### 1NC – OFF

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#### Interpretation: Appropriation means use, exploitation, or occupation that is permanent and to the exclusion of others

Babcock 19 Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Cente. Babcock, Hope M. "The Public Trust Doctrine, Outer Space, and the Global Commons: Time to Call Home ET." Syracuse L. Rev. 69 (2019): 191.

Article II is one of those succeeding provisions that curtails “the freedom of use outlined in Article [I] by declaring that outer space, including the [m]oon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation.”147 It flatly prohibits national appropriation of any celestial body in outer space “by means of use or occupation, or by any other means.”148 However, “many types of ‘use’ or ‘exploitation’. . . are inconceivable without appropriation of some degree at least of any materials taken,” like ore or water.149 If this view of Article II’s prohibitory language is correct, then “it is not at all farfetched to say that the OST actually installs a blanket prohibition on many beneficial forms of development.”150 However, the OST only prohibits an appropriation that constitutes a “long-term use and permanent occupation, to the exclusion of all others.”151

#### Violation: Megaconstellations do not appropriate – reject non-legal interpretations

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No, This Is Not Impermissible Appropriation

An opposite conclusion can also be reasonably arrived at when approached along the following lines. The counter argument would assert that the deployment and operation of these global constellations, such as SpaceX’s Starlink, OneWeb, Kepler, etc., are aligned with and in full conformity with the laws applicable to outer space. These constellations are merely the exercise and enjoyment of the freedom of exploration and use of outer space and do not constitute any impermissible appropriation of the orbits that they transit.

Freedom of Access and Use Permits Constellations

Rather than being a violation of other’s rights to access and explore outer space, the deployment of these constellations is more correctly viewed as the exercise and enjoyment of the right to access and use outer space. Article I of the Outer Space Treaty establishes a right to access and use space without discrimination.

Not allowing an actor to deploy spacecraft, regardless of their number or destination, would be infringing with the exercise of their freedom. It would be discriminatory. Additionally, actors do not need permission from any other State, or group of States, to access and explore outer space.

Aligned with the Intentions of the Outer Space Treaty

This use of outer space by constellations in LEO, while not explicitly mentioned by the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty or other space law, actually is the fulfillment of their visions for the use of outer space. The preamble to the Outer Space Treaty (which contains the subject matter and purpose of the treaty and can be used for interpreting the operative articles of the treaty) speaks of the aspirations of humanity in exploring and using outer space. It is easy to see constellations that will provide Internet access to the world as fulfilling the visions of the drafters:

The States Parties to this Treaty, Inspired by the great prospects opening up before mankind as a result of man’s entry into outer space, Recognizing the common interest of all mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, Believing that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried on for the benefit of all peoples irrespective of the degree of their economic or scientific development, Desiring to contribute to broad international cooperation in the scientific as well as the legal aspects of the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes, Believing that such cooperation will contribute to the development of mutual understanding and to the strengthening of friendly relations between States and peoples, As such, subsequent article of the Outer Space Treaty should be read in a permissive light, as permitting constellations, rather than a restrictive light which only sees potential negative aspects of constellations. Due Regard and Harmful Contamination Will be Addressed

Operators in LEO are well aware of the challenges to space sustainability that their constellations will pose and will be taking efforts to mitigate the creation of debris. OneWeb is keenly focused on space sustainability and has even argued that the current norm, whereby spacecraft are not in space for longer than 25 years and are deorbited from lower orbits at the end of their lifetime (aka post mission disposal), is not sufficient to keep outer space clean and that shorter lifespan limits should be imposed on operators, especially operators in LEO, and operators of small satellites.

Additionally, these systems will be able to cooperate with emerging space safety and space traffic management plans and can operate in ways that do not restrict or impinge on other users of the space domain. Because due regard is therefore displayed for the space domain, and to the interests of others, these constellations do not prejudice or infringe upon the freedoms of use and exploration of the space domain and are therefore not occupation, or possession, much less appropriation.

This Does Not Constitute Possession, or Ownership, or Occupation

The use of LEO by satellite constellations is substantially similar to the use of GSO, and therefore permissible. In each region, individual actors are given permission - either from a national administrator or from an international governing body (the ITU) via a national administer–to use precoordinated subsections of space. In a way that is overwhelmingly similar to the use of orbital slots in GSO, the placement of spacecraft into orbits in LEO or higher orbits does not constitute possession, ownership, or occupation of those orbits. This is because States (and their companies) have been occupying orbital slots in GSO for decades, and these uses of GSO have never been accused of “appropriating” GSO. The users have never claimed to be appropriating GSO, and their exercising of rights to use GSO is respected by other actors in the space domain. This is the same situation for other orbits, including LEO and other non-Geostationary orbits.

And while GSO locations are relatively stable (subject to space weather and other perturbations, and require stationkeeping), spacecraft in LEO are actually moving through space and are not stationary, so it is even more difficult to see this use by constellations as occupation, much less appropriation. Moreover, Space Situational Awareness (SSA) and Space Traffic Management (STM) will allow other uses to use these orbits, and nothing about the use of any one user necessarily precludes others. Lastly, there is no intention by operators of constellations to exclusively occupy, must less possess or appropriate, these orbits. Would not the appropriation of outer space be an intentional, volutional act? No such intention can be found in the operators of global constellations.

#### Standards:

#### 1] Precision outweighs – non-topical affs violate tournament rules so the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote on them and it controls the internal to pragmatic offense in a question of models.

#### 2] Predictable limits—including temporary occupation is a limits disaster—any aff about a single spaceship, satellite, or weapon would be T because they temporarily occupy space. Limits explodes neg prep and draws unreciprocal lines of debate.

#### T outweighs—we had to be abusive to compensate and we only have 2 months which o/w on timeframe.

#### Drop the debater to deter future abuse.

#### CI- Reasonability is arbitrary and we don’t know the brightline while prepping. Collapses since it uses an offense/defense paradigm to win it.

#### No RVIs- A] Illogical- you don’t win for being fair B] Encourages baiting theory which proliferates abuse C] Chills checking abuse for fear of the RVI

#### DTA on 1AR shells/IVIs – they can blow up blippy shells in the 2AR but I split time and can’t preempt the 2AR causing intervention making it irresolvable so don’t drop me

#### Reasonability on 1AR shells/IVIs – 1AR theory is aff-biased because the 2AR gets to line-by-line with new answers

#### RVIs on 1AR theory – 2AR being able to win on a 15 second shell forces at least 2:30 in the 2NR so RVIs check time skew

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#### Interp: The affirmative must correctly tell the negative which aff they will be reading, including any and all changes, thirty minutes before the posted start time.

#### Violation: screenshots - they said they would replace contention cards which they didn’t and no new scenarios but they read a laundry list scenario

A screenshot of a phone

Description automatically generated with low confidence

A screenshot of a computer

Description automatically generated with low confidence

#### Negate:

#### 1] Prep and clash - they force us to spend pre-round prep prepping the wrong arguments which means I’m unprepared to engage - that decks clash and fairness.

#### 2] Lying is an independent voter

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#### Permissibility and presumption negate:

#### 1] Falsity- Statements are more often false than true because infinite ways to prove something false. Presuming everything is true creates contradictions which would be bankrupt.

#### 2] Trichotomy Triple- there is a trichotomy between obligation, prohibition and permissibility. Proving one disproves the other two because they are intertwined moral terms. Outweighs because it interacts with each term.

#### 3] Negating is harder- A] First and last speech and judge psychology B] They can uplayer giving them a 7-6 time skew C] Infinite prep time D] Infinite perms in the 1AR

#### The meta-ethic is moral naturalism. Non-natural moral facts are epistemically inaccessible

Papineau 7 [David, Academic philosopher. He works as Professor of Philosophy of Science at King's College London, having previously taught for several years at Cambridge University and been a fellow of Robinson College, Cambridge, “Naturalism”. [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/))]

Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If **all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world** (Harman, 1986). At first sight **this** may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it **has** **very awkward epistemological consequences.** For beings like us, **knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them.**

#### No a priori reason—evidence proves.

**Schwartz** “A Defense of Naïve Empiricism: It is Neither Self-Refuting Nor Dogmatic.” Stephen P. Schwartz. Ithaca College. pp.1-14.

The empirical support for the fundamental principle of empiricism is diffuse but salient. Our common empirical experience and experimental psychology offer evidence that humans do not have any capacity to garner knowledge except by empirical sources. The fact is that we believe that there is no source of knowledge, information, or evidence apart from observation, empirical scientific investigations, and our sensory experience of the world, and we believe this on the basis of our empirical a posteriori experiences and our general empirical view of how things work. For example, we believe on empirical evidence that humans are continuous with the rest of nature and that we rely like other animals on our senses to tell us how things are. If humans are more successful than other animals, it is not because we possess special non-experiential ways of knowing, but because we are better at cooperating, collating, and inferring. In particular we do not have any capacity for substantive a priori knowledge. There is no known mechanism by which such knowledge would be made possible. This is an empirical claim.

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. Pleasure and pain *are* intrinsic value and disvalue – everything else *regresses* – robust neuroscience.

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**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10]. Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14]. Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals. Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it. It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring. Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding. There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health. Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage. Finding happiness is different between apes and humans As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure. Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even produce **the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered. Desire and reward centers It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation. In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41]. Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42]. Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans. In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45]. Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations. Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50] In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders. In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS. Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

#### Prefer:

#### 1] Actor spec—governments must use util because they don’t have intentions and are constantly dealing with tradeoffs—outweighs since different agents have different obligations—takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

#### 2] No intent-foresight distinction for states.

Enoch 07 Enoch, D [The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew Unviersity, Mount Scopus Campus, Jersusalem]. (2007). INTENDING, FORESEEING, AND THE STATE. Legal Theory, 13(02). doi:10.1017/s1352325207070048 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/article/intending-foreseeing-and-the-state/76B18896B94D5490ED0512D8E8DC54B2

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves 39. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38. I will use this text as my example of an expressive theory here. 40. See id. at 1554, 1564. 41. For a general critique, see Mathew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1999–2000). 42. As Adler repeatedly notes, the understanding of expression Anderson & Pildes work with is amazingly broad, so that “To express an attitude through action is to act on the reasons the attitude gives us”; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38, at 1510. If this is so, it seems that expression drops out of the picture and everything done with it can be done directly in terms of reasons. 43. This may be true of what Anderson and Pildes have in mind when they say that “expressive norms regulate actions by regulating the acceptable justifications for doing them”; id. at 1511. http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Aug 2014 IP address: 134.153.184.170 Intending, Foreseeing, and the State 91 to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance. This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.44 In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken. Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows45 the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the dxeath of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable. Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):46 perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments. They have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.47 States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

#### 3] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to not kill. Only consequences explain why which is intuitive. Outweighs—a) parsimony—metaphysics relies on long chains of questionable claims that make conclusions less likely b) hijacks—intuitions are inevitable since every framework must take some starting point.

#### Impact calc –

#### 1] Extinction outweighs:

#### A] Structural violence- death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### B] Mathematically outweighs.

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### 2] Calc indicts fail: A] Ethics- it would indict everything cuz they use events to understand how ethics have worked B] Reciprocity- they are NIBs that create a 2:1 skew where I have to answer them to access offense while they only have to win one C] Internalism- asking why we value life is nonsensical since it’s intrinsic and we just do.

### 1NC – OFF

CP

#### CP Text: States ought to call a global constitutional convention and establish a constitution reflecting intergenerational concern with exclusive authority to make the appropriation of outer space by private entities unjust and bind participating bodies to its result.

#### ASPEC—they didn’t—that’s key to preserving neg flex to generate disad links and competition—anything else justifies infinite shiftiness that decks ground. Stick them with the counterplan—if they contest links, drop them.

#### Normal means is the UNCOPUOS*.*

Halstead 10—(B.S., Psychology, The University of Alabama; J.D., The University of Alabama School of Law; LL.M., Institute of Air and Space Law, McGill University; Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General's Corps). C. Brandon Halstead. 2010. "Prometheus Unbound - Proposal for a New Legal Paradigm for Air Law and Space Law: Orbit Law," Journal of Space Law 36, no. 1, 143-206

The debate on how to distinguish airspace from outer space is as old as the space age itself. The problems emerging from space exploration first entered the agenda of the United Nations in 1957, and were later placed on the agenda before the General Assembly through the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in 1958.' Although this Committee initially focused on the debate of disarmament, its status was later made permanent in 1961 while its charter was expanded to include examination of all issues relating to the field of exploration and use of outer space by governmental and non-governmental organizations.16 In 1962 the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee and Legal Sub-Committee began their true substantive work and became the main center of international cooperation and coordination for exploration of peaceful uses of outer space." Successive sessions focused on general and specific issues of space law, including the establishment of a frontier between outer space and atmospheric space18.

#### The CP applies intergenerational equity to future generations – that’s better than trying to decide now whether the plan is beneficial across time – every country would say yes.

Tan 2k [David Tan, LL.M., Harvard Law School; LL.B. (Hons), B.Com., University of Melbourne. Former Tutor in Law, Trinity College, University of Melbourne, “Towards a New Regime for the Protection of Outer Space as the "Province of All Mankind",” 2000, *The Yale Journal of International Law*, Vol. 25, https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1114&context=yjil]

Edith Brown Weiss has advanced the theory of “intergenerational equity,” which provides for generational rights and obligations.158 Her thesis consists of a normative framework of intersecting theories of intergenerational and intragenerational equity that are derived from an underlying planetary trust, embodying the notion that generations act as stewards to sustain the welfare and well-being of all generations. This planetary trust obliges “each generation to preserve the diversity of the resource base and to pass the planet to future generations in no worse condition than it receives it.”159 The principle of the conservation of options requires each generation “to conserve the diversity of the natural and cultural resource base, so that it does not unduly restrict the options available to future generations in solving their problems and satisfying their own values, and should be entitled to diversity comparable to that enjoyed by previous generations.”\*60 The theory of intergenerational equity is an appealing one. Unfortunately, Weiss’s model generally rests upon an intertemporal human rights model for preserving the global environment. This presents many problems, ranging from the questionable existence of the right to a decent environment to the issue of remedies in respect of claims made by future generations against present generations.161

Whether the global awareness of the harm to our sense of intergenerational identity, as evidenced by the various U.N. General Assembly resolutions and numerous international conventions, will be sufficient to mobilize the implementation and enforcement of effective legal measures on behalf of future generations is doubtful. But more importantly, the notions of intergenerational identity and sustainable development will prove to be invaluable concepts in framing the discussion in Part VI.

Current literature has concentrated on the notion of sustainable development as involving the integration of economic and environmental considerations at all levels of decision-making.162 But the outer-space environment has been largely ignored, as if it were simply economic development on Earth that must be environmentally sound. There is no reason, however, why the precautionary principles that emerge from the concept of sustainable development in the Stockholm Declaration, the Rio Declaration, and the World Charter for Nature should not apply equally to the outer-space environment. Few states, if any, will take issue with the proposition that the exploration and use of outer space should be sustainable. It is in the common interest of all states, whether spacefaring or otherwise, to subscribe to a regime that allows for the development of space activities in a manner that leaves the space environment in a substantially unimpaired condition for future generations. One might even ultimately find that the uniqueness and vulnerability of the outer-space environment demand that the international community as a whole recognize sustainable development as a “global ethic”163 that transcends terrestrial boundaries, as a peremptory norm that prohibits “policies and practices that support current living standards by depleting the productive base, including natural resources, and that leaves future generations with poorer prospects and greater risks than our own.”164 We should not confine our actions to those we are now able to determine as directly or indirectly benefiting ourselves or our descendants. On the contrary, we should “cultivate our natural sense of obligation not to act wastefully or wantonly even when we cannot calculate how such acts would make any present or future persons worse off.”165 It seems impossible to find universally agreed-upon limits on the freedom of exploration and use of outer space. Rather than focus on indeterminate rules of custom-formation, we should concentrate on establishing fair and workable arrangements and institutions that can successfully accommodate the competing interests of all nations. With these guidelines in mind, we will now examine new methods of treaty-making that will enhance the willingness of states to participate in an environmental program that seeks to achieve an acceptable balance between pollution control and freedom of space exploration.

#### That solves the aff – it addresses shared anxieties while building political consensus.

Gardiner 14 1 [Stephen M. Gardiner, Professor of Philosophy and Ben Rabinowitz Endowed Professor of Human Dimensions of the Environment at the University of Washington, Seattle, “A Call for a Global Constitutional Convention Focused on Future Generations,” 2014, *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 28, Issue 3, pp. 299-315, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679414000379, EA]

A Constitutional Convention

In my view, the above line of reasoning leads naturally to a more specific proposal: that we—concerned individuals, interested community groups, national governments, and transnational organizations—should initiate a call for a global constitutional convention focused on future generations. This proposal has two components. The first component is procedural. The proposal takes the form of a “call to action.” It is explicitly an attempt to engage a range of actors, based on a claim that they have or should take on a set of responsibilities, and a view about how to go about discharging those responsibilities. The second component is substantive. The main focus for action is a push for the creation of a constitutional convention at the global level, whose role is to pave the way for an overall constitutional system that appropriately embodies intergenerational concern.

The substantive idea rests on several key ideas. Still, for the purposes of a basic proposal, I suggest that these be understood in a relatively open way that, as far as is practicable, does not prejudge the outcome of the convention, and especially its main recommendations. First, the convention itself should be understood as “a representative body called together for some occasional or temporary purpose” and “constituted by statute to represent the people in their primary relations.”14 Second, a constitutional system should be thought of in a minimalist sense as “a set of norms (rules, principles or values) creating, structuring, and possibly defining the limits of government power or authority.”15 Third, the “instigating” role of the convention should be to discuss, develop, make recommendations toward, and set in motion a process for the establishment of a constitution. Fourth, its primary subject matter should be the need to adequately reflect and embody intergenerational concern, where this would include at least the protection of future generations, the promotion of their interests (where “interests” is to be broadly conceived so as to include rights, claims, welfare, and so on), and the discharging of duties with respect to them. It may also (and in my view should) include some way of reflecting concern for past generations, including responsiveness to at least certain of their interests and views. However, I will leave that issue aside in what follows.

The proposal to initiate a call for a global constitutional convention has at least two attractive features. First, it is based in a deep political reality, and does not underplay the challenge. It acknowledges the problem as it is, both specific and general, and calls attention to the heart of that problem, including to the failures of the current system, the need for an alternative, and the background issue of responsibility. Moreover, though the proposal is dramatic and rhetorically eye-catching, it is so in a way that is appropriately responsive to the seriousness of the issue at hand, the persistent political inertia surrounding more modest initiatives, and the fact that (grave though concerns about it are) climate change is only one instance of the tyranny of the contemporary (and the wider perfect moral storm), and we should expect others to arise over the coming decades and centuries.

The second attractive feature of the proposal is that, though ambitious, it is not alienating. While it does not succumb to despair in the face of the challenge, neither does it needlessly polarize and divide from the outset (for example, by leaping to specific recommendations about how to fill the institutional gap). Instead, it acknowledges that there are fundamental difficulties and anxieties, but uses them to start the right kind of debate, rather than to foreclose it. As a result, the proposal is a promising candidate to serve as the subject of a wide and overlapping political consensus, at least among those who share intergenerational concern.

Selective Mirroring

To quell some initial anxieties, it is perhaps worth clarifying the open-ended and non-alienating character of the proposal. One temptation would be to view the call for a global constitutional convention as a fairly naked plea for world government, a prospect that would be deeply alienating—indeed anathema—to many. However, that is not my intention. Though it is possible that a global constitutional convention would lead in this direction, it is by no means certain.

At a minimum, no such body could plausibly recommend any form of “world government” without simultaneously advancing detailed suggestions about how to avoid the standard threats such an institution might pose. Moreover, it seems perfectly conceivable, even likely under current ways of thinking, that a global constitutional convention would pursue what we might call a selective mirroring strategy. Specifically, a convention would seek to develop a broader system of institutions and practices that reflected the desirable features of a powerful and highly centralized global authority but neutralized the standing threats posed by it (for example, it might employ familiar strategies such as the separation of powers). In all likelihood, one feature of a selective mirroring approach would be the significant preservation of existing institutions to serve as a bulwark against the excesses of any newly created ones. Whether and how such a strategy might be made effective against the perfect moral storm, and whether something closer to a “world government” would do better, would be a central issue for discussion by the convention.

#### It spills over to foster broader intergenerational representation, but independence is key

Gardiner 14 2 [Stephen M. Gardiner, Professor of Philosophy and Ben Rabinowitz Endowed Professor of Human Dimensions of the Environment at the University of Washington, Seattle, “A Call for a Global Constitutional Convention Focused on Future Generations,” 2014, *Ethics & International Affairs*, Vol. 28, Issue 3, pp. 299-315, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0892679414000379, EA]

One set of guidelines concerns how the global constitutional convention relates to other institutions. The first guideline concerns relative independence:

(1) Autonomy: Any global constitutional convention should have considerable autonomy from other institutions, and especially from those dominated by factors that generate or facilitate the tyranny of the contemporary (and the perfect moral storm, more generally).

Thus, for example, attempts should be made to insulate the global constitutional convention from too much influence from short-term and narrowly economic forces.

The second guideline concerns limits to that independence:

(2) Mutual Accountability: Any global constitutional convention should be to some extent accountable to other major institutions, and they should be accountable to it.

Thus, for example, though the global constitutional convention should not be able to decide unilaterally that national institutions should be radically supplanted, nevertheless such institutions should not have a simple veto on the recommendations of the convention, including those that would result in sharp limits to their powers.

A third guideline concerns adequacy:

(3) Functional Adequacy: The global constitutional convention should be constructed in such a way that it is highly likely to produce recommendations that are functionally adequate to the task.

Thus, for example, the tasks of the global constitutional convention should not be assigned to any currently existing body whose design and authority is clearly unsuitable. In my view, this guideline rules out proposals such as the Royal Society’s suggestion that governance of geoengineering should be taken up by the United Nations’ Commission on Sustainable Development,20 or the Secretary-General’s recommendation of a new United Nations’ High Commissioner for Future Generations.21 Though such proposals may have merit for some purposes (for example, as pragmatic, incremental suggestions to highlight the importance of intergenerational issues), they are too modest, in my opinion, to reflect the gravity of the threats posed by climate change in particular, and the perfect moral storm more generally.

Aims

A second set of guidelines concerns the aims of the global constitutional convention. Here, the perfect moral storm analysis would suggest:

(4) Comprehensiveness: The convention should be under a mandate to consider a very broad range of global, intergenerational issues, to focus on such issues at a foundational level, and to recommend institutional reform accordingly.

(5) Standing Authority: Though the convention may recommend the establishment of some temporary and issue-specific bodies, its focus should be on the establishment of institutions with standing authority over the long term.

#### Discounting future generations causes extinction – only formalizing a mechanism to weight their concerns solves

Jones et al 18 [Natalie Jones, Mark O'Brien, and Thomas Ryan, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom. Representation of future generations in United Kingdom policy-making. Futures Volume 102, September 2018, Pages 153-163. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016328717301179#sec0005]

Global catastrophic and existential risks pose central challenges for intergenerational justice and the structure of our current democracy. The Global Challenges Report 2016 defines global catastrophic risk as risk of an ‘event or process that, were it to occur, would end the lives of approximately 10% or more of the global population, or do comparable damage’ (Global Challenges Foundation & Global Priorities Project, 2016). A subset of catastrophic risks are ‘existential’ risks, which would end human civilisation or lead to the extinction of humanity (Global Challenges Foundation & Global Priorities Project, 2016). Catastrophic and existential risks may be categorised in terms of ongoing risks, which could potentially occur in any given year (e.g. nuclear war; pandemics), versus emerging risks which may be unlikely today but will become significantly more likely in the future (e.g. catastrophic climate change; risks stemming from emerging technologies). Ongoing risks have existed for some time now and are generally well-understood. However, emerging risks, particularly those arising from technological developments, are less understood and demand increasing attention from scientists and policymakers. These technological developments include advances in synthetic biology, geoengineering, distributed manufacturing and artificial intelligence (AI) (Global Priorities Project, Future of Humanity Institute, Oxford Martin School, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, 2014). Although the impact of these technologies is still very uncertain, expert estimates suggest a non-negligible probability of catastrophic harm.

In this article we rely on two main premises. The first is that future generations are under-represented in current political structures partly due to political ‘short-termism’ or ‘presentism’ (Thompson, 2010). Governments primarily focus on short-term concerns, which mean that they may systematically neglect global catastrophic risks and, accordingly, future generations (Global Priorities Project et al., 2014). The problem of presentism transcends political divisions: people across the political spectrum are concerned about its effects, and should care about mitigating global catastrophic risks. This situation is exacerbated in that the good of mitigating global catastrophic and existential risks is typically global. Individual political actors (even whole countries) bear many costs in providing for such goods, whereas the benefits are dispersed globally. In addition to the benefits of mitigating existential risks being global, many of the beneficiaries are future people who do not exist presently and as such have no voice in the political process. There is a clear lack of incentives to mitigate such risks, and market failure should be expected (Beckstead, 2013).

The second key assumption is that we as a society consider the rights and interests of future generations to be important. It is beyond the scope of this paper to present a complete account of the philosophical arguments on this matter. It is sufficient to note that although significant philosophical problems have been pointed out, chiefly due to the fact that the actions of present people have a causal impact on the values, number and identity of future individuals (Parfit, 1984), there are several theories of intergenerational justice that may support this assumption (Gosseries, 2008).

The need to include explicit pathways in governance structures for accountability to the rights and needs of future generations has been noted (Global Priorities Project et al., 2014). Some thought has been put into how future generations may be represented in relation to environmental risks such as climate change, resource depletion and biodiversity loss; this research is reflected in the sustainable development literature (Brown Weiss, 1990). However, this problem has not been explored in relation to society’s burgeoning awareness of technology-related catastrophic and existential risks. In addition, such pathways have not been fully explored in the United Kingdom (UK) context. This policy paper hopes to fill this gap in the literature.

### 1NC – OFF

#### Mega-Constellations generates next-level weather forecasting.

Erwin 20 Sandra Erwin 10-14-2020 "SpaceX to explore ways to provide weather data to U.S. military" <https://spacenews.com/spacex-to-explore-ways-to-provide-weather-data-to-u-s-military/> (Sandra Erwin writes about military space programs, policy, technology and the industry that supports this sector. She has covered the military, the Pentagon, Congress and the defense industry for nearly two decades as editor of NDIA’s National Defense Magazine and Pentagon correspondent for Real Clear Defense.)//Elmer

The $2 million contract is to “assess the feasibility and long term viability of a ‘weather data as a service business model.” WASHINGTON — SpaceX is looking at ways it could provide weather data to the U.S. military. The company is working under a $2 million six-month study contract from the U.S. Space Force’s Space and Missile Systems Center. Charlotte Gerhart, chief of the Space and Missile Systems Center Production Corps Low Earth Orbit Division, said in a statement to SpaceNews that SpaceX received the contract in July from SMC’s Space Enterprise Consortium. The contract is to “assess the feasibility and long term viability of a ‘weather data as a service business model,’” said Gerhart. SpaceX did not respond to questions from SpaceNews on how the company would leverage the Starlink internet constellation to provide weather data. The contract awarded to SpaceX is part of a Space Force program called Electro Optical/Infrared Weather System (EO/IR EWS). The consortium in June awarded $309 million in contracts to Raytheon Technologies, General Atomics Electromagnetic Systems, and Atmospheric & Space Technology Research Associates to develop weather satellite prototypes and payloads. SpaceX won the portion of the EO/IR EWS program that is looking at how weather data could be purchased as a service from a commercial company. “The EWS program goal remains to provide a more resilient and higher refresh capability, enhancing global terrestrial weather capability,” said Gerhart. The SpEC consortium was created in 2017 to attract commercial space businesses to work with the military. The contracts awarded by SpEC are known as “other transaction authority” deals that are used for research projects and prototyping. The consortium on Oct. 8 informed its members that SpaceX had won the weather study contract. “The Air Force is pursuing a space-based environmental monitoring EO/IR system in a multi phased approach,” the SpEC said in an email to members. The EO/IR EWS program is looking at a future proliferated low-Earth orbit constellation to focus on cloud characterization and theater weather imagery that could be supplemented by commercial services. SpaceX’s contract is for the “weather data as a service system architecture exploration phase,” said SpEC. Industry sources speculated that SpaceX could provide weather data collected by sensors hosted on its own Starlink satellites, or it could team with a weather data services company and use Starlink to distribute the data to customers. One executive noted that both the U.S. military and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration have growing demands for data that can be provided at relatively low cost from companies that operate proliferated LEO systems.

#### Solves climate change.

Taylor-Smith 21 Kerry Taylor-Smith 3-25-2021 "What Role can Advanced Weather Forecasting have in Providing Climate Crisis Solutions?" <https://www.azocleantech.com/article.aspx?ArticleID=1193> (Pursuing a passion for science, Kerry completed a degree in Natural Sciences at the University of Bath; where she studied a range of topics, including chemistry, biology, and environmental sciences. Her passion for writing grew as she worked on the university newspaper as a contributor, feature editor, and editor.)//Elmer

Humankind is in the midst of a climate crisis, battling to prevent global temperatures from rising while also keeping up with the energy demands of a growing population. Weather-related disasters cost billions of dollars each year, but it is not just the financial cost that should be considered – there is the loss of life, homes, wildlife, and infrastructure. There are several ways weather monitoring can help solve the climate crisis, from lowing transportation emissions to pinpointing extreme weather events such as wildfires and extraordinary variations in temperature. Tackling Emissions Global travel and shipping contribute significantly to global warming. Aircraft, ships, cars – nearly all modes of transportation emit harmful greenhouse gases, notably carbon dioxide, but also nitrous and sulfur oxides as well as particulates. These greenhouse gases trap heat in the Earth’s atmosphere, causing an overall warming effect and a negative impact on our climate. Aviation accounts for 2.4% of all anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions, with international flights in 2019 producing 915 million tons of the gas. Weather forecasting technology providing accurate, real-time data on meteorological conditions can help airlines adjust routes to avoid headwinds or take advantage of favorable winds, both of which can help reduce fuel consumption and emissions. Shipping is one of the most fuel-efficient means of transport, but also one of the most polluting, contributing 3% of all greenhouse gas emissions - a figure expected to almost double by 2050. “Burning bunker fuel accounts for almost 90% of global sulfur emissions and the 15 largest ships in the world produce more sulfur each year than all cars put together,” states Renny Vandewege, Vice President of Weather Operations at DTN, a company providing decision support tools and forecast insights across many sectors. Shipping discharges a large and growing source of noxious gas but the sector has the potential to drastically cut emissions through fuel-saving techniques. Among the most promising is weather routing. “Using weather information and analytics can help mitigate risks today caused by climate change and can also reduce emissions further reducing future impacts”, explains Vandewege, a former director of the Broadcast Meteorology Program at Mississippi State University. Weather analytics can optimize routes and “reduce emissions up to 4% and reduce fuel consumption up to 10%, depending on the type of vessel, the season, and the conditions,” states Vandewege. “If there’s bad weather ahead, sophisticated algorithms that use information about the ship and its capabilities and the weather effects on that specific ship can make numerous calculations and provide optimal route alternatives for the mariner.” Extreme Weather Events Advanced weather forecasting alerts us to the probability of extreme meteorological events occurring. While these events are largely unpredictable, accurate meteorological data can identify hotspots where they are likely to occur. The better the data, the better prepared the general public and authorities can be. Wildfires have ravaged the US state of California and huge swathes of land in Australia. Climate change is responsible for the increasing intensity and occurrence of blazes, not just here, but worldwide. It has created the optimal conditions for wildfires to start, including warmer weather, less precipitation, dryer vegetation, and stronger winds. Advanced weather forecasting, such as DTN’s live Geographic Information System (GIS) can monitor atmospheric conditions to evaluate wildfire risk and predict areas where conditions are just right for a wildfire to ignite. “Fire weather forecasting uses atmospheric conditions to evaluate wildfire risk,” explains Vendewege. “Meteorologists can also use their tools and experience to identify the specific location of wildfires. Sophisticated imaging systems can show fire locations in real time, allowing for a live look at the conditions using a GIS layer service containing the latest fire hotspot data and also showing the likelihood of a fire.” Machine learning, a means of artificial intelligence, can also be used in conjunction with current forecasting methods to predicts heat waves or cold snaps. These extreme weather events are the result of unusual atmospheric patterns that researchers from Rice University realized could be taught to a pattern recognition program. The technology, designed to work with current analog forecasting systems rather than replace them, could predict events with 80% accuracy, five days before the event occurred. Although only proof-of-concept, the technology could provide an early warning about when and where an extreme weather event might occur. Conclusion Humans are heavily reliant on the weather; it has a role in every aspect of our lives, from feeding us to providing power for our ever-growing needs. Climate change has warmed the planet and altered our weather, making extreme weather events such as droughts and floods more likely. High-tech weather forecasting technology can help in the fight against climate change by monitoring meteorological conditions to aid decision making, whether that be in the aviation or shipping industry, or by helping us understand and predict natural hazards and disasters, allowing us to reduce the risk of adverse events – and the costs, environmental, economic or otherwise.

#### Climate change causes extinction.

Dr. Peter Kareiva 18 – Ph.D. in Ecology and Applied Mathematics from Cornell University, Director of the Institute of the Environment and Sustainability at UCLA, Pritzker Distinguished Professor in Environment & Sustainability at UCLA, et al., September 2018, “Existential Risk Due To Ecosystem Collapse: Nature Strikes Back”, Futures, Volume 102, p. 39-50

In summary, six of the nine proposed planetary boundaries (phosphorous, nitrogen, biodiversity, land use, atmospheric aerosol loading, and chemical pollution) are unlikely to be associated with existential risks. They all correspond to a degraded environment, but in our assessment do not represent existential risks. However, the three remaining boundaries (climate change, global freshwater cycle, and ocean acidification) do pose existential risks. This is because of intrinsic positive feedback loops, substantial lag times between system change and experiencing the consequences of that change, and the fact these different boundaries interact with one another in ways that yield surprises. In addition, climate, freshwater, and ocean acidification are all directly connected to the provision of food and water, and shortages of food and water can create conflict and social unrest.

Climate change has a long history of disrupting civilizations and sometimes precipitating the collapse of cultures or mass emigrations (McMichael, 2017). For example, the 12th century drought in the North American Southwest is held responsible for the collapse of the Anasazi pueblo culture. More recently, the infamous potato famine of 1846–1849 and the large migration of Irish to the U.S. can be traced to a combination of factors, one of which was climate. Specifically, 1846 was an unusually warm and moist year in Ireland, providing the climatic conditions favorable to the fungus that caused the potato blight. As is so often the case, poor government had a role as well—as the British government forbade the import of grains from outside Britain (imports that could have helped to redress the ravaged potato yields).

Climate change intersects with freshwater resources because it is expected to exacerbate drought and water scarcity, as well as flooding. Climate change can even impair water quality because it is associated with heavy rains that overwhelm sewage treatment facilities, or because it results in higher concentrations of pollutants in groundwater as a result of enhanced evaporation and reduced groundwater recharge. Ample clean water is not a luxury—it is essential for human survival. Consequently, cities, regions and nations that lack clean freshwater are vulnerable to social disruption and disease.

Finally, ocean acidification is linked to climate change because it is driven by CO2 emissions just as global warming is. With close to 20% of the world’s protein coming from oceans (FAO, 2016), the potential for severe impacts due to acidification is obvious. Less obvious, but perhaps more insidious, is the interaction between climate change and the loss of oyster and coral reefs due to acidification. Acidification is known to interfere with oyster reef building and coral reefs. Climate change also increases storm frequency and severity. Coral reefs and oyster reefs provide protection from storm surge because they reduce wave energy (Spalding et al., 2014). If these reefs are lost due to acidification at the same time as storms become more severe and sea level rises, coastal communities will be exposed to unprecedented storm surge—and may be ravaged by recurrent storms.

A key feature of the risk associated with climate change is that mean annual temperature and mean annual rainfall are not the variables of interest. Rather it is extreme episodic events that place nations and entire regions of the world at risk. These extreme events are by definition “rare” (once every hundred years), and changes in their likelihood are challenging to detect because of their rarity, but are exactly the manifestations of climate change that we must get better at anticipating (Diffenbaugh et al., 2017). Society will have a hard time responding to shorter intervals between rare extreme events because in the lifespan of an individual human, a person might experience as few as two or three extreme events. How likely is it that you would notice a change in the interval between events that are separated by decades, especially given that the interval is not regular but varies stochastically? A concrete example of this dilemma can be found in the past and expected future changes in storm-related flooding of New York City. The highly disruptive flooding of New York City associated with Hurricane Sandy represented a flood height that occurred once every 500 years in the 18th century, and that occurs now once every 25 years, but is expected to occur once every 5 years by 2050 (Garner et al., 2017). This change in frequency of extreme floods has profound implications for the measures New York City should take to protect its infrastructure and its population, yet because of the stochastic nature of such events, this shift in flood frequency is an elevated risk that will go unnoticed by most people.

4. The combination of positive feedback loops and societal inertia is fertile ground for global environmental catastrophes.

Humans are remarkably ingenious, and have adapted to crises throughout their history. Our doom has been repeatedly predicted, only to be averted by innovation (Ridley, 2011). However, the many stories of human ingenuity successfully addressing existential risks such as global famine or extreme air pollution represent environmental challenges that are largely linear, have immediate consequences, and operate without positive feedbacks. For example, the fact that food is in short supply does not increase the rate at which humans consume food—thereby increasing the shortage. Similarly, massive air pollution episodes such as the London fog of 1952 that killed 12,000 people did not make future air pollution events more likely. In fact it was just the opposite—the London fog sent such a clear message that Britain quickly enacted pollution control measures (Stradling, 2016). Food shortages, air pollution, water pollution, etc. send immediate signals to society of harm, which then trigger a negative feedback of society seeking to reduce the harm.

In contrast, today’s great environmental crisis of climate change may cause some harm but there are generally long time delays between rising CO2 concentrations and damage to humans. The consequence of these delays are an absence of urgency; thus although 70% of Americans believe global warming is happening, only 40% think it will harm them (http://climatecommunication.yale.edu/visualizations-data/ycom-us-2016/). Secondly, unlike past environmental challenges, the Earth’s climate system is rife with positive feedback loops. In particular, as CO2 increases and the climate warms, that very warming can cause more CO2 release which further increases global warming, and then more CO2, and so on. Table 2 summarizes the best documented positive feedback loops for the Earth’s climate system. These feedbacks can be neatly categorized into carbon cycle, biogeochemical, biogeophysical, cloud, ice-albedo, and water vapor feedbacks. As important as it is to understand these feedbacks individually, it is even more essential to study the interactive nature of these feedbacks. Modeling studies show that when interactions among feedback loops are included, uncertainty increases dramatically and there is a heightened potential for perturbations to be magnified (e.g., Cox, Betts, Jones, Spall, & Totterdell, 2000; Hajima, Tachiiri, Ito, & Kawamiya, 2014; Knutti & Rugenstein, 2015; Rosenfeld, Sherwood, Wood, & Donner, 2014). This produces a wide range of future scenarios.

Positive feedbacks in the carbon cycle involves the enhancement of future carbon contributions to the atmosphere due to some initial increase in atmospheric CO2. This happens because as CO2 accumulates, it reduces the efficiency in which oceans and terrestrial ecosystems sequester carbon, which in return feeds back to exacerbate climate change (Friedlingstein et al., 2001). Warming can also increase the rate at which organic matter decays and carbon is released into the atmosphere, thereby causing more warming (Melillo et al., 2017). Increases in food shortages and lack of water is also of major concern when biogeophysical feedback mechanisms perpetuate drought conditions. The underlying mechanism here is that losses in vegetation increases the surface albedo, which suppresses rainfall, and thus enhances future vegetation loss and more suppression of rainfall—thereby initiating or prolonging a drought (Chamey, Stone, & Quirk, 1975). To top it off, overgrazing depletes the soil, leading to augmented vegetation loss (Anderies, Janssen, & Walker, 2002).

Climate change often also increases the risk of forest fires, as a result of higher temperatures and persistent drought conditions. The expectation is that forest fires will become more frequent and severe with climate warming and drought (Scholze, Knorr, Arnell, & Prentice, 2006), a trend for which we have already seen evidence (Allen et al., 2010). Tragically, the increased severity and risk of Southern California wildfires recently predicted by climate scientists (Jin et al., 2015), was realized in December 2017, with the largest fire in the history of California (the “Thomas fire” that burned 282,000 acres, https://www.vox.com/2017/12/27/16822180/thomas-fire-california-largest-wildfire). This catastrophic fire embodies the sorts of positive feedbacks and interacting factors that could catch humanity off-guard and produce a true apocalyptic event. Record-breaking rains produced an extraordinary flush of new vegetation, that then dried out as record heat waves and dry conditions took hold, coupled with stronger than normal winds, and ignition. Of course the record-fire released CO2 into the atmosphere, thereby contributing to future warming.

Out of all types of feedbacks, water vapor and the ice-albedo feedbacks are the most clearly understood mechanisms. Losses in reflective snow and ice cover drive up surface temperatures, leading to even more melting of snow and ice cover—this is known as the ice-albedo feedback (Curry, Schramm, & Ebert, 1995). As snow and ice continue to melt at a more rapid pace, millions of people may be displaced by flooding risks as a consequence of sea level rise near coastal communities (Biermann & Boas, 2010; Myers, 2002; Nicholls et al., 2011). The water vapor feedback operates when warmer atmospheric conditions strengthen the saturation vapor pressure, which creates a warming effect given water vapor’s strong greenhouse gas properties (Manabe & Wetherald, 1967).

Global warming tends to increase cloud formation because warmer temperatures lead to more evaporation of water into the atmosphere, and warmer temperature also allows the atmosphere to hold more water. The key question is whether this increase in clouds associated with global warming will result in a positive feedback loop (more warming) or a negative feedback loop (less warming). For decades, scientists have sought to answer this question and understand the net role clouds play in future climate projections (Schneider et al., 2017). Clouds are complex because they both have a cooling (reflecting incoming solar radiation) and warming (absorbing incoming solar radiation) effect (Lashof, DeAngelo, Saleska, & Harte, 1997). The type of cloud, altitude, and optical properties combine to determine how these countervailing effects balance out. Although still under debate, it appears that in most circumstances the cloud feedback is likely positive (Boucher et al., 2013). For example, models and observations show that increasing greenhouse gas concentrations reduces the low-level cloud fraction in the Northeast Pacific at decadal time scales. This then has a positive feedback effect and enhances climate warming since less solar radiation is reflected by the atmosphere (Clement, Burgman, & Norris, 2009).

The key lesson from the long list of potentially positive feedbacks and their interactions is that runaway climate change, and runaway perturbations have to be taken as a serious possibility. Table 2 is just a snapshot of the type of feedbacks that have been identified (see Supplementary material for a more thorough explanation of positive feedback loops). However, this list is not exhaustive and the possibility of undiscovered positive feedbacks portends even greater existential risks. The many environmental crises humankind has previously averted (famine, ozone depletion, London fog, water pollution, etc.) were averted because of political will based on solid scientific understanding. We cannot count on complete scientific understanding when it comes to positive feedback loops and climate change.

### 1NC – FW

#### Nonideal theory is necessary—even Korsgaard concedes extinction justifies moral loopholes

Korsgaard 02 [Christine, PhD in Philosophy, works at Harvard] “Internalism and the Sources of Normativity” RE

But actions are also events in the world (or correspond to events in the world, at least), and they too have consequences. There are a number of different ways in which one can deal with worries about what happens to the consequences in Kant’s ethical theory. It is worth pointing out that Kant himself not only did not ignore the consequences, but took the fact that good actions can have bad effects as the starting point for his religious philosophy. In his religious thought, Kant was concerned with the question how the moral agent has to envision the world, how he has to think of its metaphysics in order to cope with the fact that the actions morality demands may have terrible effects that we never intended, or may simply fail to have good ones. I myself see the development of what Rawls has called “nonideal theory” to be the right way of taking care of a certain class of cases, in which the consequences of doing the right thing just seem too appalling for us to simply wash our hands of. But I do not want to say that just having bad consequences is enough to put an action into the realm of nonideal theory. I think there is a range of bad consequences that a decent person has to be prepared to live with, out of respect for other people’s right to manage their own lives and actions, and to contribute to shared decisions. But I also think that there are cases where our actions go wrong in such a way that they turn out in a sense not to be the actions we intended to do, or to instantiate the values we meant them to instantiate. I think that some of these cases can be dealt with by introducing the kind of double-level structure into moral philosophy that I have described in the essay on “The Right to Lie: Kant on Dealing with Evil.”3 But I also think there are cases that cannot be domesticated even in this way, cases in which, to put it paradoxically, the good person will do something “wrong.” I have written about that sort of case too, in “Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Kant on the Right to Revolution.”4

#### Kant fails:

#### 1. Schmagency objection—people can shift out of obligations and be a schmagent which means it never hold anyone culpable

#### 2. Tailoring objection—you can tailor a maxim to be particular to the point where every maxim is permissible

#### 3. Every action has an enabler i.e. to mow a lawn you need to turn on the mower – to create a new maxim for infinite enablers is impossible

#### 4. Can’t weigh violations—minimal rights violations are just as bad as murder even though one is clearly worse.

#### Constructivism is wrong.

Fitzpatrick 5 The Practical Turn in Ethical Theory: Korsgaard’s Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity Author(s): by William J. FitzPatrick Source: Ethics, Vol. 115, No. 4 (July 2005), pp. 651-691 BE

Considered in itself, this version of the argument seems more promising. Whether it truly fares better, however, will depend on whether it has really been shown that, in the course of solving the practical problem in the first two premises, one would necessarily be treating oneself as if one were the unconditionally valuable, value-conferring source of the value of one’s ends (3a and 4a). To answer this question, we need first to clarify the required notion of treating something as if it had a certain property by acting in a certain way. The general idea seems to be this: in acting in a certain way, one treats X as if it were F insofar as the action is predicated on one’s taking it to be the case that p, and p could in fact be the case only if X were F. So insofar as any action of mine is predicated on my taking it to be the case that my end is good, and my end could be good only if I were an unconditionally valuable source of its value, I am—simply by so acting—treating myself as if I were an unconditionally valuable source of the value of my end. The burden of the argument would thus be to show that it is indeed the case that S: My ends could be good only if I were the unconditionally val- uable source of their value. Only if this is so can it be said that in pursuing ends I judge to be good I am treating myself as if I were the unconditionally valuable, value- conferring source of the value of my ends. Now S is a value-theoretic claim about the true dependency of the value of ends on agents. Ironically, this sounds like just the sort of metaphysical construal of value conferral that Korsgaard herself re- nounced in favor of claims simply about how we allegedly must see and value things and ourselves.50 The latter, of course, was the focus of the first interpretation of the argument, which failed. We are thus back to what looks like a crucial metaphysical claim about how things truly stand with respect to the source of value. Setting this tension to one side, we may notice that, in relying on S, the positive constructivist argument depends entirely on the success of sweeping negative arguments against realism. For if even a very mod- est form of realism were true, S would be false. If, for example, severe animal suffering is intrinsically bad—bad in a way that is not derived from facts about the conditions of my exercise of agency—then my end of stopping a forest fire could be good quite apart from any value conferral on my part. Unless we have been given independent reason to reject such claims, we have no reason to accept S. It is not obvious that Korsgaard’s general attack on realism (Sec. II) will help here, since that was focused on the problem of normative force rather than on the present question whether ends can be good in a relevantly nonderivative way, violating S. And in any case, one of my aims is precisely to deflate her critique of realism. If that is successful, then, it will not only answer her objections to realism but will also undermine support for the positive constructivist argument as presently construed, insofar as that argument depends on the prior rejection of realism. Apart from relying on an independent rejection of realism, Kors- gaard’s support for S seems to come down to a simple intuition: if I didn’t matter, then it couldn’t matter whether my ends were realized or frustrated; if it matters that my ends be realized, then that implies that I am an important being.51 This reasonable intuition, however, has force only in connection with ends having to do with my own welfare and fulfillment. My end of taking piano lessons in order to develop musically, for example, would indeed not matter if I were worthless and my welfare counted for nothing. But there is no similar intuitive pull to say anything parallel about any number of other ends I might pursue, as in the forest fire example. And even with respect to ends that do pertain to the agent’s own welfare, all that is compelling is that the agent-neutral importance of the ends’ being realized is conditional on the importance of the agent or of the agent’s welfare. Nothing follows about the agent’s being the value-conferring source of the choice wor- thiness of the ends themselves in the sense that what makes these ends worth pursuing is explained by the agent’s desires, inclinations, or choices together with the fact that the agent is unconditionally valuable and endorses those desires or makes those choices.52

#### Metaethic –

#### Uncertainty –

1] Brain studies can universalize feeling of pleasure and pain

2] Government aggregation of body count solves

#### Is/Ought Gap –

It’s grounded in prescriptivism which never has implication for our world descriptively and justifies abstraction which ignores ongoing atrocities by bracketing off interests of the marginalized

#### Korsgaard 83 –

Util solves—if every life is valuable than we should aggregate between them

#### Regress –

1] Blum solves – neuroscience concludes pleasure is motivation for actions within the short and long term – for example the pursuit of goals or pulling your hand from a stove

2] Conflates practical reason and logical reason which Kant explicitly contrasts.

#### Korsgaard 98 –

Fallacy of origin—they use a technical ploy on words to say the term categorial imperative is necessary to follow any rules—justifies standard is drinking water

#### ASPEC –

Collapses – states have unique responsibilities which mandates they look at consequences even if they had good intentions

### 1NC – Contention

#### Freedom mandates a market-oriented approach to space—that negates

Broker 20 [(Tyler, work has been published in the Gonzaga Law Review, the Albany Law Review and the University of Memphis Law Review.) “Space Law Can Only Be Libertarian Minded,” Above the Law, 1-14-20, <https://abovethelaw.com/2020/01/space-law-can-only-be-libertarian-minded/>] TDI

The impact on human daily life from a transition to the virtually unlimited resource reality of space cannot be overstated. However, when it comes to the law, a minimalist, dare I say libertarian, approach appears as the only applicable system. In the words of NASA, “2020 promises to be a big year for space exploration.” Yet, as Rand Simberg points out in Reason magazine, it is actually private American investment that is currently moving space exploration to “a pace unseen since the 1960s.” According to Simberg, due to this increase in private investment “We are now on the verge of getting affordable private access to orbit for large masses of payload and people.” The impact of that type of affordable travel into space might sound sensational to some, but in reality the benefits that space can offer are far greater than any benefit currently attributed to any major policy proposal being discussed at the national level. The sheer amount of resources available within our current reach/capabilities simply speaks for itself. However, although those new realities will, as Simberg says, “bring to the fore a lot of ideological issues that up to now were just theoretical,” I believe it will also eliminate many economic and legal distinctions we currently utilize today. For example, the sheer number of resources we can already obtain in space means that in the rapidly near future, the distinction between a nonpublic good or a public good will be rendered meaningless. In other words, because the resources available within our solar system exist in such quantities, all goods will become nonrivalrous in their consumption and nonexcludable in their distribution. This would mean government engagement in the public provision of a nonpublic good, even at the trivial level, or what Kevin Williamson defines as socialism, is rendered meaningless or impossible. In fact, in space, I fail to see how any government could even try to legally compel collectivism in the way Simberg fears. Similar to many economic distinctions, however, it appears that many laws, both the good and the bad, will also be rendered meaningless as soon as we begin to utilize the resources within our solar system. For example, if every human being is given access to the resources that allows them to replicate anything anyone else has, or replace anything “taken” from them instantly, what would be the point of theft laws? If you had virtually infinite space in which you can build what we would now call luxurious livable quarters, all without exploiting human labor or fragile Earth ecosystems when you do it, what sense would most property, employment, or commercial law make? Again, this is not a pipe dream, no matter how much our population grows for the next several millennia, the amount of resources within our solar system can sustain such an existence for every human being. Rather than panicking about the future, we should try embracing it, or at least meaningfully preparing for it. Currently, the Outer Space Treaty, or as some call it “the Magna Carta of Space,” is silent on the issue of whether private individuals or corporate entities can own territory in space. Regardless of whether governments allow it, however, private citizens are currently obtaining the ability to travel there, and if human history is any indicator, private homesteading will follow, flag or no flag. We Americans know this is how a Wild West starts, where most regulation becomes the impractical pipe dream. But again, this would be a Wild West where the exploitation of human labor and fragile Earth ecosystem makes no economic sense, where every single human can be granted access to resources that even the wealthiest among us now would envy, and where innovation and imagination become the only things we would recognize as currency. Only a libertarian-type system, that guarantees basic individual rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness could be valued and therefore human fidelity to a set of laws made possible, in such an existence.

#### Acquisition of property can never be unjust – rights violations presupposes somethings appropriation by another entity.

Feser 1, (Edward Feser, 1-1-2005, accessed on 12-15-2021, Cambridge University Press, "THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS AN UNJUST INITIAL ACQUISITION | Social Philosophy and Policy | Cambridge Core", Edward C. Feser is an American philosopher. He is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Pasadena City College in Pasadena, California. [https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)[brackets](https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy/article/abs/there-is-no-such-thing-as-an-unjust-initial-acquisition/5C744D6D5C525E711EC75F75BF7109D1)%5bbrackets) for gen lang]//phs st

There is a serious difficulty with this criticism of Nozick, however. It is just this: There is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources; therefore, there is no case to be made for redistributive taxation on the basis of alleged injustices in initial acquisition. This is, to be sure, a bold claim. Moreover, in making it, I contradict not only Nozick’s critics, but Nozick himself, who clearly thinks it is at least possible for there to be injustices in acquisition, whether or not there have in fact been any (or, more realistically, whether or not there have been enough such injustices to justify continual redistributive taxation for the purposes of rectifying them). But here is a case where Nozick has, I think, been too generous to the other side. Rather than attempt —unsatisfactorily, in the view of his critics—to meet the challenge to show that initial acquisition has not in general been unjust, he ought instead to have insisted that there is no such challenge to be met in the first place. Giving what I shall call “the basic argument” for this audacious claim will be the task of Section II of this essay. The argument is, I think, compelling, but by itself it leaves unexplained some widespread intu- itions to the effect that certain specific instances of initial acquisition are unjust and call forth as their remedy the application of a Lockean proviso, or are otherwise problematic. (A “Lockean proviso,” of course, is one that forbids initial acquisitions of resources when these acquisitions do not leave “enough and as good” in common for others.) Thus, Section III focuses on various considerations that tend to show how those intuitions are best explained in a way consistent with the argument of Section II. Section IV completes the task of accounting for the intuitions in question by considering how the thesis of self-ownership itself bears on the acqui- sition and use of property. Section V shows how the results of the previ- ous sections add up to a more satisfying defense of Nozickian property rights than the one given by Nozick himself, and considers some of the implications of this revised conception of initial acquisition for our under- standing of Nozick’s principles of transfer and rectification. II. The Basic Argument The reason there is no such thing as an unjust initial acquisition of resources is that there is no such thing as either a just or an unjust initial acquisition of resources. The concept of justice, that is to say, simply does not apply to initial acquisition. It applies only after initial acquisition has already taken place. In particular, it applies only to transfers of property (and derivatively, to the rectification of injustices in transfer). This, it seems to me, is a clear implication of the assumption (rightly) made by Nozick that external resources are initially unowned. Consider the following example. Suppose an individual A seeks to acquire some previously unowned resource R. For it to be the case that A commits an injustice in acquiring R, it would also have to be the case that there is some individual B (or perhaps a group of individuals) against whom A commits the injustice. But for B to have been wronged by A’s acquisi- tion of R, B would have to have had a rightful claim over R, a right to R. By hypothesis, however, B did not have a right to R, because no one had a right to it—it was unowned, after all. So B was not wronged and could not have been. In fact, the very first person who could conceivably be wronged by anyone’s use of R would be, not B, but A himself, since A is the first one to own R. Such a wrong would in the nature of the case be an injustice in transfer—in unjustly taking from A what is rightfully his—not in initial acquisition. The same thing, by extension, will be true of all unowned resources: it is only after some- one has initially acquired them that anyone could unjustly come to possess them, via unjust transfer. It is impossible, then, for there to be any injustices in initial acquisition.7

#### Walla and Westphal –

1] Assumes space is finite – libertarian market approach indicates it’s infinite

2] This argument is absurd—justifies not drinking water since it appropriates a resource someone else wants to—action by a unilateral will is allowed insofar as it is an exercise of freedom of the ability to manipulate external objects

### 1NC – Advantage

#### Physics and math proofs prove no impact.

Cairncross 17 [Duncan Cairncross, Retired Planetary Science Engineer, BSc in Mechanical Engineering from the University of Glasgow, Diploma in Management DMS, Business Administration and Management, General from Teeside University, Former Asset Management Officer for the Gore District Council, “Is the Kessler Syndrome Disputed By Some Scientists?”, Quora, 10/25/2017, https://www.quora.com/Is-the-Kessler-Syndrome-disputed-by-some-scientists

Lets look at some numbers - we are talking LEO - so anything very small will de-orbit itself quite fast from atmospheric drag

These lumps are going the same direction - at similar speeds - as our satellites - so we are not talking about km/sec impacts - just rifle bullet speeds - 300 m/sec at maximum and the vast majority would have much much lower speeds

Everything is in a torus

Altitude 100 km to 300 km, - 1000 km North to 1000 km South - and about 40,000 km long

200 x 2000 x 40,000 = volume 16 billion cubic km -

18,000 Big bits - 100 mm - including 1,200 satellites

750,000 “bullets” - 10 mm

150 million bits 1 mm

Small bits we will ignore as they will not be going fast enough relative to our satellite to cause damage - and they will de-orbit quite fast

So one “bullet” for every 21,000 cubic km

That does not sound like too dangerous a neighborhood!

What happens if start some sort of cascade?

There is not much to cascade - 18,000 - “big bits” - if each of them became 1000 “bullets” then we would have 18 million “bullets” + the existing 750,000 bullets

And that is erring on the generous side - these bits are mostly metallic and metals don’t shatter into lots of 10 mm bits when hit by rifle bullets

That would be one “bullet” for every 853 cubic km AND most of the “bullets” will not actually be going very fast

Some time in the future when we have a lot mor,e as in a 100,000 times as much stuff in orbit then the Kessler Syndrome may be possible

If you are worried about communication satellites way up there in geostationary orbit then the situation is even better - there is a LOT more space up there and we have boosted a lot less junk up to those orbits

It is worth tracking the big bits and making sure that most satellites are safely de-orbited? - YES

But worrying about a Kessler Syndrome? - no not really

#### Long timeframe and squo solves

Kurt 15 [Joseph Kurt, JD- William & Mary School of Law, BA-Marquette University, NOTE: TRIUMPH OF THE SPACE COMMONS: ADDRESSING THE IMPENDING SPACE DEBRIS CRISIS WITHOUT AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY, 40 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 305 (2015)]

A. Practical Considerations: Feasible Solutions to the Space Debris Problem Are on Their Way

One key question in assessing whether an international treaty is a requisite for solving the space debris problem is just how difficult it will be to fashion a remedy. The more complex and costly are feasible solutions, the more likely it is that a comprehensive regime is necessary to bind the various actors together. 93Link to the text of the note

A good place to begin is to determine just how imminent is the onset of the cascade of exponentially more frequent debris-creating collisions, known as the Kessler Syndrome. 94Link to the text of the note To be certain, no one can be sure--this phenomenon being subject to highly complex probabilities. 95Link to the text of the note Indeed, experts' estimates of when such a cascade will become irreversible vary [\*316] widely. 96Link to the text of the note The National Research Council produced a report in 2011 that suggested that "space might be just 10 or 20 years away from severe problems." 97Link to the text of the note In fact, the cascading effect has already begun, albeit at a modest pace. 98Link to the text of the note However, Donald Kessler, who first described the eponymous effect in 1978, has significantly recalibrated his own outlook over the years. 99Link to the text of the note Originally, Kessler predicted that catastrophe would result by the year 2000. 100Link to the text of the note That date long passed, Kessler now speaks of a century-long process that "we have time to deal with." 101Link to the text of the note

Nevertheless, few would disagree with Cristophe Bonnal of the Centre National d'Études Spatiales ("CNES"), the French space agency, who says that it is "not yet clear" how much time we have to act. 102Link to the text of the note None of this is to say that interested parties should not act with great dispatch to address the space debris problem. Even if catastrophe is not on the immediate horizon--as some have suggested--Heiner Klinkrad, the European Space Agency's leading authority on space debris points out that "[t]he longer you wait, the more difficult and far more expensive" any solution will be. 103Link to the text of the note

The additional slack in plausible timelines is cause for optimism when one considers the progress being made towards remediating the problem of space debris. Such remediation entails a three-pronged approach: preventive measures to reduce the creation of new debris, 104Link to the text of the note space debris tracking technologies, 105Link to the text of the note and active debris removal ("ADR"). 106Link to the text of the note

In an effort to address the first prong, the United Nations General Assembly in 2007 endorsed the COPUOS Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines. 107Link to the text of the note The recommended measures include design changes which would [\*317] avoid the previously common practice of releasing debris during standard operations, refraining from intentional destruction of space objects, and limiting the risk of collisions through avoidance maneuvers and delaying launch times. 108Link to the text of the note As the COPUOS document points out, many of these practices had already been adopted by spacefaring nations. 109Link to the text of the note

Compliance with the COPUOS Mitigation Guidelines is voluntary and has not been universal; 110Link to the text of the note however, many nations do take steps beyond those called for in the Mitigation Guidelines, recognizing the importance of redressing the issue. 111Link to the text of the note That said, even if no nation ever again launched a single object into outer space, the operation of the Kessler Syndrome would ensure that, over time, continuing collisions amongst already present objects would result in Earth's orbit being rendered unusable. 112Link to the text of the note

Improvements in space debris tracking technology are another partial solution that promises to help actors avoid collisions by identifying orbital debris in the path of satellites or spacecraft. 113Link to the text of the note There are limits on the effectiveness of such tracking, however, including the inability of some optical systems to track objects at night. 114Link to the text of the note Moreover, commonly employed systems cannot continually track objects smaller than thirty centimeters in diameter. 115Link to the text of the note New systems are being developed, however, that will use lasers that can track the location of objects as small as a softball--sometimes to within one meter. 116Link to the text of the note Such technology is still at the planning stage for NASA, 117Link to the text of the note but Lockheed Martin is teaming up with an Australian-based company on a laser-tracking project already in the works. 118Link to the text of the note Another promising development comes from scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who are working on soccer-ball-sized robots [\*318] designed to travel alongside the ISS, investigating potentially harmful space debris along the way. 119Link to the text of the note

But while tracking space debris can help avoid specific accidents, and thus slow the machinations of the Kessler Syndrome, only ADR can stabilize the space environment. 120Link to the text of the note

Fortunately, the targets for ADR that scientists believe will allow us to forestall an irreversible cascade of collisions are relatively modest. 121Link to the text of the note The most common estimate is that removing five to ten large pieces of debris per year is enough to keep the Kessler Syndrome at bay. 122Link to the text of the note And even more encouraging is that a broad array of national and private actors are exploring a plethora of ADR methods. 123Link to the text of the note For example, the Japanese hope to deploy, by 2019, a magnetic net that will draw pieces of space debris down to the Earth's atmosphere, where they will burn up. 124Link to the text of the note Such use of the atmosphere to incinerate debris is a common element of many ADR strategies, whether they employ nets, harpoons, tentacles, or ion thrusters to impact the debris. 125Link to the text of the note Meanwhile, a German Space Agency program is developing the means to robotically capture satellites. 126Link to the text of the note Other solutions include using enormous puffs of air, static electricity, or lasers to throw objects out of orbit. 127Link to the text of the note

Obviously, such projects carry a hefty price tag, but funding is coming in from a variety of sources. 128Link to the text of the note A laser-based project being developed by Australian National University, for example, received $ 20 million from the Australian government and an additional $ 130 million from NASA and other international public and private actors. 129Link to the text of the note But even these sums [\*319] are dwarfed by the $ 2 billion that Russia's leading space corporation, Energia, is investing in a nuclear-powered pod that it hopes to deploy by 2023. 130Link to the text of the note This pod will fly around space for fifteen years, knocking debris out of the atmosphere using an ion drive. 131Link to the text of the note

That substantial investments in ADR technologies have seemingly put us on the cusp of possessing the technology to stabilize the space environment significantly undermines claims that incentives to solve the orbital debris problem are lacking because of its nature as a "tragedy of the commons". 132Link to the text of the note Successful implementation of a solution is still years away--and can't be presumed. But taken together with the fact that we likely have a decades-long window to redress the problem, 133Link to the text of the note Col. Joseph Imburgia's 2011 warning that "a binding international agreement is needed to provide stability and order . . . and to preserve mankind's access to and through space" looks less and less prescient. 134Link to the text of the note

#### No impact:

#### 1] They don’t care about a downed satellite – their evidence is hysteria.

Bowen 18 [Bleddyn Bowen, Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Leicester. The Art of Space Deterrence. February 20, 2018. https://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-art-of-space-deterrence/]

Space is often an afterthought or a miscellaneous ancillary in the grand strategic views of top-level decision-makers. A president may not care that one satellite may be lost or go dark; it may cause panic and Twitter-based hysteria for the space community, of course. But the terrestrial context and consequences, as well as the political stakes and symbolism of any exchange of hostilities in space matters more. The political and media dimension can magnify or minimise the perceived consequences of losing specific satellites out of all proportion to their actual strategic effect.