# 1NC Semis Apple Valley

## 1

### T

#### Interp: The affirmative may only garner offense from the hypothetical implementation that a just government ought to recognize the unconditional right of workers to strike and may not garner offense external to that.

#### Resolved indicates a policy action.

Parcher 1. [Jeff. 2/26/01. “Re: Jeff P--Is the resolution a question?” <https://web.archive.org/web/20050122044927/http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html>] Justin

(1) Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at \*analyze\* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution to. See Syns at \*Solve\* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Frimness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or decided on. A formal statemnt of a deciion, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconcievable. Why? Context. The debate community empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context - they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be resolved by determining the policy desireablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committtee somewhere to adopt their own group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the prelimanary wording of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is used to emphasis the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body. Should this statement be adopted or not.

#### Recognition requires policy action.

Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/topic/international-law/States-in-international-law

Recognition is a process whereby certain facts are accepted and endowed with a certain legal status, such as statehood, sovereignty over newly acquired territory, or the international effects of the grant of nationality. The process of recognizing as a state a new entity that conforms with the criteria of statehood is a political one, each country deciding for itself whether to extend such acknowledgment. Normal sovereign and diplomatic immunities are generally extended only after a state’s executive authority has formally recognized another state (see diplomatic immunity). International recognition is important evidence that the factual criteria of statehood actually have been fulfilled. A large number of recognitions may buttress a claim to statehood even in circumstances where the conditions for statehood have been fulfilled imperfectly (e.g., Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1992). According to the “declaratory” theory of recognition, which is supported by international practice, the act of recognition signifies no more than the acceptance of an already-existing factual situation—i.e., conformity with the criteria of statehood. The “constitutive” theory, in contrast, contends that the act of recognition itself actually creates the state.

#### Violation: <<Insert>>. At best they’re extra topical which is a voter for exploding limits and inflating aff solvency or effects topical which is worse, since any small aff can spill up to the resolution. Hold the line on the violation.

#### Vote neg for competitive equity and clash: changing the topic favors the aff because it destroys the only stasis point which makes prep impossible because any ground we receive is self-serving, concessionary, and from distorted lit. Filter this through debate’s competitive nature of being a game where both teams want to win, which becomes meaningless without constraints: defining a role for negation is key to sustaining competition and outweighs.

#### Impacts:

#### 1] Procedural fairness is a voter and outweighs—a) intrinsicness—debate is a game and equity is necessary to sustain the activity b) probability—debate can’t alter subjectivity, but it can rectify skews c) metaconstraint—all your arguments concede fairness since you assume they will be evaluated fairly

#### 2] Institutional infiltration is good.

Williams 70 – Robert F Williams [American civil rights leader and author best known for serving as president of the Monroe, North Carolina chapter of the NAACP and being a complete badass] “Interviews” The Black Scholar. Volume 01, No. 7. BLACK REVOLUTION. May 1970, pp. 2-14. IB

Williams:It is erroneous to think that one can isolate oneself completely from institutions of a social and political system that exercises power over the environment in which [they]heresides.Self-imposed and premature isolation, initiated by the oppressed against the organs of a tyrannical establishment, militates against revolutionary movements dedicated to radical change. It is a grave error for militant and just minded youth to reject struggle-serving opportunities to join theman'sgovernment and the services**,** police forces, peace corpsand vital organs of the power structure. Militants should become acquainted with the methods of the oppressor. Meaningful change can be more thoroughly effectuated by militant pressure from within as well as without. We can obtain valuable know-how from the oppressor.Struggle is not all violence.Effective struggle requires tactics, plans, analysis and a highly sophisticated application of mental aptness.The forces of oppression and tyranny have perfected highly articulate systems of infiltration for undermining and frustrating the efforts of the oppressed in trying to upset the unjust status quo. To a great extent, the power structure keeps itself informed as to the revolutionary activity of freedom fighters. With the looming threat of extermination looming menacingly before black Americans, it is pressingly imperative that our people enter the vital organs of the establishment. Infiltrate the man's institutions.

#### 3] TVA – defend the right to strike as a method for black people to engage in sabotage by destroying the production lines of capitalism. Any DA to the TVA proves neg ground.

#### 4] Switch Side Debate – they can read it as a K against affirmatives – proves they can research and cut the same argument but it forces debaters to consider issues from multiple perspectives.

#### No impact turns – T is just like a disad or K – just like the cap k that says the aff engaged in a practice that reinforced – impositions are inevitable because the negative has the burden of rejoinder – every disad link says the aff did something wrong and theres a version of the aff that wouldn’t have linked

## 2

### K

#### The 1AC is a misdiagnosis of the university – their techniques are enfolded within logistical transparency in which the worlds visibility and mappability is taken as ontological presumption to be achieved by techniques of resistance. The aff’s praxis of resistance is articulated through a grammar of concrete planning utilized by state governance and the neoliberal university that reproduces logistics as the terrain of the political – only a refusal of the aesthetics of planning, logistics, and transparency can facilitate fugitivity

Moten & Harney 9 – Fred Moten, professor of Performance Studies at New York University and has taught previously at University of California, Riverside, Duke University, Brown University, and the University of Iowa, and Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University, 2009 (“Policy and Planning” Social Text 100 • Vol. 27, No. 3 • Fall 2009 Pages 182-186)

Policy is correction. Policy distinguishes itself from planning by distinguishing those who dwell in policy and x things, from those who dwell in planning and must be xed. This is the first rule of policy. It xes others. In an extension of Michel Foucault, we might say of this first rule that it remains concerned with how to be governed just right, how to x others in a position of equi- librium, even if this today requires constant recalibration. But the objects of this constant adjustment provoke this attention because they just don’t want to govern at all. And because such policy emerges materially from post-Fordist oppor- tunism, policy must optimally, for each policy maker, x others as others, as those who have not just made an error in planning (or indeed an error by planning) but who are themselves in error. And from the perspective of policy, of this post-Fordist opportunism, there is indeed something wrong with the multitude. They are out of joint — instead of constantly positing their position in contingency, they seek solidity, a place from which to plan, some ground on which to imagine, some love on which to count. Nor is this just a political problem from the point of view of policy, but an ontological one. Seeking xity, nding a steady place from which to launch a plan, hatch an escape, signals a problem of essentialism, of beings who think and act like they are something in particular, like they are somebody, although at the same time that something is, from the perspective of policy, whatever you say I am. To get these planners out of this problem of essentialism, this x- ity and repose, this security and base, they have to come to imagine they can be more, they can do more, they can change, they can be changed. Because right now, there is something wrong with them. We know there is something wrong with them because they keep making plans. And plans fail. Plans fail because that is policy. Plans must fail because planners must fail. Planners are static, essential, just surviving. They do not see clearly. They hear things. They lack perspective. They fail to see the complexity. Planners have no vision, no real hope for the future, just a plan here and now, an actually existing plan. They need hope. They need vision. They need to have their sights lifted above the furtive plans and night launches of their despairing lives. Vision. Because from the perspective of policy, it is too dark in there to see, in the black heart of the multitude. You can hear something, you can feel something, feel people going about their own business in there, feel them present at their own making. But hope can lift them above ground into the light, out of the shadows, away from these dark senses. Whether the hope is Fanonian redemption or Arendtian revaluation, policy will x these humans. Whether they lack consciousness or politics, utopianism or common sense, hope has arrived. With new vision, planners will become participants. And participants will be taught to reject essence for contingency, as if planning and improvisation, flexibility and fixity, and complexity and simplicity were opposed within an imposed composition there is no choice but to inhabit, as some exilic home. All that could not be seen in the dark heart of the multitude will be supposed absent, as policy checks its own imagination. But most of all they will participate. Policy is a mass effort. Left intellectuals will write articles in the newspapers. Philosophers will hold conferences on new utopias. Bloggers will debate. Politicians will surf. Change is the only constant here, the only constant of policy. Participating in change is the second rule of policy. Now hope is an orientation toward this participation in change, this participation as change. This is the hope policy gives to the multitude, a chance to stop digging and start circulating. Policy not only offers this hope, but enacts it. Those who dwell in policy do so not just by invoking contingency but riding it, by, in a sense, proving it. Those who dwell in policy are prepared. They are legible to change, liable to change, lendable to change. Policy is not so much a position as a disposition, a disposition toward display. This is why policy’s chief manifestation is governance. Governance should not be confused with government or governmen- tality. Governance is the new form of expropriation. It is the provocation of a certain kind of display, a display of interests as disinterestedness, a display of convertibility, a display of legibility. Governance offers a forum for policy, for bidding oneself, auctioning oneself, to post-Fordist production. Gover- nance is harvesting of immaterial labor, but a willing harvest, a death drive of labor. As capital cannot know directly affect, thought, sociality, imagi- nation, it must instead prospect for these in order to extract and abstract them as labor. This is the real bioprospecting. Governance, the voluntary but dissociative offering up of interests, willing participation in the general privacy and privation, grants capital this knowledge, this wealth-making capacity. Who is more keen on governance than the dweller in policy? On the new governance of universities, hospitals, corporations, governments, and prisoners, on the governance of NGOs, of Africa, of peace processes? Policy offers to help by offering its own interests, and if it really seeks to be valuable, provoking others to offer up their own interests, too. But governance despite its own hopes to universality is for the initi- ated, for those who know how to articulate interests disinterestedly, who know why they vote (not because someone is black or female but because he or she is smart), who have opinions and want to be taken seriously by serious people. In the meantime, policy also orders the quotidian sphere of aborted plans. Policy posits curriculum against study, child develop- ment against play, careers against jobs. It posits voice against voices, and gregariousness against friendship. Policy posits the public sphere, and the counterpublic sphere, and the black public sphere, against the illegal occupation of the illegitimately privatized. Policy is not the one against the many, the cynical against the roman- tic, or the pragmatic against the principled. It is simply baseless vision. It is against all conservation, all rest, all gathering, cooking, drinking, and smoking, if they lead to marronage. Policy’s vision is to break it up, move along, get ambition, and give it to your children. Policy’s hope is that there will be more policy, more participation, more change. However, there is also a danger in all this participation, a danger of crisis. When the multitude participates in policy without first being xed, this leads to crisis: participation without fully entering the enlightenment, without fully functioning families, without financial responsibility, with- out respect for the rule of law, without distance and irony; participation that is too loud, too fat, too loving, too full, too owing, too dread. This leads to crisis. People are in crisis. Economies are in crisis. We are facing an unprecedented crisis, a crisis of participation, a crisis of faith. Is there any hope? Yes, there is, if we can pull together, if we can share a vision of change. For policy, any crisis in the productivity of radical contingency is a crisis in participation, which is to say, a crisis provoked by the wrong participation of the multitude. This is the third rule of policy. The crisis of the credit crunch caused by subprime debtors, the crisis of race in the U.S. elections produced by Reverend Wright and Bernie Mac, the crisis in the Middle East produced by peace movements, the crisis of obesity produced by unhealthy eaters, the crisis of the environ- ment produced by Chinese and Indians, are all instances of uncorrected, unmanaged participation. If the multitude is to stop its sneaky plans only to participate in this way, crisis is inevitable. But policy diagnoses the problem: participation must be hopeful, it must have vision, it must embrace change. Participants must be fashioned who are hopeful, visionary change agents. Those who dwell in policy will lead the way, toward concrete changes in the face of the crisis. Be smart. Believe in change. This is what we have been waiting for. It’s time for the Left to offer solutions. Now’s the time, before it’s night again, and you start hearing D.O.C. They got a secret plan of their own and they won’t be corrected. Before you get stopped by KRS-One and asked for your plan, before Storm says “holla if you understand my plan ladies.” Before you start singing another half-illiterate fantasy. Before you are in the ongoing amplification at the dark heart of the multitude, the operations in its soft center. Before someone says let’s get together and get some land where we’ll still plan to be communist about communism, still plan to be unreconstructed about reconstruction, and still plan to be absolute about abolition. Policy can’t see it, policy can’t read it, but it’s intelligible if you got a plan.

#### Their investment into the university is a tool of speed-elitism. The move for more transparent discussions about revolutionary praxis mystifies the reliance on the highly exclusive and unethical technologies of the university. By figuring those technics as the metrics for liberatory strategization, that expands debate’s state of exploitation.

Hoofd 10 – Ingrid M. Hoofd is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Communications and New Media at the National University of Singapore, ("The Accelerated University: Activist-Academic Alliances and the Simulation of Thought." Ephemera: Theory and politics in organisation, Vol. 10, No.1 (September 2010), <http://www.ephemerajournal.org/contribution/accelerated-university-activist-academic-alliances-and-simulation-thought>) KB + TR Recut Justin

Cries announcing the **demise** of the university abound, in particular in Europe and North America. Those who utter these cries often do this in an admirable attempt to **renew** the original mandate of the university, namely the fostering of **truth**, **justice** and **democratic debate**. Giving up on the now largely neoliberal and managerial university system that plagues Europe and the United States, some such critics try to mobilise a renewal of this mandate **outside academia’s institutional walls** with people and groups who represent an alternative to neoliberal globalisation. Much of this mobilisation is in turn done through technologies and discourses of mobility and tele-communication. Examples here are the European anti-Bologna ‘new university’ projects like Edu-Factory, the various autonomous virtual universities, and the intellectual collaboration with local and international activists and non-Western academics. I am referring here in particular to the promising formation of various extra-academic ‘activist-research’ networks and conferences over the last years, like Facoltà di Fuga (Faculty of Escape), Mobilized Investigation, Rete Ricercatori Precari (Network of Precarious Researchers), Investigacció (Research), Universidad Nómada (Nomadic University), and Glocal Research Space. Characteristically, these projects organise events that try to set up dialogues between non-Western and anti-neoliberal activists and academics, and carve out spaces for offline and web-based discussion and participation. Initiators and participants of these projects often conceptualise their positions as relating closely to **alter-globalist activism** – positions which hence are **hoped** to effectively **subvert neo-liberalism** as well as the **elitist-managerial university space** and its problematic method of scientific objectification for capitalist innovation.

In this paper, I will explain how such announcements of **the university’s demise**, the conceptualisation of its current situation as **one of crisis**, as well as the mobilisation of **the true academic mandate** today which often segues into a **nostalgia for the original university** of independent thought, truth and justice, are themselves paradoxically **complicit in the techno-acceleration that** precisely **grounds and reproduces neo-liberalism.** This is because the playing out of such nostalgia typically runs through the problematic invocation of **the humanist opposition between doing and thinking.** This causes the terms and their mode of production to become increasingly intertwined under contemporary conditions of capitalist simulation in which ‘thinking’ is more and more done in service of an economist form of ‘doing’. The aforementioned commendable projects thus paradoxically appear foremost as symptoms of acceleration.

Moreover, I will argue that this acceleration increasingly renders certain groups and individuals as **targets of techno-academic scrutiny and violence.** This increasing objectification that runs through the contemporary prostheses of the humanist subject hence spells disaster for non-technogenic forms of **gendered**, **raced** and **classed otherness.** I therefore suggest that this disastrous state of affairs is precisely carried out by the humanist promise of transcendence, democracy and justice that currently speeds up institutions like the university, and vice versa. Following this line of thought through, I claim that technological acceleration then surprisingly also harbours the promise of the coming of **a radical alternative** to neo-liberalism, and that it is precisely through the eschatological performance of this promise – arguably a repetition of the Christian belief in the apocalypse – that these activist-research projects and their neo-liberal mode of production may fruitfully **become the future objects of their own critique.** In short then, this paper attempts to affirm and displace the projects’ call for reinstating the original ‘true’ or transcending the current ‘spoilt’ university, in the hope of gesturing towards yet another alterity, through its own accelerated argument.

I argue that the complicity of projects like Edu-Factory and Facoltà di Fuga in technological acceleration should primarily be understood in terms of what I in my work call **speed-elitism** (Hoofd, 2009: 201). I extrapolate the idea of speed-elitism largely from the work of John Armitage on the discursive and technocratic machinery underlying current neoliberal capitalism. In turn, I will argue that these activist-academic projects exacerbate speed-elitism by connecting the latter to Jacques Derrida’s ideas on technology and thought, as well as the late Bill Readings’ and Fred Moten and Stefano Harney’s critiques of the contemporary university. In ‘Dromoeconomics: Towards a Political Economy of Speed’, Armitage and Phil Graham suggest that due to the capitalist need for the production of excess, there is a strong relationship between the forces of communication and the logic of speed. They connect the logic of speed specifically to a certain militarisation of society under neoliberalism. In line with Virilio’s Speed and Politics, they argue that the areas of war, communication and trade are today intimately connected through the technological usurpation and control of space (and territory), and through the compression and regulation of time. Eventually, Armitage and Graham suggest that ‘**circulation** has become **an essential process** of capitalism, **an end in itself**’ (Armitage and Graham, 2001: 118) and that therefore any form of cultural production increasingly finds itself tied up in this logic.

Neoliberal capitalism is hence a system in which the most intimate and fundamental aspects of human social life – in particular, forms of thought and linguistic difference – are formally subsumed under this system by being **circulated** as capital. In “Resisting the Neoliberal Discourse of Technology’, Armitage elaborates on this theme of circulation by pointing out that the current mode of late-capitalism relies on the continuous extension and validation of the infrastructure and the optimistic discourses of the new information technologies. Discourses that typically get repeated in favour of what I designate as the emerging speed-elite are those of connection, instantaneity, liberation, transformation, multiplicity and border crossing. **Speed-elitism**, I therefore argue, **replaces Eurocentrism** today as the primary nexus around which global and local disparities are organised, even though it largely builds on the formalisation of Eurocentric conceptual differences like doing versus thinking, and East versus West.

Under speed-elitism, the utopian emphasis on the transparent mediation through technologies of instantaneity gives rise to the fantasy of the networked spaces ‘outside’ the traditional academic borders as radical spaces, as well as the desire for a productive dialogue or alliance between activism and academia. This would mean that activism and academia have become *relative* others under globalisation, in which the (non-Western or anti-capitalist) activist figures as some kind of *hallucination* of radical otherness for the Western intellectual. This technological hallucination serves an increasingly aggressive neo-colonial and patriarchal economic state of exploitation, despite – or perhaps rather *because of* – such technologies of travel and communication having come to figure as tools for liberation and transformation.

So the discourses of techno-progress, making connections, heightened mobility and crossing borders in activist-academic alliances often go hand in hand with the (implicit) celebration of highly mediated spaces for action and communication between allied groups. Such **discourses** however **suppress** the **violent colonial, capitalist and patriarchal history** of those technological spaces and the subsequent unevenness of any such alliance. More severely, they **foster an oppressive** sort of **imaginary ‘collective’ or ‘unity of struggles’ through the myth of ‘truly’ allowing for radical difference and multiplicity within that space** – a form of **techno-inclusiveness that** in turn **excludes** a variety of **non-technogenic groups and slower classes**. That these highly mediated spaces of thought and knowledge production are exclusivist is also shown by Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades’ study of the transformation of higher education in ‘The Academic Capitalist Knowledge/Learning Regime’. Slaughter and Rhoades argue that new technologies allow the neo-liberal university to precisely cross the borders of universities and external for-profit and non-profit agencies in the name of development, production and efficacy, resulting in ‘new circuits of knowledge’. These ‘opportunity structures’ (Slaughter and Rhoades, 2004: 306) that the neoliberal economy creates, I in turn argue, become precisely those spaces of imagination that come to signify as well as being resultant of the university’s humanist promise of reaching-out to alterity. This paradoxically also **leads to** what Slaughter and Rhoades accurately identify as a ‘**restratification among and within** **colleges** and **universities’** (2004: 307).

*Thought* is then increasingly exercised in, and made possible through, spaces that are just as much spaces of acceleration and militarisation. The increasing complicity of the humanities in the applied sciences within the contemporary university, and hence the integration of critical thinking and neo-liberalist acceleration, is also a major theme running through Jacques Derrida’s *Eyes of the University*. Derrida there suggests that neo-liberalisation entails a militarisation of the university, claiming that ‘never before has so-called basic research been so deeply committed to ends that are at the same time military ends’ (Derrida, 2004: 143). The intricate relation between the military (‘missiles’) and the imperatives of the humanities (‘missives’) also pervades Derrida’s ‘No Apocalypse, Not Now’, in which he argues that the increasing urgency with which intellectuals feel compelled to address disenfranchisement and crisis **paradoxically** leads to a differential acceleration of such oppression through technologies of instantaneous action. But the relationship between new technologies and the subject’s *perception* of and subsequent desire for the incorporation of otherness that speed-elitism engenders, is best illustrated through Derrida’s *Archive Fever* and *Monolingualism of the Other*. Derrida’s concerns here are not so much directly with the contemporary university, but rather with the link between how thought is situated in technologies of communication (like language) and the emergence of authority as well as (academic and activist) empowerment.

#### The affirmative’s move to re-figure Blackness from object of consumption to agent of resistance is precisely the move that gives anti-Black accumulation its visceral, affective reality – their rhetoric and politics of “survival” and “maintaining the ability to fight another day” simply ensures time never passes and only accumulates

James 15 (Robin, associate professor of UNC at Charlotte in Gender Studies], Resiliency and Melancholy: Pop Music, Feminism, Neoliberalism. Zero Books: Winchester, Kindle version, page numbers unavailable, Chapter 4) JA

(d) “Look, I Overcame!” Resilience must be performed explicitly, legibly, and spectacularly. Overcoming is necessary, but insufficient; to count and function as resilience, this overcoming must be accomplished in a visible or otherwise legible and consumable manner. Overcoming is a type of “affective labor” which, as Steven Shaviro puts it, “is productive only to the extent that it is a public performance. It cannot unfold in the hidden depths; it must be visible and audible” (PCA 49n33). In order to tune into feminine resilience and feed it back into its power supply, MRWaSP has to perceive it as such. “Look, I Overcame!” is the resilient subject’s maxim or mantra. Gender and race have always been “visible identities,” to use philosopher Linda Martin Alcoff’s term, identities strongly tied to one’s outward physical appearance. However, gendered/ racialized resilience isn’t visible in the same way that conventional gender and racial identities are visible. To clarify these differences, it’s helpful to think of resilience in terms of a “Look, I Overcame!” imperative. “Look, I Overcame!” is easy to juxtapose to Frantz Fanon’s “Look, a Negro!”, which is the touchstone for his analysis of gendered racialization in “The Fact of Blackness.” In both cases, looking is a means of crafting race/gender identities and distributing white patriarchal privilege. But, in the same way that resilience discourse “upgrades” traditional methods for crafting identities and distributing privilege, the “looking” in “Look, I Overcame!” is an upgrade on the “looking” in “Look, a Negro!” According to Fanon, the exclamation “Look, a Negro!” racializes him as a black man. To be “a Negro” is to be objectified by the white supremacist gaze. This gaze fixes him as an object, rather than an ambiguous transcendence (which is a more nuanced way of describing the existentialist concept of subjectivity). “The black man,” as Fanon argues, “has no ontological resistance for the white man” (BSWM 110) because, as an object and not a mutually-recognized subject, he cannot return the white man’s gaze (“The Look” that is so important to Sartre’s theory of subjectivity in Being & Nothingness). The LIO narrative differs from Fanon’s account in the same way it differs from Iris Young’s account of feminine body comportment: in resilience discourse, objectification isn’t an end but a means. Any impediment posed by the damage wrought by the white/male gaze is a necessary prerequisite for subjectivity, agency, and mutual recognition. In other words, being looked at isn’t an impediment, but a resource. Resilience discourse turns objectification (being looked at) into a means of subjectification (overcoming). It also makes looking even more efficient and profitable than simple objectification could ever be. Recognizing and affirming the affective labor of the resilient performer, the spectator feeds the performer’s individual overcoming into a second-order therapeutic narrative: our approbation of her overcoming is evidence of our own overcoming of our past prejudices. This spectator wants to be seen by a wider audience as someone who answers the resilient feminine subject’s hail, “Look, I Overcame!”. Just as individual feminine subjects use their resilience as proof of their own goodness, MRWaSP uses the resilience of its “good girls” as proof that they’re the “good guys”—that its social and ethical practices are truly just, and that we really mean it this time when we say everyone is equal. For example, the “resilience” of “our” women is often contrasted with the supposed “fragility” of ThirdWorld women of color. Or, in domestic US race-gender politics, the resilience of some African-American women (their bootstraps-style class ascendance) is contrasted to the continued fragility of other AfricanAmerican women, and thus used to reinforce class distinctions among blacks. There are a million different versions of this general story: “our” women are already liberated—they saved themselves— but, to riff on Gayatri Spivak, “brown women need saving from brown men.” Most mainstream conversations about Third-World women are versions of this story: discussions of “Muslim” veiling, female circumcision, sweatshops, poverty, “development,” they’re all white-saviorist narratives meant to display MRWaSP’s own resilience. Look, I Overcame!” upgrades “Look, a Negro!” by (a) recycling objectification into overcoming and (b) compounding looking, so that one can profit from others’ resilience, treating their overcoming as one’s own overcoming. This upgrade in white supremacist patriarchy requires a concomitant upgrade in “looking.” This shift in looking practices parallels developments in film and media aesthetics. As Steven Shaviro has argued, the values, techniques, and compositional strategies most common in contemporary mainstream Western cinema—like Michael Bay’s Transformers—are significantly different than the ones used in modernist and post-modernist cinema, and that these differences in media production correlate to broader shifts in the means of capitalist and ideological production. Neoliberalism’s aesthetic is, he argues, “post-cinematic.” This post-cinematic aesthetic applies not just to film and media, but to resilience discourse. Its performance practices and looking relations configured by the “Look, I Overcame!” imperative, resilience is, in a way, another type of post-cinematic medium. In the next section I use Shaviro’s theory of post-cinematic media to identify some specific ways in which traditional patriarchal tools are updated to work compatibly with MRWaSP resilience discourse. The looking in the “Look, I Overcame!” narrative is not the same kind of looking described by concepts like “the male gaze” or “controlling images.” This looking is a type of deregulated MRWaSP visualization.

#### The alternative is

#### Voting neg is a withdrawal from the instrumental game of call-and-response into an aesthetic under-commons of redaction, opacity, and fugitive resonance. The refusal of demands for transparent or professionalized alternative frustrates the professional logistics of academia. Redaction is an aesthetic embodiment of indecision, a critical strategy of resistance that cannot be captured on a wiretap because it’s always on the tip of the tongue.

Moten & Harney 13 – Fred Moten, professor of Performance Studies at New York University and has taught previously at University of California, Riverside, Duke University, Brown University, and the University of Iowa, and Stefano Harney, Professor of Strategic Management Education at Singapore Management University, 2013 (Undercommons: Fugitive Planning and Black Study, pgs. 28-32)

In that undercommons of the university one can see that it is not a matter of teaching versus research or even the beyond of teaching ver- sus the individualisation of research. To enter this space is to inhabit the ruptural and enraptured disclosure of the commons that fugitive enlightenment enacts, the criminal, matricidal, queer, in the cistern, on the stroll of the stolen life, the life stolen by enlightenment and stolen back, where the commons give refuge, where the refuge gives commons. What the beyond of teaching is really about is not finishing oneself, not passing, not completing; it’s about allowing subjectivity to be unlawfully overcome by others, a radical passion and passivity such that one becomes unfit for subjection, because one does not possess the kind of agency that can hold the regulatory forces of subjecthood, and one cannot initiate the auto-interpellative torque that biopower subjection requires and rewards. It is not so much the teaching as it is the prophecy in the organization of the act of teaching. The prophecy that predicts its own organization and has therefore passed, as commons, and the prophecy that exceeds its own organization and therefore as yet can only be organized. Against the prophetic organization of the undercommons is arrayed its own deadening labor for the university, and beyond that, the negligence of professionalization, and the professionalization of the critical academic. The undercommons is therefore always an unsafe neighborhood.

As Fredric Jameson reminds us, the university depends upon “Enlightenment-type critiques and demystification of belief and committed ideology, in order to clear the ground for unobstructed planning and ‘development.’” This is the weakness of the university, the lapse in its homeland security. It needs labor power for this “enlightenment- type critique,” but, somehow, labor always escapes.

The premature subjects of the undercommons took the call seriously, or had to be serious about the call. They were not clear about planning, too mystical, too full of belief. And yet this labor force cannot reproduce itself, it must be reproduced. The university works for the day when it will be able to rid itself, like capital in general, of the trouble of labor. It will then be able to reproduce a labor force that understands itself as not only unnecessary but dangerous to the development of capitalism. Much pedagogy and scholarship is already dedicated in this direction. Students must come to see themselves as the problem, which, counter to the complaints of restorationist critics of the university, is precisely what it means to be a customer, to take on the burden of realisation and always necessarily be inadequate to it. Later, these students will be able to see themselves properly as obstacles to society, or perhaps, with lifelong learning, students will return having successfully diagnosed themselves as the problem.

Still, the dream of an undifferentiated labor that knows itself as superfluous is interrupted precisely by the labor of clearing away the burn- ing roadblocks of ideology. While it is better that this police function be in the hands of the few, it still raises labor as difference, labor as the development of other labor, and therefore labor as a source of wealth. And although the enlightenment-type critique, as we suggest below, informs on, kisses the cheek of, any autonomous development as a re- sult of this difference in labor, there is a break in the wall here, a shal- low place in the river, a place to land under the rocks. The university still needs this clandestine labor to prepare this undifferentiated labor force, whose increasing specialisation and managerialist tendencies, again contra the restorationists, represent precisely the successful in- tegration of the division of labor with the universe of exchange that commands restorationist loyalty.

Introducing this labor upon labor, and providing the space for its de- velopment, creates risks. Like the colonial police force recruited un- wittingly from guerrilla neighborhoods, university labor may harbor refugees, fugitives, renegades, and castaways. But there are good reasons for the university to be confident that such elements will be exposed or forced underground. Precautions have been taken, book lists have been drawn up, teaching observations conducted, invitations to contribute made. Yet against these precautions stands the immanence of transcendence, the necessary deregulation and the possibilities of criminality and fugitivity that labor upon labor requires. Maroon communities of composition teachers, mentorless graduate students, adjunct Marxist historians, out or queer management professors, state college ethnic studies departments, closed-down film programs, visa- expired Yemeni student newspaper editors, historically black college sociologists, and feminist engineers. And what will the university say of them? It will say they are unprofessional. This is not an arbitrary charge. It is the charge against the more than professional. How do those who exceed the profession, who exceed and by exceeding escape, how do those maroons problematize themselves, problematize the university, force the university to consider them a problem, a dan- ger? The undercommons is not, in short, the kind of fanciful com- munities of whimsy invoked by Bill Readings at the end of his book. The undercommons, its maroons, are always at war, always in hiding.

There is no distinction between the American University and Professionalization

But surely if one can write something on the surface of the univer- sity, if one can write for instance in the university about singularities – those events that refuse either the abstract or individual category of the bourgeois subject – one cannot say that there is no space in the university itself ? Surely there is some space here for a theory, a con- ference, a book, a school of thought? Surely the university also makes thought possible? Is not the purpose of the university as Universitas, as liberal arts, to make the commons, make the public, make the na- tion of democratic citizenry? Is it not therefore important to protect this Universitas, whatever its impurities, from professionalization in the university? But we would ask what is already not possible in this talk in the hallways, among the buildings, in rooms of the university about possibility? How is the thought of the outside, as Gayatri Spivak means it, already not possible in this complaint?

The maroons know something about possibility. They are the condition of possibility of the production of knowledge in the university – the singularities against the writers of singularity, the writers who write, publish, travel, and speak. It is not merely a matter of the secret labor upon which such space is lifted, though of course such space is lifted from collective labor and by it. It is rather that to be a critical academic in the university is to be against the university, and to be against the university is always to recognize it and be recognized by it, and to institute the negligence of that internal outside, that unas- similated underground, a negligence of it that is precisely, we must insist, the basis of the professions. And this act of being against always already excludes the unrecognized modes of politics, the beyond of politics already in motion, the discredited criminal para-organiza- tion, what Robin Kelley might refer to as the infrapolitical field (and its music). It is not just the labor of the maroons but their prophetic organization that is negated by the idea of intellectual space in an organization called the university. This is why the negligence of the critical academic is always at the same time an assertion of bourgeois individualism.

Such negligence is the essence of professionalization where it turns out professionalization is not the opposite of negligence but its mode of politics in the United States. It takes the form of a choice that excludes the prophetic organization of the undercommons – to be against, to put into question the knowledge object, let us say in this case the university, not so much without touching its founda- tion, as without touching one’s own condition of possibility, with- out admitting the Undercommons and being admitted to it. From this, a general negligence of condition is the only coherent position. Not so much an antifoundationalism or foundationalism, as both are used against each other to avoid contact with the undercom- mons. This always-negligent act is what leads us to say there is no distinction between the university in the United States and profes- sionalization. There is no point in trying to hold out the university against its professionalization. They are the same. Yet the maroons refuse to refuse professionalization, that is, to be against the university. The university will not recognize this indecision, and thus professionalization is shaped precisely by what it cannot acknowledge, its internal antagonism, its wayward labor, its surplus. Against this wayward labor it sends the critical, sends its claim that what is left beyond the critical is waste.

But in fact, critical education only attempts to perfect professional education. The professions constitute themselves in an opposition to the unregulated and the ignorant without acknowledging the unregulated, ignorant, unprofessional labor that goes on not opposite them but within them. But if professional education ever slips in its labor, ever reveals its condition of possibility to the professions it supports and reconstitutes, critical education is there to pick it up, and to tell it, never mind – it was just a bad dream, the ravings, the drawings of the mad. Because critical education is precisely there to tell professional education to rethink its relationship to its opposite – by which criti- cal education means both itself and the unregulated, against which professional education is deployed. In other words, critical education arrives to support any faltering negligence, to be vigilant in its negli- gence, to be critically engaged in its negligence. It is more than an ally of professional education, it is its attempted completion.

A professional education has become a critical education. But one should not applaud this fact. It should be taken for what it is, not progress in the professional schools, not cohabitation with the Universitas, but counterinsurgency, the refounding terrorism of law, coming for the discredited, coming for those who refuse to write off or write up the undercommons.

## 3

### DA

#### Business Confidence is high now – best surveys.

ICAEW 8-20 8-20-2021 "Business confidence remains at record high as economy gets sales boost" <https://www.icaew.com/about-icaew/news/press-release-archive/2021-news-releases/business-confidence-remains-at-record-high-as-economy-gets-sales-boost> (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales)//Elmer

Friday 20 August 2021: **Business confidence** has **hit a record high** for the second quarter in a row, a survey of chartered accountants published today has found. Business confidence at record **high for second consecutive quarter**, ICAEW survey finds Strong sales growth projections key to confidence boost Companies face new challenges as economy reopens Business confidence has hit a record high for the second quarter in a row, a survey of chartered accountants published today (FRIDAY 20 AUGUST 2021) has found. Sentiment tracked by ICAEW’s Business Confidence Monitor™ (BCM) found **optimism at 47 on the quarterly index**, its **highest** level **since** the **survey was launched** in 2004 and surpassing the previous record set last quarter. [1] The optimism was **shared by businesses of all sizes across all sectors, nations and regions** in the UK. The record reading was a likely reflection of the expectation of strong sales growth in the year ahead, especially in the domestic market where a record rise of 7.4% is predicted over the coming 12 months. Companies also expect a sharp boost in export sales, which will rebound to pre-pandemic rates of increase. [2] However, the likelihood of confidence remaining positive is highly dependent on the COVID-19 situation not deteriorating further, ICAEW said. Decisions on interest rates, the winding down of support schemes, such as furlough, could also have an impact on future business sentiment. Office for National Statistics figures published last week showed that Britain’s economy grew 4.8% between April and June, below the 5% that the Bank of England had forecast. Michael Izza, ICAEW Chief Executive, said: “Business confidence has now hit record levels for two quarters in a row - companies are clearly benefitting from rising customer demand as the economy reopens and life begins to return to normal. The high level of optimism is unsurprising but it remains vulnerable to a possible resurgence of COVID-19 as we head into the autumn. “While confidence is high across all sectors, with companies reporting record expectations for domestic sales growth, they also told us they **face challenges from** **skills shortages**, wage increases and rising costs. “This is a crucial stage for the economy. Despite having to cope with the winding down of government financial support and possible interest rate rises, businesses are definitely bouncing back, but **finances are fragile** and any **additional costs could threaten** the recovery.”

#### Right to Strike has unintended effects that threaten growth and business confidence.

Tenza 20, Mlungisi. "The effects of violent strikes on the economy of a developing country: a case of South Africa." Obiter 41.3 (2020): 519-537. (lecturer in the field of Labour Law at the School of Law. He holds a LLM Degree.)//Elmer

2 BACKGROUND When South Africa obtained democracy in 1994, there was a dream of a better country with a new vision for industrial relations.5 However, the number of **violent strikes** that have bedevilled this country in recent years seems to have **shattered-down** the **aspirations of a better South Africa**. South Africa recorded 114 strikes in 2013 and 88 strikes in 2014, which **cost** the country about **R6.1 billion** according to the Department of Labour.6 The impact of these strikes has been hugely felt by the mining sector, particularly the platinum industry. The biggest strike took place in the platinum sector where about 70 000 mineworkers’ downed tools for better wages. Three major platinum producers (Impala, Anglo American and Lonmin Platinum Mines) were affected. The strike started on 23 January 2014 and ended on 25 June 2014. Business Day reported that “the five-month-long strike in the platinum sector pushed the economy to the brink of recession”. 7 This strike was closely followed by a four-week strike in the metal and engineering sector. All these strikes (and those not mentioned here) were characterised with violence accompanied by damage to property, intimidation, assault and sometimes the killing of people. Statistics from the metal and engineering sector showed that about 246 cases of intimidation were reported, 50 violent incidents occurred, and 85 cases of vandalism were recorded.8 Large-scale unemployment, soaring poverty levels and the dramatic income inequality that characterise the South African labour market provide a broad explanation for strike violence.9 While participating in a strike, workers’ stress levels leave them feeling frustrated at their seeming powerlessness, which in turn provokes further violent behaviour.10 These **strikes** are not only violent but **take long to resolve**. Generally, a lengthy strike has a **negative effect on employment**, **reduces business confidence** **and increases the risk of economic stagflation**. In addition, such strikes have a **major setback on** the growth of the economy and **investment opportunities**. It is common knowledge that consumer spending is directly linked to economic growth. At the same time, if the economy is not showing signs of growth, employment opportunities are shed, and poverty becomes the end result. The economy of South Africa is in need of rapid growth to enable it to deal with the high levels of unemployment and resultant poverty. One of the measures that may boost the country’s economic growth is by attracting potential investors to invest in the country. However, this might be difficult as **investors** would want to invest in a country where there is a likelihood of getting returns for their investments. The wish of getting returns for investment **may not materialise** **if the labour environment** **is not fertile** for such investments **as a result** **of**, for example, **unstable labour relations**. Therefore, investors may be reluctant to invest where there is an unstable or fragile labour relations environment. 3 THE COMMISSION OF VIOLENCE DURING A STRIKE AND CONSEQUENCES The Constitution guarantees every worker the right to join a trade union, participate in the activities and programmes of a trade union, and to strike. 11 The Constitution grants these rights to a “worker” as an individual.12 However, the right to strike and any other conduct in contemplation or furtherance of a strike such as a picket13 can only be exercised by workers acting collectively.14 The right to strike and participation in the activities of a trade union were given more effect through the enactment of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 199515 (LRA). The main purpose of the LRA is to “advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation of the workplace”. 16 The advancement of social justice means that the exercise of the right to strike must advance the interests of workers and at the same time workers must refrain from any conduct that can affect those who are not on strike as well members of society. Even though the right to strike and the right to participate in the activities of a trade union that often flow from a strike17 are guaranteed in the Constitution and specifically regulated by the LRA, it sometimes happens that **the right to strike is exercised** **for purposes not intended** by the Constitution and the LRA, generally. 18 For example, it was not the intention of the Constitutional Assembly and the legislature that violence should be used during strikes or pickets. As the Constitution provides, pickets are meant to be peaceful. 19 Contrary to section 17 of the Constitution, the conduct of workers participating in a strike or picket has changed in recent years with workers trying to emphasise their grievances by causing disharmony and chaos in public. A media report by the South African Institute of Race Relations pointed out that between the years 1999 and 2012 there were 181 strike-related deaths, 313 injuries and 3,058 people were arrested for public violence associated with strikes.20 The question is whether employers succumb easily to workers’ demands if a strike is accompanied by violence? In response to this question, one worker remarked as follows: “[T]here is no sweet strike, there is no Christian strike … A strike is a strike. [Y]ou want to get back what belongs to you ... you won’t win a strike with a Bible. You do not wear high heels and carry an umbrella and say ‘1992 was under apartheid, 2007 is under ANC’. You won’t win a strike like that.” 21 The use of violence during industrial action **affects** not only the strikers or picketers, the **employer** and his or her **business** but it also affects **innocent members of the public**, **non-striking employees**, the **environment** **and the economy at large**. In addition, striking workers visit non-striking workers’ homes, often at night, threaten them and in some cases, assault or even murder workers who are acting as replacement labour. 22 This points to the fact that for many workers and their families’ living conditions remain unsafe and vulnerable to damage due to violence. In Security Services Employers Organisation v SA Transport & Allied Workers Union (SATAWU),23 it was reported that about 20 people were thrown out of moving trains in the Gauteng province; most of them were security guards who were not on strike and who were believed to be targeted by their striking colleagues. Two of them died, while others were admitted to hospitals with serious injuries.24 In SA Chemical Catering & Allied Workers Union v Check One (Pty) Ltd,25 striking employees were carrying various weapons ranging from sticks, pipes, planks and bottles. One of the strikers Mr Nqoko was alleged to have threatened to cut the throats of those employees who had been brought from other branches of the employer’s business to help in the branch where employees were on strike. Such conduct was held not to be in line with good conduct of striking.26

#### Extinction

McLennan 21 – Strategic Partners Marsh McLennan SK Group Zurich Insurance Group, Academic Advisers National University of Singapore Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes Center, University of Pennsylvania, “The Global Risks Report 2021 16th Edition” “http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF\_The\_Global\_Risks\_Report\_2021.pdf //Re-cut by Elmer

Forced to choose sides, governments may face **economic** or diplomatic **consequences**, as proxy disputes play out in control over economic or geographic resources. The deepening of geopolitical fault lines and the lack of viable middle power alternatives make it harder for countries to cultivate connective tissue with a diverse set of partner countries based on mutual values and maximizing efficiencies. Instead, networks will become thick in some directions and non-existent in others. The COVID-19 crisis has amplified this dynamic, as digital interactions represent a “huge loss in efficiency for diplomacy” compared with face-to-face discussions.23 With some **alliances weakening**, diplomatic relationships will become more unstable at points where superpower tectonic plates meet or withdraw. At the same time, without superpower referees or middle power enforcement, global **norms** may **no longer govern** state **behaviour**. Some governments will thus see the solidification of rival blocs as an opportunity to engage in regional posturing, which will have destabilizing effects.24 Across societies, domestic discord and **economic crises will** **increase** the risk of **autocracy**, **with corresponding** **censorship, surveillance**, restriction of movement and abrogation of rights.25 Economic crises will also amplify the **challenges for middle power**s

as they navigate geopolitical competition. **ASEAN countries, for example, had offered a potential new manufacturing base as the United States and China decouple, but the pandemic has left these countries strapped for cash to invest in the necessary infrastructure and productive capacity.26** Economic fallout is pushing many countries to debt distress (see Chapter 1, Global Risks 2021). While G20 countries are supporting debt restructure for poorer nations,27 larger economies too may be at **risk of default** in the longer term;28 this would **leave them further stranded**—**and unable to exercise leadership—on the global stage**. Multilateral meltdown **Middle power weaknesses** will be **reinforced** in weakened institutions, which may translate to **more uncertainty and lagging progress on shared global challenges such as climate change**, **health, poverty reduction and technology governance**. In the absence of strong regulating institutions, **the Arctic and space represent new realms for** potential **conflict** as the superpowers and middle powers alike compete to extract resources and secure strategic advantage.29 If the global superpowers continue to accumulate economic, military and technological power in a zero-sum playing field, some middle powers could increasingly fall behind. Without cooperation nor access to important innovations, middle powers will struggle to define solutions to the world’s problems. In the long term, GRPS **respondents forecasted “w**eapons of **m**ass **d**estruction” **and “state collapse**” as the two top critical threats: in the absence of strong institutions or clear rules, clashes— such as those in **Nagorno-Karabakh or the Galwan Valley**—**may more frequently flare into** full-fledged **interstate conflicts**,30 which is particularly worrisome where unresolved tensions among nuclear powers are concerned. These conflicts may lead to state collapse, with weakened middle powers less willing or less able to step in to find a peaceful solution.

# Case

### NC – Presumption

#### Presumption flips neg against K affs – they have the burden of proof since they aren’t defending the rez. That’s key to ensure the neg has a shot at engagement.

#### Vote neg on presumption:

#### 1] Systems- the 1AC says institutions create social realities that replicate violence but in-round discourse does nothing to alter conditions. All you do is encourage teams to write better framework blocks.

#### 2] Spillover- they are missing an internal link as to why they need the ballot or why the reading of the aff forwards change. Empirically denied – judges vote on [x] all the time and nothing happens.

#### 3] Competition- debate is the wrong forum for change and competition moots any ethical value of the aff. Winning rounds just makes it seem like you want to win and a loss is internalized as a technical mistake.

### NC – Extinction Outweighs

#### Death is bad and outweighs

Paterson 1 – Department of Philosophy, Providence College, Rhode Island. (Craig, “A Life Not Worth Living?”, Studies in Christian Ethics, <http://sce.sagepub.com>)

Contrary to those accounts, I would argue that it is death per se that is really the objective evil for us, not because it deprives us of a prospective future of overall good judged better than the alter- native of non-being. It cannot be about harm to a former person who has ceased to exist, for no person actually suffers from the sub-sequent non-participation. Rather, death in itself is an evil to us because it ontologically destroys the current existent subject — it is the ultimate in metaphysical lightening strikes.80 The evil of death is truly an ontological evil borne by the person who already exists, independently of calculations about better or worse possible lives. Such an evil need not be consciously experienced in order to be an evil for the kind of being a human person is. Death is an evil because of the change in kind it brings about, a change that is destructive of the type of entity that we essentially are. Anything, whether caused naturally or caused by human intervention (intentional or unintentional) that drastically interferes in the process of maintaining the person in existence is an objective evil for the person. What is crucially at stake here, and is dialectically supportive of the self-evidency of the basic good of human life, is that death is a radical interference with the current life process of the kind of being that we are. In consequence, death itself can be credibly thought of as a ‘primitive evil’ for all persons, regardless of the extent to which they are currently or prospectively capable of participating in a full array of the goods of life.81  In conclusion, concerning willed human actions, it is justifiable to state that any intentional rejection of human life itself cannot therefore be warranted since it is an expression of an ultimate disvalue for the subject, namely, the destruction of the present person; a radical ontological good that we cannot begin to weigh objectively against the travails of life in a rational manner. To deal with the sources of disvalue (pain, suffering, etc.) we should not seek to irrationally destroy the person, the very source and condition of all human possibility.82

#### Impact calc –

#### 1] Extinction outweighs:

#### A] Structural violence- death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### B] Objectivity- body count is the most objective way to calculate impacts because comparing suffering is unethical

#### C] Mathematically outweighs.

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### D] Comes before value-to-life.

Tännsjö 11 (Torbjörn, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” <http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf>) //BS 1-27-2018

\*\*Bracketed to avoid triggers

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all [die] commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not [die] commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I [die] kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

### NC – NB Pess Bad

#### NONBLACK PEOPLE SHOULD NOT BE READING AFROPESSIMISM TO WIN ROUNDS

Black Debate Community 19 Zion Dixon, Joshua Porter and Quinn Hughes December 29, 2019 “ON NON-BLACK AFROPESSIMISM” - [THE DRINKING GOURD](https://thedrinkinggourd.home.blog/): BLACKNESS, DEBATE AND POLITICS, AT THE END OF THE WORLD <https://thedrinkinggourd.home.blog/> Niggas Academy ZD

“Debate is a game!” “Debate is a game!” “Debate is a game!” How many times are you non-Black people going to use this excuse for your actions? How many times does a Black debater or judge need to tell you this is triggering before you stop? How many times will we have to call you out before you are held accountable? Even better. Why are judges more compelled to hear non-Black people make the same arguments we do? Is it that hard to resist reducing Black flesh to nothingness? You know what? I am just going to say it. You will not like it. You may not even listen. I cannot be silent about this any longer. WE cannot be quiet about this anymore. NON-BLACK PEOPLE SHOULD NOT BE READING AFRO PESSIMISM. Even better, stop using Black suffering and the reality of anti-Blackness to win high school debate rounds. There I said it. If only it were that simple. If only I could be assured you would listen. Non-Black afro pessimism is problematic because our authors take an ontological stance on Blackness. Reading positions centered around Black suffering, oppression, and violence for ballots is disgusting. We have a different relation to the literature and arguments; when I do it, I am confronting the reality of my life. When you do it, your relationship to the positions is entirely different. How do you even relate to it? Stop saying, “oh, debate is a game”. That will not cut it anymore. We are talking about real lives and feelings, and non-Black debaters will never understand the weight of that. We are coping with the reality of an anti-Black world. You guys just think it must suck to be Black. Our authors make claims that Blackness is nonhuman, an object, nonbeing, nothing, outside of this world, a nigger. You people read these cards without taking the time to let it sink in that you might as well call us niggers. The logic of reducing Blackness to an object is all the same. Do you ever think debate might be more than a game to some people? Of course, you don’t. You guys don’t care about us. As a non-Black debater, your relationship to afro pessimism will always be theoretical, redundant, and objectifying. non-Black debaters can read arguments about the topics relationship to Black people, but you cannot reduce Blackness to ontological nothingness. Black people in the debate community talk about this quite often. non-Black debaters will never know how we feel about them reading these positions. We know that. Just respect that.

### NC – AT: Ontology

#### Totalizing readings of anti-blackness that preclude the possibility for political change are bad---

#### First, materially--- a confluence of statistical factors prove racial progress is possible and occurring.

Hochschild 17 (Jennifer L. Hochschild , Professor of Government, African and African American Studies, and the Chair of the Department of Government (Harvard University), Chair in American Law and Governance at the Library of Congress, President of the American Political Science Association, “Left Pessimism and Political Science,” Perspectives on Politics, Volume 15, Issue 1, March 15th, p. 6-19, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592716004102> \*\*modified to allow for more humanizing frames)

Is Pessimism the Only Sensible or Empirically Warranted Response in these Two Arenas? It is easy to find evidence to support pessimism about American racial dynamics or the societal deployment of genomic science. The United States is notorious for its racially- and ethnically-inflected poverty and excessive levels of incarceration; undocumented migrants live in legal limbo; new genomics techniques such as CRISPR-Cas9 tempt humankind into hubristic manipulation of nature, and scientists’ promises to cure cancer through genetics knowledge ring hollow to many. The question for this article is whether there are also strong grounds for optimism in my two illustrative realms, such that one could plausibly and persuasively choose to be “centered on advancement concerns” rather than “centered on security concerns.” The answer is yes. Again I can point only to illustrative, suggestive evidence. First, the gap between ~~blacks’~~ [black people’s] and whites’ life expectancy declined from seven years in 1990 to 3.4 years in 2014. That is an astonishing, perhaps unprecedented, rate of change given the usual slow pace of demographic transformation. It is important in itself, of course, and also as a summary statement about an array of other social phenomena in which racial disparities are declining. ~~Blacks~~ [Black people] are living longer mainly because of declining rates of homicides, HIV mortality, infant mortality, cancer and heart disease, and suicide among black men.19 A lot of things have to go right for a group’s life expectancy to rise rapidly. Second, applications for U.S. citizenship rose from the previous year in ten of the fifteen years from 2000 to 2015, while declining in four (and remaining stable in one). That is an important indicator of immigrant incorporation, and especially relevant to political scientists because “Hispanics and Asians who are naturalized citizens tend to have higher voter turnout rates than their U.S.-born counterparts.” 20 Third, non-white Americans themselves tend to feel pretty good about their lives. Gallup Poll asked in 2016, “Where do you expect your life satisfaction to be in five years?” If whites’ response is standardized at 1, then ~~blacks~~ [black people’s] are at 2.97, and Hispanics at 1.29. Only Asian Americans, at 0.97, were less optimistic than whites. Gallup also asked about one’s level of stress in the previous day. If whites are again standardized at 1, then ~~blacks~~ [black people] are at 0.48; Hispanics at 0.53; and Asian Americans at 0.75. Middle-class ~~blacks~~ [black people] were half as likely as middle class whites to report stress during the previous day.21 In the arena of genomics also, one can point to grounds for optimism rather than pessimism. The Innocence Project, “dedicated to exonerating wrongfully convicted individuals through DNA testing and reforming the criminal justice system to prevent future injustice,” has enabled about 350 people to be released from prison. (Not so parenthetically, seven out of ten are African American or Latino, mostly poor men.) More extensive DNA testing might lead to many more exonerations**;** one careful analysis of serious crime convictions found that “in five percent of homicide and sexual assault cases DNA testing eliminated the convicted offender as the source of incriminating physical evidence.” Previous estimates had pegged the share of wrongful convictions at no more than one to two percent.22 More generally, “DNA profiling [of convicted felons] reduces the probability of future convictions by 17% for serious violent offenders and by 6% for serious property offenders .... These are likely underestimates of the true deterrent effect of DNA profiling.” 23 Genomic scientists can point to impressive successes with regard to Mendelian (single-gene) diseases, and they focus even more on diagnoses and cures yet to come. Eric Lander, director of the Broad Institute, likens the trajectory of genomic medicine to the development of medicine based on the germ theory of disease, which “took about 75 years. With genomics, we’re maybe halfway through that cycle.” In his view, “the rate of progress is just stunning. As costs continue to come down, we are entering a period where we are going to be able to get the complete catalogue of disease genes.” Cancer is a prime target, almost in sight:“If you understand that this is a game of probability, and there is only a finite number of cancer cells and each has only a certain chance of mutating, and if we can put together two or three independent attacks on the cancer cell, we win. If we invest vigorously in this and we attract the best young people into this field, we get it done in a generation. If we don’t, it takes two generations.” Lander is “not Pollyanna .... [I]t’s not for next year. We play for the long game. I don’t want to overpromise in the short term, but it is incredibly exciting if you take the 25-year view.” 24 This is a classic statement of optimism, or being centered on advancement concerns. It begins with expertise and perspective, sees dangers and weaknesses, and nonetheless asserts empirical grounds for faith. President Obama’s insistence that “if you had to choose a moment in human history to live ... you’d choose now” has the same quality. My point is not that left pessimism is wrong—only that there are grounds, perhaps equally strong, for left optimism. One can choose either, and then find good evidence for that choice. Why Is Left Pessimism Problematic? That wily politician, Barney Frank, offers the best answer from the vantage point of the public arena: “When you tell your supporters that nothing has gotten better, and that any concessions you’ve received are mere tokenism, you take away their incentive to stay mobilized. As for those you’re negotiating with, if you denigrate anything they concede as worthless, they will soon realize they can obtain the same response by giving nothing at all.” 25 One can offer the same type of answer from the vantage point of a teacher. Many of us have had the experience of teaching a course—about civil war, inequality and politics, environmental policy, or the meaning of liberty—only to have our students politely request on the last day of class some idea or piece of information about which they can feel good or which they can use in their public engagement. We need to offer answers. Optimism may also be associated with academic success; one careful study found that “although achievement in mathematics was most strongly related to prior achievement and grade level, optimism and pessimism were significant factors. In particular, students with a more generally pessimistic outlook on life had a lower level of achievement in mathematics over time.” 26A study of college students similarly found that “dispositional and academic optimism were associated with less chance of dropping out of college, as well as better motivation and adjustment. Academic optimism was also associated with higher grade point average.” 27 And for those of us of a certain age, it is heartening to discover that “after adjusting for covariates, the results suggested that greater optimism [among middle-aged, predominantly white Americans] was associated with greater high-density lipoprotein cholesterol and lower triglycerides .... In conclusion, ... optimism is associated with a healthy lipid profile; moreover, these associations can be explained, in part, by the presence of healthier behaviors and a lower body mass index.” 28

#### Second, historically---anti-black racism is not static, but shaped by socialization and specific policies

Harari 15 [Yuval Noah Harari, Israeli historian and a tenured professor in the Department of History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, specializing in World History, Doctorate in Philosophy from Oxford University, and an acclaimed author whose first book, Sapiens, was an international bestseller that received lavish praise by figures ranging from Barack Obama to Bill Gates, *Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind,* tr. by Yuval Harari with help from John Purcell and Haim Watzman, HarperCollins: Broadway, NY, 2015, p. 133-144]

UNDERSTANDING HUMAN HISTORY IN THE millennia following the Agricultural Revolution boils down to a single question: how did humans organise themselves in mass-cooperation networks, when they lacked the biological instincts necessary to sustain such networks? The short answer is that humans created imagined orders and devised scripts. These two inventions filled the gaps left by our biological inheritance. However, the appearance of these networks was, for many, a dubious blessing. The imagined orders sustaining these networks were neither neutral nor fair. They divided people into make-believe groups, arranged in a hierarchy. The upper levels enjoyed privileges and power, while the lower ones suffered from discrimination and oppression. Hammurabi’s Code, for example, established a pecking order of superiors, commoners and slaves. Superiors got all the good things in life. Commoners got what was left. Slaves got a beating if they complained. Despite its proclamation of the equality of all men, the imagined order established by the Americans in 1776 also established a hierarchy. It created a hierarchy between men, who benefited from it, and women, whom it left disempowered. It created a hierarchy between whites, who enjoyed liberty, and blacks and American Indians, who were considered humans of a lesser type and therefore did not share in the equal rights of men. Many of those who signed the Declaration of Independence were slaveholders. They did not release their slaves upon signing the Declaration, nor did they consider themselves hypocrites. In their view, the rights of men had little to do with Negroes. The American order also consecrated the hierarchy between rich and poor. Most Americans at that time had little problem with the inequality caused by wealthy parents passing their money and businesses on to their children. In their view, equality meant simply that the same laws applied to rich and poor. It had nothing to do with unemployment benefits, integrated education or health insurance. Liberty, too, carried very different connotations than it does today. In 1776, it did not mean that the disempowered (certainly not blacks or Indians or, God forbid, women) could gain and exercise power. It meant simply that the state could not, except in unusual circumstances, confiscate a citizen’s private property or tell him what to do with it. The American order thereby upheld the hierarchy of wealth, which some thought was mandated by God and others viewed as representing the immutable laws of nature. Nature, it was claimed, rewarded merit with wealth while penalising indolence. All the above-mentioned distinctions – between free persons and slaves, between whites and blacks, between rich and poor – are rooted in fictions. (The hierarchy of men and women will be discussed later.) Yet it is an iron rule of history that every imagined hierarchy disavows its fictional origins and claims to be natural and inevitable. For instance, many people who have viewed the hierarchy of free persons and slaves as natural and correct have argued that slavery is not a human invention. Hammurabi saw it as ordained by the gods. Aristotle argued that slaves have a ‘slavish nature’ whereas free people have a ‘free nature’. Their status in society is merely a reflection of their innate nature. Ask white supremacists about the racial hierarchy, and you are in for a pseudoscientific lecture concerning the biological differences between the races. You are likely to be told that there is something in Caucasian blood or genes that makes whites naturally more intelligent, moral and hardworking. Ask a diehard capitalist about the hierarchy of wealth, and you are likely to hear that it is the inevitable outcome of objective differences in abilities. The rich have more money, in this view, because they are more capable and diligent. No one should be bothered, then, if the wealthy get better health care, better education and better nutrition. The rich richly deserve every perk they enjoy. People with lighter skin colour are typically more in danger of sunburn than people with darker skin. Yet there was no biological logic behind the division of South African beaches. Beaches reserved for people with lighter skin were not characterised by lower levels of ultraviolet radiation. Hindus who adhere to the caste system believe that cosmic forces have made one caste superior to another. According to a famous Hindu creation myth, the gods fashioned the world out of the body of a primeval being, the Purusa. The sun was created from the Purusa’s eye, the moon from the Purusa’s brain, the Brahmins (priests) from its mouth, the Kshatriyas (warriors) from its arms, the Vaishyas (peasants and merchants) from its thighs, and the Shudras (servants) from its legs. Accept this explanation and the sociopolitical differences between Brahmins and Shudras are as natural and eternal as the differences between the sun and the moon.1 The ancient Chinese believed that when the goddess Nü Wa created humans from earth, she kneaded aristocrats from fine yellow soil, whereas commoners were formed from brown mud.2 Yet, to the best of our understanding, these hierarchies are all the product of human imagination. Brahmins and Shudras were not really created by the gods from different body parts of a primeval being. Instead, the distinction between the two castes was created by laws and norms invented by humans in northern India about 3,000 years ago. Contrary to Aristotle, there is no known biological difference between slaves and free people. Human laws and norms have turned some people into slaves and others into masters. Between blacks and whites there are some objective biological differences, such as skin colour and hair type, but there is no evidence that the differences extend to intelligence or morality. Most people claim that their social hierarchy is natural and just, while those of other societies are based on false and ridiculous criteria. Modern Westerners are taught to scoff at the idea of racial hierarchy. They are shocked by laws prohibiting blacks to live in white neighbourhoods, or to study in white schools, or to be treated in white hospitals. But the hierarchy of rich and poor – which mandates that rich people live in separate and more luxurious neighbourhoods, study in separate and more prestigious schools, and receive medical treatment in separate and better-equipped facilities – seems perfectly sensible to many Americans and Europeans. Yet it’s a proven fact that most rich people are rich for the simple reason that they were born into a rich family, while most poor people will remain poor throughout their lives simply because they were born into a poor family. Unfortunately, complex human societies seem to require imagined hierarchies and unjust discrimination. Of course not all hierarchies are morally identical, and some societies suffered from more extreme types of discrimination than others, yet scholars know of no large society that has been able to dispense with discrimination altogether. Time and again people have created order in their societies by classifying the population into imagined categories, such as superiors, commoners and slaves; whites and blacks; patricians and plebeians; Brahmins and Shudras; or rich and poor. These categories have regulated relations between millions of humans by making some people legally, politically or socially superior to others. Hierarchies serve an important function. They enable complete strangers to know how to treat one another without wasting the time and energy needed to become personally acquainted. In George Bernard Shaw’s Pygmalion, Henry Higgins doesn’t need to establish an intimate acquaintance with Eliza Doolittle in order to understand how he should relate to her. Just hearing her talk tells him that she is a member of the underclass with whom he can do as he wishes – for example, using her as a pawn in his bet to pass off a jower girl as a duchess. A modern Eliza working at a jorist’s needs to know how much effort to put into selling roses and gladioli to the dozens of people who enter the shop each day. She can’t make a detailed enquiry into the tastes and wallets of each individual. Instead, she uses social cues – the way the person is dressed, his or her age, and if she’s not politically correct his skin colour. That is how she immediately distinguishes between the accounting-firm partner who’s likely to place a large order for expensive roses, and a messenger boy who can only afford a bunch of daisies. Of course, differences in natural abilities also play a role in the formation of social distinctions. But such diversities of aptitudes and character are usually mediated through imagined hierarchies. This happens in two important ways. First and foremost, most abilities have to be nurtured and developed. Even if somebody is born with a particular talent, that talent will usually remain latent if it is not fostered, honed and exercised. Not all people get the same chance to cultivate and refine their abilities. Whether or not they have such an opportunity will usually depend on their place within their society’s imagined hierarchy. Harry Potter is a good example. Removed from his distinguished wizard family and brought up by ignorant muggles, he arrives at Hogwarts without any experience in magic. It takes him seven books to gain a firm command of his powers and knowledge of his unique abilities. Second, even if people belonging to different classes develop exactly the same abilities, they are unlikely to enjoy equal success because they will have to play the game by different rules. If, in British-ruled India, an Untouchable, a Brahmin, a Catholic Irishman and a Protestant Englishman had somehow developed exactly the same business acumen, they still would not have had the same chance of becoming rich. The economic game was rigged by legal restrictions and unoɽcial glass ceilings. The Vicious Circle All societies are based on imagined hierarchies, but not necessarily on the same hierarchies. What accounts for the differences? Why did traditional Indian society classify people according to caste, Ottoman society according to religion, and American society according to race? In most cases the hierarchy originated as the result of a set of accidental historical circumstances and was then perpetuated and refined over many generations as different groups developed vested interests in it. For instance, many scholars surmise that the Hindu caste system took shape when Indo-Aryan people invaded the Indian subcontinent about 3,000 years ago, subjugating the local population. The invaders established a stratified society, in which they – of course – occupied the leading positions (priests and warriors), leaving the natives to live as servants and slaves. The invaders, who were few in number, feared losing their privileged status and unique identity. To forestall this danger, they divided the population into castes, each of which was required to pursue a specific occupation or perform a specific role in society. Each had different legal status, privileges and duties. Mixing of castes – social interaction, marriage, even the sharing of meals – was prohibited. And the distinctions were not just legal – they became an inherent part of religious mythology and practice. The rulers argued that the caste system rejected an eternal cosmic reality rather than a chance historical development. Concepts of purity and impurity were essential elements in Hindu religion, and they were harnessed to buttress the social pyramid. Pious Hindus were taught that contact with members of a different caste could pollute not only them personally, but society as a whole, and should therefore be abhorred. Such ideas are hardly unique to Hindus. Throughout history, and in almost all societies, concepts of pollution and purity have played a leading role in enforcing social and political divisions and have been exploited by numerous ruling classes to maintain their privileges. The fear of pollution is not a complete fabrication of priests and princes, however. It probably has its roots in biological survival mechanisms that make humans feel an instinctive revulsion towards potential disease carriers, such as sick persons and dead bodies. If you want to keep any human group isolated – women, Jews, Roma, gays, blacks – the best way to do it is convince everyone that these people are a source of pollution. The Hindu caste system and its attendant laws of purity became deeply embedded in Indian culture. Long after the Indo-Aryan invasion was forgotten, Indians continued to believe in the caste system and to abhor the pollution caused by caste mixing. Castes were not immune to change. In fact, as time went by, large castes were divided into sub-castes. Eventually the original four castes turned into 3,000 different groupings called jati (literally ‘birth’). But this proliferation of castes did not change the basic principle of the system, according to which every person is born into a particular rank, and any infringement of its rules pollutes the person and society as a whole. A persons jati determines her profession, the food she can eat, her place of residence and her eligible marriage partners. Usually a person can marry only within his or her caste, and the resulting children inherit that status. Whenever a new profession developed or a new group of people appeared on the scene, they had to be recognised as a caste in order to receive a legitimate place within Hindu society. Groups that failed to win recognition as a caste were, literally, outcasts – in this stratified society, they did not even occupy the lowest rung. They became known as Untouchables. They had to live apart from all other people and scrape together a living in humiliating and disgusting ways, such as sifting through garbage dumps for scrap material. Even members of the lowest caste avoided mingling with them, eating with them, touching them and certainly marrying them. In modern India, matters of marriage and work are still heavily influenced by the caste system, despite all attempts by the democratic government of India to break down such distinctions and convince Hindus that there is nothing polluting in caste mixing.3 Purity in America A similar vicious circle perpetuated the racial hierarchy in modern America. From the sixteenth to the eighteenth century, the European conquerors imported millions of African slaves to work the mines and plantations of America. They chose to import slaves from Africa rather than from Europe or East Asia due to three circumstantial factors. Firstly, Africa was closer, so it was cheaper to import slaves from Senegal than from Vietnam. Secondly, in Africa there already existed a well-developed slave trade (exporting slaves mainly to the Middle East), whereas in Europe slavery was very rare. It was obviously far easier to buy slaves in an existing market than to create a new one from scratch. Thirdly, and most importantly, American plantations in places such as Virginia, Haiti and Brazil were plagued by malaria and yellow fever, which had originated in Africa. Africans had acquired over the generations a partial genetic immunity to these diseases, whereas Europeans were totally defenceless and died in droves. It was consequently wiser for a plantation owner to invest his money in an African slave than in a European slave or indentured labourer. Paradoxically, genetic superiority (in terms of immunity) translated into social inferiority: precisely because Africans were fitter in tropical climates than Europeans, they ended up as the slaves of European masters! Due to these circumstantial factors, the burgeoning new societies of America were to be divided into a ruling caste of white Europeans and a subjugated caste of black Africans. But people don’t like to say that they keep slaves of a certain race or origin simply because it’s economically expedient. Like the Aryan conquerors of India, white Europeans in the Americas wanted to be seen not only as economically successful but also as pious, just and objective. Religious and scientific myths were pressed into service to justify this division. Theologians argued that Africans descend from Ham, son of Noah, saddled by his father with a curse that his offspring would be slaves. Biologists argued that blacks are less intelligent than whites and their moral sense less developed. Doctors alleged that blacks live in filth and spread diseases – in other words, they are a source of pollution. These myths struck a chord in American culture, and in Western culture generally. They continued to exert their influence long after the conditions that created slavery had disappeared. In the early nineteenth century imperial Britain outlawed slavery and stopped the Atlantic slave trade, and in the decades that followed slavery was gradually outlawed throughout the American continent. Notably, this was the first and only time in history that slaveholding societies voluntarily abolished slavery. But, even though the slaves were freed, the racist myths that justified slavery persisted. Separation of the races was maintained by racist legislation and social custom. The result was a self-reinforcing cycle of cause and effect, a vicious circle. Consider, for example, the southern United States immediately after the Civil War. In 1865 the Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution outlawed slavery and the Fourteenth Amendment mandated that citizenship and the equal protection of the law could not be denied on the basis of race. However, two centuries of slavery meant that most black families were far poorer and far less educated than most white families. A black person born in Alabama in 1865 thus had much less chance of getting a good education and a well-paid job than did his white neighbours. His children, born in the 1880S and 1890s, started life with the same disadvantage – they, too, were born to an uneducated, poor family. But economic disadvantage was not the whole story. Alabama was also home to many poor whites who lacked the opportunities available to their better-off racial brothers and sisters. In addition, the Industrial Revolution and the waves of immigration made the United States an extremely fluid society, where rags could quickly turn into riches. If money was all that mattered, the sharp divide between the races should soon have blurred, not least through intermarriage. But that did not happen. By 1865 whites, as well as many blacks, took it to be a simple matter of fact that blacks were less intelligent, more violent and sexually dissolute, lazier and less concerned about personal cleanliness than whites. They were thus the agents of violence, theft, rape and disease – in other words, pollution. If a black Alabaman in 1895 miraculously managed to get a good education and then applied for a respectable job such as a bank teller, his odds of being accepted were far worse than those of an equally qualified white candidate. The stigma that labelled blacks as, by nature, unreliable, lazy and less intelligent conspired against him. You might think that people would gradually understand that these stigmas were myth rather than fact and that blacks would be able, over time, to prove themselves just as competent, law-abiding and clean as whites. In fact, the opposite happened – these prejudices became more and more entrenched as time went by. Since all the best jobs were held by whites, it became easier to believe that blacks really are inferior. ‘Look,’ said the average white citizen, ‘blacks have been free for generations, yet there are almost no black professors, lawyers, doctors or even bank tellers. Isn’t that proof that blacks are simply less intelligent and hard-working?’ Trapped in this vicious circle, blacks were not hired for whitecollar jobs because they were deemed unintelligent, and the proof of their inferiority was the paucity of blacks in white-collar jobs. The vicious circle did not stop there. As anti-black stigmas grew stronger, they were translated into a system of ‘Jim Crow’ laws

and norms that were meant to safeguard the racial order. Blacks were forbidden to vote in elections, to study in white schools, to buy in white stores, to eat in white restaurants, to sleep in white hotels. The justification for all of this was that blacks were foul, slothful and vicious, so whites had to be protected from them. Whites did not want to sleep in the same hotel as blacks or to eat in the same restaurant, for fear of diseases. They did not want their children learning in the same school as black children, for fear of brutality and bad influences. They did not want blacks voting in elections, since blacks were ignorant and immoral. These fears were substantiated by scientific studies that ‘proved’ that blacks were indeed less educated, that various diseases were more common among them, and that their crime rate was far higher (the studies ignored the fact that these ‘facts’ resulted from discrimination against blacks). By the mid-twentieth century, segregation in the former Confederate states was probably worse than in the late nineteenth century. Clennon King, a black student who applied to the University of Mississippi in 1958, was forcefully committed to a mental asylum. The presiding judge ruled that a black person must surely be insane to think that he could be admitted to the University of Mississippi. The vicious circle: a chance historical situation is translated into a rigid social system. Nothing was as revolting to American southerners (and many northerners) as sexual relations and marriage between black men and white women. Sex between the races became the greatest taboo and any violation, or suspected violation, was viewed as deserving immediate and summary punishment in the form of lynching. The Ku Klux Klan, a white supremacist secret society, perpetrated many such killings. They could have taught the Hindu Brahmins a thing or two about purity laws. With time, the racism spread to more and more cultural arenas. American aesthetic culture was built around white standards of beauty. The physical attributes of the white race – for example light skin, fair and straight hair, a small upturned nose – came to be identified as beautiful. Typical black features – dark skin, dark and bushy hair, a flattened nose – were deemed ugly. These preconceptions ingrained the imagined hierarchy at an even deeper level of human consciousness. Such vicious circles can go on for centuries and even millennia, perpetuating an imagined hierarchy that sprang from a chance historical occurrence. Unjust discrimination often gets worse, not better, with time. Money comes to money, and poverty to poverty. Education comes to education, and ignorance to ignorance. Those once victimised by history are likely to be victimised yet again. And those whom history has privileged are more likely to be privileged again. Most sociopolitical hierarchies lack a logical or biological basis – they are nothing but the perpetuation of chance events supported by myths. That is one good reason to study history. If the division into blacks and whites or Brahmins and Shudras was grounded in biological realities – that is, if Brahmins really had better brains than Shudras – biology would be sufficient for understanding human society. Since the biological distinctions between different groups of Homo sapiens are, in fact, negligible, biology can’t explain the intricacies of Indian society or American racial dynamics. We can only understand those phenomena by studying the events, circumstances, and power relations that transformed figments of imagination into cruel – and very real – social structures.

#### Third, neuroscience--- bias is flexible and determined by coalitional habit forming in the brain---orienting groups around institutional change best breaks down bias. This is offense because their theory rejects these solutions

Cikara and Van Bavel 15 (Mina Cikara is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Intergroup Neuroscience Lab at Harvard University. Her research examines the conditions under which groups and individuals are denied social value, agency, and empathy. Jay Van Bavel is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Social Perception and Evaluation Laboratory at New York University. The Flexibility of Racial Bias: Research suggests that racism is not hard wired, offering hope on one of America’s enduring problems. June 2, 2015. <https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-flexibility-of-racial-bias/>)

The city of Baltimore was rocked by protests and riots over the death of Freddie Gray, a 25-year-old African American man who died in police custody. Tragically, Gray’s death was only one of a recent in a series of racially-charged, often violent, incidents. On April 4th, Walter Scott was fatally shot by a police officer after fleeing from a routine traffic stop. On March 8th, Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity members were caught on camera gleefully chanting, “There Will Never Be A N\*\*\*\*\* In SAE.” On March 1st, a homeless Black man was shot in broad daylight by a Los Angeles police officer. And these are not isolated incidents, of course. Institutional and systemic racism reinforce discrimination in countless situations, including hiring, sentencing, housing, and even mortgage lending. It would be easy to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in America’s social fabric and even, perhaps, an inevitable aspect of human nature. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our awareness. Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress. Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by exposing people to images of faces while scanning their brains in fMRI machines. Early studies found that when people viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias. This work has led many to conclude that racial biases might be part of a primitive—and possibly hard-wired—neural fear response to racial out-groups. There is little question that categories such as race, gender, and age play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to bear in their judgments of others. However, research has shown that how people categorize themselves may be just as fundamental to understanding prejudice as how they categorize others. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are formed on arbitrary grounds, such as the simple flip of a coin. These findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form coalitions. Recent research confirms that coalition-based preferences trump race-based preferences. For example, both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political party much more than they favor those who share their race. These coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics. Our research has shown that the simple act of placing people on a mixed-race team can diminish their automatic racial bias. In a series of experiments, White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias. Merely belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations with all of the members of their own group, irrespective of race. Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups produced similar effects on brain activity—the amygdala responded to team membership rather than race. Taken together, these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves. Although these coalition-based distinctions might be the most basic building block of bias, they say little about the other factors that cause group conflict. Why do some groups get ignored while others get attacked? Whenever we encounter a new person or group we are motivated to answer two questions as quickly as possible: “is this person a friend or foe?” and “are they capable of enacting their intentions toward me?” In other words, once we have determined that someone is a member of an out-group, we need to determine what kind? The nature of the relations between groups—are we cooperative, competitive, or neither?—and their relative status—do you have access to resources?—largely determine the course of intergroup interactions. Groups that are seen as competitive with one’s interests, and capable of enacting their nasty intentions, are much more likely to be targets of hostility than more benevolent (e.g., elderly) or powerless (e.g., homeless) groups. This is one reason why sports rivalries have such psychological potency. For instance, fans of the Boston Red Sox are more likely to feel pleasure, and exhibit reward-related neural responses, at the misfortunes of the archrival New York Yankees than other baseball teams (and vice versa)—especially in the midst of a tight playoff race. (How much fans take pleasure in the misfortunes of their rivals is also linked to how likely they would be to harm fans from the other team.) Just as a particular person’s group membership can be flexible, so too are the relations between groups. Groups that have previously had cordial relations may become rivals (and vice versa). Indeed, psychological and biological responses to out-group members can change, depending on whether or not that out-group is perceived as threatening. For example, people exhibit greater pleasure—they smile—in response to the misfortunes of stereotypically competitive groups (e.g., investment bankers); however, this malicious pleasure is reduced when you provide participants with counter-stereotypic information (e.g., “investment bankers are working with small companies to help them weather the economic downturn). Competition between “us” and “them” can even distort our judgments of distance, making threatening out-groups seem much closer than they really are. These distorted perceptions can serve to amplify intergroup discrimination: the more different and distant “they” are, the easier it is to disrespect and harm them. Thus, not all out-groups are treated the same: some elicit indifference whereas others become targets of antipathy. Stereotypically threatening groups are especially likely to be targeted with violence, but those stereotypes can be tempered with other information. If perceptions of intergroup relations can be changed, individuals may overcome hostility toward perceived foes and become more responsive to one another’s grievances. The flexible nature of both group membership and intergroup relations offers reason to be cautiously optimistic about the potential for greater cooperation among groups in conflict (be they black versus white or citizens versus police). One strategy is to bring multiple groups together around a common goal. For example, during the fiercely contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary process, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama supporters gave more money to strangers who supported the same primary candidate (compared to the rival candidate). Two months later, after the Democratic National Convention, the supporters of both candidates coalesced around the party nominee—Barack Obama—and this bias disappeared. In fact, merely creating a sense of cohesion between two competitive groups can increase empathy for the suffering of our rivals. These sorts of strategies can help reduce aggression toward hostile out-groups, which is critical for creating more opportunities for constructive dialogue addressing greater social injustices. Of course, instilling a sense of common identity and cooperation is extremely difficult in entrenched intergroup conflicts, but when it happens, the benefits are obvious. Consider how the community leaders in New York City and Ferguson responded differently to protests against police brutality—in NYC political leaders expressed grief and concern over police brutality and moved quickly to make policy changes in policing, whereas the leaders and police in Ferguson responded with high-tech military vehicles and riot gear. In the first case, multiple groups came together with a common goal—to increase the safety of everyone in the community; in the latter case, the actions of the police likely reinforced the “us” and “them” distinctions. Tragically, these types of conflicts continue to roil the country. Understanding the psychology and neuroscience of social identity and intergroup relations cannot undo the effects of systemic racism and discriminatory practices; however, it can offer insights into the psychological processes responsible for escalating the tension between, for example, civilians and police officers. Even in cases where it isn’t possible to create a common identity among groups in conflict, it may be possible to blur the boundaries between groups. In one recent experiment, we sorted participants into groups—red versus blue team—competing for a cash prize. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to see a picture of a segregated social network of all the players, in which red dots clustered together, blue dots clustered together, and the two clusters were separated by white space. The other half of the participants saw an integrated social network in which the red and blue dots were mixed together in one large cluster. Participants who thought the two teams were interconnected with one another reported greater empathy for the out-group players compared to those who had seen the segregated network. Thus, reminding people that individuals could be connected to one another despite being from different groups may be another way to build trust and understanding among them. A mere month before Freddie Gray died in police custody, President Obama addressed the nation on the 50th anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Selma: “We do a disservice to the cause of justice by intimating that bias and discrimination are immutable, or that racial division is inherent to America. To deny…progress – our progress – would be to rob us of our own agency; our responsibility to do what we can to make America better." The president was saying that we, as a society, have a responsibility to reduce prejudice and discrimination. These recent findings from psychology and neuroscience indicate that we, as individuals, possess this capacity. Of course this capacity is not sufficient to usher in racial equality or peace. Even when the level of prejudice against particular out-groups decreases, it does not imply that the level of institutional discrimination against these or other groups will necessarily improve. Ultimately, only collective action and institutional evolution can address systemic racism. The science is clear on one thing, though: individual bias and discrimination are changeable. Race-based prejudice and discrimination, in particular, are created and reinforced by many social factors, but they are not inevitable consequences of our biology**.**

### NC – Humanism Good

#### Black humanist movements are good---their readings run counter to black tradition.

Kelley 17 Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Robin D.G. Kelley & Fred Moten In Conversation,” transcribed from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fP-2F9MXjRE, 1:57:36-2:02:56, dml)

KELLEY: Um, Fred—Fred will take most of these questions. So that's why I'm going to begin first because he's gonna, he's gonna—he's gonna end it because he, he, he has the answer to all these questions ‘cause I turn to him for these questions. On the specific, on the first question, I just want to make sure I understand it because I'm, you know, I don't always recognize, uh, it may be because I'm just old, but I don't always recognize, uh, that black politics, black [unclear—maybe “guys”] work politics have been structured or defined by white supremacy. I mean, white supremacy is there. And I guess maybe because I'm such a student of Cedric Robinson, you know, not everything is about, or in response to, white supremacy. And in fact, one of the critiques coming out of doing Southern history was this idea that race relations framework, that race relations defines, uh, African-American history or Black history. And it's simply not true because much of what people do in terms of, of social formation, community building, um, is, is, is what Raymond Williams might call alternative cultures. In other words, it may be structured in dominance in some ways, but not defined by it. And Cedric's Black Marxism, you know, really made this point. He talks about the ontological totality, you know, the, this sense of being and making ourselves whole, in that we come out of an experience, again, structured by white supremacy, structured by violence, structured by enslavement and dispossession, but, but one in which western hegemony didn't work, you know, that modes of thinking wasn't defined by Enlightenment modes of thinking. In other words, that, that part of the Black radical tradition is a refusal to be property, to even admit that human beings could be property. You know, so we sometimes give white supremacy way too much credit, and maybe I misunderstood the question. And so I think that there's lots of things that happen outside of joy and survival, and survival is important, but survival is not the end all, you know. So I think, and I'll give you one very, very specific example, and now I'm not gonna say anything else after this. The way we have tended to more recently treat slavery, Jim Crow and mass incarceration as a piece, as the reinstantiation of the same thing, the continuation, that denies the fact that these systems are actually distinct, that they are historically specific, and in fact they’re responses to, in many ways, to the weakness of this as a racial regime. So if you think of like the whole idea of the new Jim Crow to me is very, very problematic. Um, although that book by Michelle Alexander is very, very powerful and very useful in terms of educating people about prisons. Jim Crow was not the continuation of slavery. It was not. Jim Crow was a response to the Black Democratic, uh, upsurge after slavery. It was a revolution of Reconstruction. It was a way to try to suppress that. The fact that, that, you know, there was this incredible response. That's why there's a, there's a huge gap between 1877 at the official end of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow, which is the 1890s, disfranchisement, lynching. That's because you've had 13, 14, 15, 20, 25 years of a democratic possibility and struggle. The same thing with mass incarceration—yes, we've had incarceration, but it's, but that, that, that, that upward swing has a lot to do with, again, responses to the struggles in the 1960s, the assault on the Keynesian welfare-warfare state, the fact that you know the, the war on political, the formation of political prisoners, those struggles in fact was the state's response to opposition. And so if we don't acknowledge that, then what we end up doing is thinking that somehow there's a structure of white supremacy that's unchanging, fixed, and so powerful we can't do anything about it when in fact it's the opposite. White supremacy is fragile. White supremacy is weak. Racial regimes actually are always having to shore themselves up precisely because they're unstable. We can see that. We can't see it because the whole system of hegemony is to give us the impression that it is so powerful, there's no space out. And yet it’s working overtime to, to respond to our opposition. Right. That may not answer your question, but that's sort of a way I think about it. Maybe it’s not satisfactory, but yeah.

#### Universalizing ontological claims are colonialist and delegitimize and pathologize African resistance.

* Black Author

Thomas 18, Greg. "Afro-blue notes: The death of afro-pessimism (2.0)?." Theory & Event 21.1 (2018): 282-317. (Associate Professor of English at Tufts, Ph.D. in Rhetoric from the University of California, Berkeley, M.A. in Philosophy from State University of New York, Binghamton, B.A. in Philosophy from Randolph-Macon College, 2018)//Elmer

The conceptual-geopolitical trappings of "1865" fundamentally define the discourse of "Afro-Pessimism and the Ends of Redemption," like assorted neo-pessimist texts: "The expanding field of Afro-pessimism theorises [sic] the structural relation between Blackness and Humanity as an irreconcilable encounter, an antagonism. One cannot know Blackness as distinct from slavery, for there is no Black temporality which is antecedent to the temporality of the Black slave."25 Critically, Wole Soyinka details "pre-colonial" African languages of "black" self-identification from the Yoruba to the Ga to the Hausa peoples on continent, for starters, in "The African World and the Ethnocultural Debate" (1989). But these details do not enter modern Eurocentric discussions in the main, be they Marxist or anti-Marxist, etc.26 There is in Wilderson only the slaver's history of slavery—one slaver's official "national" or state history and discourse. The "expanding field" of "Afro-pessimism" (2.0) further expands anti-Black, anti-African conceptions of historical agency. There is nothing outside of, or before, or countering Wilderson's "slavery" for the African enslaved. There is only Wilderson's "Blackness," which is curious. For what he casts as "Black" rather than "black" is more accurately cast as "negro" (in this specifically English usage, moreover, with no memory of the Spanish or Portuguese etymology) and not even "Negro," quiet as it's kept—since all of **Africa is flatly foreclosed by** this acutely paradoxical **"Afro-pessimism."** Both **Africa and diasporas eclipsed**, his "Blackness" and "Human Life" turn out to be the blackness and humanism of white Americanism, specifically and restrictively, an isolationist or **exceptionalist Americanism** despite the past and present hegemony of white Western humanism and its "anti-Black racism" worldwide. What is the "Afro" in "Afro-pessimism," therefore, when this Afro-pessimism (2.0) revivifies in disguise the "negro" concept of white settler-slave state history and historiography? It ironically does so in the name of some "Blackness" itself or, rather, the "blackness" of whiteness, of white postulation—not the Blackness of Blackness or the transvaluations of manifold Black liberation movements themselves, even as it blithely misappropriates the ongoing if now naturalized cultural-political labor of that historic Blackness in the upper case. **A dominant Anglo-American discourse of** **slavery is all** that **there is** and ever was now when it comes to the Black **and** African, **all** anti-slavery discourses and **counter-discourses** of slavery as well as Blackness somehow **vanished**. A glaring **absence of Black radical** and **revolutionary** intellectual **history** should be expected from any expression of "Afro-pessimism." Indeed, could Afro-pessimism 2.0 take hold as another trend in mainstream academia except in the political void produced after the 1960s and '70s by local as well as global counter-revolution and counter-insurgency? This absence affects the shape and agenda of the critical analysis of "anti-Black racism" in essential ways. Wilderson's critique of the "ruse of analogy" in Red, White & Black becomes a refrain that naturalizes academic approaches to politics now institutionalized with the continued reign of Western bourgeois liberalism. For older and enduring Black radical perspectives, the existence of "anti-Black racism" among non-Black peoples, organizations, and movements is neither a new nor shocking phenomenon. For many Black revolutionary movement logics of the '60s and '70s, for instance, this did not preclude alliance (or the exhaustion of alliances made) or lead to a doctrinaire rejection of "solidarity" work and its international (or "intercommunal") possibilities.27 "Contradictions" were expected, so to speak, in theory and practice, which might be resolved or not, depending on material interest, circumstance, etc. For them, this work was not about gauging identity, or the perfection of a projected analogy, but mobilization for the political accomplishments of revolution—a revolutionism that could or may not work toward the development of a new humanism not white or racist or anti-Black after all. The reach for potential solidarities was not construed as a gift or an act of good-willed benevolence, wise or unwise given the risks. Even solidarity work with obviously problematic, openly enemy forces could be a strategic or tactical mode of advancing Black collective self-interests that might dispense with any alliance at any given moment in time without seeing the relationship as a statement of some total identity or non-identity of condition and interests. The notion of solidarity has nowadays been superficialized, remaining riveted on mere rhetorical proclamation and aesthetic or representational identification in neo-colonial culture industries here and there. An older, praxical approach to alliance, perhaps "analogy," and solidarity is not taken up by current analyses of identity conflicts that prevail with the resurgence of a more academic political-intellectualism and a now much less contested liberalism. This is imperial "multiculturalism" and its malcontents. As much as Afro-pessimism (2.0) may object to certain instances of liberalism, or [End Page 292] regulation white racist liberalism at least, it assumes these Western epistemic frameworks of white academic liberalism all the same, thereby ensconcing the colonialism and neo-colonialism it constantly and symptomatically denegates in text after text. Black anti-colonialism / anti-colonialist Blackness The great anti-colonialist poet of Négritude, Aimé Césaire wrote famously in his letter of resignation from the French Communist Party that he wanted Marxism and communism to be placed in the service of Black peoples and not Black peoples in the service of Marxism or communism. He maintained in 1956: "it is clear that our struggle—the struggle of colonial peoples against colonialism, the struggle of peoples of color against racism—is more complex, or better yet, of a completely different nature than the fight of the French worker against French capitalism, and it cannot in any way be considered a part, a fragment, of that struggle."28 As always, he was writing on behalf of Black people who were, proverbially, the only people on the planet who have been excluded from the "human race" by the "modern" history of Western racism and colonialism which obstructs "a true humanism—a humanism made to the measure of the world."29 What is this Négritude if not Blackness, Black anti-colonialism, or anti-colonial Blackness? This tradition is not a tradition in Wilderson who regularly critiques the analogical arrogance of Marxism, feminism, and an academic paradigm of "post-colonialism" with less common reference to "queer" or "gay and lesbian" categories of analysis as well—all in the name of pessimism. For him, none of these political frameworks with their privileged identarian subjects can capture the condition of "Blackness" and "slavery" (or "the Black/Slave"). While that perspective can allow for some insights—ones certainly seen before around the Black world and ones certainly avoided by so much institutional scholarship—it leaves the general categorical grid of established Western political epistemologies intact. The familiar academic terrain of "race, gender, class, and sexuality" frames the critique for "Blackness" of "gender, class, and sexuality" in addition to "post-coloniality" or "post-colonialism." The most conventional US academic categories of identity and analysis are still rendered in full as discrete, monolithic, and monological categories and referents (e.g., workers, women, etc.), like the respective political ideologies based upon them in the traditional ideological history of the white West (e.g., Marxism, feminism, etc.). There are "workers" and then there are "women," generically, and then sometimes there are "gays" by whatever name, not to mention "natives" or the colonized in this culturally specific epistemology of a specific culture of colonialism itself. The upshot is quite conservative, even anachronistically so. This critique is an internal if damning critique embodying and encouraging pessimism largely from within the established order of knowledge that it analytically engages and categorically replenishes and preserves. The grid politics of Wilderson's critique of "the ruse of analogy" leaves all manner of "Blackness" in a wasteland. The routine categorical contrast with "Native Americans" reduces all that and any colonial condition to a startlingly oversimplified matter of "land" (or "land restoration"); and it occludes "Afro-Indian" history as well as "Red-Black" maroonage all across the Americas. The constant generic contrast with "feminism" or "non-Black women" eclipses the more mammoth criticism of "gender" writ large in Diop and Amadiume's Black-African studies of Europe or "Western Civilization" as a "racial patriarchy" of pessimism and "anti-Black" imperialism. The contrast with Marxism and its "workers" never resurrects any issues of "class" or economics from any other perspective to recognize or to resist, for example, the white invention of Black elites as vital instruments of racism, anti-Blackness, and white-supremacism. There never appears a trace of any critique of Black "social class' (or political class) elitism in "Afro-pessimism" (2.0), which is a tell-tale sign of petty-bourgeois or "lumpen-bourgeois" articulations. Lastly, Wilderson's occasional categorical contrast of "Blackness" with Palestinians or al-Nakba (which aligns in Arabic with the Swahili substitution for the term "Middle Passage"—Maafa, the "Catastrophe") comprehends no Blackness in Palestine or among Palestinians. His Afro-pessimism can envision no Afro-Palestinianism, unlike a great tradition of Pan-African discourses that also do not dislocate Palestine from an anti-colonialist mapping of the African continent or the Afro-Asian landmass of a Pan-Africanist and "Bandung" imagination, one powerfully shared by Malcolm X and Fayez A. Sayegh. For "Black Power" internationally, Kwame Ture would refer to Palestine as the "tip of Africa" and uphold Fatima Bernawi, the iconic Black woman who's been named the "first Palestinian female political prisoner," as the paragon of "Black and Palestinian Revolutions."30 She is likewise canonized by other Afro-Palestinian icons themselves, such as Ali Jiddeh and Mahmoud Jiddeh of the African community of the Old City of Jerusalem, for example—or, say, Ahmad and Jumaa Takrouri of Occupied Jericho—who are each among the greatest of all icons across Historic Palestine, a country which has produced multiple Black Panther formations in Hebrew as well as Arabic in the 1970s and the 1980s. Again, Wilderson tacitly "nationalizes" his category of "Blackness" although this is scarcely in the interests of Black people in or outside of the US colonized mainland of Americanism; and so none of the above "Blackness" survives the critical grid of a very Anglo-American (and white racist state-bound) critique of "analogy," regardless of the "Afro-pessimist" text at hand. Do not the vulgar colonial-nativist politics of Incognegro's strangely overlooked comment on "West Indians" go full blown then in Red, White & Black and elsewhere?31 **There is** here a general critical **erasure of the** massive tradition of Black anti-colonialism—or **anti-colonial Black resistance** to "anti-Blackness" and anti-Black colonialism, which transcends nationalization. Wilderson's "**Afro-pessimist"** **rejects** the **anti-colonialist paradigms of supposedly "other" peoples, and** yet in a manner that **reinstates** US **or Western coloniality** nonetheless—a white colonialism that oppresses "the Black" inside and outside the United States's official geopolitical limits. This position can thus make a virtue out of automatic and absolute anti-alliance postures with no further, actual political action then required for Black people, "the Black critic," or any Black liberation struggle on this view. Such chauvinism without political commitment or engagement beyond critique is logically consistent, for pessimism, where mere resentment or ressentiment can masquerade as resistance or "pro-Black" "radicalism." After all, Afro-pessimism (2.0) begins with a proud suspicion of Black liberation or Black liberation movement, itself, no less than of its potentially "anti-racist" or "anti-Black" political alliances. This provincial "American" pessimism reveals more affinities with Créolite in the Caribbean than Césaire's anti-colonialist eruption of Pan-African Négritude, in reality, its narrowly and negatively delimited rhetoric of the "Blackness" of "the Black" (as "Slave," of course) notwithstanding. As if this too is a virtue, pessimism is not just suspicious of power but possibility—while, upholding dystopia, it is casually dismissive of all historical actuality that does not support a pessimist paradigm, orientation or sensibility. Analytically, moreover, there is somehow no white colonialism for Blacks to fight in Africa or Black countries of Black people anywhere and no terrible landlessness that afflicts the African diasporas of Blackness captive within white settler and/or imperial state formations, for Wilderson and Afro-pessimism (2.0).

#### Theorizing Anti-Blackness as metaphysical and historically pre-figured crushes the potential for revolutionary humanist visions of freedom - voting neg to endorse humanist struggle in this world is key to global justice and doesn’t require racist or Eurocentric conceptions of the human.

Spencer 19, Robert. "For Humanism: explorations in theory and politics edited by David Alderson and Robert Spencer." (2019): 124-126. (Senior Lecturer in Postcolonial Literatures and Cultures at the University of Manchester)//Elmer

This frequent resort in Orientalism to a Foucaultian methodology therefore obscures Said's fairly modest and more immediately political claim, derived from Gramsci and from the Marxist tradition from which the Italian Communist is inseparable, that orthodox representations of the Middle East are ideological and have played and continue to play a crucial as well as exceptionable and contestable part in maintaining European (and latterly American) control in the region. To characterise Orientalism as a discourse, as Said does almost in the same breath, is to make a much more ambitious and far-reaching claim about 'the enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage — and even produce — the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period'. One assumes, of courses that Orientalism does not literally produce the Orients out of thin air as it were, but that it serves to construct an image of a consistent and knowable entity that actually bears little comparison with what are in reality the infinitely more diverse and societies of the Near and Middle East. But formulations like the one above go against every one of the emphases contained in the concept of hegemony: i.e. that power is pervasive but mutable and that its effects are comprehensive yet always limited and contested. A discourse, however, is so 'enormously systematic' that it is difficult, if not impossible, to get outside of and to censure. So intensive and all-embracing is **discursive power** in Said's account, so insinuatingly efficient and so detached from the invidious business of physical coercion, that it runs the risk of ignoring the potential (and even the manifest fact) of **organised political opposition** to power. Of course, Foucault famously insists that power invariably engenders its opposite: Where there is power, there is resistance and yet this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power.'77 Resistance takes place, Foucault concedes, but it does so at powers behest. This being the case, it hardly merits the term. For this kind of resistance is surely a poor substitute for revolution. If the latter indicates irreconcilable antagonism then the former denotes a kind of dependent or symbiotic relationship with power. As Moishe Postone argues, the rhetoric of resistance often goes hand in hand with an inability to identify the system supposedly being resisted or even really to countenance that system's transformation: The notion of resistance…says little about the nature of that which is being resisted or of the politics of the resistance involved – that is, the character of determinate forms of critique, opposition, rebellion, and ‘revolution.’ The notion of resistance frequently expresses a deeply dualistic worldview that tends to reify both the system of domination and the idea of agency. It is rarely based on a **reflexive analysis of possibilities** for fundamental change that are both generated and suppressed by a dynamic heteronomous order. The idea of resistance extols agency but offers no judgements about the type of agency that should be undertaken by the oppressed. Moreover, it says nothing about strategy and goals. Nor does it name the system that is being resisted or even envisage openly that system's deposal and replacement, restricting itself instead to the reactive and defensive manoeuvres implied by the word in both English and French. Thus Bill Ashcroffs account of postcolonial resistance defines it as the 'subtle' and "'unspoken' 'form[s] of defence' by which 'an invader is "kept oue. This kind of resistance is not organised or concerted or even conscious, and is not dedicated to anything as dogmatic as prevailing over or even opposing the thing it resists. Can one even resist without obviously "opposing'? The answer to this is obviously "yes! '"79 That sort of answer is inseparable from a perception of helplessness, as Postone has argued; it connotes survival and defiance but not transformation. Indeed, Postone attributes what he calls 'the current impasse of the Left'80 to the abandonment of an older anticapitalist idiom and the advent of a far less rigorous worldview that fails to identify the target of resistance and that fails to interrogate the often reactionary politics and frequently terroristic strategies of many self-styled 'resistance' movements. Indeed, by blurring distinctions between very different forms of political action, the undiscriminating acclamation of resistance leads to some crass political misjudgements. We postcolonialists are not, surely, in favour of all reactions to dominant forms of power, but only Of those responses that possess the moral and political resources necessary to supplant those forms. Postone reminds us that militant Islamism, for example, may be a form of resistance but it is hardly revolutionary. It has less to do with any genuine confrontation with dictatorship and with the precipitate economic decline in many pre- dominantly Muslim countries than with anti-Semitism. misogyny and a totalitarian vision of a 'purified' society, none of which were top of the Left's traditional wish list. What Postone does not add, perhaps because he does not trace the popularity of the notion of resistance to the esteem in which Foucaults work is still held, is that Foucault himself made the very same misjudgement, as Kevin Anderson discusses in this collection, when his articles in the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera trumpeted the Islamic forces that hijacked the Iranian revolution. In the end, the notion of resistance does nothing but cement in place the system it purports to oppose, which ironically is what Foucault believes to be the fate of the idea and practice of humanism: 'The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself." In Foucault's view, subjectivity is both the effect of power and the means by which power is articulated and enforced. To be a subject is already to be subjected, and therefore to inscribe humanist slogans on one's banners is unwittingly to confirm and endorse that subjection. Indeed, in a celebrated and lyrical passage, Foucault bids farewell not just to the idea of a unified and all-determining human subject (which the mostly Marxist thinkers against whom Foucault defined his own thinking had already rejected) but to human subjectivity itself: If the [arrangements of knowledge since the sixteenth century] were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility — without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises — were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the eighteenth century, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.83 This aversion to the prospect of a transformed and emancipated subjectivity has a deleterious effect on Foucault's work Foucault leaves himself bereft of any vision of subjective freedom to set against the subject’s domination by power. As Peter Dews has argued in relation to Foucault, 'a theory of power with radical intent requires an account of that which power dominates or represses, since without such an account relations of power must cease to appear objectionable. Candidates for this role in Foucault's work include, in Madness and Civilization, the expression of impulse and spontaneity, popular justice in the ultra-gauchiste Discipline and Punish of 1975 and the body and its pleasures in the later History of Sexuality. \*What is Enlightenment?', one of Foucault's last texts, even calls fr a more nuanced approach to humanism and the Enlightenment, this last perhaps, Janet Afary and Kevin Anderson speculate," as a result of having his fingers burnt by the tragic outcome of the revolution in Iran and the furore surrounding his support for its Islamist turn. It is perhaps his awareness of these shortcomings in Foucault's work that led Said, in several texts written after Orientalism, to offer a lengthy appraisal of what he saw as the limitations of Foucault's characterisation of power. 'Criticism Between Culture and System' concedes that Foucault had done very constructive work in exposing the interestedness and violence frequently hidden beneath the discourses of rationality and scientific objectivity. Yet Foucault had neither illuminated the sources of power nor laid enough emphasis in his work on power's limitations and weak points. Indeed, Foucault had actually obscured power's origins in ruling classes and dominant interests. His work portrayed power instead, misleadingly, as 'a spider's web without the spider\* 86 and, Said might have added, without any flies either. Why power is exercised and by whom are questions rarely if ever broached by Foucault. Moreover, contests between classes, societies and ideologies are largely absent from Foucault's work which takes a curiously passive and sterile view not so much of the uses of power, but of how and why power is gained, used, arid held onto'.87 In understandably wishing to avoid the crude notion that power is unmediated domination, Foucault more or less eliminates the central dialectic of opposed forces that still underlies modern society, despite the apparently perfected methods of 'technocratic' control and seemingly nonideological that seem to govern everything. What one misses in Foucault is something resembling Gramsci's analyses of hegemony, historical blocks, ensembles of relationship done from the perspective of an engaged political worker for whom the fascinated description of exercised power is never a substitute for trying to change power relationships within society. Said soon recognised that Foucault's portrayal of power as inexorable had induced him to ignore the possibility and desirability - quite apart from the manifest actuality — of political struggle against the effects discursive power and against the social and economic order on which discursive power rests. No matter how it may be made to appear in texts or how it looks from privileged cultural perspectives, power rarely manifests itself in history in ways that are unproblematic and unopposed, let alone non-corporeal: 'history', Said reminds us, 'is not a homogeneous French-speaking territory but a complex interaction between uneven economies, societies, and ideologies'." To pretend otherwise is to characterise power as ineluctable and, just as unhelpfully, to portray power as a kind of performance addressed not to the body but, as Foucault puts it, to the soul. Yet to speak of power becoming a discourse is, to borrow a phrase from Susan Sontag, a breathtaking provincialism.90 Foucault's scholarly work which is barely far-reaching enough to be called Eurocentric, never addresses situations in which direct physical violence (as opposed to disembodied techniques of control) is still the principal means by which power is inflicted, most of which are outside the region with which his work is immediately concerned and many of which have been controlled historically by the nations whose histories interest him above all others. This soft-peddling of power's inseparability from violence is especially problematic when it comes to giving an account of how power operates in the colonial and postcolonial worlds. The reason for Said's more or less total renunciation of Foucault's work and therefore also the reason why I think postcolonial scholarship should likewise ditch Foucault's characteristic emphases and look instead to other, more enabling antecedents, is that we cannot come close to an accurate theorisation of colonial power without acknowledging its inseparability from violence and its fallibility as well as its resulting vulnerability to moral critique and political transformation. Foucault's works most grievous flaws, for Said. are its inadvertent parochialism and its tendency to depict power as all-penetrating and inexorable. Resulting from this was Foucault's inability to even countenance revolutionary historical change. The point is that the critic, if he or she is to merit that title, has an obligation not just to describe power but also to explain its existence, trace its origins, criticise its effects and beseech its dissolution. I have gone to some trouble to demonstrate and explain the reasons for Said's renunciation of the antihumanist dimensions of Foucault's work. This was so can now go on to show in precise terms how and why Said subsequently sought to present the processes of colonial power and of revolutionary opposition to colonial power from an unmistakably, indeed avowedly, humanist perspective. It is worth pausing to note however, that the discipline his early work inspired has not followed him down that path. 'Power' for Foucault is ubiquitous and perdurable; it is attended by 'resistance', which is similarly everywhere and everlasting. Foucault makes no moral judgements about power or about resistance. Content with describing this pas de deux, his philosophy contains no perspective on liberation. In Said's work, by contrast, precisely because that work is inspired by humanist convictions, 'power' is characterized quite differently, as a historical (rather than a metaphysical) phenomenon, as a system to which a name can be given, that can be subjected to a critique and that has been placed on borrowed time by **political projects** **that aim not just to resist but actively to transform and replace power**. Nobody needs me to tell them that *Orientalism*’s influence in postcolonial studies, a discipline it effectively founded and whose characteristic methodological and political emphases it therefore helped to shape, has been immense. Yet the book decidedly exaggerates the durability, scope and intensity of the colonial discourse it maps out, it obscure’s colonialism’s origin and purpose, and it postpones until later work any attempt to those anticolonial projects whose aspirations were so far-reaching and, at least in their early years, so staggeringly successful that it would be simply churlish to dismiss them as mere acts of 'resistance'. Colonial discourse', a concept whose adoption is in many ways postcolonial theory's original sin, has been portrayed as an expansive, subjectless and ineluctable phenomenon insinuated through discreet rituals and performances. Even when texts are declared to 'hybridise' colonial discourse, or else subject it to the rejoinders of 'difference', there is rarely any sense that colonial discourse might fundamentally be undermined, let alone overthrown - the Sisyphean labour of 'subverting' colonial discourse being what keeps us in work. Postcolonial critics have commonly been suspicious of categories like class. Little wonder, because capitalism is not a word frequently heard from their lips. Indeed, the discipline has been prone to muffle ongoing forms of imperial domination with the comforting rhetoric of globalisation and hybridity. Postcolonialists are indignant about 'Eurocentrism' (which is an idea) but rarely exercised by ongoing forms of imperialism (which is also a particularly brutal practice), in addition to being curiously silent about capitalism (which has been as willing as ever to bare its teeth since the 1970s and without reference to which the phenomenon of imperialism becomes literally incomprehensible). As far back as Aijaz Ahmad's In Theory (1992), postcolonial theory's left wing has arraigned the discipline for its most prominent critics' frankly idealist belief that it was not capitalist imperialism that structured and explained the world but more cultural or 'discursive' constructions like Eurocentrism, racism or nationalism: An obvious consequence of repudiating Marxism was that one now sought to make sense of the world of colonies and empires much less in terms of classes, much more in terms of nations and countries and races, and thought of imperialism itself not as a hierarchically structured system of global capitalism but as a relation, Of governance and occupation, between richer and poorer countries, West and non-West. And whether one said so or not, one inevitably believed that ideas — 'culture' was the collective term in most mystifications, or 'discourse', but it mainly meant books and films - and not the material conditions of life which include the instance of culture itself, determine the fate of people and nations. Eurocentrism, racism and nationalism, along with patriarchy for that matter, precisely because they were seen as mostly cultural phenomena, could be opposed by defending difference or invoking hybridity, laudable endeavours of course but also incomplete or at least insufficient. The consequences of what Arif Dirlik has called this 'shift in attention to questions of cultural identity in postcolonial discourse'" are at once theoretical and practical; theoretical because the phenomenon of capitalist imperialism thereby escapes our conceptual nets, practical because energies are then devoted to 'hybridising' the West or defending difference from it, undertakngs for which the category of capitalism, let alone the practice of anticapitalism, is simply nugatory. This is the 'postcolonial unconscious' as Lazarus defines it. Postcolonial theorists look for 'resistance' in 'mimicry, 'migrancy', 'hybridity', 'ambivalence', 'subalternity, 'liminality' or the 'multitude', all of which are terms that have in common an assumption that struggle takes place not against the system of capitalist imperialism (though it is rarely called that) but within that system and even at its behest. Happily, Said's later work set about qualifying and even repudiating many of the key claims made in what would prove to be a quite anomalous early book in the context of a sizeable oeuvre that remained militantly humanist in both its methodology and its political convictions. Insofar as it has hitched its wagon to post-structuralist philosophies like that of Foucault, postcolonial theory has, by contrast, been dragged too far from the political and intellectual commitments of its founding thinker and, in what amounts to the same thing, from the original convictions and aspirations of anticolonialism. Orientalism's readers were led astray by the unnecessary and incongruous references to Foucault, who if Lazarus is to be believed was perhaps name-checked in that book for tactical 5easons in order to ease the book's reception by 'leftist' scholars for whom Foucault was de rigueur at the time of Orientalism's publication. Said's humanism, however, presents the 'discourse' of Orientalism very differently. The whole of the rest of Said's work from his early work on the philosophy of 'beginnings' through his advocacy of the rights and aspirations of his Palestinian compatriots to his later writings on music and aesthetic style, is premised on an unmistakably and avowedly, not to mention gleefully and sometimes provocatively unrepentant, humanist stress on the limits to discursive power. Said was no Marxist of course, or at least he professed himself, understandably enough, extremely Ambivalent about Marxism's political record.94 But Said's desire to attend not just to the cobweb but to the spider, to the fly and to the web's frailty certainly makes his work in my view compatible with Marxism. His later work is adamant in particular that the limits to discursive power are set and exemplified by the ideas of human solidarity and human freedom which were articulated most powerfully by the first generation of anticolonial movements, whose achievements Said celebrated, whose defeat he mourned and whose transformative aspirations he longed to reignite. Said, in short, traced his own approach not to Foucault, whose name continued to be ubiquitous in postcolonial scholars' work long after he had ceased dropping it, but to the premises and principles of humanist intellectual practice articulated by half-forgotten American literary critics like R. P. Blackmur, Richard Poirier and Lionel Trilling, and especially by German comparative philologists like Erich Auerbach and Leo Spitzer." In one of his last books, Humanism and Democratic Criticism, Said outlines what he sees as the two chief precepts of humanist practice. The first is the deceptively straightforward proposition that that which has been humanly made (and which is subject neither to the laws unearthed by the natural sciences nor to the unchanging verities pondered by metaphysicians) is uniquely susceptible to analysis and change. Societies, dogmas, texts and the very mores and ideas of the self are variable products of human work. Because they were conceived and made they can be reconceived and remade. Knowledge, however, is not uncontroversial or easily gained. Glossing Vico, Said remarks upon the mind's fallibility, its passionate rather than dispassionate nature and its unavoidable entanglement with interests and situations. Knowledge of what is humanly constructed is always incomplete and provisional, a thing to be negotiated, interrogated and improved. Hence humanism entails a taste for self-renewal and a restless impatience with the mind's dogmas: 'humanism is critique'.96 Indeed, this is the special vocation of the humanities in general, which provoke critical scrutiny of humanly produced institutions and ideas. What makes humans human, in other words, is their distinctive capacity for critical self-knowledge or, in the philologist Leo Spitzer's memorable phrase, 'the power bestowed on the human mind of investigating the human mind'.97 The distinctive (though not necessarily superior) human capacity, the thing that allows us in Sartre's words 'to establish the human kingdom as a pattern of values in distinction from the material world,98 is consciousness or, if you like, the consciousness of consciousness. Self-criticism, then, is the first precept of Said's humanism. The second is the kind of cosmopolitan moral intelligence that can result from self-criticism. Humanists' interrogation of partial and limited perspectives can engender a newly ecumenical respect for humanity in its entirety. If self-criticism is one of the twin poles of humanistic endeavour therefore, then the second is the potential of self-criticism to broaden one's sympathies as well as one's sense of moral and finally political obligation. Said is a defender of humanism in the sense of what the humanities do (which is to examine humanly made phenomena like texts, ideas and institutions) as well as humanism in the sense of human rights (that is, the belief in the dignity, equality and value of all human life contained in Seneca's great dictum: 'nothing human is alien to me'). Having established the twin principles of humanistic endeavour, Humanism and Democratic Criticism goes on to elucidate the special attributes required of the American humanist in the wake of 9/11 and the United States' belligerent response. For a start, democratic humanism contrasts with the provincial version of this creed espoused by the enthusiasts for 'humanitarian intervention'. Nor does it have anything to do with any unselfconscious defence of one's own culture against interlopers, not just because America - as Said is at pains to stress — is a society made up of immigrants and therefore in conception if not always in fact a multifarious and hospitable place, but more importantly because it is of the very nature of **humanistic activity** to upset, interrogate and reformulate ostensible certainties. They cannot long survive the knowledge of self and world to which humanistic scrutiny gives rise. Critical consciousness or, put differently, a biting distrust of received wisdom is the humanist's customary mode. A form of incessant questioning, humanism necessitates a militant critique of jingoistic ideologies and a practical refusal to tolerate distant suffering: Principally it means situating critique at the heart of humanism, critique as a form of democratic freedom and as a continuous practice of questioning and of accumulating knowledge that is open to, rather than in denial of, the constituent historical realities of the post-Cold War world, its early colonial formation, and the frighteningly global reach of the last remaining superpower of today." Without criticism, as W. J. T. Mitchell has argued, glossing Said, humanism tends to be a sterile and complacent reverence for the cultural superiority of the West; without humanism, however, criticism is nothing but empty quibbling. Saree Makdisi has argued that Said's inclusive humanism was inseparable from his vision of a 'one state solution' in Israel/Palestine. Peace there will be the outcome not of the various ideologies of ethnic. racial or religious distinctness and separation but of an acceptance, which is clearly far easier to say than to do, that 'the other' .is human and has rights. For the Israelis, whose superior political and military clout and whose blame for expelling, occupying and tyrannising the Palestinians over the decades places on them a greater responsibility to bring such a reconciliation about, peace means resolving to treat the Palestinians not as bothersome nuisances that obstruct and frustrate Israel's exclusive entitlement to the land and its resources but as partners in pursuit of a just settlement. For the Palestinians, it means abandoning the millenarian fantasies of religious sects and the futile dream of overpowering their adversaries by force of arms, while talking to persuadable Israelis, campaigning in the West for pressure to be placed on governments that indulge Israel's unconscionable occupation and repudiating the failed and unimaginative policies of their own undemocratic, short-termist leadership. In Makdisi's words, 'the idea of Palestine is a struggle for the articulation of a new sense of what it means to be human'. In Said's: The real strength of the Palestinian is just this insistence on the human being as a detail — the detail likely to be swept away in order for a grandiose project to be realized. The Palestinian therefore stands on a small plot of land stubbornly called Palestine, or an idea of peace based neither on a project for transforming people into nonpeople nor on a geopolitical fantasy about the balance of power, but on a vision of the future accommodating both of the peoples with authentic claims to Palestine, not just the Jews. In the end, it is finally the humblest and the most basic instrument that will bring peace, and certainly that instrument is not a fighter plane or a rifle butt. This instrument is self-conscious rational struggle conducted in the interests of human community. Humanism = critical thinking + the ideal of solidarity. CONCLUSION The likes of Sartre and Fanon were faced with an ideology — Western humanism and the discourse of rights — that excluded most of the world's population. 'What was required, therefore,' as Robert Young argues in his preface to the Routledge collection of Sartre's essays on colonialism and neocolonialism, 'was either to do away with the concept of humanism altogether, or, more positively, to articulate a new **anti-racist humanism**, which would be inclusive rather than exclusive, and which would be the product of those who formed the majority of its new totality'.103 Why hasn't this second approach found a more receptive audience among postcolonialists? Paige Arthur notes the suspicion in France in the 1970s of Sartre's Marxism. She mentions the nouveaux philosophes' crude equation of communism with totalitarianism and their equally simplistic attribution of dictatorship in the tiers monde to the original objectives of anticolonial nationalism. The system had stood firm against the revolutionary swell of May 1968 and against the feeble barbs of that event's Maoist progeny. The likes of Bernard-Henri Lévy made a good living out of retro certainties about the Cold Wax and la mission civilisatrice. No doubt this anti-Marxist reaction was part of a wider intellectual hostility to the grands récits of enlightenment and emancipation, which as we have seen is also part of the intellectual climate of postcolonial theory, a discipline that was brought into being at this time. Yet while such objectives might have seemed passé to a disenchanted Western intelligentsia, they retain their force for thinkers and movements in (or concerned with) other parts of the world. There the goal of universal emancipation has lost none of its urgency in the overbearing context of neocolonial retrenchment. As Patrick Williams observes, too many critics have been unable to get beyond the simple equating of humanism with the unsatisfactory Enlightenment version: thereby 'ignoring and jettisoning all that the likes of Césaire, Fanon and Sartre hoped for. 104 Still, I think we can be quite optimistic about the future of the discipline. For even one of the authors I criticised earlier for conflating the idea of a 'common humanity' with Helen Tiffin, accepts in a recent book on postcolonial studies and the environment (co-written with Graham Huggan) that humanism not have attracted quite so many adherents over the years had it represented nothing more than a bellicose assertion of the sovereignty of white men over the rest of the world. Tiffin and Huggan manage to affirm the longevity of a tradition, which this chapter has tried to commend and explain, as well as indicate the nature of future theoretical and critical work when they acclaim a 'postcolonial humanism' for which 'the historically necessary decolonisation of the "human" leads not to a post- but a pan-humanism that opens up more generous understandings of the human defined in terms of cross-cultural solidarity and achievement rather than those more likely to seek shelter in comforting notions of cultural particularity and the privileges of birth'. Only now, prompted perhaps by the resurgent imperialism of the 'wat on terror' and by the perennial inequalities made worse by the unabated (if not accelerating) project of neoliberalism, is postcolonial theory beginning to attend, in its theoretical as well as its critical work to the specifically human dimensions of oppression and liberation. Iraq's assailants, openly scornful of international law and conspicuously motivated by corporate voracity, have unwittingly done us the service of discrediting the postcolonial field’s constitutive assumption that we come after colonialism and not in colonialism's turbulent midst. By all means let us agree to keep the term 'postcolonial', provided we construe it not as a descriptive category, the temporal or historical prefix of which can mislead us into thinking that the work of decolonisation has been completed or at least that the world's persistent imbalances are just a legacy of extinct structures, but rather as a goal or aspiration, one to which the connotations of transformation and liberation are attached. I have been calling for a return to the libertarian dimension of Marxism. The responsibility for the low esteem in which even libertarian strains of Marxism are held cannot all be laid at the door of the anti-Marxists. Since Marxism, in the shape of the slow death of the Soviet bloc under Brezhnev and his successors. of the gigantic catastrophes and convulsions of China under Mao, of the deformed and deflected revolutions of the 'Third World' and of the depressing sclerosis of the labour movement in Western Europe, had shown itself incapable of real introspection and reform, post-Marxism came along to bury it. Only a humanist Marxism can resist this fate. Stalinism was the result of the Bolsheviks' failure to replace, or even to resist the temptation to intensify, the authoritarian methods of the state they had inherited. The Left has failed to surmount this legacy, and no doubt will continue to do so, unless and until it finds a way of repudiating the methods of coercion and manipulation that characterise the system from which it seeks to break free. That the quest for libertarian values with which to guide this process has been undertaken most promisingly by a diverse tradition from within Marxism (rather than by theoretical and political traditions taken up against Marxism) is the main claim for which I have been trying to provide evidence. One looks in vain in the works of the thinkers I have been examining for any assertions that subjectivity is static, unitary, centred or entirely self-determining. Rather, human subjectivity is conceived there as dynamic and developing in history. ‘We may not know what absolute good is or the absolute norm,’ as Adorno argues, ‘we may not even know what man is or the human or humanity – but what the inhuman is we know very well indeed.’ Humanity constitutes a principle of opposition and an agent of transformation. A postcolonial humanism would therefore be a humanism based not just on humanist conceptions of the value and equality of human life but also on a rigorous critical approach towards all those complacent and unselfconscious humanisms that have bedevilled the world since the concept's revival in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries: the racist humanism of the Comte de Gobineau, the colonial humanisms of the European powers, and what Chomsky has called the 'new military humanism'i0' of the twenty-first century. What I have been objecting to is the mistaken assumption that one local, self-serving definition of humanity should be taken to be true of all humankind. In Said's terms, this is political humanism shorn of its intellectual complement, an ambitious universalism bereft of self-knowledge. Though they might dislike the term 'postcolonial', the many materialist critics who are working within that field as well as against some of its primary emphases, have sought to sharpen postcolonial-ism's critical and political edges by keeping alive the memory of an anticolonial tradition that is, as Benita Parry has put it, 'grounded in a Marxist humanism'. That tradition has 'inveighed against the abuse of humanism and universalism when these ideas were mendaciously invoked to disguise capitalist exploitation and colonial malpractices'. But it did not, crucially, 'disown their ethical potential or abandon their liberatory usages, a stance shared by theorists in colonized worlds who aspired to realize the unfulfilled enlightenment notions of reason, justice, and egalitarian- ism'.108 **Humanism may have been put to use by imperialism but** that does not make all humanisms imperialist. A commonly heard criticism of human rights discourse is that it is, to use Samuel Moyn's term, depoliticising.i09 That discourse implies and sometimes explicitly asserts that it is the responsibility of the powers that abuse those rights to desist and treat their victims differently. No perspective on transforming or replacing those authorities is contained in the discourse. Rights discourse, Jodi Dean adds, shrinks 'the scope of political claims to those of victims needing recognition and redress'.ii0 To speak at all one must demonstrate one's weakness and vulnerability, thus conferring the responsibility for redress to established powers that inflicted the injury in the first place. The systematic nature of the problem and the comprehensive character of the solution are therefore concealed. The plight of the Palestinians, for example, is often referred to as a 'humanitarian crisis, as though they were the helpless victims of a flood whose fate is to be managed by outside powers, dealt with, and occasionally relieved. Minority discourse must instead be seen as a, step taken towards a substantive ideal of equality not a desperate form of special pleading that leaves the system itself intact. Respect for human rights, especially the radical social and economic rights contained in the Universal Declaration (rights to work, a decent pension, a minimum wage, an education, free healthcare and so on), cannot be achieved without also addressing the massive inequalities that structure the world; 'There can be no true installation of human rights without the end of exploitation, no true end of exploitation without the installation of human rights', in Bloch's invaluable dictum. The more postcolonialism recognises the importance of this formulation the more I believe it will start to grasp the pertinence and cogency of its Marxist antecedents, or, in other and simpler though possibly more contentious words, the more Marxist it will become. I am therefore repeating the call issued by the editors of an important volume on the state of the discipline for postcolonial studies to envision trans: formative and even utopian alternatives to this situation: visions of a postcolonial world can we as humanists offer that will interrogate, perhaps even interrupt, the forms of globalization now dictated by politicians, military strategists, captains of finance and industry, fundamentalist preachers and theologians, terrorists of the body and the spirit, in short, by the masters of our contemporary universe?'ii2 Postcolonialists ought to recognise the sheer magnitude and durability of a world system that has succeeded in halting and frequently reversing many of the achievements of anticolonial movements since independence. They also need to name that system and beseech its transformation. Ultimately, postcolonial criticism is a discipline guided by moral and political investments. The task I have set myself is to show that this libertarian humanism oh as Edward Said calls it, democratic humanism has nothing whatever in common with the Eurocentric, exclusionary and teleological version that postcolonialists have understandably repudiated. Postcolonialism is a humanism because humanism gives us a rhetoric with which to reprove the system of imperialism and both a guide and motive for combating it. Humanism gives us a vocabulary with which to denounce the failings of a form of social and economic organisation that sacrifices human potential, human need and even human life to abstract goals of profit and utility. Humanism also enables us to distinguish reactionary and even fascist anti-imperialisms from progressive anti-imperialisms. We need to be clearer about our adversary — which is capital and its indispensable partner-in-crime imperialism, both of which are occluded by abstract references to 'the West' and 'Empire' — as well as much more confident and unambiguous about our goals. Decolonisation is the wilful and insistent seizure of the status of humanity, of a subjective freedom that is even today under mortal threat both from local despots and from the intercessions of those states that march into their former colonies under the duplicitously raised banner of universal human rights. Ideas about humanity and rights have been used as a justification for exploitation and control right down to the present vogue for 'humanitarian intervention'. But those ideas could hardly exercise such appeal and fascination, could not in fact aspire to be hegemonic, if they did not also contain a promise of liberation. As ever, humanist principles are more honoured in the breach than the observance. In fact they have been misused to such an extent that they sometimes no longer mean what mean or what they might have meant had numerous groups not been discouraged for centuries from participating in the process of their definition. Nevertheless, humanism remains the only feasible basis of protest and transformation. 'If only I knew a better term than humanity', as Max Horkheimer once lamented: 'that poor, provincial slogan of a half-educated European. But I don't.'1L3 That's because there isn't one.