# 1NC R3 Blue Key

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#### The subject emerges through loss, constitutively unable to express it’s desires through language. That traps the subject in the symbolic, creating a constant desire towards the lost-object. Thus, the role of the ballot is to embrace loss.

McGowan 13 [Todd; Associate Professor of Film Studies at the UVermont; “Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” Pg. 26-29; 2013; University of Nebraska Press / Lincoln and London] Justin

The subject as such emerges through the experience of loss. It is the loss of a part of the subject — an initial act of sacrifi ce — that creates both subject and object, the object emerging through this act as what the subject has lost of itself. The subject takes an interest in the object world because it forms this world around its lost object. As Jacques Lacan notes, “Never, in our concrete experience of analytic theory, do we do without the notion of the lack of the object as central. It is not a negative, but the very spring for the relation of the subject to the world.”5 Th e loss of the object generates a world around this loss to which the subject can relate. Obviously, no one literally creates objects through an initial act of sacrifi ce of an actual body part. Th is would be too much to ask. But the psychical act of sacrifi ce allows for a distinction to develop where none existed before and simultaneously directs the subject’s desire toward the object world. In his breakthrough essay “Negation,” Freud describes this process as follows: “Th e antithesis between subjective and objective does not exist from the fi rst. It only comes into being from the fact that thinking possesses the capacity to bring before the mind once more something that has once been perceived, by reproducing it as a presentation without the external object having still to be there. Th e fi rst and immediate aim, therefore, of reality-testing is, not to fi nd an object in real perception which corresponds to the one presented, but to refi nd such an object, to convince oneself that it is still there.”6 Th ough Freud doesn’t use terms from linguistics, it is clear that he is making reference to the subject’s alienation in language and that he sees this alienation as the key to the emergence of both the subject and the object When the subject submits to the imperatives of language, it enters into an indirect relation with the object world. Th e speaking being does not relate to books, pencils, and paper but to “books,” “pencils,” and “paper.” Th e signifier intervenes between the subject and the object that the subject perceives. Th e subject’s alienation into language deprives it of immediate contact with the object world. And yet, in the above passage from “Negation,” Freud conceives of the subject’s entrance into language — its “capacity to bring before the mind once more something that has once been perceived, by reproducing it as a presentation without the external object having still to be there” — as the event that produces the very distinction between subject and object. Th is means that the indirectness or mediation introduced by language deprives the subject of a direct relation to the object world that it never had. Prior to its immersion in the mediation of language, the subject had no object at all — not a privileged relation to objects but a complete absence of relationality as such due to its autoeroticism. In this sense, the subject’s willingness to accede to its alienation in language is the fi rst creative act, a sacrifice that produces the objects that the subject cannot directly access. Language is important not for its own sake but because it is the site of our founding sacrifi ce. We know that the subject has performed this act of sacrifi ce when we witness the subject functioning as a being of language, but the sacrifi ce is not an act that the subject takes up on its own. Others always impose the entry into language on the subject. Th eir exhortations and incentives to speak prompt the emergence of the speaking subject. But the subject’s openness to alienation in language, its willingness to sacrifi ce a part of itself in order to become a speaking subject, suggests a lack in being itself prior to the entry into language. Th at is, the act through which the subject cedes the privileged object and becomes a subject coincides with language but is irreducible to it. Th e subject engages in the act of sacrifi ce because it does not fi nd its initial autoeroticism perfectly satisfying — the unity of the autoerotic being is not perfect — and this lack of complete satisfaction produces the opening through which language and society grab onto the subject through its alienating process. If the initial autoerotic state of the human animal were perfectly satisfying, no one would begin to speak, and subjectivity would never form. Speaking as such testifi es to an initial wound in our animal being and in being itself. But subjectivity emerges only out of a self-wounding. Even though others encourage the infant to abandon its autoerotic state through a multitude of inducements, the initial loss that constitutes subjectivity is always and necessarily self-infl icted. Subjectivity has a fundamentally masochistic form, and it continually repeats the masochistic act that founds it. Th e act of sacrifi ce opens the door to the promise of a satisfaction that autoerotic isolation forecloses, which is why the incipient subject abandons the autoerotic state and accedes to the call of sociality. But the term “sacrifi ce” is misleading insofar as it suggests that the subject has given up a wholeness (with itself or with its parent) that exists prior to being lost. In the act of sacrifi ce, the incipient subject gives up something that it doesn’t have. Th e initial loss that founds subjectivity is not at all substantial; it is the ceding of nothing. Th rough this defi ning gesture, the subject sacrifi ces its lost object into being. But if the subject cedes nothing, this initial act of sacrifi ce seems profoundly unnecessary. Why can’t the subject emerge without it? Why is the experience of loss necessary for the subject to constitute itself qua subject? Th e answer lies in the diff erence between need and desire. While the needs of the human animal are not dependent on the experience of loss, the subject’s desires are. It is the initial act of sacrifi ce that gives birth to desire: the subject sacrifi ces nothing in order to create a lost object around which it can organize its desire. As Richard Boothby puts it in his unequaled explanation of the psychoanalytic conception of the emergence of desire, “Th e destruction and loss of the object . . . opens up a symbolic dimension in which what was lost might be recovered in a new form.”7 He adds: “Sacrifi ce serves to constitute the very matrix of desire. Th e essential function of sacrifi ce is less do ut des, I give so that you might give, than do ut desidero: I give in order that I might desire.”8 Th e subject’s desire is oriented around this lost object, but the object is nothing as a positive entity and only exists insofar as it is lost. Th is is why one can never att ain the lost object or the object that causes one to desire.9 Th e coming-into-being of this object originates the subject of desire, but, having no substance, the object can never become an empirical object of desire. We may see an object of desire as embodying the lost object, but whenever we obtain this object, we discover its emptiness. Th e lost object is constitutively rather than empirically lost

#### The affs attempts to improve working conditions of teachers falls short of an analysis of commodity fetishism. The affs desire to fill the lack inevitably fails.

Böhm and Batta 10 [Steffen; Essex Business School, University of Essex; Aanka; Essex Business School, University of Essex; “Just doing it: enjoying commodity fetishism with Lacan,” Organization; 2010; <https://sci-hub.se/10.1177/1350508410363123>] // Re-Cut Justin

It is within this context that the anti-sweatshop campaign has emerged. It has brought to our attention the difficult working conditions, the exploitation and dehumanization that are part and parcel of the global economy and hence has helped to politicize consumption, to put Nike and other multinationals and their production practices on the spot. One of the aims of this campaign has been to improve the working conditions and wages of the workers in low-cost countries. However, what has also been caught up in this campaign is the call by many Western critics for this production to be brought back ‘home’. That is, multinationals like Nike are criticized—particularly by labour unions—for just running virtual operations in Western countries, concentrating on design and branding. In this way, it is argued, the West simply becomes an ‘experience economy’ (Gilmore et al., 1998)—or we could call it an ‘enjoyment economy’, a kind of big Disneyland—rather than developing its own ‘real economy’, its own industrial and manufacturing strength.

Both the ‘anti-sweatshop’ and ‘bring-our-production-home’ responses are, in our view, limited, as they seem to fall short of a critique of the workings of commodity fetishism. ‘If only Nike would be more of a “real economy” company, paying its workers decent wages and pensions, then things would be better’, some of the campaigners seem to be arguing. Although this kind of argument seems to be particularly attractive in today’s deep economic crisis, we would maintain that some caution needs to be applied. In fact, as we are arguing in this article the workings of commodity fetishism, are proper to all capitalist production and consumption processes, and tie individual consumers and the mass social body as such to a continuous reproduction of capitalist commodity relations. Even if Nike produced its trainers say in the US, paying its workers a decent living wage, there would still be an alienation and perversion at the heart of its commodity relations making it fundamentally problematic. Equally, even if ‘sweatshop’ workers in the so-called ‘third world’ would be paid better wages, commodity fetishism would not disappear, tying individuals to a continuous consumption cycle, which many critics (e.g. Klein, 2000) have shown to have a range of negative effects on people, societies and the environment.

What is important for us is to realize that—in the words of Guy Debord—‘it is not just that the relationship to commodities is now plain to see—commodities are now all that there is to see, the world we see is the world of the commodity’ (1994: 29). That is, humankind is enmeshed in commodity relations. A study of NikeTown in Chicago, for example, argues that a visit to this consumer haven gives one the sense of a ‘festive nature of the processions through the site, with customers cast in the role of explorers and tourists in search of clothing, souvenirs and meanings’ (Peñaloza, 1998: 379). Our perceptual apparatus cannot ‘not see’ the commodity; it is everywhere. The commodity is being produced and reproduced at a variety of different levels of reality and representation, resulting in what Debord calls a ‘spectacle’: ‘The Spectacle is not a collection of images; rather it is a social relationship between people that is mediated by images’ (Debord, 1994: 12). These images—in the form of news, advertising and entertainment—are continuously produced and reproduced by the media and culture industries (Adorno and Horkheimer, 1979), resulting in what Lacanians would call ‘Homo Symbolicus’, which implies a shift from a naturalist to a culturalist conception of need and desire (Stavrakakis, 2006: 89).

The important Lacanian contribution to this debate is that the ‘enjoyment economy’ (Baudrillard, 2001; Gilmore et al., 1998) is not only a post-World War II or ‘postmodern’ invention. Instead, enjoyment must be seen at the heart not only of capitalist organization but also of how human subjectivity and hence society as such function. What is important to realize here is that, for Lacan, desire is located in the realm of the symbolic Other, the relational structure of language that makes up society. As the fetishist deals with his or her anxiety (lack) by accepting the Law of the Nameof-the-Father, the Other becomes, what Deleuze and Guattari (1988) call a ‘desiring machine’ that constitutes the subject. With Lacan—as with Deleuze and Guattari—this fetishization process exits the realm of the Freudian clinic to enter the wider scene of social relations. Lacan’s formula to describe what Deleuze and Guattari (1988) later call the ‘desiring machine’ is $ ◊ a, where ‘$’ is the ‘barred’ or ‘divided’ subject (as the subject, according to Lacan, can never have a full identity) and the small ‘a’ is the object of desire that is, nevertheless, always unattainable. The Nike brand, for example, promises all sorts of amazing experiences and enjoyments when one buys a pair of one of their latest trainers. Yet, once bought, we realize that we cannot jump quite as high as ‘Air Jordan’ or play golf as skillfully as Tiger Woods. The symbolic regime of the Other is thus always lacking, which, however, does not prevent us from desiring and believing in it. This is what Lacan (2007: 108) calls fantasy. It is this fantasy that is at the heart of Lacan and Granoff’s (1956) conception of ‘fetishism’, which they describe as a process of the subject transferring his or her anxiety to a symbolic system, or what Lacan calls the Name-of-the-Father. What contemporary consumer capitalism has arguably achieved is that it has provided a symbolic system onto which the subject’s constitutive anxieties (lack) can be transferred, creating a set of fantasies for people to believe in. Nike and its global brand appeal is at the heart of this relationship.

#### The 1AC is an ideological fantasy constructed by relentless planning at the expense of scapegoated identities, all for recognition from the Other in an attempt to fill the lack.

Gunder 05 Michael Gunder, 2005, “The Production of Desirous Space: Mere Fantasies of the Utopian City?” Planning Theory 2005 4: 173, DOI: 10.1177/1473095205054604, all brackets were in the original text, SJBE

Jouissance is one of the four structuring elements of social discourse,4 or social interactions, links and relationships, where synchronic language meets diachronic speech to evoke an effect on the Other (Lacan, 2004: 3). Zupancic (2004) associates Lacan’s (2004) theory of the Four Discourses (see Gunder, 2003a, 2004; Hillier and Gunder, 2005) with the Marxian theory of commodification and surplus-value via Lacan’s concept of surplus-enjoyment (plus-de-jouir). Lacan (2004: 111) contends that surplusvalue and surplus-enjoyment are historically equivalent, especially in the situation of the Master’s injunction of ‘No!’ in the emerging early phase of Calvinistic repressive capitalism. In contrast to the historical authority and rationality of the Master’s repressive command, late capitalism is structured under a rationality of the university or bureaucracy. Now knowledge and technology, not the Master’s injunction, become ‘agency expressing a logic of governmentality and expertise (including that of planning) that does not prohibit enjoyment, but rather channels jouissance in ways that produces a “bio-politics” (after Foucault) of an alienated subject that has no option, but to enjoy and be satisfied’ (Hillier and Gunder, 2005; McGowan, 2004; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b; Zupancic, 2004). In this regard, ‘a nation exists only as long as its specific enjoyment continues to be materialised in a set of social practices and submitted through national myths [or fantasies] that structure these practices’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1993: 202). This is taken further by the barely challenged international hegemonic discourse of global capitalization and the fantasies it induces in externally structuring the nation state’s very enjoyment (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 63; Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 61). Even the ruling British Labour government, with its ‘Third Way’, in contrast to its tradition of socialism, has placed ‘economic globalisation’ as ‘the most significant factor in shaping Labour Party thinking since the early 1990s’ (Allmendinger, 2003: 326). As McGowan (2004) observes: we trust fully in the staying power of global capitalism. The alternatives, which once seemed to be just around the corner, have become unimaginable today. The universe of global capitalism is, or so we think, here to stay, and we best not do anything to risk our status within it. Hence, we pledge our allegiance to it, and we put our trust in it. This is the fundamental mode of contemporary obedience to authority. Only by coming to understand this obedience to the dictates of global capitalism as obedience can we hope to break out of it. Global capitalism seems an unsurpassable horizon simply because we have not properly recognized our own investment in sustaining it. We see it as unsurpassable because we don’t want to lose it – and the imaginary satisfaction that it provides. (McGowan, 2004: 193) Illusion resides under this global fantasy of capital where ‘the basic feature of’ this dominant cultural imperative ‘no longer operates on the level of ideals and identifications, but directly on the level of regulating jouissance’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 113). Even in Lefebvre’s day, this was a capitalism where surplus-value was synonymous with surplus-enjoyment supporting the injunction: ‘you must enjoy!’. In this light, the role of planning is to facilitate enjoyment by sustainably providing the correct space – healthy, competitive, fit and attractive – where enjoyment can be effectively materialized and maximized under the imperative of global capitalism. Consequently: urbanism is nothing more than an ideology that claims to be either ‘art’ or ‘technology’ or ‘science’, depending on the context. This ideology pretends to be straightforward, yet it obfuscates, harbours things unsaid: which it covers, which it contains, as a form of will tending towards efficiency. Urbanism is doubly fetishistic. First, it implies the fetishism of satisfaction. What about vested interests? They must be satisfied, and therefore their needs must be understood and catered to, unchanged . . . Second, it implies the fetishism of space. Space is creation. Whoever creates space creates whatever it is that fills space. The place engenders the thing and the good place engenders good things. (Lefebvre, 2003: 159) This is exacerbated further in the current milieu of consumerist post-democracy personified by the master signifier: global capitalism. ‘Post-democracy is founded on an attempt to exclude the political awareness of lack and negativity from the political domain, leading to a political order which retains the token institutions of liberal democracy but neutralizes the centrality of political antagonism’ (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 59). In response to the dominant ‘logic’ of global competitiveness, the technocrats and experts including planners, shape, contextualize and implement public policy in the interest of the dominant hegemonic bloc. This is constructed under the logics and knowledges of university discourses (see Gunder, 2004), with an objective to remove existing or potential urban blight,‘dis-ease’ and dysfunction detracting from local enjoyment and global competitiveness (Gunder, 2005; McGuirk, 2004). Of course, the hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debate as to what constitutes desired enjoyment and what is lacking in urban competitiveness. In turn, this defines what is blighted and dysfunctional and in need of planning remedy. This is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness, is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Planners, programmers, and users want solutions. For what? To make people happy. To order them to be happy. It is a strange way of interpreting happiness. The science of the urban phenomenon cannot respond to these demands without the risk of validating external restrictions imposed by ideology and power. (Lefebvre, 2003: 141) Yet this lack and its resolution are more often technical in nature, rather than political. As a consequence, the technocrats in partnership with their ‘dominant stakeholders’ can ensure the impression of happiness for the many, while, not to mention, achieving the stakeholders’ specific interests. Material happiness for all but that evil other Lacanian theory suggests that a subject’s jouissance is given freest rein when an act of desire contains a dimension of transgression. It is the ‘little sin’ that gives the most pleasure; it is the prohibition as such which elevates a common everyday object into an object of desire (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 177). The bio-politics of contemporary planning are predicated on enjoyment – you will enjoy! – not the prior duality of repression/freedom of the Weberian capitalist master’s injunction: ‘No you cannot do that!’. The achievements of traditional utopian goals were ones of freedom to act against the repression of the negative injunction. Contemporary injunctions are to enjoy – or at least to sustain our happiness – regardless of what we actually desire. Happiness is not a class of truth, but one of an ontological class of being where: ‘happiness’ relies on the subject’s inability or unreadiness fully to confront the consequences of its desire: the price of happiness is that the subject remains stuck in the inconsistency of its desires. In our daily lives, we (pretend to) desire things which we do not really desire, so that, ultimately, the worst thing that can happen is for us to get what we ‘officially’ desire. Happiness is thus hypocritical: it is the happiness dreaming about things we do not really want. (Zˇ izˇek, 2002a: 59–60) Planning continues to succeed because it underpins the primal desire of most subjects in society for a conflict-free, safe and assured happy future, even if it can only deliver this as a fantasy-scenario of material happiness, rather than as an impossible reality that actually sates all desires (Gunder, 2003a, 2003b). This is a fantasy predicated on an obedience to a shallow consumptive quantitative imperative to be materially happy, which often occurs at the expense of our actual qualitative psychic desires. In our contemporary global society the ‘moral law’ is no longer the imperative that acts as a limitation, stopping us from enjoying too much. Instead, the cultural imperative, the now dominant moral Law itself, in its injunction for us to enjoy becomes ‘the ultimate “transgression”’ should one wish to pursue a life of moderation (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 174). Further, ‘the fantasy of a utopian harmonious social world can only be sustained if all the persisting disorders can be attributed to an alien intruder . . . a certain particularity which cannot be assimilated, but instead must be eliminated’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 108). This is the stranger, the Other that is not us that can act as the ‘“scapegoat” to be stigmatised as the one who is blamed for our lack, the Evil force that stole our precious jouissance’ and stopped the fantasy from achieving its utopian vision (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 58). Even our ‘“complex” contemporary societies rely on the basic divide between included and excluded’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 86). Zˇ izˇek (2004b: 86) continues: in any society ‘there is a multitude within the system and a multitude of those excluded, and simply to encompass them both within the scope of the same notion amounts to the same obscenity as equating starvation with dieting.’ It is continually this Other that permits the delusion of harmony in our identity defining groups and for this to transpire we require an Other, external to the group for the group to define itself. We require a disparity, or gap, to allocate a degree of difference to an Other to conceptualize the group identification as who we are not and on this Other we can attribute all the signs of disharmony that jeopardize our shared fantasy (Zˇ izˇek, 1997: 5). Difference is essential to complete our fantasy of harmony, but only by providing the sacrificial Other on which we can blame the disappointment of the fantasy to deliver (Zˇ izˇek, 2004a: 158–9). In this light, planning,‘as part of the apparatus of the modern state, makes its own imprint, has its own powers for good and evil’ (Sandercock, 2004: 134). This is especially so as planning identifies, or at least names and legitimizes, what constitutes an urban pathology that detracts from what is desirous of the globally competitive city. Planning then sets out to remedy this lack or deficiency. Civil society, i.e. the public stage, and media of information dissemination are central to this process. Of course, our media are not ideologically neutral. As a consequence, media access for putting forth particular tropes of desire constitutes a central component of social, as well as economic, capital. This is well documented by Flyvbjerg (1998a) where the Aalborg Chamber of Commerce controlled the editorial content of the local newspaper. This argument is central to that of Chomsky’s (2003) multinational corporate steering of mass media content in the, so-called, ‘free’ press. This is where the mass media are free to publish almost anything, provided, of course, they do not alienate their corporate clients who provide their majority of income and profits via their advertising payments. Gunder (2003b) documented how planning actors and their affiliated partners gained public agreement via the rhetorical use of culturally shared ‘master signifiers’ and their related metonymies and metaphors. Here each signifier was linked to associations in the public’s unconscious that induced a conscious expression of desire for a particular set of values or specific consequential actions. Effective deployment of rhetorical tropes can seduce subjects ‘to relinquish previous desires (including identifications and embrace new ones) – or alternatively, to invest all the more completely in old ones’ (Bracher, 1993: 51–2). For example, does anyone wish to live in a city that is losing enjoyment to other locations because it lacks the fitness to compete? In Lacan, the construction of reality is continuous with the field of desire. Desire and reality are intimately connected . . . The nature of their link can only be revealed in fantasy . . . when harmony is not present it has to be somehow introduced in order for our reality to be coherent. It has to be introduced through a fantasmatic social construction. (Stavrakakis, 1999: 62–3) This is where, from a Lacanian outlook, by accepting rationalization as the means to fulfil a desire for completeness – via the utilization of falsifying words – ‘man does not adapt himself to reality; he adapts reality to himself’ (Roudinesco, 1997: 114). Ideological fantasies as to what constitutes an enjoyable and satisfying city are deployed to hide the dysfunctions and unpredictabilities that are ubiquitous throughout all social spheres, particularly for those lacking in sufficient capital to offset adversity. Social reality ‘is sustained by the “as if”, the fantasy of what things are like’ (Dean, 2001: 627). Rationalization, or realrationalität as Flyvbjerg (1998a) calls it, exists between the everyday activities of social life and the held universal ideals or values of what ought to be, even if it is not so, in social reality. The belief that planning is not political, but technical ‘allows the myths of objectivity, value neutrality, and technical reason to persist, and thereby fosters a certain delusion about planning practice’ (Sandercock, 2004: 134). Sandercock (2004: 134) continues: planning ‘helps to redefine political debate, producing new sources of power and legitimacy, changing the force field in which we operate’. Lefebvre suggests that planning is based on a strategy of mixing scientificity and rationality with ideology. ‘Here, as elsewhere, scientificity is an ideology, an excrescence grafted onto real, but fragmentary, knowledge’ (Lefebvre, 2003: 166). In particular, Lefebvre argues that quantitative expertise including the technology of urban planning is largely a myth. This is because planning administrators: and bad administrators at that, rarely use much actual technology. However, they have the ability to persuade the people as a whole that because these are technological decisions they should be accepted. In other words, a large part of Lefebvre’s criticism [of planners] is not that technocrats are technocrats, but that they are precisely the opposite. Technology should be put to the service of everyday life, of social life rather than being precisely the condition of its suppression and control. Urbanism, for example, is an ideology that operates under the cover of this myth of technology. (Elden, 2004: 145) Social reality can only exist in the symbolic and imaginary registries as it is composed, that is constructed, as a ‘result of a certain historically specific set of discursive practices and power mechanisms’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2001: 66). Flyvbjerg (1998a) illustrates this well in his exposé of the Aalborg Chamber of Commerce’s intervention in that city’s planning process. Here this grouping of dominant business people is given hegemonic voice to determine what constitutes acceptable transportation modes and spatial development in Aalborg’s town centre. In this example the planner’s technical facts, by themselves, produced the weaker argument. This was perhaps because the dissemination of these facts and their implications for planning action were ineffectively articulated to the public, if at all, via the local information media controlled by the Chamber of Commerce. In contrast, in Sydney, McGuirk (2004) documented how planners actively participated in and facilitated the dominant network of actors successfully pushing for a series of local, regional and national policies supporting Sydney’s global competitiveness. It appeared to be of little consequence that these policies induced adverse effects on the rest of the country, not to mention many of Sydney’s residents. Not dissimilarly, the Auckland case cited in the introduction illustrates how the planners actively consulted the dominant commercial stakeholders in developing their growth strategy, yet failed to have direct consultation with the Region’s actual residents (ARGF, 1999; Gunder, 2003a). Planners and their governance forum of dominant stakeholders appeared to inherently know what is in the best interests of their region’s residents. Planning as agonistic ethics Notwithstanding the ‘full rendering of the antagonisms which traverse our society, we indulge in the notion of society as an organic whole, kept together by forces of solidarity and co-operation’ (Zˇ izˇek, 1997: 6). Planning is one such instrument that shapes and justifies the governing ideals of utopian desire and in this ‘sphere, the fantasmatic ideal of harmony is dominant’ (Stavrakakis, 1999: 110). The subtle and not so subtle application of power defines truth, reason and rationality and this particularly comprises the deployment of power in our planning and related practices (Flyvbjerg, 1998a). Moreover, a Lacanian line of reasoning about knowledge and truth indicates that the constituting components of these induced fantasies of truth and rationality are mediated on the wants and needs of actors with the capacity to inflict their desires and wants on the Other and, as if, these desires belong to those who have been imposed on. This is via assertions of unquestionable ‘truth’, which are often supported and empowered by selected ‘distorted’ knowledge, practices and language put forward by their ideological supporters, employed professional experts and controlled media. Further, in this light traditional Kantian and related enlightenment ‘ethics is nothing more than a convenient tool for any ideology that tries to pass off its own commandments as authentic, spontaneous, and “honorable” inclinations of the subject’ (Zupancic, 1998: 41). In contrast to traditional ethics, Lacan’s (1992) theorizing may provide an alternative way to develop new values beyond those already constituted by society as traditional morals of good or evil shaping acceptable behaviours. Traditional ethics is predicated on a reality principle as to what is possible without transgression in social reality. As Zupancic (2003: 77) observes, this ‘reality principle itself is ideologically mediated; one could even claim that it constitutes the highest form of ideology, the ideology that presents itself as empirical factor or (biological, economic . . .) necessity.’ This ‘beyond good or evil’ does not have to lead to postmodern nihilism, rather Lacan lays a groundwork for an ethics of the Real, where through acknowledgement of this Real that we cannot know or articulate we can establish new ‘truths’ in relationship to the ‘good’ (Stavrakakis, 2003b; Zupancic, 2000, 2003). This is through a mechanism of ethical sublimation where we create ‘a certain space, scene, or “stage” that enables us to value something that is situated beyond the reality principle, as well as beyond the principle of common good’ (Zupancic, 2003: 78). It is the space, or stage, created when the planner, or other actor, makes the ethical decision to recommend an action or permission that is contrary to existing regulations, precedence, professional expectations, or cultural imperatives. This is perhaps because somehow for the planner, perhaps simply driven by strong feelings, the ‘correct’ and expected action is perceived as not being the right thing to do. From the Lacanian perspective of the ethics of the Real, to make the sensed wrong into a rightness is the ethically correct task, even if this requires the agent to act against what he/she thinks society expects of that actor. This act of transcending the reality principle, and being true to the actor’s desires,5 makes possible a new good, a new potential, it changes the rules as to what is possible (Gunder and Hillier, 2004: 230). ‘The ethical, then, is the constellation of events in which the subject frees herself from the symbolic law (“freedom”), commits herself to an act (“agency”), and thereby makes it possible for the law to be rethought’ (Kay, 2003: 109). The ethical ‘act is an “excessive”, trans-strategic intervention which redefines the rules and contours of the existing order’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 81). Viewed from this perspective, Kant’s categorical imperative must be rethought itself as purely transgressive: the ethical act proper is a transgression of the legal norm – a transgression which, in contrast to a simple criminal violation, does not simply violate the legal norm, but redefines what is a legal norm. The moral law does not follow the Good – it generates a new shape of what counts as ‘Good’. (Zˇ izˇek, 2001: 170) This is a transgression that introduces new spaces for what can be considered ‘good’ and hence a wider space for jouissance, beyond that of mere technically produced materialist satisfaction. Of course, a key question becomes: how can a credible planner, or other actor, transcend the accepted norms and expectations of a society to create a new space for a new concept of ‘good’? Further, how can one effectively and reasonably mobilize such an ethics of the Real in everyday life when it is so contrary to the consensual instrumental rationality of the modern project and its ready-made solutions, that are, arguably planning’s purpose and foundations? Planning theorists (e.g. Gunder and Hillier, 2004; Pløger, 2004) and researchers in other disciplines (e.g. Mouffe, 1999, 2000; Stavrakakis, 2003a; Thrift, 2004a, 2004b) are currently attempting to address these complex issues that essentially require new insight and perhaps even profound change in our very relationships towards social reality, itself. Further, they are attempting to do so in a manner that does not simply impose a new intransigent set of ideals to replace our late-modern cultural imperatives, but rather to encourage diverse opportunities for multiple opening in which imminence may continually occur (after Deleuze). Coherent and implementable means to achieve this desired state are yet to emerge as new knowledges and practices, if they can ever do so. Yet, this author suggests that mere awareness and articulation of the impossible implications that the Lacanian Real has on traditional rationality are perhaps one of many points of commencement. Of course, this discourse also may fall into the trap leading to transcendental idealism, i.e. a process of identifying a lack, or void, in our knowledge and practices and then presenting a hegemonic solution that must be implemented, regardless of effect and affect! This author suggests that to change social reality, to begin to question and where necessary traverse our norms and laws, while avoiding the imperative of idealism, calls for a return to agonism that reawakens the political awareness of lack and negativity in place of the technical injunction: you will enjoy! This permits a space for an inclusive acceptance of strife or agonism that does not exclude the Others’ voice attempting to articulate their desires and wants in response to the ‘irreducibility of the Real’ (Stavrakakis, 2003b: 331). Rather this re-politicization of the planning problematic from that of the technical, quantified, solution is one that values Lacan’s Real and Lefebvre’s lived space by making the ‘key “jump from quantity to quality”, from antagonisms subordinated to differences to the predominant role of antagonism’ as pure agonism (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 92). In Lefebvre’s city ‘unconscious desires and passions lay dormant, dormant beneath the surface of the real, within the surreal . . . waiting for . . . the day they can be realized in actual conscious life’ (Merrifield, 2000: 178). In this regard, rather than continuing to fill the lack generating the urban problematic and produce a largely phallic enjoyment, Stavrakakis (2003b: 332) reminds us that in Lacan’s later teachings he spoke of another form ‘of jouissance – female or feminine jouissance – which values this lack per se as something that entails a different kind of enjoyment.’ Perhaps this feminine jouissance may be more appropriate to politicize the needs and wants of lived space. Yet, to do so would require a politics that acknowledges the impossibility of the Lacanian Real. In contrast to the notion that what is meant by an utopia is an imagined ‘ideal society; what characterizes utopia is literally the construction of a u-topic space, a social space outside the existing parameters, the parameters of what appears to be “possible” in the existing social universe’ (Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 123). This proposed utopia is one that may permit, at least aspects of Lefebvre’s ‘lived space’ of the qualitative to be both visible and articulated in conscious life. Rather than contestant cities and regions competing globally under one cultural imperative to attract and retain finite capital and resources via one ‘logic’ and vision, this article calls for a planning ethos that encourages diverse groups within cities and regions to actively contest their perspectives and desires without threat of exclusion. To achieve such a state requires planning ‘to find ways of working with agonism without automatically recurring to procedures, voting, representativity, forced consensus or compromises’ that inherently exclude (Pløger, 2004: 87). This requires a planning ethos predicated on a central awareness of the irreducible Real. This is an understanding that any forced resolution always excludes a remainder, what cannot be articulated or perceived. Further, this remainder will continue to have unconscious effect in terms of what drives our materialized actions. This suggests an overt democratic planning process, representative of a society that is explicitly and overtly hegemonic for all participants, not tacitly hegemonic in its privileging of specific groups with access to power and technocratic justification that is constituted under a logic implicitly desiring social order (Critchley, cited in Zˇ izˇek, 2004b: 95). This is in contrast to the existing social reality, where political processes, such as planning, appear to strive for public participation culminating in an harmonious public consensus, when of course this is but an ideological foil that excludes in the name of a ‘general interest’ defined by a privileged few and legitimized by technocratic ‘reason’. In contrast, a strong society ‘places conflict and power at its centre’ by guaranteeing the very ‘existence of conflict’ (Flyvbjerg, 1998b: 229). Our current dominating fantasy of harmony is sustained by the illusion of continued consumer abundance produced and brought by the cornucopia of global capitalism, at least for the first world. This enjoyment of global capitalism ‘constitutes a (partial) reality with hegemonic appeal, a horizon sustained by the hegemony of an administration of desire with seemingly unlimited resources’ (Stavrakakis, 2003a: 61). Of course, resources and global carrying capacities are axiomatically finite. So perhaps must be our desires, for they can never be sated. Traversing our fundamental fantasy for harmony: a start, not a conclusion! Lacan and his followers, such as Stavrakakis, Zˇ izˇek or Zupancic, produce valid arguments for a psychoanalytically derived philosophy of reality and ideology ‘capable of theorizing the ways our deepest commitments bind us to practices of domination’ (Dean, 2001: 627). Revealing and transversing the ideological constructs that shape and structure our social reality is inadequate in itself as a mere academic critical exercise of knowledge production. This author argues that we must radically challenge our underlying beliefs for ourselves, and, in particular, not externalize them to ‘larger cultural practices and technologies’ so that hegemonic networks, or partnerships, of dominant actors, including intellectuals and bureaucratic professionals, can do our believing and desiring for us through planning and related diverse agencies of social guidance (Dean, 2001: 628). To do so we must traverse our fundamental fantasies that seek harmony and security. This article’s application of Lacan, augmented with some of Lefebvre’s urban insights, gives us a combination of Freudian and Marxist thought that is considerably at odds to that conjured up by the Frankfurt School’s vision of society as ‘a liberated collective culture’ with little space for the individual histories of unique subjects (Jameson, 2003: 8). The latter is the School, or project, drawing on Marx and Freud, which eventually created the Habermasian product of communicative rationality. This is a rationality that sought as its seldom if ever achieved ideal, to produce undistorted (ideologically free) speech acts ‘based on recognition of the corresponding validity claims of comprehensiveness, truth, truthfulness, and rightness’ constituting a basis for consensually agreement as to how we should act (Habermas, 1979: 3). Yet, as Hillier (2003) illustrates, this is an ideal of undistorted speech that is an impossibility because of the Lacanian Real and the incompleteness it always induces in language, not to mention the impossibility of absolute truth. Yet, this author would agree with Habermas’ call for the supremacy of discourse over mere technical reason. Habermas’ last two validity claims of truthfulness to our desires and the need to act in regard of what our unconscious feeling says is rightness, even if this sense is perhaps not readily justifiable with symbolic knowledge and reasoned argument, should be given due regard through our discourses. In contrast to Habermas’ validity claims of truth and comprehensiveness, Lacan’s theorizing suggests a much more fundamental contextualization of urban ideology based on the fantasies we construct to paper over the lack induced by the Real. This is a perspective that situates our very social reality, including space and social interaction, as principally constituted and composed of ideological fantasy constructs, misrecognitions and misunderstandings (see Hillier, 2003). As Jameson (2003: 37–8) observes, we owe to Lacan ‘the first new and as yet insufficiently developed concept of the nature of ideology since Marx’. Drawing on Althusser, Jameson (2003: 37–8) continues that ideology is ‘the “representation” of the Imaginary relationships of individuals to their Real conditions of existence’, so that ‘the individual subject invents a “lived” relationship with collective systems.’ This is a symbolic, materialized, relationship of practices and rituals (Krips, 2003: 149). Here, it is the desire of this Other that we fundamentally seek and wish to please as we constantly strive to return to our idealized primordial desire for infant maternal security and contentment (Hillier and Gunder, 2005). So we construct and share illusions and fantasies – ideologies – that we are somehow achieving this impossible task. It is the aggregate of these Others, and the illusions we generate about them and ourselves, that constitutes the social reality that is our lived space.

#### Their utopian politics of fiat requires a scapegoat to maintain conceptual coherence – that leads to a drive for elimination that justifies violent and genocidal practices

Stavrakakis Yannis Stavrakakis, 1999, “Lacan and the political,” Routledge, SJBE

What I will try to do in this chapter is, first of all, to demonstrate the deeply problematic nature of utopian politics. Simply put, my argument will be that every utopian fantasy construction needs a scapegoat in order to constitute itself – the Nazi utopian fantasy and the production of the Jew is a good example, especially as pointed out in Zizek’s 4 analysis. Every utopian fantasy produces its reverse and calls for its elimination. Put another way, the beatific side of fantasy is coupled in utopian constructions with a horrific side, a paranoid need for a stigmatised scapegoat. The naivety and also the danger of utopian structures is revealed when the realisation of this fantasy is attempted. It is then that we are brought close to the frightening kernel of the real: stigmatisation is followed by extermination. This is not an accident. It is inscribed in the structure of utopian constructions; it seems to be the way all fantasy constructions work. If in almost all utopian visions, violence and antagonism are eliminated, if utopia is based on the expulsion and repression of violence (this is its beatific side) this is only because it owes its own creation to violence; it is sustained and fed by violence (this is its horrific side). This repressed moment of violence resurfaces, as Marin points out, in the difference inscribed in the name utopia itself (Marin, 1984:110). What we shall argue is that it also resurfaces in the production of the figure of an enemy. To use a phrase enunciated by the utopianist Fourier, what is ëdriven out through the door comes back through the windowí (is not this a precursor of Lacan’s dictum that ‘what is foreclosed in the symbolic reappears in the real’?-VII:131) 5 The work of Norman Cohn and other historians permits the articulation of a genealogy of this manichean, equivalential way of understanding the world, from the great witch-hunt up to modern anti-Semitism, and Lacanian theory can provide valuable insights into any attempt to understand the logic behind this utopian operationóhere the approach to fantasy developed in Chapter 2 will further demonstrate its potential in analysing our political experience. In fact, from the time of his unpublished seminar on The Formations of the Unconscious, Lacan identified the utopian dream of a perfectly functioning society as a highly problematic area (seminar of 18 June 1958). The historical argument In order to realise the problematic character of the utopian operation it is necessary to articulate a genealogy of this way of representing and making sense of the world. The work of Norman Cohn seems especially designed to serve this purpose. What is most important is that in Cohnís schema we can encounter the three basic characteristics of utopian fantasies that we have already singled out: first, their link to instances of disorder, to the element of negativity. Since human experience is a continuous battle with the unexpected there is always a need to represent and master this unexpected, to transform disorder to order. Second, this representation is usually articulated as a total and universal representation, a promise of absolute mastery of the totality of the real, a vision of the end of history. A future utopian state is envisaged in which disorder will be totally eliminated. Third, this symbolisation produces its own remainder; there is always a certain particularity remaining outside the universal schema. It is to the existence of this evil agent, which can be easily localised, that all persisting disorder is attributed. The elimination of disorder depends then on the elimination of this group. The result is always horrible: persecution, massacres, holocausts. Needless to say, no utopian fantasy is ever realised as a result of all these ëcrimesíóas mentioned in Chapter 2, the purpose of fantasy is not to satisfy an (impossible) desire but to constitute it as such. What is of great interest for our approach is the way in which Cohn himself articulates a genealogy of the pair utopia/demonisation in his books The Pursuit of the Millennium and Europeís Inner Demons (Cohn, 1993b, 1993c). The same applies to his book Warrant for Genocide (Cohn, 1996) which will also be implicated at a certain stage in our analysis. These books are concerned with the same social phenomenon, the idea of purifying humanity through the extermination of some category of human beings which are conceived as agents of corruption, disorder and evil. The contexts are, of course, different, but the urge remains the same (Cohn, 1993b:xi). All these works then, at least according to my reading, are concerned with the production of an archenemy which goes together with the utopian mentality.

#### Debate is a numb emotional response to the world that rids the aff’s impacts of their importance – their form collapses meaning and ethics

Robinson 12 Andrew Robinson, 9-10-2012, “Jean Baudrillard: Hyperreality and Implosion,” Ceasefire, <https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-9/>, SJBE

The media has a special place in the implosion of meaning. In particular, it creates [a pressure of excessive information](https://soniakral.files.wordpress.com/2011/04/information_overload.jpg?w=281). According to an online saying, “getting information from the Internet is like taking a drink from a fire hydrant”. For Baudrillard, this leads to the destructuring of the social. Social life undergoes entropy. It implodes. Baudrillard also portrays the media as performing certain functions. It juxtaposes disaster and disorder, shown in the news and in most TV shows (from action films and crime dramas to documentaries and police-camera reality-shows), to the system’s ideal of order, shown in the adverts in between. This order is portrayed as natural wellbeing, but is really a new regime of constraint in consumption. The media also injects people with a vaccine of unthreatening, mediated violence which keeps fatality at bay by displaying its signs. This vaccine covers up the actual fragility of consumerism. It restores grandeur and sublimity to the everyday by making it seem under threat. At the same time, the media encourages a sense of security. Even when it presents violence or disaster, the fact of not ‘being there’ while watching it makes it reinforce security. Through the media, we never reach the real event, but only its informational stand-in, which is open to endless interpretation. It is above all the form of the media, not the specific content, which has an ideological effect. The media’s specific informational content is subordinate to the function of producing consensus by deterring thought. Knowledge of the event as an aspect of life is prevented, creating an atmosphere of stupidity. Consensus functions by the exclusion of more radical others, and the mobilisation of resources to destroy them. It is achieved by powerlessness. The personal response, and responsiveness, is not possible in mass media. Disasters past and present are neutralised in a simple emotional response. Events like Live Aid involve viewers enjoying the spectacle of their own compassion. News programmes treat all spectacles as interchangeable, reducing everything to spectacle. As a result, the media mainly talks about itself. The real function of the media is to transmit the general outlook of reducing everything to signs. Media technologies subtly alter how viewers and readers think. Viewers have to unconsciously decode stories, and as a result, internalise the code. Behind the shifting images lies a conception of a world which can be seen, divided into segments, and read in signs. Increasingly, only what can be read is allowed to exist. The differences between news and adverts are also significant: whereas adverts are cheery and encourage engagement, news encourages lack of concern through a blank, neutral tone. An ideological code of mass culture is created through the mass media’s formal homogeneity, and through technical processes such as articulation and segmentation. Mass culture, according to Baudrillard, is a set of ritualised signs of culture, with no actual content. For example, he refers to the isolated knowledge and trivia of quiz shows. Culture is reduced to the lowest common denominator of right answers. Speed of reaction-time and trial-and-error replace intellectual questioning of the answers. The form of the question-answer or stimulus-response pairing is reproduced across capitalist culture. Participation in a liturgy or ritual is all that remains of collective participation, and it would be undermined by symbolic processes. People affiliate to groups by reproducing their signs. This occurs both with specific groups, such as Guardian- or Sun-readers, and across the entire culture. It creates a kind of magical communion of the mass through electronic mass media. People are “retribalised” through a simulated totality, arising from signs which demand cultural complicity instead of conveying a meaning-content. Language becomes a fetish by being used mainly for ingroup collusion. A collapsing regime? What are the social effects of all these changes? The main function of the changes is to actualise and preserve the system. Ultimately, the system seeks only to preserve itself. The ultimate end of politics, concealed by democratic discourse, is to maintain control of the population by any means necessary, including terror. The system is a kind of violence without consequences. It constantly dominates through deterrence, without this gesture being returned or reversed. It is sustained by fascination for the system’s operations. And its effects on the everyday? The social is now a special effect. The appearance of networks converging on an empty site of collective happiness produces the special effect. Consumption now functions like labour. It is a kind of work, which gives the system sign-value. We have lost the social, the real, and power. We don’t know how to mourn them. We become fascinated by the real as a lost object. Melancholy (depression) becomes the dominant tone of social life. It is a brutal disaffection arising from generalised simulation and the loss of intensity and meaning. The system seems too strong to be checked. People become fascinated at what is happening to signs and to reality. The lines between categories become vague and categories begin to disappear, or become poorly defined or all-encompassing. The lack of differentiation – the collapse of the segmenting categories – brings us back to a terrifying, undivided nature. Interstitial space – the space between things – disappears. We are overwhelmed by the over-proximity of all things, like in the Lacanian view of psychosis. It’s not so much that reality doesn’t exist, as that it is inaccessible from within a regime of simulation. Transparency has the effect of curtailing intensity. Social life falls into a stupor or inertia, ‘deterred’ by the code and by its own transparency. Today, illusion no longer counts. Survival depends on the real, the object. This has negative effects. Objectivity is the opposite of fatality, and is always subject to law. This is another way of saying that we are lacking the symbolic dimension. This lack resounds throughout various fields, putting an end to values. The autonomy of the system of signs puts an end to the regime of signs, of representation, and of production. Aesthetics are destroyed by the cold, systematic reproduction of functional objects, including objects signifying beauty. Signs become socially mobile, as in the phenomena of kitsch and cliché. All the humanist criteria of value – from morality to truth to aesthetics – disappear, because the code rests on indifference and neutralisation. Capitalism almost becomes a parody of itself. The situation of indistinction which reason and science have historically struggled against is now coming into existence, because of hyperreality – because a lot of what exists is neither objectively true nor subjectively imagined. Panic tends to arise because of the functioning of value separately from its referential contents. We are living through a collapse of meaning.

#### Their form of politics sustains a bad relationship to the death drive, ensuring extinction.

Themi 8 [Tim; Professor in Philosophy Camp; Psychoanalysis from the School of Humanities &amp; Social Sciences at Deakin University, “HOW LACAN’S ETHICS MIGHT IMPROVE OUR UNDERSTANDING OF NIETZSCHE’S CRITIQUE OF PLATONISM: THE NEUROSIS &amp; NIHILSM OF A ‘LIFE’ AGAINST LIFE,” Cosmos and History: The Journal of Natural and Social Philosophy, Vol 4, No 1-2; 2008; http://www.cosmosandhistory.org/index.php/journal/article/view/96/192] EG // Re-Cut Justin

But with our advancements in technological power outmatching by far any correlative advance in the awareness gained as a whole of our prehistoric Thing within: the great 21st century ecological disaster that too many academics and activists now increasingly predict, seems more than just a little possible. But to this increasingly macabre scenario, we must also add the renewed proliferation of nuclear weapons which occurs, no less, amidst a world where vital resources for energy and democracy are wearing thin[50]. For just such reasons, wilful ignorance of the Thing now bares results which Lacan’s Ethics reveals as far too terrifyingly possible to rationally accept; given that we have the Thing armed to the teeth now from that primitive id-like part of the brain, with no Sovereign Good, and all the way into a nuclear age.

CONCLUSION: THE NEUROSIS &amp; NIHILISM OF A ‘LIFE’ AGAINST LIFE.

This is why Lacan proposes that his enquiry into ethics must be one to go “more deeply into the notion of the real”(LE:11). Further into what he would rather call the real, given that previous notions of ‘nature’ have been too far ‘different’––from being far too Platonic––than his own; and because it’s the very exclusions in these previous notions which upon return, as return of excess, are yielding our most tragic problems.

Today when faced with problems of the magnitude of global warming––a special but by no means solo case of adverse environment change at present due to our physical treatment of the planet––we often think the answer is to be more moral, more good, and we are thankful when exponents of the Good in some way bring attention to the problem. However, the idea of the Good as introduced by Plato, and nigh all of its descendants whether secular, rationalist, religious or not, continue to predicate themselves on a radically false picture of the human-condition: if not still of the entire cosmos––which only then lines itself up aside of an age- old repression, a repression of das Ding, that Freudian Thing in our inner real which, when it returns after being disavowed and denied in the name of the Good too long, is even more devastating.

Presently we are accelerating along the path of what Lacan discloses as our civilisation’s “race towards destruction”, a “massive destruction”, “a resurgence of savagery”, snaking the paths traced out before us by the centuries long dominion of Western morality [51]; and the nihilism detected by Nietzsche before the turn of the 20th has never threatened to reach such the grand finale. But what I would have us take from this enquiry here is that this is not because we aren’t in accordance enough with a moral ideal of the Sovereign good, but rather, it’s because we aren’t in accordance enough with a proper understanding of the real. It’s because we still at some level think that being more moral, in accordance with the Good’s inherited repressive structures towards our drives, desire, and truthfulness about the real, is actually the answer to––rather than the source of––our most tragic problems.

The goal here is by no means then to encourage all to let their Things run wild––which would probably be nothing short of an instant conflagration––but this is why and precisely why we must desist from deluding ourselves under the tightening grip of a Sovereign Good, for this is precisely the move which cuts the Thing loose after pressing down for far too long, a slippery hand’s palming on the coils of a spring, forever readying the subsequent explosion. For when that which is really real––as opposed to what Christian-Platonism falsely called the ‘real’––is forced from mind, it can’t really disappear because it is real, and it tends to end up only in our gun-sights as an imaginary overlaying of an external other, when the signifier ‘enmity’ appears. The earth itself can even seem like the enemy after while, one which like Plato in his Phaedo, we might think then to escape from “as if from a prison”, and especially from “the bonds of the body”, in the hope that we may live one day without the earthly altogether[52]. Following such negations to their logical conclusion, life itself becomes enemy too, for as being made up of the earthly and organic, life could never be free of what it is in essence. And what is the death-drive Freud tells from the start, if not to return us sundry to that dust-bowl of the inorganic; as per that “second death”[53] fantasm Lacan salvages from the Monstre de Sade, which wills to go beyond the destruction of mere beings, by destroying too the principle from which fresh sets could emerge. Such negative devaluations of our earthly, organic life though are really of our own construction: as de Sade, like any pervert, is only the mirror which shows expressed what Platonic- neurotics are but hide inside––a cess-pit of loathing contempt for life, built up from the unconscious and disowned, distorted and damned up, built up, instinctual-ideational elements of their own subjective psyches, phobically ferocious of that Thingly real lying not so dormant, and readying within…

But is it now still possible as Nietzsche teaches to say ‘Yes’ to the real of nature both without and within––to return to it!––even though it is more frightful and we are less guaranteed protection of it than the Platonic history of metaphysicians taught? For with the further disclosures of The Ethics of Psychoanalysis––Lacan’s following up and extension of the meta-ethical implications of Freud: perhaps even Nietzsche, our great intellectual übermensch, may too have bitten off more snake- head than he could chew? From certain moments in Nietzsche’s texts we can perhaps interpret that he may have had this Thing in his sights, but saw nothing much to come of it, so instead, elected to turn away, though not without some perhaps hinted at self- amusement.[54]

But with psychoanalysis, rightly or wrongly, such truths are out. It doesn’t seem all positive at first, and perhaps it never entirely will. But we must not let this deeper disclosure desist us now from the core Nietzschean project of locating and overcoming the nihilism which begs us to take cover in idealising fictions, as if life as life is not worth living. Not because nihilism and the annihilation of the species is wrong in the sense of being immoral, but rather because it is bad art, mediocre art, and the ‘knowledge’ claims it trumpets on should only make us flare. If we are at our full intellectual and creative will to power, we can only consider such cultural-civil regressions as we saw on display with that whole propaganda comedy that surrounded the war for more oil in Iraq as infantile; the hapless results of sibling rivalries gone too far astray. But we must also resist being caught up in the imaginary of those who would only re-preach to us now of a return to the Good, who would only redeploy such versions of nihilism’s precursory defensive fictions, the pernicious ones, which would only then re-falsify our data, and leave us disappointed when the truth then re-emerges. Doing more harm than good does Platonism in the end by leaving us untrained for the real, with the habit instead to take some truth as ‘error’, and error as ‘truth’––as ‘real’––to the point even of epistemic dysfunction. Take the grotesque intellectual poverty of that whole Christian middle-ages for example, whence put into relation with the heights of Aristotle and his fellow Greeks, as Augustine and Aquinas amplified some of the worst bits of Platonism, and threw the rest into abyss.

The overcoming of the moralising good of Christian-Platonism though does by no means imply then a subsequent affirmation of all that brutal Roman like greed, slavery, decadence, circus-bread corruption and mindless colonial expansion that we’ve heard all about, and are hardly so free of with our corporate today––just ask a Latin-American for instance![55] For it is possible within the perspectives opened up by Nietzsche, Freud, Lacan, as Silvia Ons puts it, to view a social-historical or individual neurosis of any kind: including the expressed acted-out, perverse-sadistic form that escapes when the Good is temporarily loosed of its repressive grip––and say to the would be Platonist: ‘No, not that, that’s not a cure, that’s a mirage; that’s sheer fantasy, resentment, spite; that’s not a cure it will only make things worse; worse in a different way, but worse nonetheless!’

By greater mindfulness then, with guided affirmation towards even that fearsome Freudian Thing that The Ethics of Psychoanalysis has us find now in our inner natures: we can eventually again say ‘Yes’-to-life in such the way that it overcomes the nihilism of not caring too much whether we as individuals or species live or die, whether we as culture or civilisation advance or decline. But we can only do this with fullest efficacy by freeing ourselves of all that wasted neurosis sickness that feels it must deny our Thing like aspect of the real: because from all those Christian-Platonic prejudices of the Good, it has been taught that such ‘things’ are too far beneath it. We must continue instead to train ourselves to stare the real directly in the face, without flinching, and that’s all we can do at least to start. For unless we can continue to utilise, sublimate, enjoy and get a positive, well-guided jouissance out of all aspects of life––including that Freudian Ding in our real––then the chances are we’re going to be at least in part, happy enough in no longer living it: offering not even a puff of genuine political praxis! We either face up to the death-drive snaking long beneath the dank, hidden history of the un-real, anti-real Good of Platonism––or let the disowned, un-understood drive resurge of its own volition **until it accidentally finishes us**!s Ethics, May 1960.

#### Vote negative to embrace the lack – this requires being open to the anxiety that occurs from an encounter with the real of the other and breaks down fantasy and drives.

McGowan 13 [Todd; Associate Professor of Film Studies at the UVermont; “Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” Pg. 26-29; 2013; University of Nebraska Press / Lincoln and London] SJBE Re-Highlighted Justin

The alternative — the ethical path that psychoanalysis identifies — demands an embrace of the anxiety that stems from the encounter with the enjoying other. If there is a certain ethical dimension to anxiety, it lies in the rela- tionship that exists between anxiety and enjoyment. Contra Heidegger, the ethics of anxiety does not stem from anxiety’s relation to absence but from its relation to presence — to the overwhelming presence of the other’s enjoyment. In some sense, the encounter with absence or nothing is easier than the encounter with presence. Even though it traumatizes us, absence allows us to constitute ourselves as desiring subjects. Rather than producing anxiety, absence leads the subject out of anxiety into desire. Confronted with the lost object as a structuring absence, the subject is able to embark on the pursuit of the enjoyment embodied by this object, and this pursuit provides the subject with a clear sense of direction and even meaning. This is precisely what the subject lacks when it does not encounter a lack in the symbolic structure. When the subject encounters enjoyment at the point where it should encounter the absence of enjoyment, anxiety overwhelms the subject.

In this situation, the subject cannot constitute itself along the path of desire. It lacks the lack — the absence — that would provide the space through which desire could develop. Consequently, this subject confronts the enjoying other and experiences anxiety. Unlike the subject of desire — or the subject of Heideggerean anxiety — the subject who suffers this sort of anxiety actually experiences the other in its real dimension.¶

The real other is the other caught up in its obscene enjoyment, caught up in this enjoyment in a way that intrudes on the subject. There is no safe distance from this enjoyment, and one cannot simply avoid it. There is nowhere in the contemporary world to hide from it. As a result, the contem- porary subject is necessarily a subject haunted by anxiety triggered by the omnipresent enjoyment of the other. And yet, this enjoyment offers us an ethical possibility. As Slavoj Žižek puts it, “It is this excessive and intrusive jouissance that we should learn to tolerate.”27 When we tolerate the other’s “excessive and intrusive jouissance” and when we endure the anxiety that it produces, we acknowledge and sustain the other in its real dimension.¶

Tolerance is the ethical watchword of our epoch. However, the problem with contemporary tolerance is its insistence on tolerating the other only insofar as the other cedes its enjoyment and accepts the prevailing symbolic structure. That is to say, we readily tolerate the other in its symbolic dimen- sion, the other that plays by the rules of our game. This type of tolerance allows the subject to feel good about itself and to sustain its symbolic identity. The problem is that, at the same time, it destroys what is in the other more than the other — the particular way that the other enjoys.¶

It is only the encounter with the other in its real dimension — the encounter that produces anxiety in the subject — that sustains that which defines the other as such. Authentic tolerance tolerates the real other, not simply the other as mediated through a symbolic structure. In this sense, it involves the experience of anxiety on the part of the subject. This is a difficult posi- tion to sustain, as it involves enduring the “whole opaque weight of alien enjoyment on your chest.”The obscene enjoyment of the other bombards the authentically tolerant subject, but this subject does not retreat from the anxiety that this enjoyment produces.

If the embrace of the anxiety that accompanies the other’s proximate enjoyment represents the ethical position today, this does not necessarily provide us with an incentive for occupying it. Who wants to be ethical when it involves enduring anxiety rather than finding a way — a drug, a new authority, or something — to alleviate it? What good does it do to sustain oneself in anxiety? In fact, anxiety does the subject no good at all, which is why it offers the subject the possibility of enjoyment. When the subject encounters the other’s enjoyment, this is the form that its own enjoyment takes as well. To endure the anxiety caused by the other’s enjoyment is to experience one’s own simultaneously. As Lacan points out, when it comes to the enjoyment of the other and my own enjoyment, “nothing indicates they are distinct.” Thus, not only is anxiety an ethical position, it is also the key to embracing the experience of enjoyment. To reject the experience of anxiety is to flee one’s own enjoyment.¶

The notion that the other’s enjoyment is also our own enjoyment seems at first glance difficult to accept. Few people enjoy themselves when they hear someone else screaming profanities in the workplace or when they see a couple passionately kissing in public, to take just two examples. In these instances, we tend to recoil at the inappropriateness of the activity rather than enjoy it, and this reaction seems completely justified. The public display of enjoyment violates the social pact with its intrusiveness; it doesn’t let us alone but assaults our senses. It violates the implicit agreement of the public sphere constituted as an enjoyment-free zone. And yet, recoiling from the other’s enjoyment deprives us of our own.¶

How we comport ourselves in relation to the other’s enjoyment indi- cates our relationship to our own. What bothers us about the other — the disturbance that the other’s enjoyment creates in our existence — is our own mode of enjoying. If we did not derive enjoyment from the other’s enjoyment, witnessing it would not bother us psychically. We would sim- ply be indifferent to it and focused on our own concerns. Of course, we might ask an offending car radio listener to turn the radio down so that we wouldn’t have to hear the unwanted music, but we would not experience the mere exhibition of alien enjoyment through the playing of that music as an affront. The very fact that the other’s enjoyment captures our attention demonstrates our intimate — or extimate — relation to it.

This relation becomes even clearer when we consider the epistemo- logical status of the enjoying other. Because the real or enjoying other is irreducible to any observable identity, we have no way of knowing whether or not the other really is enjoying. A stream of profanity may be the result of someone hurting a toe. The person playing the car radio too loud while sitting at the traffic light may have simply forgotten to turn down the radio after driving on the highway. Or the person may have difficulty hearing. The couple’s amorous behavior in public may reflect an absence of enjoyment in their relationship that they are trying to hide from both themselves and the public.¶

Considering the enjoyment of the other, we never know whether it is there or not. If we experience it, we do so through the lens of our own fantasy. We fantasize that the person blasting the radio is caught up in the enjoyment of the music to the exclusion of everything else; we fantasize that the public kisses of the couple suggest an enjoyment that has no concern for the outside world. Without the fantasy frame, the enjoying other would never appear within our experience.¶

The role of the fantasy frame for accessing the enjoying other becomes apparent within Fascist ideology. Fascism posits an internal enemy — the figure of the Jew or some analogue — that enjoys illicitly at the expense of the social body as a whole. By attempting to eliminate the enjoying other, Fascism hopes to create a pure social body bereft of any stain of enjoy- ment. This purity would allow for the ultimate enjoyment, but it would be completely licit. This hope for a future society free of any stain is not where Fascism’s true enjoyment lies, however. Fascists experience their own enjoyment through the enjoying other that they persecute. The enjoy- ment that the figure of the Jew embodies is the Fascists’ own enjoyment, though they cannot avow it as their own. More than any other social form, Fascism is founded on the disavowal of enjoyment — the attempt to enjoy while keeping enjoyment at arm’s length. But this effort is not confined to Fascism; it predominates everywhere, because no subjects anywhere can simply feel comfortable with their own mode of enjoying.¶

The very structure of enjoyment is such that we cannot experience it directly: when we experience enjoyment, we don’t have it; it has us. We experience our own enjoyment as an assault coming from the outside that dominates our conscious intentions. This is why we must fantasize our own enjoyment through the enjoying other. Compelled by our enjoyment, we can’t do otherwise; we act against our self-interest and against our own good. Enjoyment overwhelms the subject, even though the subject’s mode of enjoying marks what is most singular about the subject.¶

Even though the encounter with the enjoying other apprehends the real other through the apparatus of fantasy, this encounter is nonetheless genuine and has an ethical status. Unlike the experience of the nonexistent symbolic identity, which closes down the space in which the real other might appear, the fantasized encounter with the enjoying other leaves this space open. By allowing itself to be disturbed by the other on the level of fantasy, the subject acknowledges the singularity of the real other — its mode of enjoying — without confining this singularity to a prescribed identity.¶

The implications of privileging the encounter with the disturbing enjoy- ment of the real other over the assimilable symbolic identity are themselves disturbing. The tolerant attitude that never allows itself to be jarred by the enjoying other becomes, according to this way of seeing things, further from really encountering the real other than the attitude of hate and mis- trust. The liberal subject who welcomes illegal immigrants as fellow citizens completely shuts down the space for the other in the real. The immigrant as fellow citizen is not the real other. The xenophobic conservative, on the other hand, constructs a fantasy that envisions the illegal immigrant awash in a linguistic and cultural enjoyment that excludes natives. This fantasy, paradoxically, permits an encounter with the real other that liberal tolerance forecloses. Of course, xenophobes retreat from this encounter and from their own enjoyment, but they do have an experience of it that liberals do not. The tolerant liberal is open to the other but eliminates the otherness, while the xenophobic conservative is closed to the other but allows for the otherness. The ethical position thus involves sustaining the liberal’s toler- ance within the conservative’s encounter with the real other.

#### Best brain studies verify psychoanalysis!

Guterl 2 [Fred; “What Freud Got Right,” Newsweek; 11/10/02; <https://www.newsweek.com/what-freud-got-right-142575>] Justin

But a funny thing happened to Freud on the way to becoming a trivia question: as researchers looked deeper into the physical structure of the brain, they began to find support for some of his theories. Now a small but influential group of researchers are using his insights as a guide to future research; they even have a journal, Neuropsychoanalysis, founded three years ago. "Freud's insights on the nature of consciousness are consonant with the most advanced contemporary neuroscience views," wrote Antonio Damasio, head of neurology at the University of Iowa College of Medicine. Note that Damasio did not refer to psychoanalysis or the Oedipus complex. Instead the work is going on at the fundamental level where emotions are born and primitive passions lurk in the shadows of dreams.

Beyond the basic animal instincts to seek food and avoid pain, Freud identified two sources of psychic energy, which he called "drives": aggression and libido (the latter encompasses sexuality but also had a more expansive meaning, involving the desire for stimulation and achievement). The key to his theory is that these were unconscious drives, shaping our behavior without the mediation of our waking minds; they surface, heavily disguised, only in our dreams. The work of the past half-century in psychology and neuroscience has been to downplay the role of unconscious universal drives, focusing instead on rational processes in conscious life. Meanwhile, dreams were downgraded to a kind of mental static, random scraps of memory flickering through the sleeping brain. But researchers have found evidence that Freud's drives really do exist, and they have their roots in the limbic system, a primitive part of the brain that operates mostly below the horizon of consciousness. Now more commonly referred to as emotions, the modern suite of drives comprises five: rage, panic, separation distress, lust and a variation on libido sometimes called seeking. Freud presaged this finding in 1915, when he wrote that drives originate "from within the organism" in response to demands placed on the mind "in consequence of its connection with the body." Drives, in other words, are primitive brain circuits that control how we respond to our environment--foraging when we're hungry, running when we're scared and lusting for a mate.

The seeking drive is proving a particularly fruitful subject for researchers. Although like the others it originates in the limbic system, it also involves parts of the forebrain, the seat of higher mental functions. In the 1980s, Jaak Panksepp, a neurobiologist at Bowling Green State University in Ohio, became interested in a place near the cortex known as the ventraltegmental area, which in humans lies just above the hairline. When Panksepp stimulated the corresponding region in a mouse, the animal would sniff the air and walk around, as though it were looking for something. Was it hunger? No. The mouse would walk right by a plate of food, or for that matter any other object Panksepp could think of. This brain tissue seemed to cause a general desire for something new. "What I was seeing," he says, "was the urge to do stuff." Panksepp called this seeking.

To neuropsychologist Mark Solms of University College in London, that sounds very much like libido. "Freud needed some sort of general, appetitive desire to seek pleasure in the world of objects," says Solms. "Panksepp discovered as a neuroscientist what Freud discovered psychologically." Solms studied the same region of the brain for his work on dreams. Since the 1970s, neurologists have known that dreaming takes place during a particular form of sleep known as REM--rapid eye movement--which is associated with a primitive part of the brain known as the pons. Accordingly, they regarded dreaming as a low-level phenomenon of no great psychological interest. When Solms looked into it, though, it turned out that the key structure involved in dreaming was actually the ventral tegmental, the same structure that Panksepp had identified as the seat of the "seeking" emotion. Dreams, it seemed, originate with the libido--which is just what Freud had believed.

Freud's psychological map may have been flawed in many ways, but it also happens to be the most coherent and, from the standpoint of individual experience, meaningful theory of the mind there is. "Freud should be placed in the same category as Darwin, who lived before the discovery of genes," says Panksepp. "Freud gave us a vision of a mental apparatus. We need to talk about it, develop it, test it." Perhaps it's not a matter of proving Freud wrong or right, but of finishing the job.

#### Psychoanalysis is both falsifiable and accurate.

Grant & Harari ‘5 (Don and Edwin, psychiatrists, “Psychoanalysis, science and the seductive theory of Karl Popper,” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry ) SJBE, recut from Harvard BS

Attacks on psychoanalysis and the long-term therapies derived from it, have enjoyed a long history and much publicity [1-4]. Yet, the justification for such attacks has been challenged on many grounds, including their methodology [5] and the empirically demonstrable validity of core psychoanalytic concepts [6,7]. Also, burgeoning neuroscience research, some of which is summarized below, indicates likely neurological correlates for many key clinically derived psychoanalytic concepts such as self-coherence [8], repression [9] and projective identification [10]. Furthermore, the effectiveness of psychoanalysis and its derivative therapies has been supported by empirical research [11,12], particularly for patients with DSM axis II pathology. Despite this evidence, the attacks on psychoanalysis continue unabated, not only from some psychiatrists [13,14] but also from the highest levels of politics and health bureaucrats [15], although what exactly is being attacked is often unclear.

## 2

### T

#### Interpretation: “workers” is a generic bare plural. The aff may not defend that a just government recognizes a specific group of workers unconditional right to strike

Nebel 19. [Jake Nebel is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Southern California and executive director of Victory Briefs. He writes a lot of this stuff lol – duh.] “Genericity on the Standardized Tests Resolution.” Vbriefly. August 12, 2019. <https://www.vbriefly.com/2019/08/12/genericity-on-the-standardized-tests-resolution/?fbclid=IwAR0hUkKdDzHWrNeqEVI7m59pwsnmqLl490n4uRLQTe7bWmWDO_avWCNzi14> TG

Both distinctions are important. Generic resolutions can’t be affirmed by specifying particular instances. But, since generics tolerate exceptions, plan-inclusive counterplans (PICs) do not negate generic resolutions.

Bare plurals are typically used to express generic generalizations. But there are two important things to keep in mind. First, generic generalizations are also often expressed via other means (e.g., definite singulars, indefinite singulars, and bare singulars). Second, and more importantly for present purposes, bare plurals can also be used to express existential generalizations. For example, “Birds are singing outside my window” is true just in case there are some birds singing outside my window; it doesn’t require birds in general to be singing outside my window.

So, what about “colleges and universities,” “standardized tests,” and “undergraduate admissions decisions”? Are they generic or existential bare plurals? On other topics I have taken great pains to point out that their bare plurals are generic—because, well, they are. On this topic, though, I think the answer is a bit more nuanced. Let’s see why.

“Colleges and universities” is a generic bare plural. I don’t think this claim should require any argument, when you think about it, but here are a few reasons.

First, ask yourself, honestly, whether the following speech sounds good to you: “Eight colleges and universities—namely, those in the Ivy League—ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions. Maybe other colleges and universities ought to consider them, but not the Ivies. Therefore, in the United States, colleges and universities ought not consider standardized tests in undergraduate admissions decisions.” That is obviously not a valid argument: the conclusion does not follow. Anyone who sincerely believes that it is valid argument is, to be charitable, deeply confused. But the inference above would be good if “colleges and universities” in the resolution were existential. By way of contrast: “Eight birds are singing outside my window. Maybe lots of birds aren’t singing outside my window, but eight birds are. Therefore, birds are singing outside my window.” Since the bare plural “birds” in the conclusion gets an existential reading, the conclusion follows from the premise that eight birds are singing outside my window: “eight” entails “some.” If the resolution were existential with respect to “colleges and universities,” then the Ivy League argument above would be a valid inference. Since it’s not a valid inference, “colleges and universities” must be a generic bare plural.

Second, “colleges and universities” fails the [upward-entailment test](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/generics/#IsolGeneInte) for existential uses of bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Lima beans are on my plate.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some lima beans on my plate. One test of this is that it entails the more general sentence, “Beans are on my plate.” Now consider the sentence, “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” (To isolate “colleges and universities,” I’ve eliminated the other bare plurals in the resolution; it cannot plausibly be generic in the isolated case but existential in the resolution.) This sentence does not entail the more general statement that educational institutions ought not consider the SAT. This shows that “colleges and universities” is generic, because it fails the upward-entailment test for existential bare plurals.

Third, “colleges and universities” fails the adverb of quantification test for existential bare plurals. Consider the sentence, “Dogs are barking outside my window.” This sentence expresses an existential statement that is true just in case there are some dogs barking outside my window. One test of this appeals to the drastic change of meaning caused by inserting any adverb of quantification (e.g., always, sometimes, generally, often, seldom, never, ever). You cannot add any such adverb into the sentence without drastically changing its meaning. To apply this test to the resolution, let’s again isolate the bare plural subject: “Colleges and universities ought not consider the SAT.” Adding generally (“Colleges and universitiesz generally ought not consider the SAT”) or ever (“Colleges and universities ought not ever consider the SAT”) result in comparatively minor changes of meaning. (Note that this test doesn’t require there to be no change of meaning and doesn’t have to work for every adverb of quantification.) This strongly suggests what we already know: that “colleges and universities” is generic rather than existential in the resolution.

#### It applies to “workers” – 1] upward entailment test – “a just government ought to recognize workers unconditional right to strike” doesn’t entail that a just government ought to recognize peoples unconditional right to strike because it doesn’t prove all people should strike, 2] adverb test – adding “always” doesn’t change its meaning because recognition is unconditional.

#### Violation: They spec \_\_\_\_\_\_

#### Standards:

#### 1] Precision – the counter-interp justifies them arbitrarily doing away with random words in the resolution which decks ground and prep because the aff is no longer bounded by the resolution. Independent voter for jurisdiction – the judge doesn’t have the jurisdiction to vote aff if there wasn’t a legitimate aff.

#### 2] Limits and ground – their model allows affs to defend anything from teachers to doctors to the police— there's no universal DA since each has different functions and implications — that explodes prep and leads to random worker of the week affs which makes neg prep impossible.

#### 3] TVA solves – you could’ve read your plan as an advantage under a whole res advocacy.

#### Fairness – debate is a competitive activity that requires fairness for objective evaluation. Outweighs – it constrains your ability to evaluate the rest of the flow because they require fair evaluation.

#### Drop the debater – to deter future abuse and set better norms for debate.

#### Competing interps – reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention but we creates a race to the top where we create the best norms for debate.

#### No RVIs – a] illogical, you don’t win for proving that you meet the burden of being fair, logic outweighs since it’s a prerequisite for evaluating any other argument, b] RVIs incentivize baiting theory and prepping it out which leads to maximally abusive practices

#### 1AR theory is dta and reasonability – sandbagging o/w, irresolvable o/w

#### RVI on 1AR theory – time skew o/w

# Case

## FW

### 1NC – AT: Extinction Outweighs

#### Their attempts to fill the lack by framing death as the ultimate evil denies any value that arises from life.

McGowan 13 [Todd; Associate Professor of Film Studies at the UVermont; “Enjoying What We Don't Have: The Political Project of Psychoanalysis,” Pg. 224-227; 2013; University of Nebraska Press / Lincoln and London] Justin

On the level of common sense, this opposition is not symmetrical. What thinking person would not want to side with those who love life rather than death.3 Everyone can readily understand how one might love life, but the love of death is a counterintuitive phenomenon. It seems as if it must be code language for some other desire, which is how Western leftists often view it. Interpreting terrorist attacks as an ultimately life-affirming response to imperialism and impoverishment, they implicitly reject the possibility of being in love with death. But this type of interpretation can't explain why so many suicide bombers are middle-class, educated subjects and not the most downtrodden victims of imperialist power. 4 We must imagine that for subjects such as these there is an appeal in death itself.

Those who emphasize the importance of death at the expense of life do so because death is the source of value.5 The fact that life has an end, that we do not have an infinite amount of time to experience every possibility, means that we must value some things above others. Death creates hierarchies of value, and these hierarchies are not only vehicles for oppression but the pathways through which what we do matters at all. Without the value that death provides, neither love nor ice cream nor friendship nor anything that we enjoy would have any special worth whatsoever. Having an infinite amount of time, we would have no incentive to opt for these experiences rather than other ones. We would be left unable to enjoy what seems to make life most worth living. Even though enjoyment itself is an experience of the infinite, an experience of transcending the limits that regulate everyday activity, it nonetheless depends on the limits of finitude. When one enjoys, one accesses the infinite as a finite subject, and it is this contrast that renders enjoyment enjoyable. Without the limits of finitude, our experience of the infinite would become as tedious as our everyday lives (and in fact would become our everyday experience). Finitude provides the punctuation through which the infinite emerges as such. The struggle to assert the importance of death – the act of being in love with death, as bin Laden claims that the Muslim youths are – is a mode of avowing one’s allegiance to the infinite enjoyment that death doesn't extinguish but instead spawns.6 This is exactly why Martin Heidegger attacks what he sees as our modern inauthentic relationship to death. In Being and Time Heidegger sees our individual death as an absolute limit that has the effect of creating value for us. As he puts it, "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-for-being. This is a possibility in which the issue is nothing less than Dasein's Being-in-the-world.”7 Without the anticipation of our own death, we flit through the world and fail to take up fully an attitude of care, the attitude most appropriate for our mode of being, according to Heidegger. Nothing really matters to those who have not recognized the approach of their own death. By depriving us of an authentic relationship to death, an ideology that proclaims life as the only value creates a valueless world where nothing matters to us. But of course the partisans of life are not actually eliminating death itself. They simply privilege life over death and see the world in terms of life rather than death which would seem to leave the value-creating power of death intact. But this is not what happens. By privileging life and seeing death only in terms of life, we change the way we experience the world. Without the mediation that death provides, the system of pure life becomes a system utterly bereft of value.8 We can see this in the two great systems of modernity – science and capitalism. Both modern science and capitalism are systems structured around pure life.9 Neither recognizes any ontological limit but instead continually embarks on a project of constant change and expansion. The scientific quest for knowledge about the world moves forward without regard for humanitarian or ethical concerns, which is why ethicists incessantly try to reconcile scientific discoveries with morality after the fact. After scientists develop the ability to clone, for instance, we realize what cloning portends for our sense of identity and attempt to police the practice. After Oppenheimer helps to develop the atomic bomb, he addresses the world with pronouncements of its evil. But this rearguard action has nothing to do with science as such. Oppenheimer the humanist is not Oppenheimer the scientist.10 The same dynamic is visible with capitalism. As an economic system, it promotes constant evolution and change just as life itself does. Nothing can remain the same within the capitalist world because the production of value depends on the creation of the new commodity, and even the old commodities must be constantly given new forms or renewed in some way.11 Capitalism produces crises not because it can't produce enough – crises of scarcity dominate the history of the noncapitalist world, not the capitalist one – but because it produces too much. The crisis of capitalism is always a crisis of overproduction. The capitalist economy suffocates from too much life, from excess, not from scarcity or death. Both science and capitalism move forward without any acknowledged limit, which is why they are synonymous with modernity.12 Modernity emerges with the bracketing of death's finitude and the belief that there is no barrier to human possibility. The problem with the exclusive focus on life at the expense of death is that it never finds enough life and thus remains perpetually dissatisfied. The limit of this project is, paradoxically, its own infinitude. It evokes what Hegel calls the bad infinite – an infinite that is wrongly conceived as having no relation at all to the finite. We succumb to the bad infinite when we pursue an unattainable object and fail to see that the only possible satisfaction rests in the pursuit itself. The bad infinite -the infinite of modernity- depends on a fundamental misrecognition. We continue on this path only as long as we believe that we might attain the final piece of the puzzle, and yet this piece is constitutively denied us by the structure of the system itself. We seek the commodity that would finally bring us complete satisfaction, but dissatisfaction is built into the commodity structure, just as obsolescence is built into the very fabric of our cars and computers. Like capitalism, scientific inquiry cannot find a final answer: beneath atomic theory we find string theory, and beneath string theory we find something else. In both cases, the system prevents us from recognizing where our satisfaction lies; it diverts our focus away from our activity and onto the goal that we pursue. In this way, modernity produces the dissatisfaction that keeps it going. But it also produces another form of dissatisfaction that wants to arrest its forward movement. The further the project of modernity moves in the direction of life, the more forcefully the specter of fundamentalism will make its presence felt. The exclusive focus on life has the effect of producing eruptions of death. As the life-affirming logic of science and capitalism structures all societies to an increasing extent, the space for the creation of value disappears. Modernity attempts to construct a symbolic space where there is no place for death and the limit that death represents. As opposed to the closed world of traditional society, modernity opens up an infinite universe.14 But this infinite universe is established through the repression of finitude. Explosions of fundamentalist violence represent the return of what modernity's symbolic structure cannot accommodate. As Lacan puts it in his seminar on psychosis, "Whatever is refused in the symbolic order, in the sense of Verwerfung, reappears in the real.”15 Fundamentalist violence is blowback not simply in response to imperialist aggression, as the leftist common sense would have it. This violence marks the return of what modernity necessarily forecloses.

## Advantage

### Adv – Warming

#### No warming impact but it’s key to solve agriculture, food security, and the ice age.

Moore 16 (Dr. Patrick Moore is a Senior Fellow with the Energy, Ecology and Prosperity program at the Frontier Centre for Public Policy. He has been a leader in the international environmental field for over 40 years. Dr. Moore is a Co-Founder of Greenpeace and served for nine years as President of Greenpeace Canada and seven years as a Director of Greenpeace International. Following his time with Greenpeace, Dr. Moore joined the Forest Alliance of BC where he worked for ten years to develop the Principles of Sustainable Forestry, which have now been adopted by much of the industry. In 2013, he published Confessions of a Greenpeace Dropout – The Making of a Sensible Environmentalist, which documents his 15 years with Greenpeace and outlines his vision for a sustainable future. THE POSITIVE IMPACT OF HUMAN CO2 EMISSIONS ON THE SURVIVAL OF LIFE ON EARTH, June 2016, <https://fcpp.org/sites/default/files/documents/Moore%20-%20Positive%20Impact%20of%20Human%20CO2%20Emissions.pdf>) Recut Justin

CO2 in the Modern Era The most important question facing a species on Earth today is how long would it have been in the absence of human-caused CO2 emissions until the gradual depletion of CO2 in the atmosphere fell to levels that began to decrease biomass due to starvation, thus signaling the beginning of the end of life on Earth? It is commonly believed that volcanic activity results in massive emissions of CO2 comparable to or greater than human-caused emissions. This is not the case. Whereas the original atmospheric CO2 was the result of massive outgassing from the Earth’s interior, there is no evidence that large volumes of new CO2 were added to the atmosphere during the 140-million-year decline leading to the present era. The eruption of Mount Pinatubo, the largest in recent history, is estimated to have released the equivalent of 2 per cent of the annual human-caused CO2 emissions. Therefore, in the absence of human-caused emissions, it could reasonably be presumed that CO2 levels would have continued to fall as they had done for the previous 140 million years.20 Judging by the timing of the many glacial and interglacial periods during the Pleistocene Ice Age, the next major glaciation period could begin any time. Interglacial periods have generally been of 10,000 years’ duration, and this Holocene interglacial period began nearly 12,000 years ago. In the absence of human-caused CO2 emissions and other environmental impacts, there is no reason to doubt that another major glaciation would have occurred, following the pattern that has been established for at least the past 800,000 years, as established by the European Project for Ice Coring in Antarctica (EPICA),21 and presumably for the past 2.5 million years of the Pletstocene Ice Age. These glaciations have coincided with the Milankovitch cycles.22 (See Figure 5) The Milankovitch cycles are determined by oscillations in the Earth’s orbit and by cycles of the tilt of the Earth toward the sun. The strong correlation between the onset of major periods of glaciation during the past 800,000 years and the Milankovitch cycles has led the majority of earth scientists and climatologists to accept the hypothesis that the major glaciations are tied to the Milankovitch cycles in a causeeffect relationship. For 90 million years from the late Jurassic Period to the Early Tertiary Period, global temperature rose considerably while CO2 levels steadily declined. Then after the Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum, there began a 50-million-year cooling trend in global temperature to the current era. (See Figure 6) The Paleocene-Eocene Thermal Maximum saw an average global temperature [13] FRONTIER CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY as much as 16°C higher than the temperature today. Yet, the ancestors of every species living today must have survived through this period, as they had also survived through previous much colder climates. It is instructive to note that despite the numerous periods of extreme climatic conditions and cataclysmic events, every species alive today is descended from species that survived those conditions. This leads one to question the predictions of mass species extinction and the collapse of human civilization if the average global temperature exceeds a rise of 2°C above today’s level.25 It may seem surprising that the average global temperature could have been 16°C higher in previous ages, as this Figure 5. Graph showing the atmospheric CO2 concentration and temperature from Antarctica for the most recent four interglacial periods, closely tied to the Milankovitch cycles of 100,000 years. This graph is based on data from the 420,000 year record obtained from the Vostok ice cores drilled by Russian scientists.23 Note the gradual nature of the onset of colder temperatures and the rapid warming at the end of the cycle. Note that the peak warming during the most recent interglacial period (the Holocene) is lower than during the previous three interglacial periods.24 Figure 6. Global surface temperature from 65 million YBP showing the major cooling trend over the past 50 million years. While the poles were considerably warmer than they are today, there was much less warming in the tropics, which remained habitable throughout. The Earth is in one of the coldest periods during the past 600 million years.26 [14] FRONTIER CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY would appear to render parts of the Earth that are warm today virtually uninhabitable. The key to understanding this is that when the Earth warms, it does so disproportionally, depending on the latitude. While the Arctic and Antarctic experience considerable warming, there is much less warming in the tropics. Thus, the tropical regions remain habitable while the high latitudes shift from polar to temperate, and during the warmest ages, they shift to a tropical climate. It is clear from the 800,000-year Antarctic ice core record that the coldest periods during major glaciations coincide with the lowest levels of CO2 in the atmosphere. (see Figure 5) The correlation is certainly strong enough during this period to suggest a causal relationship between CO2 and temperature. However, there is disagreement in the literature about which is the cause and which is the effect. Those who ascribe the warming over the past century to greenhouse gas emissions, CO2 in particular, also tend to agree with the position set forth in Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth: The Planetary Emergency of Global Warming and What We Can Do about It, that the warming during the interglacial periods is caused by rising CO2 levels.27 However, it is problematic to postulate how the Milankovitch cycles could cause an increase or decrease in atmospheric CO2 levels, whereas it is plausible that the Milankovitch cycles could cause a fluctuation in global temperature due to changes in solar radiation, which in turn could cause either CO2 outgassing from or absorption into the oceans. Indeed, both sets of ice core data from Antarctica show that changes in temperature usually precede changes in CO2 levels, suggesting that temperature change is the cause of change in the level of CO2. 28 Some have suggested that although the onset of warming after a glaciation is caused by the Milankovitch cycles, the subsequent outgassing of CO2 from the ocean then becomes the predominant driver of further warming.29 Presumably, it would also be postulated that the cooling leading to glaciation is triggered by the Milankovitch cycle and then driven by reduced CO2 levels due to ocean absorption. This hypothesis is not proven. It is extremely unlikely or perhaps impossible to imagine how CO2 could have increased from a pre-industrial 280 ppm to 400 ppm in the absence of human-caused emissions. No other species, existing or imagined in the near future, is capable of digging and drilling into the massive deposits of fossil fuels and then burning them so as to release CO2 back into the atmosphere from where it had come in the first place. Many scientists think this increase in atmospheric CO2 is the dominant cause of the slight warming (0.5C) of the atmosphere over the past 65 years. Only time will tell if this is the case. Since the Little Ice Age peaked around 1700, the climate has been warming in fits and starts for about 300 years. It is possible that the most recent warming is a continuation of the longer period of warming that had already begun long before human-caused CO2 emissions could have been a factor. [15] FRONTIER CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY HIGHER CO2 CONCENTRATIONS WILL INCREASE PLANT GROWTH AND BIOMASS It has been well demonstrated that the increase in CO2 in the atmosphere is responsible for increased plant growth on a global scale. Many studies suggest that nearly 25 per cent of human-caused CO2 emissions, or 2.5 Gt of carbon annually, are absorbed by plants, thus increasing global plant biomass. A recent study postulates that up to 50 per cent of human CO2 emissions are absorbed by increased plant growth.30 This has been described as a “greening of the Earth” as CO2 reaches concentrations well above the near-starvation levels experienced during the major glaciations of the Pleistocene.31 The most prestigious Australian science body, the Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO), has shown that CO2 particularly benefits plants that are adapted to dry climates. In higher CO2 environments, they become more efficient at photosynthesis, growing faster without using more water.32 One of the most impressive records comes from an experimental forest in Germany where there is a continuous Figure 8. Change in net primary productivity of vegetation 1982 to 2010. The driest regions, such as Western Australia, sub-Saharan Africa, western India and the Great Plains of North America, show the greatest increase in plant growth.36 Figure 7. Craig Idso,expert on CO2 and author of the CO2Science website34 demonstrating the growth-rate of pine trees under ambient conditions versus the addition of 150 ppm, 300 ppm and 450 ppm CO2. In a higher CO2 world there will be a great increase in the growth of food crops, forests, and wild landscapes around the world. Studies also demonstrate that higher CO2 levels in the oceans will result in increased growth of phytoplankton and other marine plants.35 [16] FRONTIER CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY record of forest growth since 1870. Since 1960, as CO2 emissions began to rise rapidly, the growth rate of individual trees has increased by 32 per cent to 77 per cent. While some of this may be due to the slight increase in temperature since 1960, the much higher growth rate is consistent with laboratory and field studies on the effect of increased CO2 levels on plants.33 It is not widely known that greenhouse operators worldwide inject additional CO2 into their greenhouses in order to increase the growth and yield of their crops. Among horticulturalists, it is well known that this practice can increase growth by 40 per cent or more. This is because the optimum level of CO2 for plant growth is between 1,000 ppm and 3,000 ppm in air, much higher than the 400 ppm in the global atmosphere today.37 Every species on Earth, including our own, is descended from ancestors that thrived in climates with much higher levels of CO2 than are present today. Discussion The debate about climate change has one side insisting that the “science is settled.” Yet, there is no scientific proof that increased CO2 will result in disaster, as CO2 has been higher during most of the history of life on Earth than it is today. On the other hand, it can be stated without a doubt that if CO2 once again falls to the level it was only 18,000 years ago, or lower, there would be a catastrophe unlike any known in human history. We are advised by many scientists that we should be worried about CO2 levels climbing higher when, in fact, we should actually be worried about CO2 levels sinking lower. Atmospheric CO2 Concentrations in the Future If humans had not begun to use fossil fuels for energy, it is reasonable to assume that atmospheric CO2 concentration would have continued to drop as it has done for the past 140 million years. It is also reasonable to assume that the Earth’s climate would continue to fluctuate between relatively long periods of glaciation and relatively short periods of interglacial climate similar to the present climate. Given continued withdrawal of carbon from the atmosphere into the ocean sediments, it would only be a matter of time before CO2 dropped to 150 ppm or lower during a period of glaciation. At the average rate of 32 Kt of carbon lost annually, this would occur in less than two million years from now. In other words, the beginning of the end of most life on planet Earth would begin in fewer years into the future than our genus of primates, Homo, has existed as a distinct taxonomic unit. It is instructive to note that our species is a tropical species that evolved at the equator in ecosystems as warm or warmer than today’s. We were only able to leave the warmth of the tropical climate due to harnessing fire, wearing clothing and building shelters. This allowed us to settle in temperate climes and even Arctic conditions by the sea where domesticated dogs as well as marine mammals made life possible for a very small population. However, we cannot grow food crops in abundance on glaciers or in frozen soil. Moreover, we would not be able to grow much of anything anywhere if the level of CO2 went below 150 ppm. There is a distinct possibility that no amount of additional CO2 will shift the climate out of the next major period of glaciation. This is not a reason to abandon hope but rather to marvel at the fact that we can actually put some of the CO2 needed for life back into the atmosphere while at the same time enjoying abundant, reasonably priced energy from fossil fuels. There has been a gradual net loss of CO2 from the atmosphere during the past 550 million years from approximately 14,000 Gt to approximately 370 Gt at the lowest level during the height of the last glaciation. This is a reduction of nearly 98 per cent of one of the most essential nutrients for life on Earth. In the absence of human CO2 emissions over the past century, it is difficult to imagine how this process of continuous removal of CO2 would be interrupted. Massive volcanism on a scale not seen for more than 200 million years would be required to [17] FRONTIER CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY bring about a reversal in the long-term CO2 trend that has now been achieved by human CO2 emissions. There is no doubt the Earth’s interior has cooled substantially over its roughly 4.6-billion-year existence. This makes massive volcanism an ever-decreasing likelihood. There is no other plausible natural mechanism to return carbon to the global atmosphere in the form of CO2. The present Holocene interglacial has already endured longer than some previous interglacial periods. The Holocene is also somewhat cooler than previous interglacial periods. Of more urgent concern than the possible starvation of life two million years from now is what would happen at the onset of the next glaciation, possibly a relatively short time from now. In the absence of human CO2 emissions, both temperature and CO2 would have dropped to levels that would result in a continuous reduction in plant growth, bringing in climatic conditions similar to or perhaps even more severe than those that occurred in previous glaciations. This would certainly lead to widespread famine and likely the eventual collapse of human civilization. This scenario would not require two million years but possibly only a few thousand. Even if the conditions of the Little Ice Age reoccurred in the next hundreds of years with a human population of nine billion or more, we can be sure the population would not be nine billion for long. There is a strong argument to be made that the Earth is already in a cooling trend that is descending into the next 100,000-year cycle of major glaciation. See Figure 5 and note that in the three preceding interglacial periods, there was a sharp peak followed by a steady downward trend in temperature. The peak temperature in this Holocene interglacial period was during the Holocene Optimum between 5,000 and 9,000 years ago. Since then, the warming peaks have been diminishing, and the cool periods have been colder. The Little Ice Age, which peaked about 300 years ago, was possibly the coldest period of climate since the Holocene Optimum.39 A Paradigm Shift in the Perception of CO2 Independent scientist James Lovelock provides an interesting example of both these contrasting predictions of future catastrophe versus salvation regarding CO2 Figure 9. Reconstructed Greenland mean temperature anomalies (top) and Antarctic CO2 concentration (bottom). Halving the temperature anomalies to allow for polar amplification gives a reasonable approximation of global temperature change in the Holocene. Since the Holocene Optimum began about 9,000 years before present (ka BP), global temperature has fallen by ~1°C, though CO2 concentration rose throughout.38 [18] FRONTIER CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY emissions. He is undoubtedly one of the foremost experts in atmospheric chemistry,40 which is why NASA retained him to design part of the life-detection equipment for the first U.S. Mars landers.41 He concluded from the results that there is no life on Mars. Since publishing his first book on the Gaia hypothesis in 1979, Lovelock became concerned with human civilization’s impact on the global atmosphere.42 He became a strong advocate for reducing CO2 emissions, stating that humans had become a “rogue species” against Gaia (the Earth). He went so far as to state in 2006, ‘“Before this century is over, billions of us will die, and the few breeding pairs of people that survive will be in the Arctic where the climate remains tolerable . . . a broken rabble led by brutal warlords.”’43 Only four years later, in a public speech at London’s Science Museum in 2010, Lovelock recanted, stating, ‘It is worth thinking that what we are doing in creating all these carbon emissions, far from something frightful, is stopping the onset of a new ice age. If we hadn’t appeared on the earth, it would be due to go through another ice age and we can look at our part as holding that up. I hate all this business about feeling guilty about what we’re doing.’44 This abrupt reversal of Lovelock’s interpretation of CO2 is precisely what is required universally to avoid the tragedy of depriving billions of people of reasonably priced, reliable energy, especially those with a need to lift themselves out of poverty. There must be a total paradigm shift from demonizing fossil fuels and fearing CO2 as a toxic pollutant to celebrating CO2 as the giver of life that it is while continuing to use fossil fuels ever-more efficiently. Like Lovelock, we should be hopeful that CO2 will prove to be the moderate warming influence that it is predicted to be in theory. A somewhat warmer world with a higher level of CO2 in the atmosphere would result in a greener world with more plant biomass, higher yields of food crops and trees, a more hospitable climate in high northern latitudes and a possible reduction in the likelihood of another major glaciation. It is highly probable, and ironic, that the existence of life itself may have predetermined its own eventual demise due mainly to the development of CaCO3 as armour plating in marine organisms.45 The fact that humans appear able to reverse this fate temporarily due to our recycling of CO2 back into the atmosphere by burning fossil fuels for energy verges on the miraculous. Nevertheless, there is only so much fossil fuel, and once burned, it is not renewable in the short to medium term. The vast bulk of carbon is sequestered into carbonaceous rocks, mainly as CaCO3. Today, about 5 per cent of human CO2 emissions are derived from converting CaCO3 with heat into CO2 and CaO (lime) to manufacture cement. Therefore, when fossil fuels become scarce in future centuries, and if CO2 again begins to dwindle, we will have the option of producing additional CO2 by burning limestone with nuclear or solar energy, with lime for cement as a useful by-product. This has the potential to extend the existence of a highly productive living Earth into the far distant future. It is clear from the preceding discussion that rather than bringing on a catastrophic climate condition, human CO2 emissions are serving to reinstate a balance to the global carbon cycle. By reversing the 140-million-year decline in atmospheric CO2, we are helping to ensure the continuation of carbon-based life on Earth. [19] FRONTIER CENTRE FOR PUBLIC POLICY CONCLUSION CO2 is essential for life, and twice in the history of modern life there have been periods of steep decline in the concentration of CO2 in the global atmosphere. If this decline were to have continued at the same rate into the future, CO2 would eventually fall to levels insufficient to support plant life, possibly in less than two million years. More worrisome is the possibility in the nearer future that during a future glaciation, CO2 may fall to 180 ppm or lower, thus greatly reducing the growth of food crops and other plants. Human CO2 emissions have staved off this possibility so that at least during a period of glaciation, CO2 would be high enough to maintain a productive agricultural industry. A 140 million year decline in CO2 to levels that came close to threatening the survival of life on Earth can hardly be described as “the balance of nature”. To that extent human emissions are restoring a balance to the global carbon cycle by returning some of the CO2 back to the atmosphere that was drawn down by photosynthesis and CaCO3 production and subsequently lost to deep sediments. This extremely positive aspect of human CO2 emissions must surely be weighed against the unproven hypothesis that human CO2 emissions are mainly responsible for the slight warming of the climate in recent years and will cause catastrophic warming over the coming decades. The fact that the current warming began about 300 years ago during the Little Ice Age indicates that it may at least in part be the continuation of the same natural forces that have caused the climate to change through the ages.

#### Consensus of studies prove.

Idso and Idso ’12[Sherwood PhD and former research physicist for the Department of Agriculture, Keith PhD Botany, Craig PhD Geography, 4/25/2012. “Growth Response to CO2 (Flowers)”, http://www.co2science.org/subject/f/summaries/flowers.php] DHirsch Recut Justin

By 2002, so many authors had weighed in on the subject that [Jablonski *et al*. (2002)](http://www.co2science.org/articles/V5/N42/EDIT.php) conducted a meta-analysis of 159 peer-reviewed scientific journal articles published between 1983 and 2000, dealing with the effects of atmospheric CO2 enrichment on the reproductive growth characteristics of several domesticated and wild plants. In calculating the mean responses reported in those papers, Jablonski *et al*. found that for increases in the air's CO2 concentration ranging from approximately 150 to 450 ppm (rough average of 300 ppm), across all species studied, the extra CO2 supplied to the plants resulted in 19% more flowers, 18% more fruits, 16% more seeds, 4% greater individual seed mass, 25% greater total seed mass (equivalent to yield), and 31% greater total mass.

#### It’s a threat multiplier that causes extinction.

Cribb 19 [Julian; Author, journalist, editor and science communicator. He is principal of Julian Cribb & Associates who provide specialist consultancy in the communication of science, agriculture, food, mining, energy and the environment. His career includes appointments as newspaper editor, scientific editor for director of national awareness for Australia’s science agency CSIRO, member of numerous scientific boards and advisory panels, and president of national professional bodies for agricultural journalism and science communication. His published work includes over 8000 articles, 3000 media releases and eight books. He has received 32 awards for journalism. His internationally-acclaimed book, The Coming Famine explores the question of whether we can feed humanity through the mid-century peak in numbers and food demand; “6 - Food as an Existential Risk,” Cambridge; August 2019; <https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/food-or-war/food-as-an-existential-risk/8C45279588CD572FE805B7E240DE7368>] Recut Justin

Extinction and Ecological Collapse More than half of the large animals that once inhabited the Earth have been wiped from it by human action since 1970, according to the Worldwide Fund for Nature’s Living Planet Index.3 So, too, have half the fish in the sea on which humans rely for food.4 Humans are, in the words of the great biologist E. O. Wilson, ‘tearing down the biosphere’, demolishing the very home that keeps us alive.5 Extinction, it should be noted, is a part of life: 99.9 per cent of all species ever to evolve on this planet have disappeared, and new ones like ourselves have arisen to replace them. But extinction rates like today’s – a hundred to a thousand times faster than normal – are a freak occurrence that usually takes tens of millions of years, not mere decades. Animal, plant and marine species are presently vanishing so fast that scientists have dubbed our time “the Sixth Extinction” – the sixth such megadeath in the geological history of the Earth.6 By the end of the present century, Wilson says, it is possible that up to half of the eight million species thought to exist here will be gone. Furthermore, in all previous extinctions, natural events like asteroid strikes and vast volcanic outbursts have been to blame. This will be the only time in the Earth’s history when the wipe-out was caused by a single species. Us.7 [Ommited 178-180] Oxfam, illustrates how just one tenth of humanity consumes five times as much in the way of material resources (expressed here in the form of their carbon footprint) as the poorest half of the world population. The affluent are chiefly responsible for the destruction taking place on a global scale as they seek to sustain lifestyles that the planet can no longer afford or support. The significance of this blind spot around consumption for global food security is very great. As described in earlier chapters, the world food system depends critically on soil, water, nutrients and a stable climate, to supply humanity’s daily need for nutriment – and all of these essential resources are in increasingly short supply, chiefly because of our own mismanagement of them and our collective failure to appreciate that they are finite. On current trends, the existing food system will tend to break down, first regionally and then globally, owing to resource scarcity from the 2020s onward, and especially towards the mid century – unless there is radical change in the world diet and the means by which we feed ourselves. This will lead to increasing outbreaks of violence and war. Nobody, neither rich nor poor, will escape the consequences. It remains an open question whether panicking regimes in Russia, the USA or even France would be ruthless enough to deploy atomic weapons in an attempt to quell invasion by tens of millions of desperate refugees, fleeing famine and climate chaos in their own homelands – but the possibility ought not to be ignored. That nuclear war is at least a possible outcome of food and climate crises was first flagged in the report The Age of Consequences by Kurt Campbell and the US-based Centre for Strategic and International Studies, which stated ‘it is clear that even nuclear war cannot be excluded as a political consequence of global warming’. 15 Food insecurity is therefore a driver in the preconditions for the use of nuclear weapons, whether limited or unlimited. A global famine is a likely outcome of limited use of nuclear weapons by any country or countries – and would be unavoidable in the event of an unlimited nuclear war between America and Russia, making it unwinnable for either. And that, as the mute hands of the ‘Doomsday Clock’ so eloquently admonish, is also the most likely scenario for the premature termination of the human species. Such a grim scenario can be alleviated by two measures: the voluntary banning by the whole of humanity of nuclear weapons, their technology, materials and stocks – and by a global effort to secure food against future insecurity by diverting the funds now wasted on nuclear armaments into building the sustainable food and water systems of the future (see Chapters 8 and 9). Food Security Our demand for food is set to double by the 2060s – potentially the decade of ‘peak people’, the moment in history when the irresistible human population surge may top out at around 10 billion. However, as we have seen, many of the resources needed to supply it agriculturally could halve and the climate for the growing of food outdoors become far more hostile. Why food insecurity is an existential threat to humanity should, by now, be abundantly clear from the earlier chapters of this book: present systems are unsustainable and, as they fail, will pose risks both to civilization and, should these spiral into nuclear conflict, to the future of the human species. The important thing to note in this chapter is that food insecurity plays into many, if not all, of the other existential threats facing humanity. The food sector’s role in extinction, resource scarcity, global toxicity and potential nuclear war has already been explained. Its role in the suppression of conflict is discussed in the next chapter. Its role in securing the future of the megacities, and of a largely urbanised humanity, is covered in Chapter 8. And its role in sustaining humanity through the peak in population and into a sustainable world beyond is covered in Chapter 9. Food clearly has a pivotal role in the future of human population – both as a driver of population growth when supplies are abundant and as a potential driver of population decline, should food chains collapse. It is no exaggeration to state that the fate of civilisation depends on it. Food insecurity affects the progression of pandemic diseases, often in ways that are not entirely obvious. First, new pandemics of infectious disease tend to originate in developing regions where nutritional levels are poor or agricultural practices favour the evolution of novel pathogens such as, for example, the new flu strains seen every year – which arise mainly from places where people, pigs and poultry live side-by-side and shuffle viruses between them – and also novel diseases like SARS and MERS. Second, because totally unknown diseases tend to arise first in places where rainforests are being cut down for farming and viruses hitherto confined to wild animals and birds make an enforced transition into humans. Examples of novel human diseases escaping from the rainforest and tropical savannah in recent times include HIV/AIDS, Hendra, Nipah, Ebola, Marburg, Lassa and Hanta, Lujo, Junin, Machupo, Rift Valley, Congo and Zika.29 And thirdly, because the loss of vital micronutrients from heavily farmed soils and from food itself predisposes many populations to various deficiency diseases – for example, a lack of selenium in the diet has been linked with increased risk from both HIV/AIDS and bowel cancer.30 A key synergy is the way **hunger** and **malnourishment** **exacerbate** the **spread** **of** **disease**, classic examples being the 1918 Global Flu Pandemic which spread rapidly among war-starved populations, or the more recent cholera outbreak in war-torn Yemen. In a fresh twist, Dr Melinda Beck of North Carolina University has demonstrated that obesity – itself a form of malnutrition – may cause increased deaths from influenza by both aiding the virus and suppressing the patient’s immune response.31

#### Extinction from warming requires 12 degrees, far greater than their internal link, and intervening actors will solve before then

Sebastian Farquhar 17, master’s degree in Physics from the University of Oxford, leads the Global Priorities Project (GPP) at the Centre for Effective Altruism, et al., 2017, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction.15 The existential risks of climate change instead stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability of extreme levels of warming – and interaction with other sources of risk. It is impossible to say with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. Research has suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable,16 and would completely devastate agriculture.17 This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.18 Warming of around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.19 Moreover, the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean that humanity is able to adapt enough to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios. The probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, unless strong action is taken soon by major emitters, it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway.20 If we do, the chance of extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,21 which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.22 The economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway, the probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%,23 and of 10°C is around 3%.24 These estimates are of course highly uncertain. It is likely that the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is warming of 10°C. Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between CO2 emissions and eventual warming,25 and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO2 will remain in the atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.26 Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by reducing CO2 emissions. If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will therefore face strong incentives to find other ways to reduce global temperatures.

#### Err against Specktor – it makes a lot of claims without good warranted evidence – cross was embarrassing.

#### Concludes lack of food will cause war – inserted below

Specktor ’19 – Senior writer at Live Science, formerly a staff writer and editor at Reader’s Digest Magazine

Brandon Specktor, “Human Civilization Will Crumble by 2050 If We Don’t Stop Climate Change Now, New Paper Claims,” Live Science, June 4, 2019, https://www.livescience.com/65633-climate-change-dooms-humans-by-2050.html

This mass movement of refugees — coupled with [shrinking coastlines](https://www.livescience.com/51990-sea-level-rise-unknowns.html) and severe drops in food and water availability — begin to stress the fabric of the world's largest nations, including the United States. Armed conflicts over resources, perhaps culminating in nuclear war, are likely.

### Adv – Democracy

#### Decline of liberal order and emergence of US-Sino power competition is inevitable – it will be peaceful. Preserving it causes populism and war.

Mearsheimer 19, John J. "Bound to fail: The rise and fall of the liberal international order." International Security 43.4 (2019): 7-50. (President and Fellows of Harvard College)//Elmer

SUMMARY The various causal processes described above have all played an important role in subverting the liberal international order. Although each one has a distinct logic, they have often operated synergistically. For example, the negative effects of hyperglobalization on the lower and middle classes have combined with the nationalist resentment over immigration and the sense of lost sovereignty to fuel a strong populist backlash against the principles and practices of the liberal order. Indeed, that anger has often been directed at the liberal elites who have benefited from the order and who vigorously defend it. That resentment, of course, has had significant political consequences. It has caused deep political divisions in the United States and other Western democracies, led to Brexit, helped put Trump in the White House, **and fueled support for nationalist leaders** around the world. Where Are We Headed? One might acknowledge that the liberal international order is in terminal decline, but argue that it can be replaced with a more pragmatic version, one that avoids the excesses of the post–Cold War order.85 This more modest liberal order would pursue a more nuanced, less aggressive approach to spreading liberal democracy, rein in hyperglobalization, and put some significant limits on the power of international institutions. The new order, according to this perspective, would look something like the Western order during the Cold War, although it would be global and liberal, not bounded and realist. This solution is not feasible, however, because the unipolar moment is over, which means there is no chance of maintaining any kind of liberal international order for the foreseeable future. Furthermore, President Trump has no intention of pursuing a "liberal-lite" world order, and without his support, that option is a nonstarter. But even if Trump were not an obstacle and the international system were to remain unipolar, the United States would fail if it lowered its sights and attempted to construct a less ambitious liberal order. Indeed, it would end up building an agnostic international order instead. It is impossible to build **a meaningful liberal global order** with modest or more passive policies. The enterprise requires too much social engineering in too many places. If it has any chance of succeeding (I think it has none), the liberal unipole and its allies must relentlessly pursue highly ambitious global policies, which is why the United States and its liberal partners acted the way they did in the wake of the Cold War. That approach, however, is now politically infeasible because of past failures. Consequently, the **liberal democracies have no choice** but to take small steps here and there to remake the world in their own image, while adopting a live and let live approach toward most countries in the world. That humble approach would effectively produce an agnostic order. But that is not going to happen, because the system is multipolar and great power politics are once again at play. Thus, the key question is: What kinds of realist orders will dominate the landscape in the new multipolar world? THE NEW REALIST ORDERS There are likely to be three different realist orders in the foreseeable future: a thin international order and two thick bounded orders—one led by China, the other by the United States. The emerging thin international order will be concerned mainly with overseeing arms control agreements and making the global economy work efficiently. It is also likely to pay more serious attention than in the past to problems relating to climate change. In essence, the institutions that make up the international order will focus on facilitating interstate cooperation. The two bounded orders, in contrast, will be concerned principally with waging security competition against each other, although that will call for promoting cooperation among the members of each order. There will be significant economic and military competition between those two orders that will need to be managed, which is why they will be thick orders. Two key features of the new multipolar world will profoundly shape the emerging orders. First, assuming that China continues its impressive rise, it will be involved in an intense security competition with the United States that will be the central feature of international politics over the course of the twenty-first century. That rivalry will lead to the creation of bounded orders dominated by China and the United States. Military alliances will be core components of those two orders, which are now beginning to form and will resemble the Soviet-led and U.S.-led orders in the Cold War. Beijing and Washington, however, will sometimes have reasons to cooperate on select military issues, an endeavor that will fall within the purview of the international order, as it did during the Cold War. Again, the focus will be principally on arms control agreements and will involve Russia as well as China and the United States. The existing treaties and agreements dealing with proliferation are likely to remain in place, because all three great powers will want to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. But Beijing, Moscow, and Washington will have to negotiate new treaties limiting their arsenals, as the superpowers did during the Cold War.86 Nevertheless, the U.S.-led and Chinese-led bounded orders will be largely responsible for dealing with core security matters.

#### The Yulis Ev –

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