State Registers of Cultural Properties. In 2013, a bill introduced to the House of Representatives, The Apollo Lunar Landing Legacy Act, proposed to preserve all six Apollo landing sites as National Historical Parks, seeking World Heritage Site status for the Apollo 11 landing area.

But this bill also stood in contradiction with existing space law, and failed. “Although the bill acknowledges treaty obligations of the United States, it would create, in effect, a unilateral U.S. action to control parts of the Moon. …It is legally flawed, unenforceable, and contradictory to our national space policy and our international relations in space,” wrote Henry Hertzfeld and Scott Pace in an article in Science. A new bill, the One Small Step to Protect Human Heritage in Space Act, introduced in the Senate in May, tries a different approach, requiring all U.S.-licensed missions to adhere to NASA’s guidelines from 2011.

#### Putin has banked his prestige off of appropriation of the moon – the plan’s unilateral claim to sovereignty is a shock to dreams of hegemony.

Whittington 20 – Mark, Published a political study of space exploration entitled Why is It So Hard to Go Back to the Moon? as well as The Moon, Mars and Beyond. He blogs at Curmudgeons Corner. He is published in the Wall Street Journal, Forbes, The Hill, USA Today, the LA Times, and the Washington Post, among other venues, 9/6/20 [The Hill, “Russia makes bid to become a space power with Luna-25 mission to the moon,” <https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/515117-russia-makes-bid-to-become-a-space-power-with-luna-25-mission-to-the-moon>] Justin

Scientific American recently reported that Russia is making progress on its long-planned-for Luna-25 moon lander. The slight is set to take place in October 2021.

Luna-25 will be the first Russian lunar lander since the mid-1970s. The lander is a joint project with the European space agency. The mission is planned as the beginning of a Russian attempt to jumpstart its space program by joining the rush to the moon.

The fact that Luna-25 is scheduled to launch in about a year proves that Russian leader Vladimir Putin recognizes one essential truth of the 21st century. The world is divided into countries that explore space and countries that don’t matter. Putin, whose reason for living is to restore Russia as a superpower, means for the country that he rules over with the power of a Czar to matter.

Russia has a couple of problems to overcome if it means to use a return to the moon as part of its bid to claw its way back to power and respect.

First, many other countries are shooting for the moon. China has already landed two Chang’e landers on the lunar surface and is planning a sample return mission for later in 2020. China intends to land humans on the moon and establish a base.

Israel and India have attempted moon landings and, even though they have failed, are going to mount second attempts. Israel’s second attempt is a private venture in partnership with a German company.

A private company in Japan called ispace is planning a moon landing with a probe called Hakuto-R in 2022. Hakuto-R will weigh 750 pounds and will have a payload capacity of 66 pounds.

Russia’s main rival remains, as it was during the cold war space race, the United States. President Donald Trump has started the Artemis Project, a plan to expand American power and influence into deep space, starting with a return to the moon with human astronauts in 2024. NASA is sponsoring private moon landings starting next year under the Commercial Lunar Payload Systems program. Probes built by Intuitive Machines and Astrobotic are scheduled to launch in 2021. Masten Space Systems will launch a probe in 2022. All of the landers will carry NASA and commercial payloads and instruments.

#### That triggers lashout – extinction.

Gressel 16 [Gustav Acting Director and a senior policy fellow with the Wider Europe Programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations' Berlin office, European Council on Foreign Relations, “The dangerous decade: Russia-NATO relations 2014 to 2024”, July 2016, https://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary\_the\_dangerous\_decade\_russia\_nato\_relations\_2014\_to\_2024]

The domestic logic of confrontation The Russian economy hit a structural crisis in 2011, so the “power swap” between Putin and Dmitry Medvedev was not sufficiently appreciated by the Russian urban middle class, and later, when oil prices plummeted, the regime looked to its foreign policy to distract people from the worsening domestic situation. But it would be an oversimplification to consider Russia’s policy of escalation as merely a short-term domestic diversion effort. For over a decade, the Russian leadership has tried to define Russia both ideologically and politically as the counter model to Europe, putting it in conflict with Europe. The struggle to reshape the European order will not lessen in the next decade. Structural factors play a role in Russia’s foreign policy. The Russian state is more de-institutionalised and personalised than ever before. The president and a small closed circle of advisers make decisions – sometimes behind closed doors – on crucial foreign policy issues, such as the interventions in Crimea, Donbas, and Syria. Formal government structures and institutions are increasingly irrelevant, while informal ties to the president are pivotal. This system depends solely on the president as post, and to a very large extent on Putin as a person. Any change to the position of the president – such as may come in the 2018 and 2024 elections – will lead to extreme danger for the regime. A highly de-institutionalised system depending on one person will by nature be less effective and more prone to erratic behaviour over time, as the leader ages. The longer this personalised authoritarianism lasts, the less flexible, open, and creative the system will become. It would not be surprising, therefore, if the system collapsed or came close to collapse. In that situation, those holding power might see an escalation to unite the country as a lesser evil. The risk of a succession crisis is amplified by the fact that Putin cannot give up power easily. Putin has a great deal to cover up: he has waged a war in the Donbas outside his constitutional competences, which has caused the deaths of 220 to 2,000 regular Russian servicemen so far, as well as 298 international civilian casualties after Russian air-defence crews shot down Malaysia Airlines flight MH17. Putin cannot be sure of indefinite protection under a new president, nor that any new Russian leadership might not consider extraditing him as part of some political deal. There is no way out save exile in Vienna or Zurich. So, Putin needs to create conditions to allow him to rule beyond 2024. It would be difficult, and very unlikely, to create a protégé who is both unconditionally loyal and no threat, but also capable of managing intra-elite battles. Therefore, Putin has to make elites and society accept that he will lead Russia until his death. The narrative for this move needs to be shaped before 2024, most likely from re-shaping the political order in “Eurasia”. Putin needs a major project that reshapes Russia to allow him stay on, and because of Russia’s political context, the de-institutionalisation of the state, and the concentration of power with a few decision-makers, it will likely need to involve foreign policy rather than domestic modernisation. Thus, the Russian elites’ desire to rewrite the European order will coincide with Putin searching for institutional arrangements to prolong his power. The positioning of different wings of the elite to benefit from the succession could also cause instability. In old age, Putin would pick a successor who shares his thinking about Russia’s future, meaning any potential successor will have to accept the current “Eurasian” ideological framework. Rival security services are key pillars of power, and their loyalty must be secured through policies that appease their interests. All this means that the Kremlin will most likely use its rivalry with the West to stabilise the regime. Russia cannot compete with the West as an economic bloc, so military might and the use of force will be the Kremlin’s main tools to shape its foreign policy and influence its neighbourhood. Contingencies such as domestic insecurity, insurgencies, riots, or terrorist incidents would also be interpreted in an anti-Western context. Russian military endeavours in the post-Soviet space, such as putting down a “Maidan” in Minsk or dealing with jihadist insurgencies in Central Asia, would not threaten NATO directly, but they would increase tensions with the West. Russian security forces usually blame domestic unrest or their own failures on Western interference, and the West is usually critical of Russia’s response to such events. The Kremlin’s paranoia could also trigger escalation, as Russian security forces might seek to pre-emptively destroy “foreign interventionist” forces seen as instigating unrest. The Russian Baltic Navy’s war game of the occupation of Gotland, Aaland, and Bonholm, citing “Scandinavian instigation of public unrest in Moscow”, should show Western policymakers the arbitrariness of Russian accusations. The military balance Militarily, Moscow has repeatedly surprised the West. The West, and particularly Washington, was sure that US military might would deter Russia from acting militarily against the West’s interests. But they failed to recognise the many grey zones where a full US military reaction would not be expected and where Russia could create facts on the ground. Even worse: while Russia could not sustain a war with NATO, especially if the US fully engaged in Europe, Russia could start a war, hoping to deter any major reaction to Russian initial aggression through its nuclear arsenal. The fact that Russia can start a war against NATO, but not sustain it, will remain the prevailing paradigm throughout the “dangerous decade” to come. It means that Russian behaviour inclines towards confrontation, hoping that the West will blink. Such games can easily spiral out of control. Miscalculation, unprofessional behaviour, and inter-agency rivalry for political leadership could cause escalation that Russia could not control. The main cause of Western difficulties in countering an initial Russian military escalation is that European armies in particular need to implement several structural adaptations that will take time to mature. Meanwhile, Russian defence reform is progressing. Russia’s defence reform has been largely successful. Russian armed forces are more combat-ready, flexible, and effective than ever before. The wars in Ukraine and Syria provided a testing ground for new Russian procedures, formations, and equipment. Ukraine in particular, where Russia has rotated battalions from almost every brigade, was an invaluable test. New leadership techniques and increased joint officer training introduced in the early 2010s will have increasing effect as more and more officers go through the new training. Profiting from patriotism and nationalistic hysteria after Crimea, the Russian armed forces could again afford to expand and came closer to fulfilling their recruitment goals than in previous years. On the equipment side, economic troubles derailed the 2011-2020 armament plan, and a decision on the subsequent plan was postponed until 2018. Ukrainian and Western sanctions on the defence sector forced the Russian defence industry to substitute 190 items (from Ukraine) and 860 items (from the West). Russia will not reach its goal of fielding 70 percent new weapons platforms until 2020. But it will upgrade existing weapons platforms, and continue to introduce specialised weapons and combat systems that target weaknesses in Western arsenals. As a result, any Western reaction to a Russian assault would face considerable difficulties, and Russia could at least delay a reaction. The West, and particularly Europe, also has problems producing new weapons systems. Neither Europe nor the US will produce a post-Cold War main battle tank until 2030. For infantry-fighting vehicles and artillery systems, the situation is similar. Additionally, legacy US and European equipment is suffering from wear and tear. Since the end of the Cold War, the West has engaged in expeditionary warfare operations and developed equipment specifically for this kind of mission, most of which is unsuitable for the new context. While the US, Germany, Poland, and Sweden have set out new development and procurement priorities, it will take years or decades to develop new systems. Hence, until 2024, many NATO armies will not be best equipped to engage a Russian enemy. In organisational terms, NATO is trying to react to the readiness and geographic challenge Russia poses. At the Wales Summit, the Alliance set up a small spearhead force to react within days to a hybrid incursion on a limited scale. NATO also began to retrain its forces for Article 5 operations. And the US wants to re-invest in European defence. But as long as NATO relies on “deterrence from a distance”, it will need time to effectively deploy to the eastern frontier or the Black Sea, and deployment will be vulnerable to disruption. Small forces rotating in exposed areas such as the Baltic states are capable of dealing with limited hybrid incursions, but are too small to deter larger invasions. Until NATO places more substantial troops closer to exposed borders, Russia will have a time gap of around a week to range free. But while testing NATO will always be a risky move for Russia, projecting military power into the post-Soviet periphery is not. Georgia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine will remain militarily vulnerable. The West Balkans, where Russia has deep roots in nationalist circles, is a theatre where destabilising action could prepare the ground for another conflict. Any domestic conflict could be used or abused by Russia to create a reason for a pre-emptive military strike to “prevent NATO expansion”. The West has so far neither come up with a credible policy for vulnerable periphery states, nor defined a clear policy for integrating states that have made a democratic transition, nor provided an assistance programme to enable those states to resist a conventional Russian incursion. For the time being, Russia’s expansionism is held back more by its own lack of resources and skills to govern (or finance) larger conquered territories than by neighbouring states’ military capacity. During the Cold War, most neutral states could check a Soviet onslaught, at least enough to allow Western counter-moves, but the existence of many weak and semi-penetrated non-aligned states is a feature of the “dangerous decade”. A succession crisis could easily result in aggression towards that region, and the West should be prepared. Conclusion Russia has ideologically and politically positioned itself as a counter model to Europe, and its leadership claims the right to fight for this model and its recognition in the post-Soviet space and on the world stage. Domestically, the struggle for prestige and international recognition is also a struggle for the current ruling elite’s survival. Putin has created a structure that relies on him as sole permanent political centre and decision maker, and he is dependent on the survival of this system. In the possible succession crises of 2018 and particularly 2024, the regime will fight for the continuation of his power, and confrontation with the West is likely to be used as a unifying force. In the same timeframe, Russia will still enjoy some military advantages over its neighbours, particularly in the post-Soviet space. The situation will remain tense unless the force-structure of the Alliance is greatly altered – and the Russia-NATO founding act revoked. The eastern periphery of the alliance and the Western Balkans will remain especially vulnerable. European-Russian relations are entering a very dangerous decade. Russian domestic instability coincides with a weak neighbourhood, low crisis stability, and military advantages for the party that initiates military operations. The West, and particularly Europe, needs to prepare for these contingencies.

## 1NC – Case

### 1NC – Top-level

#### Public sector thumps and so does contracting.

1AC Sample 19 – Ian, Science Editor, PhD at Queens Mary College, 7/19/19 [The Guardian, “Apollo 11 site should be granted heritage status, says space agency boss” <https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/jul/19/apollo-11-site-heritage-status-space-agency-moon>] Justin

Far more is on the cards. Major space agencies, including ESA and Nasa, plan a “lunar gateway”, described by Wörner as a “bus stop to the moon and beyond”. His vision is for a “moon village”, but rather than a sprawl of domes, shops and a cosy pub, it is more an agreement between nations and industry to cooperate on lunar projects.

The private sector is eager to be involved. Between now and 2024, at least five companies aim to launch lunar landers. In May, Nasa selected three companies to design, build and operate spacecraft that will ferry scientific experiments and technology packages to the moon.

#### There’s no way to regulate it – what counts as “lunar heritage” is too ambiguous and no enforcement body.

1AC Sample 19 – Ian, Science Editor, PhD at Queens Mary College, 7/19/19 [The Guardian, “Apollo 11 site should be granted heritage status, says space agency boss” <https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/jul/19/apollo-11-site-heritage-status-space-agency-moon>] Justin

But protecting lunar heritage may not be straightforward. On Earth, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Unesco) decides what deserves world heritage status from nominations sent by countries that claim ownership of the sites. Different rules apply in space. The UN’s outer space treaty, a keystone of space law, states that all countries are free to explore and use space, but warns it “is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty”. In other words, space is for all and owned by none.

Wörner is not put off and sees no need for troublesome regulations. “My hope is that humanity is smart enough not to go back to this type of earthly protection. Just protect it. That’s enough. Just protect it and have everybody agree,” he said. A no-go zone of 50 metres around Tranquility base should do the job, he added.

### 1NC – Framework

#### We get new 2nr responses to the fw—a lot of them aren’t warranted and have infinite implications we can’t predict so 2nr recourse is key

#### Off the meta-ethic:

#### 1] Not actor-specific—individuals may be pluralistic but the only way for the government to recognize different viewpoints is to help the most amount of people

#### 2] Util solves pluralism—even if there are disagreements about morality everyone thinks pleasure is good and pain is bad

#### 3] Begs the question when we stop deliberating – regressive deliberation means we never come to actual conclusions and everything is procedural rather than normative.

#### 4] Extinction outweighs—it’s a sequencing question because it precludes the ability to deliberate in the future

Temporality and Epistemology- we should maintain a future to debate which means extinction outweighs

Subject formation proves naturalism

#### Serra 1

1] Santa Claus Objection—pragmatism justifies belief in obviously false things that are useful to believe

2] It can’t account for useless truths like how many breaths I took yesterday or how many hairs were on my dad’s head in 1982

#### Impact Calc –

Begs the question of an external framework to define good forms of deliberation or when to stop

#### TJFs –

1] Util hijacks – best for topic education and predictability which is best ofr inclusion and literature.

2] Inclusion- pragmatism allows for bad forms of deliberation and util is a sequencing question

3] Resource disparities are solved by the wiki

1] Our framework is more material because it recognizes that not all deliberation is valuable and certain perspectives shouldn’t be included

2] Util solves better because we can change moral norms over time based on what maximizes well-being whereas their framework requires tons of dogmatic and useless experiments

### 1NC – AFC

I meet- our answers proves it isn’t binding, normatively true, or prescriptive

CI- The violation

1] Negative testing- we should get to test the affirmative from multiple angles and sides that o/w’s since it’s the constitutive and inescapable role of the negative

2] Phil Ed- Reading an alternative framework is key to clashing over core philosophical issues and learning the nuances of them. That outweighs A] Uniqueness- it’s the only thing unique to LD debate B] Time frame- philosophical knowledge helps us make ethical decisions in the future outside debate.

3] Inclusion- Frameworks could be morally repugnant and justify horrible atrocities. We need to be able to contest their framework to hedge against ethical practices that impose psychic violence onto some debaters. That outweighs A] Pre-req- it’s an impact filter to other standards B] Performativity- you making arguments assumes your voice is included

A2 Time Skew/Strat skew

1] Non-unique- all arguments skew time and strategy to some extent.

2] Inevitable- Any argument that operates on a higher layer like 1ar theory would moot speech times

3] Turn- reading turns to only your offense would moot the time you spent reading the FW

4] Turn- our interp forces 1ar critical thinking and efficiency which is better since it lets them get faster for more abusive NC’s

A2 Topic Literature

1] Turn- our interp forces you to consider what the topic would say under different ethical perspectives which is better since they would just lock us into one ethical perspective

2] Topic Skews- under some frameworks the topic literature can be very aff leaning like I-law so we need a deterrent

3] Turn- AFC can be used by non-topical teams to say we can’t contest their self-serving ROTBs which still moots the topic.

### 1NC – Contention

1. The aff excludes private companies from deliberations related to space appropriation. 2. The aff denies deliberations about the desirability of passing the plan since it fiats immediate action, circumventing debate on it.

#### They can’t solve – their ev is private entities bad which isn’t specific to appropriation – even they say that non-approrpiative communal approaches like “global commons” are bad – inserted below in blue

Stockwell 20 [Samuel Stockwell (Research Project Manager, the Annenberg Institute at Brown University). “Legal ‘Black Holes’ in Outer Space: The Regulation of Private Space Companies”. E-International Relations. Jul 20 2020. Accessed 12/7/21. <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/07/20/legal-black-holes-in-outer-space-the-regulation-of-private-space-companies/> //Xu]

The US government’s support for private space companies is also likely to lead to the reinforcement of Earth-bound wealth inequalities in space. Many NewSpace actors frame their long-term ambitions in space with strong anthropogenic undertones, by offering the salvation of the human race from impending extinction through off-world colonial developments (Kearnes & Dooren: 2017: 182). Yet, this type of discourse disguises the highly exclusive nature of these missions. Whilst they seem to suggest that there is a stake for ordinary citizens in the vast space frontier, the reality is that these self-described space pioneers are a member of a narrow ‘cosmic elite’ – “founders of Amazon.com, Microsoft, Pay Pal… and a smattering of games designers and hotel magnates” (Parker, 2009: 91). Indeed, private space enterprises have themselves suggested that they have no obligation to share mineral resources extracted in space with the global community (Klinger, 2017: 208). This is reflected in the speeches of individuals such as Nathan Ingraham, a senior editor at the tech site EngadAsteroid mining, who claimed that asteroid mining was “how [America is] going to move into space and develop the next Vegas Strip” (Shaer, 2016: 50). Such comments highlight a form of what Beery (2016) defines as ‘scalar politics’. In similar ways to the ‘scaling’ of unequal international relations that has constituted our relationship with outer space under the guise of the ‘global commons’ (Beery, 2016: 99), private companies – through their anthropogenic discourse – are scaling existing Earth-bound wealth inequalities and social relations into space by siphoning off extra-terrestrial resources. By constructing their endeavours in ways that appeal to the common good, NewSpace actors are therefore concealing the reality of how commercial resource extraction serves the exclusive interests of their private shareholders at the expense of the vast majority of the global population.

#### Lexico assumes there was an original owner of space would be definitionally appropriation which means that we are a form of negative appropriation.

### 1NC – Advantage

**Even if they’re right that an accidental war is possible, vote neg. The framing question is not whether there is a risk prolif breaks down --- it’s whether a world of prolif is net-more peaceful --- default neg on the historical record.**

**Sechser 5** (Todd, Assistant Prof. Politics specializing in International Security—Stanford U., “How Organizational Pathologies Could Make Nuclear Proliferation Safer”, Presented at the annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, 4-7, \*I had to ILL this. I don’t think it’s available online)

A second counterargument to the optimist position is the claim that even if proliferation optimism enjoys greater theoretical tenability than previously thought, this does not make its position practically viable. Betts (1999: 65-66) writes that policy makers “do not marvel at all the cases where nuclear weapons will make the world safer, but worry about the exceptions where things will go wrong. . . one exception to the rule may be too many.”13 Likewise, Feaver (1993: 162) argues that even 99.5% prognostic accuracy would be insufficient for proliferation optimism to mount a persuasive case: “At best, rational deterrence theory can predict that nuclear deterrence should assure peace most of the time. Most is not all.” And Sagan (2003b: 184) contends that until military organizations are “perfect,” there is sufficient reason to be pessimistic about the effects of proliferation.14 As long as there is a chance that proliferation might entail some negative effects, the argument holds, then why not play it safe? **This** staggering **burden of proof is flawed** for two reasons. First, obscures the cost-benefit analysis inherent in any policy deliberation. The appropriate question is not whether the spread of nuclear weapons will result in any nuclear disasters, but whether a world with proliferation would on balance be more peaceful and more stable than a world without it. The issue is whether the benefits are likely to outweigh the costs. If one believes, for example, that nuclear proliferation would eventually result in a preventive war somewhere but that it would also deter numerous conventional wars, then the net overall benefit might justify a more relaxed nonproliferation policy. Second, the argument obscures the fact that proliferation pessimism to date does not possess a “99.5%” record of accuracy—rather, its record stands at 100%. Of course, the absence of nuclear catastrophe in the past does not assure its absence in the future. But theories ultimately aim to predict outcomes, and despite unearthing a trove of nuclear near-misses, the theory of proliferation pessimism has not succeeded in accomplishing this task. Existing research has successfully shown that the theory’s predicted causal mechanisms have operated in organizations that handle nu-clear weapons, but this is not the same as showing that these mechanisms generate the theory’s predicted outcomes. Even a major counterforce strike against a new nuclear power would not immediately vindicate pessimism—at least not until case study researchers were able to show that the causal mechanisms they specified (that is, preventive war pressures triggered by military biases) were indeed in operation.

#### Proliferation dampens conflict --- only our evidence does a statistical, controlled study.

Akisato Suzuki, June 2015. Akisato, Researcher at the Institute for International Conflict Resolution and Reconstruction, School of Law and Government, Dublin City University, MA in Violence, Terrorism and Security at Queen's University, “Is more better or worse? New empirics on nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict by Random Forests,” Research and Politics, SagePub

Given these conflict-reducing/provoking effects of nuclear proliferation, what overall effect would nuclear proliferation have on a systemic propensity for conflict? This is difficult to answer, not only due to the controversy over whether nuclear states are more or less prone to conflict, but also because the existing theories do not explain whether those conflict-reducing/provoking effects are large enough to influence a systemic propensity for interstate conflict, given the ratio of nuclear states to non-nuclear states in the system. This challenge motivates the empirical examination of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict.

Empirical investigation by Random Forests

The interstate–systemic year data are used here to investigate the relationship between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for interstate conflict. The dependent variable is the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets (Palmer et al., 2015; version 4.01 is used) per systemic-year, standardized as the ratio to the number of states in the interstate system (Correlates of War Project, 2011) – hereafter, the ‘dispute–state ratio’. Observations one year ahead (t+1) are used to make sure that causal effects precede a variation in the dispute–state ratio.2

Two regressors are used to examine the effect of nuclear proliferation: the number of nuclear states in the interstate system; and a count of the years since the number of nuclear states changes (hereafter ‘nuclear year counter’), measuring the effect of new nuclear states (Horowitz, 2009). The data about nuclear states are from Gartzke and Kroenig (2009); additionally, the current paper codes North Korea as a nuclear state since 2009 (Table 1).3

The model also includes the number of democratic states (Polity2 score ⩾ 6 in Marshall, 2013) in the interstate system, the gross world product (Earth Policy Institute, 2012), and the binary variable of unipolarity (coded zero until 1989 and one from 1990; see Monteiro, 2011/2012); these three variables control for democratic peace (Russett and Oneal, 2001), capitalist peace (Gartzke, 2007), and polarity (Monteiro, 2011/2012) respectively. The number of nuclear states and these control variables suffer from multicollinearity (see Table A-9 in the online appendix), and this paer later explains how to resolve this problem. A lagged dependent variable is also included to address the temporal dependence of time-series data. The temporal scope is 1950–2009 (i.e. N=59) due to the data availability and the use of the dependent variable at t+1. The descriptive statistics of all variables are displayed in Table 2.4.

As mentioned in the introduction, this paper uses the machine learning, non-parametric method Random Forests for the empirical investigation.5 Although it is unfamiliar to most political science and international relations analysts, Random Forests has been widely used in numerous scientific studies (Strobl et al., 2009: 324; Strobl et al., 2008). The popularity of the method is also apparent from the fact that Breiman’s (2001) original paper has been cited 12,721 times in the literature.6

Random Forests generates two useful analytics: first, ‘conditional variable importance’ measures how ‘important’ each regressor is, conditional on the remaining regressors (Hothorn et al., 2006; Strobl et al., 2007, 2008). This is analogous to statistical significance in conventional regression models. The significance threshold proposed by Strobl et al. (2009: 343) is whether the importance score of a regressor is negative, zero, or lower than the absolute value of the lowest negative score. If none applies, the regressor is considered as important; and the second relevant analytic is a partial dependence plot (Friedman, 2001). This estimates the marginal effect of each regressor on the dependent variable while taking the remaining regressors into consideration.

Random Forests has three attractive and distinctive characteristics for the purposes of this paper: first, the estimation of conditional variable importance and partial dependence plots enable conventional applied researchers to interpret non-parametric analysis in an intuitive way; second, Random Forests can examine non-linearity (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341), which is desirable because, as already noted, some theories expect non-linearity between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict; and finally, it can cope with potential interactions and multicollinearity between regressors (Strobl et al., 2009: 339–341; Strobl et al., 2008). As noted before, most of the regressors here are highly correlated, and also it is plausible to anticipate some interaction effect between them (e.g. the number of democratic states and the gross world product). The specific capabilities of Random Forests are therefore essential.

The estimation of conditional variable importance shows that the nuclear year counter has a negative importance score.7 Thus, the nuclear year counter is not important in explaining the dispute–state ratio. This suggests that the optimist theory is supported. The remaining regressors have an importance score higher than the absolute value of the importance score of the nuclear year counter, meaning that they are all important. Controlling for democratic peace, capitalist peace, and polarity, the number of nuclear states is still a significant predictor in explaining a systemic propensity for interstate conflict.

Figure 1 presents the partial dependence plots of the model.8 First, on average, a larger number of nuclear states is associated with a lower dispute–state ratio, although the changes from two nuclear states to three and from six to seven increase the ratio instead. Thus, the relationship is empirically non-linear, as Bueno de Mesquita and Riker (1982) and Intriligator and Brito (1981) expected in part. Overall, however, the optimist theory is supported, and the change from two nuclear states to nine nuclear states decreases the dispute–state ratio approximately from 0.228 to 0.18. This means that, if there are 194 states in the system (as there were in 2009), the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year decreases approximately from 44 to 35. This is a substantively significant decline.

Second, the nuclear year counter shows a concave relationship with the dispute–state ratio, suggesting that new nuclear states are less prone to conflict than middle-aged nuclear states. Thus, the pessimist theory finds no support from either the variable importance estimation or the partial dependence plot.

Finally, as for the control variables, the number of democratic states and the gross world product have a complex non-linear relationship with the dispute–state ratio, but if the number of democratic states and the gross world product are sufficiently large, they tend to decrease the dispute–state ratio. Their substantive effects are also significant, though not as much as the number of nuclear states. When comparing the effect of their lowest and highest values (23 and 94 in the number of democratic states and 7 and 71.2 in the gross world product), the number of democratic states decreases the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year approximately from 40 to 37, and the gross world product from 44 to 37. Unipolarity is also associated with a decline in the dispute–state ratio, suggesting that unipolarity is better than bipolarity in terms of a systemic propensity for interstate conflict; however, its effect is negligible, as it reduces the number of militarized interstate dispute onsets per system-year from 39 to 38. One caveat is, as explained in the online appendix, that the results of the number of democratic states and unipolarity are significantly sensitive to a parameter setting. Thus, these predictors are less robust, and the aforementioned points about them should be treated with caution.

Discussion and concluding remarks

The main findings reveal that the optimist expectation of the relationship between nuclear proliferation and interstate conflict is empirically supported:9 first, a larger number of nuclear states on average decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict; and second, there is no clear evidence that the emergence of new nuclear states increases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict. Gartzke and Jo (2009) argue that nuclear weapons themselves have no exogenous effect on the probability of conflict, because when a state is engaged in or expects to engage in conflict, it may develop nuclear weapons to keep fighting, or to prepare for, that conflict. If this selection effect existed, the analysis should overestimate the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear proliferation in the above model. Still, the results indicate that a larger number of nuclear states are associated with fewer disputes in the system.

This conclusion, however, raises questions about how to reconcile this study’s findings with those of a recent quantitative dyadic-level study (Bell and Miller, 2015). The current paper finds that nuclear proliferation decreases the systemic propensity for interstate conflict, while Bell and Miller (2015) find that nuclear symmetry has no significant effect on dyadic conflict, but that nuclear asymmetry is associated with a higher probability of dyadic conflict. It is possible that nuclear proliferation decreases conflict through the conflict-mitigating effects of extended nuclear deterrence and/or fear of nuclear states’ intervention, to the extent that these effects overwhelm the conflict-provoking effect of nuclear–asymmetrical dyads. Thus, dyadic-level empirics cannot solely be relied on to infer causal links between nuclear proliferation and a systemic propensity for conflict. The systemic-level empirics deserve attention.

#### Limiting prolif raises the transaction costs and causes a de-fact shift to CBWs.

Neil Narang, 4/6/2016. Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Santa Barbara, Senior Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy on a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship. “All Together Now? Questioning WMDs as a Useful Analytical Unit for Understanding Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation,” The Nonproliferation Review. Volume 22. Issue 3-4. pp. 457-468. Taylor and Francis.

The first inference that one may be tempted to draw from past findings is that a policy focused on achieving reductions in the global nuclear stockpile could cause a rise in chemical and biological weapons proliferation as more states view them as a “poor man's atomic bomb.” As noted above, our findings suggested that states appear to seek chemical and biological weapons for many of the same reasons as they pursue nuclear weapons. Furthermore, our findings also indicate that states that do not possess nuclear weapons appear to be systematically more likely to pursue chemical and biological weapons than states that do possess them. When combined, it may seem reasonable to suppose that, conditional on some level of demand for one of these types of weapons, reductions in the global supply of nuclear weapons could cause some states to pursue chemical and biological weapons as “imperfect substitutes” for the deterrence and compellence benefits of nuclear weapons.

A second inference that one may be tempted to draw is that a strengthened NPT may increase the risk of chemical and biological weapons proliferation. Understood in the terms of our study, policies and institutions designed to monitor and sanction the unilateral pursuit or dissemination of nuclear weapons material and technical expertise—like the NPT or the Nuclear Suppliers Group—might be understood as supply constraints that effectively increase the transaction costs of nuclear weapons acquisition. Furthermore, previous research has shown that the supply of sensitive nuclear assistance and civilian nuclear assistance are both positively associated with the risk of nuclear weapons pursuit and acquisition across states and over time.17

When combined, it may seem reasonable to suppose that, given some demand for a “weapon of mass destruction,” chemical and biological weapons could seem like relatively cheaper pursuits under a more robust global nuclear nonproliferation regime that further regulates the supply of nuclear weapons.

A third inference that one may be tempted to draw is that reductions in the global supply of nuclear weapons and a strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime could increase the risk of chemical and biological weapons pursuit by terrorist groups. If one is willing to assume terrorist groups aim to influence governments by threatening to impose costs in order to achieve concessions— whether this be through strategies like coercion, provocation, spoiling, or outbidding—then it may seem reasonable to suppose that limiting the availability of nuclear weapons might shift the demand to other coercive instruments such as chemical or biological weapons.18

#### Extinction- Outweighs nuclear war.

Clifford Singer, Spring 2001. Director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana—Champaign. “Will Mankind Survive the Millennium?” The Bulletin of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 13.1, http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/research/S&Ps/2001-Sp/S&P\_XIII/Singer.htm

In recent years the fear of the apocalypse (or religious hope for it) has been in part a child of the Cold War, but its seeds in Western culture go back to the Black Death and earlier. Recent polls suggest that the majority in the United States that believe man would survive into the future for substantially less than a millennium was about 10 percent higher in the Cold War than afterward. However fear of annihilation of the human species through nuclear warfare was confused with the admittedly terrifying, but much different matter of destruction of a dominant civilization. The destruction of a third or more of much of the globe’s population through the disruption from the direct consequences of nuclear blast and fire damage was certainly possible. There was, and still is, what is now known to be a rather small chance that dust raised by an all-out nuclear war would cause a socalled nuclear winter, substantially reducing agricultural yields especially in temperate regions for a year or more. As noted above mankind as a whole has weathered a number of mind-boggling disasters in the past fifty thousand years even if older cultures or civilizations have sometimes eventually given way to new ones in the process. Moreover the fear that radioactive fallout would make the globe uninhabitable, publicized by widely seen works such as “On the Beach,” was a metaphor for the horror of nuclear war rather than reality. The epidemiological lethal results of well over a hundred atmospheric nuclear tests are barely statistically detectable except in immediate fallout plumes. The increase in radiation exposure far from the combatants in even a full scale nuclear exchange at the height of the Cold War would have been modest compared to the variations in natural background radiation doses that have readily been adapted to by a number of human populations. Nor is there any reason to believe that global warming or other insults to our physical environment resulting from currently used technologies will challenge the survival of mankind as a whole beyond what it has already handily survived through the past fifty thousand years.

There are, however, two technologies currently under development that may pose a more serious threat to human survival. The first and most immediate is biological warfare combined with genetic engineering. Smallpox is the most fearsome of natural biological warfare agents in existence. By the end of the next decade, global immunity to smallpox will likely be at a low unprecedented since the emergence of this disease in the distant past, while the opportunity for it to spread rapidly across the globe will be at an all time high. In the absence of other complications such as nuclear war near the peak of an epidemic, developed countries may respond with quarantine and vaccination to limit the damage. Otherwise mortality there may match the rate of 30 percent or more expected in unprepared developing countries. With respect to genetic engineering using currently available knowledge and technology, the simple expedient of spreading an ample mixture of coat protein variants could render a vaccination response largely ineffective, but this would otherwise not be expected to substantially increase overall mortality rates. With development of new biological technology, however, there is a possibility that a variety of infectious agents may be engineered for combinations of greater than natural virulence and mortality, rather than just to overwhelm currently available antibiotics or vaccines. There is no a priori known upper limit to the power of this type of technology base, and thus the survival of a globally connected human family may be in question when and if this is [[1]](#footnote-1)achieved.

1. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)