### 1AC – Plan

CSA – PiS Controlled Media Good

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35257105>

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/world/europe/poland-election-state-television-tvp.html

#### Plan text – In the Peoples Republic of Poland, the free press ought to prioritize objectivity over advocacy

#### Advocacy is at the root of the problem – journalists become politically involved and ignore facts – only framing media through objectivity can reverse the trends. Even if advocacy can be good it is drowned out by populist media turning its impacts

**Dzięciołowski 17** Krzysztof Dzięciołowski 2017 Reuters <https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/2017-12/Is%20there%20a%20chance%20for%20non-partisan%20media%20in%20Poland%20-%20Krzysztof%20Dzieciolowsk%20Paper.pdf> //SJJK

**As the journalists take a tougher stance on so many issues, the public has lost trust in the media. A 2012 poll showed that people’s perception of journalists partisanship has in- creased by 12% since 2002 (from 34 to 46). At the same time, respondents pointed to impar- tiality and objectivism (59%)57 as the virtues they most desire from journalism**. In 2017 79% of **Poles agree that “the message in the media is so diverse that Poles no longer know where the truth lies” while 64% of those polled think journalists express their views instead of pro- viding information**.58 Bartosz Węglarczyk observes his colleagues: sometimes write quite well. **I personally know journalists who privately admit that there is a war in Poland and you need to take one of the sides**. They say it openly in private talks, but soon they will say it publicly. It has nothing to do with journalism. These are politicians, who can write and can Once on the same side of the political anti-communist struggle, Adam Michnik and Jarosław Kaczyński are today in stark opposition to each other. Poland is locked in the narratives of the post Second World War generation that has shaped the country post-1989 and influenced younger generations of journalists. There is no better illustration of this di- vision than the Kurski brothers. Jarosław and Jacek Kurski were young and politically en- gaged students in the rebellious city of Gdańsk59 in the 1980s. Over time Jarosław Kurski has become Adam Michnik’s deputy at Gazeta Wyborcza while the younger Jacek Kurski, was appointed the head of the state broadcaster TVP by the Law and Justice party led by Jarosław Kaczyński. Polish politicians and journalist to a large extent share the same background, come from the same anti-communist opposition groups, universities or student organisations, such as NZS.60 In 2005, two post-Solidarność political parties dominated the elections effectively eliminating the post-communist party. The Civic Platform and the Law and Justice party promised a grand coalition and a big change in the campaign. Both parties have been con- servative with the Civic Platform appealing to the winners of the transformation and the Law and Justice addressing poorer and less successful class of the society. One was out- ward looking the other inward looking. The Law and Justice party’s surprise victory stunned the campaign frontrunner. Televised negotiations to form the promised grand coalition government failed. The political rivalry between Kaczyński brothers and Donald Tusk was growing day by day. And so **the journalists were pulled into the political game**. But it was the Smolensk air crash that helped to turn those two splitting tribes of politicians and journalists from the same anti-communist camp into warring factions. **The logic of tribal war has led to a situa- tion when both sides use the same language, fight for the same symbols but have built their position in opposition to each other**. Krzysztof Skowroński sees these divisions as the two faces of the same coin: There were two manifestations in Warsaw: of the Law and Justice and the Committee for the Defence of Democracy. There were two ladies there and they were telling the same sto- ry. In 1981 my husband was imprisoned for political activism and I am here to fight for freedom. In 1981 my husband was a political prisoner and I fight for freedom today. Two groups that think in the exact same way. The trauma of the crash in the national psyche drives divisions in the world of politics that runs through the society and increases the level of partisanship of the journalistic commu- nity. Krzysztof Skowroński notes: There is the planet of the conservative journalists who say that Poland is this and that. And the second planet is composed of the liberal journalists, who say this and that. The conser- vative journalists say: “Poland is a country who has been regaining its freedom, indepen- dence” and there is the second group that says: “the end of freedom of speech, dictatorship, evolution towards the totalitarian regime.” From this perspective this narrative is absurd like a train with wings. Agnieszka Romaszewska-Guzy has seen **Polish journalists getting close to politicians for many years. She notes two attitudes rooted deeply in the experience of communism**. One was a submissive and service-like attitude of a journalist working for the regime media and the other was rebellious. That is why, in my journalistic opinion, we have this on-going fight ethos. **It means, that in general as a journalist you are more of a politician than a politician himself. Journalists are this more aggressive side, not politicians.** Not always of course, but very often. Therefore, on both sides of this political spectrum, we find journalists who turn out to be more dedicated to the politics than the politicians themselves. In pursuit of audience and with little funding available, the cheapest television or radio shows have been made of politicians with opposing views invited to the studio to fight each other. So the Polish political debate has been largely reduced to the contest of values where there is no more middle ground, as Bartosz Węglarczyk notes: about emotions now. Poland’s media market has been heavily influenced by the Western style and capital but not by its values and standards. So the market has undergone the process of tabloidisation and commercialisation without any proper debate on the journalistic role of private and public media. As Bartosz Węglarczyk **notes journalists “become politicians and political ac- tivists and in fact the readers have accepted that”. As Polish journalists continue to solidify their opinions, Skowroński says the narrative has replaced truth**: **hat’s what the journalists do — they deliver a narrative. Those** in politics send them text messages “say this and that”. We do it, we go to the TV stations, a journalist accepts that and says “ok”. But it’s not! Journalists’ partisanship and political bias have become a sought-after commodity in the new market economy driven by internet, social media, speed and simplification. And, with the arrival and spread of the internet, the entry barrier to the market fell. Jacek Karnowski together with his twin brother Michał have successfully built the conservative Fratria media group behind wSieci weekly and the wPolityce.pl web portal. The brothers had a solid work experience in legacy media; Jacek Karnowski worked for the BBC Polish Service and TVP. Michał Karnowski worked for Newsweek Polska and Polska the Times. Jacek Karnowski says this experience helped them understand “the media are businesses. Apart from fulfilling an important role, they are businesses.” **They too have embraced a form of jour- nalistic engagement that has emerged in Poland under the name of “dziennikarstwo tożsamościowe” or “journalism of identity” that offers ideologically engaged narratives that help build a community of like-minded readers**.61 A joint wPolityce.pl and wSieci sub- scription call reads: We invite you to the **bevy of the members of our community**. We believe that thanks to a fixed subscription of our publications prepared especially for our Friends we will be **last- ing guests in Your houses** — on computer screens, on tablets and mobile devices. Thanks to technology development we can offer You access to a bigger collection of interesting arti- cles, good political writing and opinions, to media created with passion and mission, with belief in **strength of the national interest**, media based on Polish capital and conservative values.

#### Objectivity means consistent and transparent methods of testing factual claims.

Dean (Committee of Concerned Journalists training director and API Executive Director Tom Rosenstiel formerly co-chaired the committee). No Date, American Press Institute, The lost meaning of ‘objectivity’, <https://www.americanpressinstitute.org/journalism-essentials/bias-objectivity/lost-meaning-objectivity/>

One of the great confusions about journalism, write Bill Kovach and Tom Rosenstiel in The Elements of Journalism, is **the concept of objectivity**. When the concept originally evolved, it **was not meant to imply that journalists were free of bias. Quite the contrary.** The term began to appear as part of journalism after the turn of the 20th century, particularly in the 1920s, out of a growing recognition that journalists were full of bias, often unconsciously. **Objectivity called for journalists to develop a consistent method of testing information – a transparent approach to evidence – precisely so that personal and cultural biases would not undermine the accuracy of their work.** In the latter part of the 19th century, journalists talked about something called “realism” rather than objectivity. This was the idea that if reporters simply dug out the facts and ordered them together, truth would reveal itself rather naturally. Realism emerged at a time when journalism was separating from political party affiliations and becoming more accurate. It coincided with the invention of what journalists call the inverted pyramid, in which a journalist lines the facts up from the most important to the least important, thinking it helps audiences understand things naturally. At the beginning of the 20th century, however, some journalists began to worry about the naïveté of realism. In part, reporters and editors were becoming more aware of the rise of propaganda and the role of press agents. At a time when Freud was developing his theories of the unconscious and painters like Picasso were experimenting with Cubism, journalists were also developing a greater recognition of human subjectivity. In 1919, Walter Lippmann and Charles Merz, an associate editor for the New York World, wrote an influential and scathing account of how cultural blinders had distorted the New York Times coverage of the Russian Revolution. “In the large, the news about Russia is a case of seeing not what was, but what men wished to see,” they wrote. Lippmann and others began to look for ways for the individual journalist “to remain clear and free of his irrational, his unexamined, his unacknowledged prejudgments in observing, understanding and presenting the news.” Journalism, Lippmann declared, was being practiced by “untrained accidental witnesses.” Good intentions, or what some might call “honest efforts” by journalists, were not enough. Faith in the rugged individualism of the tough reporter, what Lippmann called the “cynicism of the trade,” was also not enough. Nor were some of the new innovations of the times, like bylines, or columnists. **The solution, Lippmann argued, was for journalists to acquire more of “the scientific spirit … There is but one kind of unity possible in a world as diverse as ours. It is unity of method, rather than aim; the unity of disciplined experiment.” Lippmann meant by this that journalism should aspire to “a common intellectual method and a[n] common area of valid fact.”** To begin, Lippmann thought, the fledgling field of journalist education should be transformed from “trade schools designed to fit men for higher salaries in the existing structure.” Instead, the field should make its cornerstone the study of evidence and verification. Although this was an era of faith in science, Lippmann had few illusions. “It does not matter that the news is not susceptible to mathematical statement. In fact, just because news is complex and slippery, good reporting requires the exercise of the highest scientific virtues.”

#### Advocacy means to be biased for a specific viewpoint.

Cambridge Dictionary No Date [Cambridge Dictionary, No Date, "advocacy," https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/advocacy]/Kankee

public support for an idea, plan, or way of doing something:

However, despite internal disagreements, most journalists generally agree that journalistic objectivity aspires to having news reports’ depiction of what occurred as being close as possible to what actually happened, focusing on facts over opinions and values. Lofty as that goal may be, there are still two major hiccups of note that cause the line between objectivity and advocacy to be blurry.

(1) Though reality itself is objective given the actual existence of one set of true facts, individuals’ perceptions and interpretations of what is real isn’t. Journalist’s attempts to make objective conclusions about what actually happened may come to drastically different beliefs about those facts and what they entail. One may say one’s view of what is objective is within itself subjective.

(2) Reporters often use statements from eyewitnesses to an event as testimony to what happened during an event – these eyewitnesses may advocate a specific belief about what happened. Given the reporter themselves isn’t advocating anything, and is just using the testimony of someone else, they could in effect be advocating something while saying their reporting is objective.

(3) Reporters quoting both sides of a story can falsely conflate both sides of having equal weight on an issue in the form of false balance. This is explained further in neg contention 1.

What’s also important to note is that journalist’s adherence to objectivity has drastically changed over time. Originally, most journalism was subjective and partisan, but slowly became more and more objective to expand to a wider audience (and sell more papers), which led to several decades of strong journalistic ethics until the 1990s. With the rise of the internet and Fox News, objectivity again became lackluster.

#### Free press is a country’s

Cambridge Dictionary, ND, "free press," No Publication, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/free-press

If a country has a [free](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/free) pres[s](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/press), [its](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/its) newspapers, magazines, and [television](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/television) and [radio](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/radio) stations are [able](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/able) to express any opinions they want, even if these [criticize](https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/criticize) the government and other organizations:

### 1AC – Advantage

#### The PiS controlled Polish media is key to guarantee future elections and sway voters to the PiS.

**Kalan 19** Kalan, Dariusz. “Poland's State of the Media.” Foreign Policy, 25 Nov. 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/25/poland-public-television-law-and-justice-pis-mouthpiece/.//SJEP

**WARSAW, Poland—Asked about the difference between Poland’s public television station, TVP, before 2015 and after, a veteran journalist who works at the network was quick to respond. “Ruling politicians,” they said, “had never had that kind of impact on television” before. “They have audacity and courage to approach reporters and say, ‘I want to say something, and you have to record me.’ This is our everyday life,” the journalist, who insisted on anonymity, said in early October. After a long moment of reflection, they added: “You will not find true information in our television.” TVP, whose two flagship channels were among the country’s** [**most popular**](https://businessinsider.com.pl/media/tv-radio/najpopularniejsze-programy-i-kanaly-w-2018-roku/24lx5c1) **in 2018, has for the last several years been squarely under the control of Poland’s right-wing Law and Justice (PiS) party, which clung to power in elections in mid-October. According to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, these elections were “administratively prepared well.” But the voters’ “informed choice was undermined by a lack of impartiality in the media, especially the public broadcaster,”** [noted](https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/435941) Jan Petersen, the head of an election observation mission**. It was not the first time TVP’s reporting raised concerns. This fall, 54 members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe** [**called**](https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=28221&lang=en) **TVP “a propaganda channel for the ruling party.” Reporters Without Borders similarly** [**stated**](https://rsf.org/en/poland) **that Poland’s public media outlets “have been transformed into government propaganda mouthpieces.” This fall, in interviews with almost a dozen current and former TVP journalists and executives, most asked to go unnamed. None argued that TVP’s political news has been objective. In fact, many openly admitted that TVP is purposefully keeping quiet about PiS scandals, gives airtime almost exclusively to pro-PiS voices, and has campaigned against the party’s opponents. Those I spoke to who back PiS largely argued that the hard line was both necessary to ensure a second PiS term and a legitimate response to the private media’s alleged support of the opposition. Interlocutors on both sides believe that there is nothing unique in what is happening in Poland. Rather, their country is just one among many suffering the rise of fake news. According to Ryszard Bankowicz, the head of the Polish Council of Media Ethics, a nonpartisan body promoting principles of ethical journalism, readers and viewers around the world have ceased to want real information.** “They chose a given newspaper or TV station not in order to find the truth but to confirm their own beliefs or take a side against or for someone,” Bankowicz said. “And many journalists do not know principles of ethical journalism. This is a worldwide trend, and Poland is its victim.” But not everyone has given up. This year, Bankowicz, took a public stand on one of the [most serious accusations](https://www.rp.pl/Platforma-Obywatelska/190119723-Borusewicz-To-skutek-nagonki-na-Adamowicza.html) against TVP, made by Bogdan Borusewicz, a former democratic opposition activist under the communist regime and a former speaker of the Senate, among others: that it had incited hatred against Pawel Adamowicz, Gdansk’s mayor, who was stabbed to death at a January charity event. Adamowicz, a popular liberal politician, had been a target of numerous TVP reports that had suggested he was corrupt and had close ties with local businessmen. In a [report](http://www.rem.net.pl/data/20190211.pdf) published in February, Bankowicz wrote that “the authors of these publications manipulated the facts … in order to present Adamowicz as an unreliable person.” He concluded that “TVP spews propaganda, which serves to destroy opponents of the ruling party.” However, he refused to comment on whether violations of journalistic ethics contributed to Adamowicz’s death. “TVP is certainly not to blame for this tragic event,” said Maciej Stanecki, who was TVP’s deputy chairman from 2016 to 2019. But he was quick to add: “But for allowing the radicalization of the public opinion, of the crowd … well, I think that every media person must be aware that such responsibility exists.” Stanecki, a film producer, is proud of his achievements at TVP during his leadership, which include the television’s technological development, but he is aware that the network’s reputation has been tarnished.

#### Poland will never leave the EU, but PiS power ensures packed courts and decisions that deck legitimacy-that spills over and causes a massive crisis

**Economist 21** Economist, Oct 21 2021, "Poland is a problem for the EU precisely because it will not leave," https://www.economist.com/europe/2021/10/14/poland-is-a-problem-for-the-eu-precisely-because-it-will-not-leave//SJJK

Brexit, before it happened, was imagined in many forms. Hard, soft, Norwegian, Swiss or Turkish. Briefly, an Albanian option was discussed. Often it was just “clean”. A “clean Brexit” would free Britain from the eu’s single market, customs union and its courts, advocates said. Just as there are many ways of leaving the eu, there are many ways of remaining. There is the clean version, in which countries quietly accept the eu’s strictures. Then there is the messy version, where governments foul up the club. Think of it as “dirty remain”. **To see dirty remain in action, look at Poland. Its Constitutional Tribunal challenged the legal order of the club in a ruling on October 7th. In a case brought by the Polish prime minister, the court, which is stuffed with allies of the government**, **ruled that fundamental parts of eu law do not trump Poland’s constitution. The judgment, which was exactly what the government wanted, has punctured six decades of European case law. In short, the eu’s supreme court is no longer supreme, as far as Poland is concerned. Poles protested in droves, claiming that the government was attempting to drag the country out of the bloc against their will. But anyone expecting a British-style “Polexit” will be disappointed**. S**upport for the eu within the country is among the highest in the union. Standing for an election in Poland on a platform of quitting the eu would be akin to a manifesto promising to drown puppies.** **The problem is not that Poland is trying to leave the eu; the problem is that it intends to stay.** Dirty remain is more pernicious than Polexit. **The risk is that the eu’s legal order in Poland slowly fades,** argues Daniel Sarmiento of the Complutense University of Madrid**. A domino effect takes over**. **If courts across the eu cannot trust their Polish peers, then the eu’s legal system starts to gum up**. An arrest warrant here is not honoured there; a banking licence granted in one country may not be honoured in another. **Over time, an area over which people, goods, capital and services can flow freely turns into one where they can move only with trouble. Bad behaviour can spread**. Eurosceptics have mostly given up on leaving the eu. It is, as Britain has shown, rather stressful. **Eric Zemmour, the nationalist radical mulling a run in the French presidential election, has pledged to restore the primacy of French law over eu law**. Even more mild-mannered figures, such as Michel Barnier, the eu’s Brexit negotiator, toy with the same idea. **If one government can avoid abiding by unpopular rulings by the eu’s top court with little fear of sanction, it becomes a tempting option for all**. As an idea, “dirty remain” has a veneer of respectability. Its Polish proponents argue that everyone else does it, but only Poland is attacked. Polish judges are fond of citing their German counterparts, who have accused the European Court of Justice (ecj) of overstepping the mark in recent years. In such rulings, the medium counts as much as the message. No one doubts the independence of Germany’s constitutional court. No one believes in the independence of Poland’s. The messages are different, too. The German court accused the ecj of exceeding its mandate in approving a programme of bond-buying by the European Central Bank. **The Polish court said the country’s constitution trumped fundamental parts of eu law, such as “ever closer union”, a much more sweeping ruling**. The German court was playing with matches; **its Polish counterpart doused the eu’s legal system in petrol and deliberately started a fire. On paper, the solution to such a disagreement is simple: leave the eu**. Britain made things easy for the club when it departed. Rather than hanging around blocking things and generally causing a fuss, it followed the procedures as laid down in Article 50 of the treaties it was so keen to leave. Doing this without a clear plan was “like putting a gun in your mouth and pulling the trigger” according to Dominic Cummings, the man who led the Vote Leave campaign. Yet to the surprise of eu diplomats this is exactly what the British government did. **Instead, Poland is following a strategy that played out in Watchmen, a comic**. **In it, Rorschach, a vigilante, is sent to jail, where he greets a fellow inmate in the canteen by tipping the contents of a deep-fat fryer over his head**. “None of you seem to understand,” he says to his now-crispy foe. **“I’m not locked in here with you. You’re locked in here with me.”** **In the eu, destinies are linked. If one person starts hurling a fryer, everyone must duck**. David Cameron, Britain’s prime minister at the time, begged for concessions from the eu ahead of Britain’s referendum on leaving it, including an opt-out from “ever closer union”. **Poland threw its fryer without warning.** Such dirty **tricks are difficult to deal with inside the club**. **A nation-state can enforce its will internally, sending in the police or even, in extremis, the army to quell insurrection. The eu has no such tools.** The European Commission could refuse to sign off on Poland’s share of its covid-19 recovery fund, depriving the country of €57bn ($66bn), for instance. **The danger is that this will prompt Poland to bring the eu’s workings to a halt in protest.** Amicable divorce or poisonous marriage Bad behaviour outside the club is less of a problem. After doing things by the book as a member, Britain has discovered a rebellious streak, trying to renege on the terms of its deal with the eu. This causes little trouble for the eu. Rather than an existential problem, Brexit is a tedious one involving the movement of sausages across the Irish sea. Britain has been cauterised. By contrast, **the rule of law in Poland is an open wound**. **It is a long-term threat, which needs to be solved if the eu is to thrive**. **Just as a financial crisis in one country can spread to another, so can a constitutional crisis.** Dealing with a departure is relatively easy for the eu. Handling dirty remain is much harder.

#### The EU is already weak and Poland is at the front of their issues-further legitimacy crisis emboldens russian invasions

**Tisdall 21** Simon Tisdall Guardian, 11-21-2021, "Instability grips a weakened Europe as global predators smell blood," https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/21/instability-grips-a-weakened-europe-as-global-predators-smell-blood//SJJK

**Threats from Russia and China, a weaker US security alliance and internal discord expose fundamental strategic weaknesses** Is [Europe](https://www.theguardian.com/world/europe-news) entering a dangerous new age of instability? **Not since the height of the cold war with the Soviet Union has it looked so vulnerable to hostile forces.** Accumulating external threats and internal divisions, coupled with a weakening US security alliance, relentless Russian subversion, and power-hungry China’s war on western values are exposing fundamental strategic weaknesses. Europe increasingly resembles a beleaguered democratic island in an anarchic world, where a rising tide of authoritarianism, impunity and international rule-breaking threatens to inundate it. Some European leaders understand this, notably French president [Emmanuel Macron](https://www.theguardian.com/world/emmanuel-macron), yet long-term policy remedies elude them. For example, Belarus dictator Alexander Lukashenko’s use of migrants to pressure the EU is plainly outrageous. Yet it worked, in the sense that Germany’s caretaker chancellor, Angela Merkel, phoned him for a chat, ending his post-coup isolation. [Her unilateral demarche](https://www.france24.com/en/europe/20211117-merkel-and-lukashenko-agree-to-talks-about-belarusian-border-crisi) understandably infuriated Baltic states. It was a concession to a thug, not a lasting solution. Talking of thugs, Russian president Vladimir Putin’s ongoing intimidation of Ukraine risks widening conflagration. The latest border build-up of 90,000 Russian troops may be [sabre-rattling,](https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/nov/14/uk-must-be-ready-for-war-with-russia-says-armed-forces-chief) similar to provocations in the Donbas and Black Sea last spring. If not, Europe will only have itself to blame. Putin’s importunities stem directly from its de facto acquiescence in his illegal 2014 annexation of Crimea. Instability on Europe’s periphery extends to the Balkans amid well-founded fears that Bosnia-Herzegovina is slipping back into conflict 26 years after the [Dayton peace accords.](https://www.theguardian.com/world/from-the-archive-blog/2020/nov/18/the-dayton-accords-a-peace-agreement-for-bosnia-archive-1995) Resurgent ethnic nationalism, embodied by the separatist Bosnian Serb leader, Milorad Dodik, is fuelled by Belgrade and Moscow. **A larger, strategic problem is the EU’s inability** [**to fulfil promises**](https://ecfr.eu/article/western-balkans-in-trouble-why-the-eu-should-make-a-new-offer-to-the-region/) **of closer integration with the region**. Europe’s relationship with Turkey, a key gatekeeper, is dysfunctional, too, thanks partly to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, its deeply unpleasant president. When he menaced EU members Greece and Cyprus last year, Macron [sent naval forces](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/29/greece-turkey-standoff-france-send-warships-east-mediterranean) to the eastern Mediterranean. The rest of Europe sat on its hands. Erdoğan is also meddling in Ukraine and the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, which [flared up again](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/tensions-high-after-deadly-clashes-between-armenia-and-azerbaijan-gwmpfqgdd) last week. Yet Brussels pays him to keep out Middle Eastern refugees, so it **hardly dares challenge him. The vice-like circle of instability squeezing Europe is about more than actual or potential armed conflict.** One of its bigger dilemmas is migration. Despite the searing 2015 Syrian refugee crisis, **the EU still lacks an agreed, humane policy**. **That guarantees more trouble down the road.** **One of the main objectors, ironically,** [**is Poland,**](https://notesfrompoland.com/2021/11/10/eu-council-president-visits-poland-to-express-solidarity-in-face-of-hybrid-attack-by-belarus/) **which rejects migrant quotas.** **Yet faced by border mayhem, its hypocritical rightwing leaders who, like Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, are in a bitter fight with Brussels over rule of law and democracy issues, appealed for EU solidarity.** Disturbing, too, is the way **much European opinion appears to have accepted illegal pushbacks and routine mistreatment of asylum-seekers**, whether in camps in Libya or on the beaches of Greece, in breach of EU law. This reflects another self-inflicted wound: the increased influence of xenophobic, rightwing populists and the re-normalisation of circa 1914 ultra-nationalist politics across Europe. **If Europeans will not stand up for western democratic values in a world overrun by Donald Trump clones and copycats, who will?** Sadly, they cannot look to Britain. No longer a trusted friend, the UK under Boris Johnson, sniping and sneering from the sidelines, has become another peripheral conflict zone for the EU. Britain is more irritant than ally. Defence minister Ben Wallace used the linked Belarus-Ukraine crises last week to advance the Brexit agenda and seal arms deals with Warsaw and Kiev. Tellingly, the [UK sent troops,](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/18/british-soldiers-to-give-more-support-to-poland-amid-belarus-border-crisis) not humanitarian aid, to the Polish border. Europe’s age of instability also owes much to events beyond its control. Few forecast Trump would try to blow up what Franklin D Roosevelt called the “arsenal of democracy”, and the western alliance with it. [He may yet try again](https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/15/us/politics/republicans-2022-redistricting-maps.html). Likewise, few predicted, as [Merkel now admits,](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/exclusive-germany-may-have-been-naive-china-first-merkel-says-2021-11-17/) that China would emerge as such a domineering, economically aggressive, anti-democratic global competitor. **US president Joe Biden reassures Europeans that Nato, even after Afghanistan, is as vital as ever. But his** [**edgy video summit**](https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/16/biden-xi-summit-highlights-tensions-and-desire-for-cooperation) **with China’s Xi Jinping last week showed where his true focus lies. Putin sees this, and smells blood. Europe’s gas supply is one pressure point. Covert cyber-attacks are another. Russia’s reckless anti-satellite missile test, scorning European safety concerns, was the first recorded act of** [**hooliganism in outer space.**](https://www.theguardian.com/science/2021/nov/16/a-wild-west-out-there-russian-satellite-debris-worsens-space-junk-problem) **Europe’s inability to make Putin pay a serious price for aggression in Georgia and Crimea, his decimation of Russian democracy, his foreign election meddling, and his murderous attacks on Alexei Navalny – and other opponents on European soil – heightens a sense of decline. On China, there is nothing close to a united front. Such weakness encourages other predators. So what is to be done?** Europe, as ever, is a house divided. East Europeans continue to place their faith in Washington rather than Brussels, despite clear portents of another transatlantic rupture if the Democrats lose the White House in 2024. **The EU bureaucracy is feebly led, its parliament toothless. Germany lacks a proven leader. In France, Macron faces** [**a vicious spring election**](https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/eric-zemmour-macrons-far-right-rival-wins-backing-from-russia-t25c086kc) **scrap against the Russian-backed far right.** Yet it is Macron’s ideas about enhanced European political, security and military “strategic autonomy”, and a stronger, more fiscally and economically integrated EU, that offer the most hopeful path forward. EU defence ministers last week discussed [a “Strategic Compass” plan](https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-policy-document-against-russia-china/) to boost joint capabilities. But agreement on proposed “rapid-deployment forces” and the like seems a long way off. As [France](https://www.theguardian.com/world/france) prepares to assume the EU presidency, will other leaders recognise this critical moment and back Macron? In a world of sharks, snakes and scary monsters, Europe’s independence, cohesion and values are on the line like never before.

#### Escalation.

**Majumdar 17** Dave Majumdar, 9-7-2017, "A War with Russia Would Go Nuclear. Here's Why.," National Interest, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/war-russia-would-go-nuclear-heres-why-22202//SJJK

Simply put, **if Russia were faced with a large-scale attack that could defeat its conventional forces, Moscow might resort to nuclear weapons.** While a recent [RAND Corporation study](http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf) concluded that **Russia could overrun NATO’s member states Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the Baltics within sixty hours**, the war games did not simulate the use of nuclear weapons. **If, however, a war were to breakout between NATO and Russia, nuclear weapons would certainly come into play**—especially if the conflict were going poorly for Moscow. **Unlike the Soviet Union, which had a stated “no first use” policy, modern Russia explicitly rejected that pledge in 1993**. In fact, as Moscow’s conventional forces continued to atrophy during the economic and social meltdown of the 1990s, Russia developed a doctrine [called de-escalation in 2000](http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/dc3ma00). Simply put, if Russia were faced with a large-scale attack that could defeat its conventional forces, Moscow might resort to nuclear weapons. In 2010, Russia revised the doctrine somewhat as its conventional forces started to recover from the aftermath of the Soviet collapse—the current version states [Moscow would use nuclear weapons in](https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf) situations “that would put in danger the very existence of the state.” While the RAND study shows that Russia would be able to take the Baltics fairly easily, the war game didn’t explore what would happen in the event of a NATO counter offensive. The RAND study simply states: Such a rapid defeat would leave NATO with a limited number of options, all bad: a bloody counteroffensive, fraught with escalatory risk, to liberate the Baltics; to escalate itself, as it threatened to do to avert defeat during the Cold War; or to concede at least temporary defeat, with uncertain but predictably disastrous consequences for the Alliance and, not incidentally, the people of the Baltics. A NATO counter-offensive would be bloody and fraught with escalatory risk—but it’s one of the probable outcomes of a Russian invasion. **In that eventuality, Russian conventional forces—of which only a portion are well trained and well equipped—would likely be severely damaged or even destroyed**. Moreover, if NATO forces hit targets inside Russia or crossed over into Russian territory, Moscow might conclude that there is a danger to the existence of the state. After all, Moscow has expressed concerns in the past that regime change by the West is an all too real danger. **In that situation, Russia might counter advancing NATO forces with its arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons**. The Russian tactical nuclear arsenal is not nearly as large as the Soviet arsenal had once been, but concrete numbers are hard to come by. The Soviet Union was thought to have possessed between 15,000 and 25,000 tactical nuclear weapons of all types ranging from suitcase-sized containers and nuclear mines to short-range aircraft delivered missiles, nuclear gravity bombs and artillery shells—as well as short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missile warheads. While Moscow has been slowly eliminating its non-strategic arsenal since the end of the Cold War, Russia many still have as many as [4,000 tactical nuclear weapons](https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf), according to the Congressional Research Service. However, other analyses suggest that Russia has as few as [2,000 operational tactical nuclear weapons.](http://bos.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/04/13/0096340215581363.full) A more recent analysis by [Royal United Service Institute’s Igor Sutyagin suggests](https://rusi.org/sites/default/files/201211_op_atomic_accounting.pdf) that Russia has a maximum of 1,040 non-strategic nuclear weapons. Of those about 128-210 warheads are assigned to the Russian ground forces. The Russian navy has about 330 tactical nuclear weapons, while the Russian air force has 334 non-strategic weapons. Meanwhile, Russian air defense forces have a further sixty-eight to 166 tactical nuclear weapons mounted on various surface-to-air missiles. Another report, this one by the [Federation of American Scientists, suggests that](http://fas.org/issues/nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-forces/) Russia doesn’t have any deployed non-strategic nuclear weapons. “All are declared to be in central storage. Several thousand retired non-strategic warheads are awaiting dismantlement,” reads the FAS’s Status of World Nuclear Forces.

#### Nuclear detonations cause nuclear winter and extinction, and the rainout effect is wrong – self-lofting means soot goes above the clouds

**Starr 15** Steven Starr, 10-14-2015, "Nuclear War, Nuclear Winter, and Human Extinction," Federation Of American Scientists, [Steven Starr is the director of the University of Missouri’s Clinical Laboratory Science Program, as well as a senior scientist at the Physicians for Social Responsibility. He has been published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the Strategic Arms Reduction (STAR) website of the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology.], https://fas.org/pir-pubs/nuclear-war-nuclear-winter-and-human-extinction/, SJBE

While it is impossible to precisely predict all the human impacts that would result from a nuclear winter, it is relatively simple to predict those which would be most profound. **That is, a nuclear winter would cause most humans and large animals to die from nuclear famine in a mass extinction event similar to the one that wiped out the dinosaurs**. **Following the detonation** (in conflict) **of** US and/or Russian launch-ready **strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear firestorms would burn simultaneously over a total land surface area of many thousands or tens of thousands of square miles. These mass fires, many of which would rage over large cities and industrial areas, would release many tens of millions of tons of black carbon soot and smoke** (up to [180 million tons](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/ToonRobockTurcoPhysicsToday.pdf), according to peer-reviewed studies), **which would rise rapidly above cloud level and into the stratosphere.** [For an explanation of the calculation of smoke emissions, see [Atmospheric effects & societal consequences of regional scale nuclear conflicts](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/acp-7-1973-2007.pdf).] **The scientists who completed the most recent peer-reviewed studies on nuclear winter discovered that the sunlight would heat the smoke, producing a self-lofting effect that would not only aid the rise of the smoke into the stratosphere (above cloud level, where it could not be rained out), but act to keep the smoke in the stratosphere for 10 years or more**. The longevity of the smoke layer would act to greatly increase the severity of its effects upon the biosphere. **Once in the stratosphere, the smoke** (predicted to be produced by a range of strategic nuclear wars) **would rapidly engulf the Earth and form a** [**dense stratospheric smoke layer**](http://www.nucleardarkness.org/warconsequences/hundredfiftytonessmoke/). **The smoke from a war fought with strategic nuclear weapons would quickly prevent up to 70% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Northern Hemisphere and 35% of sunlight from reaching the surface of the Southern Hemisphere.** Such an enormous loss of warming sunlight would produce Ice Age weather conditions on Earth in a matter of weeks. **For a period of 1-3 years following the war, temperatures would fall below freezing every day in the central agricultural zones of North America and Eurasia.** [For an explanation of nuclear winter, see [Nuclear winter revisited with a modern climate model and current nuclear arsenals: Still catastrophic consequences](http://climate.envsci.rutgers.edu/pdf/RobockNW2006JD008235.pdf).] Nuclear winter would cause average global surface temperatures to become colder than they were at the height of the last Ice Age. **Such extreme cold would eliminate growing seasons for many years, probably for a decade or longer.** Can you imagine a winter that lasts for ten years? The results of such a scenario are obvious. **Temperatures would be much too cold to grow food, and they would remain this way long enough to cause most humans and animals to starve to death. Global nuclear famine would ensue in a setting in which the infrastructure of the combatant nations has been totally destroyed,** resulting in massive amounts of chemical and radioactive toxins being released into the biosphere. We don’t need a sophisticated study to tell us that no food and Ice Age temperatures for a decade would kill most people and animals on the planet. Would the few remaining survivors be able to survive in a radioactive, toxic environment? It is, of course, debatable whether or not nuclear winter could cause human extinction. There is essentially no way to truly “know” without fighting a strategic nuclear war. Yet while it is crucial that we all understand the mortal peril that we face, **it is not necessary to engage in an unwinnable academic debate as to whether any humans will survive.**

### 1AC – Framing

#### The meta-ethic is moral naturalism. Non-natural moral facts are epistemically inaccessible

Papineau 7 [David, Academic philosopher. He works as Professor of Philosophy of Science at King's College London, having previously taught for several years at Cambridge University and been a fellow of Robinson College, Cambridge, “Naturalism”. [http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/naturalism/))]

Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If **all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world** (Harman, 1986). At first sight **this** may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it **has** **very awkward epistemological consequences.** For beings like us, **knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them.**

#### No a priori reason—evidence proves.

**Schwartz** “A Defense of Naïve Empiricism: It is Neither Self-Refuting Nor Dogmatic.” Stephen P. Schwartz. Ithaca College. pp.1-14.

The empirical support for the fundamental principle of empiricism is diffuse but salient. Our common empirical experience and experimental psychology offer evidence that humans do not have any capacity to garner knowledge except by empirical sources. The fact is that we believe that there is no source of knowledge, information, or evidence apart from observation, empirical scientific investigations, and our sensory experience of the world, and we believe this on the basis of our empirical a posteriori experiences and our general empirical view of how things work. For example, we believe on empirical evidence that humans are continuous with the rest of nature and that we rely like other animals on our senses to tell us how things are. If humans are more successful than other animals, it is not because we possess special non-experiential ways of knowing, but because we are better at cooperating, collating, and inferring. In particular we do not have any capacity for substantive a priori knowledge. There is no known mechanism by which such knowledge would be made possible. This is an empirical claim.

#### Thus, the standard is maximizing expected wellbeing. Pleasure and pain *are* intrinsic value and disvalue – everything else *regresses* – robust neuroscience.

Blum et al. 18 – Kenneth Blum, 1Department of Psychiatry, Boonshoft School of Medicine, Dayton VA Medical Center, Wright State University, Dayton, OH, USA 2Department of Psychiatry, McKnight Brain Institute, University of Florida College of Medicine, Gainesville, FL, USA 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA 5Department of Precision Medicine, Geneus Health LLC, San Antonio, TX, USA 6Department of Addiction Research & Therapy, Nupathways Inc., Innsbrook, MO, USA 7Department of Clinical Neurology, Path Foundation, New York, NY, USA 8Division of Neuroscience-Based Addiction Therapy, The Shores Treatment & Recovery Center, Port Saint Lucie, FL, USA 9Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary 10Division of Addiction Research, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC. North Kingston, RI, USA 11Victory Nutrition International, Lederach, PA., USA 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA, Marjorie Gondré-Lewis, 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA 13Departments of Anatomy and Psychiatry, Howard University College of Medicine, Washington, DC US, Bruce Steinberg, 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA, Igor Elman, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, David Baron, 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA, Edward J Modestino, 14Department of Psychology, Curry College, Milton, MA, USA, Rajendra D Badgaiyan, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, Mark S Gold 16Department of Psychiatry, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA, “Our evolved unique pleasure circuit makes humans different from apes: Reconsideration of data derived from animal studies”, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 28 February 2018, accessed: 19 August 2020, <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/>, R.S.

**Pleasure** is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also **defines reward.** As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the **basis for hedonic theories** of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10]. Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14]. Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals. Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it. It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that **organisms are** the **result of evolutionary competition.** In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring. Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding. There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health. Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage. Finding happiness is different between apes and humans As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure. Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are **many brain regions**, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly **modulate** (increase or decrease) our **pleasure or** even produce **the opposite** of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered. Desire and reward centers It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation. In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41]. Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42]. Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans. In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45]. Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations. Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50] In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders. In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, **there was** a **remarkable contrast in** the **neocortices**, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) for the enzyme, responsible for the production of dopamine, was expressed in the neocortex of humans, but not chimpanzees. As discussed earlier, dopamine is best known for its essential role within the brain’s reward system; the very system that responds to everything from sex, to gambling, to food, and to addictive drugs. However, dopamine also assists in regulating emotional responses, memory, and movement. Notably, abnormal dopamine levels have been linked to disorders including Parkinson’s, schizophrenia and spectrum disorders such as autism and addiction or RDS. Nora Volkow, the director of NIDA, pointed out that one alluring possibility is that the neurotransmitter dopamine plays a substantial role in humans’ ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

#### Prefer:

#### 1] Actor spec – the free press should be consequentialist —takes out calc indicts since they are empirically denied.

Pitcher 18 George Pitcher (advises Dow Jones, publisher of the Wall Street Journal, on ethics and the future of journalism and is a Visiting Fellow at LSE. He formerly held senior editorial positions at The Observer and the Daily Telegraph). 10/8/2018, The New Media Ethics: Lessons from how the BBC failed to consider the consequences of its Cliff Richard story, <https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/polis/2018/10/08/the-new-media-ethics-how-the-bbcs-failed-to-consider-the-consequences-of-its-cliff-richard-story/>

So, there’s a demand on a self-regulated, free press to manage its own operational ethics. And it’s in its own interests to do so, because not to do so, as we’ve seen and heard in the wake of the Sir Cliff ruling, leads to circumstances in which its freedom is forfeited. The school of ethics that we’re addressing here is consequentialism. It differs from other ethical frameworks in that it requires less of the character of people and the virtue of their actions and concentrates pragmatically on the consequences of those actions. In corporate jargon, we’d call them ‘outcomes’. Consequentialist ethics claim that morally correct actions are defined by those that have the best outcomes. Dark arts A nice touch for journalists is that consequentialism is also non-prescriptive, meaning that it isn’t subject to the rule of law or, for that matter, any other authority. So, deceit, perjury and other dark journalistic arts are morally acceptable if they are in the public interest – or, indeed, in a person’s best interests. (Though it’s hard under this ethical provision to see how the consequences of the Sir Cliff’s 2014 media coverage served the better interests of anyone.) We’re in the territory here of asking whether ends justify means, or utilitarianism in philosophical terms. In shorthand, positive utilitarianism requires that our actions are morally justified by choosing those which do the greatest good for the majority of people. And that could serve as a public-interest defence for journalists. The problem arises that reporters simply can’t know in advance what the outcomes of their actions are going to be. Furthermore, a media organisation could persuasively argue that it bears no moral responsibility anyway – it has a function, which is to report what is happening accurately, but the outcomes of its actions in doing so are not its moral burden. Alternatively, we could argue that consequentialism can productively be internalised within a media organisation. It’s unlikely that a public-service broadcaster is going to want to take actions that ruin the careers of young reporters, restrict the media’s ability to operate in law and result in six-figure fines, for no demonstrable – and consequential – public interest. Newsrooms acting under pressure will get it wrong. When they do, it’s probably better for editors to put their hands up and say so, than belatedly to plead a free-press defence, as the BBC did. But they could also save themselves embarrassment, time in court and money if they taught their staff to consider the consequences of the actions they are poised to take. Journalists will make errors of judgement. The consequences of those errors are probably the price we pay for a free press. But the frequency and severity of those errors – and the consequences that arise – can be tempered by systems of ethics that have been tested down the centuries (it dates at least from the 5th-century BC). For media groups, consequentialism isn’t a bad place to start for a practical ethical code.

#### 2] No intent-foresight distinction for states.

Enoch 07 Enoch, D [The Faculty of Law, The Hebrew Unviersity, Mount Scopus Campus, Jersusalem]. (2007). INTENDING, FORESEEING, AND THE STATE. Legal Theory, 13(02). doi:10.1017/s1352325207070048 https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/legal-theory/article/intending-foreseeing-and-the-state/76B18896B94D5490ED0512D8E8DC54B2

The general difficulty of the intending-foreseeing distinction here stemmed, you will recall, from the feeling that attempting to pick and choose among the foreseen consequences of one’s actions those one is more and those one is less responsible for looks more like the preparation of a defense than like a genuine attempt to determine what is to be done. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction seems like an attempt to evade responsibility, and so thinking about the distinction in terms of responsibility serves 39. Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38. I will use this text as my example of an expressive theory here. 40. See id. at 1554, 1564. 41. For a general critique, see Mathew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1363 (1999–2000). 42. As Adler repeatedly notes, the understanding of expression Anderson & Pildes work with is amazingly broad, so that “To express an attitude through action is to act on the reasons the attitude gives us”; Anderson & Pildes, supra note 38, at 1510. If this is so, it seems that expression drops out of the picture and everything done with it can be done directly in terms of reasons. 43. This may be true of what Anderson and Pildes have in mind when they say that “expressive norms regulate actions by regulating the acceptable justifications for doing them”; id. at 1511. http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 03 Aug 2014 IP address: 134.153.184.170 Intending, Foreseeing, and the State 91 to reduce even further the plausibility of attributing to it intrinsic moral significance. This consideration—however weighty in general—seems to me very weighty when applied to state action and to the decisions of state officials. For perhaps it may be argued that individuals are not required to undertake a global perspective, one that equally takes into account all foreseen consequences of their actions. Perhaps, in other words, individuals are entitled to (roughly) settle for having a good will, and beyond that let chips fall where they may. But this is precisely what stateswomen and statesmen—and certainly states—are not entitled to settle for.44 In making policy decisions, it is precisely the global (or at least statewide, or nationwide, or something of this sort) perspective that must be undertaken. Perhaps, for instance, an individual doctor is entitled to give her patient a scarce drug without thinking about tomorrow’s patients (I say “perhaps” because I am genuinely not sure about this), but surely when a state committee tries to formulate rules for the allocation of scarce medical drugs and treatments, it cannot hide behind the intending-foreseeing distinction, arguing that if it allows45 the doctor to give the drug to today’s patient, the dxeath of tomorrow’s patient is merely foreseen and not intended. When making a policy-decision, this is clearly unacceptable. Or think about it this way (I follow Daryl Levinson here):46 perhaps restrictions on the responsibility of individuals are justified because individuals are autonomous, because much of the value in their lives comes from personal pursuits and relationships that are possible only if their responsibility for what goes on in the (more impersonal) world is restricted. But none of this is true of states and governments. They have no special relationships and pursuits, no personal interests, no autonomous lives to lead in anything like the sense in which these ideas are plausible when applied to individuals persons. So there is no reason to restrict the responsibility of states in anything like the way the responsibility of individuals is arguably restricted.47 States and state officials have much more comprehensive responsibilities than individuals do. Hiding behind the intending-foreseeing distinction thus more clearly constitutes an evasion of responsibility in the case of the former. So the evading-responsibility worry has much more force against the intending-foreseeing distinction when applied to state action than elsewhere.

#### 3] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to not kill. Only consequences explain why which is intuitive. Outweighs—a) parsimony—metaphysics relies on long chains of questionable claims that make conclusions less likely b) hijacks—intuitions are inevitable since every framework must take some starting point.

#### 4] Only consequentialism explains degrees of wrongness—if I break a promise to meet up for lunch, that is not as bad as breaking a promise to take a dying person to the hospital. Only the consequences of breaking the promise explain why the second one is much worse than the first which is the most intuitive.

#### Outweighs- A] Parsimony- metaphysics relies on long chains of questionable claims that make conclusions less likely. B] Hijacks- intuitions are inevitable since even every framework must take some unjustified assumption as a starting point.

#### Impact calc –

#### 1] Extinction outweighs:

#### A] Structural violence- death causes suffering because people can’t get access to resources and basic necessities

#### B] Mathematically outweighs.

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

#### 2] Calc indicts fail: A] Ethics- it would indict everything cuz they use events to understand how ethics have worked B] Reciprocity- they are NIBs that create a 2:1 skew where I have to answer them to access offense while they only have to win one C] Internalism- asking why we value life is nonsensical since it’s intrinsic and we just do.

### 1AC – Underview

#### 1] 1AR theory is legit – anything else means infinite abuse – drop the debater, competing interps – 1AR are too short to make up for the time trade-off – no rvis – 6 minute 2nr means they can brute force me and always win.

**2] Reject skep/permissibility – it’s an abhorrent view of the world that makes the debate space horrible which ow on accessibility – making args in favor of an alternate ethic solves.**

#### 3] Permissibility and presumption affirm.

**A] Freeze- otherwise we would not be able to justify morally neutral actions since there isn’t a prohibition and we would have to prove an obligation.**

**B] Trivialism- statements are true until proven false, if I told you my name you’d believe me.**

#### C] Negation Theory- Negating requires a complete absence of an existing obligation

Negate: to deny the existence of

That’s Dictionary.com- “Negate” https://www.dictionary.com/browse/negate.

#### D] The Law of Excluded Middles- if something is not false, it must be true, which means that if something is not prohibited, it must be obligatory, and permissibility is the same as obligatory.

#### 4] Evaluate the debate after the 2AR – otherwise it gives debaters an unfair time skew and is arbitrary.

#### 5] Ought is an obligation – outweighs because entry 1.

Merriam Webster ["Ought." Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 27 Dec. 2018. [https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought //](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/ought%20//) ABML]Top of Form

Ought [auxiliary verb](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/auxiliary%20verb) \ˈȯt  \ Definition of ought  (Entry 1 of 4) —used to express obligation ought to pay our debts, advisability ought to take care of yourself, natural expectation ought to be here by now, or logical consequence the result ought to be infinity ought [verb](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/verb) \ˈȯ(ḵ)t  \ Definition of ought (Entry 2 of 4) [transitive verb](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/transitive) 1chiefly Scotland : [POSSESS](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/possess) 2chiefly Scotland : [OWE](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/owe) ought  [noun](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/noun) \ˈȯt  \ Definition of ought (Entry 3 of 4) : moral obligation : [DUTY](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/duty) ought \ˈȯt,  ˈät\ Definition of ought (Entry 4 of 4) archaic spelling of [AUGHT](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/aught)

#### 7] Use comparative worlds – A] topic ed – forces the neg to research the topic instead of low quality rez flaw args – the only benefit to debate is making us better arguers not perfect logicians, B] reciprocity – truth-testing allows the neg to disprove any part of the aff, but the aff has to defend every part, which gives the neg too much ground, C] inclusion – truth testing says rez is only thing that’s relevant which excludes ks – either only the rez matters so we can’t punish slurs, or people should get dropped for making debate unsafe which proves other things matter

#### This isn’t offense unless you read truth testing or logcon but

#### A] Resolve is defined as, settle or find a solution to (a problem, dispute, or contentious matter) so the past tense, resolved, grammatically means the resolution has been resolved.

#### B] The rules of logic claim that the only time a statement is invalid is if the antecedent is true, but the consequent is false.

SEP [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.] “An Introduction to Philosophy.” Stanford University. <https://web.stanford.edu/~bobonich/dictionary/dictionary.html> TG Massa

Conditional statement: an “if p, then q” compound statement (ex. If I throw this ball into the air, it will come down); p is called the antecedent, and q is the consequent. A conditional asserts that if its antecedent is true, its consequent is also true; any conditional with a true antecedent and a false consequent must be false.  For any other combination of true and false antecedents and consequents, the conditional statement is true.

**Implications: A] Neg a priori’s affirm – denying the assumptions of a statement proves it valid – the aff is a set of conditionals since the offense being true relies on the framework B] If the aff is winning, they get the ballot is a tacit ballot conditional which means denying the premise proves the conclusion that I should get the ballot.**

#### Interpretation: Debaters must disclose all analytics on open source on the 2021-22 NDCA LD wiki after the round in which they read them.

#### Violation – they didn’t disclose NCC versus me Yale Finals.

#### No shifty I-meets – we have sent documents of 1Ns they read against us – a whole NCC shell is missing.

#### 1] Debate resource inequities—you’ll say people will steal arguments, but that’s good—it’s the only way to truly level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs. That outweighs – accessibility is an impact filter to everything.

Overing 18 – Bob Overing, LD Scholar (“Holiday Disclosure Post #6 – 10 Things Edition” JANUARY 12, 2018. http://www.premierdebate.com/disclosure-post-6/)

**Open source improves on usual disclosure practices** in the obvious way – **you can read their evidence for better prep**aration – and in a number of smaller ways too. **It solves the analytics problem** I discussed above, **so round-altering uncarded arguments are available** (though this doesn’t really apply to Harvard-Westlake), **and it gives access to evidence from paywalled articles**. **Every season I coach debaters who lack access to major databases; for schools without robust online library offerings or teams without college coaches, this matters a lot**.

#### 2] Depth of clash – it allows debaters to have nuanced objections to their opponents arguments before the round at a much faster rate, which leads to higher quality evidence comparison and argument generation – outweighs cause thinking on your feet is NUQ but the best quality responses come from full access to a doc. Analytics too – it incentivies them to stock up on 1NC analytics that we had no way to prepare for that kills the 1AR everytime.

3] Norming – prevents norming. Norming outweighs – basis for all theory arguments and resolves actual abuse.

4] Strat skew – cheap shots and moot offense

#### Competing interps – A] reasonability is arbitrary and invites judge intervention B] race to the top to create the best norms

#### Drop the debater – to deter future abuse and set norms

#### No RVIs on 1AC theory – A] They get 7 minutes to dump on a short shell – that’s infinitely abusive cuz they’ll have a huge time advantage and moot 6 minutes of 1AC offense B] Clash – incentives the 1NC to go all in on theory before the 1NC begins – creates horrible substantive debates C] Specific to disclosure – they would bait theory and purposely misdisclose, which also hurts novices

#### Empirical approaches to international relations and nuclear warfare are epistemologically valid — prefer quantitative analyses.

Fuhrmann, 14 — Matthew Fuhrmann is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas A&M University. Matthew Kroenig is an Associate Professor and International Relations Field Chair in the Department of Government at Georgetown University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at The Atlantic Council. Todd S. Sechser is an Assistant Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia. He has held research fellowships at Stanford University and Harvard University, and from 2011-12 was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. (2014; “The Case for Using Statistics to Study Nuclear Security;” *H-Diplo/ISSF Forum*, No. 2; pg. 41-46; <https://issforum.org/ISSF/PDF/ISSF-Forum-2.pdf>; //GrRv)

The questions we ask in our articles require a more comprehensive approach to data collection. By collecting information about dozens (or hundreds) of cases rather than just one or two, we can gain insights into whether the patterns we observe in any individual case are representative of broader trends. The implicit question in our research is always ‘what would have happened if conditions had been different?’ Of course, it is impossible to answer this counterfactual with certainty since history happens only once, and we cannot repeat the ‘experiment’ in a laboratory. But that does not mean we should shrug our shoulders and abandon the enterprise.

Instead, we can gain insight by looking at cases in which conditions were, in fact, different. To illustrate, let’s return to the smoking example above. Studying a single smoker in depth might give us an accurate and textured understanding of the role of smoking in this person’s life, but it would be a poor way to learn about the broader health effects of smoking, because we could not make an informed guess about what would have happened had he not smoked. Our approach described earlier, in contrast, allows us to generalize about the effects of smoking on health. For precisely this reason, large-scale quantitative analysis is the primary method by which medical researchers have tackled the health effects of tobacco smoke. To be sure, some of the data in our hypothetical study would surely be inaccurate, and we would know comparatively little about the lives of each individual subject. But the loss in individual case knowledge would be more than compensated by the increase in information about the variables we hope to study.

So it is with nuclear weapons. To understand how nuclear weapons impact international crises, we must examine crises in which nuclear ‘conditions’ were different. For Kroenig, this means comparing the fortunes of crisis participants that enjoyed nuclear superiority to those that did not. For Sechser and Fuhrmann, it means comparing the effectiveness of coercive threats made by nuclear states to those made by nonnuclear states. By making these comparisons, we can begin to engage in informed and evidence-based speculation about how nuclear weapons change (or do not change) crisis dynamics. Indeed, the statistical models we employ require this comparison – they will return no results if all of our cases look the same.

Gavin argues that the Berlin/Cuba episode is sufficient for understanding the dynamics of nuclear weapons because it is the “most important and representative” case of nuclear deterrence and coercion.12 There are two distinct (and contradictory) claims here: that the case is the most important crisis episode for studying nuclear weapons, and that it is representative of the broader universe of such episodes. With respect to the first claim, Gavin offers no criteria for evaluating what an “important” case might be. What makes a case important – its profile among the general public? Its consequences? The availability of information about it? The countries involved? Moreover, for whom must the case be important? Gavin may view the 1958–1962 case as critical for understanding nuclear dynamics, but it is by no means clear that policymakers today look to this example for guidance about dealing with Iran or North Korea. This is not to say that we disagree with Gavin’s assessment – undoubtedly the 1958–1962 episode is important in many respects. But importance, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. The second claim is equally dubious: that the 1958–1962 episode is somehow representative of the ways in which nuclear weapons typically shape international politics. Without first examining other cases, Gavin simply has no grounds on which to base this claim. Moreover, there is tension between this claim and his previous assertion that the case is important: one key reason the Cuba/Berlin episode is often seen as important is because it was not like other Cold War crises: nuclear weapons were brandished more explicitly, and stoked more public anxiety about nuclear war, than any other crisis before or since. In the broader universe of crises, this episode actually may be quite anomalous. If so, then studying it to the exclusion of other cases would yield misleading conclusions about the role of nuclear weapons in world politics.

A key advantage of quantitative methods is that the researcher need not make questionable judgments about which cases are more or less important: unless explicitly instructed otherwise, statistical models assign equal weight to each case. Likewise, statistical models provide ways to identify – and exclude – anomalous cases that deviate markedly from dominant trends. Indeed, a quantitative analysis can be a useful precursor to the selection of individual cases for in-depth analysis, precisely because it allows us to locate cases that either represent or deviate from the overall pattern. These selections, however, are based on careful comparisons with other cases, not opaque judgments.

A second advantage is that quantitative analyses provide greater transparence about methods, judgments, and conclusions. One of Gavin’s central critiques is that various cases in our quantitative analyses have been miscoded. In other words, he argues, we have mismeasured important factors.13 This criticism – irrespective of its validity14 – is possible only because our coding decisions are unambiguous and easily ascertained from our datasets. Moreover, each of our studies sets forth clear rules for how each variable in our datasets was coded. This does not mean that our coding decisions are all correct and beyond dispute, but it does mean that they are clearly stated for outside scholars to evaluate. This degree of transparency is a key strength of quantitative research. Because each case in a quantitative analysis necessarily must be clearly coded,15 there is no ambiguity about how the researcher has classified each case. If other researchers believe a case should be coded differently, they can make that change and rerun the analysis.

By extension, quantitative research designs permit scholars to easily evaluate how much a study’s findings depend on individual coding decisions. Simply noting a few coding errors or differences of interpretation in a large quantitative dataset is of little consequence unless one can demonstrate that those differences are responsible for generating incorrect inferences. In a quantitative study, this typically amounts to recoding disputed cases and repeating the core statistical models to determine whether the results change substantially. 16 Not only are the original coding decisions laid bare, but it is also straightforward to determine whether the study’s inferences depend on them. This high level of transparency — and the external quality-control it enables – is one of the most attractive features of quantitative research designs. Transparency is useful not because it produces scholarly consensus, but because it allows opposing sides to identify the precise nature and implications of their disagreements.

Consider, for example, the 1990 exchange in World Politics between Paul Huth and Bruce Russett on one hand, and Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein on the other. highlights the similarities between this debate and the present exchange, separated by almost twenty-five years, as evidence that quantitative analysis has made little progress in understanding nuclear issues. We see the issue differently. Both debates, in fact, illustrate a key strength of quantitative analysis: the ability to assess the importance of individual coding decisions. In the World Politics debate, Lebow and Stein objected that Huth and Russett had improperly coded many cases in their deterrence dataset, much as Gavin has disputed some of our classifications But Huth and Russett responded by noting that “even if Lebow and Stein’s recodings of our cases are accepted, the statistical and substantive findings of our past research remain fundamentally unchanged.”18 Similarly, as we report in our articles, our central findings do not change even if we accept Gavin’s arguments. In a quantitative study, simply showing that certain coding decisions can be contested is insufficient: one must also demonstrate that the core results depend on those decisions. While Gavin is correct to argue that coding cases is a tricky exercise, quantitative approaches allow us to evaluate the substantive importance of questionable coding decisions. Qualitative research, by contrast, is not always so amenable to external oversight. Whereas quantitative models demand clear coding decisions, qualitative research designs can be much more forgiving of ambiguous classifications. Gavin’s critique of our coding decisions illustrates this problem: while he criticizes the way we have coded particular cases in our datasets, he offers no clear alternative coding scheme. He raises questions about our coding decisions, but then declines to answer them. This ambiguity allows him to have his cake and eat it too: he can criticize our classifications without being liable for his own. Uncertainty, of course, is inherent to any scientific enterprise, and quantification is sometimes criticized for presenting a false illusion of certainty. To be clear, quantitative research cannot create certainty where the evidence is ambiguous. Just because a case is coded a certain way does not mean that the broader scholarly community (or even the researcher) has reached a consensus about that case. Likewise, the problem of ambiguity is not inherent to qualitative research: nothing intrinsic to historical research precludes scholars from laying their assumptions bare. But by compelling scholars to take a clear initial position on coding cases, the process of quantification allows scholars to debate each decision and evaluate whether potentially questionable choices are decisive in generating a study’s core results. This transparency is central to peer evaluation and, ultimately, scientific advancement.

A third advantage of statistical analysis is that it is designed to cope with probabilistic events. In the physical world, causal relationships are often deterministic: a certain amount of force imparted to an object will cause that object to move a certain distance. So long as conditions are kept constant, this result will obtain again and again, no matter how many times the experiment is repeated. In the social world, however, we are not blessed with such ironclad reliability. No two individual people are exactly identical, and even in carefully controlled environments it is rare to find a “force” that begets exactly the same effect on all people with perfect regularity. The causal relationships we observe are not deterministic – they are probabilistic, occurring with imperfect regularity.19

The ‘force’ of interest to us in our articles is, broadly, the possession of nuclear weapons. When this force is applied to crisis bargaining situations, what happens? Implicit in this question, however, is a question about probability: when nuclear weapons are inserted into a crisis bargaining situation, what is the likelihood of a particular outcome? Kroenig’s study, for example, asks: in a nuclear crisis, what is the likelihood that the nuclear-superior side will achieve its basic goals? Likewise, Sechser and Fuhrmann seek to discover the likelihood that a coercive demand made by a nuclear-armed state will be met. The central difficulty with posing our research questions in this way is that we cannot actually see the thing we care about: probability is inherently unobservable. We cannot examine a crisis and directly observe the probability of one side capitulating; we can only observe whether it actually capitulated.20 How, then, can we begin to answer our original research question?

Quantitative research is designed for precisely this sort of situation. If we cannot directly observe whether we are holding a loaded six-sided die, for example, we can throw it many times, observe the result, and infer the underlying probability from the results. Throwing the die just one time would tell us little, since all six numbers are theoretically possible even if the die were loaded. Only after observing the pattern of results across many events can we determine the underlying probabilities of each number turning up.

The single-case approach Gavin proposes cannot cope with probabilistic events as effectively. Knowing that one smoker happened to die of cancer does not tell us much about the broader health effects of tobacco. Based on this single data point, we might conclude that smoking leads to cancer 100 percent of the time. Yet we know this to be false: there are heavy smokers who remain cancer-free, just as there are nonsmokers who still get cancer. The true relationship between smoking and cancer emerges only after looking at a large number of cases. Similarly, even if we determine that nuclear weapons appeared to “matter” from 1958-1962, we cannot safely infer from this observation that nuclear weapons influence crisis outcomes in general. Any relationships observed during this particular period could have been due to any number of chance events that might be unlikely to recur. Studying just one episode allows us to say much about that episode but little about the underlying relationships.

Fourth, statistical analysis allows researchers to uncover causal relationships in social phenomena even if the participants themselves do not record, record accurately, or understand these relationships. Gavin’s approach, in contrast, requires finding primary source documents and learning what participants themselves believed to be the relevant causal factors at play. His essay conveys an exceptionally narrow conception of how one should gather knowledge about the effect of nuclear weapons on international politics. Gavin believes that if one wants to “really understand” the effect of nuclear weapons on international politics,21 archival research is “the only way to get real insight.”22 While we agree that studying primary documents has great value, we believe that there are many other ways to generate useful knowledge, and that a narrow focus on primary documents can often lead a scholar astray.