# 1AC R5 St Marks

## 1AC

### FW

#### Ethics must begin a priori

#### 1] Empirical uncertainty: evil demon could deceive us and inability to know others experience make empiricism unreliable—outweighs since it would be escapable because people could say they don’t experience the same.

#### 2] Constitutive authority: I could infinitely question any ethical theory by asking “why” but only practical reason solves because asking “why” concedes the authority of reason.

#### 3] Naturalistic fallacy: experience only tells us what is, not what ought to be, but it’s impossible to derive an ought from descriptive premises so there needs to be a priori premises.

#### 4] Action theory: reason is key to evaluate intent and unify actions – otherwise we could infinitely divide actions. For example, if I was brewing tea, I could break up that action into multiple actions. If we were never able to unify action, we could never classify actions as moral or immoral since those actions would be divisible.

#### 5] Principle of explosion is true.

**Wikiwand**. “Principle of Explosion.” Wikiwand, 0AD, [www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle\_of\_explosion](http://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion). //Massa

A screenshot of a cell phone

Description automatically generated

The principle of explosion (Latin: ex falso (sequitur) quodlibet (EFQ), "from falsehood, anything (follows)", or ex contradictione (sequitur) quodlibet (ECQ), **"from contradiction, anything (follows)"), or the principle of**[**Pseudo-Scotus**](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Pseudo-Scotus), is the law of [classical logic](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Classical_logic), [intuitionistic logic](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Intuitionistic_logic) and similar logical systems, according to which any statement can be proven from a contradiction.[[1]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote1) That is, once a contradiction has been asserted, any proposition (including their negations) can be inferred from it. This is known as **deductive explosion**.[[2]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote2)[[3]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote3) The proof of this principle was first given by 12th century French philosopher [William of Soissons](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/William_of_Soissons).[[4]](https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Principle_of_explosion#citenote4)

As a demonstration of the principle, **consider two contradictory statements – "All lemons are yellow" and "Not all lemons are yellow"**, and suppose that both are true. If that is the case, **anything can be proven**, e.g., **the assertion that "unicorns exist", by using the following argument:**

1. We know that **"All lemons are yellow"**, as it **has been assumed to be true.**
2. **Therefore**, the two-part statement **"All lemons are yellow OR unicorns exist” must also be true**, since the first part is true.
3. However, **since we know that "Not all lemons are yellow"** (as this has been assumed), **the first part is false, and hence the second part must be true, i.e., unicorns exist.**

#### Either the aff is winning OR they get the ballot is a statement where denying the first part that the aff is winning proves the second part that they should get the ballot.

#### 6] No objective reality.

MIT ’19 (Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page; Covers latest ideas from blog post about arXiv; 03/12/2019; “Emerging Technology from the arXiv archive page”; <https://www.technologyreview.com/2019/03/12/136684/a-quantum-experiment-suggests-theres-no-such-thing-as-objective-reality/>; *MIT Technology Review*; accessed: 11/19/2020; MohulA)

Back in 1961, the Nobel Prize–winning physicist Eugene Wigner outlined a thought experiment that demonstrated one of the lesser-known paradoxes of quantum mechanics. The experiment shows how the strange nature of the universe allows two observers—say, Wigner and Wigner’s friend—to experience different realities. Since then, physicists have used the “Wigner’s Friend” thought experiment to explore the nature of measurement and to argue over whether objective facts can exist. That’s important because scientists carry out experiments to establish objective facts. But if they experience different realities, the argument goes, how can they agree on what these facts might be? That’s provided some entertaining fodder for after-dinner conversation, but Wigner’s thought experiment has never been more than that—just a thought experiment. Last year, however, physicists noticed that recent advances in quantum technologies have made it possible to reproduce the Wigner’s Friend test in a real experiment. In other words, it ought to be possible to create different realities and compare them in the lab to find out whether they can be reconciled. And today, Massimiliano Proietti at Heriot-Watt University in Edinburgh and a few colleagues say they have performed this experiment for the first time: they have created different realities and compared them. Their conclusion is that Wigner was correct—these realities can be made irreconcilable so that it is impossible to agree on objective facts about an experiment. Wigner’s original thought experiment is straightforward in principle. It begins with a single polarized photon that, when measured, can have either a horizontal polarization or a vertical polarization. But before the measurement, according to the laws of quantum mechanics, the photon exists in both polarization states at the same time—a so-called superposition. Wigner imagined a friend in a different lab measuring the state of this photon and storing the result, while Wigner observed from afar. Wigner has no information about his friend’s measurement and so is forced to assume that the photon and the measurement of it are in a superposition of all possible outcomes of the experiment. Wigner can even perform an experiment to determine whether this superposition exists or not. This is a kind of interference experiment showing that the photon and the measurement are indeed in a superposition. From Wigner’s point of view, this is a “fact”—the superposition exists. And this fact suggests that a measurement cannot have taken place. But this is in stark contrast to the point of view of the friend, who has indeed measured the photon’s polarization and recorded it. The friend can even call Wigner and say the measurement has been done (provided the outcome is not revealed). So the two realities are at odds with each other. “This calls into question the objective status of the facts established by the two observers,” say Proietti and co. That’s the theory, but last year Caslav Brukner, at the University of Vienna in Austria, came up with a way to re-create the Wigner’s Friend experiment in the lab by means of techniques involving the entanglement of many particles at the same time. The breakthrough that Proietti and co have made is to carry this out. “In a state-of-the-art 6-photon experiment, we realize this extended Wigner’s friend scenario,” they say. They use these six entangled photons to create two alternate realities—one representing Wigner and one representing Wigner’s friend. Wigner’s friend measures the polarization of a photon and stores the result. Wigner then performs an interference measurement to determine if the measurement and the photon are in a superposition. The experiment produces an unambiguous result. It turns out that both realities can coexist even though they produce irreconcilable outcomes, just as Wigner predicted. That raises some fascinating questions that are forcing physicists to reconsider the nature of reality. The idea that observers can ultimately reconcile their measurements of some kind of fundamental reality is based on several assumptions. The first is that universal facts actually exist and that observers can agree on them. But there are other assumptions too. One is that observers have the freedom to make whatever observations they want. And another is that the choices one observer makes do not influence the choices other observers make—an assumption that physicists call locality. If there is an objective reality that everyone can agree on, then these assumptions all hold. But Proietti and co’s result suggests that objective reality does not exist. In other words, the experiment suggests that one or more of the assumptions—the idea that there is a reality we can agree on, the idea that we have freedom of choice, or the idea of locality—must be wrong. Of course, there is another way out for those hanging on to the conventional view of reality. This is that there is some other loophole that the experimenters have overlooked. Indeed, physicists have tried to close loopholes in similar experiments for years, although they concede that it may never be possible to close them all. Nevertheless, the work has important implications for the work of scientists. “The scientific method relies on facts, established through repeated measurements and agreed upon universally, independently of who observed them,” say Proietti and co. And yet in the same paper, they undermine this idea, perhaps fatally. The next step is to go further: to construct experiments creating increasingly bizarre alternate realities that cannot be reconciled. Where this will take us is anybody’s guess. But Wigner, and his friend, would surely not be surprised.

#### Means action under one framework doesn’t preclude another. I can still have an obligation under the categorical imperative, even if the aff is bad under Hobbes so framing issues don’t exclude the offense.

#### That justifies universality – a priori principles apply to everyone since they are independent of experience and any non-universalizable norm justifies someone’s ability to impede on your ends i.e. if I want to eat ice cream, I must recognize that others may affect my pursuit of that end.

#### Thus, the standard is consistency with the categorical imperative.

#### Prefer:

#### 1] Resource disparities—focusing on evidence privileges debaters with the most prep excluding lone-wolfs. A debater under my framework can easily be won without any prep since minimal evidence is required. That pre-req to accessing the activity.

#### 2] Practical identities – we find our lives worth living under practical identities such as student but that presupposes agency.

**Korsgaard 92** CHRISTINE M. Korsgaard 92 [I am a Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, where I have taught since 1991. From July 1996 through June 2002, I was Chair of the Department of Philosophy. (The current chair is Sean Kelly.) From 2004-2012, I was Director of Graduate Studies in Philosophy. (The current DGS is Mark Richard.) Before coming here, I held positions at Yale, the University of California at Santa Barbara, and the University of Chicago, as well as visiting positions at Berkeley and UCLA. I served as President of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association in 2008-2009, and held a Mellon Distinguished Achievement Award from 2006-2009. I work on moral philosophy and its history, practical reason, the nature of agency, personal identity, normativity, and the ethical relations between human beings and the other animals], “The Sources of Normativity”, THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES Delivered at Clare Hall, Cambridge University 16-17 Nov 1992, BE

The Solution: Those who think that the human mind is internally luminous and transparent to itself think that the term “self-consciousness” is appropriate because what we get in human consciousness is a direct encounter with the self. Those who think that the human mind has a reflective structure use the term too, but for a different reason. The reflective structure of the mind is a source of “self-consciousness” because it forces us to have a conception of ourselves. As Kant argues, this is a fact about what it is like to be reflectively conscious and it does not prove the existence of a metaphysical self. From a third person point of view, outside of the deliberative standpoint, it may look as if what happens when someone makes a choice is that the strongest of his conflicting desires wins. But that isn’t the way it is for you when you deliberate. When you deliberate, it is as if there were something over and above all of your desires, something that is you, and that chooses which desire to act on. This means that the principle or law by which you determine your actions is one that you regard as being expressive of yourself. To identify with such a principle or law is to be, in St. Paul’s famous phrase, a law to yourself.6 An agent might think of herself as a Citizen in the Kingdom of Ends. Or she might think of herself as a member of a family or an ethnic group or a nation. She might think of herself as the steward of her own interests, and then she will be an egoist. Or she might think of herself as the slave of her passions, and then she will be a wanton. And how she thinks of herself will determine whether it is the law of the Kingdom of Ends, or the law of some smaller group, or the law of the egoist, or the law of the wanton that is the law that she is to herself. The conception of one’s identity in question here is not a theoretical one, a view about what as a matter of inescapable scientific fact you are. It is better understood as a description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking. So I will call this a conception of your practical identity. Practical identity is a complex matter and for the average person there will be a jumble of such conceptions. You are a human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, someone’s friend, and so on. And all of these identities give rise to reasons and obligations. Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.

#### 3] Performativity—freedom is the key to argumentation—willing we abide by their theory presupposes we own ourselves. Thus, it is logically incoherent to justify a standard without first willing that we can pursue ends free from others.

#### 4] The rules of logic claim that the only time a statement is invalid is if the antecedent is true, but the consequent is false.

SEP [Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.] “An Introduction to Philosophy.” Stanford University. <https://web.stanford.edu/~bobonich/dictionary/dictionary.html> TG Massa

Conditional statement: an “if p, then q” compound statement (ex. If I throw this ball into the air, it will come down); p is called the antecedent, and q is the consequent. A conditional asserts that if its antecedent is true, its consequent is also true; any conditional with a true antecedent and a false consequent must be false.  For any other combination of true and false antecedents and consequents, the conditional statement is true.

#### Implications:

**A] Neg a prioris affirm – denying the assumptions of a statement proves it valid – the aff is a set of conditionals since the offense being true relies on the framework**

**B] If the aff is winning, they get the ballot is a tacit ballot conditional which means denying the premise proves the conclusion that I should get the ballot.**

**5] Presumption and permissibility affirm –**

**A] Statements are true before false since if I told you my name, you’d believe me.**

**B] Epistemics – we wouldn’t be able to start a strand of reasoning since we’d have to question that reason.**

**C] Illogical – presuming statements false is illogical since you can’t say things like P and ~P are both wrong.**

**D] Presuming obligations is logically safer since it’s better to be supererogatory than fail to meet an obligation.**

**E] Presuming statements false is impossible since we can’t operate in a world where we don’t trust anything.**

**F] To negate means to deny the truth of, which means if there isn’t offense to deny the truth of you should affirm.**

**G] Otherwise we’d have to have a proactive justification to do things like drink water.**

**H] If anything is permissible, then definitionally so is the aff since there is nothing that prevents us from doing it.**

#### 6] There are infinite worlds, the aff is logical in one which is sufficient.

**Vaidman 2** Vaidman, Lev, 3-24-2002, "Many-Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)," No Publication, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/>

-MWI: Multiple Worlds Interpretation

**The reason for adopting the MWI is that it avoids the collapse of the quantum wave.** (Other non-collapse theories are not better than MWI for various reasons, e.g., nonlocality of Bohmian mechanics; and the disadvantage of all of them is that they have some additional structure.) **The collapse postulate is a physical law that differs from all known physics in two aspects: it is genuinely random and it involves some kind of action at a distance**. According to the collapse postulate the outcome of a **quantum experiment is not determined by the initial conditions** of the Universe prior to the experiment: **only the probabilities are governed by the initial state**. Moreover, Bell 1964 has shown that there cannot be a compatible local-variables theory that will make deterministic predictions**. There is no experimental evidence in favor of collapse and against the MWI.**

#### 7] Only universalizable reason can effectively explain the perspectives of agents – that’s the best method for combatting oppression.

Farr 02 Arnold Farr (prof of phil @ UKentucky, focusing on German idealism, philosophy of race, postmodernism, psychoanalysis, and liberation philosophy). “Can a Philosophy of Race Afford to Abandon the Kantian Categorical Imperative?” JOURNAL of SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY, Vol. 33 No. 1, Spring 2002, 17–32.

One of the most popular criticisms of Kant’s moral philosophy is that it is too formalistic.13 That is, the universal nature of the categorical imperative leaves it devoid of content. Such a principle is useless since moral decisions are made by concrete individuals in a concrete, historical, and social situation. This type of criticism lies behind Lewis Gordon’s rejection of any attempt to ground an antiracist position on Kantian principles. The rejection of universal principles for the sake of emphasizing the historical embeddedness of the human agent is widespread in recent philosophy and social theory. I will argue here on Kantian grounds that although a distinction between the universal and the concrete is a valid distinction, the unity of the two is required for an understanding of human agency. The attack on Kantian formalism began with Hegel’s criticism of the Kantian philosophy.14 The list of contemporary theorists who follow Hegel’s line of criticism is far too long to deal with in the scope of this paper. Although these theorists may approach the problem of Kantian formalism from a variety of angles, the spirit of their criticism is basically the same: The universality of the categorical imperative is an abstraction from one’s empirical conditions. Kant is often accused of making the moral agent an abstract, empty, noumenal subject. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Kantian subject is an embodied, empirical, concrete subject. However, this concrete subject has a dual nature. Kant claims in the Critique of Pure Reason as well as in the Grounding that human beings have an intelligible and empirical character.15 It is impossible to understand and do justice to Kant’s moral theory without taking seriously the relation between these two characters. The very concept of morality is impossible without the tension between the two. By “empirical character” Kant simply means that we have a sensual nature. We are physical creatures with physical drives or desires. The very fact that I cannot simply satisfy my desires without considering the rightness or wrongness of my actions suggests that my empirical character must be held in check by something, or else I behave like a Freudian id. My empiri- cal character must be held in check by my intelligible character, which is the legislative activity of practical reason. It is through our intelligible character that we formulate principles that keep our empirical impulses in check. The categorical imperative is the supreme principle of morality that is constructed by the moral agent in his/her moment of self-transcendence. What I have called self-transcendence may be best explained in the following passage by Onora O’Neill: In restricting our maxims to those that meet the test of the categorical imperative we refuse to base our lives on maxims that necessarily make our own case an exception. The reason why a universilizability criterion is morally signiﬁcant is that it makes our own case no special exception (G, IV, 404). In accepting the Categorical Imperative we accept the moral reality of other selves, and hence the possibility (not, note, the reality) of a moral community. The Formula of Universal Law enjoins no more than that we act only on maxims that are open to others also.16 O’Neill’s description of the universalizability criterion includes the notion of self-transcendence that I am working to explicate here to the extent that like self-transcendence, universalizable moral principles require that the individ- ual think beyond his or her own particular desires. The individual is not allowed to exclude others as rational moral agents who have the right to act as he acts in a given situation. For example, if I decide to use another person merely as a means for my own end I must recognize the other person’s right to do the same to me. I cannot consistently will that I use another as a means only and will that I not be used in the same manner by another. Hence, the universalizability criterion is a principle of consistency and a principle of inclusion. That is, in choosing my maxims I attempt to include the perspective of other moral agents.

#### Interpretation: The negative must concede the aff framework if it isn’t morally repugnant and the advocacy is topical and disclosed

#### Violation: It’s preemptive

#### 1] Time skew- winning the framework moots 6 minutes of 1AC offense and forces a 1AR restart- outweighs on quantifiability and reversibility- we can’t get back time lost and it’s the only way to measure abuse.

#### 2] Topic Ed- every debate would just be a framework debate which crowds out core debates about the topic- outweighs- A] Timeframe- we only have 2 months to debate the topic B] Inclusion- Phil and K literature is dense and requires prior knowledge that excludes novices while topic literature is less esoteric C] Constitutivism- the only thing intrinsic to debate is the topic D] Portability- topics are chosen to have relevance so only debates can generate skills.

#### Drop the debater and competing interps- the constitutive purpose of 1AC theory is to deter a practice and anything else lets them get away with it.

#### No RVIs on 1AC preemptive violations- allows them to read 7 minutes of a CI and autowins every debate- the whole 1AC can’t be the shell because they can just choose to not violate.

### Offense

#### Resolved: The member nations of the World Trade Organization ought to reduce intellectual property protections for medicines—we’ll defend the resolution as a general principle so PICs and CPs don’t negate since they don’t deny the general principle.

#### The aff is good under a standard of pragmatic deliberation since it requires deliberation over revising TRIPs.

#### IPP minimizes the opportunity of innovation and limits individual freedom through creating monopolies. They also limit the use of tangible objects such as medicines for good purposes.

Cernea and Uszkai 12 Cernea, Mihail-Valentin, and Radu Uszkai. *The Clash between Global Justice and Pharmaceutical Patents: A Critical Analysis*. 2012, the-clash-between-global-justice-and-drug-patents-a-critical-analysis.pdf. SJEP

To make this point clearer, we regard property as an ethical institution which emerged in the context of reiterated conflict between agents for tangible goods. A useful analogy would be, for example, the particular way in which David Hume discusses the emergence of justice in the context of scarcity in which agents pursue their own interests4 . As a result, the purpose of property rights would be that of avoiding or minimizing the possibility of conflict and that of increasing the costs of free-riding or trespassing. Let’s take the following example which will illustrate better our point. Assume that X is a philosophy student and has a copy of Immanuel Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. Y is a college of him but he does not have the book. They both have to write an essay on Kant’s categorical imperative. Because Y does not have the book, let’s assume that he decides, whether by the use of coercion or fraud to take his book. As a result, the theft leaves X without his property because tangible goods are rivalrous in consumption. Both student can’t, at the same time but in a different place read about Kant’s categorical imperative from the same copy. Now a different example: suppose X invents a new way of harvesting corn and Y harvests his corn accordingly. This situation is quite different in comparison to the case we presented earlier, because Y does not leaves X without either his new harvesting mechanisms which he created but neither without the idea behind the mechanism. It would be hard to say that Y stole something from X because the consumption of intangible goods such as ideas does not have the same rivalrous property as a copy of a book written by Kant. Actually, the existence of the patent system fosters the scarcity of ideas. In this context patents represent unjustified state-granted monopolies. Moreover, intellectual property rights have another profound immoral consequence: it limits the use of tangible objects which we acquired fully in line with market rules.

### Underview

#### 1] 1AR theory is legit—anything else means infinite abuse—drop the debater, competing interps, highest layer—1AR is too short to make up for the time trade-off—no RVIs or 2NR theory and paradigm issues– 6 min 2NR means they can brute force me every time.

#### 2] Neg a priori’s do not negate

#### A] they all assume I didn’t already meet my burden after the ac,

#### B] Resolved is defined as settle or find a solution to (a problem, dispute, or contentious matter) so the past tense, resolved, grammatically means the resolution has been resolved so it’s true.

#### C] A priori’s 1st – they question the validity of logic which all your arguments are predicated upon

#### 3] If I win one layer, vote aff

#### A] they have 7 minutes to uplayer and nullify my offense

#### B] forces engagement with the aff since they have to defend all arguments which means they read better ones.

#### C] Evaluate the debate after the 1AC – key to preventing the 1N from reading unfair arguments. Responses presume the debate hasn't already been evaluated.

#### 4] All neg interps are counter interps since the aff takes an implicit stance on every issue which means any neg theory interp requires an RVI to become offensive.

#### Evaluate the theory debate after the 1AR since a) the 6 min 2n can dump on theory making the 3 min 2AR impossible b) we both get 1 speech on theory.

#### 5] RVI on NC theory – you can read arguments such as T that are exclusively neg so I need them to compensate and weighing is structurally unfair since the 7-4-6-3 time skew means that the neg can just dump on weighing and the 2ar becomes impossible.

#### Only vote on fully verifiable interps because otherwise people lose on theory for no reason which kills the purpose of norm setting.

#### 6] Reject neg fairness concerns since

#### A] 13-7 time skew and 6-minute collapse gives the negative the strategic advantage and means the AFF must split 1AR time.

#### B] The NC has the ability to uplayer and restart the round and have time to generate offense that matters.

#### C] You have access to more positions due to generic backfiles and bidirectional shells which means neg theory is impossible to avoid.

#### D] neg reactivity means you can just perfectly react to any of my advantages and then generate offense – if anything it’ll be for 3 mins max which evens out the 1ar and 2n.

#### E] No neg analytics – I don’t have time to cover 100 blippy 1NC args since you can read 7 min of analytics and extend any of them to win. Answering this triggers, a contradiction since it relies on an analytic argument and those affirm since I spoke first and they were your fault for creating and you could’ve adapted.

#### 7] The role of the ballot is to determine the truth or falsity of the resolution

#### Prefer on semantics - affirm[[1]](#footnote-1) and negate[[2]](#footnote-2) are defined as to prove true and deny the truth of which means it’s constitutive and jurisdictional – that’s a meta constraint on anything else since the judge voting aff if they affirm better and neg the contrary proves that it’s an independent voter and otherwise they could just hack against or for you which means hack against them if they contest it and it also controls the internal link to fairness since that’s definitionally unfair. And all statements appeal to truth – for example 2+2 =4 or ducks lay eggs are all statements of truth, the resolution is also an appeal to truth, logic is a metaconstraint on argumentation

#### 8] Affirming is harder

#### A] Neg is reactive – they tailor the 1NC before the round to exploit the aff’s weakness. Not reciprocal – affs enter the round unaware.

#### Also means no neg weighing – it supercharges the abuse since they can collapse in the 2NR and outweigh any turns I make.

#### B] Aff extends twice – takes valuable time from already most time-pressed speeches.

#### Also means the neg must extend all of their arguments TWICE verbatim in the 2NR to compensate – means if neg gets weighing, they must weigh prefiat args against side bias since otherwise I’m just making the ground even.

#### 9] Accept aff interps and definitions

#### A] causes regress since we can infinitely debate what something means but the aff speaks first which means they should define it

#### B] moots 6 mins of the aff if you alter the way arguments function.

#### C] let me recontextualize their arguments since they can collapse for 6 minutes on something I misunderstood in the 1ar to end the round since the 2ar can’t answer.

#### 10] No neg meta-theory – I only have time to check abuse 1 time but you can do it in the nc and 2n, uplayering my attempt means we never get to the best norm.

#### This means reject any reason why an aff spike is bad since they claim aff theory is unfair.

#### 11] No theory or Ks on spikes – moots AC offense since I don’t have anything to leverage in the 1AR

#### 12] Procedural fairness is a voter and outweighs

#### a] it’s an intrinsic good – debate is a game and equity is necessary to sustain the activity,

#### b] probability – debate can’t alter subjectivity, but it can rectify skews,

#### c] internal link turns every impact – a limited debate promotes research and engagement

#### d] All your arguments concede fairness since you assume they will be esvaluated fairly.

1. Dictionary.com – maintain as true, Merriam Webster – to say that something is true, Vocabulary.com – to affirm something is to confirm that it is true, Oxford dictionaries – accept the validity of, Thefreedictionary – assert to be true [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/negate>, <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.vocabulary.com/dictionary/negate>, <http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/negate> [↑](#footnote-ref-2)