Pet pic – hazel.



### 1AC – Plan

CSA – PiS Controlled Media Good

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35257105>

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/world/europe/poland-election-state-television-tvp.html

#### Plan text – In the Peoples Republic of Poland, the free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy

#### Advocacy is at the root of the problem – journalists become politically involved and ignore facts – only framing media through objectivity can reverse the trends. Even if advocacy can be good it is drowned out by populist media turning its impacts

**Dzięciołowski 17** Krzysztof Dzięciołowski 2017 Reuters <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2017-12/Is%20there%20a%20chance%20for%20non-partisan%20media%20in%20Poland%20-%20Krzysztof%20Dzieciolowsk%20Paper.pdf> //SJJK

**As the journalists take a tougher stance on so many issues, the public has lost trust in the media. A 2012 poll showed that people’s perception of journalists partisanship has in- creased by 12% since 2002 (from 34 to 46). At the same time, respondents pointed to impar- tiality and objectivism (59%)57 as the virtues they most desire from journalism**. In 2017 79% of **Poles agree that “the message in the media is so diverse that Poles no longer know where the truth lies” while 64% of those polled think journalists express their views instead of pro- viding information**.58 Bartosz Węglarczyk observes his colleagues: sometimes write quite well. **I personally know journalists who privately admit that there is a war in Poland and you need to take one of the sides**. They say it openly in private talks, but soon they will say it publicly. It has nothing to do with journalism. These are politicians, who can write and can Once on the same side of the political anti-communist struggle, Adam Michnik and Jarosław Kaczyński are today in stark opposition to each other. Poland is locked in the narratives of the post Second World War generation that has shaped the country post-1989 and influenced younger generations of journalists. There is no better illustration of this di- vision than the Kurski brothers. Jarosław and Jacek Kurski were young and politically en- gaged students in the rebellious city of Gdańsk59 in the 1980s. Over time Jarosław Kurski has become Adam Michnik’s deputy at Gazeta Wyborcza while the younger Jacek Kurski, was appointed the head of the state broadcaster TVP by the Law and Justice party led by Jarosław Kaczyński. Polish politicians and journalist to a large extent share the same background, come from the same anti-communist opposition groups, universities or student organisations, such as NZS.60 In 2005, two post-Solidarność political parties dominated the elections effectively eliminating the post-communist party. The Civic Platform and the Law and Justice party promised a grand coalition and a big change in the campaign. Both parties have been con- servative with the Civic Platform appealing to the winners of the transformation and the Law and Justice addressing poorer and less successful class of the society. One was out- ward looking the other inward looking. The Law and Justice party’s surprise victory stunned the campaign frontrunner. Televised negotiations to form the promised grand coalition government failed. The political rivalry between Kaczyński brothers and Donald Tusk was growing day by day. And so **the journalists were pulled into the political game**. But it was the Smolensk air crash that helped to turn those two splitting tribes of politicians and journalists from the same anti-communist camp into warring factions. **The logic of tribal war has led to a situa- tion when both sides use the same language, fight for the same symbols but have built their position in opposition to each other**. Krzysztof Skowroński sees these divisions as the two faces of the same coin: There were two manifestations in Warsaw: of the Law and Justice and the Committee for the Defence of Democracy. There were two ladies there and they were telling the same sto- ry. In 1981 my husband was imprisoned for political activism and I am here to fight for freedom. In 1981 my husband was a political prisoner and I fight for freedom today. Two groups that think in the exact same way. The trauma of the crash in the national psyche drives divisions in the world of politics that runs through the society and increases the level of partisanship of the journalistic commu- nity. Krzysztof Skowroński notes: There is the planet of the conservative journalists who say that Poland is this and that. And the second planet is composed of the liberal journalists, who say this and that. The conser- vative journalists say: “Poland is a country who has been regaining its freedom, indepen- dence” and there is the second group that says: “the end of freedom of speech, dictatorship, evolution towards the totalitarian regime.” From this perspective this narrative is absurd like a train with wings. Agnieszka Romaszewska-Guzy has seen **Polish journalists getting close to politicians for many years. She notes two attitudes rooted deeply in the experience of communism**. One was a submissive and service-like attitude of a journalist working for the regime media and the other was rebellious. That is why, in my journalistic opinion, we have this on-going fight ethos. **It means, that in general as a journalist you are more of a politician than a politician himself. Journalists are this more aggressive side, not politicians.** Not always of course, but very often. Therefore, on both sides of this political spectrum, we find journalists who turn out to be more dedicated to the politics than the politicians themselves. In pursuit of audience and with little funding available, the cheapest television or radio shows have been made of politicians with opposing views invited to the studio to fight each other. So the Polish political debate has been largely reduced to the contest of values where there is no more middle ground, as Bartosz Węglarczyk notes: about emotions now. Poland’s media market has been heavily influenced by the Western style and capital but not by its values and standards. So the market has undergone the process of tabloidisation and commercialisation without any proper debate on the journalistic role of private and public media. As Bartosz Węglarczyk **notes journalists “become politicians and political ac- tivists and in fact the readers have accepted that”. As Polish journalists continue to solidify their opinions, Skowroński says the narrative has replaced truth**: **hat’s what the journalists do — they deliver a narrative. Those** in politics send them text messages “say this and that”. We do it, we go to the TV stations, a journalist accepts that and says “ok”. But it’s not! Journalists’ partisanship and political bias have become a sought-after commodity in the new market economy driven by internet, social media, speed and simplification. And, with the arrival and spread of the internet, the entry barrier to the market fell. Jacek Karnowski together with his twin brother Michał have successfully built the conservative Fratria media group behind wSieci weekly and the wPolityce.pl web portal. The brothers had a solid work experience in legacy media; Jacek Karnowski worked for the BBC Polish Service and TVP. Michał Karnowski worked for Newsweek Polska and Polska the Times. Jacek Karnowski says this experience helped them understand “the media are businesses. Apart from fulfilling an important role, they are businesses.” **They too have embraced a form of jour- nalistic engagement that has emerged in Poland under the name of “dziennikarstwo tożsamościowe” or “journalism of identity” that offers ideologically engaged narratives that help build a community of like-minded readers**.61 A joint wPolityce.pl and wSieci sub- scription call reads: We invite you to the **bevy of the members of our community**. We believe that thanks to a fixed subscription of our publications prepared especially for our Friends we will be **last- ing guests in Your houses** — on computer screens, on tablets and mobile devices. Thanks to technology development we can offer You access to a bigger collection of interesting arti- cles, good political writing and opinions, to media created with passion and mission, with belief in **strength of the national interest**, media based on Polish capital and conservative values.

#### Objectivity means consistent and transparent methods of testing factual claims.

Dean (Committee of Concerned Journalists training director and API Executive Director Tom Rosenstiel formerly co-chaired the committee). No Date, American Press Institute, The lost meaning of ‘objectivity’, <https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/journalism-essentials/bias-objectivity/lost-meaning-objectivity/>

One of the great confusions about journalism, write Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel in The Elements of Journalism, is **the concept of objectivity**. When the concept originally evolved, it **was not meant to imply that journalists were free of bias. Quite the contrary.** The term began to appear as part of journalism after the turn of the 20th century, particularly in the 1920s, out of a growing recognition that journalists were full of bias, often unconsciously. **Objectivity called for journalists to develop a consistent method of testing information – a transparent approach to evidence – precisely so that personal and cultural biases would not undermine the accuracy of their work.** In the latter part of the 19th century, journalists talked about something called “realism” rather than objectivity. This was the idea that if reporters simply dug out the facts and ordered them together, truth would reveal itself rather naturally. Realism emerged at a time when journalism was separating from political party affiliations and becoming more accurate. It coincided with the invention of what journalists call the inverted pyramid, in which a journalist lines the facts up from the most important to the least important, thinking it helps audiences understand things naturally. At the beginning of the 20th century, however, some journalists began to worry about the naïveté of realism. In part, reporters and editors were becoming more aware of the rise of propaganda and the role of press agents. At a time when Freud was developing his theories of the unconscious and painters like Picasso were experimenting with Cubism, journalists were also developing a greater recognition of human subjectivity. In 1919, Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, an associate editor for the New York World, wrote an influential and scathing account of how cultural blinders had distorted the New York Times coverage of the Russian Revolution. “In the large, the news about Russia is a case of seeing not what was, but what men wished to see,” they wrote. Lippmann and others began to look for ways for the individual journalist “to remain clear and free of his irrational, his unexamined, his unacknowledged prejudgments in observing, understanding and presenting the news.” Journalism, Lippmann declared, was being practiced by “untrained accidental witnesses.” Good intentions, or what some might call “honest efforts” by journalists, were not enough. Faith in the rugged individualism of the tough reporter, what Lippmann called the “cynicism of the trade,” was also not enough. Nor were some of the new innovations of the times, like bylines, or columnists. **The solution, Lippmann argued, was for journalists to acquire more of “the scientific spirit … There is but one kind of unity possible in a world as diverse as ours. It is unity of method, rather than aim; the unity of disciplined experiment.” Lippmann meant by this that journalism should aspire to “a common intellectual method and a[n] common area of valid fact.”** To begin, Lippmann thought, the fledgling field of journalist education should be transformed from “trade schools designed to fit men for higher salaries in the existing structure.” Instead, the field should make its cornerstone the study of evidence and verification. Although this was an era of faith in science, Lippmann had few illusions. “It does not matter that the news is not susceptible to mathematical statement. In fact, just because news is complex and slippery, good reporting requires the exercise of the highest scientific virtues.”

### 1AC – Advantage

#### The PiS controlled Polish media is key to guarantee future elections and sway voters to the PiS.

**Kalan 19** Kalan, Dariusz. “Poland's State of the Media.” Foreign Policy, 25 Nov. 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/25/poland-public-television-law-and-justice-pis-mouthpiece/.//SJEP

**WARSAW, Poland—Asked about the difference between Poland’s public television station, TVP, before 2015 and after, a veteran journalist who works at the network was quick to respond. “Ruling politicians,” they said, “had never had that kind of impact on television” before. “They have audacity and courage to approach reporters and say, ‘I want to say something, and you have to record me.’ This is our everyday life,” the journalist, who insisted on anonymity, said in early October. After a long moment of reflection, they added: “You will not find true information in our television.” TVP, whose two flagship channels were among the country’s** [**most popular**](https://businessinsider.com.pl/media/tv-radio/najpopularniejsze-programy-i-kanaly-w-2018-roku/24lx5c1) **in 2018, has for the last several years been squarely under the control of Poland’s right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, which clung to power in elections in mid-October. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, these elections were “administratively prepared well.” But the voters’ “informed choice was undermined by a lack of impartiality in the media, especially the public broadcaster,”** [noted](https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/435941) Jan Petersen, the head of an election observation mission**. It was not the first time TVP’s reporting raised concerns. This fall, 54 members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe** [**called**](https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=28221&lang=en) **TVP “a propaganda channel for the ruling party.” Reporters Without Borders similarly** [**stated**](https://rsf.org/en/poland) **that Poland’s public media outlets “have been transformed into government propaganda mouthpieces.” This fall, in interviews with almost a dozen current and former TVP journalists and executives, most asked to go unnamed. None argued that TVP’s political news has been objective. In fact, many openly admitted that TVP is purposefully keeping quiet about PiS scandals, gives airtime almost exclusively to pro-PiS voices, and has campaigned against the party’s opponents. Those I spoke to who back PiS largely argued that the hard line was both necessary to ensure a second PiS term and a legitimate response to the private media’s alleged support of the opposition. Interlocutors on both sides believe that there is nothing unique in what is happening in Poland. Rather, their country is just one among many suffering the rise of fake news. According to Ryszard Bankowicz, the head of the Polish Council of Media Ethics, a nonpartisan body promoting principles of ethical journalism, readers and viewers around the world have ceased to want real information.** “They chose a given newspaper or TV station not in order to find the truth but to confirm their own beliefs or take a side against or for someone,” Bankowicz said. “And many journalists do not know principles of ethical journalism. This is a worldwide trend, and Poland is its victim.” But not everyone has given up. This year, Bankowicz, took a public stand on one of the [most serious accusations](https://www.rp.pl/Platforma-Obywatelska/190119723-Borusewicz-To-skutek-nagonki-na-Adamowicza.html) against TVP, made by Bogdan Borusewicz, a former democratic opposition activist under the communist regime and a former speaker of the Senate, among others: that it had incited hatred against Pawel Adamowicz, Gdansk’s mayor, who was stabbed to death at a January charity event. Adamowicz, a popular liberal politician, had been a target of numerous TVP reports that had suggested he was corrupt and had close ties with local businessmen. In a [report](http://www.rem.net.pl/data/20190211.pdf) published in February, Bankowicz wrote that “the authors of these publications manipulated the facts … in order to present Adamowicz as an unreliable person.” He concluded that “TVP spews propaganda, which serves to destroy opponents of the ruling party.” However, he refused to comment on whether violations of journalistic ethics contributed to Adamowicz’s death. “TVP is certainly not to blame for this tragic event,” said Maciej Stanecki, who was TVP’s deputy chairman from 2016 to 2019. But he was quick to add: “But for allowing the radicalization of the public opinion, of the crowd … well, I think that every media person must be aware that such responsibility exists.” Stanecki, a film producer, is proud of his achievements at TVP during his leadership, which include the television’s technological development, but he is aware that the network’s reputation has been tarnished.

#### Poland will never leave the EU, but PiS power ensures packed courts and decisions that deck legitimacy-that spills over and causes a massive crisis

**Economist 21** Economist, Oct 21 2021, "Poland is a problem for the EU precisely because it will not leave," https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/10/14/poland-is-a-problem-for-the-eu-precisely-because-it-will-not-leave//SJJK

Brexit, before it happened, was imagined in many forms. Hard, soft, Norwegian, Swiss or Turkish. Briefly, an Albanian option was discussed. Often it was just “clean”. A “clean Brexit” would free Britain from the eu’s single market, customs union and its courts, advocates said. Just as there are many ways of leaving the eu, there are many ways of remaining. There is the clean version, in which countries quietly accept the eu’s strictures. Then there is the messy version, where governments foul up the club. Think of it as “dirty remain”. **To see dirty remain in action, look at Poland. Its Constitutional Tribunal challenged the legal order of the club in a ruling on October 7th. In a case brought by the Polish prime minister, the court, which is stuffed with allies of the government**, **ruled that fundamental parts of eu law do not trump Poland’s constitution. The judgment, which was exactly what the government wanted, has punctured six decades of European case law. In short, the eu’s supreme court is no longer supreme, as far as Poland is concerned. Poles protested in droves, claiming that the government was attempting to drag the country out of the bloc against their will. But anyone expecting a British-style “Polexit” will be disappointed**. S**upport for the eu within the country is among the highest in the union. Standing for an election in Poland on a platform of quitting the eu would be akin to a manifesto promising to drown puppies.** **The problem is not that Poland is trying to leave the eu; the problem is that it intends to stay.** Dirty remain is more pernicious than Polexit. **The risk is that the eu’s legal order in Poland slowly fades,** argues Daniel Sarmiento of the Complutense University of Madrid**. A domino effect takes over**. **If courts across the eu cannot trust their Polish peers, then the eu’s legal system starts to gum up**. An arrest warrant here is not honoured there; a banking licence granted in one country may not be honoured in another. **Over time, an area over which people, goods, capital and services can flow freely turns into one where they can move only with trouble. Bad behaviour can spread**. Eurosceptics have mostly given up on leaving the eu. It is, as Britain has shown, rather stressful. **Eric Zemmour, the nationalist radical mulling a run in the French presidential election, has pledged to restore the primacy of French law over eu law**. Even more mild-mannered figures, such as Michel Barnier, the eu’s Brexit negotiator, toy with the same idea. **If one government can avoid abiding by unpopular rulings by the eu’s top court with little fear of sanction, it becomes a tempting option for all**. As an idea, “dirty remain” has a veneer of respectability. Its Polish proponents argue that everyone else does it, but only Poland is attacked. Polish judges are fond of citing their German counterparts, who have accused the European Court of Justice (ecj) of overstepping the mark in recent years. In such rulings, the medium counts as much as the message. No one doubts the independence of Germany’s constitutional court. No one believes in the independence of Poland’s. The messages are different, too. The German court accused the ecj of exceeding its mandate in approving a programme of bond-buying by the European Central Bank. **The Polish court said the country’s constitution trumped fundamental parts of eu law, such as “ever closer union”, a much more sweeping ruling**. The German court was playing with matches; **its Polish counterpart doused the eu’s legal system in petrol and deliberately started a fire. On paper, the solution to such a disagreement is simple: leave the eu**. Britain made things easy for the club when it departed. Rather than hanging around blocking things and generally causing a fuss, it followed the procedures as laid down in Article 50 of the treaties it was so keen to leave. Doing this without a clear plan was “like putting a gun in your mouth and pulling the trigger” according to Dominic Cummings, the man who led the Vote Leave campaign. Yet to the surprise of eu diplomats this is exactly what the British government did. **Instead, Poland is following a strategy that played out in Watchmen, a comic**. **In it, Rorschach, a vigilante, is sent to jail, where he greets a fellow inmate in the canteen by tipping the contents of a deep-fat fryer over his head**. “None of you seem to understand,” he says to his now-crispy foe. **“I’m not locked in here with you. You’re locked in here with me.”** **In the eu, destinies are linked. If one person starts hurling a fryer, everyone must duck**. David Cameron, Britain’s prime minister at the time, begged for concessions from the eu ahead of Britain’s referendum on leaving it, including an opt-out from “ever closer union”. **Poland threw its fryer without warning.** Such dirty **tricks are difficult to deal with inside the club**. **A nation-state can enforce its will internally, sending in the police or even, in extremis, the army to quell insurrection. The eu has no such tools.** The European Commission could refuse to sign off on Poland’s share of its covid-19 recovery fund, depriving the country of €57bn ($66bn), for instance. **The danger is that this will prompt Poland to bring the eu’s workings to a halt in protest.** Amicable divorce or poisonous marriage Bad behaviour outside the club is less of a problem. After doing things by the book as a member, Britain has discovered a rebellious streak, trying to renege on the terms of its deal with the eu. This causes little trouble for the eu. Rather than an existential problem, Brexit is a tedious one involving the movement of sausages across the Irish sea. Britain has been cauterised. By contrast, **the rule of law in Poland is an open wound**. **It is a long-term threat, which needs to be solved if the eu is to thrive**. **Just as a financial crisis in one country can spread to another, so can a constitutional crisis.** Dealing with a departure is relatively easy for the eu. Handling dirty remain is much harder.

#### The EU is already weak and Poland is at the front of their issues-further legitimacy crisis emboldens russian invasions

**Tisdall 21** Simon Tisdall Guardian, 11-21-2021, "Instability grips a weakened Europe as global predators smell blood," https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/21/instability-grips-a-weakened-europe-as-global-predators-smell-blood//SJJK

**Threats from Russia and China, a weaker US security alliance and internal discord expose fundamental strategic weaknesses** Is [Europe](https://www.theguardian.com/world/europe-news) entering a dangerous new age of instability? **Not since the height of the cold war with the Soviet Union has it looked so vulnerable to hostile forces.** Accumulating external threats and internal divisions, coupled with a weakening US security alliance, relentless Russian subversion, and power-hungry China’s war on western values are exposing fundamental strategic weaknesses. Europe increasingly resembles a beleaguered democratic island in an anarchic world, where a rising tide of authoritarianism, impunity and international rule-breaking threatens to inundate it. Some European leaders understand this, notably French president [Emmanuel Macron](https://www.theguardian.com/world/emmanuel-macron), yet long-term policy remedies elude them. For example, Belarus dictator Alexander Lukashenko’s use of migrants to pressure the EU is plainly outrageous. Yet it worked, in the sense that Germany’s caretaker chancellor, Angela Merkel, phoned him for a chat, ending his post-coup isolation. [Her unilateral demarche](https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20211117-merkel-and-lukashenko-agree-to-talks-about-belarusian-border-crisi) understandably infuriated Baltic states. It was a concession to a thug, not a lasting solution. Talking of thugs, Russian president Vladimir Putin’s ongoing intimidation of Ukraine risks widening conflagration. The latest border build-up of 90,000 Russian troops may be [sabre-rattling,](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/nov/14/uk-must-be-ready-for-war-with-russia-says-armed-forces-chief) similar to provocations in the Donbas and Black Sea last spring. If not, Europe will only have itself to blame. Putin’s importunities stem directly from its de facto acquiescence in his illegal 2014 annexation of Crimea. Instability on Europe’s periphery extends to the Balkans amid well-founded fears that Bosnia-Herzegovina is slipping back into conflict 26 years after the [Dayton peace accords.](https://www.theguardian.com/world/from-the-archive-blog/2020/nov/18/the-dayton-accords-a-peace-agreement-for-bosnia-archive-1995) Resurgent ethnic nationalism, embodied by the separatist Bosnian Serb leader, Milorad Dodik, is fuelled by Belgrade and Moscow. **A larger, strategic problem is the EU’s inability** [**to fulfil promises**](https://ecfr.eu/article/western-balkans-in-trouble-why-the-eu-should-make-a-new-offer-to-the-region/) **of closer integration with the region**. Europe’s relationship with Turkey, a key gatekeeper, is dysfunctional, too, thanks partly to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, its deeply unpleasant president. When he menaced EU members Greece and Cyprus last year, Macron [sent naval forces](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/29/greece-turkey-standoff-france-send-warships-east-mediterranean) to the eastern Mediterranean. The rest of Europe sat on its hands. Erdoğan is also meddling in Ukraine and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, which [flared up again](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/tensions-high-after-deadly-clashes-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan-gwmpfqgdd) last week. Yet Brussels pays him to keep out Middle Eastern refugees, so it **hardly dares challenge him. The vice-like circle of instability squeezing Europe is about more than actual or potential armed conflict.** One of its bigger dilemmas is migration. Despite the searing 2015 Syrian refugee crisis, **the EU still lacks an agreed, humane policy**. **That guarantees more trouble down the road.** **One of the main objectors, ironically,** [**is Poland,**](https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/11/10/eu-council-president-visits-poland-to-express-solidarity-in-face-of-hybrid-attack-by-belarus/) **which rejects migrant quotas.** **Yet faced by border mayhem, its hypocritical rightwing leaders who, like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, are in a bitter fight with Brussels over rule of law and democracy issues, appealed for EU solidarity.** Disturbing, too, is the way **much European opinion appears to have accepted illegal pushbacks and routine mistreatment of asylum-seekers**, whether in camps in Libya or on the beaches of Greece, in breach of EU law. This reflects another self-inflicted wound: the increased influence of xenophobic, rightwing populists and the re-normalisation of circa 1914 ultra-nationalist politics across Europe. **If Europeans will not stand up for western democratic values in a world overrun by Donald Trump clones and copycats, who will?** Sadly, they cannot look to Britain. No longer a trusted friend, the UK under Boris Johnson, sniping and sneering from the sidelines, has become another peripheral conflict zone for the EU. Britain is more irritant than ally. Defence minister Ben Wallace used the linked Belarus-Ukraine crises last week to advance the Brexit agenda and seal arms deals with Warsaw and Kiev. Tellingly, the [UK sent troops,](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/18/british-soldiers-to-give-more-support-to-poland-amid-belarus-border-crisis) not humanitarian aid, to the Polish border. Europe’s age of instability also owes much to events beyond its control. Few forecast Trump would try to blow up what Franklin D Roosevelt called the “arsenal of democracy”, and the western alliance with it. [He may yet try again](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/15/us/politics/republicans-2022-redistricting-maps.html). Likewise, few predicted, as [Merkel now admits,](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-germany-may-have-been-naive-china-first-merkel-says-2021-11-17/) that China would emerge as such a domineering, economically aggressive, anti-democratic global competitor. **US president Joe Biden reassures Europeans that Nato, even after Afghanistan, is as vital as ever. But his** [**edgy video summit**](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/16/biden-xi-summit-highlights-tensions-and-desire-for-cooperation) **with China’s Xi Jinping last week showed where his true focus lies. Putin sees this, and smells blood. Europe’s gas supply is one pressure point. Covert cyber-attacks are another. Russia’s reckless anti-satellite missile test, scorning European safety concerns, was the first recorded act of** [**hooliganism in outer space.**](https://www.theguardian.com/science/2021/nov/16/a-wild-west-out-there-russian-satellite-debris-worsens-space-junk-problem) **Europe’s inability to make Putin pay a serious price for aggression in Georgia and Crimea, his decimation of Russian democracy, his foreign election meddling, and his murderous attacks on Alexei Navalny – and other opponents on European soil – heightens a sense of decline. On China, there is nothing close to a united front. Such weakness encourages other predators. So what is to be done?** Europe, as ever, is a house divided. East Europeans continue to place their faith in Washington rather than Brussels, despite clear portents of another transatlantic rupture if the Democrats lose the White House in 2024. **The EU bureaucracy is feebly led, its parliament toothless. Germany lacks a proven leader. In France, Macron faces** [**a vicious spring election**](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/eric-zemmour-macrons-far-right-rival-wins-backing-from-russia-t25c086kc) **scrap against the Russian-backed far right.** Yet it is Macron’s ideas about enhanced European political, security and military “strategic autonomy”, and a stronger, more fiscally and economically integrated EU, that offer the most hopeful path forward. EU defence ministers last week discussed [a “Strategic Compass” plan](https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-policy-document-against-russia-china/) to boost joint capabilities. But agreement on proposed “rapid-deployment forces” and the like seems a long way off. As [France](https://www.theguardian.com/world/france) prepares to assume the EU presidency, will other leaders recognise this critical moment and back Macron? In a world of sharks, snakes and scary monsters, Europe’s independence, cohesion and values are on the line like never before.

#### Escalation.

**Majumdar 17** Dave Majumdar, 9-7-2017, "A War with Russia Would Go Nuclear. Here's Why.," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/war-russia-would-go-nuclear-heres-why-22202//SJJK

Simply put, **if Russia were faced with a large-scale attack that could defeat its conventional forces, Moscow might resort to nuclear weapons.** While a recent [RAND Corporation study](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf) concluded that **Russia could overrun NATO’s member states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the Baltics within sixty hours**, the war games did not simulate the use of nuclear weapons. **If, however, a war were to breakout between NATO and Russia, nuclear weapons would certainly come into play**—especially if the conflict were going poorly for Moscow. **Unlike the Soviet Union, which had a stated “no first use” policy, modern Russia explicitly rejected that pledge in 1993**. In fact, as Moscow’s conventional forces continued to atrophy during the economic and social meltdown of the 1990s, Russia developed a doctrine [called de-escalation in 2000](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/dc3ma00). Simply put, if Russia were faced with a large-scale attack that could defeat its conventional forces, Moscow might resort to nuclear weapons. In 2010, Russia revised the doctrine somewhat as its conventional forces started to recover from the aftermath of the Soviet collapse—the current version states [Moscow would use nuclear weapons in](https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf) situations “that would put in danger the very existence of the state.” While the RAND study shows that Russia would be able to take the Baltics fairly easily, the war game didn’t explore what would happen in the event of a NATO counter offensive. The RAND study simply states: Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options, all bad: a bloody counteroffensive, fraught with escalatory risk, to liberate the Baltics; to escalate itself, as it threatened to do to avert defeat during the Cold War; or to concede at least temporary defeat, with uncertain but predictably disastrous consequences for the Alliance and, not incidentally, the people of the Baltics. A NATO counter-offensive would be bloody and fraught with escalatory risk—but it’s one of the probable outcomes of a Russian invasion. **In that eventuality, Russian conventional forces—of which only a portion are well trained and well equipped—would likely be severely damaged or even destroyed**. Moreover, if NATO forces hit targets inside Russia or crossed over into Russian territory, Moscow might conclude that there is a danger to the existence of the state. After all, Moscow has expressed concerns in the past that regime change by the West is an all too real danger. **In that situation, Russia might counter advancing NATO forces with its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons**. The Russian tactical nuclear arsenal is not nearly as large as the Soviet arsenal had once been, but concrete numbers are hard to come by. The Soviet Union was thought to have possessed between 15,000 and 25,000 tactical nuclear weapons of all types ranging from suitcase-sized containers and nuclear mines to short-range aircraft delivered missiles, nuclear gravity bombs and artillery shells—as well as short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile warheads. While Moscow has been slowly eliminating its non-strategic arsenal since the end of the Cold War, Russia many still have as many as [4,000 tactical nuclear weapons](https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf), according to the Congressional Research Service. However, other analyses suggest that Russia has as few as [2,000 operational tactical nuclear weapons.](http://bos.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/04/13/0096340215581363.full) A more recent analysis by [Royal United Service Institute’s Igor Sutyagin suggests](https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf) that Russia has a maximum of 1,040 non-strategic nuclear weapons. Of those about 128-210 warheads are assigned to the Russian ground forces. The Russian navy has about 330 tactical nuclear weapons, while the Russian air force has 334 non-strategic weapons. Meanwhile, Russian air defense forces have a further sixty-eight to 166 tactical nuclear weapons mounted on various surface-to-air missiles. Another report, this one by the [Federation of American Scientists, suggests that](http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/) Russia doesn’t have any deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons. “All are declared to be in central storage. Several thousand retired non-strategic warheads are awaiting dismantlement,” reads the FAS’s Status of World Nuclear Forces.

#### Nuclear detonations cause nuclear winter and extinction, and the rainout effect is wrong – self-lofting means soot goes above the clouds

**Starr 15** Steven Starr, 10-14-2015, "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction," Federation Of American Scientists, [Steven Starr is the director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility. He has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology.], https://fas.org/pir-pubs/nuclear-war-nuclear-winter-and-human-extinction/, SJBE

While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. **That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs**. **Following the detonation** (in conflict) **of** US and/or Russian launch-ready **strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke** (up to [180 million tons](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/ToonRobockTurcoPhysicsToday.pdf), according to peer-reviewed studies), **which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere.** [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see [Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf).] **The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more**. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. **Once in the stratosphere, the smoke** (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) **would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a** [**dense stratospheric smoke layer**](http://www.nucleardarkness.org/warconsequences/hundredfiftytonessmoke/). **The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere.** Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. **For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia.** [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see [Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockNW2006JD008235.pdf).] Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. **Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer.** Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? The results of such a scenario are obvious. **Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed,** resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet. Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment? It is, of course, debatable whether or not nuclear winter could cause human extinction. There is essentially no way to truly “know” without fighting a strategic nuclear war. Yet while it is crucial that we all understand the mortal peril that we face, **it is not necessary to engage in an unwinnable academic debate as to whether any humans will survive.**

### 1AC – Framing

#### The meta-ethic is moral naturalism. Non-natural moral facts are epistemically inaccessible

Papineau 7 [David, Academic philosopher. He works as Professor of Philosophy of Science at King's College London, having previously taught for several years at Cambridge University and been a fellow of Robinson College, Cambridge, “Naturalism”. [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/))]

Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If **all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world** (Harman, 1986). At first sight **this** may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it **has** **very awkward epistemological consequences.** For beings like us, **knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them.**

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. Pleasure and pain *are* intrinsic value and disvalue – everything else *regresses* – robust neuroscience.

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**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10]. Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14]. Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals. Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it. It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring. Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding. There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health. Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage. Finding happiness is different between apes and humans As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure. Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even produce **the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered. Desire and reward centers It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation. In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41]. Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42]. Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans. In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45]. Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations. Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50] In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders. In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS. Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

#### Prefer:

#### 1] Actor spec – the free press should be consequentialist —takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

Pitcher 18 George Pitcher (advises Dow Jones, publisher of the Wall Street Journal, on ethics and the future of journalism and is a Visiting Fellow at LSE. He formerly held senior editorial positions at The Observer and the Daily Telegraph). 10/8/2018, The New Media Ethics: Lessons from how the BBC failed to consider the consequences of its Cliff Richard story, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/polis/2018/10/08/the-new-media-ethics-how-the-bbcs-failed-to-consider-the-consequences-of-its-cliff-richard-story/>

So, there’s a demand on a self-regulated, free press to manage its own operational ethics. And it’s in its own interests to do so, because not to do so, as we’ve seen and heard in the wake of the Sir Cliff ruling, leads to circumstances in which its freedom is forfeited. The school of ethics that we’re addressing here is consequentialism. It differs from other ethical frameworks in that it requires less of the character of people and the virtue of their actions and concentrates pragmatically on the consequences of those actions. In corporate jargon, we’d call them ‘outcomes’. Consequentialist ethics claim that morally correct actions are defined by those that have the best outcomes. Dark arts A nice touch for journalists is that consequentialism is also non-prescriptive, meaning that it isn’t subject to the rule of law or, for that matter, any other authority. So, deceit, perjury and other dark journalistic arts are morally acceptable if they are in the public interest – or, indeed, in a person’s best interests. (Though it’s hard under this ethical provision to see how the consequences of the Sir Cliff’s 2014 media coverage served the better interests of anyone.) We’re in the territory here of asking whether ends justify means, or utilitarianism in philosophical terms. In shorthand, positive utilitarianism requires that our actions are morally justified by choosing those which do the greatest good for the majority of people. And that could serve as a public-interest defence for journalists. The problem arises that reporters simply can’t know in advance what the outcomes of their actions are going to be. Furthermore, a media organisation could persuasively argue that it bears no moral responsibility anyway – it has a function, which is to report what is happening accurately, but the outcomes of its actions in doing so are not its moral burden. Alternatively, we could argue that consequentialism can productively be internalised within a media organisation. It’s unlikely that a public-service broadcaster is going to want to take actions that ruin the careers of young reporters, restrict the media’s ability to operate in law and result in six-figure fines, for no demonstrable – and consequential – public interest. Newsrooms acting under pressure will get it wrong. When they do, it’s probably better for editors to put their hands up and say so, than belatedly to plead a free-press defence, as the BBC did. But they could also save themselves embarrassment, time in court and money if they taught their staff to consider the consequences of the actions they are poised to take. Journalists will make errors of judgement. The consequences of those errors are probably the price we pay for a free press. But the frequency and severity of those errors – and the consequences that arise – can be tempered by systems of ethics that have been tested down the centuries (it dates at least from the 5th-century BC). For media groups, consequentialism isn’t a bad place to start for a practical ethical code.

#### 2] No intent-foresight distinction for states.

Enoch 07 Enoch, D [The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew Unviersity, Mount Scopus Campus, Jersusalem]. (2007). INTENDING, FORESEEING, AND THE STATE. Legal Theory, 13(02). doi:10.1017/s1352325207070048 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/article/intending-foreseeing-and-the-state/76B18896B94D5490ED0512D8E8DC54B2

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves 39. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38. I will use this text as my example of an expressive theory here. 40. See id. at 1554, 1564. 41. For a general critique, see Mathew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1999–2000). 42. As Adler repeatedly notes, the understanding of expression Anderson & Pildes work with is amazingly broad, so that “To express an attitude through action is to act on the reasons the attitude gives us”; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38, at 1510. If this is so, it seems that expression drops out of the picture and everything done with it can be done directly in terms of reasons. 43. This may be true of what Anderson and Pildes have in mind when they say that “expressive norms regulate actions by regulating the acceptable justifications for doing them”; id. at 1511. http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Aug 2014 IP address: 134.153.184.170 Intending, Foreseeing, and the State 91 to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance. This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.44 In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken. Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows45 the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the dxeath of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable. Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):46 perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments. They have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.47 States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

#### Impact calc –

#### 1] Extinction outweighs:

#### A] Structural violence- death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### B] Mathematically outweighs.

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### C] It's the only static category – even if life is bad now.

Tännsjö 11 (Torbjörn, the Kristian Claëson Professor of Practical Philosophy at Stockholm University, “Shalt Thou Sometimes Murder? On the Ethics of Killing,” <http://people.su.se/~jolso/HS-texter/shaltthou.pdf>) //BS 1-27-2018

\*\*Bracketed to avoid triggers

I suppose it is correct to say that, if Schopenhauer is right, if life is never worth living, then according to utilitarianism we should all [die] commit suicide and put an end to humanity. But this does not mean that, each of us should commit suicide. I commented on this in chapter two when I presented the idea that utilitarianism should be applied, not only to individual actions, but to collective actions as well.¶ It is a well-known fact that people rarely commit suicide. Some even claim that no one who is mentally sound commits suicide. Could that be taken as evidence for the claim that people live lives worth living? That would be rash. Many people are not utilitarians. They may avoid suicide because they believe that it is morally wrong to kill oneself. It is also a possibility that, even if people lead lives not worth living, they believe they do. And even if some may believe that their lives, up to now, have not been worth living, their future lives will be better. They may be mistaken about this. They may hold false expectations about the future.¶ From the point of view of evolutionary biology, it is natural to assume that people should rarely commit suicide. If we set old age to one side, it has poor survival value (of one’s genes) to kill oneself. So it should be expected that it is difficult for ordinary people to kill themselves. But then theories about cognitive dissonance, known from psychology, should warn us that we may come to believe that we live better lives than we do.¶ My strong belief is that most of us live lives worth living. However, I do believe that our lives are close to the point where they stop being worth living. But then it is at least not very far-fetched to think that they may be worth not living, after all. My assessment may be too optimistic.¶ Let us just for the sake of the argument assume that our lives are not worth living, and let us accept that, if this is so, we should all kill ourselves. As I noted above, this does not answer the question what we should do, each one of us. My conjecture is that we should not [die] commit suicide. The explanation is simple. If I [die] kill myself, many people will suffer. Here is a rough explanation of how this will happen: ¶ ... suicide “survivors” confront a complex array of feelings. Various forms of guilt are quite common, such as that arising from (a) the belief that one contributed to the suicidal person's anguish, or (b) the failure to recognize that anguish, or (c) the inability to prevent the suicidal act itself. Suicide also leads to rage, loneliness, and awareness of vulnerability in those left behind. Indeed, the sense that suicide is an essentially selfish act dominates many popular perceptions of suicide. ¶ The fact that all our lives lack meaning, if they do, does not mean that others will follow my example. They will go on with their lives and their false expectations — at least for a while devastated because of my suicide. But then I have an obligation, for their sake, to go on with my life. It is highly likely that, by committing suicide, I create more suffering (in their lives) than I avoid (in my life).

#### 2] Calc indicts fail: A] Ethics- it would indict everything cuz they use events to understand how ethics have worked B] Reciprocity- they are NIBs that create a 2:1 skew where I have to answer them to access offense while they only have to win one C] Internalism- asking why we value life is nonsensical since it’s intrinsic and we just do.

### 1AC – Method

#### 1] 1AR theory is legit – anything else means infinite abuse – drop the debater, competing interps, and the highest layer – 1AR are too short to make up for the time trade-off – no rvis – 6 minute 2nr means they can brute force me and always win.

#### Their focus on the body as a site for politics limits emancipatory potential and recreates exclusion

Anna Mollow 4, PhD candidate in English at the University of California, Berkeley. IDENTITY POLITICS ANDDISABILITY STUDIES:A CRITIQUE OF RECENT THEORY quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?cc=mqr;c=mqr;c=mqrarchive;idno=act2080.0043.218;rgn=main;view=text;xc=1;g=mqrg

The most troubling aspect of Thomson's use of identity politics is her definition of disability as visible physical difference. Extraordinary Bodies locates "the disabled people of the later twentieth-century" at the end of a historical trajectory that begins with "the wondrous monsters of antiquity" and moves to "the fascinating freaks of the nineteenth-century" (58). Undoubtedly, many of the people who appeared in nineteenth-century freak shows might today be described as disabled. But other nineteenth-century constructions that have little to do with visual bodily difference—such as the hysteric or the invalid—are also important to consider in a history of disability. Thomson, however, tends to equate disability with visible difference. She writes that "the disabled body is a spectacle . . . in a complex relation between seer and seen" (136). In literature, she claims, disability "functions only as a visual difference"; and throughout history, female "deviance" is "always attributed to some visible characteristic" (10-11; 28; emphasis added) I do not mean to suggest that Thomson would deny that many people with invisible impairments are disabled; on the contrary, like each of the critics I discuss in this essay, Thomson is committed to combating oppression of people with all forms of disability. In fact, early in the first chapter of her book, she provides a definition of disability that includes a number of non-visible impairments (13). Yet Thomson does not explain in Extraordinary Bodies how her definition of disability as a visual spectacle might be reconciled with her recognition of arthritis as a disability, or with the ADA's inclusion of conditions such as carpal tunnel syndrome, Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, hypertension, and chronic back pain under the category of disability. [24] Thomson's unintentional elision of invisible disability has potentially serious political repercussions; people with unseen disabilities are often objects of suspicion and disbelief. [25] Thomson's narrow definition of disability does not result from a wish to exclude, but rather from the use of an identity politics model. Critics of identity politics point out that the construction of identity is an inevitably exclusionary process; one defines who one is in part by saying what one is not, thus producing what Butler has called a "constitutive outside" (xi). In Extraordinary Bodies, this constitutive outside might be understood as disease. Thomson's construction of a positive disabled identity is facilitated by her emphatic disassociation of disability from disease. She seeks "to recast [disability] from a form of pathology to a form of ethnicity" (6). The title of her conclusion—"From Pathology to Identity"—repeats the call for such a transition in understanding disability.

#### Not all judgements about well-being are rooted in pathologizations of disability – they are often critical to stopping material harm

Vehmas and Watson 13 Simo and Nick, Disability Studies at the Universities of Helsinki and Glasgow respectively, “Moral wrongs, disadvantages, and disability: a critique of critical disability studies”, Disability & Society (2013), http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09687599.2013.831751)

Impairment sometimes produces practical, difficult ethical choices and we need more concrete viewpoints than the ideas provided through ableism, which offers very little practical moral guidance. It is questionable whether the notion of ableism would help the parents in deciding whether to have a child who has a degenerative condition that results in early death. Campbell (2009a, 39, 149 and 159), for example, discusses arguments about impairments as harmful conditions, the ethics of external bodily transplants as well as wrongful birth and life court cases (whether life with an impairment is preferable to non-existence), and how ableism impacts on discourse around these issues. Whilst her analysis of such ableist discourses suggests ethical judgements, she provides no arguments or conclusions as to whether, for example, external bodily transplants are ethically wrong or whether impairment may or may not constitute a moral harm. Under the anti-dualistic stance adopted by CDS, even the well-being/ill-being dualism becomes an arbitrary and nonsensical construct. Under ableism it can be constructed as merely maintaining the dominance of those seemingly faring well (supposedly, ‘non-disabled’ people), and labels those faring less well as having lesser value. There may not be a clear answer to what constitutes human well-being or flourishing, but in general we can and we need to agree about some necessary elements required for well-being. Also, as moral agents we have an obligation to make judgements about people’s well-being and act in ways that their well-being is enhanced (Eshleman 2009). This is why we have, for example, coronary heart disease prevention programmes because the possible death or associated health problems are seen as harms. Possibly these policies are based on ableist perspective, but if that is the case then the normative use of ableism is null; eradicating supposedly ableist enterprises such as coronary heart disease prevention would be an example of reductio ad absurdum. Denying some aspects of well-being are so clear that their denial would be absurd, and simply morally wrong. CDS raises ethical issues and insinuates normative judgements but does not provide supporting ethical arguments. This is a way of shirking from intellectual and ethical responsibility to provide sound arguments and conceptual tools for ethical decision-making that would benefit disabled people. If we are to describe disability, disablism, and oppression properly, we have to explicate the moral and political wrong related to these phenomena. Whilst CDS has produced useful analyses, for example, of the cultural reproduction of disability, it needs to engage more closely with the evaluative issues inherently related to disability. As Sayer has argued (against Foucault): while one could hardly disagree that we should seek to uncover the hidden and unconsidered ideas on which practices are based, I would argue that critique is indeed exactly about identifying what things ‘are not right as they are’, and why. (Sayer 2011, 244) By settling almost exclusively to analyses of ableism without engaging properly with the ethical issues involved, CDS analyses are deficient. The moral wrongs related to disablism or ableism are matters of great concern to disabled people, and CDS should in its own part take the responsibility of remedying current wrongs disabled people suffer from.

#### Disability must be politicized---this is the only way to secure collective rights---the retreat from politics reifies ableist tropes of charity politics and naively tries to wish problems away

Ruckelshaus 17, (Jay Ruckelshaus is a Rhodes Scholar and graduate student in political theory at the University of Oxford, and the founder and president of Ramp Less Traveled, a nonprofit organization that helps students with spinal cord injuries pursue higher education, The Non-Politics of Disability, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/18/opinion/denouncing-trump-wont-help-disability-rights.html)

Disability rights enjoy a seemingly ironclad moral consensus, an ostensible unanimity that is striking given America’s entrenched polarization and the antagonism surrounding other identity movements. Many are wary of L.G.B.T. rights or the Black Lives Matter movement, but it seems beyond the pale — almost cruel — to oppose disability rights. Nobody wants to be anti-disability. Initially, this harmony would seem helpful. Free from partisan discord, advancements for the approximately 57 million Americans with disabilities should be easier to achieve, borne aloft by the wings of certain progress. Why, then, do rampant unemployment and educational disparities endure, and why does success remain the exception? I think part of the reason is the insulation of our pro-disabled political consensus. Its logic is rooted not in any deep belief in the equal worth of citizens with disabilities, but rather in a general aversion to disability. This is related to the charity impulse that has always surrounded disability — and has constrained liberation efforts by assuming that inequities are unfortunate but natural realities to be mitigated through compassion, rather than politically structured injustices. There is also a profound lack of disabled people in the public sphere, meaning any substantive discussion that does occur is extremely rare. I suspect many people I talk to about disability maintain an implicit hope that, if they nod as vigorously as possible, the issue will simply go away. In this way, support for disability rights is similar to the act of expressing perfunctory thanks to military veterans. It temporarily absolves us of the responsibility to address the heart of the matter. Moreover, the apparent moral consensus may be mostly superficial. In trying to enact accessibility, disability advocates encounter increasing resistance as the effort and costs involved in proposals come closer to being realized. (Consider the neighborhood store that decides it’s just too costly to install a ramp, or the community lecture that excludes deaf attendees by refusing to hire a sign-language interpreter.) Instead of facilitating change, false unity actually restrains change. It stifles the more substantive conversations true progress requires. And our inability to speak honestly — and contentiously — about disability shows how the politics of disability is in this sense non-political. We are the worse for it. In addition to greater participation in the public sphere, true progress for citizens with disabilities will require a willingness to confront the issues head-on, even when — especially when — citizens disagree on competing solutions. We must politicize disability — not in the cable-news, grandstanding kind of way, but in the term’s more formal sense. The work of the Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe can help illuminate what’s at stake. Mouffe begins with the premise that human relations are inherently antagonistic: Political change always requires controversial transfers in power or prestige, and it is an illusion to imagine politics without confrontation. Per this “agonistic” conception of democracy, a healthy political order is one that prefers vigorous, good-faith argumentation to complacent consensus. Until we publicly recognize real disagreements surrounding disability and accessibility, Mouffe would insist, we are doomed to a vacuous, empty debate that is neither political nor productive. Recall the Kovaleski incident. I’m not suggesting that the abhorrence of Mr. Trump’s actions is open to legitimate questioning. But in their forcefully reassuring comments and messages, my friends prevented any serious discussion of disability at the level where reasonable disagreement does exist. Where will the money come from to fund disability employment schemes? How do we even define “disability”? Despite — and, I would argue, partly because of — the broad condemnation of Mr. Trump for his insensitivity, there was no substantive public discussion of such issues. You may be thinking, haven’t we had enough politics lately? Maybe it’s a blessing that disability isn’t as political as it might be; it avoids the drama and messiness that now seem to define our common life. Avoiding politics might be possible if disability were an exclusively private affair. But it is fundamentally a public concern, affecting everyone directly or indirectly and revealing our obligations to one another as members of a democratic society. Issues of accessibility can be fully addressed only through public institutions and collective effort. For the disability community, there is no answer but politics.

#### Disengagement makes every impact worse and only robust academic scrutiny paired with a push for increased access to basic services solves the case

Blockand Friedner2017 (Pamela, Professor and Director of the Concentration in Disability Studies for the Ph.D. Program in Health and Rehabilitation Sciences, a former President of the Society for Disability Studies (2009-2010), and a Fellow of the Society for Applied Anthropology and Michele, PhD and Assistant Professor of Health and Rehabilitaion Sciences, Anthropology and Disability Studies at Stony Brook University, "Teaching Disability Studies in the Era of Trump," <http://somatosphere.net/2017/08/teaching-disability-studies-in-the-era-of-trump.html>, August 23, 2017)spaldlose

Countless hundreds of thousands in the US – and millions worldwide suffered and died at the hands of eugenics ideologies and practices (Kevles 1998, Lifton 1986). There is potential for suffering in the current practices of making inconvenient populations disappear, in incarcerating and ejecting on a grand scale, in determining who is and is not entitled to what kinds of health, education and social supports, and in the gutting of the already-thin social safety net. We know that already vulnerable people will die. We know many disabled people are vulnerable. We are already seeing it unfold. Although disabled people are not specifically targeted (at this point anyway) – disability is used as a justification to contain other populations, immigrant populations who are represented as criminals, unstable, and violent. Both targeted immigrant groups, Muslims and those from Central and Latin America, have a history of being pathologized and dehumanized in ways that incorporate disability (Block, Balcazar and Keys 2001, Patel 2014). We can also see a familiar way that gender, sexuality, addiction, mental illness and criminality are brought into play to identify urban black populations as threatening (Ben Moshe et al. 2014). A consistent similarity between eugenics and the Trump era is this deployment of intersectional characteristics and the mobilization of disability as a means of making broader claims to discredit other kinds of differences. Disability functions as what Snyder and Mitchell (2013) call narrative prosthesis – in other words as a prop with no real engagement with material conditions or experiences of disability and disablement. While we saw forms of able-nationalism (Snyder and Mitchell 2010) before, there is something distinct happening under Trump whereby it does not even seem that there is a mask of benevolence: disability has been discredited starting from Trump’s actions mocking a disabled reporter on the campaign trail to Jeff Sessions’ and Betsy DeVos’ comments about disabled children in schools. However, it is possible that the lack of benevolence will provide an opportunity for politics to emerge. Indeed, we have seen the mobilization of disabled voters with #cripthevote #Iamapreexistingcondition and the January 2017 Women’s March, which planners argued was the largest gathering of disabled people in the United States, an interesting claim to consider. There appears to be a great deal of grass roots activism as well, in school district meetings, in local disability groups forming to lobby local representatives, and on college campuses. We know that we are in for some hard times; we know that people will die and indeed are already dying from the ever-growing holes in the US health system. The largest provider of mental health services in the country is the US prison system and the already active school-to-prison pipeline and for-profit incarceration centers for prisoners of all sorts have ample opportunity for growth in this era (Ben Moshe et al. 2014). We grew up in the age of deinstitutionalization but we are living in a time now in which there are both vocal calls and quiet structural changes that entrap disabled people in institutions of various sorts. Thus it is our (sad) responsibility as anthropologists and disability studies scholars to direct our students to study these trends and as activists to prepare to resist them.

#### Psycho-analysis is wrong---terrible methodology, every refutable claim has been disproven, and ineffective results

Robert Bud and Mario Bunge 10 {Robert Bud is principal curator of medicine at the Science Museum in London. 9-29-2010. “Should psychoanalysis be in the Science Museum?” [https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827806-200-should-psychoanalysis-be-in-the-science-museum/}//JM](https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827806-200-should-psychoanalysis-be-in-the-science-museum/%7d//JM) (link credit to EM)

WE SHOULD congratulate the Science Museum for setting up an exhibition on psychoanalysis. Exposure to pseudoscience greatly helps understand genuine science, just as learning about tyranny helps in understanding democracy. Over the past 30 years, psychoanalysis has quietly been displaced in academia by scientific psychology. But it persists in popular culture as well as being a lucrative profession. It is the psychology of those who have not bothered to learn psychology, and the psychotherapy of choice for those who believe in the power of immaterial mind over body. Psychoanalysis is a bogus science because its practitioners do not do scientific research. When the field turned 100, a group of psychoanalysts admitted this gap and endeavoured to fill it. They claimed to have performed the first experiment showing that patients benefited from their treatment. Regrettably, they did not include a control group and did not entertain the possibility of placebo effects. Hence, their claim remains untested (The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, vol 81, p 513). More recently, a meta-analysis published in American Psychologist (vol 65, p 98) purported to support the claim that a form of psychoanalysis called psychodynamic therapy is effective. However, once again, the original studies did not involve control groups. In 110 years, psychoanalysts have not set up a single lab. They do not participate in scientific congresses, do not submit their papers to scientific journals and are foreign to the scientific community - a marginality typical of pseudoscience. This does not mean their hypotheses have never been put to the test. True, they are so vague that they are hard to test and some of them are, by Freud's own admission, irrefutable. Still, most of the testable ones have been soundly refuted. For example, most dreams have no sexual content. The Oedipus complex is a myth; boys do not hate their fathers because they would like to have sex with their mothers. The list goes on. As for therapeutic efficacy, little is known because psychoanalysts do not perform double-blind clinical trials or follow-up studies. Psychoanalysis is a pseudoscience. Its concepts are woolly and untestable yet are regarded as unassailable axioms. As a result of such dogmatism, psychoanalysis has remained basically stagnant for more than a century, in contrast with scientific psychology, which is thriving.

#### Implicit bias is an automatic thought function which is not pre-social – changing material conditions affects those processes

Matthew 15 (Dayna Bowen Matthew, nonresident senior fellow in the Center for Health Policy, who works at the University of Colorado School of Law, the Colorado School of Public Health, and the Center for Bioethics and Humanities at the University of Colorado Health Sciences Center specializes in health and behavioral sciences and her research interests include public health law, poverty, and ethics in health professions, “Just Medicine: A Cure for Racial Inequality in American Health Care” New York University Press 2015. Pg 43-45)

Implicit biases are attitudes, preferences, and beliefs about social groups that operate outside of human awareness or control. Neuroscientists believe there are three regions of the brain that relate to the automatic activation of implicit attitudes. First, the amygdala, a small group of nuclei located in both the left and right hemispheres of the brain, has been linked to implicit attitudes in numerous studies. The amygdala is believed to control memory, attention, and automatic responses to stimuli. It plays a role in our ability to evaluate members of other social groups. MRI studies show that elevated blood-oxygen level responses in the amygdala region of the human brain correlate to a person’s implicit attitudes, but are suppressed in the presence of explicit stimuli in the form of faces of a person from a different racial background.”¶ Activity in two other regions of the brain appears to work in a correlated fashion with the amygdala in order to keep implicit racial associations responses below the threshold of conscious awareness. Studies show that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (diPFC) and the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) have both been correlated with the attenuated responses of the amygdala. In lay terms, a three-part neural model exists in which the amygdala generates automatic responses to racial stimuli, while the diPFC and ACC work to maintain those responses at an unconscious level.” While neuroscientists have measured and studied the physical activity of the brain that generates implicit attitudes, social psychologists have studied the cognitive processes that produce them.¶ Implicit bias is a form of automatic thought. According to the classic, dual processing model of human cognition, thought generally occurs on two levels. On the one hand, explicit or conscious thought occurs by processes that are intentional and deliberate. Automatic thought, on the other hand, is a system of information processing that occurs without any intentionality. There are four basic processes of automatic thought. First, a person acquires and stores social knowledge in a way that is accessible from memory when triggers or cues stir up the associations that make up social knowledge. Social knowledge is the information generally available to members of a community by virtue of the messages chronically reinforced and adopted about people or things. Stereotypes, for example, are a particular form of social knowledge in which attributes or traits are assigned to a group of people. Second, a person’s ability to retrieve social knowledge from memory is the next process of automatic thought, and social psychologists call this function “accessibility.” When cues or triggers from familiar contextual settings allow a person to “activate” social knowledge so that it is ready to direct conduct or judgments without deliberate or conscious decision-making, the second process of automatic thought is enacted. The third and fourth processes involve automatic application of social knowledge to a current situation because of the apparent fit between knowledge stored in memory and the situation at hand. However, the remarkable discovery about these processes is that stereotyping and prejudices can occur unintentionally, at an implicit or unconscious level. This means that a person can apply negative group attributes or traits, presumed from memory of social knowledge, to an individual who is a member of the group, despite the lack of evidentiary support to confirm the truth of the presumed attribute or trait, without or even against that person’s intentional will. In short, the evidence shows that implicit biases can operate automatically, unintentionally, and unconsciously.¶ Where race and ethnicity are concerned, Americans gather their social group knowledge from the environment. From the abundance of images of minorities on television and in the print media, to commentary by political leaders, lyrics in popular music, discussions among friends, entertainment outlets, chance encounters, and interracial relationships or experiences-the subconsciously gathered information that unconsciously becomes stored group knowledge is as pervasive as it is powerful. Consider this example. It is a statistical fact that white Americans receive the greatest share of public entitlement assistance, or “welfare.” Nevertheless, the social group knowledge many gathered from the 2012 presidential campaign was that it is minorities who predominantly receive welfare. One politician attempted to capitalize on the social group knowledge that presumed a poor work ethic among blacks by labeling President Barack Obama a “food stamp president,” while another candidate sought to distinguish himself from the president by promising that he will not “make black people’s lives better by giving them somebody else's money.” Neither of these campaign pitches accurately reflected the fact that whites are the predominant recipient of welfare funds, Medicaid support, and food stamps, but reference to these programs were deemed useful in the campaign against Barack Obama because they matched the subconscious impressions some voters have of blacks, even if they contradicted the truth. Let’s look at the facts: In reality, African Americans do not constitute the majority of welfare recipients. The DHHS reports that in 2012, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), the cash assistance program to families in need, helped 1.8 million families; 30.1 percent of those families were white, 31.5 percent were black, and 31.1 percent were Hispanic.l3 Indeed, DHHS also reports that "the percentage of African-American TANB families has slowly decreased since 2001.”” The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid (CMS) report that in 2013, Medicaid enrolled a monthly average of 57.4 million people; 41.1 percent were white, 21.6 percent were black, and 24.7 percent were Hispanic.” In 2013, a total of 22.8 million households used food stamps-the supplemental nutrition assistance program called “SNAP.” The United States Department of Agriculture reports that 40.2 percent of households receiving SNAP had white heads of households; blacks headed 25.7 percent of SNAP households; and 10.3 percent were headed by a Hispanic.16 Clearly, despite the political claims that captured the airways, blacks are not, in fact, the primary recipients of “welfare.” Whether the source is a political campaign advertisement, television news channel, sports and music personalities profiled in or permarket tabloids, Hollywood box office hits, or lessons taught in high school history classes-the negative imagery of minority Americans that is readily available in our culture tends to override reality and dominate the stored social group knowledge most whites have about people of color in this country. Social scientists have reported study after study that confirms the power of negative imagery of African Americans and Latinos which associates them with criminality, animals, and socially undesirable behavior such as drug abuse and hypersexuality. These are the associations that create stereotypes that inform implicit biases. Doe tors, nurses, pharmacists, dentists, and others in the health care industry are not insulated from this negative social group knowledge. These same types of biases influence decision-makers within the health industry as well. Thanks to the work of social scientists over the past thirty years, tools have been developed to measure implicit bias. We are now able to quantify reliably the extent to which stored social group knowledge produces implicit racial and ethnic bias.